
Third World Quarterly

1987 Index



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Notes on the Index

The Index contains three parts:

- (i) Subject Index
- (ii) Geographical Index
- (iii) Title Index of books reviewed, with authors' names, and (in brackets) reviewers' names

The following abbreviations are used throughout the Index:

- E (Editorial)
- FR (Feature Review)
- LFR (Literary Feature Review)
- LP (Literary Profile)
- LR (Literary Review)
- M (North-South Monitor)
- R (Review)

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State of exile: the African National Congress of South Africa, 1976–86

The environment of exile politics is usually viewed as hazardous, sterile, corrosive and demoralising. Political groups which are forced out of their domestic terrain are understood to be especially vulnerable; loneliness, frustration, inactivity, hardship and insecurity generate ideological dissent, personality conflicts, and escapist delusions. Exile politicians are forced into a dependent relationship with their hosts and patrons, whose hospitality and generosity may be conditional and subject to capricious change. Survival and success in such an environment may depend on skills and talents quite different from those developed in the history of the movement before its departure from home. It can require ideological innovations which risk distancing it from its original social constituency. Exile is usually perceived as an experience which is inherently detrimental and problematic.

The understanding of exile as a term of trial for political organisations has been consolidated by the study of movements which have been especially badly affected by their displacement.¹ Outstanding in the studies of African exile politics is John Marcum's work based on the history of Angolan nationalist organisations.² Marcum's analysis of the difficulties of exile has influenced many other academic commentaries.³ Those historians of exile movements which have prospered or flourished have understood their success as being achieved *despite* the pitfalls of exile, usually as the result of the reinsertion of leadership and followers back within their native territory.⁴

¹ See, for example, Sheridan Johns, 'Obstacles to guerrilla warfare: a South Africa case study', *Journal of Modern African Studies*, 11(2) 1974; Kenneth Grundy, *Guerrilla Struggle in Africa*, New York: Grossmann, 1971; Richard Gibson, *African Liberation Movements*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1971.

² John Marcum, 'The exile condition and revolutionary effectiveness. Southern African liberation movements', in Christian Potholm and Richard Dale (eds), *Southern Africa in Perspective*, New York: Free Press, 1979; John Marcum, *The Angolan Revolution: Volume II: Exile Politics and Guerrilla Warfare*, Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 1978.

³ Including my own. See my analysis on the exile Pan-Africanist Congress in Tom Lodge, *Black Politics in South Africa since 1945*, London: Longman, 1983, pp 305–17.

⁴ For this perspective see: Barry Munslow, *Mozambique: The Revolution and its Origins*, London: Longman, 1983; Basil Davidson, *In the Eye of the Storm*, London: Longman, 1972.

The approach in this article is rather different. Here the subject is an organisation whose bureaucracy, structures, and disciplined following exists outside its country of origin yet which has not only survived exile but has, it will be argued, been strengthened by the experience. The African National Congress has been an exile body for over two decades. Its survival during the first phase of exile during which it was unable to initiate any significant political or military activity within South Africa has been described in an earlier essay by this author.⁵ Our concern here will be with its development in the post-1976 phase, in the ten years since the political reawakening inside South Africa represented by the Soweto uprising. The ANC's activities inside the country since 1976 will not be detailed here. They lie outside the focus of this article which is with the ANC's external presence and functions. It is sufficient to state that accompanying the development of the exile movement over the last ten years and contributing very significantly to its buoyant morale and diplomatic impact has been the revival of an internal guerrilla insurgency. The guerrilla warfare, though still at a very modest level, has been steadily increasing its scope and effectiveness in quite exceptionally difficult circumstances. Tables 1 and 2 provide an indication of the present character of guerrilla activity. The insurgent campaign has succeeded in re-establishing the ANC as the predominant force in black South African politics even if its support is still mainly in the form of ideological inclination and emotional sentiment rather than organised membership.⁶

The apparent self-confidence and vitality of the ANC exiles at present is certainly partly attributable to the ANC's success in re-establishing a presence within the townships of South Africa. But, this article contends, this is not the whole story. The terrain of exile is not wholly disadvantageous for the development of a political movement. It can provide protection, security, powerful forms of external support, factors and conditions which facilitate the development of a form and

⁵ Lodge, *Black Politics* . . . pp 296-304.

⁶ For details of the urban guerrilla campaign from 1977 to date Tom Lodge, 'The African National Congress in South Africa, 1976-1983: guerrilla war and armed propaganda', *Journal of Contemporary African Studies* (Pretoria) 3(1-2) 1983-4, pp 153-80; Tom Lodge, 'The ANC in 1982', in South African Research Service, *The South African Review I*, Johannesburg: Ravan, 1984; Tom Lodge, 'The ANC in 1983', *South African Review II*, Johannesburg: Ravan, 1984; Tom Lodge, 'Maychome!—Let us go to war! from Nkomati to Kabwe, the ANC, January 1984-June 1985', *South African Review III*, Johannesburg: Ravan, 1985; Tom Lodge, 'The Second Consultative Conference of the ANC', *South Africa International* (Johannesburg) 16(2), October 1985, pp 80-97; Tom Lodge, 'The ANC, Kabwe and after', *International Affairs Bulletin* (Johannesburg) 10(2), September 1986.

STATE OF EXILE

Table 1: Guerrilla activity, July 1985 to June 1986

	1 Jul 1985 31 Dec 1985	1 Jan 1986 30 Jun 1986
Attacks on police or police facilities; police/Umkhonto clashes:	25	50
Attacks on SADF personnel or buildings:	6	0
Attacks on homeland politicians, community councillors, and other individuals:	22	9
Landmine explosions:	6	11
Limpet mine attacks on economic infrastructure (mainly Escom substations):	9	26
Limpet mine attacks on railway facilities:	2	3
Limpet mine attacks or bombings on commercial premises used by civilians during business hours:	1	4
Limpet mine or bomb attacks in or outside hotels or restaurants during business hours:	0	4
Gunfire attacks on commercial premises during business hours:	0	1
Grenades thrown in crowded business districts:	1	0
Limpets in central business districts out of business hours:	15	3
Limpets in or outside recreational facilities out of hours:		2
Attacks on government or public buildings:	1	0
Others/unspecified	0	5
TOTAL	88	118

Source: Both Tables 1 and 2 are compiled by the author from statistics based upon press reports, official statements and events mentioned in political trials. The figures may be slightly conservative because of government suppression of information.

quality of organisation unattainable in the precarious circumstances of opposition politics within the homeland.

What follows is a sketch of the bureaucracy which the ANC has created in a foreign environment. After examining the workings and functions

South Africa) and the rest administrative or educational.¹³ ANC sources claim Umkhonto recruitment has increased very dramatically since September 1984¹⁴ as an effect of the exodus of refugees from South Africa. In May 1984 the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) distributed funds through the ANC for about 9,000 South African refugees,¹⁵ so the higher estimates of ANC strength appear quite reasonable. Umkhonto we Sizwe is clearly the largest structure within the exile organisation and it seems sensible to begin any survey of the ANC's bureaucracy with an examination of Umkhonto's essential characteristics.

For the majority of the men and women who join the ANC's external organisation, joining the ANC means joining an army. Much of this army is accommodated in five training camps run by the ANC in Angola, two near Luanda, and the others in the north and north-east. Umkhonto recruits have been trained in Angola since 1977, before then most of the ANC's military instruction was conducted in Tanzania.¹⁶ Umkhonto guerrillas often spend two years in Angola and a chosen elite supplement their basic training with advanced courses in the Soviet Union and the German Democratic Republic.

From the testimony of state witnesses and defectors at political trials a fairly coherent picture of the contents of the military training programme has emerged. ANC recruits join the organisation in territories neighbouring South Africa—most frequently Botswana or Swaziland—and after a screening process which is intended to weed out police agents they are offered the choice of immediate military instruction or the completion of their academic education.¹⁷ Only in 1985, at the Kabwe Conference, was experience of the military camps made compulsory for all ANC members. Prospective guerrillas after their

¹³ Stephen Davis, *Season of War: Insurgency in South Africa, 1977–1980*, Medford, Mass: Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University, 1982, p 207.

¹⁴ Howard Barrell, 'Exiles swell ANC ranks', March 1986. Barrell cites 'reliable estimates' of 7,000 for the size of the Umkhonto trained forces *before* the exodus.

¹⁵ *Cape Times* (Cape Town), 11 May 1984. Not all recipients of UNHCR funds though the ANC need necessarily be ANC recruits. The statistic merely provides an indication of the scale of the refugee community. In 1986 the UNHCR provided \$10 million to the ANC 'to take care of displaced people' (Steve Mufson, *New Republic*, August 1986, p 22).

¹⁶ See John D Nelson, *Some External Aspects of Internal Conflict Within South Africa*, PhD dissertation, George Washington University, 1975, p 193. Umkhonto's Tanzanian camp today accommodates only trained men.

¹⁷ Captured ANC activists as well as defectors sometimes claim that they were beguiled into joining the ANC with promises of scholarships and then compelled to join Umkhonto. Such allegations have become less common; this may reflect ANC recruiting successes and the wider acceptance by black South Africans of the legitimacy of political violence.

induction into the organisation and a few educational sessions concerning ideological essentials, are flown from Lusaka where they are placed in a reception camp. Here they receive introductory lessons in South African history and politics, lectures on explosives, map reading, and military tactics, as well as physical drilling and exercise sessions. Weapon handling begins in a second camp; recruits are taught to handle automatic rifles, RPG 7 rocket launchers, hand-grenades, as well as the light weaponry employed by the South African Defence Force. The instruction is usually supervised by Cubans¹⁸ and its quality is excellent, according to South African police sources.¹⁹ The trainees learn how to use explosives and deploy them in sabotage, they are taught the principles of clandestine organisation and communications, and they are instructed in guerrilla tactics as well as the military techniques employed in more conventional forms of warfare. The range of weaponry and equipment to which trainees are introduced is much wider than the variety actually used by Umkhonto in South Africa; apart from theoretical classes in the operation of heavy artillery, the Angolan trainees programme has included lessons on the use of land-mines since 1977²⁰ (eight years before such devices were introduced into South Africa) as well as radio communications.

After the completion of basic guerrilla training Umkhonto members are given more specialised courses, sometimes in a different camp: different programmes are arranged for rural and urban warfare, some people receive special training in ordnance and logistical support, and others (especially women)²¹ graduate as couriers. The more proficient are sent to Europe, often to the Ukraine in the Soviet Union where they learn to handle more complicated weaponry: Grad P rocket launchers,²² anti-tank weapons, mortars, and heavy machine guns—weapons which require a team to operate them and which are usually associated with mobile or conventional warfare rather than small-scale

¹⁸ According to one ANC defector, nine Cubans were present at one camp which otherwise had an ANC complement of 450. Testimony of Jeffrey Boshigo to the Subcommittee on Security and Terrorism of the United States Senate, 24 March 1982, mimeo (henceforth, Denton Committee hearings).

¹⁹ See for example statement by Lieutenant-Colonel Jack Buchner, cited in *The Star*, 13 May 1982.

²⁰ Boshigo testimony, *op. cit.* Denton Committee hearings. According to Ephraim Mfalapitsa, another witness in the Denton Committee hearings, the Umkhonto command intended to initiate a rural land mine offensive based from Botswana as early as 1981. Mfalapitsa's own defection apparently thwarted this.

²¹ The vast majority of Umkhonto cadres who have been tried in South African courts have been men but recent trials suggest the pattern is changing.

²² First used by the ANC in South Africa in an attack on Voortrekker-hoogte military base near Pretoria in 1981.

guerrilla operations. In the USSR they learn more sophisticated sabotage techniques as well as interrupting the curriculum with cultural excursions to collective farms, schools and factories.²³ Fully trained guerrillas are either absorbed straight away into operational duties or they are placed in holding camps and subjected to refresher courses.

Only a small proportion of trainees at any one time are involved in combat in South Africa. As yet it is a small-scale war; since the beginning of 1980 to mid-1986 the number of attacks carried out by Umkhonto totals less than five hundred. If each of these attacks was carried out by a different Umkhonto unit (which is not the case) then at most two to three thousand Umkhonto people would by 1986 have had field experience—a minor proportion of their numbers. How are the rest deployed? Placing large numbers of men in holding camps for long periods of inactivity is an almost certain recipe for low morale and indiscipline. Reports of demoralisation and mutiny in ANC camps have been infrequent since 1977,²⁴ the year of resumption of guerrilla operations. It is likely that a proportion of trained guerrillas are used in the logistical support given to combat units—Umkhonto is organised on the basis of a very compartmentalised division of labour.²⁵ The camps themselves require staffing and defending—Cubans and other non-South Africans provide technical expertise but much of the direct instruction in all branches of the programme is given by Umkhonto members. Other ANC facilities require defending, especially in frontline states. The training camps are supposed to provide their own food and each camp maintains a farm.²⁶ Then there is the possibility that those

²³ The numbers involved in Soviet and Eastern European training are quite large. Boshigo's group numbered sixty altogether and short training periods in Europe are a fairly common factor in the experiences of guerrillas who are later captured and put on trial in South Africa. For a general description of Soviet training facilities based on trial testimony see *The Star*, 17 May 1984.

²⁴ Camp mutinies in Tanzania and Angola were reported in 1984 and 1985 (*The Star*, 18 March 1985 and *Rand Daily Mail*, 23 April 1984) the one a reaction to the Nkomati Accord set-back by guerrillas impatient for action and the other related to dissatisfaction with living conditions. That there were reasons for rank-and-file dissatisfaction was obliquely acknowledged by Oliver Tambo ('We are a force', *Sechaba*, October 1984). However if discontent and tension was an endemic problem it would have been more apparent at the Kabwe conference of which we now have quite a detailed picture. No reports suggest camp demoralisation on the scale which existed in the late 1960s (see *The Star*, 'Big Troubles in ANC guerrilla camps', 22 December 1968) and which came to a head at the 1969 Morogoro Conference (for reference to tensions at the Morogoro Conference see Joe Slovo in *The African Communist* (95), 1983).

²⁵ See Davis, *op. cit.*, p. 368. As well as divisions with specialised military functions—ordnance, rural guerrilla activity, sabotage—different groups are assigned to financial, transport, and other administrative operations.

²⁶ *The Financial Mail* (Johannesburg) of 8 June 1984 reported the camps as agriculturally self-sufficient. Poor food has in the past been the most frequent source of morale and disciplinary problems. In 1967–9 Zambian-based diplomats claimed that Umkhonto units in local ANC camps conducted 'food raids' in the surrounding countryside (Nelson, p. 203).

guerrillas not involved in the South African theatre may be engaged alongside MPLA troops fighting UNITA forces in Angola itself. Both UNITA spokesmen and ANC defectors have alleged that the ANC plays a role in the Angolan conflict.²⁷ It would not be the first time Umkhonto soldiers have fought on foreign soil; ANC units participated in joint offensives with ZAPU in 1967–68 and again in 1978–80.²⁸

With the exception of those who go to Europe the direct influence on them of their East European and Cuban instructors is confined to technical matters. Paralleling the military training is an extensive academic programme with a heavy emphasis on South African history, political economy, and philosophy. The teaching is by South Africans, in the early stages of the development of the camps by eminent leaders of the ANC and the South African Communist Party (SACP), later on administered by the hierarchy of political commissars who provide a second element in the command structure of the camps from platoon level upwards. The academic programme includes courses on the history of South African resistance, ANC ideological principles, especially those associated with the Freedom Charter, the analysis of the South African economy, and the basic essentials of Marxism–Leninism. Some of the political education was reportedly a cause of dissatisfaction among recruits for it reflected the ideology of a left-wing leadership which had emerged ascendent within the ANC during the 1950s and 1960s and which was out of step with the intellectual background of recruits influenced by the Black Consciousness of the early 1970s.²⁹ This does not seem to have been an enduring problem probably because of the shift in black political culture within South Africa since 1976. Considering the location of the camps, the sources of externally supplied training and resources available to Umkhonto, and the strong association of the SACP with the Umkhonto hierarchy from its inception in 1961, it would not be surprising if the camps were an important source of a radicalising impulse within the ANC as a whole.

Umkhonto operations and logistics are directed and administered through Botswana and other territories adjacent to South Africa, but

²⁷ Testimony of Elizabeth Matube in *State vs. Sipho Binda*, 19 August 1985. UNITA claims vary. Savimbi has suggested that the ANC has several thousand soldiers committed to anti-UNITA operations (*The Citizen* (Johannesburg) 7 May 1986). A UNITA brigadier was more conservative, claiming the ANC to have deployed three battalions, 600 men, alongside FAPLA forces (*The Citizen*, 20 May 1986).

²⁸ References to joint ZAPU–ANC operations, 1978–80: *The Washington Post*, 2 January 1984; *The Star*, 12 April 1984; Mfalapitsa testimony, Denton Committee hearings. At the end of the Zimbabwean conflict 100 ANC guerrillas reported to guerrilla reception points.

²⁹ See Davis, *op. cit.*, pp 182–9.

the vulnerability of these countries and their government's attitudes to Umkhonto rules out the development of large military bases by the ANC within their borders.³⁰ Umkhonto's command structure was, until the 1984 Nkomati accord, largely located in Maputo³¹ but that is no longer possible and leading Umkhonto officers seem to work for most of the time in Lusaka or in Angola. Political and military leadership within the ANC is closely intertwined, the three most senior Umkhonto officers are all members of the NEC, and at least a third of NEC members have military experience.³²

Umkhonto is a bureaucratically complicated technically sophisticated, and operationally effective organisation. Its training programme produces highly motivated and militarily accomplished combatants whose quality has been proven in the progress Umkhonto has made in developing an insurgent campaign inside the Republic.³³ It is still, though, largely an exile army—only quite recently has its organisational structure within South Africa advanced beyond individual and mutually isolated cells or units.³⁴ Despite a formal commitment to democratic principles reflected in the absence of privileges associated with rank as well as periodic attempts by military and political leaders to make themselves personally accessible to rank

³⁰ Neither the Zimbabweans nor the Botswana authorities are prepared to tolerate any military linked activity by the ANC. The transport of guerrillas and arms across their territories has to be clandestine. The Swazis are openly hostile to the ANC.

³¹ In 1982 a Mozambican intelligence official defected to South Africa bringing with him a document which he claimed to be an official agreement between the Mozambique government and Umkhonto representatives. In return for Mozambican provision of field equipment, transport base areas and houses, the ANC would hit targets of strategic significance to the Mozambican economy. There is no evidence that such plans were ever implemented and whatever help the Mozambican government provided came to an end in April 1984 (*Scope* (Durban) 18 March 1983). It does seem likely that Maputo was an important operational centre for Umkhonto. ANC and SACP publications have conceded that among the casualties of the SADF raid on ANC houses in Matola were several experienced Umkhonto officers. (See for example profile of Motso Mokgabudi in *Umsebenzi* 2(1) 1986).

³² The three leading Umkhonto Officers are Joe Modise, Commander in Chief, Thembi Chris Hani, Political Commissar, and Joe Slovo, Chief of Staff.

³³ The training seems to be weakest in educating prospective combatants in the techniques of clandestine operation. A significant number of Umkhonto cadres have been arrested in South Africa as a result of their own indiscretions. Careless driving is one especial cause for them attracting police attention. On the other hand the fact that Umkhonto units are able to survive in the field undetected for increasingly lengthy periods suggests that this may not be a universal problem.

³⁴ Since mid-1984 Umkhonto units have been recruiting and training activists within the country. Several trials have suggested that a command structure located within South Africa co-ordinates the activities of different groups of units. South African police were prepared to concede this at the beginning of 1986 (*The Citizen*, 18 March 1986).

and file, the organisation is hierarchical,³⁵ elitist,³⁶ and disciplined.³⁷ This is in keeping with its East European models of external military inspiration and is also appropriate with a military organisation whose leaders conceive its future development as advancing through increasingly sophisticated phases of warfare. South Africa is a modern industrial state; the armed force which seeks to overcome its defences requires a matching bureaucratic and technological quality and this is difficult to reconcile with prerequisites of democracy.

The second largest wing of the ANC's organisation also provides a haven for a substantial number of its youthful recruits. The ANC's educational establishment is situated in Morogoro, the isolated area in south-eastern Tanzania where the organisation used to have its guerrilla training camps. The need for the ANC to provide secondary schooling for its adherents became especially pressing in the wake of the Soweto riots when it began receiving large numbers of refugee school children. A school was first established in a few farm buildings on a 600 acre site in Mazimba, Morogoro, the land being donated by the Tanzanian government in 1977.³⁸ The following year the ANC created a Department of Education and Culture, a complex pyramid of committees which

³⁵ All reports suggest that the spartan regime of the training camps is shared by everybody within them. Promotion within the Umkhonto hierarchy seems to be the reward of combat experience and quite high-ranking Umkhonto officers continue to be deployed in the field. Most defectors' accounts do not claim that a hierarchy of privilege exists within the ANC.

³⁶ Within Umkhonto there are elite combat units, such as the Special Operations Unit (see *The Weekly Mail*, 11 April 1986; *The Citizen*, 22 May 1986, R Kasrils in *Sechaba*, May 1986). As we have seen, Umkhonto training is graded according to ability and potential of different trainees, and the graduates of Angolan camps are regarded overall by the ANC leadership as the officer corps of a future people's army. 'We have to bear in mind the fact that the comrades we are training outside constitute the core of our army. They are the organisers and the leaders of the mass army that we have to build inside the country. They are our officer corps, we cannot deploy them forever as combat units. They are our officer corps. For obvious reasons, no army in the world fights with combat units composed of officers'. *Documents of the Second National Consultative Conference of the African National Congress, Zambia, 16-23 June 1985, Zambia* London: ANC, p 35.

³⁷ Police sources claim a harsh disciplinary system prevails which includes a prison camp in Quatro, Angola (*The Star*, 17 May 1984). Such reports should be treated with reserve. Nevertheless changes instituted at the Kabwe conference may have been prompted by resentment of the disciplinary regime in the camps. One of the two former NEC members who failed to be re-elected was Andrew Masondo, National Political Commissar and Head of Security. The conference established a grievance procedure to act as a check on abuse of leadership authority. On the more positive side Umkhonto discipline had the effect of restraining units in the field from attacking civilian targets at the end of 1985. It is not clear whether the recent series of attacks on shopping arcades and commercial premises is the effect of a breakdown in discipline or rather, as Howard Barrell has argued (*Weekly Mail*, 18 July 1986), the result of units in the field being given greater tactical autonomy.

³⁸ *Sechaba*, August 1979; *The Herald* (Harare), 4 September 1985.

linked leading office-bearers in the ANC, SACTU, Youth and Women's sections to the administration of the school.³⁹ Starting with fifty students, by the end of 1980 student enrolment had increased to nearly 200 taught by twenty teachers. An elaborate building programme began in 1980 and three years later 1,000 pupils were accommodated at Mazimba. Numbers seem to have stabilised since then; today the ANC community at Mazimba totals about 1,500 including teachers, administrative staff and infants and primary school children.⁴⁰

As well as the secondary school, the Solomon Maglangu Freedom College (SOMAFCO), the complex houses the Charlotte Maxeke Child Care Centre,⁴¹ a crèche, a hospital and a maternity home, three small factories which supply furniture, clothing and food, a photographic laboratory, and 800 hectares of farmland which make Mazimba self-sufficient in maize, sorghum, and beans. The farm is the nucleus of an ambitious project to establish a 5,000-strong community accommodated in ten villages supported through industrial workshops, agriculture and ranching. SOMAFCO itself has well-equipped classrooms, a library, and several dormitory buildings. The planning and construction of the buildings were executed by ANC members but the finance for the facilities came from outside. The single most important donors have been Swedish, both private and governmental, though Dutch anti-apartheid organisations, and UN agencies have given substantial support as well. In 1982 SOMAFCO's budget alone amounted to \$5.5 million.⁴² As well as externally derived financial support the ANC has also begun to appeal for volunteer teachers; certain Labour Party-controlled local education authorities in Britain recently announced plans to recruit and pay British teachers to work at Mazimba.⁴³

Apart from the normal concerns of educationists, the teaching staff at Mazimba have two particular preoccupations. First, there is the object of providing the ANC community with the vocational skills required for government. In the words of SOMAFCO's principal, Comrade Njobe: We are thinking of educating to take over a country which is highly developed and therefore in our curriculum we stretch over ordinary academic subjects

³⁹ *ibid.*

⁴⁰ 'A people's education', SASPU National (Braamfontein), April 1986

⁴¹ 'Childcare: Imperative for our future', *Sechaba*, November 1982.

⁴² *International Herald Tribune* (Paris), 12 September 1985.

⁴³ The authorities concerned were those of Brent, Haringey and ILGA. The help is at the ANC's request. *The Star*, 23 November 1985.

... to skills in the vocational and technical fields—commercial skills, secretarial skills, and all skills along those lines.⁴⁴

Secondly the curriculum itself and the way in which the school is administered is calculated to strengthen the influence of certain political and social principles. So, for example, considerable emphasis is placed on 'bridging the gap between mental and manual labour'—teachers and students spend several hours each week working on the farm. As far as is possible the school stresses material self-sufficiency. Amongst the various subjects taught is a course on the 'development of society'. Corporal punishment is prohibited. Student representatives participate in the deliberations of the School Administrative Committee.⁴⁵ Students run the hostels and also contribute to disciplinary decisions. To quote Njobe again: 'We are teaching to destroy all tendencies towards stratification of societies into exploiting classes. We would like to create a school of comradeship'.⁴⁶

The ideas are of course very similar to those which are orthodox within the educational system of the ANC's host, and major benefactor, Tanzania. Over the seven years of the centre's existence donors have clearly remained impressed, for the ANC has apparently gained a reputation for 'honest and competent use of resources'.⁴⁷ Scandinavian aid, which is principally directed at the ANC's educational projects, has increased rapidly; nearly \$12 million was received by the ANC from Norway and Sweden in the course of 1985.⁴⁸ Twenty million dollars is expected this year from these sources.⁴⁹

The ANC's resources do not stretch to tertiary education. In 1983 it was estimated⁵⁰ that about 1,500 ANC members were being trained in British, European and American universities. This represents an impressive proportion of the total membership of the exile organisation. There are sizeable groups of students attending institutions in the Netherlands, East Germany, and the USA. Communist countries seem to have been especially significant in supplying technical skills to the organisation: agriculturists, paramedical workers, and engineers. The wide variety of higher educational systems experienced by people destined to occupy senior positions within the movement is likely to

⁴⁴ 'Interview with Njobe', *Sechaba*, February 1980

⁴⁵ *SASPU National*, April 1986

⁴⁶ *Sechaba*, February 1980.

⁴⁷ *SASPU National*, April 1986.

⁴⁸ *International Herald Tribune*, 17 August 1985.

⁴⁹ *ibid.*, 12 September 1985

⁵⁰ *Financial Mail* (Johannesburg), 8 June 1984, citing Davis in *Harper's*, December 1983.

ensure that it remains subject to eclectic intellectual influences. Regional educational committees in different parts of the world where there are concentrations of ANC students do provide one means of regulating the ideological predisposition of the student diaspora. Within the facilities at Mazimba this is the task of political commissars appointed to the governing committees.

From 1977 the ANC has become predominantly an organisation of young men and women surmounted by senior echelons of soldiers and bureaucrats whose exile had in many cases preceded the births of their new followers. The townships exodus in the couple of years following the Soweto uprising brought to the ANC a mass of vigorous recruits whose intellectual development had been unaffected by the ideological tradition represented by the older ANC leaders. Davis, writing in 1981, refers to the 'neo-Africanism' of the post-1976 recruits and their impatience with the heavy emphasis on class analysis in the education received in the camps.⁵¹ In 1980 the victory of ZANU in the Zimbabwean *Chimurenga* was rumoured to have reinforced the questioning within rank and file of the ANC's customary political alignments.⁵² Xan Smiley, writing in *The Times* (London) in June 1983, reported that the ANC was contemplating a restoration of 'a more traditional black African image'.⁵³ In the same year Tom Karis, an authoritative analyst of the ANC, suggested that the abolition of the Revolutionary Council and its replacement with committees more directly subject to the NEC may have been intended to emphasise the pre-eminence of Africans in the organisation.⁵⁴ In the case of the ANC's African leaders, their manner and bearing as diplomats, and increasingly, statesmen, conflicted with the sartorial expectations of the teenage graduates of Soweto street battles. Oliver Tambo, an essentially unpretentious man, is not in the habit of donning combat fatigues on public occasions, and this has allegedly been a source of some grumbling among ANC student communities.⁵⁵

Administrative measures such as the provision of educational programmes or a political commissariate can help to bridge the gulf between different generations and echelons of ANC membership, but

⁵¹ Davis, *op. cit.*, pp 182-9.

⁵² *ibid.*, p 182.

⁵³ 'A new and bloodier image for the ANC?', *The Times*, 27 June 1983.

⁵⁴ T Karis, 'Revolution in the making, black politics in South Africa', *Foreign Affairs*, Winter 1983/4, p 395.

⁵⁵ Testimony of Elizabeth Matube, *State vs. Sipho Binda*, 1985. This defector's claim has been corroborated by similar complaints from informants of the author who remain loyal to the ANC.

they can only be part of the solution. Since 1981, which the ANC designated as the 'Year of the Youth', a conscious effort has been put into fostering an ideological base for young people. The Youth Section was re-invigorated at a special conference in Mazimba in 1982 under the leadership of Umkhonto cadres. The predominantly military role young people play inside the ANC was a theme which influenced much of the discussion:

. . . ANC youth have to fully come to terms with the fact that we are at war inside South Africa and we are not just here outside the country . . . It also means that membership of Umkhonto we Sizwe is not only for those who are 'less educated'—intellectuals are needed in the field of battle. We are not talking about the 'battle of ideas' but the actual armed confrontation. We need engineers, scientists, technicians etc—in the past we tended to concentrate on social sciences but now there is a shift in our ranks towards natural sciences.⁵⁶

The fifteen-man Youth Secretariat is apparently composed of men and women said to be 'steeped in conspiracy' and 'clandestine methods' with a reputation for fearlessness earning for them 'a good deal of respect from the older leaders'.⁵⁷ By the mid-1960s, though, the 'young lions' had left 'neo-Africanism' a long way behind them; many of their leaders were said to have joined the Communist Party as well as the ANC⁵⁸ and an extensive process of discussion and debate preceded the election at Kabwe of the ANC's first 'non-racial' National Executive.⁵⁹ Since 1980, of course, the ANC's youthful intake is being shaped by a popular political culture in which Black Consciousness is no longer pre-eminent. In South Africa the most powerful influences are being supplied by the burgeoning trade union movement, as well as the massive federation of local community and youth organisations led by the United Democratic Front. The UDF has itself been radicalised since its inception partly as a result of the absorption into its leadership structures of the men from Robben Island, the pioneers of the first Umkhonto guerrilla offensive of 1961–5. Today the ANC's ideas and iconography are intrinsic to South African black teenage sub-culture; and ideological disaffection with the 'second wave' of post-1984 recruitment is rather unlikely.

⁵⁶ 'Impressions of the ANC Youth Conference', *Sechaba*, November 1982.

⁵⁷ *The Sowetan*, 21 October 1985.

⁵⁸ *The Sunday Star*, 20 October 1985. Leaders of the Youth Section delegation to an international youth festival in Moscow found in Soviet achievements evidence 'of the superiority of Socialism over Capitalism' (Nyawuza in *Sechaba*, October 1985, pp 18–19).

⁵⁹ See H J Simons, *The Freedom Charter, equal rights and freedoms*, in *Selected Writings on the Freedom Charter*, London: Sechaba Publications, 1985, p 105.

The original purpose of the ANC organisation which began to be built outside South Africa after 1960 was diplomacy and this still remains as one of the most important functions of the ANC's bureaucracy. Diplomacy is a vital sphere of ANC activity. It can secure financial and other forms of assistance in such a way as to minimise reliance on a single or narrow range of foreign allies. International legitimacy is crucial for the ANC in a conflict which already involves many powerful external interests. With foreign governments poised to implement various sanctions against South Africa the extent to which the ANC is recognised by these powers as being popularly representative has become all the more important. Most recently ANC diplomacy has assumed a fresh dimension, that of defining or developing the movement's relationship with a variety of interest groups and organised bodies inside the Republic.

The ANC receives its military equipment from the Soviet Union and other allied states. As we have seen these countries also give military training and various forms of tertiary and vocational education of selected groups. The German Democratic Republic prints ANC and SACP literature. The help is significant for the ANC but does not represent massive allocations of these states' resources. Much of the weaponry is fairly old and unlike other insurgent armies in Southern Africa (for instance, SWAPO or UNITA) the ANC's arsenal seems limited to automatic rifles, hand-grenades, mines, and side-arms. The ANC receives very little cash from Warsaw Pact donors.⁶⁰ It is accorded hardware which no other states (with the exceptions perhaps of China and one or two African countries) are willing to supply, hospitality and recognition. The ANC's representatives in Eastern European countries are granted diplomatic status and treated with elaborate courtesy. It is a relationship of long standing; key ANC leaders visited the socialist bloc during the 1950s and the channel of military assistance was opened in 1962. Obviously the alliance with SACP helped to keep it open without being a necessary condition for it. The affinities developed by the ANC in the international cold war tensions of the 1950s and early 1960s also helped to bring it into alignment with the ideologically similar MPLA and Frelimo of Angola and Mozambique, establishing a relationship with both which was to be very helpful later on.

To what extent help from socialist countries is reciprocated by the ANC is difficult to say. It is true that the ANC is supportive of Soviet positions

⁶⁰ According to Oliver Tambo when he met South African businessmen in September 1985

in foreign policy; Tambo, for example, in his presentation of the NEC report at Kabwe indicated sympathy for Soviet perceptions of issues in Afghanistan and Czechoslovakia—but neither are of vital concern to Southern African politics. It is likely that socialist donors place less value on such formal gestures of rhetorical courtesy than on the development of several generations of soldiers, technocrats, and scholars now holding high office in the ANC who can be expected to have been intellectually influenced by their training in socialist institutions.⁶¹

Western-derived aid is of considerable importance to the ANC and probably needs more diplomatic effort to secure and maintain. The ANC has an international network of offices, though these are modest establishments and representing the ANC publicly is often allocated to fairly junior people. The ANC does not maintain a vast cadre of diplomats, but the few it does support in the USA, Western Europe, and, since 1984, Australia, are extremely able.⁶² In these countries the ANC has traditionally benefited from the activities of local anti-apartheid or anti-racist pressure groups; in the case of the British Anti-Apartheid Movement (AAM), the ANC had a role in its establishment and continues to work very closely with its leadership. Britain has always been a centre of ANC diplomatic work and this is logical. Britain's links with South Africa are stronger than any other foreign power, there is an expatriate community of 50,000 South Africans living in Britain, and a long history of contact between left-wing and liberal British politicians and their black South African counterparts. The ANC's headquarters once was situated in London and a large number of older ANC and SACP members live in Britain permanently.⁶³ The long-established ANC presence in Britain is beginning to reap dividends. Quite apart from symbolic gestures of recognition—freedom of several British cities for Nelson Mandela and his statue on the bank of the Thames—the ANC has begun to have contacts with both the Foreign Office and Conservative politicians and has been promised more substantial favours by the Labour Party. ANC spokesmen use a language and have a manner which seems to evoke a warm public response in Britain; this is partly a

⁶¹ Francis Meki, for example, the author of an historical PhD dissertation on the history of the Comintern written at the University of Leipzig in the 1960s. Today he is editor of *Sechaba*. The obituary in *Sechaba* (January 1982) of a leading personality in the Women's section, Nomvana Shangaia, refers to ten years she spent in the USSR undergoing medical training.

⁶² This is a reputation they have enjoyed since the 1960s. See Nelson, *op. cit.*, p 200.

⁶³ Both *Sechaba* and the *African Communist* are edited in London.

reflection of the skill of their representatives but also the result of familiarity and common elements of culture.⁶⁴

Notwithstanding the lobbying experience of Mfanafuthi Makatini, their seasoned UN representative, the ANC's position in the US is less certain. Until recently ANC presence in America was limited largely to students. Official American hostility to Marxism and the lack of American experience in dealing with radical anti-colonial movements used to ensure that ANC contact with US politicians was slight or inconsequential. Nevertheless, the ANC has had a considerable impact on non-government circles. Oliver Tambo began what has become a succession of meetings with or addresses to multinational corporation executives from 1981. In 1982 the New York group of ANC activists had succeeded in attracting considerable media attention through pickets of 'tribal' musicals and were being asked to check and advise on forthcoming productions of South African-related material.⁶⁵ The ANC presence in the US was at least sufficiently developed to enable it to be cast in a leading role when the disinvestment campaign exploded on college campuses in 1984. This has now compelled the present US Administration to grudgingly concede a degree of official contact with ANC representatives.

The frontline states apart, the ANC seems to accord Africa rather a low priority in its diplomatic agenda. It is represented in only a sprinkling of African states outside Southern Africa. African aid, with the exception of Zambia, Tanzania, and Ethiopia, is usually administered through the Organisation of African Unity, and as Oliver Tambo has often publicly indicated is neither dependable nor substantial.⁶⁶ It is chiefly in Africa in which the ANC finds itself confronted with the presence of a competitor, the Pan-Africanist Congress, which is still able to influence public and official perceptions in at least Nigeria, Zimbabwe, and Libya. The most important help, of course, which the ANC obtains from any foreign power is the accommodation provided by Zambia, Angola, and Tanzania, but this today is the outcome of a relationship which is of a much deeper and more intimate character than that characterised by diplomacy. The

⁶⁴ Western European recognition is by no means confined to Britain. ANC representatives are given semi-official status in Scandinavian countries (in which they receive Government aid), were signatories to the Geneva Convention in 1980, and have had several meetings with European Economic Community officials (*The Star*, 10 September 1985 and 26 September 1985).

⁶⁵ *The Star*, 4 February 1982.

⁶⁶ See Tambo's criticisms of the OAU reported in *The Times*, 11 August 1984.

ANC's relationship with other frontline states is more problematic because of their vulnerability to South African pressure. Outstanding in its absence from the various expressions of congratulatory support from foreign governments and organisations at Kabwe was any mention of a greeting from Mozambique.⁶⁷ The ANC's experience in Mozambique and the way it was kept ignorant of the events which culminated in the signature of the Nkomati pact is a telling instance of the uneven quality of its African diplomacy.⁶⁸ It serves as a reminder of just how important diplomatic activity can be, especially in the case of a foreign country with the potential to influence South African events and with a non-committal approach to the ANC—the US and Britain are two such examples.

The ANC's usual diplomatic work has been augmented by the beginning of a new phase of formal contacts with South African groups. Since September 1985 the Lusaka or Harare offices have entertained at least a dozen deputations. Beginning with a group of businessmen led by the Anglo American chairman, these have included representatives of the Progressive Federal Party, the Soweto Parents' Crisis Committee (SPCC), the Federated Chamber of Industries, the National Convention Movement, Roman Catholic and Protestant churches, the Kngwane Inyandya movement, the Congress of South African Trade Unions, the National Union of South African Students, and the National African Federated Chambers of Commerce (NAFCOC). In some cases, as with the white businessmen, these talks have been exploratory to elicit from the ANC its position on particular issues. In the case of COSATU and NAFCOC, intentions may have been more ambitious; both represent constituencies which may favour the ANC's accession to power subject to certain assurances. In the case of Inyandya and the SPCC, visiting the ANC was a significant political statement: in Inyandya's case, setting it apart from other homeland-based groups and with the SPCC in endorsing its attempt to represent and lead the school children boycott movement.

These contacts are obviously beneficial for the ANC: they help to confirm its ascendancy in black South African politics and open up the possibility of eroding the South African government's support base within the white community. They have their difficult dimension, though. Commenting on the talks, a SACP Politburo document observed:

... a political readjustment in the ruling power bloc which favours its liberal

⁶⁷ See list of greetings in *Documents from the Second Consultative Conference of the ANC*, pp 60–1.

⁶⁸ Joseph Hanlon, *Mozambique: The Revolution Under Fire*, London: Zed Books, 1985, p 261.

bourgeoisie wing would undoubtedly create better objective conditions for the continuing struggle by the revolutionary forces to achieve the aims of national democratic revolution.

Tactically, what flows from this?

On the one hand we are justified in helping by all means (including talks) to advance the process of breaking the cohesion and unity of the ruling class and to isolate and weaken its most racist and politically reactionary class brothers . . .

We must expose their objective of co-opting forces from among the oppressed in order to frustrate the achievements of the main aims of the national democratic revolution.

We must not play into their hands by working out compromises (or being seen to work out compromises) for some hypothetical negotiating table . . .

Nor must a genuine desire to project a public image of 'reasonableness' tempt us to paddle softly on the true nature of the liberation alliance and its revolutionary socio-economic objectives.

At the same time we must not mechanically dig in our heels against any future possibility of negotiation with brother forces.⁶⁹

The difficulty for the ANC leadership is that in such a process it can become increasingly difficult to distinguish between a tactical position and one representing a principle. This is especially the case when the ANC leadership itself is eclectically diverse and lacks a detailed conception of such issues as the precise role the state would play in the economy in a liberated South Africa. There is also the problem of whatever the intentions of the participants in such talks these cannot always be easily communicated. This difficulty has obviously been worrying the ANC leadership:

[there is the] possibility that our movement will be in contact with levels of the ruling circles . . . that it has never dealt with before . . . [it is] vital [that we] should be of one mind about this development . . . to ensure . . . it does not have a negative effect on the development of the struggle.⁷⁰

ANC spokesmen do seem to have made some allowances for the preoccupations and special concerns of their partners in these various talks. The key question for both businessmen and Western governments has been the extent and nature of economic nationalisation advocated by the ANC. Oliver Tambo and other ANC leaders have insisted on their commitment to a mixed economy and have suggested that the level of private enterprise which would be a matter of debate, not something, to

⁶⁹ SACP Politburo document released to South African State President's office, 12 June 1986.
⁷⁰ *Documents from the Second Consultative Conference*, p 36.

quote Tambo, that 'we . . . envisage fighting in the street over'.⁷¹ The same point incidentally, was made by Joe Slovo in his speech at the sixty-fifth anniversary celebrations of the SACP in London: '... the continuing drive towards a socialist future . . . could well be settled in debate rather than on the streets'.⁷² Oliver Tambo at the September 1985 meeting with South African businessmen speculated that ANC nationalisation measures might be limited to a 51 per cent state shareholding. This moderation well may be the reflection of principled beliefs rather than a tactical negotiating ploy: even the SACP has a theoretical commitment to a transitional phase of national democracy.⁷³ Nevertheless ANC ambivalence on economic issues is out of step with more radical economic philosophies which prevail inside South Africa: UDF leaders proclaim the virtues of a 'people's dictatorship' in which private ownership would be restricted to boutiques and barber's shops.⁷⁴ Clearly this was not the vision Sam Motsuenyane and his colleagues in NAFCOC brought away with them from Lusaka.⁷⁵

The ANC like any other organisation in such a situation uses different language for different constituencies. The gentle and courteous language of diplomacy and discussion with outsiders contrasts sharply with the strident and jargonised prose employed in its journal, *Sechaba*. In its radio broadcasts to South Africa, directed presumably at a popular audience, the language is especially harsh:

The regime's police and soldiers who have been massacring our people in millions over the years still return to their homes and spend comfortable nights in the warmth of their beds . . . They must be haunted by the mass offensive. We must attack them at their homes and their holiday resorts just as we have been attacking their bootlickers at their homes. This must now happen to their white colleagues. All along it has only been the black mothers who have been mourning. Now the time has come that all of us must mourn. White families must also wear black costumes. (Domestic servants must play) a leading role. They know where their employers keep their weapons and they are the ones who can devise plans of transferring the ownership of these weapons.⁷⁶

⁷¹ 'A conversation with Oliver Tambo of the ANC', *Cape Times*, 4 November 1985.

⁷² 'Communist blueprint for South Africa', *The Guardian Weekly*, 17 August 1986, p 9.

⁷³ Peter Hudson, 'The Freedom Charter and socialist strategy in South Africa', *Politikon*, 13(1), June 1986.

⁷⁴ See Raymond Suttner and Jeremy Cronin, *Thirty Years of the Freedom Charter*. Johannesburg: Ravan Press, 1986, pp 179-80.

⁷⁵ See *Business Day* (Johannesburg), 30 May 1986 and 'ANC in favour of private property says Motsuenyane', *Weekly Mail*, 11 July 1986, p 5.

⁷⁶ Reported in *The Guardian* (London), 20 October 1985.

The issue of just whom violence should be directed at seems to be one over which there is disagreement in the ANC. Reddy Mazimba, the ANC representative in Harare was attributed with the injunction that 'White parents would have to go to the graveyards' when the ANC's offensive reached white areas and white schools',⁷⁷ a threat which was swiftly repudiated by the ANC's Lusaka office.⁷⁸ ANC leaders maintain that white civilians *per se* will not be targets of attack, only incidental victims of 'crossfire'.⁷⁹ Joe Slovo referred to recent limpet mine explosions which killed or hurt civilians at bus stops and a Wimpy Bar as 'diversions' and 'blemishes'.⁸⁰ Even within the narrower field of diplomacy the ANC employs variations in rhetoric: in the United States its personalities describe the organisation as 'a community of love and justice [on a] pilgrim's road to freedom' and speak of their admiration for the values enshrined in the American Constitution,⁸¹ while in a different context they proclaim their 'natural alliance with the Soviet Union and the world socialist system as a whole'.⁸²

Such alterations of language and tone are inevitable and necessary in an organisation which has to preserve a balance between the requirements of loyalty and gratitude to its military patrons, assuaging the potential hostility of Western governments and reassuring liberal allies within capitalist democracies, while at the same time retaining and expanding support within a heterodox collection of constituencies inside South Africa. They only represent a threat to the ANC's integrity if they open up ideological and strategic divisions within leadership or between leadership and following. As yet this does not appear to be a serious risk but it should be borne in mind that the ANC's leadership is socially and ideologically an eclectic one. We will conclude this survey of the exile organisation by looking briefly at the composition of its leadership and the different political traditions it represents.

The men and women elected at the Kabwe conference can be placed in four categories each of which represent a significant group within the organisation. First there are the people whose political experience dates back to the nationalist revival of the ANC Youth League in the 1940s and who predominated in the mass-based militant populist campaigning of the 1950s. Oliver Tambo is representative of these, a former attorney

⁷⁷ *The Star*, 28 May 1985.

⁷⁸ *ibid.*

⁷⁹ See for example Oliver Tambo's statement to the House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee, *The Situation in South Africa*, minutes, 29 October 1985, p 6.

⁸⁰ Joe Slovo interviewed on the BBC World Service, 4 July 1986.

⁸¹ Joe Leyleveld, quoted in *The Star*, 3 November 1983, and Tom Karis, *op. cit.*, pp 394-5.

⁸² Joe Leyleveld, quoted in *The Star*, 3 November 1983.

and school teacher whose moderate philosophy and lack of interest in economic questions recall a period when the ANC's ideology expressed the concerns of a class alliance which had strong roots in the African middle class. Of the same age as the veterans of populist nationalism are the working-class leaders of the 1940s and the 1950s many of them former trade unionists and SACTU office holders and some of them also office holders within the Communist Party. John Nkadimeng, the late Moses Mabhida, and also Joe Slovo (never in fact a trade unionist, but currently the Chairman of the SACP) can be put in this group. More radical in their socio-economic ideals they nevertheless share many common areas of experience with the older nationalists: the decade of open multi-class and multi-communal campaigning of the 1950s, an aversion to extreme degrees of violence, the patience and caution of long years of exile, a dislike of utopian sectarianism,⁸³ and other elements of a common political outlook.

Then there are two younger groups. A considerable proportion of NEC leaders spent their politically formative years in the politics of violent and clandestine action of the 1960s when the ANC's methods of necessity had to be those of a conspiratorial and clandestine elite. Within the country the ANC was reconstituted underground and in the process considerably radicalised. Some of these men, Mac Maharaj and Jacob Zuma are two such cases, underwent lengthy prison sentences on Robben Island for their role in the first Umkhonto campaign. Meanwhile a fourth group of young men left the country to join the ANC in exile; virtually the whole of their political experience has been in the external bureaucracy. Simon Makana, Francis Meli and Thabo Mbeki, all students who completed their academic training at foreign universities, are representative of this category.

The younger men have matured in an ANC which for them has always been a revolutionary organisation and despite the self-control and diplomatic restraint which they are often called upon to exercise they are likely to be less conciliatory and more radical in their attitudes.⁸⁴

⁸³ See for example 'Conference expels left-wing deviationists', *Sechaba*, August 1985, for a detailed history of the ANC's treatment of a group of Trotskyite dissenters.

⁸⁴ For instance, contrast Thabo Mbeki's position with relationship to black entrepreneurs with that of Nelson Mandela, as expressed in the 1950s:

'Thus black capitalism instead of being the antithesis is rather confirmation of the parasitism with no redeeming features whatsoever, without any extenuating circumstances to excuse its existence' (Mbeki in *Selected Writings on the Freedom Charter*, p 48).

'The breaking up and democratisation of these monopolies will open up fresh fields for the developments of a prosperous Non-European bourgeois class. For the first time in the history of this country the Non-European bourgeoisie will have the opportunity to own in their own name and right mills and factories and trade and private enterprise will boom and flourish as never before' (Nelson Mandela, 'In our lifetime', *Liberation*, No. 19, June 1956, p 6.)

They are presently being joined by a fresh influx of potential leaders from the post-1980 era of open working-class mobilisation inside South Africa. These bring with them the politics of a conflict which increasingly is popularly perceived in the terms of a polarisation of class.

Many external commentaries devote a great deal of attention to the extent to which the SACP influences the ANC leadership. This is very difficult to quantify exactly. The SACP keeps the identity of most of its membership secret. This is partly the consequence of the ingrained habit of always functioning in hostile terrain but also because of the sensitivity of SACP involvement in the affairs of the ANC in the context of both African and Western hostility to Communists. Of the thirty NEC members less than a quarter can be authoritatively said to be SACP members though there is evidence which suggests that the SACP influences several others as well. As has been argued above, life experiences are at least as important as formal political affinities in determining the ideology of different members of the NEC (and presumably the ANC as a whole). Two other points are relevant to the evaluation of SACP influences. First, recent SACP documentation suggests that the manpower resources of the Party are very stretched at the moment and this has inhibited the degree to which the Party can function as a deliberate and unified presence within the wider liberation movement. For example, between 1983 and 1985 the Central Committee did not hold a single meeting.⁸⁵ Secondly, adherence to Marxism is by no means confined to Communists within the ANC. Both well-educated recruits from South Africa and the graduates of Western European universities are influenced by an intellectual background in which Marxism is a powerful constituent. Interestingly Thabo Mbeki, a British and US-trained economist, and one of the more radical young NEC members, was criticised in a Zimbabwean newspaper recently for his 'incomplete study of the SACP and the ANC'. Mbeki was taken to task by this contributor for allegedly asserting that the SACP was responsible for the 'shelving' of socialism.⁸⁶

African nationalism, Christian liberalism, clandestinity, technocracy, communist popular frontism, Western Marxism, and indigenous working-class radicalism as well as residual elements of black consciousness are constituents in the ANC's complicated ideological recipe. Within this mixture individual ideological identities are very

⁸⁵ 'Inner Party Bulletin' taken by South African Defence Force members raiding ANC facilities in Gaborone in June 1985 and later given to South African journalists.

⁸⁶ *Zimbabwe Herald*, 28 November 1985.

difficult to chart and plot. There are, though, several issues which observably provide differences of emphasis and even implicit disagreement. Two have already been referred to: the nature of the violence employed by ANC guerrillas and the ingredients in the ANC's projection of a mixed economy. A third, which with future diplomatic activity may become accentuated, is the question of how the conflict will ultimately be resolved. Three years before his death, Moses Mabhida provided a clue illuminating different perceptions between SACP revolutionaries and the wider movement on the mechanics of transition: (There is) one issue, on which the Party (the SACP) follows Communist doctrines in preference to the (Freedom) Charter's proposals. The issue is concerned with the nature of the State organisation to be established after the democratic seizure of power. In our opinion it will be necessary to destroy the apparatus of the racist state and replace it with new political institutions to safeguard the revolution and clear the way for a new social order.⁸⁷

Obviously the *form* of 'seizure' (a favourite word in ANC phraseology) will be a decisive factor in the attainment of such a goal. There do seem to be two different perceptions within the ANC of how transference of political power is likely to take place. On the one hand is the scenario favoured by Umkhonto strategists (probably irrespective of political affiliation): here the dénouement of the struggle is conceived in terms of an overwhelming general insurrection:

Armed insurrection, in some form or other, rather than guerrilla warfare, but often as a culmination of guerrilla warfare, is the classic method of making a revolution. There appear to be two main categories into which insurrections fall—the spontaneous mass uprising, as in Iran, and the planned uprising, as in Petrograd, October 1917. These stand at either end of a scale of varying possibilities.

In the first category there is no prearranged plan or date, with an entirely unexpected, even extraneous, event sparking off the conflagration. In such a situation, revolutionaries struggle to gain control, and organise the seizure of power.

In the second category, insurrection is deliberately timed as the final move in a carefully prepared plan of revolutionary action—in which the balance of forces has been finely calculated. The Bolsheviks struggled to gain control over the forces unleashed by the February Revolution, as an unexpected event, and directed these forces to the planned seizure of power in October 1917. What we can be sure about is that every revolution which must depend for its ultimate

⁸⁷ Moses Mabhida, Speech to ANC Youth Conference, Morogoro, 17–23 August 1982, *African Communist*, No. 92, First Quarter, 1983.

success upon popular support demands an active revolutionary situation before insurrection can be safely launched. It also needs a movement which has the forces and means powerful enough to overthrow the existing order.⁸⁸

In emphatic contrast with this almost millennial vision is the practical *Realpolitik* of the diplomats. Oliver Tambo has asserted on several occasions that the ANC's main objective lies not 'in a military victory but to force Pretoria to the negotiating table',⁸⁹ an argument elaborated by Thabo Mbeki:

The call you make to people is the same, saying you are not prepared to negotiate, that you must intensify the offensive. But in the course of that offensive it is clear that one of the most important things is breaking up of the power structure. . . . Even the army will have its problems because it is a conscript army subject to all the pressures that the general public is subject to. There are 'homeland' leaders also subject to pressures and we hope that more of them will desert Botha's camp as well. Out of this you will get a re-alignment of forces. We are not talking of overthrowing the government but of turning so many people against it that it would be forced to do what Ian Smith had to do.⁹⁰

This should not be understood as a division between 'radicals' and 'moderates' but rather a difference separating realist from romantics, both of which categories may embrace a variety of ideological inclinations. For Marxists as well as revolutionaries the advantages of inheriting an advanced industrial state relatively unscathed by civil warfare are obvious enough. When the Commonwealth Eminent Persons' Group (CEPG) presented the possibility of a non-violent accession to power the ANC's leadership's response was unexpectedly, even receptively, uncertain.⁹¹ For revolutionaries, guerrilla insurgency is by no means the only safeguard against the revolutionary process (to cite the historical analogy used by the SACP) stopping short at a February without 'moving into an October'.⁹² Not with the reappearance in South Africa of a massive working-class political movement.

This article began with the contention that the ANC has been not only unharmed by the pressures and trauma of exile but has actually

⁸⁸ Ronnie Kasrils, 'People's war, revolution and insurrection', *Sechaba*, May 1986.

⁸⁹ *Financial Mail* (Johannesburg), 17 January 1986.

⁹⁰ *The Observer* (London), 2 March 1986.

⁹¹ An ANC representative at the Nassau Conference appeared willing to contemplate the possibility of a truce proposal (*The Star*, 25 October 1985). ANC preconditions for negotiation with the South African authorities seemed to soften significantly in the days which immediately succeeded the SADF raids on ANC buildings in Zimbabwe, Zambia and Botswana (*Business Day*, 'EPG peace package is still on the rails', 21 May 1986).

⁹² SACP Politburo document.

prospered because of it. Underneath the shelter afforded by sympathetic government, the organisation has developed resources well beyond the capacity of internally based South African political movements. It has been able to offer to its partisans an hermetic world which has taken its moral and physical authority to heights that vastly exceed those of a political party. But then, as Oliver Tambo has frequently argued, the ANC 'is not a political party, it is a national movement'.⁹³ It is an army, an educational system, a department of foreign affairs, a mini economy, a source of moral hegemony, in short, a government. Despite the manifest insecurities of dependence on weak countries unable to protect the organisation from the hostility of the South African Republic,⁹⁴ despite the human suffering which produced it and continues to inform every facet of its existence, it is a state-in-exile, and only in exile could such a state have been constructed.

⁹³ House of Commons, *op. cit.*, p 4.

⁹⁴ Witness the recent deportations of ANC members from Lesotho. There is a long list of assassinations of prominent ANC people in the Frontline States. A plot to kill the Lusaka-based leaders reported by Howard Barrell (*Sunday Tribune* (Durban), 19 December 1982) has at least been partially corroborated by defector testimony (see statement by Ephraim Mfala, Denton Committee hearings, p 19).

⁹⁵ The ANC's reputed overall budget of \$100 million in 1983 (*Financial Mail*, 8 June 1984) is comparable to that of the reformist business group, the Urban Foundation, and minute when contrasted with, for example, the 1981 South African military budget of \$2.76 billion (*Washington Post*, 2 January 1984). Recently the ANC's budget was estimated more conservatively at between \$25 million and \$40 million a year. Swedish contributions were estimated at \$6 million in 1985, equal in value to the weaponry provided by the Soviet Union (Steve Mufson, *New Republic*, August 1986, p 22).

The politics of Palestinian exile

Uprooting, occupation, and dispersal

In 1948, 78 per cent of the historic land of Palestine came under occupation by the newly established State of Israel. Of a total Palestinian Arab population of 1.4 million, 60 per cent became refugees in the remaining parts of Palestine and in neighbouring Arab countries.¹ Between 83 per cent and 93 per cent of the inhabitants of the areas now occupied by Israel were uprooted and sent into exile. Most of the refugees crowded in with the original residents of the Gaza Strip, under Egyptian administration, and of the West Bank, which was formally annexed to Jordan in 1950, while additional numbers settled in Syria, Lebanon, and Transjordan, or even further afield.²

Different legal conditions pertained to the refugee community in each Arab country. In Jordan, the Palestinians were granted full citizenship, including the issuing of passports, in accordance with the 1950 Act of Union. Syria granted equal rights (including the vote) with its own citizens and Iraq waived the need for residence and work permits, whereas Egypt permitted certain political and military activities but confined its Palestinians to the Gaza Strip; Lebanon imposed major restrictions on all aspects of refugee life.³ In several Arab countries, a minority of refugees became full nationals, but the

¹ Various estimates at 750–840,000 people. There are many accounts of the circumstances surrounding the flight of the Palestinians and their resettling. One is N Nazzari, *The Palestinian Exodus from Galilee, 1948*, Beirut: Institute for Palestine Studies, 1978. Another is R Sayigh, *Palestinians: From Peasants to Revolutionaries*, London: Zed Press, 1979. A more general history is D Hirst, *The Gun and the Olive Branch*, London: Faber and Faber, 1977. Recently, an Israeli journalist unearthed official Israeli Army documents confirming the fact that the Palestinians fled as a result of Zionist military action and not because of exhortations to do so by Arab leaders. B Morris, 'Operation Dani and the Palestinian Exodus from Lydda and Ramle in 1948', *The Middle East Journal* 40(1) Winter 1986, pp 82–109.

² 200,000 refugees joined 800,000 residents in the Gaza Strip while 360,000 others joined the 425,000 residents in the West Bank. Over 100,000 refugees fled to each of Lebanon, Syria, and Transjordan.

³ These countries have issued special 'Palestinian refugee' identity cards and travel documents. In many cases in Lebanon, refugees could only obtain *laissez-passer* papers defining them as 'stateless' and 'of uncertain origin'. The PLO has frequently pressed the Arab League to issue a recognised Palestinian passport. See interview with the PLO's 'foreign minister', Farouq Qaddoumi, in the PLO weekly *Filistin ath-Thawrah* (571) 24 August 1985, p 20. For a portrait of refugee life in Lebanon, see F Turki, *The Disinherited: Journal of a Palestinian Exile*, New York: Monthly Review Press, 1972.

individuals affected usually enjoyed family or religious affinity with the issuing authorities (as in Syria and Lebanon), or provided needed professional and technical skills to the host country (as in the Gulf).

In 1967, Israel occupied the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, forcing 300,000 persons, many refugees for the second time, into Jordan.⁴ The whole of Palestine was now under occupation, as well as Egyptian Sinai and the Syrian Golan Heights. Israel also ruled over 1.5 million Palestinians: 1 million inhabitants of the so-called 'Occupied Territories' of the West Bank and Gaza Strip, and 0.5 million 'Israeli Arabs' in Israel proper. By 1986, the captive population had grown to 2 million, with another 2.5 million Palestinians in the Arab Diaspora.⁴

Elements of uniqueness

The Palestinians are not the only people to have experienced occupation and national subjugation. Many peoples around the world have suffered colonial domination, during which they experienced collective political and physical repression and economic exploitation. In the post-colonial era, many ethnic or tribal minorities have also suffered expulsion and mass migration as a result of inherent conflicts within their new nation-states. Rarely, though, has a whole people been subjected simultaneously to uprooting, expulsion, dispersal, and complete denial of nationhood, as have the Palestinians; in history, only the Armenians and Kurds have suffered somewhat similar experiences. Since its establishment, Israel has undertaken a systematic attempt to deny the very existence of the Palestinians and to erase their national identity: by treating the Palestine question solely as one of refugees, by rewriting history textbooks, demolishing villages, and changing historical landscapes.⁵ This is what makes the Palestinian case unique in the modern world.

⁴ There were 1.25 million refugees and migrants in Jordan, 4-500,000 in the Arab oil states, 400,000 in Lebanon, and 250-300,000 in Syria. On Palestinian demography, see E Said, E Zureik, J Abu-Lughod, I Abu-Lughod and M Hallaj (eds), *A Profile of the Palestinian People*, Chicago: Palestine Human Rights Campaign, 1983. In 1979, there were 1,803,564 registered Palestine refugees still receiving benefits from the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees. *Report of the Commissioner General of UNRWA*, 1978-9, paragraph 2.

⁵ The former Israeli Prime Minister, Golda Meir, best expressed this process when she responded to a journalist's question by asking: 'The Palestinians, who are they? They do not exist.' Western countries have assisted in the denial of Palestinian rights. The implication that the Palestinians are not a legitimate national community is the essence of US and Israeli policy that 'is so extreme that Palestinians are not even permitted to select their own representatives for eventual negotiations about their fate'. N Chomsky, 'Thought control in the USA: the case of the Middle East', *Index on Censorship* (7) 1986, p 2.

Complicating the Palestinians' situation and adding to its uniqueness is their special relationship to the broader Arab world, with whom they share a common political, social, and cultural heritage. The Palestine cause is an Arab one, and has received widespread support in all Arab countries. But it has also become an element of domestic (national) and inter-Arab politics, rendering it vulnerable to the regional and sectarian conflicts of the area. Specifically, the Palestinians—as people, cause, or movement—in the main host countries of the Palestinian Diaspora have been subjected to continuous attempts at co-optation or containment by regimes which are themselves still seeking to assert the political and moral legitimacy of their claim to power.

Features of exile

These circumstances—uprooting, dispersal, national denial, and interaction with the Arab environment—have imbued the Palestinian exile with several distinct features and have determined the nature and form of the Palestinians' historical response.

The first of four main features is that the Palestinians have felt an overwhelming need to reassert their identity, to the extent of emphasising their distinctiveness from their Arab brethren. Yet the emphasis on a separate Palestinian identity has brought the contemporary national movement of the Palestinians into conflict with its Arab environment. Pan-Arabists deny the right of any Palestinian to offer territorial or political concessions in Palestine, claiming that the land and therefore any decisions affecting it belong to the whole Arab nation. The Syrian and Jordanian leaderships both lay a rival historical claim to all or part of Palestine.

Secondly, in a situation where over half the Palestinian people and the whole of Palestine are under Israeli occupation, and given rival Arab claims, it has been imperative for the contemporary Palestinian leadership to construct a political entity that could represent the Palestinians politically and existentially. Furthermore, the fact that the Palestinians have never had indigenous governing bodies has also made it necessary that such an 'entity' be embodied in institutions that can legitimately claim to represent and serve the Palestinian people.

A third feature is that, despite the presence of large Palestinian refugee communities in the three 'confrontation' states immediately abutting Israel—Jordan, Syria, and Lebanon—there has not been, since 1948, a solid foundation on which to construct a Palestinian entity, nor

even a dependable base from which to launch independent politico-military action. Since the mid-1960s, when the contemporary national resistance movement came into being, several attempts have been made to establish a political entity, a military base, and even a rudimentary socio-economic structure. Yet on every occasion the combination of the challenge posed by the Palestinian example, the threat to internal stability, and the risk of inviting Israeli retaliation, has been sufficient to bring the host governments into direct confrontation with the Palestinian movement. Indeed, the movement's vulnerability to the political and physical consequences of Arab divisions, and thus its need to play an unending balancing game between competing Arab interests, form the fourth feature of the Palestinian exile.

It is these features which, in different ways and for widely varying reasons, make the bond with the Palestinians under occupation so important to the contemporary Palestinian national leadership. The ability to evoke support from the Palestinians 'inside' the Occupied Territories and to reach the Israeli occupier militarily, endows the leadership 'outside' in exile with added legitimacy and moral strength. Legitimacy also strengthens the leadership's claim to represent the Palestinians to the world community. In turn, international legitimacy and support assist that leadership in its rivalry with certain Arab states. Ultimately, it has been the success of the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO), in re forging Palestinian identity, in building institutions that represent the Palestinians and serve them, and in eliciting broad international recognition of Palestinian rights, that makes the PLO their sole legitimate representative in the eyes of the 4.5 million Palestinians, even though 4 million of them are now completely outside its physical control in Israel, the Occupied Territories, Jordan, Syria and Lebanon.

Palestinian nationalism and its environment

The unique position of the Palestinians within the Arab environment has influenced the nature and development of their contemporary national movement, inter-group ties, and Arab-Palestinian relations. The following three sections deal with these areas. Later sections deal with Palestinian responses: to formulate autonomous political goals, to develop a specific approach to the use of military means in the struggle against Israel, and to build national institutions.

Two forms of contemporary Palestinian nationalism

In response to their plight, the Palestinians have constantly displayed a high level of political activism. During the 1950s and early 1960s, this took the form of participation in Arab opposition parties, mass support for pan-Arab issues and leaders, and *fedayeen* action—cross-border raids against Israeli targets by individuals or self-organised groups.⁶ In Israel proper, a nationalist movement emerged, al-Ard, but it was soon banned and its leaders were gaoled, leaving only the Arab section of the Israeli Communist Party as a vehicle for political expression.⁷ Equally, most Arab governments undertook population control of the Palestinians, limiting or repressing political and social activism in varying degrees; the low point was in the 1961–3 period.

In this climate, many Palestinians concluded that they could not rely on either the Arab governments or the opposition parties to restore their homeland. Between 1956 and 1964, several clandestine groups preaching armed struggle evolved, most prominent of which were the Palestine National Liberation Movement (Fateh) and the Palestinian branch of the Arab Nationalist Movement (which coalesced into the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) in late 1967). Although both groups believed in the ultimate necessity of broader Arab military involvement, they felt that the Palestinians themselves had to take the initiative; Fateh even spoke of the need for an example of armed propaganda, a *foco*.⁸ From these early beginnings developed the idea of applying the concepts of 'guerrilla warfare' and 'people's war' in the Palestinian case.⁹ In the two-year period before June 1967, the guerrillas implemented their slogans by launching military operations against Israeli targets from adjacent Arab territory, despite

⁶ On Palestine political activism in Jordan in this period, see A Cohen, *Political Parties in the West Bank under the Jordanian Regime, 1949–1967*, Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1982, and A Plascov, *The Palestinian Refugees in Jordan, 1948–1957*, London: Frank Cass, 1981. On *fedayeen* action in Gaza, see K Love, *Suez The Twice-Fought War*, New York: McGraw-Hill, 1969.

⁷ On this period, see S Jiryis, *The Arabs in Israel*, New York: Monthly Review Press, 1976, and F Asmar, *To be an Arab in Israel*, London: Frances Pinter, 1975.

⁸ L Kadi, *Basic Political Documents of the Armed Palestinian Resistance Movement*, Beirut: PLO Research Center, 1969, p. 22. Fateh in particular took an independent line, whereas the Arab nationalists considered themselves part of the Arab front.

⁹ Fateh's early military thought was strongly influenced by the Algerian example, and its leaders met Chinese and Vietnamese leaders, as well as 'Che' Guevara, in the early 1960s. On the rise of the guerrilla movement, see Abu Iyad with Eric Rouleau, *My Home, My Land: A Narrative of the Palestinian Struggle*, New York: Times Books, 1981; H Cobban, *The Palestinian Liberation Organisation: People, Power and Politics*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983; and R El-Rayyes and D Nahas, *Guerrillas for Palestine*, London: Croom Helm, 1976.

constant attempts in most Arab countries to intercept and detain Palestinian infiltrators. After the Six Day War, the various guerrilla groups came to be termed collectively as the Palestine Resistance Movement (PRM).

Sensing the growing dissatisfaction of the Palestinians, and fearing their orientation towards the autonomous guerrilla groups, the Arab leaders sought the creation of a docile instrument that would keep 'a tight rein on Palestinian activities [rather] than promot[e] an effective Palestinian Resistance'.¹⁰ Accordingly, the First Arab Summit Conference (January 1964) authorised the delegate for Palestine, Ahmad Shuqeiri, to contact various Palestinians and study the issue of a Palestinian entity.¹¹ Shuqeiri overstepped his mandate, however, and convened a Palestine National Council (PNC) in Jerusalem, on 28 May 1964.¹² The 388 members of this effective Palestinian 'parliament', who represented all the Palestinian communities (excepting that of Israel), established the Palestine Liberation Organisation and elected an Executive Committee to head it. Faced with this *fait accompli*, the Second Arab Summit felt obliged to recognise the PLO on 11 September and approve the formation of a Palestinian Liberation Army (PLA).¹³

Prior to June 1967, the two forms of contemporary Palestinian nationalism grew in parallel: one, the PLO, represented legitimacy sanctified by the Arab regional order; the other, the PRM, represented extra-legal grassroots militancy and self-reliance. One provided the 'entity', the other the 'identity'. Ironically, while the PLO was negatively affected by the outcome of the June 1967 War because of its affiliation to the Arab states, the PRM's real growth came after the Israeli Army (IDF) had overwhelmed the combined Egyptian, Syrian, and Jordanian

¹⁰ El-Rayyes and Nahas, *op. cit.*, pp 16–17.

¹¹ A Shuqeiri, *Min al-Qimma ila al-Hazimah (From Summit to Defeat)*, Beirut: Dar al'Awdah, 1971, pp 61–2. (In Arabic).

¹² An excellent discussion of this period is in I Sakhnini, 'Al-Kayan al-Filistini, 1964–1974' ('The Palestinian Entity, 1964–1974'), *Shu'un Filistiniyya* (41–42) January–February 1975, pp 46–74. (In Arabic).

¹³ A cynical view is that the PLO was 'a device to enable the Arab governments to pass the responsibility of confronting Israel to the Palestinians and thereby avoid shouldering it themselves' M Kerr, *The Arab Cold War: Gamal 'Abd al-Nasir and his Rivals, 1958–1970*, New York: Oxford University Press, 1971 (3rd edn, 1978 reprint), p 115. In any case, as Fateh's second-in-command states, 'the PLO was kept paralysed for a year after its establishment, and was then prevented from taking an independent line'. Abu Jihad (Khalil al-Wazir) in interview with Ahmad Saif, 'Taqqeem Mukhtalaf Marahil an-Nidal al-Filistini' ('Evaluation of the various phases of the Palestinian struggle'), *Shu'un Filistiniyya* (152–153) November–December 1985, p 6. (In Arabic). On the regional background to the Arab decision on the PLO, see Kerr, *op. cit.*, pp 114–17.

armed forces. The war shattered more than soldiers and tanks: it overturned prevalent assumptions and expectations about the power of the modern Arab states and their regular armies. In discrediting the Arab governments, the war weakened their physical and moral ability to repress the Palestinian guerrillas.

If the June War had created the objective conditions for the rise of a resistance movement (the presence of a captive population in occupied territory, and the debilitation of Arab political control), then it was the Battle of Karameh, in March 1968, that transformed the guerrillas into a real alternative to the existing Arab order in Palestinian and Arab eyes. In Karameh, a refugee town on the East Bank of the Jordan River, some 300 guerrillas fought off elements of a 15,000-strong Israeli force for thirty-two hours. Eventually, over half the guerrillas were killed or captured and the town was devastated, but the myth of Israeli invincibility had been destroyed.¹⁴ As a result, the PRM was flooded with thousands of volunteers and in the following months it expanded into Palestinian population centres, opening social, organisational and political offices and recruiting a popular militia. The PRM's overall military capability remained modest, but the swell of Arab popular support had not made it a political force to be reckoned with.

Throughout 1968, the guerrillas increased their representation and support within the PLO, and in February 1969 Arafat became its new Chairman. However, not all guerrilla groups had entered the PLO at this stage, nor accepted its authority. The amorphous PRM was still seen as the true fighting force, the authentic Palestinian conscience, whereas the PLO was viewed as having bureaucratic tendencies by definition. For two years, while Arafat's Fateh group worked to consolidate the PLO's role, all major decisions were still taken by loosely knit coordinating committees within the PRM. It was the Jordanian civil war of 1970-1 that altered this situation: the guerrillas sustained heavy casualties and were finally driven out of Jordan altogether.¹⁵ The PRM, both as a body and a

¹⁴ The Jordanian Army also played a major role in the battle, contributing to the figure of twenty-eight Israelis killed, but of concern here is the guerrillas' decision to stand and fight inside Karameh despite the certainty of an Israeli victory. Of 116 guerrillas killed, some had thrown themselves under IDF vehicles with explosive satchels; many were only trainees, and all were poorly armed.

¹⁵ Arafat estimated guerrilla losses in September 1970 at 921 dead, of whom 860 belonged to Fateh and the PLA. *Palestine Chronology* (PC hereafter) (12), Beirut: PLO Research Center, 1971, p 684. The Palestine Red Crescent Society estimated Palestinian civilian dead at 3,490. K Hindi, F Bawarshi, and S Moussa (eds), *The Palestinian Revolution and the Jordanian Regime*, Beirut: PLO Research Center, 1971, p 502. Guerrilla dead over the next ten months reached 200, and 200-300 more were killed in the Jordanian Army's final sweep in July 1971. Again, the vast majority of these men were from Fateh. PC (12) p 664, and Volume 13, p 84.

concept, was thrown into disarray. The politico-military slogans of the small 'radical' groups in particular were discredited, allowing Fateh (always the dominant force) the opportunity to promote the PLO as the Palestinian political centre. From then on, until the evacuation from Beirut in 1982, the PRM was effectively subsumed to the PLO, and the two terms 'PLO' and 'PRM' became virtually synonymous.

Inter-Palestinian group ties

The Palestinian arena has constantly witnessed a profusion of self-styled 'liberation groups'.¹⁶ Until 1965, most were no more than bands of local youths intent on hitting back at the Israeli settlers just across the new borders, while a few adopted a more systematic approach and constructed clandestine, politicised organisational networks. After 1965, the rise of the PRM led to the progressive disappearance of dozens of small bands which merged with the dominant guerrilla groups. This process peaked during the ninth PNC in July 1971, when several figures declared their merger with Fateh following the effective dissolution of their bases during the Jordanian civil war.¹⁷ Since then, the line-up of Palestinian guerrilla groups has remained virtually unchanged.

Three guerrilla groups are generally considered to be *bona fide* resistance organisations. These are Fateh, the PFLP, and the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP). Each of these groups is led by people seen as authentic Palestinian nationalists with a long history of independent political activism, most prominently Yasser Arafat, Khalil al-Wazir and Khaled al-Hasan in Fateh, George Habash and Ahmad al-Yamani in the PFLP, and Nayef Hawatmen and Yasser Abd-Rabbo in the DFLP. Each group was formed under the initiative of these founders, and subsequently formulated policy according to its own view of Palestinian needs. In contrast, the formation and policies of three other groups have been closely tied to certain Arab regimes. These are the Vanguard of Popular Liberation War Organisation-Sa'iqa Forces (Sa'iqa), the Arab Liberation Front (ALF), and the PFLP-General Command (PFLP-GC).¹⁸ The first two were established by the Palestinian branches of the ruling Ba'thist wings in Syria and Iraq

¹⁶ One discussion of the causes for multiplicity is B Stanley, 'Fragmentation and National Liberation Movements: the PLO', *Orbis* 58 (4) Winter 1979, pp 1033-55.

¹⁷ Ironically, one such person was Dr Samir Ghosheh, the Secretary-General of the Palestine Popular Struggle Front, who soon led his group back out of Fateh and later joined the anti-Arafat faction in 1983.

¹⁸ Even Egypt and Jordan sponsored their own Palestinian groups at one stage—the Palestine Arab Organisation and Battalions of Victory—but these had dissolved by late 1970.

respectively, while the third was established by a former Syrian Military Intelligence officer, Ahmad Jibril. Two other minuscule groups emerged independently—the Palestine Popular Struggle Front (PPSF) and the Palestine Liberation Front (PLF)—but have only survived by receiving support from one Arab or Palestinian sponsor or another. Fateh, and the precursors of the PFLP, DFLP and PFLP-GC all came into being before 1967, while Sa'iqa, the ALF, and the PPSF all appeared in 1968–9.¹⁹

The reasons for organisational multiplicity in the Palestinian exile relate to the physical facts of geographical dispersal and to ideological differences, rather than traditional tribal, sectarian or regional divisions. True, certain socio-political tendencies are discernible, with Palestinian Christians tending to join Marxist groups (reflecting a minority's preference for secular programmes and the high proportion of middle-class Christians within the intelligentsia) or of lower middle-class Palestinians and those from rural backgrounds leaning towards mainstream Fateh (reflecting broad nationalist and conservative social sentiments); however, these are not dominant patterns that adequately explain political behaviour. Nor has popular support been significantly affected by regional considerations. The proportion of 1948 refugees supporting any particular group roughly equals the same proportion among 1967 refugees, although it might be expected that the former would only back a group insisting on the 'total liberation of Palestine' and the latter a group working for a mini-state in the West Bank and Gaza Strip.²⁰

The major role in promoting and perpetuating organisational diversity among the Palestinians has therefore been played by the physical facts of exile and dispersal. Geography has placed the Palestinian people and movement under the security and political control of rival Arab governments. These governments have had an interest in promoting Palestinian divisions and in hindering unity or mergers in order to prevent the growth of a potent politico-military movement outside their control. In turn, the ability of the smaller guerrilla groups to obtain Arab backing has encouraged them to manipulate the Palestinian mainstream or at least to insist on

¹⁹ The PLF split off from the PFLP-GC in 1977, taking the name under which Jibril had operated in the early 1960s.

²⁰ The fact that many Palestinian leaders support 'partial', as opposed to 'total', liberation of Palestine although they originate in the areas occupied by Israel proper, indicates the weakness of the regional factor.

maintaining greater organisational and political autonomy than would have been the case for purely ideological reasons.

This Arab role explains why groups that lack credibility and mass support have managed to survive, and why the PLO has had to recognise their legitimacy as Palestinian organisations.²¹ As a result, the PLO has never been the commanding organ for a single political and military body combining the resources of a number of ideologically diverse parties that the National Liberation Front (NLF) in South Vietnam was, nor could it impose homogeneity by forced merger as did the National Liberation Front (FLN) in Algeria. But, at least until 1983, it was more effective as a representative and coordinating structure than is the case with national and social liberation movements in many parts of the Third World today.

In response to Arab involvement and the multiplicity of guerrilla groups, Palestinian politics evolved in several distinct ways. First, Fateh constantly attempted to transform the PLO into the sole and final arbitrator in the Palestinian arena, in order to secure political autonomy from the Arab states. Despite basic policy differences, both the PFLP and DFLP supported this direction, even though the PFLP often suspended participation in the PLO Executive Committee in protest against specific actions and though both engaged in their own bilateral contacts (with other Arab and Palestinian actors). This meant, secondly, that the main guerrilla groups always strived for broad consensus within the movement regardless of the actual balance of forces in the field or voters in the PNC (and Executive Committee). Consensus and collective policy formulation were important both in order to demonstrate and preserve Palestinian identity through a show of political unity, and to circumvent damaging splits that would be manipulated by the Arab states. This also meant that the smaller groups gained leverage over the mainstream that went far beyond their real capabilities or political weight.²²

Reflecting this game of power politics, two sets of inter-organisational relations developed, operating in parallel. One involved ties between each individual group and the PLO; the other consisted of

²¹ Besides the constant threat of Arab retaliation, the Palestinian mainstream has been unwilling to eliminate such rivals because of the need to reinforce the Palestinian people's sense of unity and identity. Khaled Hasan, one of Fateh's founders and a member of its Central Committee, is quoted as saying that he had supported Shuqeiri's idea of handing the PLO over to Fateh in 1968, but that his colleagues had preferred it as 'a comprehensive front for all Palestinian groupings—"the Palestinian people in exile"'. Cobban, *The Palestinian* . . . , p 42.

²² A cogent discussion of this aspect is in A D Miller, 'Organisational constraints: the Palestinian dimension', in *The PLO and the Politics of Survival*, New York: Praeger, 1983, pp 40-64.

bilateral or multilateral contacts outside the PLO's framework. Fateh acted mainly through the PLO, and formed its inter-group alliances within the PLO Executive Committee on the platform of official PLO policies. Conversely, the smaller groups often operated outside the PLO structure in order to counter Fateh's dominance; besides issuing individual or joint statements, actual alliances were formed as a tangible vehicle for opposition. The major instance was the 'Rejection Front' set up in 1974 between the PFLP, ALF, PFLP-GC and PPSF in order to defeat any move by Fateh and the PLO to participate in an international peace conference that would result in a negotiated peace with Israel. The existence of rival platforms did not determine individual ties with the PLO, however. For instance, of the 'Rejection' groups, only the PFLP withdrew its representative from the PLO Executive Committee in 1974. Similarly, the ALF and PFLP-GC suspended participation in the Executive Committee (without formal withdrawal) in the late 1970s although they were out of line with other 'rejectionists'. These political dynamics may suggest that the PLO was unable at any point to impose itself as the sole authority and final arbitrator within the Palestinian arena, but in fact the smaller groups resorted to these alternatives as a means of pressure to influence policy and improve their position within the PLO, rather than to supplant it.

Palestinian-Arab relations

There is a symbiotic relationship between the Arab states and the Palestine question: the Palestinians are Arabs and share close ties of kinship, commerce and political history with their immediate neighbours; two million of them live in the Arab countries; Palestine has strong political and religious significance for all Arabs; consequently there is considerable overlap at the social, economic, and political levels between the refugee community and host population in each Arab county. This has led to widespread grassroots support among the Arab peoples, and even within various Arab armies, for the contemporary Palestinian national movement.²³ Also tying the Arabs to the Palestine question is the fact that Israel demonstrably threatens

²³ Sympathy for the PRM is evident in the assistance the guerrillas have received from various Arab armies: from Jordanian officers and soldiers, including bedouins, who aided attacks on Israel in 1968-9; from members of the Iraqi Expeditionary Force to Jordan in 1967-70 who provided arms, training, and supplies; from Syrian officers who provided fire cover and intelligence information for operations on the Golan front; and from Lebanese rank and file who deserted their army in 1976, splitting it in two, to prevent a crackdown on the PRM.

their own vital interests, whether territorial, economic, political, or military. Indeed, both moral and strategic reasons have made 'the cause' a factor leading to changes of regime in several Arab countries since 1948.

Due both to popular sentiment (implying a threat to regime security) and institutional interests, therefore, Arab governments have constantly been under strong internal pressure to espouse Palestinian aims and to support them morally and materially. Conversely, the same governments have taken advantage of the Palestine cause and posed as its guardians in order to rally public opinion around themselves and gain greater internal legitimacy and stability.²⁴ By adopting a forward position on Palestine, the Arab governments have contained popular movements and diverted them through their own institutional channels rather than any alternative political structures (whether local opposition parties or the PRM itself).²⁵ This logic has also been reflected in inter-Arab politics in an 'outbidding' process by which one regime can discredit a rival regime by showing greater commitment to 'the cause'. The immediate reasons for the involvement of a particular Arab state in the Palestine question may thus be positive or negative, and policy may be active or passive, but the involvement is unavoidable. It is the organic nature of the Arab states' link to the Palestine question that makes Palestinian-Arab relations crucially important, and that creates a complexity unparalleled for any other national movement in exile.

The above comments do not apply equally to all Arab countries. Of the twenty-one members of the League of Arab States (besides the PLO), Somalia, Mauritania, and Djibouti have been peripheral to the central Arab process. Similarly, the two Yemens, Sudan, and several Gulf emirates are not influential Arab actors and in any case have adopted a consistent stand of political (and some material) support for the Palestinian movement and Arab confrontation states without real involvement in intra-Palestinian or Palestinian-Arab feuds. This

²⁴ Arab motives for supporting the Palestine cause are discussed by M Hudson, *Arab Politics: The Search for Legitimacy*, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977; and A D Miller, *The Arab States and the Palestine Question: Between Ideology and Self-Interest*, Washington DC: Georgetown University, 1986.

²⁵ A PLO official illustrated this process with the following example. Prior to March 1968, Fateh enjoyed widespread support and influence in Iraq through local 'Support Committees of the Palestine Revolution', committees which Ba'th Party members, then in opposition, joined in large numbers. On seizing power in March, one of the Ba'th's first decrees was to dissolve the Support Committees. Over the next few months, the government gradually curtailed Fateh's freedom of action, and then established its own guerrilla group in spring 1969. Interview in Amman, March 1984.

includes Tunisia, where the Arab League has its headquarters but which has little regional influence. Finally, because Morocco's foreign policy is oriented towards the Maghreb (Arab West) and Europe, rather than the Mashreq (Arab East), its Palestinian role has been marginal, although it is a major North African country and has played an active mediatory role in inter-Arab politics.²⁶

Leaving these countries aside, the remaining Arab states have been directly affected in one way or another by the Palestine question. Of this group, some countries have adopted 'interventionist' Palestinian policies, the others 'non-interventionist' ones.²⁷ Interventionism signifies direct interference in the internal affairs of the PRM/PLO through material support for one group or another, public comments on the movement's policies and leadership, and/or physical measures affecting the movement's freedom of operation. Non-interventionism lacks most of these active features, depending instead on reciprocal arrangements by which broad political, moral, or financial support has been extended to the PRM/PLO in return for acceptance of those countries' general policies and regional manoeuvres.²⁸

In the interventionist category are Syria and Jordan, followed by Iraq and Libya. In the non-interventionist group are Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait. In each case, there have been strong incentives for involvement: the presence of a large Palestinian community (1,200,000 in Jordan, 250,000 in Syria, 100,000 in Saudi Arabia, and 250,000 in Kuwait, besides 800,000 on the West Bank and 400,000 in the Gaza Strip whose movement, trade, and documentation pass through Jordan and Egypt respectively); ideological commitment (Syria, Iraq, and Libya); and inter-Arab rivalry (Syria versus Iraq, Jordan, or Egypt, and Libya versus Egypt). Two exceptions to the above categorisation are Lebanon and Algeria. Lebanon has been directly influenced by the Palestine question, due to its proximity to the battlefield and the

²⁶ Despite ostentatious actions like the Hasan-Peres meeting in July 1986, long-standing contacts between Israel and Morocco, the despatching of an army brigade to Syria in 1973, and strong popular support for the Palestinians have had little real impact on the evolution of the Palestine conflict. Indeed, following the said meeting, Morocco further reduced its regional significance by relinquishing the chairmanship of the Arab League.

²⁷ A distinction is made here between policies towards the Palestine question and the Palestinian national movement and those related to the Arab-Israeli conflict.

²⁸ This applies even to Egypt. PLO-Egyptian relations were severed after former President Sadat's conclusion of the Camp David peace agreements with Israel, but since 1983 relations have been restored on a basis of mutual interest in countering Syrian influence and in promoting PLO participation in a peace process, although Egypt remains committed to the Camp David Accords.

presence of a large refugee community (400,000). Yet it cannot be considered an interventionist Arab state, despite attempts to limit Palestinian activities within its borders, because its government has failed to manipulate the Palestine question and to impose its authority. Algeria, in contrast, is not tied to or influenced by the Palestine question, but for moral and ideological reasons it has been the only Arab country to offer unconditional material and political support to the Palestinian movement consistently since the early 1960s.²⁹

The presence of large numbers of Palestinian civilians and of an armed movement, or their absence, has obviously been a primary factor shaping Arab government policy, but this does not explain the interventionism of Iraq and Libya, which have only small refugee communities, or the non-interventionism of Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, which have large ones.³⁰ Although demographic factors (the number of guest Palestinians, their proportion to the host population, and their position in local society and economy) and geographical ones (proximity to Palestine) are important, it is the factors of internal stability and regional rivalries that have been decisive in Arab policy-formulation. The main distinction between the two categories, therefore, is that the non-interventionists have been able to avoid dramatic roles by managing reciprocal interest arrangements with the PRM/PLO and with the other Arab states (Saudi aid to the PLO and Syria, or Egyptian diplomatic support for the PLO and Jordan, for example), while the interventionists have been motivated by the wish to repel challenges to their rule from within and threats to their position in the regional balance.

Of all the Arab countries, Jordan and Syria have been the most vital to the contemporary Palestinian national movement. Jordan is considered the 'natural' and 'main' base because it contains the largest Palestinian community anywhere, and has the longest Arab frontier with Israel and open bridges to the Occupied Territories, thus offering an ideal support base for both clandestine and guerrilla warfare against Israel.³¹ Syria is seen as the 'lung' the PLO breathes through because it

²⁹ It was the victorious FLN in Algeria that arranged Fateh's first meetings with senior officials in China and Vietnam in the early 1960s, and with 'Che' Guevara in Algiers in 1964. As part of its aid, Algeria replaced Fateh's weapons losses during the July 1971 showdown with the Jordanian Army and the March 1978 Israeli invasion of south Lebanon.

³⁰ On the motives and forces promoting the Gulf States' involvement with the Palestine question, see A H Cordesman, *The Gulf and the Search for Strategic Stability*, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1984.

³¹ Between 100,000 and 150,000 Palestinians from the West Bank and visitors cross the Jordan River each year.



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occupies a central geographical position between Jordan and Lebanon and wields considerable leverage over them (military, political, and economic), thus controlling Palestinian access to, and operations in, the two countries.³²

For their part, Jordan and Syria have the longest record of active intervention in Palestinian affairs. Since there is a 60 per cent resident Palestinian majority there, the Palestine problem has been internalised in Jordan and integrated into its socio-political fabric. King Hussein has a vital stake in controlling Palestinian action capable of threatening the state itself or inviting massive Israeli retaliation. That control could only be achieved if Hussein adopted and managed the issues that concerned his Palestinian constituency (such as the PLO's status and restoration of the West Bank). For Syria, the Palestinian dimension has been important partly as an internal political issue, but much more as a tool of regional policy. Successive Syrian governments have supported Palestinian activities in neighbouring Jordan and Lebanon (and against Israel) as a pressure device to influence local policy or demonstrate Syrian regional power. Conversely, Syria's intervention has also been aimed at preventing the PLO from disrupting Syrian objectives, which would happen if the PLO formed its own power base in Lebanon or resumed independent relations with Jordan.³³

Each of the Arab interventionist states has employed one or other of four main forms of intervention in Palestinian affairs: sponsorship of specific guerrilla groups; imposition of regulations restricting the guerrillas' freedom of movement, basing, and action; physical assault on the forces or representatives of the movement; and public commentary on the political stands of rival guerrilla groups and the legitimacy of their leadership.

Sponsorship of guerrilla groups With the growth of the Palestinian guerrilla movement, several Arab states sought to guarantee their influence within it by sponsoring their own groups. As well as bolstering the militant, patriotic image of each regime, sponsoring guerrilla groups allowed these states to contain and divert enthusiasm for anti-Israeli action within their own people and decrease the PRM's freedom of action

³² Following his expulsion from Syria in June 1983, Arafat expressed Syria's importance by saying 'if [the Syrians] close the front door I'll come back in through the window; they and I wage a common battle'. *Palestine News Agency (Wafa) Bulletin*, 19 July, 1983.

³³ For a discussion of Syrian-PLO relations since 1970, see R Khalidi, 'The Asad regime and the Palestinian resistance', *Arab Studies Quarterly* 6(4) 1984, pp 259-66.

at the same time. Syria established Sa'iqa in 1968 and took effective control over the PFLP-GC in 1977. Iraq established the ALF in 1969. Jordan set up the (short-lived) Battalions of Victory as an agent provocateur group in 1968. And Libya has provided the PFLP-GC with substantial financial and military aid since 1978, besides more intermittent support for the PFLP, DFPLP, and PPSF.³⁴ Syria and Iraq soon gained the representation they wanted when Sa'iqa and the ALF were accepted within the Palestinian movement's various bodies. This happened despite Fateh's strong objections; by incorporating the Arab-sponsored groups, Fateh's main rivals increased their overall strength and countered Fateh's dominance. In response, Fateh hampered the activities of the sponsored groups in Jordan and Lebanon and worked to turn the PLO, rather than the PRM, into the central structure of Palestinian decision-making.³⁵

The Jordanian civil war effectively eliminated the sponsored groups as viable political and military forces that could hope to represent some alternative to Fateh. Although Sa'iqa and the ALF continued to act as political pressure groups within the PLO, particularly in alliance with other factions, the Arab states had to seek new forms of sponsorship. Attempting to find a credible alternative to the guerrillas, the Syrian government wrested effective control over the Palestine Liberation Army's General Headquarters and Hittin Brigade (both based in Syria) in late 1971, provoking a mass exodus of the fighting forces of Fateh and most smaller groups into south Lebanon.³⁶ In 1974, Iraq encouraged Fateh's local representative, the now notorious Abu Nidal, to secede from his parent organisation and establish a 'rival Fateh'.³⁷ Similar Syrian and Libyan attempts made between 1976 and 1978 failed; Syria

³⁴ Among other items, the PFLP-GC was equipped by Libya with mobile SAM-9 launchers and 40-barrel BM-21 multiple rocket launchers.

³⁵ Besides Fateh's own sizeable representation in the PNC and PLO-EC, it had the support of a majority of independents and delegates from the various mass and professional unions (students, workers, women, and so on), none of whom attended or influenced the coordinating committees of the PRM.

³⁶ The issue of control over the PLA was to reappear during the Lebanese civil war in 1975-76, when the whole Qadisiyyah Brigade and large parts of the Hittin Brigade refused Syrian orders and deserted to the PLO, and during the Palestinian mini-civil war in late 1983, when 300 PLA men joined the PLO besieged in Tripoli.

³⁷ With tacit Iraqi approval, Abu Nidal occupied small arms factories and farms run by Fateh in Iraq and sequestered substantial quantities of weapons and supplies that were in Fateh's depots or that later reached the port of Basrah. 'Mudhakkarah min Harakat at-Tahrir al-Watani al-Filistini "Fateh" ilal-Hukumah al-'Iraqiyyah'" (Memorandum from the Palestine National Liberation Movement 'Fateh' to the Iraqi Government, in Arabic), Beirut: *Palestine News Agency (Wafa)*, 16 July 1978, pp 6-8.

then tried to gain influence within Fateh by cultivating ties with specific individuals or factions (an approach that bore fruit in 1983, as will be discussed later). Other Arab interventionists have also supported the emergence of alliances within the PLO that would oppose Fateh. One such coalition was the Rejection Front, established in 1974 by the PFLP, ALF, and PFLP-GC, which received Iraqi and Libyan backing; Libya also convened several public meetings of Palestinian opposition leaders on anti-Fateh and anti-Arafat platforms between 1978 and 1981.³⁸

Restrictive regulations Every Arab government has at one time or another imposed regulations defining and limiting the guerrillas' freedom of operation within its territory. Three main issues have been at stake: the launching of military action against Israel from that Arab country; formal and practical relations between the Palestinian movement and the central government; and Palestinian political activity among the host population.

Syria has imposed the most stringent conditions on Palestinian military activity. It has exploited guerrilla activity to exert pressure on its neighbours, but has avoided uncontrolled military action that would provoke massive Israeli retaliation. From 1966 to 1973, the guerrillas were only allowed to infiltrate across Syrian lines after obtaining written permission from the Minister of Defence prior to each and every action.³⁹ Since then, guerrilla action on the Golan front has been totally prohibited. The Jordanian government, in contrast, in 1968–70 tried mainly to limit the extension of the PRM's military and political apparatus into the country's Palestinian population centres, realising that mobilisation of the Palestinian majority would alter the country's internal balance of power.⁴⁰ To this end, all movement of armed or uniformed Palestinian personnel and of military vehicles outside assigned border base areas was prohibited, and systematic efforts were made to disarm and disband the popular militia in the cities.⁴¹ The PRM's

³⁸ The main reasons for Libyan hostility to Fateh were the latter's interest in a negotiated peace settlement after 1973, its acceptance of a cease-fire with Israel and the stationing of UN troops in south Lebanon in March 1978, and its alliance with certain Lebanese parties, principally the Shi'ite Amal movement.

³⁹ This system was imposed as early as 1966, when the then Defence Minister, now President, Hafez Asad, drew up a secret memo which each guerrilla group had to sign if it was to operate in Syria. According to a Fateh battalion commander interviewed by the author in Amman, May 1985.

⁴⁰ The population of the capital and its surrounding governate has been estimated at 75 per cent–85 per cent Palestinian.

⁴¹ Because of massive support for the PRM, the Jordanian government had to negotiate all regulations and obtain Palestinian approval, whereas the Syrian and Iraqi governments simply notified the PRM of their conditions. Following the expulsion of the PRM to Syria in July 1971, the Jordanian government abrogated its bilateral agreements with the movement.

political activity was also seen as a threat by the Syrian and Iraqi governments, which feared exploitation of the emotive Palestine question by the regime's opponents. Both governments worked, therefore, to isolate the PRM from the local people. By 1971, it had become illegal for the PRM to hold public meetings, open offices, or distribute its publications without prior approval, and for Syrian and Iraqi nationals to join the PRM's political networks or to volunteer as guerrillas.⁴²

Physical repression Since 1968, the Palestinian national movement has suffered three main forms of physical repression by the Arab states. These have been the detention of PRM members; major military crackdowns; and the assassination of PLO leaders and representatives. Of the Arab interventionist states, Jordan has resorted to systematic security harassment and massive military repression most often. Jordanian security services arrested hundreds of suspected PRM members in the two years preceding the June 1967 War, and thousands more in the years since the 1970–71 civil war. During the same period, the Jordanian Army intercepted hundreds of guerrillas on their way to attack Israel, killing several in the process.⁴³ Besides such harassment, the Army attempted to enforce government decisions on several occasions during the rise of the PRM in 1968–70, leading to the major confrontations of September 1970 and July 1971 in which some 5,000 Palestinian civilians and 1,300 guerrillas were killed. Syria's physical intervention, in contrast, was usually connected with a conflict over Lebanon policy, rather than internal stability. As a result, there have never been armed clashes inside Syria, though any guerrillas carrying out unauthorised operations against Israel have been arrested, their action being considered detrimental to Syrian security. The major instance of Syrian physical intervention was in 1976, during which the Syrian Army assaulted PLO forces in Lebanon while security services detained hundreds of Fateh members in Syria. Lacking such direct leverage over the Palestinian movement, Iraq has attempted to counter the PLO's shift towards diplomacy by supporting the assassination of its

⁴² At crucial moments, such as the September 1970 civil war in Jordan, the October 1973 Arab–Israeli war, and the March 1978 Israeli invasion of south Lebanon, thousands of Iraqis flocked to Palestinian offices in Baghdad to volunteer for action, but were prevented from doing so. Interviews with PLO officials by the author in Beirut, March 1982, and Amman, May 1985.

⁴³ During the October 1973 War, some 120 guerrillas were detained or injured at the Syrian border while infiltrating into Jordan on their way to attack Israel. See *The Fourth Arab–Israeli War: Facts and Interactions*, Beirut, PLO Research Center, 1974, p 160.

representatives abroad. In 1978 and 1979, gunmen of the Abu Nidal group operating under Iraqi guidance shot the PLO representatives to London, Paris, Karachi and Kuwait, depriving the PLO of several of its veteran diplomats and weakening its public relations effort abroad.

Political commentary In addition to the attempt to influence Palestinian decision-making through proxy groups or by restricting PLO activities, the Arab interventionists have made detrimental comments on specific PLO and Fateh policies. Most serious has been to dispute the PLO's claim to be the sole legitimate Palestinian representative. Jordan in particular has competed with the PLO to represent the Palestinians of the Kingdom (on both East and West Banks). This contest was particularly intense until 1974, when Jordan was obliged to fall in line with the Arab consensus that the PLO was the sole representative of the Palestinians everywhere. Jordan, although upholding the PLO's special status has at the same time continued to vie for influence on the West Bank and for a special role in any peace settlement on that front.

The other Arab interventionists have not publicly denied the legitimacy of the PLO's claim to unique representation, but they have often disputed the legitimacy of Arafat's or Fateh's right to lead the PLO itself. Iraq's objection to the PLO's possible participation in a Middle East peace conference prompted it to present Abu Nidal's faction as an alternative to Fateh in 1974, while Syria's opposition to the PLO's Lebanon policy led it to promote Sa'iqa's Secretary-General, Zuheir Mohsin, as a replacement for Arafat as PLO Chairman in 1976.⁴⁴ Moreover, each Arab interventionist state has at some time denied the PLO's right to take unilateral decisions on the twin issues of peace and war with Israel, asserting that the PLO's representation of the Palestinians does not negate the Arab say in the Palestine question. The Arab interventionists have used this argument to justify establishing or supporting alternative Palestinian political formations, such as the Rejection Front or the self-styled Unified Palestinian Committee in Iraq.⁴⁵ The effect has been to undermine the PLO's uniqueness as a representative.

Palestinian defence Palestinian defence against Arab intervention has taken three main forms. One is self-defence against military attack or repudiation of political criticism. Another is the consolidation of

⁴⁴ Posters even went up on Beirut's walls showing Mohsin sitting at a desk clad, for the first time, in a keffiyeh (Palestinian headdress), in an obvious attempt to imitate Arafat.

⁴⁵ The Unified Committee brought together representatives of the PFLP, DFLP, ALF, and Abu Nidal's Fateh faction in Baghdad, completely circumventing the official PLO office there.

Palestinian national identity and entity through the creation of autonomous goals, institutions, and military means. The third (discussed here) is the use of relations with individual Arab states, or with the Arab regional system, to provide a deterrent and counterweight to Arab interventionists.

Of the Palestinian mainstream groups, Fateh in particular has sought to build solid ties with as many Arab states as possible, in the hope both of obtaining material assistance and regional political protection. The smaller guerrilla groups have tended, conversely, to ally themselves with self-styled 'radical' Arab states, although they too have benefited from the financial support and political 'umbrella' that Fateh has woven together from its relations with the so-called Arab 'moderates' or 'conservatives'.⁴⁶ Fateh, whether operating through the framework of the PRM or that of the PLO, has tried specifically to ensure that it enjoys good relations with the major Arab countries, avoiding reliance on any one state politically or materially. During the PRM's 'honeymoon phase' in 1968–70, for example, Fateh repeatedly elicited President Nasser's intervention to dissuade King Hussein from undertaking military action against the guerrillas.⁴⁷ Fateh has also used inter-Arab rivalries to pit one Arab state against another, weakening Syrian leverage in 1968–70 by improving relations with Iraq, and confronting the Syrian onslaught in 1976 with Egyptian military and diplomatic support. The period of greatest Palestinian security commenced in 1974, when the PLO was incorporated as a member of the Arab regional order, enabling it to manipulate a broader network in support of its objectives. Ironically, its period of greatest vulnerability followed, when Egypt concluded a separate peace accord with Israel in 1979. Egypt's balancing effect against Syria was thus lost, and a series of inter-Arab feuds erupted (Syria against Iraq and Jordan, Egypt against Libya, Algeria against Morocco, North Yemen against South Yemen), dissipating the Palestinian 'umbrella' and increasing its vulnerability to Syrian pressure. The PLO therefore spent much of the 1979–82 period desperately trying to reconcile the Arab states and restore its regional safety net.

⁴⁶ See the excellent discussion of Fateh's Arab relations in Cobban, *The Palestinian* . . . , Chapter 9.

⁴⁷ Nasser's protective attitude is clear in the minutes of his meetings with Hussein, reproduced in A-M Farid (ed), *From the Minutes of 'Abdul-Nasser's Meetings*, Beirut: Arab Institute for Research, 1979, p 143.

The Palestinian 'state in exile'

Exile, destruction of the independent structures of Palestinian society, and Arab intervention have played the major role in shaping the development of the contemporary Palestinian national movement and of its internal and Arab relations. The Palestinian response has not been passive, nor merely reactive; rather, the movement's current leadership has constantly adopted a 'forward' policy of its own, seeking to deal actively with its environment.⁴⁸ Specifically, this leadership has sought to restore a sense of purpose to the Palestinians by formulating political goals, to change their material situation by undertaking military action against Israel and to provide them with a physical basis for political autonomy by establishing unified institutions.

Palestinian goals

The formulation of coherent political goals has been particularly important to the Palestinian movement in its attempt to deal with the effects of dispersal and exile. By defining clear, shared goals, the Palestinian leadership has been able to reforge a distinct national identity, and to mobilise and unite the scattered Palestinians. In turn, presenting clear goals has enabled the Palestinian leadership to interact constructively with its environment. Palestinian objectives have been distinguished, ending the subsuming of Palestinian interests to those of the Arab regimes, without negating the overlap between the two. Distinction of goals has made division of roles easier within the Arab regional system, allowing the Palestinian national movement to focus its own energies more effectively. Neither Arab intervention nor internal fragmentation has ended, but the Palestinian movement has gradually won a degree of political autonomy that it lacked before 1965. On another level, by presenting specific aims and proposals, the Palestinian leadership has been able to develop good relations with major states and blocs within the world community. The ties have reinforced the pressure on Israel to accommodate Palestinian rights, and have occasionally acted as a constraint inhibiting physical attacks on the PLO by Israel or certain Arab states.

⁴⁸ For a cogent analysis of the patterns and logic of PLO policy (despite some oversimplification and factual error), see M E Selim, 'The survival of a nonstate actor: the foreign policy of the Palestine Liberation Organisation', in B Korany and A E H Dessouki, *The Foreign Policies of Arab States*, Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1984, pp 197-240.

Objectives Whether termed *isti'ādah* (restoration), *'awdah* (return) or *tahrīr* (liberation), the retrieval of Palestine has been the ultimate goal of successive generations of Palestinians since 1948.⁴⁹ Nonetheless, the developments of the past twenty years have led to a gradual shift in practical objectives and even in the final goal of the contemporary Palestinian national movement. Prior to June 1967, the emphasis was on liberating that part of Palestine which had become Israel. This was a simple concept that appealed to all political tendencies and socio-economic strata in the Palestinian exile and so united them.⁵⁰ However, setting the liberation of Palestine as a primary aim ran counter to the actual (as opposed to the proclaimed) policy of the Arab states, which sought to avoid an immediate war with Israel, seeking instead to consolidate themselves socially, economically, and politically.

In 1967, the occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip introduced several new elements. First, the one million additional Palestinians who then came under Israeli military rule had some political, organisational, and military experience, unlike their brethren across the 'Green Line' in Israel. Second, the PRM was able to step into the vacuum created by the dissipation of Arab political authority in the newly occupied territories. The PRM benefited especially from the destruction of official Arab population control. Third, its goals changed, reflecting its awareness of the military imbalance between the Arabs and Israel. Its ultimate aim was now expressed as the establishment of a secular, democratic state uniting Jews and Arabs, while its practical objective narrowed down to restoration of the West Bank and Gaza Strip. The latter objective in particular was shared by the Arab states and supported by the world community. These elements stamped the growth of the PRM in the post-1967 period with a specific character. Within a year, guerrilla strength had soared from a few hundred to several thousand, the bulk of new recruits coming from the recently occupied territories. Although the top leadership still consists of Palestinians originating from Israel proper who founded the movement or joined it in its early years, since

⁴⁹ On the idea of 'return', see E Sanbar, *Palestine 1948. L'Expulsion*, Washington DC: Institute for Palestine Studies, 1984, Chapter 8 (in French). For an excellent discussion of the evolution of contemporary Palestinian political thinking and goals, see A Greish, *The PLO: The Struggle Within*, London: Zed Press, 1985.

⁵⁰ The Palestinian community of Israel was effectively isolated from developments affecting their compatriots, partly because they had lived under Israel's discriminatory Emergency Regulations for sixteen years. On the community's political and social conditions, see Jiryis, *The Arabs* . . . ; and Asmar, *To be an Arab* . . .

1967 the majority of middle-ranking Palestinian cadres have been former residents of the West Bank and Gaza Strip who joined up in 1967-70.⁵¹

The fourth Arab-Israeli war, in October 1973, reinforced this shift in the PLO's aims, moving from total liberation of Palestine by military means to the restoration of the territories occupied in 1967 through a combination of military and political pressures. From 1973 onwards, the primary objective of the PLO became the establishment of a Palestinian 'national authority' in any part of Palestine retrieved from Israeli occupation.⁵² The further implications of this aim were that the PLO would enter a political process in coordination with other Arab and non-Arab states, from which a mini-state would be established in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, accompanied by reciprocal recognition between the Palestinians and Israelis. Initially, only Fateh and the DFLP supported this shift in strategy, facing vigorous opposition from the other groups. By 1982, however, the basic tenets of the PLO's policy had been adopted by all its members, as demonstrated by their unanimous acceptance of Brezhnev's peace plan in 1981, which explicitly asserted Israel's right to exist and to enjoy secure borders.

Two factors prompted these changes in Palestinian strategy in 1974: the PLO's post-Jordan debilitation, and the opportunity offered by the post-1973 rise of Arab power. The expulsion of the guerrilla movement from Jordan in 1971 exposed the basic shortcomings in its political and military thinking, provoking intense internal debate and recriminations. The crisis became more acute between 1971 and 1973, as one Arab border after another was closed to guerrilla action and Syrian attempts to co-opt the movement mounted.⁵³ Given the Palestinian leadership's inability to develop effective politico-military alternatives, demoralisation and dissent spread within its organisational and military base. The rise of Arab political and economic power and the atmosphere of inter-Arab solidarity in the post-October 1973 War period, in contrast, presented the PLO with an opportunity to operate in

⁵¹ Most of those from the West Bank and the Gaza Strip holding senior positions who joined before 1967 did so in their places of employment or study in Arab exile and Europe.

⁵² The first formal expression of this policy came in the final political statement of the Twelfth PNC (held in June 1974). Article 2 called for a 'people's national, independent and fighting authority in every part of Palestinian land that is liberated'. See text of 10-point programme in *Al-Kitab as-Sanawi lil-Qadiyyah al-Filistiniyyah 1974* (*The Yearbook of the Palestine Cause 1974*), Beirut: Institute for Palestine Studies, 1977, p. 25. (In Arabic).

⁵³ On Palestinian-Arab relations in this period, see F. Jabber, 'The Arab Regimes and the Palestinian Revolution', in W. B. Quandt, F. Jabber, and A. M. Lesch, *The Politics of Palestinian Nationalism*, Berkeley, CA: California University Press, 1973, pp. 186-98.

relative security and attain certain objectives. The Arab regional system would help to protect the PLO in inter-Arab politics, and would back it in the conflict with Israel. In return, the PLO would be obliged to accept the legitimacy of the system and its member states, and to reduce its objectives in Palestine until they became modest enough to be achieved by more limited means than all-out war with Israel. After joining the Arab regional order, the Palestinian national movement dropped its image as a vehicle for revolutionary socio-political change in the Arab world, to become another [para-]nation-state seeking its own interests within the confines of post-colonial Arab divisions.

The strategy developed by the PLO after the October 1973 War has remained virtually unchanged since then, despite the set-backs it has suffered as a result of inter-Arab politics, the 1975–6 Lebanese civil war, and the 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon. According to this strategy, the PLO's attainment of its objectives depends on: developing bonds with the West Bank and Gaza Strip; building a supporting network of international relations; and maintaining military pressure on Israel.

Bonds with the Occupied Territories After the failure of their insurrectionary attempt in late 1967, the guerrillas exerted little effort towards developing political, as opposed to military, struggle within the Occupied Territories. The PRM formed no special committees to organise political action in the territories, nor did it assign clandestine cadres exclusively to the task. As a result, political struggle was limited to occasional instances of *ad hoc* civilian protest (strikes, marches, or signing petitions), which had little impact as they lacked organisation and overall direction. In fairness to the PRM, the scale of Israeli repression was daunting; between July 1967 and February 1986, the Israeli Army and security services deported 2,061 people (including mayors, unionists, and political and social figures) to Jordan or Lebanon, detained or interrogated 250,000 others, and demolished 1,425 houses belonging to convicted or suspected PRM members.⁵⁴

⁵⁴ In addition, 13,945 houses were demolished in the refugee camps of Gaza during anti-resistance operations in 1971. Figures from *Shu'un al-Ard al-Muhtallah (Affairs of the Occupied Homeland)*, Amman: Ministry of the Occupied Homeland Affairs, 1986; and *Ad-Daffah al-Gharbiyyah: Haqa'iq wa Arqam (The West Bank: Facts and Figures)*, Jerusalem: Arab Studies Society, 1985. (Both of these are in Arabic). The three villages of Yalu, Beit Nuba, and Umwas near Jerusalem were completely destroyed in 1967 because they lay in designated 'security zones'. B O'Neill, *Armed Struggle in Palestine: An Analysis of the Palestinian Guerrilla Movement*, Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1978, p 76.

It was only in 1974 that mass political action in the Occupied Territories received major attention from the PLO. This reflected the growing importance of these areas to the organisation. Initially, the PLO expressed its support for the Palestine National Front (PNF) in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Although the PNF had actually been established in mid-1973, largely by the efforts of the West Bank branch of the Jordanian Communist Party, it only expanded into a major force when local PLO members and a number of independents joined it in 1974. The PNF was severely repressed by the Israeli military administration, prompting the PLO to seek an alternative. An opportunity emerged during the municipal elections held in spring 1976, in which PLO supporters won an overwhelming majority of mayoralities and seats in town councils throughout the West Bank.⁵⁵ A further organisational form for political action appeared in late 1979, when a National Guidance Committee emerged as the effective representative and coordinating body for PLO supporters in the Occupied Territories. In all cases, these various political groupings have translated PLO policies into local mass action, while influencing the organisation's decision-making on behalf of their own constituency. The importance of this relationship has been demonstrated by the inclusion of several deported West Bank figures in the PLO Executive Committee since 1974.⁵⁶ The effectiveness of PLO strategy in the Occupied Territories since 1974 is evident in the unending civil unrest there and in the Israeli inability to effectively suppress the increasing political activism of the Palestinians living in Israel proper (across the Green Line).⁵⁷

External relations Syria and Egypt waged war in October 1973 for limited aims. They hoped to regain territories lost in 1967, or at least to alter the military balance, so that a political process could be initiated leading to voluntary Israeli withdrawal. As this strategy affected the Sinai Peninsula and Golan Heights most directly, restoration of the West Bank and Gaza Strip became emphatically the PLO's

⁵⁵ Elections were held only in the West Bank, where Jordanian legislation called for them, unlike civil regulations in the Gaza Strip. Political developments in the West Bank since 1967 are reviewed in M Ma'oz, *Palestinian Leadership on the West Bank: The Changing Role of the Mayors under Jordan and Israel*, London: Frank Cass, 1984. This book is marred, however, by its uncritical attitude towards Israeli policy and motives.

⁵⁶ In 1974, four out of fourteen Executive Committee members were West Bank deportees. Since then at least four other deportees have served in the Executive Committee, while a ninth became President of the PNC in 1984.

⁵⁷ On the activism of the 'Israeli' Arabs, see M Segal, "'Palestinization' alarm bells', *Jerusalem Post International* 10 May, 1986, p 10.

responsibility. The implication for the PLO was that although it would enjoy broad Arab backing, it would have to develop its own means to achieve a settlement on these fronts. With this Arab backing, the PLO launched a concerted diplomatic campaign to win international support.⁵⁸

Since 1974, PLO diplomacy has focused on four main areas of relations: the United Nations; other international and Third World groupings; the Socialist bloc; and the Western countries. The UN is important as the single international body whose moral, if not practical, authority is universally recognised. Obtaining UN resolutions favourable to the Palestine cause since 1974 has been especially significant in light of a long series of resolutions between 1948 and 1973 that had treated the Palestinians merely as refugees, not as a national community with the right to self-determination. At the UN, the PLO has depended to a large degree on the support it receives from Third World delegates; it has therefore maintained close ties with the Non-Aligned Movement, the Islamic Conference, the Organisation of African Unity, and similar groupings. The PLO has also developed special ties with individual non-Arab members of these organisations, such as India and Yugoslavia.⁵⁹ PLO relations with the Socialist bloc (including China) are not new, though consistent public support from the USSR and Eastern Europe only evolved in the early 1970s.⁶⁰ Since then, the PLO has enjoyed both material and diplomatic support from these countries, leading it to insist on Soviet participation in any international peace conference dealing with the Arab-Israeli conflict. Finally, the thrust of PLO diplomacy in other areas has aimed at influencing the position taken by the Western countries towards the rights of the Palestinian people and the PLO's status as their sole representative. In turn, in seeking to influence the position of West European countries, the PLO has aimed at isolating the United States in its rejection of Palestinian rights. Ultimately, the PLO's political strategy rests on its ability, through diplomatic manoeuvres or military pressure, to bring both the United States and Israel to a realisation that there will be no peace or stability in

⁵⁸ What PLO delegate to the UN, Zuhdi Tarazi, has termed 'the phase of commando diplomacy'. See *Filistin ath-Thawra* 15 (616) 2 August 1986, p. 12.

⁵⁹ An element of PLO foreign ties has been the assistance it has extended to various countries and liberation movements, most notably in Zimbabwe, Nicaragua, and Eritrea.

⁶⁰ On PLO-Soviet relations, see G. Golan, *The Soviet Union and the Palestine Liberation Organisation*, New York: Praeger, 1980. On PLO-Chinese ties, see H. Behbehani, *China's Foreign Policy in the Arab World*, London: Kegan Paul International, 1981, Chapters 2-5.

Palestine and the Middle East until Palestine rights have been recognised.

Palestinian Military Means

Two basic facts have influenced the development of Palestinian military action over the past twenty years. The scope for mobile guerrilla warfare inside Palestine itself has been extremely limited because the geographical area is small, the terrain is relatively exposed, and the risk of exposure to the hostile Israeli population is high. Conversely, the greatest opportunity for growth has been in the Arab exile, due to the presence of over half the Palestinian people there, sympathetic host populations, extensive border zones, strategic depth, and governments driven by inter-Arab rivalry to afford some support.

This situation has held several implications for the Palestinian national movement. First, virtually all its activities have had to be based in, or launched from, the Arab exile, particularly the confrontation states (Jordan, Syria, Lebanon). Secondly, the Palestinians could not hope to achieve liberation unaided, and would need the political, military, and economic support of their Arab brethren. But as official Arab support has stopped always short of waging all-out war or suffering intolerable levels of social and economic dislocation due to Israeli reprisals, the host governments have in fact severely limited Palestinian military activity. These considerations have finally led the contemporary Palestinian leadership into using military action as a political and diplomatic tool rather than a means to total, physical liberation.

The military instrument In 1968, the handful of guerrilla groups that had operated in near-total clandestinity for many years was transformed almost overnight into an armed mass movement undertaking open political, organisational and military activity in the Arab confrontation states of Jordan, Syria, and Lebanon. This change presented the PLO with new strategic opportunities (such as opening new fronts against Israel, increasing the freedom of operation in the Arab countries, taking over the PLO and entering regional and international politics), but it also stretched the ability of the limited number of guerrilla cadres to cope with the vastly expanded needs of the movement's military and civilian apparatus. As important a problem was the effect on relations with the host governments of the emergence of an autonomous armed force actively involved in the political and military mobilisation of local

Palestinian communities and enjoying the support of the host populations.

Guerrilla expansion and anti-Israeli action reached their peak between the Battle of Karameh in March 1968 and the first round of the Jordanian civil war in September 1970. In that period, total guerrilla strength grew from 500 to well over 5,000 full-timers, backed by a popular militia of 20–25,000, most of whom were based in Jordan.⁶¹ Simultaneously, military action against Israel grew from eight to 235 operations a month. However, the Jordanian civil war radically altered this situation, closing a major border and driving the guerrillas into Syria. Between 1971 and 1973, the bulk of guerrilla strength (4,500 out of 6,000 men, including 2,000 deserters from the Jordanian Army) was concentrated in Syria, along with 4,000 out of a total of 5,000 PLA men. But the severe restrictions placed by the Syrian authorities on guerrilla movements and operations, combined with Syrian attempts to gain control of the movement, led the PLO to rebase all but the 3,000 men of the PLA's Hittin Brigade (under Syrian Army command, according to the provisions of the PLA's establishment in 1964) in Lebanon.

True, Lebanon was an inadequate substitute for Jordan as a base for anti-Israeli military action, but it offered a margin of freedom from Syrian hegemony.⁶² Reinforcing the PLO's freedom there were the weakness of the central state authority (which disintegrated totally in 1976) and the support the organisation enjoyed among broad sectors of the Lebanese population and the large local Palestinian community. Between 1973 and 1982, the PLO gradually built up an integrated military infrastructure in Lebanon, which paralleled the growth of Palestinian social, economic and political institutions.⁶³ By 1982, PLO forces numbered 5,000 full-timers backed by a loosely structured reserve of up to 20,000 part-timers and militia, fielding dozens of artillery pieces and rocket-launchers, several dozen obsolete tanks and light armoured personnel carriers, and hundreds of anti-aircraft and anti-tank weapons (including portable guided SAM-7 and Sagger missiles).

⁶¹ These and following figures are estimates based on interviews by the author with senior PLO officials and journalistic sources.

⁶² That Lebanon was a last resort is emphasised by PLO leaders quoted in A Hart, *Arafat: Terrorist or Peacemaker?*, London: Sidgwick and Jackson, 1984, pp 325–6 and 353–4.

⁶³ On the Palestinian military structure in Lebanon, see Y Sayigh, 'Palestinian military performance in the 1982 war', *Journal of Palestine Studies* 13 (1) Summer 1983, pp 1–24. On this aspect of the PLO's Lebanese base, see R Khalidi, *Under Siege: PLO Decisionmaking in the 1982 War*, New York: Columbia University Press, 1986, Chapter 1.

Political aims of military action Palestinian military action has always had three main aims: mobilising the Palestinian people; demonstrating their presence to the world; and actively wearing down the Israelis.⁶⁴ In all cases, it was the fact that Palestinians were fighting back, refusing to accept their plight, that was considered important.⁶⁵ This has been the driving force of all Palestinian operations since 1965. Indeed, it has been this perseverance of the guerrilla groups and the continuing willingness of Palestinian civilians to accept Israeli retaliation, rather than actual battlefield results, that has won broad international recognition for the Palestinian national movement and people. Reinforcing insistence on armed struggle has been the conviction that the world community forgot about the Palestinians after 1948, remembering them only when they resorted to organised, mass-based military action.

Prior to June 1967, the guerrillas hoped, by a chain of action and reaction, to draw the Arab armies into an all-out war that would end with the defeat of Israel and the return of the Palestinian exiles to their homes. The Six Day War dispelled this hope, prompting the PLO to present itself as the military force that would exhaust, if not defeat, the Israeli Army. The slogans of 'guerrilla warfare' and 'people's war' were raised in this period, though no specifically Palestinian military theory emerged.⁶⁶ The PLO's defeat in Jordan in 1971, and the subsequent closure of Arab borders to guerrilla operations, led to a questioning of these slogans and to a search for new military means. One result was to reorganise most Palestinian forces along semi-regular lines, introducing ranks, differential pay-scales, large formations, heavy weapons and appropriate training and tactics. Regularisation helped to reinforce discipline and cohesion during a period of disorientation, and to portray the Palestinian movement as a credible force.

Two developments in the 1973-82 period strengthened the trend towards semi-regular military forms. One was the gradual expansion of

⁶⁴ Commenting on Fatah's first military action, central committee member, Salah Khalaf, expressed Palestinian thinking succinctly: 'We wanted to mount a spectacular operation that would arrest the attention of the Israelis, Palestinians, Arab regimes, and world public opinion'. Abu Iyad (with Eric Rouleau), *My Home, My Land: A Narrative of the Palestinian Struggle*, New York: Times Books, 1981, p. 43.

⁶⁵ On the ethos of Palestinian military action, see M. Omar, 'Vingt ans de la lutte armée', *Revue d'Etudes Palestiniennes* (Paris) Number 14, Winter 1985, pp. 81-93 (in French).

⁶⁶ The PLO's military commander at the time wrote a book in which he reviewed the Chinese, Cuban, Vietnamese, and Soviet experiences, but failed to make more than superficial comments on the Palestinian case. Abu Hamam, *Al-Muqawamah 'Askariyyan* (*The Resistance Seen Militarily*), Beirut: Dar al-Tali'ah, 1972.

the PLO's Lebanese base under the impetus of the burgeoning civil war and Palestinian institutionalisation. The other was the PLO's adoption as its primary objective of the restoration of the West Bank and Gaza Strip through negotiations. By the late 1970s, the political use of Palestinian military means was well developed.⁶⁷ The PLO maintained sufficient force in Lebanon to deter or repel attacks by local parties, thus protecting its headquarters and main base, from where it launched its diplomatic offensive in the West. It also ensured its ability to mount raids against Israel or support clandestine operations within the Occupied Territories, in order to escalate the pressure on the Israeli leadership to negotiate and to derail peace initiatives that ignored the PLO's role. Finally, the PLO's ability to use military action in a controlled manner and to impose cease-fires, and its possession of an organised military force, reinforced its image as a capable, responsible regional actor.

Palestinian institutions

Since 1968, a wide variety of Palestinian institutions have emerged, catering to the political and existential needs of the scattered Palestinian people. Mass organisations of workers, women, farmers, students, engineers, doctors, journalists, artists and others have mobilised the Palestinians at large, involving them in the political process and enabling them to promote their own special concerns within the PLO and host Arab countries. The Palestine Red Crescent Society has provided free medical care, nurse and medical technician training courses, and public health and preventive medicine education for the local Palestinian community and host population in several Arab countries.⁶⁸ The Education Department of the PLO has been responsible for the primary schooling of tens of thousands of Palestinian children, extra-curricular teaching, vocational training, and the distribution of thousands of study grants to universities abroad.⁶⁹ Local Popular Committees have overseen programmes for the improvement of sewage, road, and electricity networks in the refugee camps, while their inhabitants have been offered employment and training in Children of Martyrs Workshops (SAMED).

⁶⁷ For a discussion of this aspect, see Y Sayigh, 'Palestinian armed struggle: means and ends', *Journal of Palestine Studies* 16 (1) Fall 1986.

⁶⁸ The PLO's National Fund contributes \$13 million annually to the PRCS, according to its head, Jawad al-Ghusain. See the PLO's central weekly, *Filastun al-Thawrah* (596) 1 March 1986, p. 15.

⁶⁹ On Palestinian education generally, see S G Brown, *Education, Liberation or Repression: Palestinians*, London: World University Press, 1984.

The PLO has also had to deal with the effects of military conflict with Israel and certain Arab parties on the Palestinian people. The Engineering Committee has constructed air raid shelters in the refugee camps and has helped to rebuild civilian homes damaged by hostile action, while the Social Welfare Office has provided pensions to over 50,000 families of guerrillas or civilians (including many non-Palestinian Arabs) killed, wounded, or captured over the last twenty-one years.⁷⁰ The total burden, both financial and administrative, of extending such support is enormous. The picture becomes complete, however, only when the costs of arming and training thousands of guerrillas and militia and of supporting Palestinian information and diplomacy abroad are added. Since 1979, moreover, the PLO has undertaken financial support for social and economic institutions in the Occupied Territories as a means to bolster resistance there.⁷¹ The need to obtain funds and provide basic security for the Palestinian civilian population is therefore a primary concern of the PLO (and a constraint), and goes far to explain the organisation's care to maintain good working relations with the Arab environment as far as possible.

However important, providing vital services and support in the Palestinian exile has not been the main driving force and achievement of Palestinian institution-building. More significant have been the political implications of institutionalisation. In the words of one PLO cadre: 'institutional achievement is an ambition of all revolutions . . . [in the Palestinian case] its first and foremost feature is that [the PLO] is the organised expression of Palestinian national identity'.⁷² After its revitalisation as an authentic Palestinian body when the guerrilla groups took it over in 1968-9, it was the PLO which became the central, representative institution embodying that identity. The crucial role played by the PLO since then has come from two main political functions it fulfils.

⁷⁰ For example, the PLO spent \$37 million on repairs and compensation to Palestinian refugees in Beirut following the four-week 'camp war' launched by the Lebanese Shi'ite Amal movement in May-June 1985. In 1985, the PLO's share of social welfare payments amounted to \$39 million. See interview with al-Ghusain in *Filasun al-Thawrah*, *op. cit.*, p. 15. The head of Fateh's Social Welfare Office, Intisar Wazir, confirms in an interview with ABC's correspondent Peter George in Amman in May 1986 that total pensions amount to \$100 million annually. More figures of pension beneficiaries in R Khalidi, 'The Palestinians in Lebanon: social repercussions of Israel's invasion', *The Middle East Journal* 38 (2) Spring 1984, pp. 225-66.

⁷¹ In 1979, the Arab Summit in Baghdad allocated \$100 million to be distributed in the Territories by a joint PLO-Jordanian committee, and another \$50 million to be administered by the PLO alone.

⁷² M Omar, 'Harb Ramadan al-Filistiniyyah: al-Mawqi' wal-Nata'ij' ('The Palestinian Ramadan War: position and results'), *Shu'un Filistiniyya* (119) October 1981, pp. 78-9. (In Arabic).

The PLO has provided the Palestinians with a common framework for their internal political processes, thus countering the effects of dispersal. The Palestine National Council acts as an effective Parliament-in-Exile which both elects the PLO's Executive Committee and holds it to account.⁷³ In turn, the PLO Executive Committee operates as the Palestinian cabinet, with individual members heading social, political, military, financial, educational, and other departments. Although it has been impossible for the PLO to hold free, general elections due to the physical dispersal and political subjugation of the vast majority of its people, many PNC members have in fact been chosen by electoral processes within the mass organisations, some of the guerrilla groups, and several Diaspora communities. As a result, not only has the PLO been the main arena for Palestinian 'party' politics, it has also provided independents with a forum and a share in Palestinian decisionmaking. By providing for the immediate existential and political needs of its people, the PLO has won the overwhelming support and confidence of Palestinians everywhere and has become the nearest thing to a Palestinian 'entity', to a state in exile, even though it has never had a firm territorial base.

Ultimately, however, it has been the PLO's ability to formulate comprehensive policies and develop strategies for providing solutions to the long-term problems facing the Palestinians that has won it mass support. In turn, this has allowed it both to present and represent the Palestine question to the international community, translating Palestinian sacrifices into political and diplomatic gains. Furthermore, by mobilising and focusing Palestinian material and moral resources, the PLO has provided itself with the strength to implement strategy. At this level, institutionalisation has indicated the political maturity of the Palestinian people and their leadership, and thus the legitimacy of their claims to nationhood.

The PLO since 1982

The 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon initiated a process which has had serious consequences for the PLO. Most important has been the split within Fateh, leading to the PLO's debilitation. The split took place largely as a consequence of the rupture of Palestinian-Syrian relations,

⁷³ A comprehensive review of the PLO's structure is offered in C Rubenberg, *The Palestine Liberation Organisation: Its Institutional Structure*, Belmont, MA: The Institute for Arab Studies, 1983.

during a period of cooling Arab ties, and has weakened the PLO's international standing. Nonetheless, both Fateh and the PLO have survived and still retain overwhelming support among Palestinians everywhere, a fact which bolsters their claim to represent them to the Arab and international communities. The background to this course of developments starts in 1981.

In July of that year, Israeli air raids provoked PLO artillery fire against northern Israeli settlements. For two weeks the Israeli Army kept up its attack, killing 300 people when its aircraft bombed a residential quarter housing PLO offices in West Beirut, but the PLO refused to stop its return fire. A cease-fire was eventually brokered by Saudi Arabia and the US, bringing the PLO and Israel into their first bilateral agreement. For a year, despite constant Israeli incursions into the border area, the PLO maintained the cease-fire in south Lebanon, proving its sense of responsibility and its ability to control its ranks. The PLO continued its operations inside the Occupied Territories, however, as the cease-fire covered only the Lebanese border. By 1982, the PLO had shown itself to be a capable political actor: displaying diplomatic flexibility through its willingness to negotiate, but also demonstrating its insistence on a just solution through continued political-military struggle inside Palestine. Informal PLO-US contacts grew in this context, raising the prospect of a transition to open dialogue. This possibility alarmed a number of parties. Foremost was Israel, followed by certain American officials and Syria, which feared isolation if the PLO were to conclude a separate settlement. Conversely, the PLO's insistence on acceptable terms for peace and its cool reception of the 1981 Fahd Plan displeased its 'moderate' Arab backers, while its continued rejection of UN Resolution 242 as a viable basis for negotiations distanced the West Europeans.

This background goes far in explaining Arab inactivity during the 1982 war. Indeed, it explains the negative role played by Syrian and Saudi emissaries to Washington, who undermined Palestinian demands for US recognition of Palestinian rights in return for the PLO's evacuation from Beirut.⁷⁴ (In stark contrast, Egypt and France insisted on using the occasion to seek a solution for the Palestine problem.) An added aspect of Arab policy was the wish to avoid direct involvement in the Palestine problem. This meant support for the PLO, but only if it kept the problem from Arab doors. The Arab states were therefore reluctant

⁷⁴ For a full discussion, see R. Khalidi, *Under Siege* . . . pp 147-65.

to accept the PLO evacuees from Beirut. Of the eight that finally did, Algeria, Tunis, Sudan, and the two Yemens were too far from the battlefield to be threatened by the presence of a few thousand unarmed guerrillas. Neither Syria nor Jordan wanted to take in large numbers of PLO fighters, heroes in the eyes of the local people, but for the same reason neither could afford to refuse sanctuary entirely.⁷⁵ At the last moment, Iraq's willingness to assist the PLO prompted the Syrian government to switch from adamant refusal into accepting any number of guerrillas who wished to enter the country.

The PLO's ability to withstand the Israeli onslaught virtually unaided for eighty-eight days and then extricate its entire leadership and the bulk of its fighting force intact, was a remarkable achievement. Yet the dismantling of the PLO's institutional base in Lebanon and the dispersal of its combat forces inevitably had their consequences. In the wake of the war, the Syrian leadership moved to exploit Palestinian differences over the causes leading up the exodus from Beirut. The Syrians benefited in particular from their physical control over thousands of guerrillas stationed in east and north Lebanon, and over other forces and support bases in Syria itself. In September 1982, PLO control over its forces was dealt a severe blow when its Chief of Staff, Brigadier-General Sa'd Sayel, was assassinated by unidentified gunmen in a Syrian military zone in eastern Lebanon. In the next few months Syrian officials met members of Fateh's internal opposition, and activated criticism by the PFLP-GC of PLO policies. Concurrently, Libya intensified its contacts with Palestinian rejectionists, condemning Arafat's move towards closer ties with Jordan.

The real basis for Syrian leverage against the PLO was the influence which Syria slowly had gained within Fateh by supporting certain individuals among its leadership.⁷⁶ This was demonstrated during Fateh's Fourth Congress, held in Damascus in May 1980, in which Syria's allies, led by the Fateh Central Committee member, Nimr Saleh, found themselves in a minority. When Saleh and his main supporters withdrew from the meeting, threatening to secede formally unless their

⁷⁵ On Arab positions, see E F Sahliyeh, *The PLO After the Lebanon War*, Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1986, pp 41-3.

⁷⁶ In fact, the first such Syrian attempt was in 1965, when Syrian Intelligence 'planted' two agents into Fateh's minuscule leadership. They took control of two of Fateh's five office-cum-bases in Damascus in early 1966, but the mutiny ended when they were killed by unidentified assailants in February. Interview by the author with former ranking member of the Ba'th Party's Palestinian branch, Amman, May 1985. Since 1980, the Abu Nidal faction has shifted its loyalty to Libya (briefly) and then to Syria, where it is firmly based.

demands were met, senior Syrian officials pressured the Fateh Central Committee into reinstating them and conceding their demands.⁷⁷ It was the same connection that provided the Syrians with the opportunity finally to split Fateh in 1983.⁷⁸ However, the secession of a Fateh faction led by Saleh Nimr, Abu Musa, and Abu Khaled al-'Amlah on 10 May 1983, was important to Syria for its political and moral, rather than its military, value.⁷⁹ This became evident when the Fateh split started to lose momentum, having failed to affect more than a couple of battalions largely officered by ex-Jordanian Army men, colleagues of Abu Musa and Abu Khaled.

During the next few weeks, the Fateh 'mutineers' (as the PLO termed them) tried to expand their support within Fateh itself and the Palestinian movement at large. This proved difficult, however, as the Fateh base generally rejected secession or alliance with Syria as a means for expressing opposition, despite sympathy for specific complaints.⁸⁰ Nor did the split gain strong backing from the PFLP and DFLP, although Habash declared support for the mutineers' demand for reform in June. Only Syrian-backed groups, the PFLP-GC, PPSF, and Sa'iqa, joined the secessionists in calling for a change in the PLO's leadership on 6 June.⁸¹ By this time, Syria was supporting military action against Fateh loyalists, although its official position remained committed to peaceful resolution of the internal conflict and to 'preventing all parties from resorting to military means'.⁸² On 29 May, Fateh mutineers accompanied by Syrian security men had occupied Fateh offices and depots in Damascus. Over the next week, several military bases in the Lebanese Bekaa Valley were attacked or isolated in similar action.

Developments moved more rapidly after 24 June, when Arafat was expelled from Damascus following his public criticism of Syrian involvement in the Fateh split. Libya's public opposition to Arafat since

⁷⁷ Interviews by the author with ranking Fateh members in Tunisia, February 1984, and Amman, March 1984 and May 1985.

⁷⁸ On background and development of the split, see E Rouleau, 'The Future of the PLO', *Foreign Affairs* 62 (1) Fall 1983, pp 138-56, and A M Garfinkle, 'Sources of the Al-Fateh mutiny', *Orbis* 27 (3) Fall 1983, pp 603-40.

⁷⁹ On the secessionists' reasons for action, see translated excerpts from M Shuqeir, 'The history of the split inside Fateh', *Journal of Palestine Studies* 13 (1) Fall 1983, pp 169-80. Pages 180-3 also contain excerpts from interviews in the press with Abu Musa and Nimr Saleh.

⁸⁰ An internal analysis by some Fateh secessionists criticises the mutiny's inability to attract support, or to develop clear alternatives. Reproduced in *An-Nashra* (64), (Nicosia), pp 10-15.

⁸¹ *As-Safir* (Beirut), 7 June 1983.

⁸² On May 30, the Ba'th Party set up an ineffectual three-man committee to initiate a dialogue within Fateh. *As-Safir*, 31 May 1983.

8 June was now matched by Syria's, with both states encouraging the use of force to occupy or evacuate loyalist bases. The Fateh mutineers were generally unable to fulfil this task alone, however, or unwilling to fight their former comrades-in-arms. The PFLP-GC was employed in this role instead, after reinforcing it with Syrian infantry and tanks. The Syrian Army finally intervened directly in late September, ordering loyalist forces out of central Lebanon and escorting them towards Tripoli. That leadership of the PLO was the issue at stake became clear when Arafat joined his men in northern Lebanon. The mutineers and PFLP-GC reaffirmed their intention to oust him, while Sa'iqa and the PLA declared Arafat's continued chairmanship 'illegitimate'. Arafat's success in embarrassing his critics was reflected in the stand taken by the PFLP and DFLP. Though critical of Arafat's return, both groups warned against the use of force to resolve the issue, and subsequently condemned opposition assaults on the Nahr el-Bared and Baddawi refugee camps. Indeed, even the Fateh mutineers ultimately refrained from joining the attack on the camps, forcing the Syrians to deploy the PFLP-GC and the PLA Hittin Brigade, backed by regular Syrian armour and artillery battalions.⁸³ The ensuing siege of Tripoli cost some 400 Palestinian lives, and ended in the evacuation of Arafat and 4,000 men on 23 December.

There has been little change in the basic position of most parties since the brief Palestinian 'civil war'. Repeated attempts at mediation between the PLO and the 'mutineers' by Algeria and South Yemen or between the PLO and Syria by Algeria and Saudi Arabia have largely failed, although Fateh, the DFLP, and the PCP now meet regularly. One consequence for inter-Palestinian relations has been the end of consensus politics; for example, having invited the other groups to attend the sixteenth session of the PNC in November 1984, the PLO convened it in their absence when they refused to participate without prior concessions from Arafat. This change has strained some of the PLO's Arab ties, particularly with Algeria (and South Yemen to a lesser extent). Algeria has consistently refused to host the PNC unless the PFLP and DFLP (especially) participate, although its support for Fateh and the PLO remains unaltered.

Since 1983, the main internal Palestinian development has been the

⁸³ During the battle for the refugee camps of north Lebanon, some 300 PLA men deserted to the PLO. Syria finally threatened to use its own 'iron fist' if Arafat did not leave Tripoli. *As-Safir*, 1 December 1983.

division into three main trends: the PLO mainstream led by Arafat, including Fateh, the ALF and the PLF; the middle-of-the-road opposition including the PFLP, DFLP, and Palestine Communist Party (PCP); and the hardline opposition of the Fateh 'mutineers', PFLP-GC, Sa'iqa, and PPSF. Reflecting this division, two new political formations have emerged. The first is the Syrian-sponsored Palestine National Salvation Front (PNSF), established in March 1985 by the PFLP-GC, PPSF, Sa'iqa and the Fateh dissidents, with the support of breakaway factions from the PLF and PCP.⁸⁴ Although the PNSF has presented itself as the 'protector of the PLO and of national unity', it was in fact formed specifically to 'lead the PLO and topple Arafat'.⁸⁵ The PFLP, DFLP, and Palestine Communist Party (PCP) refused to join this front, establishing the Democratic Alliance instead.

The Democratic Alliance has played an increasingly important role in inter-Palestinian politics. Most significantly, it has consistently refused to undermine the PLO or deny the legitimacy of its bodies, though criticising its policies (notably the PLO-Jordanian accord signed on 11 February 1985). The Democratic Alliance has thus deprived Syrian policy of the unqualified support of the only Palestinian groups besides Fateh to enjoy some credibility among the Palestinian people. This has been made most obvious by the Alliance's statements condemning the savage war of attrition waged by Syria's Lebanese ally, the Shi'ite Amal movement, against Beirut's refugee camps. Indeed, Syria's involvement in the continuing suffering of Palestinian civilians in Lebanon, and its prevention of sustained guerrilla action against Israel in the south, have embarrassed its Palestinian allies and strained relations within the Palestinian opposition. Unless the members of the Democratic Alliance are willing to sacrifice their base in Damascus, however, they are unlikely to resume participation in the PLO's main bodies. Nonetheless, the Democratic Alliance's refusal to undermine the PLO has defeated Syrian attempts first to present the PNSF as an effective alternative and then to suggest the formation of a 'new PLO'. Syria's failure even led it, recently, to make the bizarre suggestion that the PNSF members form a new PLO Executive Committee by choosing a

⁸⁴ See PNSF's founding statement, reproduced in 'Abdul-Hadi an-Nashash, *Al-Azmah ar-Rahinah lith-Thawrah al-Filistinyyah: Judhuruha wa Afaq Halluha (The Current Crisis in the Palestinian Revolution: Its Roots and Prospects for Resolution)*, Damascus: Dar 'An-Nadim Al-Wa'i', 1985, pp 168-72. (In Arabic).

⁸⁵ See statements by the PNSF on 16 May 1984, and the PCP-Provisional Leadership on 27 March 1985, reproduced in An-Nashash, *op. cit.*, pp 185-90 and 181-2.

number of 'independents', although this would deny the PNSF's own relevance and amount to political suicide for its members.⁸⁶

For its part, the PLO has worked to retain its centrality to the regional political process. The primary element in its response has been to strengthen its bonds with the Occupied Territories. The convening of the sixteenth PNC session in Amman in November 1984 reflected, among other considerations, the attempt to address the Palestinians under occupation directly. Similarly, the PLO-Jordanian agreement to form a joint delegation to any negotiations, and the acceptance of the principle of federation between a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza Strip and Jordan, indicated the PLO's concentration on consolidating its position within the Occupied Territories. The success of PLO policy and the continuing popularity of its leadership has been demonstrated by opinion polls in the concerned areas, statements by local figures, and by the massive turnout of 50,000 people at the funeral of the assassinated mayor of Nablus, Zafer Masri, who was a Fateh supporter.⁸⁷

A second element in the PLO's counter-strategy has been to reinforce its Arab and international standing, in response to the damage done to the PLO's credibility by the internecine strife. Combined with the PLO's remoteness from the battlefield, the internal split raised serious doubts about the organisation's continued ability to influence events. The PLO has therefore worked to gain a counterweight to Syria. Relations with Egypt and Iraq in particular have improved, though neither country is currently in a position to impose a relaxation on Syrian opposition to Arafat's continued leadership of the PLO. Furthermore, despite some coolness in the PLO's relations with Saudi Arabia in late 1983 and with Algeria in late 1984, ties with both countries have now stabilised. The PLO has also engaged in active diplomacy among non-Arab countries, in order to build its own foundations for international political action, independently of Arab support were that to be withheld.⁸⁸ An added

⁸⁶ The minutes of the meeting between Syrian Vice-President Abdul-Halim Khaddam and the PNSF, suggest that Jibril was the most vehemently opposed to the proposal.

⁸⁷ Polls quoted by the *Jerusalem Post* on 1 July and 2 December 1983, for example, show support for Arafat among 92 per cent–94 per cent of respondents. A more recent poll place Arafat's personal popularity in the Occupied Territories at 74 per cent, against 1 per cent for Abu Musa. See D Kuttab, 'Opinions of the Occupied', *Middle East International* (London) Number 283, 12 September 1986, pp 14–15.

⁸⁸ During a two-week tour in spring 1986, Arafat brought the number of sub-Saharan African countries granting the PLO full diplomatic recognition to thirty-four. Successive issues of *Filistin ath-Thawra*.

element in the PLO's attempts to provide itself with regional protection has been the constant attempt to improve ties with the USSR, which cooled after the conclusion of the PLO-Jordanian agreement.⁸⁹ In April 1986, Arafat and the Soviet leader, Mikhail Gorbachev, met for the first time, indicating a renewal of Soviet support for the current leadership of the PLO.⁹⁰ Simultaneously, the PLO has sought to limit the regression in West European attitudes towards the Palestine question, relying on its ties with France, Greece and Austria especially to retain a voice in European circles.

The PLO's hopes for survival rest on its ability to generate support in the Occupied Territories, to obtain Arab protection and backing, and to convince the Western countries of the urgent necessity of recognising Palestinian rights in the form of a specific peace plan. Ultimately, the PLO's main card remains its ability to mount military action against Israel, if only for its nuisance value. Although armed struggle against Israel is now less the PLO's *raison d'être* than achieving tangible political and territorial gains, it remains a major element supporting the claim of any group to moral legitimacy in the eyes of the Palestinians. Equally, in their view, armed action remains necessary to remind the world of their plight and to provoke it into actively seeking a just solution. To this extent, the form and content of military operations, not to mention their actual results, are less important than the fact of their happening. The Fateh-Central Committee member, Khalil Wazir, a main architect of Palestinian military strategy, expressed this by saying: 'We try and we experiment. We succeed here and fail there. No matter. What is important is our insistence on pursuing our course'.⁹¹

⁸⁹ During the siege of Tripoli, the USSR urged Arafat to 'cooperate with Syria'. *As-Safir*, 29 November 1983. On PLO-Soviet ties since 1982, see G Golan, 'The Soviet Union and the PLO since the war in Lebanon', *The Middle East Journal* 40 (2) Spring 1986, pp 285-305.

⁹⁰ *Filistin ath-Thawra* 14 (604) 26 April 1986.

⁹¹ Interview by the author with A Saif, *Shu'un Filistiniyya* (152/153) November/December 1985, p 14.

The Afghan politics of exile

The contemporary Afghan case is very complex. Political exile has been the fate of many Afghan leaders, both of the present PDPA (People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan) Government and the opposition, over the last decade. Exile leaders of Afghan parties are currently living in cities in Pakistan, Iran and India. Other Afghan politicians are scattered as exiles in Western Europe and the USA.

There are degrees of exile, gradations which may not be simple to classify, but which nonetheless exist. Some political leaders find exile half-way across the world, in a country not only geographically distant but remote in culture too, as in the case of Leon Trotsky in Mexico. Others find refuge in a neighbouring country sharing some or many cultural traits with their homeland; Ayatollah Khomeini spent all but a brief interlude of his exile just across Iran's border with Iraq, in the self-contained subworld of the Atabat, the Shi'a holy places. Ayatollah Khomeini's fifteen year-long exile also illustrates well the persistent hope, faith and often delusion of so many exile leaders—that they will eventually return to their homeland in triumph.

The key date from which the present pattern of conflict developed is 27 April 1978 (the Saur Revolution) when a small Marxist party took power after a successful military coup in the capital Kabul. By the end of 1978, two distinct groups of leaders had begun to form in exile; the conservative opposition mainly in Peshawar, Pakistan, and key leaders of the Parcham (Banner) faction of the PDPA in Eastern Europe.

Peshawar was a natural place of refuge for Afghan political opponents of the new Kabul regime led by Nur Mohammed Taraki and Hafizullah Amin. Peshawar, the capital of Pakistan's North West Frontier Province (NWFP), lies close to the Afghan border with easy access to many of Afghanistan's most populous provinces. The Pushtun (Pathan) tribal population of NWFP still has much in common in culture, language and traditions with their fellow Pashto-speakers across the Durand Line, a British-created frontier arbitrarily cutting across tribes. The mainly Pushtun Afghan exile leaders would probably feel more at home in Peshawar than in any other city outside Afghanistan. Cultural affinities and links were not the only relevant aspects. It is an article of faith among Afghan nationalists that Peshawar, along with NWFP and

Baluchistan provinces, are by right Afghan lands and should not belong to Pakistan. The irredentist policies pursued from Kabul since Pakistan's creation in 1947 have been the main factor poisoning relations between the two states. The long tribal borderlands stretching almost from Peshawar far into southern Afghanistan form a porous frontier, allowing easy access by many passes.

Already established in Peshawar was a small circle of obscure Afghan political exiles, members of a Muslim fundamentalist group known as 'Young Muslims'. Their radical Islamic ideology had won support among students at Kabul University, where the fundamentalists were the main rivals of the left-wing parties which developed from 1965. Young Muslim leaders had arrived in Peshawar as early as 1973, strongly opposed to the Government of President Mohammed Daoud. After the abject failure of their attempts in 1975 to provoke rural uprisings inside Afghanistan, surviving members of the Young Muslims soon split into three small rival groups living in exile; *Jamiat-i-Islami* (Islamic Society) led by Burhanuddin Rabbani, *Hizb-i-Islami* (Islamic Party) led by Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, and *Hizb-i-Islami* led by Yunis Khalis. The titles each of the three leaders went by was a clue to their backgrounds. 'Professor' Rabbani (born c 1940) had been a teacher in the Islamic department at Kabul University, 'Engineer' Gulbuddin (born 1948) had been a student in the engineering faculty, while 'Maulawi' Yunis Khalis (born c 1920) was a religious scholar (*alim*) of an older generation.

Activists of the Young Muslims and the parties which developed from this circle shared certain ideals and basic objectives, in spite of the differences (personal and other) which broke their original unity. They all treat Islam as a radical political ideology and aim to create by their parties' actions an ideal Islamic state. Whether they realise it or not, the intellectual sources for their often radical social and political views are certainly not restricted to their Muslim roots, but also include modern Western ideologies.

From Summer 1978, the Afghan fundamentalists based in Peshawar boldly seized the initiative in declaring a *jihad* (holy war or struggle) against the Taraki regime.¹ They had a headstart on rival Afghan political organisers in exile, having close links with the Pakistan authorities, besides enjoying the support of Pakistan's *Jama'at-i-Islami*,

¹ See further, Anthony Hyman, *Afghanistan under Soviet Domination, 1964-83*, London: Macmillan, 1984.

the fundamentalist party intimately associated with General Zia ul-Haq's military regime. The tighter organisation and discipline of the fundamentalist parties gave them advantages over the amorphous new parties—less true parties than broad coalitions.

From Summer 1978, they were joined in Peshawar by many new exiles, conservative, religious or liberal democratic opponents of the regime. These included the heads of two influential Afghan families, with substantial religious prestige and popular appeal in Afghanistan's tradition-bound society. Sayyid Ahmad Gailani (born 1936) was a Sufi *pir*, a hereditary 'saint' of the Qadiriya order, venerated by Pushtun tribes of the borderlands. He was also a liberal and secular-minded Kabul businessman and landowner, linked by marriage to the royal family.

Professor Sibghatullah Mojaddedi (born 1929) was a surviving member of a prominent religious family in Kabul, most of whom were murdered by the Taraki regime soon after the April 1978 coup. The Mojaddedis were followed by Afghan members of the Naqshbandi Sufi order. He arrived in Peshawar from Scandinavia, where he had been directing a Saudi-funded Islamic mission. Unlike the other leaders mentioned, he had studied at Al-Azhar in Cairo, the greatest Muslim seminary. As a teacher of religious studies in Kabul *lycées* from the 1960s, he had the reputation of being an Islamic revolutionary and suffered imprisonment before leaving for self-imposed exile in Scandinavia.

A third leader was Mohammad Nabi Mohammadi (born 1920), a well-respected conservative nationalist figure known over a wide region of southern and western Afghanistan. Spanning the gulf between secular and religious, modern and traditional, Mohammadi was both a religious scholar (*alim*) and former member of parliament for Logar province. Unlike the other two conservative leaders, whose families were reckoned to have an alien or exotic status outside Pushtun tribal society, Mohammadi was an Ahmadzai Pushtun as well as a distinguished *maulawi*.

Though none of the three men had been major political figures before the 1978 coup, each soon emerged at the head of a new party based in exile. It was their religious and family status, rather than innate political abilities or intense ambition, which pushed them to the front against many would-be leaders. Gailani was head of the Mahaz (National Islamic Front of Afghanistan), Mojaddedi head of the Jabha (National Liberation Front of Afghanistan) and Mohammadi presided over

Harakat (Islamic Revolution Movement). These six parties grew rapidly from 1979, incorporating dozens more small groups or factions in Peshawar.

A seventh party emerged in 1981, paradoxically out of an attempt to forge unity between the existing rival fundamentalist parties. This was the Islamic Alliance of Afghan Mujahidin, led by Professor Abdul Rasul Sayyaf (born 1947), a political activist who arrived in Peshawar only in 1980 after being released from Pul-e-Charkhi prison in Kabul. Sayyaf was a former teacher in Kabul University's Islamic department, who had earlier studied at Al-Azhar in Cairo and also in Mecca. An ambitious and clever man who speaks fluent modern Arabic, Sayyaf was rumoured to hold puritanical Wahhabi beliefs dear to the hearts of powerful patrons in Saudi Arabia who lavishly funded the Alliance.

The Afghan Left in exile

As for the Parcham faction of the PDPA, its leading members lost out in a vicious power struggle only months after the April coup, being dismissed from their posts or imprisoned from July 1978. Their rivals in the Khalq (Masses) faction—at this time virtually a separate party dominating the ruling PDPA—controlled the levers of power, but being very dependent on Soviet backing, were obliged to agree to Soviet requests to send away to exile and safety some key Parchami leaders as appointed ambassadors to foreign countries. Among these were the two men who in turn were placed in power after the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan at the end of 1979: Babrak Karmal, sent to Prague as ambassador, and Dr Najibullah, sent to the Tehran embassy and who finally replaced Karmal in May 1986.

The small group of Parchami leaders in exile during the eighteen months before the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan remained together for a time in Prague where Karmal had been appointed ambassador before being moved to Moscow in mid-1979. As exiles, the Parchami leaders were clearly under firm Soviet protection, but to most observers their political careers seemed over. With hindsight, they were being held ready to replace their Khalq rivals in the troubled PDPA in Kabul.

The veteran leftist politician Babrak Karmal (born 1930), appointed Deputy Prime Minister after the April 1978 coup, had earlier been elected as one of a group of left-wing MPs during Afghanistan's 'New Democracy' period under King Zahir Shah in the 1960s. Dr Najibullah,

a medical doctor by training and still young (he was born in 1947), was a senior organiser of the party. In 1979 Najibullah was reportedly attached to the KGB in Moscow, in preparation for taking over as head of the Afghan secret police (State Intelligence Service, known from 1980 under the acronym KHAD).

Exile parties and the Afghan Resistance

The relationship between the parties based in exile and the internal guerrilla resistance has been far from straightforward. Resistance sprang up in many parts of Afghanistan during 1979, for the most part spontaneously, in opposition to the crude and often brutal attempts by PDPA activists in the provinces to impose a new order. Beatings, arrests and murders of village *maliks* (chiefs) and *mullahs* (Muslim clergymen) rapidly alienated the rural population from a regime and party which initially had some popular appeal in the country, offering reforms after the stultifying dictatorship of President Daoud. Nor was opposition all conservative. In the north-eastern region in 1979 and later, uprisings were led by the ultra-leftist grouping Setem-i-melli (so-called Afghan Maoists) under the direction of the Marxist revolutionary, Taher Badakhshi.

Each of the Afghan parties based in exile claimed to be playing a major role in the internal Afghan Resistance, though in 1979 their influence was actually often marginal to the various local struggles. The better organised were undoubtedly the fundamentalists. The party Jamiat-i-Islami was the most active in 1979, exploiting its extensive network of militants and sympathisers in non-Pushtun parts of Afghanistan to lead uprisings in the north-west and north-east, notably in Herat and Badakhshan.² In March 1979, cadres of Jamiat-i-Islami—some of whom had earlier taken refuge in Iran's border province of Khorasan in Mashad—started a successful uprising in Herat province, then staged a mutiny in the large military base in Herat city which was joined by many people from the city. The rebellion was suppressed only after air raids on the city and bombardments by Afghan armoured units loyal to the regime rushed to Herat.

None of the Afghan exile parties were able at this time to attract more than small amounts of money from foreign patrons in the Gulf States, and thus their ability to give arms in return for political influence over the many local independent guerrilla groups inside Afghanistan was

² See *ibid.* and Olivier Roy, *L'Afghanistan. Islam et modernité politique*, Paris: Seuil, 1985.

strictly limited. It was among steadily growing numbers of Afghan refugees in Pakistani camps that the parties' influence was most direct. They could raise recruits for *jihad* from among the men, but money was still scarce even for ammunition and .303 calibre rifles made in Darra Adam Khel in the tribal belt of NWFP, let alone dearer, more sophisticated foreign infantry weapons. In 1979, the volume and quality of arms given by the Pakistani military in covert aid to mujahidin of the exile parties were very low. The major source of arms for the exile parties, as for internal guerrilla fronts, continued to be captured convoys, military posts and arsenals (as in Herat city) together with deserters from the Afghan army.

This situation altered overnight with the Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan at the end of December 1979. The stakes of guerrilla warfare were suddenly raised. What had been looked on as a small-scale civil war in a remote land became a conflict involving units of the Soviet armed forces, for the first time since the Second World War. Hitherto largely ignored, the guerrilla war inside Afghanistan now became of intense interest to the international media, and inevitably to some key foreign states and their intelligence agencies. The natural beneficiaries of this surge of interest were, of course, the exile parties.

The 1980 watershed

The exile parties developed spectacularly from 1980. A number of interconnected factors made the Soviet intervention a watershed. The nature of the war, the numbers of refugees, the amount of foreign interest and aid for the Afghan Resistance—all were affected. The war itself changed qualitatively with the arrival of strong Soviet army and air force units. At a total figure which soon reached some 120,000, the Soviet 'limited military contingent' was considerably larger than total Afghan military strength. Their alien presence helped alter a localised civil war into a nationwide guerrilla resistance, whose sole unifying element at this stage was a general hostility to the foreign occupying forces. The exile parties, with their claims to represent the Afghan people as a whole rather than a particular region, tribe or ethnic group, were well placed to exploit the situation. The USA, China and the Gulf States all stepped in to offer aid on a bigger scale than seen before the intervention. At last the largely ignored exile parties were the focus of considerable foreign interest.

The Soviet military presence in Afghanistan alarmed all the states of

the region. Their concern was stirred not only on strategic grounds, but also in some cases because of claims of 'Islamic solidarity', a sympathy with a Muslim people's resistance to foreign and communist aggression. There was a tradition in Saudi Arabia and other Arab states of funding and giving moral support to the Palestinians and other Muslim peoples, claiming to be fighting a *jihad* for independence or autonomy, as in Mindanao in the Philippines. Of the Arab states, Egypt under President Anwar Sadat was the most open in admitting sending arms to the Afghan Resistance from 1980. Sadat described in an interview in 1981, shortly before he was assassinated, how, soon after the Soviet intervention, the Carter Administration had requested him to provide infantry weapons from the extensive stocks of Soviet-made arms in Egypt. These were reportedly flown from Cairo to Pakistan in US planes.

Pakistan's role in the Afghan struggle since 1978 has been the subject of bitter polemics. As the host of the exile parties based across the border in Peshawar and Quetta, Pakistan was crucial to the parties' growth and development. The Pakistan military authorities not only permitted foreign funds and military aid for the Resistance to be channelled through Pakistan, but they themselves actually organised their distribution to the parties. However, the scale and significance of these operations before 1980, together with the covert provision of military training facilities in Pakistan, have been grossly exaggerated in a propaganda campaign orchestrated from Kabul and Moscow, really aimed at justifying and explaining the Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan.³

The proof of this is best seen in the rapid expansion of influence inside Afghanistan of each of the exile parties from 1980. Their sudden growth in influence was directly due to greatly increased quantities of foreign funds and arms, without which they had little to offer the several hundred internal local resistance fronts and guerrilla groups. The impact of these developments was felt unevenly by the various exile parties. The party to benefit most was at first Hizb-i-Islami of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar. By general consensus, it was the best organised of the six, and certainly its activists in Peshawar had the most flair for publicity. To influential American and Chinese officials keen to foil the threat of Soviet expansion from military bases and airfields in Afghanistan, as

³ See, for example, *Undeclared War*, Kabul publications, third edition, 1984, and White Book, 'Pakistan's subversive activities against the Afghan Revolution', 1984.

well as to fundamentalist circles in Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and Iran, Gulbuddin's party seemed to represent the brightest hope in efficiently organising and leading the Afghan resistance.

Another important cause of post-1980 growth in influence of all the exile parties was the Pakistan system of distributing international relief aid to ever-increasing numbers of Afghan refugees. Bombardments and air raids on villages in many areas of Afghanistan were stepped up greatly from 1980, generating a huge increase in numbers of refugees into Pakistan and Iran. Numbers of refugees rose fifteen-fold in just five years from 1980, to reach some 2.8 million in Pakistan alone. Relief aid was channelled partly through the parties, whose activists were responsible in each of hundreds of refugee camps in NWFP and Baluchistan provinces for distributing aid to new arrivals. In registering new arrivals they claimed new party members, and from the men in the camps they recruited volunteers for *jihad*. This indirect relief system must have helped reduce the burden of Pakistani administration at a time of crisis, but one indirect consequence was to increase the patronage and membership, and therefore the power, of the exile parties.

The fundamentalist parties were favoured over and above the moderate nationalist parties in the area of camp administration in the early years, largely, no doubt, due to the influence of certain sympathetic senior officials belonging to Pakistan's Jamaat-i-Islami. This favouritism altered, though, to a more even-handed approach in 1983, when a new Commissioner for Refugees was appointed for the NWFP.

Pressures on exile parties

Three main sources existed for pressure on the Afghan parties based in exile; the host government, other foreign states giving support in money or arms, and guerrilla groups and fronts, together with representative Afghans from inside Afghanistan itself. The host governments of Pakistan and Iran have had considerable potential for leverage over the Afghan parties based in their countries. If they have failed to get their way over the parties on a number of key issues, it is certainly not for want of trying. The ultimate sanctions—the expulsion of leaders or the dissolution of an exile party—have not been used by Pakistan, though Iran has expelled Afghan leaders. Pakistan's military regime under General Zia ul-Haq trod warily in its relations with the Afghan

opposition parties, and from the very beginning their relationship was on an essentially different footing than Revolutionary Iran's with the Afghan exiles. In Pakistan's case, it was almost a process of symbiosis, of mutual benefit through mutual support. General Zia's regime had antagonised or alienated Pakistan's Western and Gulf Arab friends, alike by the hanging of former Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto in 1979, and for the most important of the foreign states one of the few redeeming features of his regime was its support for the Afghan opposition.

At times, there was serious friction between the Afghan parties and the Pakistan authorities. On the issue of the 'leakage' of weapons (the illegal selling off in Pakistan by party officials of arms intended for guerrillas inside Afghanistan), there have been serious disagreements, creating a lot of friction. Pakistan has been deeply embarrassed over the years by the parties' bringing over the border into Pakistan dozens of their Soviet prisoners of war, to hand them over to the International Red Cross or simply to gain foreign publicity. Another issue causing problems has been the degree of unity or disunity between the parties.

It is often argued by Afghan nationalists in exile that Afghan attempts at creating unity between the parties have failed through deliberate obstruction by Pakistan. It may well be true that Pakistan had reason to be concerned if a single, united (and well-armed) Afghan resistance organisation based in Pakistan emerged, comparable to the Palestine Liberation Organisation in Jordan and Lebanon in the 1960s. This was, however, hardly a realistic option, in the medium term at least. The evidence actually points the other way, for Pakistan officials did take repeated initiatives to obtain unity in the form of an alliance of the exile parties. That the various alliances formed have so far proved ephemeral, incomplete or even counter-productive has scarcely been the fault of Pakistan. The blame lies probably more in the nature of Afghan society, with its diverse ethnic, tribal and religious background—differences accurately reflected, after all, in the composition of the parties themselves.⁴ Personality conflicts compounded by basic tribal and ethnic divisions have been the most serious obstacles to opposition unity, and these also exist, significantly enough, within the PDPA ranks.

The inability of the Peshawar parties to form a cohesive political unity

⁴ The ethnic element is crucial to understanding the spread of support for the various parties. Jamiat-i-Islami has attracted mainly Tajiks and Uzbeks, while the other parties based in exile have a mainly Pushtun following. See further A Hyman and Olivier Roy, *ibid.*

had been recognised even in 1979 to be damaging to their joint interests and fatal to any prospect of declaring a viable government-in-exile. A number of initiatives for unity took place from Spring of 1980, in the aftermath of the Soviet intervention. The first one was prompted by Pakistan officials, and probably by Saudi Arabia and other interested foreign states. The others came about by pressure from inside Afghanistan.

Unity was anticipated from the formation in March 1980 of the Islamic Alliance under a compromise figure, Professor A. R. Sayyaf. This paper alliance of five of the Peshawar parties—the sixth (Hizb-i-Islami of Gulbuddin) refused to join—was formed under direct pressure on the reluctant parties by Pakistan officials, according to reliable accounts. It was intended to put an end to the rivalries between the parties and to provide an efficient means for channelling foreign—essentially Saudi and Kuwaiti—aid to the Afghan resistance. Instead, the Islamic Alliance under Sayyaf's management developed by 1981 into something akin to a seventh rival party. It did not succeed even in uniting the fundamentalist-inclined parties. A blistering public exposé of Sayyaf's manipulation of Alliance funds to serve his own ambitions was made late in 1983 by one of the most widely respected Peshawar leaders, Yunis Khalis—the only leader, incidentally, who for much of each year lived across the border in Nangarhar province in southern Afghanistan, sharing the dangers of the guerrilla war. Khalis at the same time attacked the Arab countries for giving over their aid to 'stooges' who, he claimed, represented neither significant political parties nor the guerrillas inside Afghanistan, blaming the meddling Arabs for the disunity of the Afghan mujahidin.

From inside Afghanistan, the shock of the Soviet invasion and the state of division and rivalry between the exile parties jointly produced a striking initiative during the early months of 1980, to hold a Loya Jirga, a general assembly of representatives from every province of the country. The Loya Jirga is a traditional form of Afghan assembly called by rulers to decide or give assent to important policy decisions. This Loya Jirga was different, of course, in being called by a large number of local leaders throughout the country against, rather than for, the Kabul government. For the same reason, the assembly could not be held in the capital city of Kabul, so the decision was taken to summon it just across the border in Peshawar for April 1980, giving time for the delegates from the far-flung regions to the west and north of the Hindu Kush to make their way there.



The Loya Jirga was a bold, imaginative but doomed venture to get real unity for a national struggle against a Soviet-imposed communist regime. Its leaders hoped to merge the internal fighting groups and the six rival parties into an effective and party-less alliance. Over two thousand representatives from the twenty-nine provinces and the nomadic tribes had arrived in Peshawar by April 1980, including some eminent and influential local *maliks*, especially from the southern Pushtun tribes. The elected president of the Loya Jirga was Omar Babrakzai, an urbane and secular-minded judge, aged forty and a graduate of the Sorbonne.

Babrakzai explained the Afghan struggle as being essentially one for independence. As a recognised state, Afghanistan had the right to a separate and independent existence, and 'Soviet imperialism' had no business in their country. He denounced Soviet imperialism as being even more deadly than other types of imperialism or colonialism; while the British had only been interested in exploiting a colony's raw materials, the Soviet Union attempts also to destroy its culture, religion, history and traditions.⁵

The delegates elected a 68-member revolutionary council in May 1980. A number of members of smaller groups or parties (such as Afghan Mellat, a Pushtun nationalist party founded in 1966) joined the delegates of the Loya Jirga. But it represented a threat to the interests of the six established exile parties, and may also have been looked on with disapproval by the Pakistani authorities. The Loya Jirga's unity was shattered in July 1981, when a majority of its Pushtun representatives were persuaded to back the National front of Pir S A Gailani.

Grassroots internal pressure for national unity, and impatience over the anarchy within the Afghan resistance, produced another initiative in April 1981. A band of some three hundred *mullahs* (Muslim clergymen) from many areas of Afghanistan arrived in Peshawar to press for unity. They also sought an end to harmful rivalries producing gun-fights between local guerrillas and the activists of some of the exile parties—notoriously, Hizb-i-Islami of Gulbuddin, which was trying to expand its power in many areas. The *mullahs'* efforts to promote unity attracted praise from many sides, and may have helped to spur the exile parties to form new alliances later that summer.

In June 1981, the three so-called moderate nationalist leaders—Nabi Mohammadi, Gailani and Mojaddedi—announced the formation of

⁵ A Hyman, *ibid.*, p 144-5.

their alliance, the Islamic Unity of Afghan Mujahidin. This loose alliance, in the form of a common council in Peshawar and close relations in the field between the three parties' guerrilla commanders has held well since then. The moderates have proved more successful in working together, though an important section of Mohammadi's party at once broke away, declaring it was now part of the fundamentalist grouping under Professor Sayyaf. In August 1981, the fundamentalists declared their own response, a new alliance of the three parties of Gulbuddin, Rabbani and Khalis, together with Sayyaf's. The large assembly announcing this decision took place in a Peshawar mosque under the slogan of 'one leader and one banner'. Unfortunately, they never decided upon implementing this slogan, and fierce rivalry persisted between the fundamentalist alliance's respective parties.

A second Loya Jirga meeting in October 1981 was promoted by the moderate Alliance, this time held in the city of Quetta in Pakistan's western province of Baluchistan. Again, it attracted much interest from inside Afghanistan, and several thousand delegates came to Quetta. They demanded the creation of a Grand Council to make decisions binding on the Afghan people as a whole. The hopes of the organisers were fatally damaged by the fundamentalist parties, who denounced the Quetta assembly and refused to take part. However, a considerable number of individual guerrilla commanders linked to the fundamentalist parties did attend the Loya Jirga in Quetta, probably indicating a strong Afghan desire to reach unity, irrespective of exile party orders. The Quetta assembly was in the end broken up by Pakistan police, probably in collusion with the fundamentalist leaders Gulbuddin and Sayyaf.

Rumours of support for the Jirga from Afghanistan's former King Zahir Shah caused a surge of interest among Afghan nationalists. Reports that the ex-King, (living in exile in Rome since 1973), was in close touch with leaders of the three conservative parties were credited widely among the Afghan population as a whole. At this time and since, a potential rallying-point for Afghan unity has been the symbol of monarchy, grown more attractive for most Afghans nostalgic for the 'Golden Age' of peace before the 1973 coup which had ended Zahir Shah's reign. But there was also fierce antagonism to the idea of any role for Zahir Shah, coming from the fundamentalists. And there was little sign that the timid ex-King himself was willing to embark on a crusade to forge unity, or to restore peace to the land.

Since 1981, a number of new, grandly named alliances between the

Peshawar-based parties have come and gone. Their actual significance has been minimal. More important has been the state of relations between the internal commanders of the respective parties. These have steadily improved, on the whole. The essential lines have emerged as a close working relationship between the five more moderate parties—the three forming the Islamic Unity (led by Mohammadi, Gailani and Mojaddedi), together with the Jamiat-i-Islami of Rabbani and Hizb-i-Islami of Khalis. The aggressively independent Hizb-i-Islami of Gulbuddin has lost ground inside Afghanistan, and suffered from defections from its commanders. As for Sayyaf's grouping, it has failed to develop into a party as such, and stands somewhat isolated.

There has been a growing realisation on the part of Afghan exile parties of the need for a formal degree of unity so as to help towards the goal of international recognition of the Afghan Resistance as a government-in-exile, rather than a mere collection of rival parties. All the parties at least agree in denouncing the UN-sponsored indirect talks in Geneva, which have taken place over eight (so far inconclusive) rounds, between Pakistan and Afghanistan. In particular, the Afghan parties have stated that the fate of Afghanistan will be decided by the Afghans, and that Pakistan is not their representative at Geneva. The shadow of Geneva looms large over the Afghan exile parties.

The seven Peshawar-based parties agreed to allow Rabbani, head of the Jamiat-i-Islami (emerging as the most important single party inside Afghanistan) to serve as spokesman for the Afghan Resistance in January 1984, at a summit of the Islamic Conference Organisation (ICO).⁶ Yet they made no institutional progress towards unity for over a year, until at the end of March 1985, 'a very senior Pakistani official called the leaders in and told them that they had to form an alliance that could represent them jointly'.⁷ Henry Bradsher writes that the direct result of this piece of advice was the formation by the seven parties of the Islamic Alliance of Afghan Mujahidin, seeking to gain representation at the United Nations and other international organisations.

The seven leaders decided on a rotating chairmanship, so as to allow each party leader in turn a three-month period in which to represent the Alliance as a whole. In the ICO the Alliance spokesmen and their

⁶ The ICO gives the Unity, not Jamiat-i-Islami, observer status, as the entity representing the Afghan Resistance as a whole. A delegation of Afghan representatives of the seven major exile parties attends the regular meetings of the ICO.

⁷ Henry S Bradsher, *Afghanistan and the Soviet Union*, Durham, USA: Duke University Press, 1985, p 296.

influential backers among the Muslim states are pressing hard to be granted the vacant seat of Afghanistan, possibly early in 1987, at the next summit meeting of the ico. The most dramatic international trip undertaken by Alliance representatives recently was a visit to the US in June 1986, in the course of which four Afghan party leaders met President Reagan in Washington. Nothing of real substance emerged from this meeting, but the very fact that it took place at all is significant. Though Reagan refused to concede official diplomatic recognition—a formal request for such recognition was made, but Reagan said this was 'premature'—the White House meeting cannot fail to have encouraged the Afghan leaders. In Paris and other West European capitals, the Afghan delegation was also warmly received.

However, only four out of the seven leaders had agreed to go on the visit to the USA, and Rabbani (the Alliance chairman at the time) on his return to Peshawar in July 1986, sounded more conciliatory towards the inveterately hostile Gulbuddin and Sayyaf who had strongly opposed the US visit. Rabbani stressed that the first priority for the Alliance must be gaining recognition by Islamic states as the rightful representative of the people of Afghanistan. The Alliance plans to open in the near future some offices in order to lobby actively for international recognition, with offices planned initially in Jeddah as well as New York.

Iran and the Afghan Resistance

The basic ethnic and tribal alignments within Afghanistan which have acted as the key to the development of the party system have already been briefly alluded to. Also important is the sectarian split between Sunni and Shi'a Islam. At least 80 per cent of the Afghan population are Sunni Muslims, with the Shi'a minority nearly all *imami* (Twelver Shi'as), in common with the majority of Iranians. (An Isma'ili Shi'a community also exists in Badakhshan, but it has produced no parties in exile). Shi'as are concentrated in central and western Afghanistan, and have long maintained religious links with Iran, where their *ulema* study at the famous seminaries in Qum and Mashad. The Afghan Shi'as have long been a despised minority in their own land, often subjected to persecution. The main body of Afghan Shi'as are from the Persian-speaking Hazara minority, a desperately poor ethnic group of Mongol-Turk origin, living in the central mountain region of Afghanistan, who have settled in Kabul and all the big Afghan towns.

Iran's role in the Afghan Resistance has been far less important than

Pakistan's since 1978. One explanation for this is the fact that Iran has been in turmoil since 1978, first with its Islamic Revolution, then with the war with Iraq to distract it from the Afghan struggle. Iran's interest in the Afghan struggle is essentially different from Pakistan's on several levels; Iran does not permit any foreign arms to reach the Afghan exile parties with offices in its cities—not even allowing, until 1983, the UNHCR's offer of strictly humanitarian relief aid of medicine, food and tents for about one and a half million Afghan refugees in Iran. The Iranian government jealously guards its own monopoly of dealings with the Afghan parties, and has in the past closed down some Afghan party offices, and expelled leaders on suspicion of their 'plots' with foreign powers—in particular the 'Great Satan', the USA.

Iran's leaders and state-controlled media regularly brand Soviet support for the PDPA regime in Kabul as 'Soviet imperialism', and pledge Iran's backing for the 'just and Islamic cause' of the Afghan mujahidin. The four fundamentalist parties of Sunni Afghans based in Peshawar also maintain offices in Tehran, Mashad and Qum. Seven specifically Shi'a Afghan parties are also represented in Iran—some of which also maintain offices in Quetta, in a part of Pakistan not so distant or alien as Peshawar to Shi'a centres inside Afghanistan. They do not form a united movement.

Inevitably, it is the Afghan Shi'a parties which are more at home in Iran, in the fervently Shi'a atmosphere of the Islamic Republic. But only those small, militantly Shi'a Afghan parties which abandon pretences to independence *vis-à-vis* the Tehran regime have been given privileged treatment, weapons and training. These are the Afghan groups known as Jihad Islami, Hizbollah and Pasdaran, described by a recent shrewd visitor to Iran as, 'straightforward emanations of the Tehran regime'.⁸ Iran's help for these groups has been actually counter-productive as far as the war against the Kabul regime is concerned, for the Pasdaran and associated militant Shi'a groups have fought not against the Soviet-Afghan government forces, but against other Shi'a groups for control of the Hazarajat region of central Afghanistan.

Relations with the regime's representatives have often been strained for the more important and independent Afghan parties in Iran, whether Shi'a or Sunni. The major Afghan parties are still funded mainly by voluntary contributions of money from those Afghan

⁸ See Chris Kutschera in *The Middle East* (London) August 1986, pp 43–7.

refugees working in Iran. Many of the refugees in Iran regard it as their sacred duty to give over to the parties a portion of their miserable wages as labourers, and some volunteer to go to fight in Herat or other regions across the border. The party offices in Mashad, close to the Herat border, have many wounded Afghans from the war fronts on their hands, for whom they find medical treatment once they have brought them across.

Many Afghan party organisers based in Iran have become sceptical of the depth of Iranian commitment to their cause, because they continue to face serious difficulties in their relations with the Pasdaran (Iranian Revolutionary Guards) at the borders, as well as with local *komitehs* in Khorasan province, Tehran and other parts of Iran where they have settled. Afghan guerrillas have frequently had their arms confiscated at the borders with Herat province, others claim to have been robbed of their possessions by Pasdar units. Afghans are not permitted the freedom of movement within Iran which they enjoy in Pakistan, being forced to register with local *komitehs*, and request official permits from the Iranians. The parties bitterly resent Iran's refusal to allow them to transit through Iran or stockpile there the arms and ammunition badly needed in Herat and other western regions of Afghanistan.

The two major independent Afghan Shi'a parties based in Iran are Harakat Islami (Islamic Movement), and Nasr (Victory). Harakat Islami was founded in 1978 by a well-known Shi'a religious leader of Kandahar, Shaikh Asef Mohsini. His independence of the Iranian authorities was shown when the party was banned for a time from Iran, on the fatuous charge of being US agents. The party is said to be the sole Afghan Shi'a party still seriously fighting the Soviet-Afghan forces on fronts all over western Afghanistan. Harakat captured early on in the war heavy artillery, and it has cooperated well with the strongest Afghan party of all, Jamiat-i-Islami. Nasr, on the other hand, is embroiled in the intra-Shi'a power struggle in the central region, though its spokesmen claim Nasr is also active against Soviet forces on a number of fronts. Nasr is a radical Shi'a political party with its own distinct identity and origin. It was formed from a circle of intellectuals and *ulema* in Kabul before the 1978 Saur Revolution, and is not simply a reflection of Iranian interference in the Afghan political scene.

War and peace

Hopes for an Afghanistan settlement to end the war have continued

through four years of protracted negotiations at Geneva, under the auspices of the UN Under-Secretary, Diego Cordovez. The latest brief round, the eighth in the series of indirect talks between Pakistan and Afghanistan, ended in August 1986, with Mr Cordovez reportedly concentrating on the problem of monitoring effectively the implementation of agreements which would have to be signed before any phased withdrawal of the Soviet 'limited military contingent' could begin. Mikhail Gorbachev announced on 28 July in Vladivostok a unilateral token withdrawal of six Soviet regiments (6,000–8,000 troops) by the end of the year.

Spokesmen for the Afghan Resistance are extremely critical of the fact that the UN-sponsored talks are taking place without any representation by the Afghan alliance. They claim that it is unrealistic for the Geneva talks not to include both the Resistance and the Soviet Union, arguing that it is these two unrepresented parties which actually control Afghanistan, rather than the puppet regime in Kabul imposed by Soviet military forces at the end of 1979, or Pakistan for that matter.

The serious prospect of being shut out completely from a negotiated settlement of the Afghan crisis is something which has helped to concentrate the collective mind of the Resistance parties of the Afghan Alliance. It has not yet, however, forged either firm unity or agreement on strategy between the Alliance's component parties. Without greater unity of purpose, there can be little realistic expectation of forming, let alone gaining international recognition for, an Afghan government in exile. This is widely recognised by Afghan opposition spokesmen as essential towards the long-term goal of challenging the PDPA government's right to hold the seat of Afghanistan in the UN General Assembly. Of the many experienced professional diplomats who have resigned from Afghan posts abroad since 1979—including former senior Afghan representatives at the UN General Assembly—few believe that progress at the UN will be anything but slow, with or without observer status. (International moral backing for the PLO and ANC has won little for their causes at the UN.) De-recognition of a state is rare at the UN. Even where a government has lost effective control of its national territory, or the support of the bulk of its population, as long as it retains control of the capital the government has claims to represent the state.

It is difficult to dispute the substantial accuracy of Afghan opposition assessments that what is being attempted by the UN-sponsored Geneva talks is to reach peace by a sell-out—a settlement guaranteeing the stability of an unpopular, unrepresentative and essentially unstable

Kabul regime. Whether or not the guerrilla struggle inside Afghanistan could survive, or would effectively die down if Pakistan agreed at Geneva to close its borders and not allow arms through for the Afghan Resistance, is very difficult to predict, and beyond the scope of this article. The fact that Pakistan is under increasing strain, political as well as economic, to resolve the Afghan crisis, by ending the war, getting a withdrawal of Soviet troops and the return of some three million Afghan refugees, does increase the likelihood of an eventual agreement being reached at Geneva. But whether such a settlement would stick, let alone accomplish the voluntary return of all Afghan refugees from Pakistan and Iran, is quite another matter.

Much speculation has gone on in recent years by well-meaning regional specialists about the possible 'Finlandisation' of Afghanistan. This would be a very happy conclusion to the terribly destructive war, but it may be over-optimistic, even naive, to expect that this is really likely, given the fact that Afghanistan occupies the sensitive place it does along the Central Asian borders of the USSR—in the Soviet Union's 'backyard'. It will continue to be a matter for discussion and polemics whether there is a willingness on the part of the Soviet Union to compromise over Afghanistan's independence. Certainly it was easier for the Soviet Union to enter Afghanistan than to leave it, battered but still defiant. I think the Indian specialist, Professor Bhabani Sen Gupta, is more realistic in his recent assessment;

Afghanistan cannot be a Finland; there is no reason why the Soviets should have a Finland across its southern border in the mid-1980s, when they can have a fully-fledged pro-Soviet Marxist-ruled state with considerable future political and strategic implications for the sensitive regions of the Persian Gulf and South Asia.⁹

⁹ Bhabani Sen Gupta, *Afghanistan. Politics, Economics and Society*, London: Frances Pinter, 1986, p. 155.

SWAPO of Namibia: a movement in exile

'The world has forgotten us. We sit here and write our atrocity stories and no one cares.'
Editor of *The Namibian*, the Windhoek weekly newspaper.

Namibia has indeed been forgotten, despite the world's momentary interest in the prospects of change amidst turmoil in South Africa, Namibia's occupying power. The twenty-sixth of August 1986 marked the twentieth anniversary of the start of the guerrilla war waged by the South West Africa People's Organisation (SWAPO) against the South African occupation forces, estimated at between 50,000 and 100,000.

The twenty-sixth of August, which SWAPO commemorates annually as Namibia Day, is also a date of significance to the Herero community of central Namibia, who shared with the southerly Nama the brunt of German exploitation and even genocide when, from 1884 to 1915, their country was colonised as German South West Africa. On that date in 1923 their chief, who had died in exile, was buried at their sacred burial place at Okahandja, where a great gathering has been held annually ever since, to keep alive the spirit of Namibian independence.

At a pre-Namibia Day rally in Windhoek on Sunday, 24 August 1986, the main speaker, Mokganele Tlhabanelo of SWAPO, also Assistant General Secretary of the Council of Churches in Namibia, told the 8,000-strong gathering that the Namibians had taken up arms in 1966 against a background of colonial violence:

Was it SWAPO who in 1904 exterminated almost half the Herero speaking people, or was it General von Trotha? Was it SWAPO who in 1917 killed Chief Mandume and his men, or was it Louis Botha? Was it SWAPO who in 1922 killed the Bondelswarts nation in the South? On 10 December 1959, in the Old Location, many people were murdered. Was it by SWAPO?

Tlhabanelo called upon South Africa to accede to the cease-fire offered by SWAPO, since 'South Africa with all her sophisticated machinery cannot win this war,' after twenty years of 'attempting to wipe SWAPO off the face of the earth.' The veteran Acting President of SWAPO, Nathaniel Maxuilili, read a message from the exiled President, Sam Nujoma, threatening a general strike 'which will cripple Botha's regime in

Namibia'. Maxuileli, whose courageous bearing during over twenty years of house arrest and banning was an inspiration to many Namibians, remarked that while the then South African Prime Minister, P W Botha 'saw fit to call SWAPO a terrorist organisation, he himself was terrorising the whole of the sub-continent.'¹

The speeches, the celebration of Namibia Day, and the enduring armed struggle by guerrillas drawn from Namibia's small population of 1.5 million, underline both the determined nationalism that has motivated the long resistance to foreign occupation, and its continuity. The Nujoma message read by his substitute, Maxuileli, also emphasises the twenty years of interaction between on the one hand, the exiled body of SWAPO leaders and followers and on the other, the mass of membership and local leaders within Namibia. A major obstacle the Namibians have had to surmount has, however, been the indifference and ignorance regarding them that has enabled South Africa to keep the United Nations at bay for forty years, including the last twenty years of illegal occupation.

The twenty-year struggle towards independence led by SWAPO was inspired at the outset both by an acute sense of economic deprivation and racial oppression, and by the determination of Namibians in exile to recover their lost sovereignty. Much has been written of the extreme form of colonial exploitation which the South Africans have maintained, as successors to the Germans, for half a century.² It has been in defence of their own share in this exploitation that the USA, Britain and West Germany have constantly weakened efforts by the UN to bring it to an end: this aspect, too, has been studied with some thoroughness. The role of South Africa, both political and military, in Namibia is equally the subject of much analysis.³ This ground is not covered below, except in so far as it has a direct bearing on the theme of this article, the rise of SWAPO as a movement in exile. It is hoped that this chronological recital will convey some of the character of SWAPO, of the forces that have moulded that character, and of its impact on a world only too ready to ignore the intractable problem posed by South Africa's illegal occupation of Namibia.

¹ Namibia Communications Centre, London Release, Windhoek, 25 August 1986: 'Commemoration of Namibia Day in Windhoek'

² See Tore Linné Eriksen, *The Political Economy of Namibia: An Annotated, Critical Bibliography*, Uppsala: The Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, 1985. Two useful summaries are: R H Green, M L and K Kiljunen (eds), *Namibia. The Last Colony*, London: Longman, 1981; SWAPO Department of Publicity and Information, *To Be Born a Nation*, London: Zed Press, 1981

³ Eriksen, *The Political Economy of Namibia*, pp 107-71, 244-56.

Origins of exile

The will to end their exile, even within the borders of South West Africa, was a driving force for the Hereros from the days of their destruction as a nation in 1904, by the Germans. The prayer of their aged chief, Hosea Kutako, whose life spanned both the German-Herero War of 1904-46, and the pre-Sharpeville Windhoek shootings of 1959, poignantly expressed the reality of their dispossession, first by the Germans and from 1915 by South Africa, then still a British dominion: 'O Lord, help us who roam about. Help us who have been placed in Africa and have no dwelling place of our own. Give us back our dwelling place'.⁴ A few thousand Hereros escaped General von Trotha's 'extermination order' of 1904 (recalled by Tlhabanelo at the Windhoek meeting), some of them taking up exile where their descendants remain, in what is now Botswana. In 1947 they asked the Reverend Michael Scott in South Africa to gather evidence among the Namibians remaining under South African rule to disprove the claim made to the United Nations by their rulers, that they were willing to be incorporated into South Africa. Thus, it was through the efforts of exiles that Namibians themselves were able to bring the issue of Namibia to the attention of the UN, despite the virtual imprisonment of the majority of their own country, and the exile of many more.

The rise of a sense of nationhood among the Namibians and of colonial independence throughout the world further stimulated resistance to South African rule. The Namibians knew themselves to be wards of the world community, whose duty it was to free them from the control of a power, mandated by the defunct League of Nations to administer their territory after the defeat of Germany in 1945. To the old oppression of contract labour, the denial of education, and a catalogue of economic hardships, was added the apartheid policy in 1948, which was to increase their burdens beyond endurance. Some, like the young railway worker Sam Nujoma, were first aroused to revolt by the realisation of the low value placed upon Namibians as human beings.⁵ Others, especially from Ovamboland in the north, were awakened by the discrimination against their fellow-workers in the labour market, which forced them to submit to paupers' wages, brutal treatment and the total lack of rights through the hated contract labour system. Despite the denial of education and the harsh repression of

⁴ Michael Scott, *A Time to Speak*, London: Faber and Faber, 1958, p 266.

⁵ Liberation Support Movement (ed), *Namibia: SWAPO Rights for Freedom*, Oakland, California: LSM Information Center, 1978.

suspected 'trouble-makers', the workers' compounds became seed-beds for political growth in the 1950s.⁶

Some from the north broke their labour contracts and moved illegally into South Africa. In the still relatively liberal atmosphere of Cape Town in the late 1950s, one of them, Andimba Toivo ja Toivo, was to take the lead in forming the Ovamboland People's Congress, later part of the Ovamboland People's Organisation (opo) in Windhoek. The leaders, notably the President of opo and dynamic labour organiser, Sam Nujoma, were prominent in opposing the forced removal of residents of the Old Location in Windhoek to the new, apartheid-style 'townships' of Katutura. This opposition led to the events of 10 December 1959 in Windhoek, which left twelve peaceful demonstrators dead and forty-five injured in a hail of bullets. The organisers were subjected to imprisonment or banishment: Sam Nujoma was among those who escaped across the border.⁷

During 1960 many young political activists who had escaped from white-ruled South Africa were welcomed in Dar es Salaam, then the nearest independent African capital. A number of the Namibians among them appeared in New York soon afterwards, as petitioners who had followed Michael Scott to the United Nations. These early Namibian exiles were from the South West African National Union, (SWANU) founded by students in 1959, and from opo, renamed and reconstituted as the South West Africa People's Organisation (SWAPO) in April 1960. SWANU was seen as sophisticated, perhaps elitist, and Peking-orientated; SWAPO as inexperienced, populist and non-aligned. Both were recognised internationally and were drawn into the 'Casablanca' or 'Monrovia' groupings with, for the most part, artificial doctrinal differences.

A clear line of demarcation was to appear in 1964, however, when the Liberation Committee of the newly formed Organisation of African Unity (oau) put to each a straight question as to their preparedness to take up arms against the South Africans occupying their country. The unequivocal 'yes' from SWAPO led to its recognition, and SWANU's refusal to the withdrawal of oau support.⁸ In the years that followed, this

⁶ Vinnia Ndadi, *Breaking Contract. The Story of Vinnia Ndadi*, Richmond, British Columbia: LSM Press, 1974, *passim*.

⁷ John Ya Otto, *Battlefront Namibia. An Autobiography*, London: Heinemann, 1981, pp 49-54.

⁸ Peter Katjavivi, 'The Rise of Namibian nationalism and its international dimensions', Unpublished D Phil thesis, University of Oxford, 1986, p 165. A different viewpoint can be seen in Richard Gibson, *African Liberation Movements: Contemporary Struggles against White Minority Rule*, London: Oxford University Press, 1972, pp 123-4.

recognition was justified by the growth of SWAPO to its present status as the 'sole and authentic representative of the Namibian people'⁹ in the eyes of the UN General Assembly and of the vast majority of its constituent member-states.

An initial congress of the party in 1960 had elected Nujoma President and Nathaniel Maxuulili, already a popular symbol of national resistance, Acting President in Nujoma's absence abroad. This policy was followed with other posts, the incumbent in exile always having an acting opposite number within the territory. The second Annual General Conference of the executive committee, held in Dar es Salaam in 1965, was concerned to improve communications with SWAPO headquarters in Windhoek, to tighten financial control as funds increased from the OAU, socialist countries and support groups in the West, and to streamline the functioning of the departments.¹⁰

The party in exile had made strides. Offices were established in Cairo and Algiers, and at the UN, with many more to follow. The leadership had undergone a hard apprenticeship, rapidly overcoming what might have been crippling disadvantages in terms of the Namibians' early isolation and lack of educational opportunities. Observers were impressed with the dedication, high principles and self-discipline displayed by most of the SWAPO leaders, qualities soon lost by many other exiled politicians. These leaders have survived two decades of exile, leaving others to return to Namibia on South Africa's terms.

The work of SWAPO in exile seemed in these early years to be a very minor affair compared to the momentous events in train among the UN member-states, whose judges at the International Court of Justice deliberated on Namibia's future. The issue had first come before the Hague Court as a result of South Africa's refusal initially to hand the territory over to the UN Trusteeship Council, and later even to acknowledge its duties under the League of Nations mandate. An Advisory Opinion favourable to Ethiopia and Liberia, who claimed the right as League members to seek a 'contentious judgment' on South West Africa, was followed in 1966 by calamity. The World Court reversed its earlier opinion, and years of argument were nullified as it ruled that Ethiopia and Liberia had no *locus standi* and that the case was thus inadmissible. The circumstances (in which the Australian presiding judge gave the casting vote destroying the case) were almost as

⁹ UN General Assembly Resolutions 3111 (1973), 31/146 (1976).

¹⁰ Katjavivi, *Rise of Namibian Nationalism*, p 164.

damaging to the reputation of the Court as to the object of the hearings. Those who had for years prevailed upon SWAPO to await the judgment of the Court as the first, essential step before the UN could prepare the Namibians for independence, were confounded. To SWAPO it immediately became clear, as Ja Toivo was to put it, that 'we could secure our freedom only by fighting for it.'¹¹

Launching the armed struggle

On 18 July 1966 Sam Nujoma announced that SWAPO had taken up arms against South Africa, proclaiming 'we must at once begin crossing the many rivers of blood on our march towards freedom.'¹² Training had begun earlier and in August 1966 the first units had penetrated northern Namibia through the Caprivi Strip, following the long trek from Tanzania. On 26 August 1966 an engagement with South African forces at Omgulumbashe led to the killing of two guerrillas and the capture of twenty-seven. The following May the guerrilla commander, Tobias Hainyeko, was killed in action crossing the Zambezi river. In 1968 the prisoners taken at Omgulumbashe and other internal leaders, including Ja Toivo, were by means of retrospective legislation, put on trial for their lives in Pretoria. Death sentences were narrowly averted as a result of world pressure and twenty-nine of the thirty-two were sent to Robben Island prison with long sentences, twenty of them for life.¹³

SWAPO had had a very short life inside Namibia before many of its leaders had escaped abroad. Conditions for its survival inside the territory were grim indeed. As in the dark post-Sharpeville years in South Africa, the security police in Namibia had a free hand in dealing with African political activists. There was, though, a difference: SWAPO did not suffer the bans which virtually closed down the ANC and Pan Africanist Congress (PAC) in South Africa for a dozen years. South Africa, while repudiating the League Mandate, paid lip-service to its provisions by concentrating its troops inside the 100 square miles of Walvis Bay, to which it laid territorial claim, and by allowing SWAPO and other smaller parties to exist. Their existence was made precarious, however, by the proscription of leaders such as Maxuilili, by the jailing of Ja Toivo and others, and by the repression in the Katutura compound outside Windhoek and in all urban locations. In the heavily populated

¹¹ *Statement*, Supreme Court of Republic of South Africa, Pretoria, 26 January 1968.

¹² *Statement*, SWAPO Provisional Headquarters, Dar es Salaam, 18 July 1966.

¹³ Andimba Ja Toivo was released unconditionally in 1984 as were the other prisoners at later dates. In 1985 Ja Toivo was elected, unopposed, to the vacant post of Secretary-General of SWAPO.

north, indirect rule was harshly maintained through traditional chiefs and councillors protected by armed bodyguards, together the enemies of the rural SWAPO activists.

Abroad, the handicaps were immense. In addition to a lack of training, experience and learning, their numbers were small: an important consultative conference held at Tanga in Tanzania in 1969, was attended by thirty members. Ignorance of their cause was so great that they had constantly to demand for it recognition other than as a South African minority issue. Yet they rose instantly to the military challenge presented by the World Court *débâcle*, and turned the disasters that followed into rallying calls for national regeneration. As with the establishment of 26 August as Namibia Day, the memory of their first commander, Hainyeko, as a national hero was kept alive, and the Namibians with Ja Toivo on Robben Island were remembered as symbols of sacrifice and suffering for the cause of freedom.

Their human calibre commended SWAPO to the governments of countries friendly to their cause. Military training schemes were agreed with Algeria, Egypt, Ghana, North Korea, the Soviet Union and Tanzania, the majority of personnel being trained in Africa. New African missions were established in Congo (Brazzaville), Ethiopia, Nigeria, Senegal, Zambia (to which Provisional Headquarters were moved at the end of the 1960s) and, following their independence, Angola and Zimbabwe. Luanda succeeded Lusaka as Provisional Headquarters in 1979. In Europe, offices were opened in Britain (where in 1969 after the Tanga conference, the UK representative, Peter Katjavivi, was additionally charged with maintaining contact with the leadership inside Namibia), East Germany, France, Romania, Sweden, West Germany and Yugoslavia. Offices in New Delhi and Melbourne more recently extended SWAPO's reach to all five continents.

South Africa's presence outlawed

Many countries—notably in the Caribbean, West and Central Africa and Scandinavia—have assisted SWAPO, despite the ostensible remoteness to some of them of the Namibian cause. The start of the armed struggle enhanced the status of SWAPO in some countries, but it took another great event to bring the case for Namibian freedom into focus for many more. The collapse of the case at the World Court in 1966 was acclaimed by South Africa as a victory. It also stung the UN General Assembly into terminating the League Mandate under

Resolution No. 2145 of that year, thereby placing the territory directly under the UN.

In 1967 the General Assembly, again without Security Council concurrence, set up the UN Council for Namibia as the *de jure* government of the territory, with a Commissioner as its executive, in 1968 renaming the territory Namibia. All these actions were belittled and rejected by South Africa's Western trading partners, which, with very few exceptions, did not apply to join the UN Council for Namibia. Britain, for one, still refuses to recognise the authority of the Council. Support for the measures taken by the General Assembly, and for Namibian independence as a popular issue, was lacking in many countries which have since developed popular links with SWAPO. Seeming to lack the courage of its convictions, the Assembly made no immediate attempt to fill the post of UN Commissioner for Namibia, and the Council appeared to have little purpose other than to undertake occasional 'safaris' to hear evidence from Namibians in exile and sundry experts on the issue.

At a time when African liberation movements were being corralled into one Cold War camp or the other, SWAPO was nominally in the 'Casablanca' group, together with the ANC of South Africa, FRELIMO of Mozambique, the MPLA of Angola and ZAPU of Southern Rhodesia. The party nevertheless maintained a highly distinctive non-aligned profile. It was as if the Namibians' long memory of foreign exploitation and a colonial oppression of singular harshness had bred a deep suspicion of the modern blandishments of powerful states. The SWAPO leaders, as Namibians the 'last at the feast' of modern development, perhaps felt themselves as yet ill-equipped to serve as equal partners with the imperial powers of East or West.

Rebuffed by the Americans and British, with whom they felt some affinity, SWAPO's leaders were apprehensive at the presumption of authority by the Soviet Union. An awareness that the African neighbours fighting for their own independence assumed that they were superior in numbers as well in education and experience fostered a degree of reserve towards the South African and Southern Rhodesian liberation movements. SWAPO thus maintained a separateness which helped to preserve the unity of its members while the other liberation movements in exile were often wracked with dissent. Yet, its isolation created its own problems. SWAPO was reluctantly obliged to depend for bases on newly-independent African states which had not undergone the bitter struggle facing the Namibians. From some Western bloc

leaders came scarcely veiled hostility. United Nations support was largely confined to the General Assembly. The Western permanent members of the Security Council held aloof.

As if, however, to redeem its disgrace in 1966, the World Court at the request of the Security Council gave a crucial Advisory Opinion in June 1971:

The continued presence of South Africa in Namibia being illegal, South Africa is under obligation to withdraw its administration from Namibia immediately (and) member states of the UN are under obligation to recognize the illegality of South Africa's presence in Namibia . . . and to refrain from any acts . . . implying recognition of the legality of (the) administration.¹⁴

Despite *in toto* dissent from the British and French judges, the illegality of the South African occupation was clearly established. In the succeeding years the Security Council performed its belated duty in supporting the earlier actions of the General Assembly. In 1974, the first UN Commissioner for Namibia was appointed. He was the redoubtable Mr Sean McBride, later a Nobel Peace Prize winner, who brought to the office a creativity that his successors have seldom managed to reproduce.¹⁵

The contract labour strike

The event which mobilised world opinion towards a genuine understanding of the Namibian cause was not directly brought about either by SWAPO or by the UN. At the turn of the years 1971-2, a national strike by the Namibian contract labour force was engendered by the same forces which had ensured an immediate following for SWAPO at its inception. The strikers were neither articulate publicists nor skilled negotiators, but SWAPO, with its network of offices abroad and its publicity and information channels, energetically promoted their cause throughout the world. The strikers were forcibly returned to the north and, though a pretence was made of meeting their demands, the changes were for the most part minimal. Their sacrifice did, however, bear fruit outside.

The student and intellectual community was turning increasingly

¹⁴ Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice, 21 June 1971 (from *Namibia: a Unique Responsibility*, New York: United Nations, 1983, p 10).

¹⁵ *Decree No. 1 for the Protection of the Natural Resources of Namibia*, UN Council for Namibia, New York, 27 September 1974.

towards working-class interests and socialist loyalties, a trend which operated strongly in SWAPO's favour, provoking a heartening response to the exiled leaders' efforts. A Namibian International Conference held in Brussels in 1972 was enthusiastically supported by SWAPO's new constituency, in which support groups, new friends and valuable contacts rapidly proliferated. Above all, SWAPO, both in exile and internally, was put on the map. Here was a text-book example of a major worker's strike against a colonial-type oppressor. In support of this strike was a liberation movement with impeccable proletarian credentials, largely free of the bourgeois elements so often to be found in the forefront of similar movements.

The contract labour strike, the 1971 Advisory Opinion and SWAPO's active campaigning on both issues helped to create an atmosphere conducive to action by the UN. In 1972-3 the Secretary-General, Dr Kurt Waldheim, and his representative, Dr Alfred Escher, visited Namibia and South Africa for talks with the South Africans and, to a much lesser extent, the Namibians. The initiative petered out and events surrounding SWAPO and its guerrillas (by now known as the People's Liberation Army of Namibia, or PLAN) began to revive the long process towards independence which was properly the historical and moral responsibility of the UN.

Internal resurgence, 1972-4

The infiltration of PLAN into northern Namibia threatened the power and credibility of the South African administration of Namibia to a degree that seems out of all proportion to the 'kill rate' or military successes of the insurgents. Much of the attack was directed against the traditional, government-supporting chiefs in Ovamboland, with whom the real battle for popular allegiance was being fought. News of PLAN actions quickly reached Windhoek and other population centres south of what was already becoming known as the War Zone. SWAPO support grew, especially among the young, who, ahead of their brothers in the Rand townships of South Africa, were becoming the spearhead of political attack on the South African occupation.

In 1972-4 SWAPO rallies and meetings in Katutura and Ovamboland were answered with harsh repression. The public flogging by tribal courts in Ovamboland of young SWAPO leaders, both men and women (totally unjustified, by any tradition of such vicious punishments, despite South African claims to the contrary), brought the state of

affairs in Namibia into the world headlines, and to the attention of the UN, which demanded that these punishments cease. The SWAPO national chairman, David Meroro, was held and tortured: as with the floggings, one object was to prove links with PLAN which would justify the suppression of SWAPO internally, despite its status at the UN.¹⁵ The other object, of course, was to defeat PLAN, thus restoring the authority of the chiefs and of the South African regime behind them. In this way the indirect-rule, 'Bantustan' policy of apartheid could be developed in Namibia, whereby no fewer than eleven 'Native nations' would occupy less than half of the land surface, the whites retaining the major share. In 1975 the assassination, allegedly by PLAN cadres, of South Africa's main instrument in Ovamboland, the Chief Minister, Chief Philemon Elifas, was followed by a reign of terror among SWAPO supporters throughout Namibia which was reminiscent of the cruelties of the German colonial days.

SWAPO campaigned internationally for the defence of its officials, Aaron Mushimba and Hendrik Shikongo. The State nevertheless demanded—and initially achieved—the death penalty for their alleged connection with Elifas's killers. Special Branch filching of defence documents was, however, dramatically exposed almost at the last moment and the case was dismissed by the Appeal Court in South Africa. David Soggot, defence counsel in the Mushimba-Shikongo case wrote:

What was intended to strike a blow at the heart of Namibian nationalism ultimately strengthened it. The release of Mushimba, Shikongo and the two nurses was greeted by jubilant crowds in Windhoek. It was seen as a victory for SWAPO and the Namibian nationalist cause.¹⁶

The enthusiasm for SWAPO was also heightened by events north of the Kunene river, where, on 25 April 1974, the Portuguese flag was hauled down after nearly 500 years of dominating Angola. Inspired by this gain, numbers of committed young Namibians, many of them SWAPO Youth Leaguers, were ready to follow the example of the men and women of the early 1960s by continuing the struggle in exile.

External revolt

The opening of the Angolan border, a totally artificial one for the Kwanyama people who live on either side of it, transformed the

¹⁶ David Soggot, *Namibia, the Violent Heritage*, London: Rex Collings, 1986, pp 151–62.

opportunities both for PLAN, now able to penetrate the north through the Angola route, and for Namibians leaving their country. Within a matter of a few months nearly 4,000 people, perhaps 20 per cent of them women, made their way out of the country, many to join up with SWAPO in Lusaka, others as refugees from the horrors of the South African military presence in the north.

The problems for the SWAPO officials in Lusaka were immense and their resources limited. There was also plainly a lack of imagination in their handling of the hot-blooded young men and women who had been in the forefront of the struggle in Windhoek and the other towns. These people had developed sophisticated political ideas and strategies virtually unknown to the first exiles of 1960, and they expected to be welcomed and accepted into the party's highest councils. As well as lacking proper accommodation and provisions, many of the Youth Leaguers took offence at the failure of the leadership to recognise their status. When stories of discontent in the PLAN camps reached the Youth Leaguers in Lusaka, and they found one or two of the old leaders willing to stand with them, the situation became extremely volatile.

Andreas Shipanga, Secretary for Information and Publicity, seemed the leader the Youth Leaders needed and, though with motives deemed by a later enquiry to be very different from their own, encouraged their revolt. The threat was defused by rapid action on the part of the Zambian Government, partly aimed at averting the kind of situation they had faced during a ZANU rebellion which had led to the assassination of the Secretary-General, Herbert Chitepo. Nine of the leaders, including Shipanga and the Secretary for Labour, Solomon Mifima, both original members of the OPC in Cape Town, were flown to Tanzania where no *habeas corpus* writ could be served. There they spent two years in detention. Six hundred of the rank-and-file Youth League rebels were rehabilitated while others chose not to return to SWAPO and were cared for by the UN High Commission for Refugees.

The rebellion had been successfully contained and the leaders imprisoned and neutralised. SWAPO's enemies, especially in Western capitals, made much of the incident, however, and Shipanga emerged from prison in 1978 to a hero's welcome in Britain and West Germany. A man of much urbanity and charm, Shipanga's popularity was high in the West, where the bluntness and apparent lack of fitness of Nujoma was held against him by politicians and diplomats who liked their African counterparts to be good company as well as good leaders. Yet at home in Namibia, the tenacity, dedication and integrity of Sam Nujoma

survived constant onslaughts of adverse South African propaganda (and the almost obsessional desire of Prime Minister Vorster to bring him down), and SWAPO's rise continued unchecked. Shipanga's rival SWAPO-Democrats, which he led on his return to Namibia in 1979, failed to fulfil the promise of his Western backers' imaginings.

SWAPO was abused for the detentions and the relatively peaceful quelling of the revolt. No credit has been given for the Commission of Inquiry it held, perhaps because news of it had very limited circulation, within a virtually closed circle. The commission was chaired by John Ya Otto, a Central Committee member and former SWAPO official in Namibia, from which he had escaped during the great exodus. Ya Otto was to succeed Mifima as Secretary for Labour.¹⁷

While not directly addressing itself to the problems of absorbing the new arrivals from the Youth League, the Ya Otto Report dealt unequivocally with many other failings that were bound to be endemic in a movement so many years in exile. These failings ranged from the need for a new constitution and political programme to 'complacency, sheer laziness and lack of sense of urgency on the part of those in positions of leadership'. Among many other recommendations was that to eliminate 'the dichotomy between the political and military wings . . . all SWAPO members are soldiers. As a rule all SWAPO officials should spend at least two months a year at the front.' While the last sentence is unlikely to have been put into effect, the concept of the integration of the military and political functions in SWAPO was sensibly reiterated.

SWAPO's new programme

A new 'Constitution and Political Programme'¹⁸ did result, its publication preceding and upstaging South Africa's own puppet programme, propagated in the same year by the Democratic Turnhalle Alliance. The 'Discussion Paper' of 1975 setting out liberal ideals for a future constitution was followed, and to a great extent superseded, by the Political Programme agreed at the Nampundwe conference in 1976. The new Political Programme rectified the weakness that the Ya Otto commission had identified in the relationship of PLAN to the Executive, by formally constituting a Department of Defence and Transport, to

¹⁷ Katjavivi, *Rise of Namibian Nationalism* pp 396-401.

¹⁸ *Constitution of the South West Africa People's Organisation (SWAPO) and Political Programme of the South West Africa People's Organisation (SWAPO)*, Lusaka: SWAPO Department of Information and Publicity, 1976. Current editions: Luanda, 1983.

whose Secretary (the late Peter Nanyemba) PLAN's commanders and Military Council reported.

The new Political Programme pledged SWAPO to 'unite all Namibian people, particularly the working class, the peasantry and progressive intellectuals into a vanguard party capable of safeguarding national independence and of building a classless, non-exploitative society based on the ideals and principles of scientific socialism'.¹⁹ Though now using the phraseology of Marxism, SWAPO had not strayed from the main aims of the OPO Constitution, among which were 'to secure and maintain the complete unity of the people of Ovamboland, Hereroland and Namaland' and 'to promote the political, social and economic emancipation of the people, more particularly those who depend directly upon their own exertion by hand, or by brain, for the means of life.'²⁰

The teachings of Marx, Lenin and Mao which accompanied much of the training in the socialist countries were expounded in the camps by Political Commissars, full members of the Military Council that reported to the Executive Committee or to the President as Commander-in-Chief. The Namibians had grown up with exploitation at its worst in the contract labour system, and had imbibed the egalitarian principles of Christianity in a country where the masses worshipped the living Christ. They were thus ready for those high principles of Marxism that spread so rapidly through Southern Africa in the 1970s.

SWAPO in exile interacted not only with its Namibian-based counterpart, but with church leaders, some of whom also sought or were driven into exile. Three Anglican Bishops were exiled in succession, Bishops Mize, Winter and Wood, the latter two making a particular deep impression on SWAPO with their Christian commitment. Black clergy were imprisoned and tortured. Lutheran leaders such as Bishop Auala and Bishop Dumeni confronted the illegal occupiers only to see their church property destroyed for their pains. Pastor Hendrik Witbooi and the American Methodist Episcopalian church leaders, Karuaera and Tjirimuje, brought an estimated 32,000 Namibians into the SWAPO fold, the present Catholic and Anglican Bishops and other leaders, black and white, were or are members or close allies of SWAPO. SWAPO,

¹⁹ *ibid.*

²⁰ *Constitution of the Ovamboland People's Organisation*, Windhoek, 1959, 'Aims and Objects', pp 3, 6.

in turn, has valued the role of the Namibian churches at home, in the camps and abroad, whatever the materialism of Marxism may prescribe.

Consolidating the exodus

The great exodus of 1974 and onwards brought most of its participants into SWAPO's Health and Education Centres in Zambia and Angola. Nyango, the first of these, a farm given to SWAPO by the Zambian government in the early 1970s, had a population of 5,000 by 1978, with its own hospital. Many more were settled in Kwanza Sul in Angola, where schools, craft centres, and clinics were run largely by women refugees, most of the able-bodied men—and some women—undergoing military training. Many others went abroad as students under UN or Commonwealth schemes, to Britain, Cuba, Jamaica, Malta, Sierra Leone, and elsewhere. Among other local projects, the International Labour Organisation has opened a vocational training school, and the Norwegian Namibiaforeniging a secondary technical school (at Loudima in Congo Brazzaville). Also, a distance-learning literacy programme is in operation in the Angolan centres, partly financed by the Commonwealth Fund for Technical Co-operation.

The figure of 80,000 is quoted as the number of Namibians under SWAPO's control in Zambia and Angola—a major responsibility, not least in the realm of security. The first main SWAPO refugee centre was established outside a small mining town called Kassinga, at what was thought to be a safe distance, more than 150 miles north of the Namibian border. At the time of the troubles in Lusaka in 1974, there was relatively slow progress in the international arena. The UN Commissioner, Sean MacBride, greatly hastened the pace of development of the future Namibia by instituting in 1976 both the Nationhood Programme to prepare for government by Namibians, and the UN Institute for Namibia (UNIN) in Lusaka, to accelerate the training of Namibians in many administrative skills, as well as for remedial basic education programmes. Under the direction of SWAPO's former representative at the UN, Hage Geingob²¹ UNIN was essential to combat the demoralisation and neglect of education within Namibia, observable in many of the refugees and exiles.

²¹ *Namibia: Perspectives for National Reconstruction and Development*, Lusaka: UN Institute for Namibia, 1986.

Internal survival

Within Namibia the South African regime, anxious as always to buy time rather than face the imminent future, set about a new dispensation. SWAPO had held a national congress in Walvis Bay in May 1976, which confirmed the exiled leadership despite a propaganda offensive by the Administration. It was essential to render SWAPO politically harmless, and a number of South Africa's nominees were duly convened to meet in conclave in a Windhoek gymnasium called the Turnhalle to produce a new internal settlement. From the elections held in 1978 until it reached the height of its influence in 1980, the Democratic Turnhalle Alliance (DTA) worked hard to capture the initiative from SWAPO. Despite huge unattributed expenditures in vote-buying and the unconcealed support of the new Administrator-General, Judge M T Steyn, whose mistaken appointment had been intended as a sop to the West, SWAPO's support did not cease to grow. Even Afrikaner Nationalist sources estimated at the end of 1978 that the curiously precise figures of 83 per cent of Namibians identified themselves with SWAPO.²²

SWAPO was said to be dominated by Ovambos, who would oppress an independent Namibia if South Africa did not save the non-Ovambo half of the African population from this fate. Yet in 1977 Pastor Karuaera and Pastor Tjirimuje brought in an entire section of the Herero people, who had broken with Hosea Kutako's successor, Clemens Kapuuo. Once an ally of SWAPO, Kapuuo was keeping very suspect foreign company at the time of his assassination in 1978 (despite South Africa's accusations of SWAPO's complicity in his murder his family have rejected this suggestion).²³ These 17,000 Hereros, whose Association for the Preservation of the Tjamuaha-Maharero Royal House was disbanded, followed the four main Nama communities, under their traditional supreme chief, Pastor Hendrik Witbooi, great-grandson of Hendrik Witbooi who had led his people against the Germans with great valour and skill. Witbooi accepted the vice-presidency of SWAPO. All three men were able to travel out of Namibia and meet the SWAPO leaders and their friends abroad, receiving a wider and warmer public welcome than that accorded to the large party of DTA emissaries sent to the USA and Europe in an unsuccessful attempt to win support for the new regime.

²² Ivan Himmelhoch, 'ex-boss agent', *The Star* (Johannesburg) 21 August 1980 (in Soggot, *Namibia, The Violent Heritage*, p 285).

²³ Katjavivi, *Rise of Namibian Nationalism*, pp 257-8.

By 1983, P W Botha's Government had realised that continued support for the DTA was equivalent to throwing good money after bad, and despite vociferous protests from its most ambitious front man, the acknowledged leader of the white members of the Turnhalle, Mr Dirk Mudge (or 'Mudgorewa' to pro-SWAPO observers of the somewhat parallel Rhodesia-Zimbabwe situation), the Turnhalle chapter was closed, another victim of SWAPO's 'mysterious vitality'.²⁴

SWAPO's abiding success in Namibia could be attributed only in part to the work of its leaders at home. The regime made it as difficult as possible for them to operate. The acting President, Maxuulili, was under a seemingly perpetual banning order in Swakopmund. Bredan Simbwaye, first vice-president, leader of the Caprivi African National Union, with which SWAPO had merged in 1964, had been abducted back to Namibia and had there simply disappeared. Many officials, of whom the outstanding figure was Axel Johannes, had endured appalling periods of solitary confinement and torture. Weaker brethren were subject to bribes and blackmail which are hard to resist where the basic necessities of life are often only in the gift of the white man.

The endurance of so many SWAPO men and women was heroic, but they were sustained by the knowledge that throughout the world, and above all at the UN, there existed SWAPO offices with fellow Namibians working for their liberation, caring for the host of exiles (comprising a significant number within Namibia's 1.5 million population) offering education and training denied them at home. Similarly, in the bush and grasslands of Namibia were the freedom fighters, sacrificing everything in the fight against 'the Boers' occupying their country as the Germans had before them.

From Resolution 385 to 'linkage'

The protracted processes of the UN led at last to recognition by the Security Council of the illegality of South Africa's occupation of Namibia, and under Resolution 385 of 1976, to the demand for its withdrawal. This development was the product of many factors which had weakened South Africa's standing with its Western allies. The Afrikaner Nationalist Government had been forced onto the defensive by the Soweto uprisings of 1976, the first sign of losing the control that had been maintained ruthlessly since 1963 with the aftermath of the

²⁴ Soggot, *Namibia, The Violent Heritage*, p 179.

Sharpeville Emergency. The withdrawal of South Africa's invading column from an advanced position in Angola in 1975, and the US's moral vulnerability following Vietnam and Watergate, helped to create a conjunction of forces which instigated progress in the long haul towards Namibian independence.

Though the Western powers supported UNSC 385, they twice vetoed General Assembly measures aimed at enforcing it. Partly to avoid a third such 'triple veto', Andrew Young of the US Carter Administration, together with Dr David Owen, Britain's Labour Foreign Secretary, and their colleagues from France, West Germany and Canada, set about an initiative aimed at accomplishing South African withdrawal. These efforts would have failed in their aims had the strength of SWAPO's exiled leadership and its solidarity with the party inside Namibia not been incontrovertibly proven to the Western 'Five', all Security Council members at the time. Their acceptance of SWAPO as a negotiating partner could by no means have been taken for granted. SWAPO had long been the target of a series of dismissive charges by Western politicians and journalists: the Namibians must be saved from the Ovambo domination of SWAPO; external SWAPO was at odds with the 'internal wing'; Ja Toivo, on Robben Island, was the true leader and the membership considered Nujoma a usurper; PLAN actions in the war zone had alienated the local people; SWAPO was a Soviet catspaw; SWAPO was undemocratic and would force itself on Namibia undemocratically and create a one-party state. Most insidiously, SWAPO it was claimed, did not represent the Namibians at all and the erroneous nature of the 'sole and authentic representative' title conferred by the General Assembly obliged the Western powers to show equal favour to the numerous small parties whose existence the Turnhalle exercise had preserved. (In Southern Rhodesia, by contrast, the insurgents were constantly berated for their failure to speak with one voice but separately as ZANU and ZAPU.)²⁵

The single, major liberation movement of Namibia, whose members had fought and died in the war zone, or suffered cruelly at the hands of police and military gaolers and torturers, and which had represented the Namibians to the outside world for more than fifteen years was abused for claiming to speak for the Namibians. It must share its negotiating status with splinter groups and collaborators with South Africa. Paradoxically, SWAPO had repeatedly shown its willingness to enter into

²⁵ Namibia Information Service, London, *Releases*.

alliances with groups of smaller movements at home, refusing only, as with the DTA, when such groups were blatantly creations of the South African regime.

The Five were now obliged to reverse their former dismissal of SWAPO and to proceed with negotiations. SWAPO, in turn, had to respond despite misgivings at the transfer of responsibility away from the UN to five of South Africa's main trading partners. The Five achieved early success and by 1978 had extracted agreement from both SWAPO and South Africa to the terms of what became UNSCR 435; the prescription, in very vague outline, for South Africa's withdrawal from Namibia.

Any secret hopes that South Africa might be concerned other than to deceive the Five by a show of negotiation were destroyed when South African paratroopers attacked the 'safe' and hence undefended refugee camp at Kassinga on 4 May 1978, killing 600 Namibians and wounding 1,000. The victims were largely women and children. Kassinga's name was added to the calendar of solemn Namibian days of re-dedication. The Western media, despite early reports and later UN confirmation of the nature of the raid, largely ignored this monstrous South African crime.²⁶

Delays, prevarication, and dissimulation by South Africa over the status of Walvis Bay, the number and location of SWAPO bases, the numbers of their own troops, de-militarised zones, and election processes were followed early in 1981 by a so-called 'pre-implementation' UN conference in Geneva. The DTA and their South African advisers were anxious to procrastinate while the new Reagan Administration formulated a policy on which they pinned high hopes.

The DTA successfully nullified all discussions by demanding an end to 'UN bias' towards SWAPO before any further steps could be taken. They had successfully played for time: the Reagan Administration duly rewarded South Africa by an act amounting to unprincipled treachery. In 1982 Vice-President George Bush, on an African tour, formally endorsed the 'linkage' of Cuban troop withdrawals from Angola to South Africa's departure from Namibia. The departure of the Cubans was to be a 'pre-condition' (and as such was eagerly seized upon by South Africa) for the implementation of Resolution 435.²⁷

²⁶ *Remember Kassinga: Fact Paper on Southern Africa No. 9*. London: International Defence and Aid Fund, 1981; *To Be Born a Nation* (see Note 2 above), pp 242-3.

²⁷ *Vice-President George Bush: A New Partnership with Africa*, Washington DC: US Information Service, 1982.

SWAPO's misgivings towards the Five were sadly proved to have been justified. South Africa's continued presence in Namibia was virtually guaranteed by Reagan's 'constructive engagement' policy towards South Africa, reinforced by 'linkage', however many shuttles, rounds of talks and missions Reagan's emissary, Dr Chester Crocker, might indulge in. 'Linkage' heralded the bleak period of the mid-1980s. Events in Namibia were almost totally obscured by the dramatic scenes of insurrection in South Africa. Namibia was nowhere mentioned in the report of the Eminent Persons Group (7 June 1986) to the Commonwealth Heads of Government. SWAPO was itself subject to a well-orchestrated attack from South African-financed offices abroad, which were promoting its latest 'internal settlement' move, the Transitional Government of National Unity formed out of the Multi-Party Conference, successors to the DTA.

South Africa's new offensive has not been exclusively directed at PLAN militarily, and internal and external SWAPO politically. Linked to the new attack is the story of the recent uncovering of agents infiltrated into PLAN and the camps, many of them broken by blackmail or threats to family hostages. SWAPO's neutralising of the agents is bad for South Africa but already the propaganda composed of stories of SWAPO's response is yielding dividends of another sort.

The SWAPO leaders in exile and at home, and the growing numbers of young trained men and women serving with them are not dismayed by the latest version of the long campaign to traduce their organisation. They have, despite a reservoir of good will towards the West at the outset, come to expect betrayal, neglect and contempt from, in particular, the USA, Britain and West Germany. Just as putting burglars in charge of the silver would be, entrusting the Five with negotiations for their independence from South Africa was never less than a source of the deepest distrust for SWAPO.²⁸

Yet, despite repeated accusations of intransigence against President Sam Nujoma and his able Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Theo-Ben Gurirab, SWAPO has, usually under pressure from the Frontline States, made concessions in order to allow the negotiating process to continue. To give but one example: at Lusaka in 1984, SWAPO endured a further

²⁸ Among the most glaring, almost symbolic, justifications for such distrust is the management by the Rio Tinto Zinc Corporation of the Rössing uranium mine and the supply of uranium to British Nuclear Fuels, in clear defiance of UN Decree No. 1 of the UN Council for Namibia, which forbids such export, except under licence. See Alun Roberts, *The Rössing File: The Inside Story of Britain's Secret Contract for Namibian Uranium*, London: Namibia Support Committee Campaign Against the Namibian Uranium Contracts, 1980, pp 34-8

meeting with South Africa's 'internal settlement' collaborators, jointly chaired by President Kaunda and South Africa's Administrator-General, which was as pointless as its predecessor at Geneva. When sections of the Multi-Party Conference (the radical wing of SWANU, and the Damara Chiefs Council) chose to sit with SWAPO as one bloc, SWAPO yielded yet again to pressure and agreed to negotiate alone.

SWAPO's ceasefire offer is almost permanently on the table, and was reiterated in Vienna on 7 July 1986. Addressing the UN International Conference for the Immediate Independence of Namibia, President Sam Nujoma said:

Already in 1978, I signed and deposited a letter with the Office of the Secretary-General, expressing SWAPO's readiness, which I have repeated several times since, to sign a cease-fire with Pretoria as a first step in the implementation of Resolution 435. As we approach August 1, which is offered [by South Africa] as a possible date for implementing the UN Plan, I wish to state, once again, that SWAPO is ready, provided that no irrelevant and diversionary elements are introduced.

Cease-fire letters had long since been prepared by the UN Secretary-General's office for the signature of both SWAPO and Pretoria. Pretoria's letter remains, of course, unsigned and 1 August 1986 has come and gone—another meaningless date in the twenty years of deception and stalling since the termination of the League Mandate, or the ten years since UNSCR 385. The record should be closely studied by those who would like to believe that, in South Africa, Pretoria will seriously negotiate with SWAPO's old ally, the African National Congress. Western attempts at negotiations with South Africa over the apartheid crisis which has intensified since 1984 have been exposed in all their futility. SWAPO's decision of twenty years ago to take up arms has now, in principle, been vindicated.

SWAPO's preparedness to make concessions should be interpreted not as weakness but as the strength drawn from the certainty of its unassailable position in Namibia, twenty-six years after its executive went into exile. Its parallel organisation outside the country, President, Central Committee, PLAN, Youth League, Women's Council, Elders' Council and the National Union of Namibian Workers, has maintained high morale through the long years of exile. The capacity to endure was hard earned by the parents and grandparents of the present leaders, and they know that, despite their unceasing demands for immediate independence and their relative readiness for it, time is unquestionably on their side.

Sam Nujoma, as a small child, saw South African bombers flying overhead on their way to bomb the capital of the patriot northern chief, Ipumbu Tshilongo, in 1932. The old people of that time had lived most of their lives before the Germans colonised central and southern Namibia. The century since that disastrous event was aptly commemorated in 1984 with conferences in London and at the United Nations. In the end the illegal South African occupation will cease and the first of SWAPO's stated objectives will be met: 'to fight relentlessly by all possible means, for the immediate and total liberation of Namibia from colonial and imperialist occupation.'²⁹

SWAPO's growth from the mustard seed of 1960 to its present influence and position—UN observer status, full diplomatic recognition by the Non-Aligned States, its links with the Commonwealth and membership of UN agencies as well as regional bodies such as the Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference (SADCC)—has not been achieved without a daring and determination not commonly found in long-exiled liberation movements. Interaction with 'internal SWAPO' had assisted the process, and so, even more, has the commitment to the armed struggle, now in its twenty-first year of 'low intensity' warfare, by tying up 100,000 South African and Namibian troops and conscripts. At the Vienna conference, Sam Nujoma linked their struggle with the 'grave situation now facing our comrades, brothers and sisters in South Africa, who are courageously fighting and dying, under the leadership of the African National Congress, to end apartheid and replace it with a just, democratic and non-racial society . . . on the principle of one person, one vote'. He asked the conference whether the world was going to allow the Botha regime 'a repeat performance' of its treatment of its own citizens under the State of Emergency in South Africa. Would the South Africans continue to have a free hand in killing citizens of the black majority in Namibia by 'turning off all the lights' through the intimidation of foreign and local press?' He continued:

The answer is no. Nazism and fascism were defeated not by any constructive engagement or shuttle diplomacy. The world declared war, mobilised human and material resources worldwide and brought Hitler and his followers to their knees. That is the answer.

He reminded the Europeans and Americans that 'Africans crossed over the oceans and died to save Europe from Nazism.' Perhaps recalling the exploits of Afrikaner Nazis such as Robey Leibbrandt, who was

²⁹ *Constitution* (1983), 'Aims and Objectives', B(1).

brought from Nazi Germany to South Africa via the Namaqualand coast in 1941, he juxtaposed African servicemen (such as Secretary-General Ja Toivo and the Secretary of the SWAPO Elders Council, Simon Kaukungua) against 'the Afrikaner terrorists, whom you are today supporting and honouring'. They 'also came over, on the side of Hitler, killing your people and occupying your lands. Fascism is fascism, whether the victims are white or black.'³⁰ In such a statement can be seen the nature of SWAPO's ultimate requirement of the nations of the world, whose ward in international law their country remains. Its spirit also informs SWAPO's acceptance of the fact that, should their requirement not be met, and should the Namibians continue to be forgotten, they must fight on alone.

³⁰ Address by Comrade Sam Nujoma, President of SWAPO, UN International Conference for the Immediate Independence of Namibia, Vienna, 7-11 July 1986, pp 12-13.

**ANNABELLE SREBERNY-
MOHAMMADI AND ALI
MOHAMMADI**

Post-revolutionary Iranian exiles: a study in impotence

*'There was a reason to fear that, like Saturn, the Revolution might devour each of its children in turn.'*¹

An estimated two million people have left Iran for exile since the tumultuous days of the popular revolution of 1978-9 which culminated in the establishment of the Islamic Republic. Like many previous post-revolutionary epochs, a sizeable segment of this exile population comprises the 'children of the revolution', those who were actively involved in the popular movement against the Pahlavi regime and who subsequently found themselves once again in active opposition to a regime which was intolerant of their views, and who sought refuge and a base for renewed political activity outside the country. We consider briefly the immediate post-revolutionary context and the reasons for the development of opposition in exile.

The revolutionary transition and the post-revolutionary diaspora

The sixteenth January 1979 was a day of great rejoicing across Iran. Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, the second Pahlavi shah who had styled himself *Light of the Aryans* and *Farmandeh*, Commander-in-Chief, of the Great Civilisation, had been forced to leave the country, ostensibly on 'holiday' but never to return. The massive popular movement, a coalition of many classes, interests and ideologies, had achieved its central goal, the removal of a corrupt and despotic monarchy. But the moment of triumph was also the moment of fragmentation. The popular movement suddenly lost its cohesion, the unity of negative opposition, and began to divide into countless parties, groups and orientations as discussion developed about the future shape of the Iranian polity.

¹ Pierre Verginiaud, 1753-93, quoted in Lamartine, *Histoire des Girondins*, Book XXXVIII, Ch 20.

By 11 February 1979, with the proclamation of the Islamic Republic under the symbolic leadership of Ayatollah Khomeini, fundamental questions about Iran's future political shape were raised and fundamental divisions within the popular movement were already visible. Issues of political expression and participation, economic restructuring, the rights of women and minorities, which had motivated many to participate in the popular mobilisation, became the focus of bitter disputes and the basis of political manoeuvring for power.

The Islamic Republican Party (IRP), created by Ayatollah Beheshti, Hojjat-ol-Eslams Rafsanjani and Khamenei, rapidly began to dominate and control the new political system in which Khomeini was no longer a mere charismatic leader but the *Vali-ye Faqih*, the supreme religious jurist with power above and beyond the scope of the new Islamic Constitution. An extreme religious fundamentalism began to spread through all institutions, organisations and cultural arenas. The brief 'Tehran Spring' of free and open discussion, publishing and meetings was broken by the summer of 1979 with the banning of anti-clerical publications, attacks on secular assemblies and a new atmosphere of repression.

Mehdi Bazargan, the first Prime Minister of the new Republic, found himself trying to hold together many newly created and competing power centres, but possessing little authority himself. In November 1979 students of the Imam's line occupied the US embassy in response to America's admittance of the Shah for medical treatment. This crisis became a diversion from many critical domestic issues, establishing the 'Great Satan' of the USA as the source of Iran's woes, and creating yet another populist Islamic grouping which challenged the more moderate line of Bazargan. This new political climate of militant Islam allowed the further silencing of critics, and the elimination of many sincere participants in the revolutionary process, as Westernized 'tie-wearers', agents of imperialism or Zionism, or simply as anti-Islamic.

Different waves of opposition have moved into exile, from various monarchists who fled even before the revolution had finally succeeded, to religious liberals and secular and socialist elements who found no room for their political activity in the new republic. A younger generation of asylum-seekers is even now fleeing conscription into the interminable war with Iraq.

Mapping out the groups of political exiles active against the Islamic Republic is like trying to describe a perpetually moving kaleidoscope of changing political patterns and colours. In this article we focus on the

major clusters of political activists in exile, analysing their reasons for opposing the Islamic Republic, the trajectories of their politics in exile and their recent and current activities. We end by considering the efficacy of these groupings, and describing some scenarios for the future.

The major exile groupings

The Council of National Resistance

The Council of National Resistance was created in October 1981 in Paris. It consisted of major political groups and individuals who had supported the formation of the Islamic Republic, playing brief political roles in its early years, only to find themselves isolated and suffocated in the renewed atmosphere of Islamic repression, and eventually forced into exile. The Council included the Mojahedin-e-Khalq under Massoud Rajavi, the Kurdish Democratic Party of Iran under Abdul-Rahman Qassemlou, the National Democratic Front under Hedayat Matin-Daftari, the United Left of small socialist groupings, and Abolhassan Bani-Sadr.

Initially the Mojahedin, the major Islamic guerrilla group during the time of the Shah, supported the Islamic Republic, participating in the referendum of March 1979 and campaigning for Massoud Rajavi to be elected to the new Council of Experts in August 1979. He was not elected. The Mojahedin were supportive of the seizure of the US embassy in November 1979, increasing their demands for the severing of all economic, political and military treaties with the US. Followers of Shariati and his critique of the reactionary clergy, the Mojahedin had a considerable popular following among lower middle-class students, the petty bourgeoisie and the working class, and rapidly developed a populist critique of the IRP's monopolisation of power and suppression of debate. They talked of two kinds of Islam, the clerical form associated with class and exploitation, and an authentic, popular form which would triumph over the former. In January 1980, Rajavi decided to run for President but was considered ineligible by Khomeini and prevented from pursuing his candidacy. Within a year of the popular movement's success, the Mojahedin were warning of a creeping fascism which deprived people of their civil liberties while amassing power in the name of Islam. The regime replied by labelling the Mojahedin as hypocrites, *monafeqin*, apostates, and as an even worse threat than the Marxists. The

clergy-supported take-over of the American embassy in Tehran in November 1979 not only aimed to strengthen the IRP against the liberal elements in the government headed by Bazargan, but was also used to portray the IRP as a revolutionary force and thus win over the massive student following of the Mojahedin.

Unlike Rajavi, Abolhassan Bani-Sadr, one of the triumvirate who had worked closely with Khomeini in Paris during the popular mobilisation, was allowed to run for President and was endorsed by Ayatollah Pasandideh, Khomeini's elder brother. Bani-Sadr was elected by some eleven million votes, 75 per cent of the popular vote, far outstripping the 500,000 votes of the contending IRP candidate. However, the IRP managed to dominate the elections to Parliament, amid widespread charges of election rigging and fraud, and their man, Rajai'i, became Prime Minister; the party also controlled the broadcasting media, and enjoyed the cooperation of the revolutionary guards, the Reconstruction Crusade and other old and new Islamic organisations, thus increasingly isolating the President from any formal political base. While sharing their anti-imperialist stance, Bani-Sadr proffered a more radical nationalisation programme than the IRP cared for, and through his newspaper *Islamic Revolution (Enghelab-e Eslami)* he argued against the growing atmosphere of clerical dominance, political repression and torture, and censorship and violent 'cultural revolution' particularly in the universities. Bani-Sadr, himself the son of an ayatollah and like Ali Shariati concerned with developing an Islamic modernism, also identified with the National Front legacy of Mossadeq and Bazargan, and aimed to bridge the widening gap between the secular modern middle-class and the Islamic Republic. The National Front and sections of the bazaar as well as other groups increasingly opposed to the clerical regime, such as the Mojahedin, minority Fedayin and Maoist Rangbaran, expressed solidarity with Bani-Sadr's fight against clerical intolerance in the spring of 1981. His rallies and speeches were the occasions for violent confrontations with Hezbollahi supported by the IRP, which worked hard to isolate and dislodge him.² After a long struggle, in May 1981, Khomeini dismissed Bani-Sadr, the first elected President of the Islamic Republic, from his position as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, and the Parliament impeached and later dismissed him, dealing a crushing blow to all

² Further details about this period can be found in Shaul Bakhash, *The Reign of the Ayatollahs*, New York: Basic Books, 1984.

moderate and left groupings. When no military uprising or popular force came to his aid, Bani-Sadr was forced underground.

On 29 July 1981, Bani-Sadr and Rajavi together fled Iran for Paris. In October 1981 the Council of National Resistance (CNR) was established as an umbrella opposition grouping intended to unite all 'freedom-loving' Iranians. A provisional government of the Islamic Democratic Republic declared itself ready to take charge after the overthrow of Khomeini, with Bani-Sadr to be reinstated as President and Rajavi as head of the provisional government. The Council proclaimed the need to return power to the hands of the Iranian people, and argued that this provisional government was a temporary measure until a new and acceptable constitution, elections and parliament could be established; the provisional government was considered to derive its legitimacy from the just popular resistance to the 'reactionary Khomeini regime' which denied the Iranian people their hard-won rights. Yet this hastily written accord between Bani-Sadr and Rajavi embodied its own exclusionary clause, reflecting their own political elitism and desire for power, and failed to attract the support of very many exile groups.

In December 1981 the Kurdish Democratic Party of Iran (KDPI) led by Qassemlou, and the National Democratic Front of Hedayat Matin-Daftari, did join the Council. Jointly they called for the establishment of a Democratic Islamic Republic supported by a nationwide system of people's councils, for the nationalisation of foreign trade and for the revival of national industries, egalitarian land reform, and guaranteed rights for women, non-Persian nationalities and religious minorities.³ The Council maintained respect for private property and capital as long as private wealth was not excessive, did not contribute to 'dependence', was not 'harmful' to society, and was nationalistic not comprador in nature. A special concern for the interests of the lower middle classes, shop keepers and artisans, small merchants and civil servants, was acknowledged. CNR was financially supported by some prominent bazaaris who also sought exile in France; it also maintained contacts, particularly with Mojahedin cells, inside Iran.

Rajavi vehemently argued that Khomeini's regime could not be changed by peaceful means and declared the start of mass armed struggle against it.⁴ In the summer of 1981 street warfare broke out in

³ Platform of the Provisional Government of the Democratic Islamic Republic of Iran, Muslim Students Society, Long Beach, California, 1981.

⁴ Paper of the Islamic Student Organisations in Europe and America, *Nashriye-Anjomanhay-e-Daneshjooyane-Mosalmâne-europa va Emrika*, No 21, 8 January 1981.

Tehran between urban guerrillas, mainly Mojehedin, and the regime's forces of the Islamic revolutionary guards, the pasdaran, and Hezbollahi. Terror tactics against the Islamic Republic were stepped up. On 28 June 1981 a huge bomb in IRP headquarters effectively demolished the party leadership, killing the Secretary-General, Ayatollah Mohammad Beheshti, four cabinet ministers, six ministerial under-secretaries, twenty-seven parliamentary deputies and many other party and government officials. On 30 August 1981 a second bomb in the prime minister's offices killed Mohammad-Ali Raja'i, the President who had replaced Bani-Sadr, Bahonar, the Prime Minister and party chief, and Dastgerdi, the Chief of Police. A week later Qodussi, the revolutionary prosecutor-general, was killed in yet another bomb blast. Prayer-leaders in Tabriz, Kerman, Shiraz, Yazd and Kermanshah were killed, as were the governor-general of Gilan province, the warden of Evin prison, the IRP ideologue, Hasan Ayat, various revolutionary judges and more Majles deputies. Fedayeen Minority and Paykar (Maoist) members also went underground to take up arms, and the Union of Communists, Ettahadi-ye Kommunist-ha tried unsuccessfully to capture Amol, a town in the northern province of Mazandaran, at the cost of over seventy lives.

Immediately, and for the next eighteen months, the Islamic Republic answered violence with violence, armed struggle with brutal repression: demonstrations were suppressed, publications seized, safe houses raided, and prisons crammed with political prisoners. Executions became the normal procedure of revolutionary justice. The Mojahedin has documented over 7,700 deaths through executions, street battles or torture in the period June 1981–September 1983, and suggests the real figure is closer to 20,000 deaths. The urban guerrilla groups were shattered, and prominent among those killed were Moussa Khiabani, the head of Mojahedin guerrilla operations in Iran, and Massoud Rajavi's wife. Subsequently, and with what many felt was undue haste, the political relationship between Bani-Sadr and Rajavi was sealed in the marriage of Bani-Sadr's daughter to Rajavi.

Mojahedin have been active in canvassing opinion and soliciting funds abroad in order to support their efforts. They have secured endorsements by American congressmen and senators, British members of Parliament and French intellectuals, and have periodically organised small but dramatic demonstrations in many cities, including Washington, Vienna, London, New Delhi and Karachi.

However, the Council's political honeymoon was not destined to last.

Major splits developed in 1984-5, the most crucial being between Rajavi and Bani-Sadr. In January 1984 Rajavi held meetings in Paris with Tariq Aziz, the Foreign Affairs Minister of Iraq. Bani-Sadr opposed this move and resigned from the Council, later accusing Rajavi of being a fifth column of the Iraqis and a traitor to Iran, as well as an opportunist and liar. The split between the two men was sealed when Rajavi and Bani-Sadr's daughter were divorced. He then married the former wife of his second-in-command and made her co-leader, arguing that this action demonstrated the Mojahedin's acceptance of gender equality.

Conflict also developed between Qassemlou, the leader of the Kurdish Democratic Party of Iran, and Rajavi. The Kurds had participated in the popular mobilisation against the Pahlavi regime, and after its fall had presented a programme of demands to the provisional government of the fledgling republic which included self-determination for all Iran's peoples within a federal state.⁵ Clashes between the Kurds and the central government erupted into full-scale struggle in the summer of 1979, yet when Iraq invaded Iranian territory the KDPI proposed a cease-fire and a collaboration against the Iraqis provided that the central government would accede to its demands. Instead the central government fought both the Kurds and the Iraqis, and the KDPI joined the Council of National Resistance while also becoming increasingly dependent on Iraq for aid. The overthrow of the Khomeini regime became its chief goal, even taking precedence over any specifically Kurdish demands, and until 1983 the KDPI managed to control extensive 'liberated' areas in Kurdistan. But the Islamic Republic forces regained this territory in the summer of 1983, and the KDPI moved its headquarters into Iraq. But in 1984, perhaps recognising that the opposition to the Islamic Republic was not gaining much ground, the KDPI decided to try once more to negotiate with the Islamic Republic. This created a major clash in the CNR particularly with Rajavi, and the KDPI left the Council in January 1985.

Exile politics are not readily separable from international politics. In May 1986 a visit to Paris by the Iranian Deputy Prime Minister fuelled speculation about new attempts to normalise relations between the two countries. Iran pressed three demands: the extradition of certain Iranian exiles whom the Islamic Republic considers to be 'terrorists',

⁵ For a recent discussion of the Kurdish situation, see Martin van Bruinessen, 'The Kurds between Iran and Iraq', *MERIP Reports* (141) July-August 1986.

widely acknowledged to mean the Mojahedin; the return of the \$1 billion dollars which the Shah had invested in a French nuclear reprocessing plant, a deal from which the Islamic Republic withdrew; and the cessation of the supply of French armaments to the Iraqis. The French, in return, wished the Islamic Republic to use its influence among Shi'ite groups in Lebanon to secure the release of the French hostages held there. Clashes between Mojahedin supporters and minority Fedayin at Rajavi's headquarters in the suburbs of Paris, created local resentment and triggered the new right-wing French government's action against the Mojahedin which was also aimed at improving relations with the Islamic Republic. In the first week of June 1986, French police descended on Mojahedin headquarters in Auvers-sur-Oise, and within hours Rajavi together with his entourage were on a private plane heading for Baghdad where he was accorded vip treatment. His one-time political comrade, Bani-Sadr, declared Rajavi's move to be like 'a dead man committing suicide'.⁶ Rajavi nonetheless declared himself leader of the new democratic revolution of Iran and, after making a pilgrimage to the Shi'ite shrines of Imam Ali in Najaf and of Hossein in Karbala, his prayers were answered by Saddam Hossein in the form of arms, ammunition and money to fight against Khomeini.⁷ When two French journalists were freed in Beirut, Jacques Chirac pointedly thanked the Islamic Republic for its intervention, yet other matters between the two nations remain unresolved.

Rajavi evidently planned to extend the armed struggle against the Islamic Republic by creating a Mojahedin base in the Iranian city of Mehran, captured by the Iraqis, and establishing there a provisional government, with which to lead the armed struggle to take over Iran, city by city. Skirmishes escalated between Mojahedin troops and Pasdaran in the border area, but the plot was foiled even before it began, in June 1986, when Mehran and other Mojahedin encampments were bombarded by Iranian jets and many Mojahedin were killed. This border activity was paralled by a brief but terrifying wave of random bomb blasts in Tehran in which many were killed.

Exile politics directed against the Islamic Republic are thus intimately tied up with the Iran-Iraq war. Iraq has supplied financial, material and military support to the Mojahedin, including a radio

⁶ *Iran Times* 16 (13) 13 June 1986.

⁷ See article by Esmail Pourvali, 'The Report of Massoud Rajavi to Imam Hossein', *Rouzegar-e-No*, June 1986, p 32.

transmitter which carries eighteen hours of Mojahedin coverage into Iran. Yet despite, or because of such activities, it appears that the Mojahedin have lost considerable popular sympathy among the Iranian population at large who have endured the severe hardships of prolonged war for over six years and increasingly consider Mojahedin activity to be treacherous in its opposition to the national interest. The haste and spectacle of Rajavi's marriages has also alienated many believers who consider such behaviour quite unbecoming to a leader. The summer wave of bombings in Tehran, widely considered to have been the responsibility of the Mojahedin, appear to have further alienated people from the group. The Mojahedin have never gained the support of Iranian moderates because their outlook was often considered extreme, and secular elements were wary of even the Mojahedin version of Islamic modernism. To many, Rajavi appears unable to contemplate the sharing of power, to work collectively with other groups or even to respect their democratic rights, and often seems to propound contradictory positions regarding the rights of minorities, foreign policy, and trade questions. Students and youth remain the Mojahedin's main source of support, which has been whittled away by the taste of real power and authority that many have found in the Pasdaran, the Basij and other new institutions of the Islamic Republic. Certain exile figures of the democratic left currently liken the Mojahedin to Pol Pot's Khmer Rouge in Cambodia and predict an even worse blood-bath of revengeful slaughter should the Mojahedin ever attain power in Iran, a prospect which appears increasingly unlikely.

The Fedayeen-e-Khalq and Tudeh Party

Both the Fedayeen-e-Khalq marxist guerrilla group and the Tudeh (Communist) party reemerged as organised political groupings during the popular movement of 1977-9. The Fedayeen played a significant role in the tumultuous days of street fighting against Pahlavi forces that paved the way for a republic. In the early plebiscite in March 1979, the Tudeh and National Front both readily supported the establishment of the Islamic Republic.

The Fedayeen, while initially in critical support, rapidly became bitterly divided. They differed in their analysis of the class nature of the Provisional Government and the Revolutionary Council, the relationship of the ascendant petty-bourgeoisie to the working class, and the ascendancy of so-called liberal, pro-capitalist elements. The major split in the summer of 1980 came over their attitude towards

imperialism. The majority faction accepted the anti-imperialist struggle as paramount and argued that, above all, the Islamic Republic had to be supported against all outside attempts to undermine it. Since then, this faction has enjoyed a very close relation with the Tudeh and has almost been absorbed into that party. Majority Fedayin supporters still publish *Kar (Labour)* in Paris.

The minority faction, led by Ashraf Deghani, became anti-Khomeinist, and argued that the revolution remained unfinished. It maintained a concern for democratic rights, supported the Kurds and Turkomans in their struggles with the central government, was involved in the early workers' and student councils, and has been involved in sporadic armed combat elsewhere inside Iran. Its numbers have been decimated, and crucial intellectuals and symbolic leaders such as Said Sultanpour, the poet, have been executed by the regime. The Fedayin minority also characterise the Mojahedin/Bani-Sadr alliance as 'liberal reformist', anti-working class and idealist, since it only promoted the cultural battle of Islam against Western influence without demanding the severance of the structural economic relations that tied Iran to imperialism.⁸ Sporadic activity within Iran is matched by sporadic acts outside. Fedayeen have organised demonstrations in many European cities over political repression and Kurdish rights, and in 1984 took over and ransacked the diplomatic offices of the Islamic Republic in The Hague, beating the ambassador.

Though the Tudeh appeared to be useful fellow-travellers while the Islamic Republic institutionalised itself, and seemed to have assisted in the provision of strategy and training during the hostage crisis, in early 1983 the Republic moved against them. Printing houses were closed down, the Secretary-General of the Party, Nureddin Kianouri, and its leading ideologue, Ehsan Tabari, as well as over a thousand other members were arrested and imprisoned. Its military leaders were executed. Many fled the country to the Soviet Union and Afghanistan. Tabari was forced to recant his political past on Iranian television, and the party has disappeared as a visible actor on the domestic political scene, although rumours of considerable Tudeh penetration of Islamic organisations, and influence in policy-making, still persist. A new Central Committee of the Party has been formed with Ali Khavari as Secretary-General. In June 1986, it broadcast over a clandestine radio

⁸ See 'The Recent Events in Iran and Our Position', *Kar (Labour)* journal of OIPFG, No 2, Oct-Nov 1981.

channel that, despite the massacre and imprisonment of many Party members, the political activities of the Party would continue. A further split in Tudeh ranks appears to be developing as one section proposes a more grass-roots process of decision-making in opposition to the traditional centralised hierarchy of the Central Committee. Tudeh papers and journals are still published, including *Name-ye Mardom*, *People's Bulletin*, from Sweden and *Setad (Star)* from London.

The monarchists

Monarchists fled into exile during the popular movement, and while their ostensible goal, and their financial support, might have been expected to contribute to unity, they have proved as divided as other elements of the political exile spectrum.

The royal family itself has been engaged in a variety of exploits while in exile. Farah Pahlavi, the ousted queen, initially installed herself quietly in Williamsburg, Massachusetts, where her younger children attended school and she maintained a low political profile, and in 1985 she moved to Greenwich, Connecticut. The ex-Shah's investments and holdings have been a major item of contention between the Islamic Republic and the US government, and money has also caused great friction amongst the monarchists themselves. Farah has clashed with Ardeshir Zahedi, ex-Ambassador to the US and former son-in-law of the Shah, currently resident in Switzerland. Zahedi looked after the Shah in the United States and settled his various medical and travel expenses. After considerable wrangling, it appears that Farah has agreed to pay Zahedi \$2 million for services rendered.⁹ Solving this financial problem may now encourage Zahedi to play a more active, organisational role in the monarchist ranks. He has recently been joined in Geneva by his brother-in-law, Dariush Homayoun, a former Minister of Information in the Amouzegar cabinet, and they evidently intend to open a publishing house.

Ashraf, the ex-Shah's sister, is ensconced on Central Park South in Manhattan. Her wealth financed the activities of General Oveissi and the running of a radio station in Baghdad until Oveissi was gunned down in a Paris street in 1982.

Princess Azadeh organised the *Azadegan* (The Free People) group which in 1980 highjacked a boat about to be delivered by France to Iran; it was taken to Spain for a while but later returned to the French. Little

⁹ *Jebhe* 5 (4) September–October 1986.

has been heard of the group since, and one of its key figures, General Aryana, died in 1985 in Washington.

The pretender to the throne proclaimed himself Reza Shah II, the new Shah of Iran, in Paris on 9th Aban, his birthdate, in October 1980. Four years later on the same date he tried to organise a Constitutional Council, Shoraye Mashrutiat, in order to create cohesion amongst the competing monarchist factions. Bakhtiar, however, who was against the proposed structure and some of the elements involved, refused to join and the Council was dissolved.¹⁰ Reza Pahlavi has toured the USA and Western Europe to encourage and galvanise his supporters, although recently the young man has appeared more involved with wooing his new bride than new political support. The marriage to Yasmin Etemad-Amini, which took place in the New York metropolitan area in June 1986, provided glossy photographs for consumption by supporters, and revealed some interesting absences, most notably Ardeshir Zahedi and Reza Qotbi, cousin to Farah and ex-director of National Iranian Radio and Television under the Shah.

The monarchist politicians have spent the past seven years wrangling as divisively as other sectors of the political exile spectrum. Ali Amini, a Prime Minister of the Shah in the 1960s who carried out the land reform programme and had a reputation as an independent politician, still carried political weight in the popular movement of 1978. Late in 1978 the Shah asked Amini to mediate with the religious elements but it was already too late to defuse the popular mobilisation; he was also offered the prime ministership, but declined. Before the declaration of the Islamic Republic, Amini left for Paris. In 1980 the right wing of the monarchists approached Amini to create a monarchist front, Jebhe Nejat, the Saviour Front, to rescue Iran from the hands of the fundamentalists. This organisation publishes a paper and operates a radio station in Cairo which broadcasts to Iran.

Shahin Fatemi, once a leader of the Iranian Student Confederation against the Pahlavis, radically changed his political colours. After the revolution, in July 1980, he opened a Centre of Iranian Documentation, and now publishes a paper called *Iran va Jahan (Iran and the World)*. Later he joined Amini's Saviour Front and then helped to organise the Constitutional Council, Shoraye Mashrutiat, aiming to bring in exiled Iranians in Europe and the USA to support the restoration of the

¹⁰ *Iran va Jahan (Iran and the World)* 5 (215) 5-12 November 1984.

Pahlavi dynasty, albeit with constitutional guarantees modelled on the Spanish pattern.¹¹

Shahpour Bakhtiar, also a veteran politician of the 1950s, was the Shah's last prime minister, taking on a position that Amini, Sanjabi and others had refused. This move also came too late. Bakhtiar held on to the reins of what remained of government when the Shah 'went on holiday' in January 1979 until he was overthrown by Khomeinist forces in February 1979, and escaped to Paris. A Western-style political figure, Bakhtiar has called Bani-Sadr a clown, the Mojahedin fanatics, and the Tudeh an administrative group which is remote-controlled from Moscow.¹² After years of bickering and failure to cooperate, in July 1984 a coalition was patched together between Amini and Bakhtiar. On the date of the Constitutional Revolution in Iran, 14th Mordad, they issued a joint communiqué against the Khomeini regime, established the day as a national holiday, and asked people to march against Khomeini. A substantial turn-out of cars in North Tehran managed to block a section of the city for some time, perhaps constituting the only recent demonstration actually conceived and orchestrated from exile. There thus appears to be a sector of the secular middle class remaining in Tehran which is accessible to the appeals of Bakhtiar. Yet this group must by now be comparatively small and ineffective, beyond such symbolic demonstrations of disaffection.

Early in his exile Bakhtiar had clearly stated that he did not simply want the return of the Pahlavis, but proposed a public referendum in Iran on the monarchy question and supported a constitutional monarchy on Swedish or British lines. In a recent interview, however, Bakhtiar evidently decried the process of referenda in Third World countries since they 'demand a political knowledge that these countries do not possess', and also appeared now to favour Reza Pahlavi's assuming the throne 'after receiving the people's endorsement'.¹³

Both Bakhtiar and Amini have joined the new Advisory Council established by the Shah's son, and relations between Amini and Bakhtiar are at least temporarily more cooperative. Like Massoud Rajavi, Bakhtiar has received substantial support from Iraq and is on record as saying he prefers Saddam Hossein to Khomeini. His radio

¹¹ *Jebhe* 90 (11) July 1986.

¹² See interview with Shahpour Bakhtiar in 'Khomeini and the opposition', *MERIP Reports*, No 104, March-April 1982.

¹³ Excerpts from an interview with Shahpur Bakhtiar in the French magazine, *Arc en Ciel*, reprinted in *Iran Times* 26 (12) 6 June 1986.

station in Baghdad broadcasts what he calls 'forthright nationalist propaganda' into Iran.

Despite their wealth and supposed political experience, the monarchist elements have achieved little over seven years of exile. Only in the last year has a broadly based monarchist coalition emerged in which the major figures have made at least a temporary truce in the name of some common goals. There appears to be renewed recognition of the importance of mass political communication. On 24 June 1984 the publication of *Kayhan* as a weekly newspaper from London began under the management and editorship of Mostaf Mezbazadeh, *Kayhan's* founder in Iran during the Pahlavi period. Apparently well-founded speculation suggests that financial difficulties led to the financial involvement both of the Saviour Front organisation of Amini and of Manouchehr Ganji, ex-Minister of Education in the Amouzegar cabinet of the late Shah, as well as support from Bakhtiar's organisation, and the appointment of Abolfathe Vaziri, one of Bakhtiar's men, as editor-in-chief to make *Kayhan* a major monarchist print channel.¹⁴ Monarchist publishing extends geographically from *Nehzat (Movement)*, in California, to *Gam (A Step)* in Australia.

Over the summer of 1986 the monarchists held a meeting in France to review the current situation and in early September 1986 another new international communications strategy was revealed. A clandestine transmitter broadcast an eleven-minute message from Reza Pahlavi over the two unused channels of Tehran television. Radio stations broadcasting from Baghdad had announced the planned message and instructed their listeners to tune to the blank channels. So far the size of the viewing audience and their reactions remain unclear, yet it appears that the war of the air-waves is heating up once more. While it has been argued that the lack of any political alternatives and the increasingly difficult situation inside Iran have created a longing for the 'good old days' under the Shah, the monarchists have shown themselves to be as riven with competing egos and divergent strategies as are other exiled activists, and there is little concrete sign of extensive monarchist support or activity within Iran beyond slogans supporting Reza Pahlavi daubed on the walls of Tehran. Given the populist base of the Islamic Republic and the social institutionalisation of the system through new Islamic organisations, coupled with the mass exodus of the very class elements most sympathetic to royalist claims, the necessary social base of support for any attempted monarchist return appears to be lacking.

¹⁴ *Jebhe* 5 (2) July 1986.

Nationalistic republicans

Perhaps the most overt opposition to the Islamic Republic remains *inside* Iran, centred on Mehdi Bazargan, who held the post of first Prime Minister of the Islamic Republic for nine months. Bazargan, since his deposition, has continued to sit in the Majles and maintained a high profile of outspoken criticism against the excesses and 'un-Islamic' actions of the Islamic Republic. He has continued the activities of his *Nehzat-e Azadi* (Freedom Movement) despite periodic attacks by Hezbollahi, and reputedly enjoys Khomeini's special protection.

Bazargan also represents the legacy of the Mossadegh and the National Front, a political legacy still very much alive inside and outside Iran. In February 1986, tens of thousands of people, with significant bazaari representation, gathered in Tehran for the funeral of Mossadeq's eldest son, although the gathering was attacked by Hezbollahi, followed by a protest to Khomeini by Bazargan.¹⁵

Later, in May 1986, veterans of the National Front and Radical Movement in Iran proclaim the formation of a new organisation, the Association for the Defence of Freedom and Sovereignty of the Iranian Nation, *Jamiat-e Defa az Azadi va Hakemiyat-e Mellat-e Iran*. They declared that the group was not against Khomeini, nor seeking the overthrow of the Islamic Republic. They expressed their support for the revolution and the 1979 constitution, but also wished to defend certain political rights and demands, aiming to promote democratic politics in Iran. The signatories include many who were former members of the early Provisional Government of the Islamic Republic, such as Bazargan himself, Reza Sadr, Hashem Sabaghian, Ebrahim Yazdi (another of the original triumvirate around Khomeini in Paris), Yadollah Sahabi, Ali-Akbar Moinefar, Ali Ardalan, Shah-Hosseini, Mahmoud Manian, etc.¹⁶ The Central Committee of this new group issues a monthly bulletin, *Khabarnameh*, which tries to coordinate activities inside and outside Iran. Later in the month, Bazargan, Sahabi and others were seized by Islamic secret police as they left the Tehran cemetery of Behesht Zahra, blindfolded, taken into the desert, badly beaten and abandoned, a dramatic indication of the very hard times in store.

Yet this did not prevent *Nehzat-e Azadi* from issuing a very critical six-page open letter in September criticising Khomeini's leadership and the continuation of the war with Iraq. The group argues, citing

¹⁵ *Jebhe*, National Movement of Iran, No 88, London, February 1986.

¹⁶ *Jebhe* (89) April 1986.

thirty-four major Islamic texts, that the current activities of the Islamic Republic are anti-Islamic. The letter argues that war between two Moslem nations will only benefit the superpowers and Zionism, while Moslems reap only its agony. It criticises Khomeini for his hubris, arguing that the *Vali-ye Faqih* is not above the Prophet Mohammad who himself, although directly inspired by God, always valued consultation. It argues that Abraham never used vigilantes against the idol-worshippers, nor did Hussein use his martyrdom to demand that others accept his religion or to try to create a state, but only to defend justice. The communiqué argues that outright rejection of a peace treaty is against Islam and the traditions of Mohammad, and vehemently criticises the purchase of arms from the 'enemy' (implying Israel) for the purpose of killing Moslems. This letter has been one of the most outspoken and critical statements to circulate inside Iran for some time and may be expected to create quite a public stir, garnering support from bazaaris, civil servants and the middle class who feel that many of the aims of the revolution remain unrealised. It has been suggested that Ayatollah Montazeri, the successor to Khomeini, is particularly well disposed to this grouping, which seems to represent a highly significant recent development in the opposition within Iran, and merits careful monitoring.

Other aged National Front figures are now scattered across Europe and the USA, and are involved in a variety of publishing ventures, cultural activities and so forth, soothing the frustrations of exile without overcoming them. Jebhe Melli, The National Front's European faction publishes a paper called *Iran Azad (Free Iran)*, in West Germany and has been active in organising discussion groups in West Germany, France and in the USA on the future of Iran. *Jebhe*, an independent newspaper published in London by Ahmad Anvari, a veteran journalist and lifelong supporter of Mossadegh, supports the National Front line and also maintains direct personal contact with Nehzat-e-Azadi and prominent members of the new Group. A new publication, about to appear in West Germany, involves financing by the son of Ayatollah Shariat-Madari with the editorship of Hassan Nazih, the ex-head of the Lawyers Association and briefly Oil Minister in Bazargan's Provisional Government. These publications play an important role in disseminating current information about events and developments inside Iran, and the network of contacts between exiled National Front figures and those still inside Iran is amongst the strongest of all the exile groupings.

Independent left/progressive factions

A variety of progressive, democratic socialist and other leftist factions are scattered across Europe and the USA, licking the wounds of the last few years and trying slowly to develop a more coherent politics, balancing recognition of crucial Third World issues such as imperialism and dependency, with the development of practical domestic strategies for implementing democratic and socialist demands. Here, issues such as reorganising and ascribing priorities to economic production, the rights and roles of women and national minorities, democratising the workplace, and cultural and intellectual freedoms have become crucial. The variety of non-party affiliated publishing ventures provides a dynamic environment for exploring and developing such themes in print, within the exile community. The most influential and interesting include *Dowlat va Enghelab* (*State and Revolution*) and *Nimeh-ye Digar* (*The Other Half*), a feminist journal, both published from London; *Ketab-e Jome* (*Friday's Book*), and *Socialisme va Enghelab* (*Socialism and Revolution*), from Paris, which was also the home of *Alef-Ba* (*ABC*) of Gholam-Hossein Saedi until his death in 1985; and *Nazm-e Novin* (*The New Order*), and *Elm va Jame'e* (*Science and Society*), from Washington DC. The satirical paper *Ahangar* published in London has also developed the visual aesthetic of political cartooning, as well as a strong argument for an independent left struggling against both Western imperialism and the social imperialism of the Soviet Union.

Political organisations also maintain their own organs. These include *Raha'i* (*Liberation*), of Etehad-e Kommonist (Communist Unity); *Jonbesh-e Socialisti* (*Socialist Movement*), of Sazamane Socialisti Iran, ('Organisation of Iranian Socialists); *Rahe Kargar* (*The Way of Labour*), of the group of the same name, and numerous others. Frequently preoccupied with internecine arguments concerning Marxist interpretation, and often consisting of a handful of ideologically committed individuals, their publications appear erratically, and while such groupings add to the vitality of left discourse they have never had nor will ever have substantial followings.

Conclusion: Iranian politics in exile 1986

The past seven years of exile politics is a metaphoric graveyard of would-be political leaders and analysts predicting the imminent downfall of the Islamic Republic, its defeat in the war with Iraq, its descent into civil war and the emergence of a dramatic new and

successful leadership. Such posturing has proved totally without foundation and reveals a profound failure to analyse the true nature of the Islamic Republic, its sources of support, its institutionalisation, and its evident political and military successes. The Islamic Republic has proved itself far more resilient than anyone had expected. The loud claims of opposition groups and would-be leaders (such as Admiral Madani and Hassan Nazih) of their imminent take-over of the still-fledgling republic have all been shown to be baseless.

On the contrary, Iran seems to be winning the current round of military engagements with Iraq, creating in many exiles the highly ambivalent response of feeling pleased that their country is winning a war which they neither support nor comprehend. The strategy adopted by the Mojahedin, Bakhtiar and others of receiving support from the national enemy appears to have backfired; war does mobilise patriotic feelings, when too much has been suffered and lost to allow the devaluation of the process, and it became politically almost naive to argue support for the 'people' while disavowing the 'nation'. Similarly, the Iraqi support to the Mojahedin, the Kurds, and others has not proved cost-effective to them or produced the desired military results. On the other hand, Iranian propaganda directed into Iraq, and support for Ayatollah Bagher Hakim as leader of the Supreme Assembly of Iraq, Majles-e Ala'ye Iraq, and the major opposition alternative to Saddam Hossein has not proved very effective either. The Dawa party, opposing Saddam Hossein inside Iraq, has not rejected Hakim but neither has it endorsed him. Recently, Iranian war rhetoric seems to have taken a strongly nationalistic turn, away from the promulgation of revolutionary Islam which first dominated it.

Thus most of the major dangers to the regime, such as coup attempts, urban guerrilla struggle, loss of significant oil revenue, invasion of large portions of territory, have been weathered. Internal dissent has become more evident, as in the strikes of doctors and butchers over the summer of 1986, but populist support still appears strong. The key question is no longer will the regime remain, but more precisely what form and shape will it take after Khomeini's death, and how fundamentalist will it remain. Bazargan has argued that this Islamic Republic is the costume that fits Khomeini, and that much will alter to suit the new wearer(s). Answers to such questions most probably lie *inside* Iran, perhaps with Bazargan or among new groups and tendencies that have grown inside the Islamic Republic, and not amongst the motley, disunited and disorganised groupings that are the remains of the Iranian opposition in

exile. One scenario that lies within the realms of possibility is a reconciliation between Bazargan's groupings and the Mojahedin. There is a love-hate relationship between these two Islamic factions, with the Mojahedin as the angry young men who broke out of the too-moderate Nehzat-e Azadi in the 1960s. The combination of age and experience with youth and militancy could be extremely powerful.

The exile groupings are, after all, in part the products of the Pahlavi era and suffer its same deformities of political culture: severe mistrust amongst participants, an intense egoistic jostling for leadership, and an individualism which constantly prevents any coalition of forces from lasting very long. Many groups also manifest an ideological rigidity which allows the 1 per cent of disagreement to triumph over the 99 per cent of shared views, thus preventing compromise or a more pragmatic, and therefore more effective, politics. Yet at the same time well-conceived and thought-through political analyses and strategies are lacking.

Clearly this massive move to exile carries within it one enormous political irony, it has totally eroded the size of the base inside Iran that would support an alternative politics. The massive popular movement coalesced around the charismatic figure of Khomeini and the readily understandable rhetoric of a politicised Islam that supported the oppressed against the oppressors, the meek against the corrupt. No other political rhetoric has provided a language as clear to the Iranian masses, as filled with the necessary cultural connotations and values to arouse collective identification and passion. However coherent, therefore, revolutionary socialist or feminist analysis may appear to a few exiled intellectuals, if it fails to coincide with the perceived identities and experiences of the Iranian popular classes, it will not move them. The dilemmas of exile include the inability to communicate readily and directly with one's desired audience, so that rhetoric from exile becomes ever more abstract and hollow to those who remain at home. It also weakens the possibilities for engagement with the regime on specific issues. Dramatic ideological change and mass political mobilisation are rare within a polity; how much more difficult to orchestrate and achieve from outside. Thus, the bulk of exile publishing is read by other exiles, and while radio broadcasting penetrates Iran, its messages are undermined by the Iraqi connection.

Clearly, not all Iranians in exile are involved in political activities nor have they taken on activist roles vis-à-vis the Islamic Republic. Yet with the Islamic Republic's attempt to overcome the separation of religion

from politics and culture, even drinking a glass of wine becomes a gesture of defiance. The struggle for hegemony between Iranian and Islamic identities has produced a dramatic cultural politics. It is impossible, however, to reflect here on the totality of groupings, arguments and events that have filled the past seven years. Some groups with long names have short lives, an organisation may consist merely of a handful of people, a publication puts out five issues and dies.

There are substantial communities of Iranians in the USA and across Europe. California, particularly the Los Angeles area, has always attracted a sizeable community, even during the time of the Shah, because of the climate and comfortable life-style; that community now boasts over 300,000 people, with an Iranian business telephone directory as thick as an ordinary phone book, which caters for most Iranian needs from bakeries to brain surgery. West Coast political communication includes *Nehzat (Movement)* and *Mellat-e-Bidar (The Awakened Nation)*, a magazine published by Mohajer which is nationalist; Radio Iran, which also has a pro-Bakhtiar orientation, and is run by Iraj Gorgin, former head of National Iranian Radio Television's Channel Two in Tehran; there are also television companies broadcasting on the public network, one of which belongs to Sattar, a popular singer and favourite of Reza Pahlavi. Substantial numbers of Iranians live in the metropolitan areas of Washington DC and New York. *Iran Times*, a weekly publication which bills itself as 'an independent newspaper for Iranians around the world' has been published in Washington since 1970, and Persian-language radio and television broadcasting is well established. Monarchist groups are strong and include Mahnaz Afghami, the Pahlavi ex-Minister for Women's Affairs, who has established the Foundation for Iranian Studies and publishes a quarterly journal called *Iran Nameh*. In New York there is a monarchist radio channel. US census figures have revealed the very high level of education of in-coming Iranians, many Iranians are integrated into or affiliated with universities and professional organisations, and new academically oriented and progressive groupings such as the Center for Iranian Research and Analysis (CIRA) have been created. Conferences on the War and on Women have been organised by the Committee in Defense of the Democratic Rights of the Iranian People, and a supposedly non-partisan organisation, the Iranian Cooperative Movement Foundation, aims to help Iranians in their encounters with the US Immigration and Naturalization Service.

Sizeable communities of Iranians exist in West Germany, Sweden, Denmark, Holland, Belgium, France and Britain, as well as Canada and Australia. There are signs that some of these new immigrant communities will not be allowed to grow substantially. With the new wave of draftees fleeing the war, and the discovery of the East German connection, in the summer of 1986 there was considerable international discussion over the handling of Iranian refugees, which produced a subsequent tightening of immigration and asylum requirements in West Germany. Frictions between Iranians and the host community, and often simply amongst Iranians, in Sweden and France have raised questions about continued entry, and narrowed quotas for political asylum. Spain, which for a number of years required no entry visa from Iranians, and has a large community, now requires such a visa; many Bahaii have moved on from Spain to Costa Rica through the help of the Bahaii millionaire, Hojabr Yazdani. As immigration procedures tighten in the West, draft-dodgers and other Iranians managing to leave are creating new and much less fortunate communities in Istanbul in Turkey, and Lahore and Karachi in Pakistan. This new wave of exiles tends to be younger and less highly educated, and exits illegally with little money and few possessions into countries with poorly developed social security structures and limited employment opportunities; recognition of their plight has led Iranians in New York to organise an embryonic network of financial support from West to East. Clearly, the facilities both to survive economically and to be active politically have constituted important criteria for Iranian settlement. Comparative sociological research is badly needed on the nature of the adaptation of Iranians to these various host societies; particularly on these new communities-in-limbo which so dramatically reveal the real human cost and tragedy of exile.

Since the revolution, much pent-up creative and intellectual energy has found new forms and channels of expression—in painting and photography and film, through poems and short stories and novels—some of which indeed focuses centrally on the dilemmas of exile and a considerable amount of which is indeed published and available *inside* Iran.¹⁷ For Iranian political exiles the current period is one of retrenchment and self-reflection, a productive period of research and

¹⁷ On exile, see the novel *Sorraya in a Coma*, by Esmail Fassih, London: Zed Press, 1985; a recent issue of the journal *Iranian Studies* focused on contemporary Iranian writers and critics, pre- and post-Pahlavi, and a forthcoming issue will focus specifically on the theme of Iranian exile. 'Sociology of the Iranian writer', *Iranian Studies* 28 (2-4) Spring-Autumn 1985.

analysis, writing and other creative activity. There is also a growing concern for the loss of Iranian cultural identity, especially with regard to the children of exiles, evidenced by the increase in seminars, educational materials and language classes, music recitals, museum and gallery exhibits, and cultural programming on radio and television.

The longer the exile, the more difficult the return, although we fully expect a debate to grow concerning the possibilities and the need for a return to Iran. For would-be exiled activists, the major danger is to become frozen in opposition, increasingly out of touch with the mood 'back home' and increasingly integrated into the life of the host country. So far it appears, as Khomeini tells his Assembly of Experts, that the major winner in the political war directed from exile is the regime of the Islamic Republic, not the exiled protagonists.

South Korea: dissent from abroad*

In modern Korean history, foreign interventions, forty years of Japanese colonial rule, the division of the country by the United States and the Soviet Union after the Second World War, and a series of repressive regimes means the exile movement has been an indispensable part of the struggle for independence and reform.

At the end of the nineteenth century, the Korean kingdom was pulled into the power struggle for dominance in East Asia, and contact with a wide variety of political thought and a growing nationalist surge brought calls for internal reforms. The first political and civil rights movement, the Independence Society (IS), was formed in 1896 under Dr Soh Jae-pil. Dr Soh and a group of 'enlightened intellectuals' staged a coup for political reform. After the failure of this coup in 1884, Soh fled to the USA and became a US citizen with the name Philip Jason. He later returned to Seoul with the ideas of Western-style liberalism, and established the first newspaper printed only in the Korean alphabet, *The Independence*. The Independence Society's advocacy of independent neutral diplomacy, civil rights and self-help culminated in a 'People's Assembly' at Chongno Plaza in October 1898. The Assembly urged the King to accept the rule of law. The IS soon faced government repression and Dr Soh, partly acting on 'advice' from the US consul, left the country again for the US, but he returned to Korea briefly in 1945 as an adviser to the US military government.

Other well-known leaders included Ahn Joong-keun, Syngman Rhee, Kim Koo and Ahn Chang-ho. After Japan took effective control of Korea in 1905, Ahn Joong-keun organised an armed struggle unit which eventually assassinated Hirobumi Ito, the leading Japanese proponent of Japanese imperial expansion in Korea and Manchuria. Syngman Rhee, always controversial because of his egocentric partisan politics, was based in the US between 1913 and 1945. Kim Koo led a Provisional Government in Shanghai (later in Chungking), and organised commandos against the Japanese from 1919 to 1945. The

* In the writing of this article, Michael Fonte contributed much, especially to the section on US policy. However, the responsibility for this article lies with the present writer.

massive flow of refugees to Manchuria provided the base for guerrilla actions by both nationalists and leftists, and the Korean US immigrants, especially those in Hawaii, actively supported the exile movement.

The exile movement in that period fell into two broad categories, those committed to a diplomatic approach and the armed national liberation movement. Maintaining communications with underground organisations inside Korea, these movements sought the support of international opinion as well as that of the Korean overseas community.

Even though the US trained a group of young Koreans in Chungking in the last stages of the Second World War and at the same time Korean units in Mao's army in Yenan were numbered in thousands, no group received internationally recognised provisional government status. After the US-USSR occupation of Korea in 1945, all exiles returned home but only in their capacity as private citizens. The US military government successfully urged Kim Koo not to return as head of Provisional Government, and when about 40,000 Korean soldiers from Yenan crossed the Yalu River, the Soviet military government disarmed them all.

In the north, Kim Il-sung, who returned with the Soviet Army, seized power with the backing of the USSR and purged other factions, including many returned exiles. Kim Il-sung has dominated the politics of the north ever since. In the south, US policy concerns have dominated the political arena, as shown by the cases of two prominent exile politicians, Syngman Rhee and Kim Dae Jung.

South Korea: US containment policy and political power

US planners asked the same questions about Korea that they did regarding the post-War disposition of other former colonial areas. The essential issues were the same everywhere: power and control. The desire to put together a 'manageable world' needed to be squared with pledges made in the Atlantic Charter for independence and self-determination.

Trusteeship was one answer. Former colonies would be given over to the Five Great Powers (US, UK, USSR, France, China) in trust until such time as they could be fully independent. The British and French were not particularly happy with this American approach, and Sir Anthony Eden, the British Foreign Secretary, put the British view succinctly in his memoirs: '[Roosevelt] hoped that former colonial territories, once free of their masters, would become politically and

economically dependent on the United States, and had no fear that other powers might fill that role.¹

As Bruce Cummings pointed out:

Trusteeship was one path to the goal of extending and consolidating American power and influence. American planners were determined to create in Korea a government friendly and responsive to American interest. They preferred to go about this in an atmosphere of trust and co-operation, which fed the presumption of American innocence. But they were prepared to use force as a *de facto* means to the end. Trusteeship was the liberal alternative, occupation was the assured method.²

Given the development of the war in the Pacific, occupation was chosen. With the swift and strong entrance of the USSR into Asia the US feared the Soviet Union and was aware of the need to build a bulwark against the tide of revolution which the USSR threatened to bring in.

This planning by the USA did not take into account one vital ingredient, the Korean people themselves. Many Koreans inside Korea and in the exile movements had clear ideas of what was needed: a revolution that would rid their country of the legacy of Japanese colonial rule and bring land re-distribution, labour reforms and real political participation and power. After the August 1945 Japanese surrender, a Committee for the Preparation of Korean Independence (CPKI) was formed under the leadership of Lyuh Woon-hyung. Local People's Committees were set up, and on 6 September 1945 a national group called the Korean People's Republic (KPR) was formed. Korea, however briefly and imperfectly, was unified. According to Cummings, 'The entrance of American forces was the prime factor in the KPR's demise, both because the Americans opposed it, and because American power provided conditions in which the Japanese and the native Korean Right could work against it.'³ Syngman Rhee arrived in Korea on 16 October 1945 aboard one of General MacArthur's private planes, and he quickly assembled a loose coalition of the Right under an organisation called the Central Council for the Society of the Promotion of Korean Independence (SPKI). The US occupying forces set about constructing a policy that would guarantee the US position in Korea and

¹ Sir Anthony Eden, *Memoirs: The Reckoning*, Boston, Houghton Mifflin, 1965, p 593.

² Bruce Cummings, 'American policy and Korean liberation', in Frank Baldwin (ed), *Without Parallel: The American-Korean Relationship Since 1945*, New York: Pantheon Books, 1974, p 44.

³ *ibid.*, p 54.

used Rhee as the key figure in this exercise. Cummings describes this strategy: 'The new policy had four aspects: strengthening the alliance with the Right, including the proposal that it be used to establish a new Korean government; building up a reactionary police force; developing separate South Korean national defence forces; and suppressing the Left.'⁴

Rhee was willing to use and be used, as Palais explains: During this period Rhee outmaneuvered, discredited, and repressed the socialists and communists with the aid of the police, right-wing youth groups and gangs, and the American military government. In a situation in which only disorganized conservatives remained as participants in politics, Rhee emerged as the single most powerful political leader.⁵

Rhee came to power as the first President in 1948 and put together the components of autocratic rule. He served US interests well, fitting perfectly into Truman's containment doctrine of 1947 and using the Korean War to enhance his power and prestige. In change, the US saw chaos; in reaction, stability. The US chose to back the stability and reaction provided by Syngman Rhee.

Kim Dae Jung, on the other hand, does not fit into perceived US interests. Kim, a politician with strong grassroots support, challenged Park Chung Hee for the Presidency in 1971 under the banner of the New Democratic Party. Major-General Park had taken control of the South Korean government in the coup of May 1961, and his highly centralised and tightly controlled organisation, the Democratic Republican Party (DRP), dominated the government from 1961 through to the 1971 elections. Kim Dae Jung built his challenge to Park around the South Korean public's growing dissatisfaction with Park's leadership and the nature of the political system under the DRP. In the official count, Kim received 46 per cent of the vote, but the opposition claimed that there were widespread voting irregularities by the government.

Park's response to Kim's challenge was to revise the Constitution so as to preclude the possibility of a future political victory for the opposition. This *Yushin* Constitution of 1972 reversed the democratisation of the 1960s and was a setback for the cause of democracy and civil rights. Kim Dae Jung was in Japan at this time; he asked for political asylum and then went to the USA where he organised the US headquarters of the United Movement for Democracy and

⁴ *ibid.*, p 66.

⁵ James B Palais, "'Democracy' in South Korea, 1948-1972", in Baldwin, p 321.

Unification of Korea (UMDUK). Afterwards he travelled to Japan to establish a UMDUK branch, but he was abducted in Japan by the Korean Central Intelligence Agency (KCIA) on 8 August 1973.

Kim's abduction was a catalyst to the movement for change inside South Korea. Students challenged the Park Government, blaming it for Kim's abduction and calling for the repeal of the *Yushin* Constitution. While US government reaction to the Kim abduction influenced the Park Government and Kim's life was spared, there was no effective protest by Washington to the repression that followed. Park, and the 'stability' he stood for, were seen as too important to compromise.

The aftermath of Park's assassination in 1979 was an outpouring of public support for the revision of the Constitution and the construction of a real democratic political system. But the real struggle for power, within the military, was won by Major-General Chun Doo Hwan, then Military Security Commander. The final act in Chun's political coup was the Kwangju massacre, during which, according to estimates by Roman Catholic sources in Korea and Japan, over 2,000 citizens were murdered by the military. (The official government figure is now 191). The massacre stands as an indelible stain not only on the Chun Government but also on the USA.

The massacre has also become a symbol of US support for dictatorship, since the US commander of the UN forces with jurisdiction over Korean forces either permitted or condoned the transfer of Korean forces from the front line to aid in the suppression of Kwangju civilians.⁶

This same US commander, General John Wickhan, in an interview with *The Los Angeles Times* on 8 August 1980, summarised the US position:

Peace and stability are important to the United States here, and national security and internal stability surely come before political liberalization. . . . I'm not sure democracy the way we understand it is ready for Korea or the Koreans ready for it. . . . Korea seems to need a strong leader. For a variety of reasons, many of them rather curious, Chon (*sic*) seems to have emerged as a leader, an unnatural one—but nonetheless a leader. And Lemming-like (*sic*), the people are kind of lining up behind him in all walks of life. . . .

By 27 August, Chun had himself elected president under the *Yushin* Constitution. In the meantime, Kim Dae Jung and twenty-three others were put on trial on sedition charges related to the Kwangju uprising. These charges included violation of martial law decrees, conspiracy to

⁶ Asia Watch, *Human Rights in Korea*, New York: Asia Watch Report, 1986, p 43.

foment revolution, and the formation of an anti-state organ. On 17 September the court martial sentenced Kim to death and his co-defendants to sentences of up to twenty years.

The Japanese government, largely because of its concern about public sentiment following the KCIA's abduction of Kim on Japanese soil, suspended aid and made clear that Kim's execution would force a re-evaluation of its relations with the Republic of Korea.

In the USA, the weakened Carter Administration would only cautiously express its 'intense and deep concern'. A deal was struck with the incoming Reagan Administration—Kim's sentence was commuted and reduced to a life sentence with the *quid pro quo* that Chun would be the first foreign Head of State to be received by Reagan. For the new US Administration, with its emphasis on support for authoritarian regimes personified by the former ambassador to the UN, Jeane Kirkpatrick, this move made good sense. Chun's legitimacy was underscored, and the potential security and stability threat that Kim's execution might have caused was undercut.

The Reagan policy is similar to the general post-World War II US pattern, but the South Korean situation has changed dramatically, both within South Korea and in East Asia as a whole. During the Korean War, the main 'enemy' for the US changed from being the Soviet Union to the People's Republic of China (PRC). Today the US and the PRC are friends, the Soviet Union and China are moving toward *détente*, and Japan seeks to keep the peace with all its neighbours. No superpower wants to be drawn into another conflict in Korea. Change within Korea, then, does not mean chaos. Reaction does not ensure stability.

US policymakers now face the question of how to square their choices with the emerging South Korean feeling that South Korea's national pride has been, and continues to be, hurt by an unchanged US policy. For the exile community, the dilemma is how to find an effective position for their work in the USA. Does the community take an idealistic position and call for complete US withdrawal? Does it work as a checking force to US policy? Hard choices have to be made, and unity must be forged.

The return of Kim Dae Jung and its impact

Kim Dae Jung was exiled to the USA on Christmas Eve 1982, on 'health grounds' according to the government. During his two-year stay in the US, he focused his efforts on two concerns: maintaining his influence on

South Korean politics and influencing US policy. Kim worked to draw media attention to the issue of Korean democracy, to broaden contacts with the US Congress, European and Japanese leaders, organisations and opinion makers.

On the grounds that he was not an official representative of the Korean opposition, the Reagan Administration rebuffed Kim's attempts to develop contacts with the Executive branch, providing only meetings with the officials at the assistant secretary level. Kim, based in a suburb of Washington DC, established a network within the US Korean community for the support of his activities.

Given the connection between US policy and Korea's history, Kim's concerns were not basically contradictory. However, two political facts of life made him return to South Korea. Firstly, he clearly became frustrated with the prospect of a changing US policy. In a *New York Times* interview, he stated: 'I've made an effort to support the cause of democracy and human rights in our country, but I don't think I've fully succeeded, especially in persuading the American government to change its Korea policy.'⁷ Secondly, he faced the dilemma of being away from South Korea for so long that he would lose his political influence.

Kim's intention to return was a serious challenge to the Chun regime. Because he was a symbol of the South Korean people's drive to end military rule ever since 1971, both the Park and Chun Governments had gone to great lengths to ostracise Kim. Even though his political base was not strong in grassroots organisations, Kim was able to mobilise people behind him both because of his own talent and because of the growing aversion to prolonged military rule. Park's abduction of Kim added an aura of myth about Kim, and the death sentence by Chun and the failure to actually carry it out, paradoxically increased people's interest in Kim. Kim's ability during his self-imposed exile to make foreign friends was an effective challenge to Chun's desire to make Kim a forgotten man.

Thus, when he announced his return in September 1984, Kim Dae-ung was more influential than ever. His announcement did not receive much media attention at first, but General Choi Chang Yoon, political advisor to Chun, let it be known that Kim would be arrested when he returned. Given the assassination of Benigno Aquino in the Philippines

⁷ *The New York Times*, 12 November 1984.

and the parallels with Kim's political position, press attention and foreign support began to increase.⁸

Kim arrived at Kimpo International Airport on 8 February 1985 with a supporting US delegation and a large press presence. In an airport mêlée, Kim was hustled away by waiting security forces and his escorts, including two US Congressmen and several other prominent Americans, were jostled. Powerful press coverage resulted in much embarrassment and concern to the Chun Government. Kim was put under immediate house arrest but his influence on the National Assembly elections of 12 February was startling.

Almost all the opposition candidates in the election used Kim Dae Jung's name, in tandem with Kim Young Sam's, to show that they were clearly opposition members.⁹ The election results surprised both the government and the tame opposition Democratic Korea Party (DKP). The New Korea Democratic Party (NKDP), formed under the influence of the two Kims a few weeks before the election, became the leading opposition party against the expectations of many observers. The NKDP received 29.2 per cent of the nation-wide vote compared to 19.5 per cent for DKP and 35.6 per cent for the ruling Democratic Justice Party (DJP). The DKP soon collapsed as its elected Assembly members defected as a group to the NKDP, and the ruling party was faced with the reality that the combined opposition actually won the election. In five major cities, votes for the NKDP outnumbered the DJP. In Seoul, the NKDP received 43.3 per cent while the DJP took 27.3 per cent.¹⁰

⁸ cf. R Gregory Nokes, *Associated Press* story, 'Kim's American backers hope for democratic pay-off', 7 February 1985, in which he identifies the International Centre for Development Policy as one of the organisations which worked to build press attention and foreign support. Nokes quotes the Centre's executive director, Lindsay Mattison, as saying that the centre's goal is to 'build a relationship between democrats in Korea and powerful Americans who will then continue to care about Korea.' Other organisations involved included the International Human Rights Law Group and the North American Coalition for Human Rights in Korea.

⁹ Kim Young Sam, a contender for presidential nomination by the NDP in 1971, took control of the NDP when Kim Dae Jung was in exile and under house arrest. Kim Young Sam played a very important role in 1979 by challenging the Park Government. His expulsion from the National Assembly led to the Pusan uprising. Ten days later Park was assassinated. In 1980 Kim Young Sam was a key figure within the NDP during the spring of Seoul and was put under house arrest by Chun Doo Hwan for two years.

The third of the 'three Kims', Kim Jong Pil, was the key organiser of the 1961 coup. He organised the KCIA and was responsible for the rapprochement, during the 1960s, between Japan and Korea. Kim Jong Pil cultivated a public image as the successor to Park Chung Hee, but Chun Doo Hwan pushed him aside in 1980. Since his base was largely in the military and the younger generation of officers have rejected him, his days of political power seem over.

¹⁰ cf. *The Korea Herald*, 15 February 1985 and also *The Monthly Review of Korean Affairs* 7(2) March/April 1985 (published by The Council for Democracy in Korea).

The 84.6 per cent voter turn-out for this election was the nation's highest. This was not only an indication of the frustration with the Chun regime but also of the desire for a change of government, and Kim Dae Jung's return greatly contributed to the opposition's strength. Having learned of Kim's return via leaflets, thousands of people lined the streets of Seoul and turned up at the airport. Their presence was an indication that more and more people were no longer afraid of the government and that the government was losing control and was afraid of the people.

The formation of the Youth Alliance for Democracy in September 1983 was the first major move to institutionalise dissident organisations. During the severe repression of 1980-3, very few grassroots efforts were possible. Young organisers who were former political prisoners began the Youth Alliance to mobilise a non-violent, mass-oriented movement. The Youth Alliance encouraged the formation of labour, farmer and religious organisations, all of which supported the NKDP in the election. In May 1984 Kim Young Sam fasted for twenty-three days in protest against government repression, and his fasting awakened those politicians banned from political activity by Chun in 1980. Soon they formed the Council for the Promotion of Democracy (CPD), jointly led by Kim Dae Jung and Kim Young Sam, and CPD was the mother organisation for NKDP. Kim Dae Jung's physical presence in Korea clearly became a strong political rallying point. Unable to join the NKDP because his political rights were suspended, Kim took the post of CPD co-chairman and began to exert political influence.

After the collapse of the DKP, the two Kims organised a signature campaign for the direct election of the State President, a campaign that united all the opposition groups. The campaign was formally begun on 12 February 1986, the first anniversary of the controversial National Assembly elections. Though the relationship of the two Kims is sometimes called 'a political marriage' and seems vulnerable, they are under pressure from the movement and the public to continue their alliance.

Kim Dae Jung has been under frequent house arrest, suggesting that he is the most serious threat to the military-backed, unpopular regime. As Kim said in his *New York Times* interview, his presence itself greatly encouraged South Koreans and sparked a more vigorous political debate. 'Even if I'm not able to be in contact with the people, my return itself, my staying in Korea will be a most powerful message to encourage people to participate in the struggle for democracy.'

The presence of Kim Dae Jung as a political force has underscored the failure of the government to make him a nonentity. This fact, in conjunction with Chun Doo Hwan's step-by-step retreat from his original position on constitutional reform,¹¹ has taught the South Korean people a very important lesson: that the military hardliners are not omnipotent and the people can win through unity. Kim Dae Jung has served as a political rallying point as a man of principle and commitment, whatever his own personal motivations might be.

Kim's impact on US policy is far more difficult to assess. The Kimpo Airport scene received strong media coverage in the USA. The US Ambassador, Richard Walker, soon blamed Kim's party for the incident. Walker has refused to meet either Kim Dae Jung or Kim Young Sam, and it was only as recently as 4 July 1986 that both Kims were invited, along with 1,000 other guests, to a US Embassy party. It was the first such invitation in fifteen years for Kim Dae Jung and in eight years for Kim Young Sam. Given the clear personal disfavour which Walker holds for the two Kims, it is interesting that even he could not but finally recognise Kim Dae Jung as a political leader.

Other influences, of course, have had their impact on recent US policy in South Korea. Developments in Buenos Aires, Port-au-Prince and Manila have led the Reagan Administration to at least pay lip-service to democracy and 'people power'. The Administration has shifted from its early hard line on international terrorism and the East-West struggle as the basic concerns for its foreign policy, as opposed to Carter's human rights emphasis, moving slowly to a position that equates democracy with human rights. The realities of power behind democratic facades—as in El Salvador, for example—have not been important to the Administration, but Kim's return, the rise of the NKDP and calls for constitutional reform to bring about real democracy are testing the future direction of US policy in South Korea.

Regardless of some observers' pessimistic view of his chances for the presidency, Kim Dae Jung is still the most influential political figure in the country, both by attracting the attention of the international media and by speaking out as a symbol of the repressed people of South Korea.

¹¹ When the signature campaign started on 12 February 1986, Chun put all opposition leaders under house arrest and warned that there would be no constitutional amendment until after the 1988 Olympic Games. Faced with serious challenges to this position, Chun announced on 30 April that the Constitution could be amended before his term expires in February 1988 if the National Assembly could reach an agreement on constitutional amendment.

Government policy toward exiles and dissidents abroad

The South Korean Government's attitude and policy toward dissent abroad has varied from period to period, and person to person.¹² Before the 1970s there was no conspicuous exile movement abroad because of the democratic opportunities, limited though they were, under the Constitution. Park Chung Hee's *Yushin* Constitution of 1972 created a far more repressive situation internally, and created the conditions for a strong exile and dissident movement abroad. In the 1970s a policy of intimidation was used. As a US Congressional investigation by the Fraser Committee revealed, the KCIA was actively involved in various activities in the US to discourage dissidents.¹³ Harassment and intimidation were used on hundreds of South Korean nationals in the USA.

KCIA agents directly or indirectly threatened Koreans or Korean-Americans using family relations, business ties and manipulation of their travel documents. South Korean officials attempted to directly control the Korean-language media and also tried to stifle the media by exerting pressure on advertisers.¹⁴ The KCIA closely monitored anti-government demonstrations and photographed the participants. Lee Jai Hyon, former chief cultural and information attaché at the South Korean Embassy in Washington from 1970 to 1973, in his testimony described a 'highly sophisticated' plan by the KCIA in the spring of 1973 for clandestine operations. One of the nine points he described was 'to intimidate "unco-operative" South Korean residents in the US through their families, relatives and close friends in South Korea, to silence dissidents and to make already silent ones more co-operative.'¹⁵ Highlights of this plan were the abduction of Kim Dae Jung from Japan and the disappearance of the former KCIA director, Kim Hyung Wook, in Paris during 1979. Kim Hyung Wook is widely believed to have been killed by South Korean agents.

The South Korean Government's guidelines in this period seem clear enough: to dispose of those who seriously threaten to undermine the government, and intimidate or buy off the rest.

¹² The term 'exile' is used to describe a few activists from Korea with prison terms or those wanted by the Seoul government. 'Dissident' is used for those Korean residents or naturalised Korean-born American citizens who are actively engaged in anti-Chun activities.

¹³ *Investigation of Korean-American Relations*, Report of the Subcommittee on International Organisations of the Committee on International Relations, US House of Representatives, 31 October 1978, Washington DC: US Government Printing Office.

¹⁴ *ibid.*, pp 94-6.

¹⁵ *ibid.*, p 97.

In the 1980s the South Korean Government continues to cast an ominous shadow across South Korean-American communities.¹⁶ The KCIA, under the new name of the Agency for National Security Planning, 'has become more covert, more sophisticated', in Lee Jai Hyon's words.¹⁷ Joseph Cho, publisher of *The Korean Street Journal* in Los Angeles, was quoted as saying that he has had financial problems because of '[Korean] government pressure on Koreans and Korean-American businessmen to keep advertising out of his newspaper.'¹⁸ In a series of articles in his newspaper, Cho mentioned specific cases of intimidation.¹⁹ He said that the Korean consul, Park Min Soo, requested him to dismiss his managing editor in December 1981, and he added that consular officials put pressure on the sponsors not to place advertisements in the paper. He also testified that writers and interviewees were threatened with exclusion from the list of eligible members of the so-called Advisory Board for Peaceful Unification of Korea.²⁰

After the Korean Association in Los Angeles issued a declaration of conscience in support of constitutional amendment in South Korea, an important move for the formerly pro-Chun organisation, South Korean agents also exerted pressure on officials of the Association and other organisations.²¹ Similar pressure was exerted in Canada. *The Minjoong Shinmoon*, a weekly Korean-language newspaper in Toronto, suddenly lost advertising in 1985, allegedly as a result of consular offices. A dissident leader in Toronto, Park Chang Ung, has long been denied renewal of his passport by the consular office.

Pressure from Korean authorities has been exerted on many Korean-language newspapers. When Kim Dae Jung gave a speech in Los Angeles in 1984 to the largest gathering (4,000) in the history of that city's Korean community, the papers were 'persuaded' not to print Kim's photograph and not to report related news on the front pages. When students from the University of California, Los Angeles, and the University of Maryland organised forums on Korea, inviting myself in May 1986, Korean consular officials approached the students

¹⁶ *San Francisco Chronicle*, 25 June 1986.

¹⁷ *ibid.*

¹⁸ *ibid.*

¹⁹ *The Korean Street Journal*, 16 October 1985 and 30 October 1985.

²⁰ cf. Article 68 of the Chun constitution. Members number over 7,000. The government developed networks of ABPU overseas. In the Washington area there are 45 members who are known pro-Chun figures.

²¹ *The Korean Street Journal*, 14 May 1986.

responsible in an effort to stop the events. It is widely believed that dissident activities in the Korean communities in the US are closely monitored by agents and infiltrators, and that the Korean Embassy runs citizen spy-rings. The so-called 'student spy case' in which two South Korean students from Western Illinois University were charged and sentenced to death by a South Korean court was described by human rights organisations as 'an attempt to discredit the student movement and to discourage Koreans living abroad'.²² The fact that the Korean consular office in Chicago knew about the identities of the thirty-five participants when a documentary film on Kwangju was shown at the Western Illinois University, indicated the existence of infiltrators according to a professor there.

The establishment of a television broadcasting company named Korean Television Enterprises Ltd (KTE) in Los Angeles shows the South Korean Government's desire to control the US Korean community. Since its establishment in March 1983, KTE has been disseminating political propaganda. It admitted this in its 11 March 1986 registration as a foreign agent with the US Justice Department, revealing that it had received \$33,000 a month since October 1984 for political propaganda purposes from the South Korean Government-owned KBSE (Korean Broadcasting System Enterprises) in Seoul.²³ One of the documents the Korean-American Free Press Committee attached in its complaint against KTE showed that KTE's mother corporation in South Korea, KBS (Korean Broadcasting System),²⁴ corresponded with the US broadcasting firm whose call letters are KSCI to cover up the involvement of the South Korean authorities. A copy of a 1983 agreement between KBS and KSCI states that 'the presence, involvement and activities of KBS and KBSE in KSCI-KTE will appear to be minimal to the general public in order to avoid the impression of foreign intervention in local US broadcasting'.²⁵ When the government established KTE, it was believed that the Seoul authorities tried to monopolise tv programmes in the Korean community in the USA in an effort to control Koreans overseas. The news programme of KTE has never covered dissident activities. As pointed out by Jhang-gil Song,

²² *The Chicago Tribune*, 3 February 1986 and *Asianweek*, 7 February 1986.

²³ cf. KTE registration with the US Justice Department, attachment page 8.

²⁴ KBS is a 100 per cent Korean government-owned TV station in South Korea. In 1980 the Chun-appointed Special Legislature passed the Basic Press Law by which the government 'purified' the media and banned privately-owned tv and broadcasting companies. As a result KBS took over other civilian tv networks.

²⁵ cf. KTE registration and *The Washington Post*, 10 October 1985.

executive managing director of KTE, KTE views the South Korean Government as 'the most orthodox organisation, the most reliable organisation in Korea'.²⁶

It is not surprising, then, that the US Federal Communications Commission (FCC) found KTE was established 'for the purpose of presenting programming acceptable to the South Korean government'.²⁷ KTE never reported the Kimpo Airport incident when Kim Dae Jung returned, yet it broadcasts through nine TV networks in the US.²⁸

The influx of Korean immigrants to the USA numbers approximately 30,000 a year, and travellers to and from South Korea number roughly 5,000 a day. These numbers have made it imperative that the South Korean Government concentrates on controlling the US Korean community. As this community began to mobilise people and funds to influence American politicians, and began seriously to lobby Congress and influence the media, especially after Kim Dae Jung's stay in the US, the Korean government increased these efforts.

It is widely known that the Korean Embassy and consular offices send facsimile copies of all the Korean- and English-language newspaper reports to the relevant government authorities, reflecting the weakness of the Chun regime that it worries so much about the influence of dissidents. With a series of strong demonstrations against Chun's US visits and protests against the human rights abuses of his regime, few observers expect a decrease in control and intimidation activities by the government in the near future.

The exile and dissident movement today and opposition in Korea

The US dissident movement has been engaged in various actions for more than fifteen years: rallies, demonstrations, the publication of newspapers and newsletters, lobbying and publicity efforts, and activities to provide psychological and material support for the movement in South Korea with direct or indirect links with political and democratic opposition forces across the Pacific. (It should be noted that the distinction between political and democratic opposition forces is an important one in the Korean context. Democratic groups, such as the

²⁶ *The Los Angeles Times*, 11 February 1986.

²⁷ cf. 'Notice of Apparent Liability' on 10 November 1986 by the FCC with its \$10,000 fine imposed upon KSCI-TV.

²⁸ KTE registration as a Foreign Agent (11 March 1986) attachment, pp IX-IX-2.

United Movement for Democracy and Unification, have specific grassroots constituencies, e.g. within labour, religious, student and farming groups. A gap has existed between this movement and the political opposition for some time. While hundreds of democratic activists have been gaoled, the political opposition leaders have not suffered the same level of repression.)

Regardless of the extent of these activities, they contribute to the movement because they both encourage people in Korea and educate both the Korean and American communities. The US dissident movement has recently enlarged its influence by recruiting more participants and developing new strategies and tactics. Direct links with democratic forces in South Korea have improved because of the presence of more activists in the US and an increased contact with activists in Korea who are not afraid of government retaliation for their telephone or other communication with dissidents outside the country. Smear tactics by the government have been somewhat successful against activists in Japan. By announcing spy cases and imprisonment of students and others from Japan, as well as by having the South Korean Supreme Court declare the Japan Headquarters of the United Movement for Democracy and Unification as 'an anti-state organ' in 1978,²⁹ the South Korean Government has in part succeeded in isolating Korean residents in Japan from people in South Korea.³⁰ The existence of a large pro-North Korean organisation in Japan called *chochongnyon* gave the government's claim some plausibility. Since 1980 there have been claims that the US Korean community is also under growing North Korean influence. Quoting the increased number of visitors from the US Korean community to North Korea, and the emergence of 'neutral' (according to the organisations themselves) or 'pro-North' (the South Korean Government's terminology) groups, the Korean Government has tried to split the Korean movement and dissidents. In this situation, the existence of former activists from Korea has contributed to the maintenance of strong links between the movement in the US and that in Korea, in spite of the government campaign.

Despite many positive aspects, the dissident movement abroad has some weaknesses. There are more than fifteen groups listed in the Los Angeles area and yet only ninety people may show up for a

²⁹ cf. Amnesty International, *Report on South Korea*, June 1986, pp 24-28 and pp 78-85.

³⁰ Most observers do not believe that the Korean government has presented any hard evidence for these claims. They believe that the Chun Government has used these charges to sentence Kim Dae Jung to death.

demonstration. Some American observers point out that, except for a few groups, most of the Korean organisations talk only to Koreans. It was a year and a half before the KTE TV case, for example, became an issue in the US media. Although the Korean-language papers in Los Angeles had made this a big issue for some time, it seemed insignificant to the American press and the case was only brought to the attention of two American groups after October 1985. The counter-information and lobbying efforts of the dissident movement, though greatly improved, still needs strengthening.

Tension in South Korea between political opposition groups has affected dissident groups with a political orientation. Tension between the political opposition in South Korea and democratic groups on strategy creates parallel tensions in the exile and dissident movements abroad. In the Korean context, one difference concerns the role of the US. Some groups argue that the fundamental cause of the tragedy in South Korea is US intervention, and they regard this issue as a high priority. Others insist that the role of the movement overseas must be to support, materially, psychologically and with publicity, the movement inside Korea and do not see US withdrawal as a priority issue.³¹ Given the present level of consciousness in the US Korean community, the former approach might best be called 'idealistic' and the latter 'realistic'. Fears still linger in the hearts of many Koreans in the US after experiencing a long period of repression in Korea, a McCarthy-like political culture and the war between the two parts of the country. Such a legacy is a very serious obstacle to free discussions in dissident circles. It is not surprising, in this context, that no united front has been achieved and no umbrella organisation has developed to exploit the community's potential.

As the likelihood of a constitutional amendment becomes more 'real', another kind of friction may develop. The ruling military hardliners will not allow direct popular presidential elections. Instead, there is talk about a parliamentary government system, which Kim Dae Jung has rightly described as a plot to manipulate and steal the election. The election phobia of the military establishment is a result of the fact

³¹ There are many small groups in the USA and Canada. They line up under two main umbrella organisations, the United Movement for Democracy and Unification (UMDUK) in Korea and the Federation of Democratic Koreans in North America (FDKNA). UMDUK puts more emphasis on human rights, criticises US support for military dictatorship, and does not advocate US troop withdrawal at this time. EDKNA does advocate troop withdrawal and takes more 'ideological' positions. UMDUK is by far the larger of the two organisations.

that in thirty-eight years of 'constitutional democracy' the military has ruled for twenty-six of these years; as a result the South Korean people want a change of government that excludes politicised army officers. Because the government can manipulate all government officials and the police in any election campaign, the mainstream opposition believes that only direct election of the President would provide a strong impetus for change. However, as Kim Dae Jung has noted, the government's plan seems to be that by 'delaying as long as possible in the National Assembly, it would try to split the opposition, and then try a plebiscite on a cold winter's day in January in accord with the ruling elite's plan.'³²

Whatever the result of the next election, it will affect the future of the movement in foreign countries. If there is real democratisation, probably coming only because of strong popular pressure, the exiles would go back and the dissident movement in the USA may debate other issues such as unification. If a 'compromise' between the current government and some of the political opposition results in another regime basically backed by the military, this will not be an acceptable solution to the democratic opposition. The dissident movement overseas might then become more divided and polarised, and the dilemma will be how to figure out practical and effective projects under these circumstances.

Conclusion

Exiles and dissident movements have played unique historical roles in Korean politics, and they continue to do so. The South Korean Government has always concentrated energy on trying to divide and discourage such movements, and it still aims to control the community together with a systematic manipulation and influence on public opinion in the growing US Korean community. The government has used various tactics to undermine dissident activities and isolate exiles and dissidents from broad support.

Will US policy support real democracy in South Korea? Will a 'compromise' that keeps 'stability' in place be arranged? What should be the exile movement's role? The dilemma is how effectively to mobilise a viable countervailing force in the USA to the classic leanings of US policy and to underscore the long pent-up desire of Koreans for true democratic reform.

³² *Dong-A-Ilbo*, 30 July 1986.

SOUTH KOREA: DISSENT FROM ABROAD

The Korean overseas dissidents must expand to an ever broader Korean community support base in order to reach out to more Americans. This demands an effective theory and methodology that will provide not only self-satisfaction but effective support work for the movement in South Korea. Unity is essential if the long hoped for goal of real democratisation is to be achieved.

ALAN ANGELL AND SUSAN CARSTAIRS

The exile question in Chilean politics

The Chilean Government of President Pinochet has used exile as one of its instruments of social and political control. A fiercely authoritarian Government, it employs a variety of methods to try to ensure the necessary social tranquility to pursue its goal of creating a free market economy and a 'liberal' state. Thirteen years after the coup of 1973, there is neither social peace in Chile nor a free market economy, let alone a liberal state by any definition. Political protest, beginning in May 1983, has periodically shaken the country, reaching a climax in the massive demonstration of rejection of the government and its policies on 2-3 July 1986.¹ The government's main answer to this protest is repression. Exile is one form of repression, and it continues to cause acute human suffering for thousands of Chileans. Exile is no political novelty in Chilean history. It has been used by governments following periods of political conflict in 1851, 1859, 1891 and 1927-31. But the sharp contrast with the present is that in previous cases amnesty followed quickly.

The coup of 11 September 1973 and its consequences

The exile question cannot be isolated from the politics of the Unidad Popular (Popular Unity, UP) and from the aims of the military plotters who overthrew President Allende. From 1970 to 1973, the brief UP government embarked upon a programme of fundamental political, economic and social change. Allende and his governing coalition of six parties (basically the Socialist and Communist parties) intended to transform Chile peacefully—the so-called 'Chilean road to socialism'. Whatever the failures of that government, and the reasons for failure,

¹ A comprehensive set of essays on the Pinochet government is *Military Rule in Chile Dictatorship and Oppositions*. J Samuel Valenzuela and Arturo Valenzuela (eds) London and Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986. A recent assessment of the regime is Alan Angell, 'Why is the transition to democracy proving so difficult in Chile?' *Bulletin of Latin American Research* 5(1) 1986.

its supporters and members had a vision of a new society, a different economic system and a fundamentally distinct political order.

In the eyes of the military who came to power, the supporters of Allende were not just political opponents but dangerous revolutionaries. To 'restore' traditional values in Chile, military action could not be limited; it had to be massive and drastic because a military at war with the forces of international communism must use all means at its disposal to 'save' the nation.

Although Chilean political life has seen outbreaks of violence, nothing compares with the intense repression that followed the coup. Numbers of victims are always difficult to estimate, but thousands were killed, perhaps as many as 30,000 people. In the first six months following the coup, there were as many as 80,000 political prisoners, though not all being held at the same time. This scale of repression did not continue, but torture of political suspects, imprisonment, exile and even murder were vital elements of political control centralised in the DINA (National Intelligence Department), later renamed the CNI (National Information Centre).

There are several reasons why the coup was so brutal. Even though Chile had no powerful urban guerrilla movements to compare with those in Argentina (the Montoneros) or Uruguay (the Tupamaros). Talk of arming the workers was mostly speculation; some political activists undoubtedly possessed weapons, but the scale was tiny compared with those of the armed forces. However, social disintegration and polarisation had sharpened and civil war seemed imminent. In these circumstances, members of the UP were defined as the enemy, not as mere political opponents. Secondly, the military in Chile had left intervention very late, and a more interventionist military such as in Argentina or Brazil would probably have intervened much earlier when the political temperature was lower.

Thirdly, the brutality of the coup reflects the feeling that military involvement with politicians as had occurred with the UP Government was a grave mistake. Initially at least, solutions had to be military and not political. Fourthly, the coup was a move against all politicians, and not just those on the left. The plotters aimed to abolish political parties, not to do a deal with right-wing parties, however much those parties supported them. The Christian Democrats and President Frei (1964-70) were seen as the 'Kerenskys' of the Chilean process; they had prepared the way for the communist takeover. Finally, the intention of the military was to eliminate entire political and social movements. The

military did not assume that the parties of the left were creatures of a small political class. Alien parties had to be rooted out; after all, they had had decades in which to flourish.

Given this analysis, exile was politically justified and convenient for the regime. Exiles were not seen as 'true' Chileans, but as agents of sinister foreign powers. The fear of exile was manipulated to exact political passivity from those who might be tempted into opposition, and exile was less likely to produce international criticism than imprisonment in Chile.

This article will outline the size of the exile problem, and attempt to assess its political significance. Our argument is that in the overall political battle being fought in Chile today, exile is only one of a number of issues at stake, and is far from being the most important. It is easier to overlook the suffering of Chileans abroad than the plight of the shanty-town dwellers subject to constant police harassment; or of political activists like the three communists brutally murdered in 1985; or the eight Chileans who lost their lives in the protests of 2-3 July 1986, one of whom was an exile. But exile has had an impact on the ideas and behaviour of political parties, including the left, though not a uniform impact on all parties.

It is unknown exactly how many Chileans have suffered exile since 1973, nor how many are still in exile. In mid-1986, the authorities admitted that 3,717 cannot return, while the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees talks of 30,000 and the *Comite Pro-Retorno* in Chile estimates the numbers at between 100,000 and 200,000. The government denies that there is any pressure from the exiles themselves to return. Of the 6,000 authorisations granted since 1985, it claims that only 949 have returned.²

It is not easy to produce accurate information on the size of the exile population, or of its composition and distribution, but in the following section we summarise the general picture.

Who are the exiles and where are they?

The coup of 11 September 1973 was far more violent than generally

² All figures in this paragraph are quoted in *El Mercurio* (Santiago) 12 June 1986, p 6; and *Hoy* (Santiago) No 467, 30 June 1986, p 25. This issue of *Hoy* contains an interview with the priest in charge of the *Pastoral del Exilio*. The Church has played the principal role in defending the basic human rights of Chileans, including the right to live in Chile.

expected. By 1973 many people saw that a military takeover was a real possibility but few were prepared for the ferocity and thoroughness with which it was carried out. The widespread use of tanks and aircraft against an unarmed civilian population, and the initial twenty-four-hour curfew, created a climate of fear for thousands of people which turned into a nightmare as news of many detentions spread by word of mouth while the state-controlled media suppressed all reports of repression. As news of detentions and brutality spread, people began to seek help from foreign embassies and churches. The earliest systematic reaction was the establishment of the National Refugee Commission (CONAR) a few months after the coup, by a group including Bishop Helmut Frenz, the representative in Chile of the Lutheran churches. This small group—in effect the precursor of the Committee for Peace in Chile—acted as a liaison between potential refugees and embassies, often conducting people to asylum in foreign embassies at grave personal risk. In the early months the first organised effort was on behalf of foreigners in Chile. There was a large number of refugees from the military dictatorship in Brazil, and UP sympathisers from other Latin American countries. According to the UNHCR mandate, clear channels existed to assist this group and by March 1974 3,400 people had been moved from Chile.

A special programme of assistance was soon established through ICEM (the Inter-governmental Committee on European Migration) to overcome UNHCR's procedural difficulties in dealing with those seeking asylum within their own country. By the end of 1974 a total of 6,700 people had been resettled. Initial assistance went to people who feared detention or re-arrest, but increasing numbers of detainees were in prisons and concentration camps throughout Chile. In December 1974 an agreement was signed between ICEM (the International Committee of the Red Cross), CONAR and the Chilean government to allow for the transfer to exile of those detained without trial under the provisions of the State of Siege. This was followed by a similar agreement in April 1975 permitting those who had been tried and sentenced to apply under Decree Law 504 to have their sentence commuted to exile. Once visas were negotiated for prisoners, ICEM handled their travel arrangements and in total assisted around 3,000 prisoners to leave under this programme.

In March 1978 the government issued an amnesty for all crimes committed since the coup. This measure attracted much domestic criticism as it was seen as designed primarily to extricate officials from

increasing pressure over the issue of disappeared prisoners. Initially, the Interior Ministry spoke of 2,071 people who would benefit under the amnesty, of whom 1,021 were already in exile. In fact, those in exile were required to ask for permission if they wanted to return and it was by no means guaranteed. In April 1978 a veteran Communist Party member was refused entry, and many people continued to opt for exile. By May 1978, 153 prisoners had left through ICEM as a result of the amnesty; the overall total is probably around 300.

As well as those seeking asylum directly within Chile, there were many thousands who fled to neighbouring countries, and as early as 1974 there were estimated to be at least 15,000 Chilean refugees in Argentina and 1,500 in Peru. The numbers for Argentina are especially difficult to establish. There is a continuous migratory flow from Chile to Argentina and many people undoubtedly fled across the border, particularly from country areas where repression is less well documented, and have never registered themselves formally with any official body. Within Argentina the political situation deteriorated throughout 1975, and with the 1976 military coup many refugees there were in real danger. UNHCR offered assistance but as their reception hostels became a target for attack from right-wing groups, many people were unwilling to register themselves formally. The UNHCR appealed to member countries to take in refugees and people gradually obtained entry visas and left mainly for Europe, other countries of America and Australia. The final figures for official resettlement are around 30,000 Chilean exiles. The difficulty in reaching a realistic total lies in different governments' attitudes towards immigrants and refugees. In the UK, for instance, where controls are strict, the number of Chileans additional to the official figures would be fairly small. In other countries the discrepancy is likely to be enormous. It has proved difficult to obtain detailed figures from UNHCR of final numbers. To provide some measure of the magnitude of the discrepancy we have used figures from ICEM of their total resettlement from Latin America from October 1973 to May 1979. The bulk of these numbers are Chileans and most refugee transfers were completed by the end of 1979. These figures thus provide us with a reasonable guide to the final situation. The official figure for France is 3,030 whereas the Chilean Commission for Human Rights in its 1982 annual report estimated 15,000. For Spain the official figure is 204 whereas the Interior Ministry in 1984 estimated the Chilean population at 25,000. Venezuelan and Canadian ICEM figures from 1979 are officially 507 and 405 respectively but the Chilean Commission for

Human Rights put Venezuela at 80,000 and Canada at 12,000.³

The latest estimate from the Chilean Commission for Human Rights in its 1982 annual report is 163,686, while an article appeared in a Chilean weekly, *Hoy*, in January 1984 which gave a total of 179,268. Also in 1984 a study was carried out in Chile and abroad by the Centre for Research and Development in Education (CIDE) which gave a total of 200,000–250,000.⁴

It is even more difficult to be precise about exactly who the refugees are. About 3,000 went to exile directly from prison, and many others had experienced short periods of detention and been released inside the country. Many fled from detention orders issued against them or because they heard that they were being pursued by the secret police. Others left the country due to fear of persecution or the very real difficulties of subsistence in Chile for people dismissed from their jobs, either for political reasons or because of the drastic changes in economic policy brought about by the new regime. There have been attempts to look at the exiles as two separate groups—those motivated by political reasons and those with a purely economic motivation—but it is very difficult to evaluate this clearly as circumstances are so confused and motivation inevitably mixed.

The point is often made, probably accurately, that a larger proportion of middle-class and professional people found refuge than the working class. Accepting the inaccuracy caused by larger numbers of working-class exiles not being among official figures, the following analysis of the social status of exiles was carried out by CIDE in 1984 based on interviews with 800 families in six countries (Venezuela, Canada, Spain, France, Sweden and the German Democratic Republic).

The vast majority of exiles are related to the political parties that formed the UP alliance, and the revolutionary party the MIR (Movement of the Revolutionary Left). There were a number of prominent Christian Democrat (Partido Demócrata Cristiano, PDC) exiles, but they comprised a small proportion of the total number. The major parties of the UP were the Socialist and Communist Parties, part of the Radical Party, and the much smaller MAPU (United Popular Action

³ All figures in this paragraph are drawn from *Provisional Report on Movements Effected by the Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration under the Special Programme for Resettlement from Latin American Countries* (June 1979); and, *Inserción Laboral para el Retorno: el caso de los exiliados Chilenos*, Santiago: Centro de Investigación y Desarrollo de la Educación (CIDE), 1984.

⁴ All figures in this paragraph are taken from CIDE (*op. cit.*) and an article by Alfonso Alacalde in *Hoy*, January 1984.

Table 1: Occupational status of refugees: 1984 (in percentages)

University educated	53.6	Without university education	43.7
Managers	3.2	Tech qualification	5.9
Engineers, architects	7.9	Technician without qualification	5.6
Social professions	11.8	Admin and clerical	15.6
Teachers	9.9	Skilled manual	16.6
Other	6.0	Unskilled manual	6.1
		Other	3.8

Source: Patricia Cariola and Josefina Rossetti, *Insercion Laboral Para el Retorno: el caso de los Exilados Chilenos*, Santiago: CIDE 1984.

Movement) and the Christian Left. Although many politicians were killed in the coup, the General Secretaries of the parties survived and went into exile; in the case of Luis Corvalan of the Communist Party (CP), this was only after long imprisonment and a much publicised East-West exchange. There were various attempts to set up central bodies for the whole of the opposition. The Chilean Trades Union Congress (the CUT, Central Unica de Trabajadores de Chile) based in Paris was a centre for a while, as was *Chile Anti-Fascista*, based in Berlin. None of these groups, however, was able to maintain a continuous unifying force over a disparate and embattled exile community.

The majority of refugees are probably from the Socialist Party (PS), a party with a substantial mass membership in Chile but with little or no preparedness for illegal organisation. The CP was probably under-represented among exiles because of its former experiences with underground operations; it had been banned from 1948 to 1958. Of the smaller parties, MIR and MAPU were probably over-represented among exiles, the latter because of its high middle-class intellectual membership with easier access to friends abroad than the average working-class party member. MIR members experienced very heavy repression because of their policy of armed resistance to the military junta. In so far as it is possible to construct a chronology of repression between different parties, MIR appears as the major target in the first few years, culminating in September 1975 with the death of the General Secretary, Miguel Enriquez, in a gun battle with the military. In 1976 the CP and the PS became targets as their central committees were infiltrated and assassinated.

It is hard to make a geographical division of party sympathies among exiles. Sweden was outstanding in responding swiftly to urgent cases, and therefore initially may have received a higher proportion of MIR members in need of immediate assistance. The numbers of refugees in the USSR are small and probably all communists, though among the larger population of East Germany there are a substantial number of socialists, most notably Clodomiro Almeyda, Allende's former Foreign Minister. Paris was always seen by Chilean intellectuals as the cultural centre of Europe and they opted for France when they had a choice. Cuba was particularly sympathetic to MIR.

Return

Although the political situation in Chile has not changed dramatically, there has been a continual trend towards return. Throughout the late 1970s people were formally invited to return, subject to the provisions of two Decree Laws (81 and 604) which effectively gave the government complete discretion to refuse entry to applicants suspected of being a potential threat to state security. A slight trend towards return can be observed from the late 1970s when the economy started to experience its short-lived 'boom', but many were refused entry and others objected as a matter of principle to submit to this procedure.

This situation continued until October 1982, when Pinochet convened a short-lived commission to examine the problem of exiles. A list was issued in December 1982 of 125 people authorised to return, and this was followed throughout 1983 and part of 1984 by the issuing of a series of lists covering about 4,000 people. In September 1984 the policy changed and a list was made of 4,942 people not allowed to return. During 1985 this list was subjected to three major revisions and 1,347 names were removed. In 1986 there were three amendments in the period up to June, each of approximately 50 names bringing the total of those excluded down to 3,717. Many criticisms of the lists were made as they have included children, people who have already returned to Chile and dead people. Some people who had appeared on the lists as authorised have been refused entry. Since February 1985 the government has given a formal guarantee that those not named in lists will be allowed to return, but there is still some understandable apprehension on the part of exiles about trusting such statements.

From 1976 to May 1985, 2,112 people returned to Chile through ICEM and the UNHCR. Others finance their own return or receive assistance

from the country of asylum, and the overall figure has been estimated by CIDE at between 2,640 and 3,017. While there has been a steady trickle of returnees, most of those who have gone back have done so from 1983 onwards when the relaxing of certain restrictions in Chile and the growth of the opposition gave people the confidence to go back. Numbers have declined again with the reinstatement of the State of Siege in November 1985 and the clear determination of Pinochet to hold on to power.

Exile politics

Although exiles were scattered in a number of countries, they were sufficiently numerous to form communities which could reflect upon their experiences. The question that was uppermost in their minds was: 'why did we fail?'.⁵

The tragedy of exile is first and foremost of human suffering. Isolation, depression, family break-up, suicide and despair were bitter products of an exile that dragged on year after year.⁵ But the tragedy was also political, in two senses. Firstly, the very centrality of the question of why they failed, intensified the ideological divisions that had always been present in the UP coalition—above all in Allende's own Socialist Party. Did the government proceed too fast, or too slow? Was the economic policy correct? These and other questions were endlessly debated, but in the absence of any obvious way of resolving the dispute they were debated fruitlessly.

In another sense, the tragedy was greater because the issues being discussed in exile were less and less those being discussed in Chile. In the years immediately following the coup, Chileans both in exile and at home were preoccupied with questions related to the failure of the UP Government. But for exiles, tension arose from the pressures to integrate into their host society, in which the issues of Chilean politics were fairly marginal, or to remain in a kind of ghetto where the political issues remained centred on the events of 1973.

In Chile a new generation of adults grew up without real memory of these years, and the memories of older people began to fade. The central questions of 1986—how to remove Pinochet, construct a united opposition and devise a stable and popular alternative—are not best

⁵ A moving account of exile is contained in one of the chapters of the book by Patricia Politzer, *Miedo en Chile*, Santiago: CESOC, 1985.

answered with reference to what went wrong in 1973. There are positive lessons to be learnt from the experience of the UP and some have undoubtedly been learnt, but Chile has changed greatly since 1973. The trade union movement is now much weaker, the population of the shanty-towns much larger and poorer, social divisions are wider, the economy has changed in many ways and the international context is distinct. It is far from easy to analyse these changes from inside Chile, but how much more difficult it is to make sense of them in exile.

Exile as a means of political control

Discussions of exile tend to concentrate on the view from exile and the impact on the community abroad. This would be a one-sided perspective in the case of Chile, for exile is used deliberately by the government to strengthen its grip over political life. The government uses the exile issue in its 'divide and rule' tactics. For example, it may announce the publication of a list of those entitled to return and then delay the specific list, which is in any case less complete than hoped for. Permission to return may be granted and then capriciously withdrawn, or exiles may be allowed to return and are then expelled. There is little hope of legal redress as the courts, in spite of some positive developments in recent years, have been faithful to the government's wishes in this area.⁶

Although this issue is crucial for exiles, it is not the only area of abuse of human rights and other issues concern human rights campaigners in Chile. It is not the central political issue for the opposition in Chile, including the Church which has made no secret of its distaste for exile. Trade union rights are constantly under assault, organising parties is dangerous, economic hardship is a permanent concern for the growing numbers of poor and unemployed, and university students are constantly agitating for respect for basic academic freedom. With these preoccupations, the opposition can devote only limited resources to exert pressure on the government to allow exiles to return.

A weak government, or a government responsive to international concern, would be very vulnerable to pressure on this issue. Allowing

⁶ The government announced in mid-1986 amid a mixture of surprise and derision, the creation of a Commission on Human Rights. One of its members, a Supreme Court judge, has already stated in a press interview that he thinks exile is justified if the government thinks that the person concerned is a *potential* terrorist. The fact that it does not have to be legally proved reflects the supine attitude of some judges—though there are notable exceptions—before the government, Emilio Filippi, 'El Exilio y la Comisión', *Hoy*, 7 July 1986, p 5.

exiles to return would not have a major political impact on the strength of the opposition, assuming that a few key leaders were still exiled, but it would be a gesture warmly approved in human terms, not just in Chile but abroad. Occasionally the government makes gestures, but only token ones, to try to deflect attention from other areas such as torture and mass arrests. Chile has been constantly criticised by international organisations for its abuse of human rights, and even the USA has joined in this criticism.⁷ By making concessions to exiles, Pinochet can claim that he is solving the problems of political order in Chile, but he cannot allow return without control because that would be tantamount to admitting that Chile was not surrounded by potential enemies. Pinochet is part prisoner of his own rhetoric: if negotiation is defined as a climb-down, then supporters may draw the wrong conclusions from humanitarian gestures.

Chile has been internationally isolated almost since the day of the coup, and this weakens the ability of the international community to persuade the government to change its policy.

The US government is still the single most important foreign influence in Pinochet's Chile, in spite of the limited trade between the countries and the US embargo on arms sales to Chile since 1977. The activities of the US Ambassador Harry Barnes, appointed in mid-1985, are a sharp contrast with those of his predecessor. Barnes has spent considerable time meeting opposition politicians and stressing his government's commitment to support for human rights and a peaceful return to democracy.

However, other less public reassurances are probably being given to the regime; in the present climate of political uncertainty, any prudent US government would want to keep its options open. The economic relations between the USA and Chile are of less importance than they used to be, but Chile is the world's largest single exporter of copper, a product that still has strategic and economic importance. There is increasing private investment, mostly North American, in the copper sector, and the USA presumably seeks a political outcome that safeguards investment in, and the supply of, copper. Moreover, the USA has recently gained the agreement of the Pinochet Government to establish a satellite tracking station on Easter Island. This has been opposed by nationalist opinion across the political spectrum in Chile, and again the USA will want to safeguard its base there.

⁷ In March 1986, the USA approved the UNHCR report which criticised the Chilean government's continued abuse of human rights.

The major political opponent of the Pinochet Government is the PDC, and it makes sense therefore for the USA to make overtures to the PDC. The USA will also want to ensure that the CP remain far from power, and a continuation of the Pinochet regime would be preferable to a CP government. Pursuing a clear foreign policy in these circumstances is far from easy.

The single issue on which Chile is most vulnerable is repayment of its huge US \$23 billion foreign debt, most of which is debt to private international banks rather than the US or other foreign governments. Neither the international banks nor the IMF are likely or willing to make loans to Chile, conditional on human rights issues, let alone take up the question of exile.⁸ International criticism from other sources or countries is attributed by the government to the activities of international communism, and are used to further justify authoritarian measures.

The exile question would receive more political prominence if there was an undisputed national figure in exile, ready and able to return. But there is no exile leader who commands the kind of support that Benigno Aquino in the Philippines, or Juan Domingo Perón in Argentina or Romulo Betancourt in Venezuela did when they were in exile. The two major political figures of recent Chilean history, Salvador Allende and Eduardo Frei, are both dead. The government has assassinated two possible leaders of the opposition—General Prats, a former Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces, in Buenos Aires in 1974, and the Socialist leader Orlando Letelier in Washington in 1977—and seriously wounded Bernardo Leighton, a well-respected Christian Democrat, after an attempt to kill him in Rome.

Exile and the political parties

All parties and persuasions have had to rethink their basic political beliefs in the last two decades. Some 200,000 Chileans (at the very least) have been scattered in countries all over the world, and they have often been politically experienced and intellectually aware of the major

⁸ The US did refuse to approve credits to Chile at meetings of the Inter-American Development Bank in February 1985, and of the World Bank in March and May 1985. This action was aimed at getting Pinochet to lift the state of siege he had declared in November 1984. It was successful, though the effects were only marginal as the country is still governed under emergency decrees. The US cannot push such measures too far, especially as Chile is a model 'debtor' country, unlike, say, Argentina or Mexico. Carlos Portales, 'De 1985 a 1986: Estados Unidos y la Transición a la Democracia en Chile'. *Cono Sur* (Santiago) 5(2) April 1986.

debates in world politics. They have had an impact on societies that received them, above all those societies where the political configuration bore some resemblance to that of Chile—notably Italy and France. In both those countries the debate on the ‘lessons of Chile’ led to a rethinking of political strategies on the Left, and the Chilean exiles were deeply affected by the political discussion around them. The debate over Eurocommunism seemed to result in the victory of a more moderate and pragmatic Left which gave great weight to the maintenance of a democratic system, even at the cost of abandoning goals of state control over the economy and greater equality. The European Left developed ideas on planning, the desirability of the mixed economy and the need for cooperation between capital, labour and the government that have profoundly affected the Chilean exiles, especially those in the socialist parties.

The Socialist Party

Political parties play a central and dominant role in the organisation of political life in Chile—even after thirteen years of dictatorship.⁹ Electoral competition has been fierce in the past, and is likely to be as fierce in the future. Most social organisations, such as trade unions, have been closely linked to one or more parties, and still maintain these links, though with greater autonomy. One of the major aims, if not *the* major aim, of the dictatorship was to break the hold of parties over political life in Chile, and a principal method used was to exile leaders. Although this aim has clearly not been achieved, the impact of repression and of exile has had important effects on the parties.

The party most affected by exile and repression has been the PS, the largest party on the Left under Allende and always more divided and less cohesive than its major rival on the Left, and CP. The PS is now divided into two major blocs—the party of Ricardo Nuñez, which forms part of the Democratic Alliance along with the PDC, and the party of Almeyda, which forms part of the Popular Democratic Movement (MDP) along with the Communist Party. There are factions and divisions within these two main blocs.

These divisions are hardly surprising given the brutal political assault by the Pinochet regime on the party. In the words of one of the major leaders of the moderate (Nuñez) Socialists, Ricardo Lagos:

How can a party exist when practically all of its leadership has been exiled,

⁹ See the chapter on opposition parties in Valenzuela and Valenzuela, *Military Rule in Chile* . . .

imprisoned or 'disappeared'? All the regional committee of La Serena, of Atacama, of Calama, of Antofagasta, of Iquique, died. In Chile, there are only two parties that managed to maintain a unified leadership in the period of dictatorship—the PDC and the Communist Party. The rest were incapable of overcoming the organic crisis created by the dictatorship, and we were, no exception. This explains the diaspora of socialism today.¹⁰

Apart from the murder of Allende, José Tohá and Orlando Letelier, those socialist leaders who escaped a similar fate have not been allowed to return. Amongst them are Carlos Altamirano, a former Senator and Secretary-General of the party, and Clodomiro Almeyda, Allende's Foreign Secretary. Even moderate socialists such as former Secretary-General Aniceto Rodríguez have not been allowed to return. The suffering this causes is immense, and Aniceto Rodríguez writes from Venezuela: 'This illegal and inhumane sanction of exile continues crushing me worse than a sentence of perpetual imprisonment—yet I have committed no crime.'¹¹ Chilean socialism after 1973 entered a period of profound self-analysis, and this process produced two major rival interpretations of policies for the future—one towards a 'Eurosocialist' tendency, the other towards closer alliance with the communists. This debate took place largely in exile after the party in Chile was subject to fierce repression, and in effect these rival interpretations were imported back into Chile as party activity of a subdued kind gradually became possible in the 1980s.

The first major statement agreed in a clandestine meeting in Chile stressed, according to Carmelo Furci: 'an organisation based on Leninist democratic centralism homogeneous in its ideology and programme, a party that must constitute the disciplined and homogeneous revolutionary vanguard of the masses.'¹² But this apparently clear ideological line conflicted with the confused reality of the party; various exile groups claimed to be the authentic leaders of the party, and links with the small underground movement in Chile were complicated and tenuous.¹³

¹⁰ From the interview in *Qué Pasa?* (Santiago) 27 March 1986, p. 26.

¹¹ *Hoy*, 30 June 1986, p. 26.

¹² Carmelo Furci, *The Crisis of the Chilean Socialist Party in 1979*, Working Paper No 11, Institute of Latin American Studies, University of London, 1984. This is an invaluable source on the 1979 split. See also the exile publication *Chile—America* (Rome), Dossier No 54–55, 1979. An interesting reflection on the past, present and future of Chilean socialism is to be found in the book by the exiled socialist Jorge Arrate, *La Fuerza Democrática de la Idea Socialista*, Santiago: Ediciones Ornitorrinco, 1985.

¹³ Aniceto Rodríguez a former secretary-general of the party, exiled in Venezuela, complained bitterly that in six years of exile (1973–9) there were only two apparently representative assemblies—in Cuba and Algiers. But both in his opinion were used by manipulative minorities trying to prolong their power. See *Chile—America*, *op. cit.*, p. 112.

The major split came in 1979, following a session of the central committee of the party in Algeria in 1978. It was a complicated event involving ideological differences, personal ambition, problems of communication and, presumably, foreign influences on the major groups inside the party, not least through financial pressure—though details of that kind of activity are shrouded in mystery.

The pro-communist wing of the party appointed Clodomiro Almeyda as Secretary-General, and this group forms part of the MDP alliance in Chile today. The more moderate socialists continued with Carlos Altamirano as Secretary-General, but this group was much more a 'federation of various ideological tendencies, . . . united in rejecting the Leninist party style.'¹⁴ This tendency was weakly represented in Chile at the time of the split in 1979, but it has developed rapidly since then, though autonomously from the exiled leaders; Altamirano has little influence on, or authority over, the moderate (Nuñez) socialists in the Democratic Alliance.

The Nuñez socialists seem to be more influenced by intellectual and comparative examples than by a unified line of leadership coming from exile, and they support a less utopian and less sectarian version of socialism. Ricardo Lagos, for example, stresses the necessity of constructive dialogue with the entrepreneurial sectors: 'this is the influence of European Socialism on Chilean Socialism today.'¹⁵ He points to another major influence, that of Gramsci, in the sense that he sees socialism not as a seizure of state power, but as the widespread diffusion of socialist values.¹⁶ This kind of analysis has been reinforced by the entry into the Socialist party of important sectors of the intelligentsia, once part of the MAPU party.

This moderate group has made inroads amongst the intellectuals, but the Almeyda socialists remain the dominant group with the rank-and-file. Their view of socialism remains intransigent. Almeyda defends his beliefs by the ideas expressed in the *Communist Manifesto*, Marxism-Leninism, and the 'dictatorship of the proletariat'. The ideas of this group reflect the belief that permanent gains for the working class can only be secured by effective control over state power, which is understandable in the context of the bitter repression that they have suffered. Their criticism of the moderate socialists is that they run the

¹⁴ Furci, *Crisis* . . . , p 12.

¹⁵ Interview in *Qué Pasa?*, 27 March 1986, p 27.

¹⁶ This is also the sentiment of one of the major theoreticians of Chilean socialism, Raúl Ampuero. *Chile—America*, op. cit., p 94.

risk of becoming a mere appendage of the Christian Democrats, and that their ideas are little more than thinly disguised social democracy. The Almeyda socialists argue that they represent the historic tradition of Chilean socialism.¹⁷ Of course, this group is in danger of becoming an appendage of the communists, but their more radical policy seems to have greater appeal to the popular base of the party, though only a free election would demonstrate that.

Chilean socialism has always been receptive to outside influences, and has often divided over questions of ideology and of political alliance, above all with the CP. Exile has increased the variety of ideological influences on the party, and has given rise to two very different versions of socialism. Without the unifying process of electoral competition with other parties, without the strong impulse for unity that comes when the rank-and-file are able to participate fully in party activities, and with the primacy of ideological dispute that affects parties in exile, it seems that two distinct varieties of socialism will persist in separate parties.

The other parties

The CP suffered a huge loss of middle level leaders after the coup, but several dominant figures in the party were either abroad at the time of the coup (Volodia Teitelboim), or were released from Chile (Luis Corvalán). The exile leaders are firmly in control with the backing of Moscow. The CP copes reasonably well operating clandestinely, having had experience when banned in Chile for ten years after 1948. Exile does not mean loss of funds, international support and prestige, or contradictory pressures leading to splits. But there is tension between the exile leadership—with its background in congress or the union movement and adept in the Popular Front style of politics—and the rank-and-file in Chile, increasingly drawn from the young and unemployed poor of the shanty-towns who are prone to see violence as the basic political tactic.¹⁸

The CP shifted towards a more insurrectionary tactic in 1980, when it argued that violence was a legitimate tactic in the struggle to overthrow Pinochet. It seems that the change reflected a shift in the attitude of the international communist movement which emphasised the armed

¹⁷ See the interview with Almeyda socialist, German Correa, in *Hoy*, 23 September 1985.

¹⁸ The Secretary-General of the CP, Luis Corvalán is reportedly seriously ill in exile in Moscow. Partly as a result of the need to think about a successor, also on the agenda is the question of moving the party leadership back to Chile. *Hoy* 7 July 1986, p 11.

struggle to achieve socialism, rather than the peaceful path. The communist movement was anxious not to be always last on to the revolutionary barricades, as happened in the movement that overthrew President Somoza in Nicaragua, but there are also internal reasons for the change. The social base of the party has changed with the decline in the power of organised labour and the rise of radical unemployed youth in the shanty-towns. Anxious to tap this potential source of opposition to Pinochet, the party was prepared to use political tactics appropriate to those who could exercise influence not by going on strike but by organising protest in the shanty-towns. Moreover, this strategy appears to be paying dividends in increased support for the CP and the small urban guerrilla group unofficially associated with it, the Frente Patriótico Manuel Rodríguez.

However, this change of line is not necessarily any more than a tactical change which can be altered again if circumstances dictate. Many experienced cadres of the CP are old-style union leaders whose approach emphasises patient work in the factories rather than impatient violence in the shanty-towns. After all, historically the CP has been rather unsuccessful in attempting insurrection, but relatively successful in engineering broad alliances of the kind embodied in the Popular Front and the Popular Unity. Chile is not Nicaragua or El Salvador, and the Frente Patriótico is not the Sandinista movement. It is doubtful if the ideological commitment of the unemployed youth is the unwavering, often life-long allegiance that has characterised communist militants in the long history of that party in Chile.

Exile has not had the same disunifying effect on the CP which it has had on the PS. The reasons are fairly clear. The CP has long been an orthodox party, very loyal to Moscow, and most leaders were exiled in the USSR or Eastern Europe. Even more than before the CP depends upon Moscow for support, not least of all for financial support. As Valenzuela and Valenzuela point out, the communists have 'benefited significantly from access to highly powerful short-wave radio broadcasts from Moscow to Chile, which have kept the regular party leadership before militants and followers while providing them with information on the internal situation and party activities.'¹⁹

The PDC has suffered from fewer traumas than the parties of the left. It has remained the largest party of the opposition, and this has led to increased international support and prestige for the party. The number

¹⁹ Valenzuela and Valenzuela, *Military Rule in Chile* . . . p 211.

of PDC exiles have been fewer and their period of exile shorter, and the presence of such obviously moderate leaders as Jaime Castillo in Venezuela and Andrés Zaldívar in Madrid (where he was President of the Christian Democratic International) has been designed to improve the image of the PDC with foreign governments and to intensify the international isolation of Chile, though there is some evidence of tension between the exiled leaders and those who remained in Chile. Exiled leaders often lived in comparative comfort, though they still had to suffer the unique problems that exile brings. Those who remained in Chile sometimes resented the return of exiles to positions of power in the party. The major dilemma for the party, however, is whether to move to the right or the left in Chile and this is only marginally affected by the issue of exile.

The effect of exile upon the Radical Party has been broadly similar to that of the PS, but the Radicals were so badly divided before 1973 that the loss of support and the divisions of the party have been exacerbated and not caused by exile. The Radical Party in Chile, led by Enrique Silva Cimma, forms part of the Democratic Alliance and advocates policies similar to those of European social democracy. But the party in exile is dominated by one of the Vice-Presidents, Anselmo Sule, whose position is closer to that of the MDP and the communists, and whose power in the party is partly based upon control of the international funds that help to keep the party alive—for example, from the Socialist International, of which the Radical Party is a member.²⁰

The Radical Party divided into three distinct parties during the UP Government, and its electoral support declined considerably. As a weak party whose electoral base is uncertain, the additional problem of exile contributes to continuing uncertainty and impedes the unity of the old Radical constituency.

The effect of exile on the union movement is by now fairly marginal. Most union leaders of any importance on the left were killed or removed from their unions after the coup. The real weakness of the unions is the product of systematic policy by the government and would not be changed by the return of those union leaders still in exile. Immediately after the coup, many union leaders were removed from their posts, or murdered or exiled. The government dismantled protective union legislation established by the workers after years of struggle. In 1979 the

²⁰ The ascendancy of the Silva Cimma wing seems assured with his recent election in July 1986 as one of the Vice-Presidents of the Socialist International. *Quē Pasa*, 26 June 1986.

government promulgated its Labour Plan which made effective collective bargaining all but impossible, and gave employers almost complete rights to dismiss workers at will. Moreover the union world has changed in many ways since the coup and returning leaders might not always find that they enjoyed the same prestige as they did under the UP. Attempts to recreate the old CUT in exile have not been notably successful. A new generation of union leaders has emerged—men like Manuel Bustos of the textile workers, Rodolfo Seguel of the copper workers and Jose Ruiz di Giorgio of the petroleum workers. Although these men, apart from Seguel, had union experience before 1973, it is only after the coup that they emerged as leaders. Their leadership stems from their contacts with the rank and file in Chile, not from links with union movement in exile.

Conclusions

A final solution to the problem of exile is highly unlikely unless the regime of General Pinochet is replaced by a democratic government. After the protests of 2–3 July 1986, such a change looks more likely than at any time since 1973. But the odds are against complete change while the monolithic unity of the army remains intact. Even if Pinochet stands down in 1989 (when the Constitution comes into force and the choice of President has to be ratified by a plebiscite), the problem of exile would remain unless the authoritarian Constitution is also dismantled.

Exile is not a capricious excess of authoritarian rulers in Chile: it is an intrinsic and indispensable part of that authoritarian system of rule. The rulers of Chile define their opponents as anti-patriotic and as agents of foreign powers. It is quite logical, by this reasoning, that such people be exiled, forbidden to return and in extreme cases even deprived of their nationality. War demands such extreme measures, and the rulers of Chile see themselves as engaged in a war against international communism.

If exiles are allowed to return tomorrow, it is difficult to envisage any dramatic change in the politics of Chile. The parties of the left would be reinforced by the return of prominent leaders, but such returns would be unlikely, for example, to bridge the gap between the rival socialist parties or alter the policy direction of the CP. After all, there is no one like Perón ready to return in triumph to assume political leadership of the left as he did in Argentina in 1973.

The effect of exile on the political parties has already been described.

THE EXILE QUESTION IN CHILEAN POLITICS

It is only one factor that has produced policy changes, changes of style, new ideas and new partners in the shifting world of Chilean party competition. Quite how permanent those changes are will only be known once free competitive elections are held, and the population can respond to the programmes offered by the parties.

The Government of the Saharawi Arab Democratic Republic*

History offers examples of governments or peoples in exile, particularly during the process of decolonisation, but rarely have there been instances of states in exile. There is, however, the one: the Saharawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR).

In 1975, after the Madrid Accords, the Moroccan and Mauritanian armed forces seized the territory of the Western Sahara.¹ The Saharawi people fled from the persecution of the military and found refuge near the town of Tindouf, in Algeria. There they developed their model of state socialism. Ten years later, the Saharawis are still living in exile in the Tindouf region, but their state is recognised by the governments of sixty-five countries, and is a full member of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU). Moreover, the most recent legal studies suggest that the SADR is a true state.²

The Saharawis are represented by their national liberation movement, the Front for the Liberation of the Saguiat al-Hamra and the Rio del Oro (POLISARIO), more commonly known as the Polisario Front. Founded in 1973, the Polisario employs the same tactic as other

* Originally commissioned in French and translated by Ruth Bowden.

¹ The Madrid Accords were a tripartite agreement between Spain, Morocco and Mauritania. Under the agreement Spain effectively handed over control of the Western Sahara to the two other countries by agreeing to withdraw its troops. In return, Spain secured concessions on Ceuta and Melilla, and rights to fish off the Moroccan and Saharan coasts, and kept its 35 per cent stake in Fosbucraa, giving the compensation for the other 65 per cent to Morocco.

² Works on this longstanding controversy include: M Barbier, *La Formation de la RASD, Les Fondements juridiques et institutionnels de la République Arabe Sahraouie Démocratique*, Paris: Harmattan, 1984, the Proceedings of the International Jurists' Conference held in Paris, 20 and 21 October 1984, pp 42–58, and *Le processus historique de la formation du peuple sahraoui, La question sahraouie, un problème historique-politique*, Rome: la Fondation Lelio Basso, 1985. Proceedings of the Bologna International Conference, 15–16 November 1984, pp 26–34. Barber defines the problem in European terms, and believes the SADR is still in the process of becoming a state, and will remain in this transitory condition until the land is reintegrated. S C Saxena, on the other hand, in *Le statut légal de la RASD, Les fondements juridiques*, op. cit., pp 59–78, considers the SADR to be a true state in spite of its exile. Others of similar opinion are: C Bontems, *La guerre du Sahara Occidental*, Paris: Presse Universitaire de France, 1984 and B Terki, *La république Arabe Sahraouie Démocratique, un processus d'édification nationale*, duplicated doctoral thesis, Toulouse: 1986. This viewpoint seems to be shared by B Scarsia—*The SADR*, Naples: Fondazione Internazionale Lelio Basso, 1985—although the author argues from a purely political point of view, and does not enter into any legal analysis.

liberation movements: constant attrition of the colonial occupant, in order to speed up the transition to independence. In this respect, Spain is considered the main enemy, the aim being to banish it from the national territory.

The years 1975–6, in particular the last quarter of 1975 and the first quarter of 1976, marked a decisive turning-point in the formulation of Saharawi strategy. The Green March and the invasion of the Western Sahara territory left a lasting impression on the movement.³ Not only was the decolonisation process disrupted, African colonisers replacing European ones, but the indigenous population was driven from its own territory. The Saharawis sought refuge in one of the most inhospitable regions of the Maghreb, the Hammada del Sraa in Algeria. Despite Algerian support, settlement was a particularly painful process, and nearly half of all new-born babies died in the first few months. The Saharawi leaders realised the difficulties facing them and were aware that their land would be recovered not by military force alone but by a more subtle attempt to gather support for their claim. Between 1975 and 1976 the world hardly took the idea of a Saharawi state seriously.⁴ The future Saharawi state was portrayed as an anomaly consisting of a few thousand nomads whom history had neglected. International observers believed it would only be a matter of months before Morocco and Mauritania would take permanent control of the former Spanish colony.

The Polisario leaders were aware of the threatened extinction of the Saharawi people. Not all the Saharawis were refugees in Tindouf,⁵ but the future of the SADR depended on those who were. Aware of the Saharawis' weakness in number and of the extremely harsh conditions inhibiting their survival, the leaders believed that the population could only grow within the framework of an organised society:

Certain liberation fronts devote their efforts essentially to armed combat . . . and dedicate themselves to building their country afterwards. . . . The Polisario Front laid the foundation of the independent Saharawi society as a strategic mission in the cause of national liberation, using as its starting-point the idea that a people's purpose is to create not only military protection but also

³ Named after the holy colour of Islam, the Green March was made by 350,000 Moroccan volunteers across the Western Sahara border to assert Morocco's claim to the land.

⁴ The articles published in the press at that time are significant. The Western Sahara is presented as a micro-state bringing more danger than advantage to the stability of the Maghreb (cf *Le Monde* (Paris) 8–9 and 10 December 1974; *Le Monde*, 27 and 28 November 1975).

⁵ For several years the Polisario maintained that the population amounted to 800,000, when it was difficult to arrive at a figure higher than 150,000 in the camps. A more realistic estimate is of 165,000 Saharawi camp residents, rather than the hypothetical 800,000.

a civilised society that constructs, and evolves constantly towards, superior material and moral conditions.⁶

Polisario officials wanted to avoid another exodus, in which a badly-supervised and loosely-knit population would risk being exterminated. The Saharawi people had to be prepared to confront any challenge, not only as a means of recovering its sovereignty, but also of gaining true cultural, economic and political independence. A refugee population, in cutting itself off from its roots, risks becoming a disorganised mass, shunted from one area to another, with no choice but to lose its cultural identity and be assimilated into any country that will accept it. By developing their own form of self-government, the Saharawis have avoided this fate. Their institutions have not become ossified but have remained flexible, adapting to changing domestic and international circumstances.

Institutional organisation: from exodus to state

As the exodus of the Saharawi people reached its peak during the first three months of 1976, many foreign observers spoke of 'Palestinians in the Maghreb'.⁷ Though superficially apt, this comparison is fundamentally mistaken. Like the Palestinians, the Saharawis were driven from their land by a foreign invader, but having learned from the mistakes of the Palestinians, the Saharawis have taken every action possible to preserve the unity of their people. This commitment to unity operates on two levels. The first level concerns the international community, where the commitment anticipates or is conditioned by events; the SADR's successive constitutions reflect this point. The second level concerns the Saharawi people, a constant effort being made to integrate the elements of Saharawi society into a single entity: the Saharawi state. The process entails adopting the terminology of the West, while relying on Saharawi traditions, endeavouring to mobilise the people in a way that is relevant to modern life.

Background to the Constitution⁸

In February 1976 Spain announced that it would finally withdraw from

⁶ *Sahara Libre*, 15 June 1982, p 10.

⁷ 'Les Palestiniens du Maghreb', *Libération*, 2-8 February 1976.

⁸ In addition to the works mentioned above, the following may also be consulted: C Bontems, *Réflexions sur les institutions du peuple sahraoui*, *Sahara Info*, January-March 1985, 72, pp XVI-XXI; C Bontems, *Le fonctionnement des institutions de la RASD, Les fondements juridiques et institutionnels*, op. cit., pp 108-21; *La questione del Sahara Occidentale: Profilo Storico e Documentazione*, Rome: Fondazione Internazionale Ielio Basso, 1985, p 34.

the Western Sahara by 26 February 1976. The Spanish presence had given the Western Sahara a colonial identity, and the departure left a constitutional void which Morocco and Mauritania could have used to their advantage, by annexing the Sahara and destroying its autonomy.⁹ To oppose Moroccan and Mauritanian claims, the President of the National Sahawari Provisional Council (NSPC) declared the birth of the SADR at Bir Lahlou on the evening of 27 February 1976, witnessed by some forty foreign journalists.¹⁰ A brief constitutional text consisting of eighteen articles was subsequently made public. When the Third Congress of the Polisario Front was held on 26–30 August 1976, a more complete text of thirty-one articles was adopted. It was further completed at the Fifth Congress in October 1982 and the Sixth Congress in December 1985. The final text comprised thirty-eight articles.¹¹

These constitutions are partly aimed at an international public and they affirm the existence of an organised Saharawi people. Each text has two sections. The first lays down the general principles governing the SADR; the second describes the main institutions of government. The general principles link the SADR with the international system, while the governmental institutions are conducive to a democratic system and give the state its own identity.

Principles of the Constitution

These principles were set out in the first Constitution and were only slightly modified in August 1976. The text revised at the Third Congress was further developed in 1982 and 1985.

First, 'the Saharawi people are an Arab, African and Muslim people. They opt for a policy of non-alignment.'¹² Consequently 'the SADR belongs to the Arab nation, the African family and the Third World community'.¹³ By defining itself in relation to its people, the SADR

⁹ This legal void had been well identified by Morocco. Thus, on 14 January 1976, it enlisted the cooperation of the President of the Djemaa (an organisation set up by the Spanish in 1967 to represent the Saharawi people) in ratifying the Madrid Accords.

¹⁰ The Council was created on 28 November 1975 and was intended to replace the colonial Djemaa. See T Hodges, *Historical Dictionary of the Western Sahara*, London: The Scarecrow Press, 1982, p 290.

¹¹ The different constitutional texts have been published in the following editions: Constitution of February 1976: *North African Yearbook*, Paris: Centre Nationale de la Recherche Scientifique, (15), 1976), pp 906 onwards; Constitution August 1976: M O Hinz, *The Western Sahara's Right to Self-Determination*, Bonn: Dritter Welt Verlag 1978, pp 135 onwards; Constitution of October 1982: *Les fondements juridiques et institutionnels*, op. cit., pp 152 onwards; Constitution of December 1985: *Sahara Libre*, December 1985, p 5.

¹² Preamble to the *Constitution*.

¹³ *Constitution*, Article 2.

indicates its loyalties. It takes as its model the group of societies to which it is attached by history and geography, rather than European society. The Arab, African, Islamic and Third World philosophies each contribute to the Saharawi identity. The Arab culture has contributed its history, language, tradition and culture. The African affiliation binds the Saharawis to a continent which is striving to surmount its colonial past, achieve unity and thereby establish its independence in the face of a second drive for colonial hegemony by the West. This connection has been very important since 1976, and Africa has given the strongest support to the SADR. Islam commits SADR to a set of values that have recently enabled previously dominated people to safeguard their identity and reassert their independence. Nevertheless, Islam's anti-colonial values lose much of their relevance here since the aggression the Saharawis suffer itself stems from Muslim countries. This fact explains the distinct place given to Islam in the Saharawi constitution, as it pertains much more to internal affairs and the Saharawi people than to international ties.¹⁴ Lastly, the affinity with Third World countries testifies to the Saharawis' avowed involvement in the struggle of developing countries against developed nations which attempt to impose their economic order on the rest of the world.

This solidarity has two aspects. First, the SADR asserts that its struggle is universal to Third World countries seeking real independence. Second, this quest for a common identity entails the use of certain structural ties as a means of gaining independence. The contradictions between the three groups—Arab, African and Third World—must somehow be overcome.¹⁵ The contradiction between African and Arab cultures may for instance be resolved by positing a Maghrebian unity as an intermediary stage.¹⁶

¹⁴ *Constitution*, Article 3: 'Islam, the state religion, is the source of legislation . . .'

¹⁵ These groups are qualitatively differentiated. Thus it is a question of the Arab 'nation' (Ummah), the African 'family' and the Third World 'Community': *Constitution* article 2. The distinction between these groups was well established in the National General Programme adopted at the third congress in August 1976 (M O Hinz, *The Western Sahara's Right* . . . *op. cit.*, pp 127 onwards). Arab unity may be achieved in a cultural and structural way, on condition that reactionary Arab regimes are ended. (It is obvious that this is aimed at Morocco and Saudi Arabia). African unity is a product of geopolitics, that is, the unity of the Third World develops from the international class struggle: 'The struggle, within the context of the Third World is a major contribution to the overturning of the plots hatched by imperialism against the will of the people, against their true emancipation, so they may continue to pillage their rich natural resources.' (*ibid.*, p 130).

¹⁶ *Constitution*. Article 4: 'The search for the unity of the peoples of the Arab and Maghreb peoples is a step towards Arab and African unity'.

The first chapter of the Constitution deals specifically with the rights of the Saharawi citizens: they are equal before the law. They are guaranteed the right to education, health and social care and freedom of expression.¹⁷ Private ownership is not abolished but is protected on condition that no exploitation occurs.¹⁸ Some writers have attempted to calculate, from the basis of these few written declarations, the extent of socialisation achieved by the Saharawi regime.¹⁹ This method does not produce any convincing conclusions, since it fails to reveal any of the SADR's originality, simply measuring the SADR's Constitution against the ideal democratic model.²⁰

System of government

A simple reading of the Constitution does not indicate how the institutions of government work, nor how the Polisario Front overlaps with the state machinery. In the Constitution, these aspects are dealt with in Western terms. Thus the Arab-African-Third World powers are formally stated in an unrealistic way. The legislature does not make laws and the judiciary has no power.²¹ Numerous other examples illustrate the extent to which the Constitution simply borrows terms from the Western world, apparently bowing to the supremacy of the Western democratic model.²²

The SADR, however, does not conform to the European model and its originality lies in its institutional framework. The concept of the people takes precedence over that of the nation and occupies a key position in the state.²³ This is the first break with Western thought, and the idea of the nation is deliberately excluded. By this exclusion the SADR

¹⁷ Constitution, Articles 6 and 7

¹⁸ Constitution, Article 8.

¹⁹ M Barbier, *Le conflit du Sahara Occidental*, Paris. Harmattan, 1982, p 205.

²⁰ It is important, however, to note that certain specific points (Arab or Islamic) have been reintroduced into this model of the democratic ideal, in particular the role of the family (article 5: 'The family, the basis of society, is founded on morality and religion'), and that of religion, which is closely linked with the construction of the state (Article 3).

²¹ Constitution, articles 21 and 27. The Constitution lays down the consultative powers of the legislature. In a public interview in *Sahara Libre* (February 1986, p 8), the President of the Saharawi National Council declared the following on judicial power: 'It is based on the principle of the separation of powers, which enables complete independence for sentences to be passed and legal codes to be developed'. This shows the extent to which the concept of 'separation of power' carries a meaning other than that attributed to it by European constitutional thought.

²² This readiness to refer to the European model is illustrated by the *Memorandum relating to the proclamation of the Saharawi Arab Democratic Republic*, published 20 May 1976, M O Hinz, *The Right op. cit.*, p 91 onwards.

²³ On the importance of the concept of the people in Saharawi ideology, see C Bontems, *Les fondements*, *op. cit.*, p 110 and *Memorandum relating to the proclamation of the SADR*, M O Hinz, *op. cit.*, p 92 onwards.

deliberately distances itself from the historical tradition that has founded nations, and been written by colonialists, hence rejecting Moroccan claims on the grounds of their being based on tradition and history rather than on people's needs. The idea of the people's primacy is immutable. It is based on Saharawi cultural and communal values. As the Saharawis justifiably point out, in international law people have rights as well as states.²⁴

The people confer legitimacy on each of the Saharawi institutions. Every year they attend the Popular Base Congress.²⁵ This congress votes for the popular committees and their presidents, and every three years chooses representatives to the General Popular Congress.²⁶ The General Popular Congress in turn selects the seven members of the supreme organ of the SADR: the Council for the Command of the Revolution (CCR),²⁷ as well as the twenty-seven members of the Political Bureau.²⁸ This Congress also discusses and adopts the national plan and the political manifesto. Leadership is assumed by the CCR and its role is to remain a joint one with the Polisario Front's Executive Committee²⁹ until full sovereignty is achieved. This provides an example of ideological machinery (the Polisario Front) overlapping closely with state apparatus (the CCR). This lack of distinction is dictated by the need to preserve the unity of the population. Since 1982 the General Secretary of the Polisario Front has also been the Head of State.³⁰ The competence of the CCR is general: 'matters of sovereignty and legislation fall within the competence of the Council for the Command of the Revolution, and it decides on the general policies of the State'.³¹ The CCR ensures ideological acceptance of the national plan adopted by the General Popular Congress.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, p 92: 'Today, there are the rights of peoples, and not merely the rights of states, so they may exercise their sovereignty'.

²⁵ Constitution, article 34, which was added at the Popular General Congress of December 1985. This clause sanctioned what was already common practice. The Constitution, a purely formal document, was enriched by rules deriving from practices already part of the Saharawi lifestyle.

²⁶ The Popular General Congress has met at variable intervals, originally every year (May 1973, August 1974), then every two years (August 1976, September 1978), then every four years (October 1982), and finally every three years (December 1985).

²⁷ The number of members of the CCR has varied since its foundation. It was originally 9. In 1982, at the Fifth Congress, this figure was down to 7, and stayed the same in 1985.

²⁸ The number of members of the Political Bureau has also varied. It has increased at each congress. Originally 21, in 1982 it went up to 25, and to 27 in 1985. This increase is bound to the growth in the number of *daira* (whose presidents are automatically members of the Saharawi National Council), and the increase in posts with immediate access to the Political Bureau (the office of *wali*, for example).

²⁹ *Constitution*, Article 38.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, Article 13.

³¹ *Ibid.*, Article 12.

The CCR's duties include that of nominating the thirteen ministers.³² The ministers perform the increasingly technical role of implementing the Council's decisions and have no political power. Certain changes have taken place since 1984. Until 1984, pre-eminence seemed to have been granted to the ideological apparatus, the Polisario Front taking precedence over the CCR. Since the accession of the SADR to the OAU, and its election to the vice-presidency of this regional organisation, however, emphasis has shifted to the issue of the SADR's statehood. The Polisario Front is becoming eclipsed by the Republic, and greater efforts are being made to lend more credence to the SADR's status as a bona fide state. Moreover, the ministerial team was considerably strengthened at the last General Popular Congress, as the number of ministers rose from nine to thirteen. This enlargement highlights the Saharawis' interest in certain sectors, especially the economy. Various ministries emerged concerned with economic development, transport, construction, as well as the economic infrastructure as a whole. The Office of Information, which until then had been directly responsible to the Prime Minister, came under the CCR. It is clear that the Saharawis intend to devote their energies equally to fulfilling their right to sovereignty and solving the problems resulting from the population growth in the Tindouf region.

The Saharawi National Council is intended to wield legislative power, but in practice this function belongs more to the CCR.³³ Nevertheless, the National Council does occupy a very important position, and consists entirely of elected members with specific functions. It brings together the twenty-seven members of the Political Bureau as well as the twenty-five presidents of the different Councils in the camps (the *daira*). The former are elected by the National Congress and are responsible for issues of national concern, while the latter, appointed by members of the camp, are responsible for local matters. In this way, the National Council provides the means of fusing both the people's and the CCR's aspirations. There is no separation of powers in the National Council.

Seven of the Constitution's articles are devoted to judicial power. The Constitution lays down courts of first instance, a court of appeal, a supreme court and a state security court.³⁴ Although this hierarchical structure was referred to in a recent interview it is doubtful whether it is

³² *Ibid.*, Article 14.

³³ *Ibid.*, Article 21. All of the Constitution's clauses relating to the Saharawi National Council (Articles 21 to 26) appear in Chapter III, under the heading 'The Legislature'.

³⁴ *Constitution*, Articles 32 and 33.

being implemented.³⁵ The state security court was conceived to counter dissident movements that might threaten the unity of the Saharawi revolution, a threat that has so far not materialised. In other areas of jurisdiction, a system is elaborated which is far too cumbersome for the life-style of the camps' inhabitants. In practice, a committee for social affairs in each camp deals with the minor differences within the community. These committees make complex judicial machinery unnecessary. According to the Constitution, the judiciary wields no power, as magistrates are nominated. In practice, the judiciary does have power because the members of the popular committees are elected by the members of the camps.

The SADR has a small decision-making body which is elected by the people, while the power of negotiation rests in the hands of local government leaders. This system is profoundly democratic, and conducive to the preservation of SADR's unity.

The few people in power remain loyal. The majority of the CCR's present members have been in office since 1976.³⁶ The same applies to the Council of Ministers and the Political Bureau. Contrary to Western practice, officials enter political office (the Political Bureau, for example) via administrative jobs. Thus the *wali* (members of the Political Bureau appointed by the Minister of the Interior and backed by the CCR) automatically become members of the Political Bureau, and the same opening exists to officials of mass organisations such as women, workers and young people. Election to the top of such an organisation opens the door to membership of the Political Bureau. An increasing number of women hold political and administrative positions and three women are members of the Political Bureau: Fatimatou Allali (Principal of the Women's School of 27 February), Senniya Ahmed (Wali of Smara) and Guejmoula Ebbi, officials of the National Union of Saharawi Women (NUSW).

Tradition and modernity

The SADR's constitution is derived largely from European thought, but the day-to-day running of Saharawi society rests on tradition. Traditional values are preserved to enable the Saharawis to survive in difficult conditions. These values also mediate between Saharawi society and the modern world.

³⁵ *Sahara Libre*, February 1986, p 8.

³⁶ On the members of the CCR, see Tony Hodges' *Historical Dictionary*, *op. cit.*

In 1976 the Saharawis who took refuge in the Tindouf region were divided into three large groups called *wilaya*, which were divided into *daira* (camps).³⁷ Until 1985 there were twenty-one camps, twenty of which were officially registered by the SADR.³⁸ In 1985 a fourth *wilaya* was set up; the number of registered *dairas* increased to twenty-five, and the total number of camps to twenty-six.³⁹ The *dairas* are evidence of the link between tradition and modernity.

Each administrative area (*wilaya* and *daira*) is named after a Western Sahara locality. In the early days of exile, the refugees used this geographical reference to re-assemble on the basis of their native areas, hence preserving former social links and encouraging continued mutual cooperation. This process was designed to make the reintegration of the population easier once independence had been achieved. Eleven years on, this motive has lost much of its importance. Marriages between Saharawis from different *daira* and *wilaya* have reduced the geographical reference to a mere symbol. The Tindouf is seen not as a totally foreign land,⁴⁰ but as a miniature Western Sahara, a temporary substitute for the homeland.

The *daira* integrates tradition with modern life. Each *daira* is divided into four sections, each quarter comprising rows of tents, generally in multiples of five. The tents are assigned to one of the five Popular Committees. The row, the quarter, the *daira* and the *wilaya* are as much an administrative arrangement as the old system of family tents, tribal divisions, and groupings of tribes.

The Saharawi tradition of solidarity is constantly emphasised. The

³⁷ Tony Hodges, *ibid.*, pp 359–60. The three *wilaya* are called El Ayoun, Dakhla and Smara.

³⁸ The *daira* of El Ayoun are: Bou Craa, Boujdour, Daora, Echderia, Guelta Zemmour and Hagounia; of Dakhla: Aoussert, Argoub, Bir Enzaren, El Foula Gleibat, La Guera, Mijek and Tichla. The Smara *wilaya* consists of: Amgala, Bir Lehlou, El Farsia, Haousa, Jdiriya, Mahbes and Tifariti. Near the school of 27 February is a camp (the twenty-first) not yet constitutionally a *daira*.

³⁹ From then on the *wilaya* were as follows: Aoussert, El Ayoun, Dakhla and Smara. Six new *daira* were created. The *daira* were allocated to the *wilaya* as follows—the *wilaya* of Aoussert: Aguenit, Bir Gandous, Zug (all new), La Guera, Mijek and Tichla (all ex-Dakhla). *Wilaya* of El Ayoun: Amgala (ex-Smara), Bou Craa, Daora, Echderia, Guelta Zemmour and Hagounia. *Wilaya* of Dakhla: Ain Beida, M'Dreiga, J'reifa (all new), Boujdour (ex-El Ayoun). Argub, Bir N'zaran, and El Foula Gleibat. *Wilaya* of Smara: Birt Lehlou, El Farsia, Haousa, Jdiriya, Mahbes and Tifariti.

⁴⁰ The status of the Tindouf region merits closer attention. To the international community, Algeria holds firm to its claim to sovereignty over this territory. In the eyes of the Saharawis, Algeria behaves as if the camps were in Saharawi territory. So frontier posts have been put up in this zone. The advantage of this system is that it creates a true sanctuary for the Saharawis (any attack on the camps would be considered an attack against Algeria), and also that the Saharawis may more easily establish their own identity and so achieve complete independence.

reference to the *assabiyya*, described by Ibn Khaldoun,⁴¹ is always present. The Saharawis can only survive if they embrace solidarity with enthusiasm. An element of fanaticism is necessary in every struggle for independence. The decolonisation of the Muslim world was given impetus by a particular expression of religious zeal, the *jihad*. This ideology was indispensable in convincing the fighters to accept their own martyrdom. The Polisario, fighting against a Muslim occupier, cannot rely on *jihad* ideology. The population is mobilised by a more Saharan, less Arab or Muslim, tradition. The mutual support among Saharawis results in the uniformity of family heritage. Every aspect of life is a common concern, one example being the Saharawi wedding, where the marriage of two Saharawi people is a collective matter. The members of the community make the tent, the matting, and the bedcovers for the newlyweds, and each time a new home is set up it is provided with the same contents. The whole community organises the wedding. Saharawi communities encourage the continuity of religious traditions, while emptying them of their individualist and materialist content. According to Islamic tradition, the groom gives a gift (*cadaq*) to the bride at the end of the marriage ceremony, but the absence of money in Saharawi society makes this impossible. Instead, the *qadi* gives a small amount of the community's money to the groom, who gives it to the bride, who then returns it to the *qadi*.

Administration and cohesion

According to the Constitution, each camp meets annually for a Popular Base Congress at which the various administrative institutions are set up.⁴² In fact, the Congress merely names the President of the Popular Council responsible for running the *daira*. The other members of the Popular Council are mainly officials on the five Popular Committees and they attend the council as representatives of their respective committees. Other people working for the *wilaya* include officials of large organisations and representatives of essential services (Red Crescent, *qadis*, local militia officials, etc). The President is not the only one to be elected; all officials are given the people's vote of confidence, even the Committee officials are elected by their respective committee. The Popular Council resembles the former *djemaa* which, under an elected leader, was composed of people selected for their competence,

⁴¹ Ibn Khaldoun, *Al-Muqaddima*, Paris: Sinbad, 1978. Vol. 1, ch 2, para 7 onwards.

⁴² Constitution, Article 34.

THE GOVERNMENT OF THE SADR

and each member is admitted by the community.⁴³ This way of meeting camp members' needs has direct repercussions on the level of the *wilaya*. Each of the four *wilaya* has a Popular Council in turn made up of the presidents of the *dairas*' Popular Councils and the five directors of the specialised departments. All important matters debated in the *daira*, are transferred to the agenda of the *wilaya*. The *wilaya* Popular Council is presided over by the *wali*. If questions regarding day-to-day life in the camps reach the *wilaya* via the presidents of the Popular Councils, responsibility for overall policy is transferred to the *wilaya* and from there via the *wali* to the *daira*. As the body in which the people's aspirations and centralised power are fused, the *wilaya* professes to favour dialogue.

Economy and mobilisation

The fact that the Saharawis have not merely remained refugees, awaiting rescue by international aid, is largely due to the economic and social infrastructure set up by the Polisario. The key word used by Saharawi leaders is still self-sufficiency. Since 1976, the leaders have realised the importance of believing independence to be attainable.⁴⁴ The effort towards self-sufficiency is more important than the degree of success in achieving it. The ultimate purpose of seeking self-sufficiency is to mobilise all the people enabling them to realise their full potential. The Saharawis must believe that they can attain this goal, even if exile makes it impossible.⁴⁵ This commitment to self-sufficiency keeps the people active and prevents them from assuming the passive mentality of a disaster victim, as well as providing the world with evidence of the Saharawis' ability to govern themselves. The results of the Saharawis' socio-economic policy will not be analysed here; their achievements in health and education, their arable agriculture and craft industry testify

⁴³ B Terki, *Le République Arabe Sahraouie*, op. cit., p 315 onwards.

⁴⁴ This will to self-sufficiency existed before exile started, as early as the second Congress in August 1974. It was strongly asserted in the Programme adopted at the third Congress in August 1976: "count on our own strength" is the principle to be imperatively carried out so that our people may assert their full capability and achieve total independence' (M O Hinz, op. cit., p 132).

⁴⁵ Although remarkable advances have been achieved in health, education and production, the situation may become critical from now on. It is not certain that the Hammada del Draa region can accommodate a population with a prolific rate of demographic growth, particularly when the price of certain products threatens the economies of the Third World countries who have been the SADR's best defenders and allies. Production, still relatively low, will not be able to keep pace with the population growth, and more food will have to be provided by international aid agencies. The secondary education sector faces the same predicament. Only healthcare seems little affected by the demographic growth.

to their success.⁴⁶ The economic structures which have led to these successes will, however, be discussed below. The economic activity of the population is organised at the *daira* level. The inhabitants of each quarter in the camps are assigned to one of five Popular Committees:⁴⁷

- the Popular Committee for education, responsible for literacy and the efficient running of the schools;
- the Popular Committee for Health carries out health education programmes and manages the local health care centres;
- the Committee for Social Affairs deals with small legal disputes and family issues;
- the Committee for Provisions distributes food and runs the warehouses; and
- the Committee for the Craft Industry preserves traditions of craftsmanship and manages the workshops that supply the camps.⁴⁸

In this way, each Tindouf refugee belongs to a Committee and participates in essential economic activity. This participation enables each Committee not only to service the economy, but also to provide a training ground for the whole community.

The economic mobilisation of the population is hierarchically organised. Each row of tents is represented on a Popular Committee and each quarter has its own committee with its appointed representative. The same principle applies to the *daira*. The five *daira* Popular Committee officials who are also members of the *daira* Popular Council, are elected by this procedure. Many Committee officials are women. Each *daira* has five specialist departments, one per Popular Committee, and each of these departments has a Director, appointed by the supervisory Minister (eg: the Minister of Health appoints the Director of the Department of Health). The *wilaya* has no specialist system of economic representation, because its function is administrative; the *wilaya*'s Council consists of presidents of *wilaya* Popular Councils and directors of specialist departments.

Ideology and national identity

Ever since the first few congresses, the Polisario has seen its task as the development of national identity and the training of those to develop

⁴⁶ B Terki, *La République Arabe Sahraouie*, op. cit., p 299 onwards.

⁴⁷ There were originally nine Popular Committees. Four were abolished in 1977: commerce, transport, livestock breeding and the Red Crescent.

⁴⁸ B Terki, op. cit., p 302 onwards; and *L'Armée de Libération Populaire Sahraouie, de la colonisation espagnole à l'agression marocaine*, Reghoua, Algiers: SNED Department of Information 1980, p 214 onwards.

it.⁴⁹ At the fifth Congress in 1982 the national consciousness was considered to have evolved,⁵⁰ although the training programme was incomplete.⁵¹

The row of tents with its five-committee representation plays an important role in promoting a unified ideology. Its inhabitants comprise a cell. Each cell appoints the person responsible for group activities and these representatives constitute a *daira* body that comes under the Department of Planning. This Department is run by a political prefect appointed by the Minister of the Interior. The *wilaya* also has a Department of Planning which encompasses all the political prefects as well as the presidents of the Popular Councils. Each *wilaya*'s Department of Planning is managed by the *wali*, who acts as political prefect for the *wilaya*.

The originality of the SADR lies in the positive use that is made of the Saharawis' deficiency in number. Every inhabitant of the Tindouf region has political, economic and ideological roles—the state and ideological machinery completely intertwine. Political and economic activities are not separated under this democratic system, and election to a position of technical responsibility (economic or administrative) often leads to one of political responsibility. The reverse is equally true.⁵² Although this system is perfectly adapted to the exiled population, it is neither temporary, nor solely circumstantial to the conflict with Morocco. The Polisario has a considerably more comprehensive, global vision of the Saharawi people and their government.

⁴⁹ These aims are very clearly stated in the various texts adopted at each of the National Congresses of the Polisario Front. Examples are the Political Manifestos adopted at the 1974 and the 1978 Congress, as well as the Programmes of National Action adopted in 1974 and 1976. Few alterations were made in 1985: 'To politicise, organise, train the masses, within the framework of the Polisario Front' (Programme of National Action, 1974, cf M D Hinz, *op. cit.*, p 118) 'To carry out the work of cultivating political awareness and the consolidation of political organisation'. Programme of National Action, 1985, cf *Sahara Libre*, December 1985, special issues, p 7

⁵⁰ 'The majority of our people are trained within the Polisario Front. The political awareness of our people has spread and deepened thanks to the political organisation' Political Manifesto of the Fifth Congress, cf *Fifth Congress of the Polisario Front*, Paris: Harmattan 1983, p 26.

⁵¹ 'To increase mass participation in the running of state affairs, by the election of popular authorities and the training of executives to a level of competence and specialisation that will equip them to settle state matters.' Programme of National Action, 1985, *Sahara Libre*, December 1985, special issue, p 7.

⁵² Contradictory examples include officials of mass organisations (General Union of Workers of Saguia el Hamra and Rio de Oro (GUWSARIO), National Union of Saharawi Women (NUSW) etc) automatically becoming members of the Political Bureau, by virtue of their being elected to a position of responsibility; conversely, the *walis* are chosen from the members of the Political Bureau.

Institutional dynamics: the state today and tomorrow

In place virtually since SADR's inception, these institutions have had to adapt to the problems caused by population growth. The solution has been to set up a fourth *wilaya*⁵³ and an account of how this was done will indicate the SADR's possible future strategy. While those sections of the population living in Morocco and Mauritania and in the Moroccan-occupied Saharawi land are taken into account in political decisions, many questions are being asked regarding the future integration of all the groups of Saharawi society following independence.

The state and population growth

The population growth in the camps has three causes. First, the higher fertility of Saharawi women; demographic growth is the only possible response to the threat of genocide for any people outnumbered by their enemy. Second, the improvements in hygiene which the Saharawis consented to have yielded rewards and infant mortality is remarkably low. Third, the Saharawi's growing national identity and determination to win back their homeland have led to an increasing number of settlers in the Tindouf region.⁵⁴ One of the problems caused by population growth has been a shortage of water. Because of the difficulty in sinking wells, and the limited water output, large numbers of people cannot live in the same areas and the people have had to disperse throughout the land conceded by Algeria. This is the reason for the creation of the fourth *wilaya*.⁵⁵

In April 1986 I visited the *wilaya* of Aoussert and had a long conversation with the *wali* of Aoussert, Lahcen Lehratani. The first task in starting another *wilaya* was to find a site. The crucial factor here was the phreatic level. A layer of drinkable water had to be found.⁵⁶ Before

⁵³ 'It should be remembered that the recent construction of the *wilaya* of Aoussert is in response to the demographic growth of our citizens, out of a concern to bring them closer to the authority and out of a wish to serve them better'. Interview with Abdelkader Taleb Omar, Minister of the Interior, *Sahara Libre*, February 1986, special issue, p. 12

⁵⁴ Some 'internationalists' maintain with great conviction, although they have not actually been to the Tindouf camps, that the latter are staged by the Algerians. According to this argument, there is no such thing as a Saharawi people, but Tuaregs, Malis and citizens of Niger placed there by the Algerian government to give the impression of a Saharawi people who, according to these fervent fictionalists, are all zealous followers of Hassan II. The camp inhabitants all speak Hassaniyya, a language indigenous to the Saharawis. Moreover, it is difficult to imagine how the Tuareg, Mali and Niger people would have agreed to live for ten years in one of the world's most inhospitable regions, when it would be easy for them to leave and return to their home countries or, even simpler, to travel the few kilometres to Morocco.

⁵⁵ cf note 56.

⁵⁶ It may seem obvious that deserts lack water but this is not the case. The Hammada del Draa does not lack a phreatic layer, but it is often salty. The site of Aoussert was chosen for its fresh water

moving the people, the community's infrastructure had to be built: schools, dispensaries and administrative buildings. Members of various popular movements ensured that the permanent structures were erected. Only then were the people brought to the *wilaya*. Saharawi families from a cross-section of age-groups were chosen to make the journey and consented because they knew it was the most logical solution, not because there were no alternatives, nor due to any definite agreement. Those who went to Aoussert found themselves in conditions identical to those which they had left. They accepted the situation because they had to survive, and their attitude demonstrates the Saharawis' ability to adapt to new surroundings.

The state and the people

The important role granted to the people in Saharawi ideology applies not merely to those in Tindouf, but to all those who identify with the same culture. Their politics have not evolved solely because of circumstances—the will for greater democracy existed before the exodus, and even during the Polisario's Second Congress, there was an insistence on 'the return of the political exiles to live among the natural inhabitants . . .'.⁵⁷ Before 1976, the Polisario defined the Saharawis as one people, including all those living in the Western Sahara as well as those who had taken refuge in neighbouring countries after the 'Ecouvillon' and 'Ouragon' operations, and Spain's retaliation against Saharawi demands for independence.

From 1976 the idea of the people acquires a new dimension. The concept evolved in Tindouf under the impetus of state socialism and combat. Far from being isolated, the Saharawis in Moroccan-occupied territory are constantly referred to by Polisario leaders and no distinction is made between those in exile and those who have stayed—all are part of the struggle for independence.⁵⁸ Certain Saharawis have for various reasons rallied to the Moroccan monarchy,⁵⁹ but this is never mentioned.

⁵⁷ M O Hinz, *op. cit.*, p 115.

⁵⁸ 'Part of the SADR still suffers under Moroccan occupation. The Saharawis' resistance there is admirable. Their endurance and perseverance brings together the struggle of the whole Saharawi population. The Saharawis intend, first and foremost, to preserve their culture, their way of being, by standing firmly by it.' *The Saharawi Arab Democratic Republic, past and present*, SADR: Ministry of Information, 1985, pp 53–4.

⁵⁹ One such person is Bachir Figuigui, better known under the pseudonym of Edouardo Moha, founder of the Resistance Movement of the Blue Men (MOREHOB), who, in return for some payment, transferred his allegiance to the Moroccan monarchy. T Hodges, *Historical Dictionary*, *op. cit.*, p 248.

The Saharawis are stronger and more united than might be expected. There are four groups of varying importance. In addition to the exiles in Tindouf and the Saharawis in Moroccan-occupied zones, there are the small communities in the lands liberated by the Saharawi Popular Liberation Army (SPLA). Their lifestyle and economy are very close to the ancient nomadic traditions. The final group are those who fled from the Franco-Spanish military operations, Ecouvillon and Ouragon, in 1958, and settled in Mauritania.

Links exist between all these groups. Cooperation between the SADR and the Saharawis living under Moroccan rule is compelled to secrecy, but the instances of passive resistance and the number of Saharawis entering the camps to escape oppression confirms the durability of this liaison.⁶⁰ There are more obvious links between the other groups.

The Saharawis living in the liberated zones are in touch with SPLA units. Their failure to join the camps does not mean that they reject their compatriots' efforts to build a new state, but more simply that they wish to preserve their traditions. This position is recognised by the SADR who have never sought to impose their model of state socialism on them. The same applies to the Saharawis in Mauritania. Some have adapted to the Mauritanian culture while others continue to see themselves as Saharawi. Relations are growing between these communities. The Mauritanian-based Saharawis periodically visit the camps and there is modest trade between the groups, which is tolerated by the authorities.⁶¹

These various observations suggest that the Saharawis are one people in culture and tradition and are engaged in the same struggle. The whole people gives the Polisario Front its terms of reference and this fact provides the answer to the questions about what will happen after independence: How will the inhabitants of the currently occupied zone live with those returning from exile? The answer is that the Polisario Front accepts diversity and that a new society will result from the

⁶⁰ This liaison was ensured by the repressive policies of the Moroccans in the occupied territory. To add credibility to the myth of Moroccan sovereignty in the Western Sahara, the Moroccans tried systematically to destroy the Saharawi culture. Hassaniyya is a taboo language in educational establishments, and it is forbidden to wear Saharawi costume. The enforcement of such rules and the punishment accompanying refusal to comply have strengthened the Saharawis' spirit of resistance.

⁶¹ Although it is difficult to verify the truth of these assertions, it would seem that money does circulate, in small amounts, in the camps. The money comes from pensions that some Saharawis still receive from their former Spanish employers (public and private). A further allegation is that there are places where a few small luxuries may be bought. The goods are brought by the Saharawis living in Mauritania, who are at the forefront of this embryonic 'free economy'.

integration of communities which are united by their past and have a common cultural heritage. Only the present struggle has separated them.

Conclusion

The Saharawi institutions seem profoundly contradictory. At the level of discussion, they appear to be replicas of the European constitutional model. However, certain aspects of Saharawi political practice deserve closer attention. The mobilisation of the people is very effective, every Saharawi being made aware of his contribution towards building of the country and of working towards real progress. This effectiveness explains how the SADR has been transformed from a tribal to a national system in such a short time. This success is due to two factors:

- 1) The use of Saharawi social and cultural traditions. Modernism is seen not as a break with the Saharawi past, but with the colonial past. Establishing new institutions seems to have brought about an evolution that might have occurred had colonisation not intervened. Contrary to experience elsewhere in the Muslim world, there is no antagonism between tradition and modernity in Saharawi society.
- 2) SADR officials have skilfully mobilised key sectors, particularly education, health, and the economy. Although generally neglected by international aid, the people feel no loss of control over their destiny, but rather that they are contributing to its advancement. Visitors have confirmed that the Saharawis do not behave like refugees waiting to be rescued by international charity. There is a difference in attitude between certain African peoples driven from their land by drought and the Saharawi people who live on far more arid land, which can be explained by the political and ideological commitment sustained by firm and effective social structures. The Saharawis in the Tindouf region have ceased to be refugees and have become fighters for independence. Furthermore, the experience of the SADR has been elevated to a symbolic level and the Saharawis living under Moroccan rule have placed all their hopes in the SADR. For these people, freedom can be achieved only if it is practised in the camps. Their confidence stems from the Saharawi leaders' ability to embody their people's hopes and without exploiting them for ulterior motives.

Often, freedom has failed to bring the benefits it promised. New governments have not learnt to promote the democracy the people

aspired to when oppressed. The Saharawi experience suggests that it is possible for a people to free themselves from colonial tutelage and at the same time preserve their ideal of freedom and democracy.

Civil war and the coalition government of Democratic Kampuchea

The so-called 'Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea' must be recognized for what it is—neither a coalition, nor a government, nor democratic.

Ben Kiernan¹

An exiled person is ordinarily thought to be a sub-species of the category, 'refugee'. More specifically, an exile is one who is a refugee for political reasons, and is also in some sense a leader, or otherwise of high social status. A refugee is formally defined as any 'person who, owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion or nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable, or owing to such fear, . . . is unwilling to return to it.'² Definitions such as these can assume great importance, as for example when a country may define refugees not as such but rather as 'illegal immigrants'.

Whether or not the Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea (CGDK) can technically be considered an 'exile' government is, correspondingly, an interesting question. Certainly the CGDK is exiled from political life in the national capital, Phnom Penh, which is ruled by the Vietnamese-backed People's Republic of Kampuchea (PRK). Democratic Kampuchea (DK), however, has retained political control and physical possession over small parts of Kampuchean territory continuously since the Khmer Rouge state was overthrown in 1979. DK continues to represent itself to the world as a sovereign government within its own country. The United Nations as an institution, a majority of its members, and numerous inter-governmental organisations still regard DK as the legitimate government of Kampuchea.

¹ Ben Kiernan, 'A Proposal for peace,' *Inside Asia*, February–March 1985, p 37. See also Ben Kiernan, *How Pol Pot Came to Power*, London: Verso, 1985.


² This definition was established in 1951 by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. See William Shawcross, *The Quality of Mercy: Cambodia, Holocaust, and Modern Conscience*, New York: Simon and Schuster, 1984, pp 81–2.

In practice, the physical reality of the CGDK is largely of a handful of small settlements and armed camps in remote areas of the Thai-Kampuchean border. The troops of the various factions making up the CGDK are billeted, and the civilians under their control are located, in territory of uncertain nationality. In many places the precise location of the border is uncertain. In others, the demarcation between Thailand and Kampuchea is more in the nature of a frontier zone than a line, resulting from centuries of border changes and disputes. Among other things, this uncertainty allows the PRK and the Socialist Republic of Vietnam (SRV) to claim that the rebel camps are in Thailand, while the Thais maintain that they are in Kampuchea. In fact, they are in a twilight zone between the two.

The question of the exile status of the CGDK is not one for mere academic curiosity. The ambiguous territorial situation and legal status of Kampuchean refugees in the border zone greatly complicated the efforts of international relief agencies to aid civilian victims of the Third Indochina War.³ Conditions in the rebels' border camps, and the United Nations-sponsored relief camps deeper in Thailand, have improved greatly from their hellish state in 1979, when a flow of emaciated wretches seemed to erupt from wounded DK into the hastily erected camps. The failure of the Kampuchean rice-planting in 1979-80 and the ensuing famine in some provinces created an event for the world media and a mission for relief organisations.⁴ The relief organisations, at least, responded as best they could in extremely difficult geo-political and logistical circumstances. Many lives were saved, among them many cadre and soldiers of the brutal Khmer Rouge regime of Democratic Kampuchea. These would come to form the foundation of the CGDK.

³ See David Elliott (ed), *The Third Indochina Conflict*, Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1981; William Turley and Jeffrey Race, 'The Third Indochina War', *Foreign Policy* (38) Spring 1980; and Bernard Gordon, 'The Third Indochina conflict', *Foreign Affairs*, Fall 1986, pp 66-85.

⁴ Both the media event itself (William Shawcross, 'Cambodia: some perceptions of a disaster', pp 230-58 in David P Chandler and Ben Kiernan (eds), *Revolution and Its Aftermath in Kampuchea: Eight Essays*, New Haven: Yale University Southeast Asia Studies, Monograph Series No. 25, 1983; Michael Vickery, *Cambodia: 1975-1982*, Boston: South End Press, 1984, Mikko Valtasaari, *et al.*, 'The question of Kampuchea in the mass media', in Kimmo Kiljunen (ed), *Kampuchea: Decade of the Genocide*, London: Zed Books, 1984; and, Noam Chomsky and Edward S Hermann, *After the Cataclysm: Postwar Indochina and the Reconstruction of Imperial Ideology*, Boston: South End Press, 1983), and the relief mission (see William Shawcross, *The Quality of Mercy*, *op. cit.*; and Kimmo Kiljunen (ed), *Kampuchea: Decade of the Genocide*, *op. cit.*) have generated secondary literatures.



Origins of the CGDK

Most analysts discuss the CGDK in terms of three factions. This convenient shorthand serves to communicate the outlines of the situation in an economical fashion, and does bear a close resemblance to public appearances. It also vastly over-simplifies an exceedingly complex reality. These three factions, now and in the past, actually consist of many separate, loosely allied groups, which are now and then at odds. They have fielded their flags using a wide variety of names and espousing a diverse assortment of policies, ranging from monarchical to nationalist, republican to communist. A tangled web of alliance, betrayal and counter-alliance tends to complicate the neat 'three factions' description.

In general, however, one may begin by characterising the CGDK as a loose alliance of exiles and refugees from the previous three Kampuchean (or Cambodian) governments. Norodom Sihanouk, placed on the throne as a boy in 1941 by the French, with Japanese consent, governed the country first as King and later as Prince and Head of State, until he was overthrown in 1970. The Prince, his retainers and extended entourage, form one faction; they have variously been known as Sihanoukists, the Khmer Rumdo, the Moulinaka, or more recently, the FUNCINPEC (National United Front for an Independent, Neutral, Peaceful and Cooperative Cambodia) and its military arm, the ANS (Army of Nationalist Sihanoukians). In 1970 Sihanouk's Defence Minister, General Lon Nol, and another Sihanouk rival, Prime Minister Sirik Matak, overthrew Sihanouk's 'kingdom of Cambodia'. Their Khmer Republic quickly allied itself with the US in the Second Indochinese War, but succumbed after only five years to the now infamous Khmer Rouge guerrillas. Refugees from the Khmer Republic account for the bulk of a second so-called faction of the CGDK, Son Sann's Khmer People's National Liberation Front (KPNLF). After the fall of the Khmer Republic, the Khmer Rouge established DK, led by Pol Pot. From the promulgation of its constitution on 5 January 1976, DK existed as a government for exactly three years and two days, until its defeat on 7 January 1979. Loyalist DK refugees form the largest faction of the CGDK, which still calls itself 'Democratic Kampuchea'. Their military forces, known as the 'National Army of Democratic Kampuchea' (NADK), continue fiercely to defend the sovereignty of the state apparatus, despite its deteriorated state. An understanding of the tense nature of the CGDK begins with the recognition that the exile

groups which make up the organisation all originally became exiles by over-throwing one another, one after the other.

Origins of the Sihanoukist faction

In 1941, Norodom Sihanouk was selected by the French Governor-General to be crowned King of Cambodia. In 1953 he used his skill to ensure that he benefited when France granted independence to his country. After the French withdrawal, in an effort to consolidate his political control of the country, Sihanouk abdicated the throne in favour of his father and formed an umbrella political organisation called the Sangkum Reastr Niyum. Using his stature as former 'God-King' and now Prince of the realm, Sihanouk projected the Sangkum into a vehicle with which he would dominate Kampuchean politics for more than fifteen years.

It is interesting to note that during his struggle against French colonialism Sihanouk forged alliances with numerous anti-French guerrilla groups, both on the Left and on the right. After independence, however, Sihanouk allied himself principally with politicians on the right of the political spectrum. Sihanouk did attempt to co-opt certain members of the political left, such as Khieu Samphan—Khieu, who at the same time covertly held high office in the Kampuchean Communist Party, served in several Sihanouk governments during the early 1960s—but Sihanouk's relations with his domestic left were perfunctory and at most tactical. The Prince encouraged his security forces to persecute the mass organisations of the Left, especially the main Leftist one, the Pracheachon, and its covert sister organisations in the countryside and the cities. This pattern continued throughout Sihanouk's reign, and accelerated after the Battambang peasant rebellions of 1967 and 1968.

Conflict over Sihanouk's conduct of relations with Vietnam, rather than his repression of the domestic Left, was the main motivation for the right-wing coalition's finally deposing the Prince in 1970. After his overthrow, Sihanouk retreated to Peking where he immediately formed a coalition with the Khmer Rouge. Though he had been at war with them for several years, he became the figure-head for their struggle against Lon Nol's nascent Khmer Republic.

Origins of the KPNLF

The KPNLF, as noted, is largely led by exiles from Lon Nol's Khmer Republic, and largely populated by refugees from Pol Pot's DK. Yet Son Sann, founder and sometimes-disputed leader of the KPNLF, spent almost the entire duration of the Khmer Republic in exile, mostly in France. Sann was appointed by Sihanouk as Deputy Prime Minister, then Prime Minister of the 'Government of the Last Chance' early in 1968. Soon realising that he had little real power against either Sihanouk or the increasingly assertive forces backing General Lon Nol, he resigned after a few months. Sann fled into self-imposed exile after the 'Kingdom of Cambodia' crumbled in a coup less than two years later. He returned briefly in 1974, in an abortive effort to challenge Lon Nol's leadership of the Khmer Republic.

The KPNLF connection with the Khmer Republic is also well personified by General Sak Sutsakhan. Sutsakhan had risen rapidly through the upper echelons of the Force Armée Nationale Khmer (FANK the army of the Khmer Republic). On 12 April 1975 Sutsakhan was named the Commander-in-Chief of the FANK. On 13 April 1975, only four days before the Khmer Rouge captured the seat of government, Sutsakhan took the oath of office as what was to be the last President of the Khmer Republic. Sutsakhan has served as Vice President of the KPNLF, and Commander-in-Chief of the KPNLF military forces. He holds no formal position in the CGDK.

The remote jungles and hills of north-western Kampuchea are an excellent place to hide from the central authorities in the distant capital. Bandits, smugglers and revolutionaries have taken advantage of this remote location for centuries, the twentieth century being no exception. Throughout the period of French control (1863-1954), numerous groups of rebels *cum* smugglers operated from this region. The right-leaning groups gradually coalesced under the name Khmer Issarak, meaning 'Free Khmer'. These groups were precursors to the loosely-labelled Khmer Serei (also 'Free Khmer'), which emerged in the early 1950s in opposition to Sihanouk's rule. Several groups of Khmer Serei played aggressive roles in the coup against Sihanouk in 1970, and were politically active in the Khmer Republic. Some have since maintained their political resistance in Thailand and overseas. One such Khmer Serei leader, General In Tam, a key activist in the 1970 coup against Sihanouk, rose to prominence in the Khmer Republic. In Tam is currently Vice President of Sihanouk's FUNCINPEC, and has

served as commander of the Moulinaka army. He is also Sihanouk's representative to the CGDK's 'Coordinating Committee for National Defence'. Ex-Khmer Republic and Khmer Serei leaders such as In Tam and Sak Sutsakhan may have seen Son Sann's proclamation of the KPNLF in 1979 as a last chance to return to Khmer political life, and thus helping to rescue the country from the Vietnamese domination inadvertently brought about by Pol Pot.

Origins of the Khmer Rouge

The origins of the Khmer Rouge must be considered in terms of three loose groupings: 'old' revolutionaries, 'young' revolutionaries and regional warlords. The roots of the Khmer Rouge stretch back to the break-up of Ho Chi Minh's Indochinese Communist Party in the late 1940s and early 1950s, and before. Sihanouk publicly referred to the Kampuchean leftists of the 1940s and 1950s as the 'Khmer Vietminh', thus simultaneously impugning their integrity and highlighting their historical ties with Vietnamese communism. The so-called 'Khmer Vietminh' actually consisted of dozens of separate organisations with complex inter-relations and sundry conflicts.⁵ These groups, like the Khmer Serei, operated in the remote western (and eastern) reaches of Kampuchea. These are the 'old' revolutionaries, and not by accident, people who form one of the groups of the PRK currently in Phnom Penh.

The name Khmer Rouge—meaning 'Red Khmer'—was given to the Kampuchean Communist Party (KCP) by Sihanouk in the 1950s. This name has come to be associated with a group of 'young' Kampuchean communists who had few ties with the older generation of Khmer Leftists known as the Khmer Vietminh. In the early 1960s this younger group gained control of the KCP apparatus, successfully challenging the stewardship of the older revolutionaries. Known variously as the 'Paris Group' or the 'Pol Pot Clique', they maintained effective dominance of the organisation thereafter. There has been much debate among scholars of Cambodia over the extent to which this group was able consistently to impose its policy preferences during this long period, but it is undeniable that the so-called 'Paris Group' (including Pol Pot, Ieng Sary, Son Sen, Khieu Samphan, Ieng Thirith, Thionn Mum, Hu Nim

⁵ Craig Etcheson, *The Rise and Demise of Democratic Kampuchea*, Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press and London: Pinter Publishers, 1984; see Figure 4.1 on pp 46–7, and Figure 6.1, pp 78–9; see also Ben Kiernan and Chanthou Boua (eds), *Peasants and Politics in Kampuchea, 1942–1981*, New York: Sharpe, 1982.

and Hou Yuon) held key positions in the KCP continuously from 1963 to 1981, though of course they themselves were divided, and the latter two were amongst the prominent victims of the purges in DK.

Account has, however, to be taken of other powerful players. Among these are the cells of 'bandits' who seem to have existed in Kampuchea under many if not most governments in recorded history, in the manner of regional warlords. Ta Mok, for one, seems to have exploited this tradition in his base in south-west Kampuchea. Pol Pot formed an alliance with Ta Mok during the internal struggle for control of Kampuchean revolutionary politics in 1973-77, using Mok's military prowess to purge the Khmer Rouge of rivals real and imagined. Today Mok continues to serve as Chief of the General Staff of the NADK and Vice Chairman of the 'Supreme Commission' of DK.

Pol Pot's Paris Group met as students in France, developing radical political theories which they converted into practice as soon as they returned from their schooling abroad. Though they had managed to take over Cambodia's communist movement by 1963 or 1964, their success in Cambodian society was much less impressive. Hounded by Sihanouk's security forces, their urban strategy was not a success. When peasants spontaneously revolted in the important agricultural province of Battambang in the late 1960s, Pol Pot and his party belatedly declared open armed struggle, attempting with marginal success to become a vanguard for the peasant revolt. After two years of combat against Sihanouk, they had little to show for their efforts. This state of affairs was to change with the coup against Sihanouk.

Following the coup in 1970, Sihanouk fled to Peking where he rapidly established an exile government, the Royal Khmer Government of National Unification (GRUNK), and a front organisation, the National United Front of Kampuchea (FUNK). Through FUNK, Prince Sihanouk became the public figurehead for the Khmer Rouge, a fact of great strategic significance for the communists in terms of international propaganda, but of even greater moment in winning the hearts and minds of the peasant masses of Kampuchea. Following their victory in 1975, the Khmer Rouge persuaded the Prince to return to Kampuchea from exile in North Korea and the People's Republic of China (PRC), and continue as ceremonial Head of State. Sihanouk little understood, however, the literal nature of the offer; he was soon placed under house arrest, and brought out only for ceremonial occasions. By this time, most of Sihanouk's family and supporters had been liquidated by Pol Pot's security forces. More than a million Kampuchians died.

The harsh nature of Pol Pot's DK was not limited to abuse of its nationals. Soon the xenophobic Khmer Rouge turned their aggression outward. Throughout 1977 and 1978, DK mounted increasingly vicious cross-border attacks into Vietnam, featuring atrocities against civilians living on the other side of the Kampuchean border. After repeated diplomatic initiatives and a limited military incursion had failed to discourage this activity, SRV finally responded at the end of 1978 with the decision to invade DK, and depose Pol Pot and his Khmer Rouge regime.⁶

Thus, the groups that make up the CGDK share a common history of intrigue and violent conflict. The record of factionalism even within the so-called factions of the CGDK must be taken into account in any realistic assessment of the nature of the organisation. As suggested at the outset, it is as mistaken to view the 'Khmer Serei' or the 'Khmer Rouge' today as unitary organisations as it was forty years ago to so view the 'Khmer Issarak' or the 'Khmer Vietminh'. These generalised labels mask many different groupings and factions beneath a convenient but misleading shorthand.

The formation of the CGDK

It is characteristic of Khmer rulers and the Khmer people alike to shelve their internal differences in order to make common cause against foreign adversaries. This is at least the mythology promoted by the CGBK, though the extent to which it operates in practice is less certain. The motives involved are perhaps more complex than patriotic solidarity against the Vietnamese invader.

Pol Pot's Khmer Rouge regime reeled before the Vietnamese advance during the last days of 1978 and the first of 1979. DK suffered crushing military defeats in the eastern region, especially in the 'Parrot's Beak' area of Svay Rieng province and the 'Fishhook' area of Kompong Thom, where almost half of the divisions Pol Pot had committed to the border war were destroyed by Vietnamese arms and artillery. To combat this assault, Pol Pot and his colleagues decided to abandon the cities and return to guerrilla warfare, in a sense, their natural mode. The decision has borne fruit. Though the Vietnamese took Phnom Penh in a

⁶ For DK's side of the story, consult the Department of Press and Information of the Democratic Kampuchean Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *Black Paper: Facts and Evidences of the Aggression and Annexation of Vietnam Against Kampuchea*, September 1978; the Vietnamese version of events is recounted in *Kampuchea Dossier* (3 volumes), Hanoi: Le Courier du Vietnam, 1978.

two-week campaign, and eight years after their invasion, still have an estimated 140,000 troops in Kampuchea, they have yet to take the entire country. Pol Pot retreated under a scorched-earth policy to strongholds in the remote western and northern reaches of Kampuchea, where resistance, funded and armed via Thailand, has continued unabated.

Still functioning as Secretary of the KCP and as DK Prime Minister, Pol Pot pledged in May 1979 to kill 20,000 Vietnamese in five months. Over the next five months, however, the military and political position of DK deteriorated continuously. Pol Pot and his second-in-command, DK Foreign Minister, Ieng Sary, were tried during the summer and convicted of genocide by a tribunal in Phnom Penh. Though the outcome of the trial was hardly in doubt, the verdict nevertheless left a stain on the defendants' records. This fact was prominently cited by Heng Samrin, Chairman of the PRK's Council of State, in his autumn challenge to the credentials of the DK delegation to the UN. In the wake of these psychological and diplomatic assaults, DK made efforts to reduce the visibility of the now strongly symbolic personage of Pol Pot. In December 1979, Pol Pot handed the Prime Minister's portfolio to his trusted comrade, Khieu Samphan, while keeping his titles as Secretary of the KCP and Chairman of the DK Military Commission. Under Vietnamese military pressure, the territory of DK continued to shrink towards the Thai border. Unable to cope with these developments, Khieu Samphan appealed to the USA by declaring that 'all peace-loving, justice-loving countries ought to realise that it is in their interests to stop Vietnamese and Soviet expansionism'. Apart from the PRK, however, potential foreign patrons remained aloof.

At approximately the same time, in the autumn of 1979, Son Sann took action. On 9 October 1979 Sann crossed a short distance over the Thai border into Kampuchea, and there proclaimed the founding of the KPNLF. This action brought together five of the most powerful Khmer Serei guerrilla bands in action along the border. Some of these groups had been operating from Thailand against Pol Pot since the fall of the Khmer Republic in 1975. Sann proceeded to consolidate his control over the remaining right-wing warlords and bandits inhabiting the border. The assertion of Sann's authority proved a bloody affair, but within one year he had established the supremacy of his command over these groups. This leadership gave the KPNLF control of several strategically-located rebel bases, including those at Nong Samet, Nong Chan, and Sok Sann. Meanwhile, the leadership of the NADK—Pol Pot

and his field commanders, Ta Mok and Ke Pauk—looked askance at these developments. They regarded the KPNLF as a potentially worse threat to the sovereignty and legitimacy of DK even than that posed by the Vietnamese, for this challenge came from within the exile community. The NADK acted accordingly, probably causing more KPNLF casualties in this period than had resulted from combat with the ostensible 'enemy', Vietnamese and PRK units.

Not all of the Khmer Serei groups defected to Sann. A few decided to repatriate themselves to Kampuchea, such as In Sakhan, who took roughly one hundred guerrillas to the PRK. Several other groups of Khmer Serei declared loyalty to Prince Sihanouk. The largest of these, the Moulinaka (Mouvement Pour la Libération Nationale du Kampuchea), founded by Kong Sileah in 1979, eventually formed the basis for Sihanouk's Army of Nationalist Sihanoukians (ANS). The Prince, however, was wary of becoming involved with these groups, having had similar experiences thirty years previously in his struggle against the French. At the chaotic climax of the fall of Phnom Penh in January 1979, the Khmer Rouge arranged for Sihanouk to be flown to Peking for 'safe-keeping'. In a matter of only two months, however, Sihanouk had publicly renounced his ten-year alliance with the Khmer Rouge. Nonetheless, at the urging of the Chinese, the Prince soon began to explore alternative means of resisting the Vietnamese occupation of Kampuchea. For Sihanouk, the obvious alternatives lay with the Khmer Serei groups declaring loyalty to him, and/or with Son Sann and his KPNLF. It was reported that over the course of 1979, both the Khmer Rouge and Son Sann repeatedly offered Sihanouk a leading role in their respective organisations, with Sihanouk constantly refusing. These refusals had created much frustration for Sann, but continued throughout 1980.

International pressure for the formation of a Khmer resistance coalition began to mount in 1981. The inability of DK's leaders to induce cooperation among the Kampuchean exile factions began to irk DK's principal international sponsor, the PRC. On a visit to Thailand in February 1981, PRC Premier, Zhao Ziyang suggested that Sihanouk and Sann would make better leaders of the resistance than would Samphan and his associates. Within days, Khieu Samphan was en route to Sihanouk's home in Pyongyang, North Korea, where the DK leader again approached Sihanouk with a view to offering him a role in the Khmer Rouge government. All too familiar with DK methods, Sihanouk stipulated certain unspecified 'guarantees' concerning his role

and the policies of the DK leadership, which Samphan was unable to provide. Sihanouk consequently rejected the DK proposition. 'Personally,' he said, 'I have no sympathy for the Khmer Rouge. They killed several members of my family. I want the whole truth to be told of them. That is why I require guarantees. If I do not obtain them, I will not cooperate.'⁷ An escalation of Chinese pressure on DK followed.

For the first time, in March and April 1981, the PRC openly delivered weapons to the KPNLF. At the end of April 1981, Son Sann met and was positively received by US Secretary of State Alexander Haig in Washington. These moves by Washington and Peking apparently gave Sann sufficient encouragement for him to reconsider a deal, enabling Sihanouk to announce the formation of a united front between himself and Sann. Within days, however, Son Sann denied that any such agreement had been reached. In response to the continued failure of negotiations among the Kampuchean rebels, the USA increased its pressure. Assistant Secretary of State John B Holdridge reportedly told a gathering of US businessmen in Peking that if the factions in the Kampuchean resistance could form a united front, the US would consider arming them. At the UN, the DK's Foreign Minister, Sary, continued to insist that while a united front with Sihanouk was still possible, an alliance with the KPNLF was out of the question.

On 4 September 1981 Sihanouk and Sann signed an accord of joint resistance to the Vietnamese occupation of Kampuchea. At the same meeting in Singapore, Khieu Samphan appeared as representing DK, and all parties agreed on the principle of forming a tri-partite united front. There remained, however, the matter of Pol Pot and his Kampuchean Communist Party. International pressure continued to mount in November 1981 as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN, consisting of Thailand, Singapore, Malaysia, the Philippines and Indonesia) rejected a proposal to provide arms for the Kampuchean resistance, while Malaysia and Singapore individually made it known that they would do so if the rebels formed a united front. Son Sann remained adamant in his refusal to collaborate with the KCP. Under pressure from the US, the PRC, Japan, Australia, the European Economic Community, Thailand, Malaysia and Singapore, the KCP acted decisively. On 7 December 1981 it dissolved itself.

The dissolution of the KCP left the state apparatus of DK intact; the elimination of the political organisation left all KCP personnel in place in their dual roles as officers of the government. Yet this superficial

⁷ *New Solidarity*, 3 May 1981.

change was enough to prompt renewed diplomatic activity. A proposal two weeks later formed a watershed: ASEAN suggested to the Khmer Rouge that a coalition government be formed with the other groups in the Kampuchean resistance. Early in January 1982, DK rejected the proposal, but Chinese interest was now intensifying. The Chinese had always supported Sihanouk as one of their 'cards', giving him arms and aid in the pre-1970 period, hosting his exile GRUNK in Peking from 1970-75, and supporting him after the fall of DK in 1979 with a handsome stipend, a home and servants. They also continued to support the Pol Pot-organised communists. In 1982 the Chinese gave Sihanouk what seemed to be the required guarantees, and on 21 February 1982 Sihanouk and Samphan announced plans for a tripartite coalition. Sihanouk said, however, that the coalition depended on the agreement of Son Sann, who meanwhile remained unsatisfied. While rejecting Sann's demand that Pol Pot be exiled from any coalition, Samphan tried to reassure Sann by asserting that 'Pol Pot will bow to the orders of a government elected by the people'.⁸

In June 1982, the resistance of Sann's people to a coalition with Pol Pot finally crumbled. Sihanouk, Sann and Samphan met in Kuala Lumpur to sign the agreement founding the Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea, with Sihanouk as President, Sann as Prime Minister and Samphan as Vice President for Foreign Affairs. All retained their previous roles in their respective movements. The agreement was carefully worded to preserve the sovereignty of the 'existing' state of DK, specifying that the coalition 'shall have no right to take any decision infringing or restricting . . . political identity or freedom of action' of the parties to the agreement. Furthermore, an explicit priority clause preserved the supremacy of the Khmer Rouge: in the event that an impasse has developed which renders the coalition government of Democratic Kampuchea inoperative . . . the current state of DK led by Mr. Khieu Samphan will have the right to resume its activities as the sole legal and legitimate state of Kampuchea. . . .

One observer succinctly summarised the achievement: 'At the end of the 1960s it would not have seemed credible that just over ten years later, Sihanouk would be simultaneously allied with both the Khmer Rouge against whom he fought a civil war and the Khmer Serei which overthrew him in the Lon Nol coup . . .'.⁹ Even today in 1987, this situation lacks credibility for many.

⁸ *Los Angeles Times*, 3 November 1982.

⁹ Kiljunen (ed), *Kampuchea: Decade of the Genocide*, op. cit., pp 56, 57.

Form and function of the CGDK

The CGDK's so-called alliance of factions is burdened by their history of mutual animosity. Sihanouk—who believes that five of his children and fourteen of his grandchildren lost their lives in DK—says simply of the Khmer Rouge, 'They are not like us.'¹⁰ Son Sann is more colourful in his language: 'Choosing between the Vietnamese and the Khmer Rouge is like choosing between plague and cholera.'¹¹ For their part the Khmer Rouge tend to be discreet in public about their attitudes toward their coalition partners. The steadily mounting toll of KPNLF and ANS troops killed in NADK ambushes over the years, however, indicates the limitations of Khmer Rouge commitment to the unity and democracy of the resistance.

The NADK is perhaps inappropriately named. It is not a regular army, and it would be difficult to argue that it in any way represents the combined interests of even the CGDK, let alone the Khmer nation as a whole. The NADK is a collection of dispersed guerrilla bands, controlled by DK regional military commanders. The two largest bands have been led by Ta Mok and Ke Pauk, former chieftains of the Southwest and Central Zones of DK. All that really remains of the once absolute totalitarian power of DK resides in these bands. Beyond the obvious fact that military authority belongs to field commanders such as Mok and Pauk, there have been persistent rumours of political rivalry within the upper ranks of the DK apparatus. In July 1984 a Khmer Rouge defector alleged that DK Defence Minister Son Sen was challenging Pol Pot, a rumour bolstered the following month by the defection to Thailand of two Pol Pot supporters, DK Finance Minister Thionn Thioum and Keat Chhom (an official of the DK Prime Minister's office). Thus it appears that years of exile have taken a toll on Pol Pot's regime. The fragmented nature of real power even within this, the most disciplined of the CGDK factions, speaks eloquently of chances for unity within this coalition.

The actual institutions of the CGDK are equally indicative of the nature of the coalition. Early in 1984 Sihanouk revealed plans to open joint offices of his and Sann's organisations in Canberra and Tokyo, in addition to two joint KPNLF-Sihanouk offices in existence in Europe. He cited these four offices, plus the tri-partite offices at the CGDK mission(s)

New York Times, 7 September 1982.

Canberra Times, 5 December 1983.

to the United Nations, as proof of the unity of the CGDK.¹² Yet he admitted that in all of these offices the three groups maintain their separate administration. Later in the year this impressive evidence of unity was augmented by the announcement of plans for 'unification' of the ANS and the KPNLF. Some reports suggested, however, that the much touted 'unification' actually entailed absorbing stragglers from Sihanouk's defeated militia, following the destruction in the 1983 Vietnamese dry season offensive of the ANS base at O Smach.¹³ It was nearly a year before the 'joint command' idea resurfaced with an announcement in June 1985 that a single command for the ANS and the KPNLF was to be established, led by Sak Sutsakhan. By August 1985 Sutsakhan was named Commander-in-Chief of the Joint Military Committee, to operate from O Bok. Sutsakhan was to report to the 'Permanent Military Committee for Coordination'. His deputy would be General Teap Ben of the ANS; General Toan Chay (ANS) would be chief-of-staff, and Peang Meth (KPNLF) would be his deputy.

The next month, Khieu Samphan announced on behalf of the government of DK that the NADK High Military Commission had been abolished, that DK Defence Minister Son Sen was to chair the new High Command of the NADK, and that Pol Pot had retired to academia to do 'research'. This development presumably cleared the way for true joint CGDK military action. Sihanouk soon asserted that the new tri-partite coordinating committee was working well, and that 'we are no longer three factions but a solid coalition. . . .' This may have reflected Sihanouk's enthusiasm; it had been nearly six weeks since his son, Prince Ranaridh, had reported another 'incident', this time with thirty-eight ANS troops killed in an ambush by the NADK. Nonetheless, military unity proved elusive. Before the end of 1985, Sutsakhan and a group of supporters in the KPNLF staged a coup against Son Sann. Calling themselves the 'Provisional Central Committee for Salvation', Sutsakhan, Peang Meth, Chak Bory and Huy Kanthoul challenged Sann's leadership, citing differences on matters of strategy and politics. The Joint Military Committee for Coordination was again at a standstill.

By January 1986, Pol Pot had offered to retire, in reality this time, in exchange for Vietnamese withdrawal; Sann had asserted that 'CGDK factionalism is on its way to being resolved and will be resolved very

¹² *Indochina Chronicle*, 3(1) Jan-Mar 1984, p 14.

¹³ Beat U Wieser, 'Khmer Resistance to Vietnamese Domination', *Swiss Review of World Affairs*, July 1983, pp 11-13.

soon'; US congressmen had warned that rebel in-fighting jeopardised additional US aid to the CGDK; and Sihanouk had cited figures on troop strength which pertained only to his ANS. Much of the remainder of 1986 witnessed increasing contention among coalition members concerning their very purpose: the settlement of the 'Kampuchean problem'. Fundamental disagreements over whether to negotiate (or fight), who to negotiate with (SRV or PRK or both or others), how to negotiate (in direct, 'proximity', or proxy talks) and most importantly, what to negotiate about, still divide the coalition. With the continued existence of the state apparatus of DK, prospects appear encouraging neither for rebel unity, nor for Kampuchean peace and independence.

Conclusion: plus ça change, plus c'est la même chose

It has been said that academic politics is a vicious discipline because so little is at stake. Academics might be cautioned in this respect by the experience of the CGDK. Rent by factionalism, dominated by fanatics, possessed of scanty resources, little territory and dim prospects for regaining control of Kampuchea in the foreseeable future, the CGDK struggles for mastery over a country which has for years appeared at the very bottom of the World Bank's list of nations ranked by wealth. The factions comprising the CGDK appear to expend more blood, money and energy in internecine struggles than they do in opposing their ostensible enemies, the PRK and the SRV. The exiled CGDK leaders are mostly old and tired veterans of Indochina's war-laden post-World War II history. They have existed together along an imperceptible line between war and politics for their entire adult lives. Perhaps unsurprisingly, the collective experience of exile has done little to change their manifest lifelong tendency towards mutual, violent, politico-military conflict. On the contrary, exile has done much to reinforce it.

Return ticket to Brazil*

Exile

Exile is perhaps as old as humanity itself, and has certainly been a constant feature of the history of Latin America, leaving a deep impression on the life of its people. It is estimated that a substantial proportion of the population of Paraguay lives outside the country, while waves of Bolivian exile recur as frequently as the military coups in that country. In Central America, exile has been a pervasive phenomenon, and more recently, since the 1960s, exiles have fled countries which were themselves traditional sanctuaries for those in flight, such as Chile and Uruguay.

Exile is a form of political violence, an indicator of the violence of the state in its relation to civil society. It is a form of radical repression, which forcibly removes the actor from his natural environment, his country. The growth of the phenomenon of exile in recent decades indicates how political crises have been polarised and how a new type of contradiction has thrown states and their people into opposing camps. The evidence suggests that the process of internationalising the economy has been accompanied by the development of radical, authoritarian forms of government-military dictatorships. States have been more intent on following the logic of internationalisation than on attending to the interests of local bourgeoisies or to the majority of the population in each country. The dictatorships established in Latin America throughout the 1960s and 1970s seem to conform to this pattern and were marked by a cycle of generalised and, in some cases, genocidal violence. The deaths in Chile and Argentina, the dead and tortured in Uruguay, were, by their very scale and dramatic nature, virtually unprecedented in the history of Latin America. They invite comparison only with the deaths incurred in the Mexican revolution and in the Guatemalan massacres. The precise figures for those killed and tortured in these countries are, however, a part of their history which may only come to light in the future.

* Originally commissioned in Portuguese and translated by Peter Flynn, Director of the Institute of Latin American Studies, University of Glasgow.

The recent, widespread collapse of authoritarian regimes seems to indicate a general crisis of authoritarian forms of government, and the emergence of a popular democratic movement, still in the process of developing. Furthermore, it presages a mass return of exiles to their countries. Yet, though liberalisation has brought back some exiles, others are still not free to return. Thousands of Chileans still await the end of the Pinochet regime, not to mention the Paraguayans who cannot return, and the Central Americans who continue to endure 'civil war' and unending counter-revolution.

In this context, Brazil has its own distinctive history. Brazilian exile was never massive, but selective. The political violence, which has always existed there, manifests itself in other less evident forms, such as migrations, the concentration of income and property, marginalisation, unemployment, infant mortality and racism. Ever since colonial times, political violence has been selectively applied against the opposition in an 'exemplary' form, as a deterrent to others. The Portuguese initiated this policy and the Brazilians acquired their methods. In the colonial period, for example, the Portuguese Crown punished the rebel 'Tiradentes', today a hero, with hanging in order to deter potential followers. The struggles for power in the Empire and the Republic were always marked by state violence against the opposition, involving frequent use of torture and assassination, while exile, when it existed, was used sparingly. In the period of Getúlio Vargas, who governed Brazil between 1930 and the 1950s, exile was directed against the liberal opposition. Some dozens of political leaders sought refuge in various countries of Latin America and Europe, and it was in this period that the liberal, Euclides de Figueiredo, took up exile in Argentina. He was accompanied by his son, João Batista de Figueiredo, who later, as General and President during the last period of military dictatorship, signed the amnesty won for exiles through the struggle of the Brazilian people.

In the period from the end of World War II until the 1960s, Brazil seemed to have ended its authoritarian cycle, and its political leaders seemed to be building a new order, which was liberal, even reformist. Brazil seemed to have discovered a path combining both liberal democracy and development.

From the time of the *Plano de Metas* of the government of Juscelino Kubitschek (1956-60), 'transnationalisation' became the government's main plank. Through the *Plano de Metas*, transnational companies, particularly in the automobile sector, came to occupy a strategic place in

national production, becoming, in effect, a new political actor intent on dictating the political direction of the state. The national sovereignty of the state was thus called into question, and this crisis of national identity came to a head in the Goulart period. The coup of 1964 decided the loyalties of the Brazilian dominant class, sealing an alliance with transnational capital which still continues today. In order to be decisive in this respect, however, the coup had effectively to remove all those political forces committed to a national, popular and reformist future. Thus arose the modern form of Brazilian exile.

One of the first measures taken by the military government of General Castello Branco in 1964, was to publish a list of names of hundreds of people who were to be deprived of their political rights for ten years. In this period those people were forbidden to undertake any political activity whatsoever; they were, in effect, banished within their own country. Among this group were ex-presidents, governors, senators, deputies, prominent politicians, and military and trade union leaders. The political police, both civil and military, immediately began to detain party leaders, those elected to political office, members of the Goulart government, trade union and religious leaders, intellectuals and students. This political repression was carried out in the name of a future democracy, whose way was to be paved by the purifying actions of the state. Within a few months, those who had not submitted to the authority of the recently established government, sought exile in Uruguay, the first sanctuary for several hundred Brazilian exiles, and in several other countries. Midway through 1964, more than fifty leading representatives of the opposition to the new regime gathered together in Montevideo. Another group of exiles fled to Santiago de Chile, and yet another to Europe, notably to France.

The opposition to the military government re-formed from about 1965 onwards and took up the political struggle, especially through public street protests by students, artists and intellectuals. In 1968, Brazil played its part in the great wave of student demonstrations which swept through the major cities of the world. The political leaders of the opposition tried to regain the initiative by forming the Frente Ampla, which brought together the most influential leaders, both within the country and in exile (Juscelino Kubitschek, João Goulart and Carlos Lacerda). The regime's response was to decree Institutional Act No. 5, a kind of coup within the coup, granting the Executive absolute and arbitrary control. With all doors closed to legal, liberal and reformist opposition, Brazil become trapped in a cycle in which the increasingly

radical political opposition was met with increasing violence on the part of the state. There now began armed action, kidnapping, bank robberies, and the establishment of a system of state terror through military and paramilitary organisations, indiscriminately arresting, torturing and murdering leaders of the opposition, regardless of the different methods or objectives of each political group.

Brazilian exile then entered a second phase, its numbers swelled by student and military leaders from the revolutionary organisations, who left via the frontiers of the Southern Cone, or, following kidnappings, in the resulting exchange of prisoners. If the first exile was composed of leaders of the reformist, liberal opposition, the second was characterised by the revolutionary militants, who arrived in Chile, Algeria, Mexico, Cuba and various countries of Europe. From 1969-79, the number of Brazilians in exile was estimated to be about 10,000, of which probably half were in Latin America, particularly in Chile under Unidad Popular, and the other half in Europe.

The phenomenon of Brazilian exile touched virtually all the principal capitals of the world, but was mainly concentrated in Santiago de Chile and in Paris. In the course of their long journey, which for some lasted fifteen years, many exiles lived in a succession of countries. There, they experienced other coups and met new exiles, as, during the 1970s, the majority of Latin American countries, including those receiving exiles, succumbed to military dictatorship. In the Panamanian Embassy in Santiago de Chile, an apartment of two bedrooms and two living-rooms, a gathering of more than 300 people graphically illustrated the way in which exiles were overtaken by political events in their countries of refuge. Brazilians, Chileans, Bolivians, Uruguayans, Hondurans, Panamanians, Guatemalans, Salvadoreans, Paraguayans and people of other nationalities waited in hope of a flight which would take them to some other country, though not their own, while armed soldiers threatened to invade the building. Some Brazilians who were there had already experienced the coups in Bolivia; now they were living in Chile at the time of the 1973 coup and were later to become acquainted with Argentina in the post-Perón period.

Following the end of the rule of President Garrastazu Médici in 1973, which had brought political repression in Brazil to unprecedented levels of violence, there grew a broad movement for amnesty both within Brazil and abroad, which united differing groups within Brazilian society in a struggle against the military regime. The Geisel period (1974-8) ended with the announcement of an amnesty, which was,

however, only to be fulfilled in September 1979, during the presidency of General João Batista Figueriedo, himself the son of a former liberal exile.

The long period of exile saw a silent struggle between the exiles and the government, with the exiles formulating campaigns denouncing the crimes of the dictatorship, and the regime in turn denying its critics even the basic rights of citizenship. In terms of documentation, for example, the Brazilian government denied passports to all exiles and their children, as well as refusing them any type of assistance or protection in their countries of residence. In some cases the political police extended their persecution across the frontier, openly acting against members of the Brazilian opposition after the coup in Chile, and interrogating political prisoners in the national stadium, which had been transformed into a concentration camp.

Return

The amnesty campaign mobilised and affected the whole of Brazilian society, reaching such a pitch that the regime was forced to grant an amnesty on 15 September 1979, though the government tried to present its gesture to the public as an act of generosity on its part. Immediately afterwards, the exiles returned to the country amidst scenes of excitement and celebration, which lasted, almost continuously, from September to November 1979.

The joy of realising the dream of return was, however, mingled with fear. The structure of repression remained intact and the military dictatorship was not yet ended: the government had succumbed to pressure, but had made it clear that though the exiles could return to the country, they would continue to be excluded from political life. Moreover, after 1979, there were already signs of an economic crisis—the end of the Brazilian ‘miracle’—which was marked by unemployment, now made worse by the return of thousands of people and their families. The state apparatus, at every level, remained closed to the exiles. The intelligence services prevented their entry into public life; the federal universities also kept their doors closed, while the private sector, suffering under the impact of the crisis, afforded few opportunities.

Once the initial euphoria had passed, the exiles found themselves facing unemployment and felt themselves to be strangers in their own country. Political life in Brazil had changed. It was now filled with new

people and often the exiles were seen as intruders or competitors. The reform of political parties, imposed from above by the government, and the prospect of elections, completed a picture in which the exiles constituted a threat or were seen as a source of trouble. Some political leaders, even among the opposition, propounded a bizarre theory attempting to demonstrate that everything of worth in Brazil was necessarily new, and that, as relics of a bygone era, the exiles constituted a mere return to the past. Since the coup of 1964 was also a thing of the past, there arose a strange association between exiles and the threat of some kind of political regression *à la* 1964. The original victim of the coup came to be seen as a possible catalyst for a new coup to which everyone would in turn fall victim.

Between 1979 and 1982, the exiles were obliged to take care of themselves, struggling for employment in the midst of a recession and striving for political influence in the new parties and for an opportunity to come to terms with a country which they no longer recognised. Brazil had indeed changed, and yet exile, in a certain sense, remained. Naturally, the process of reintegration varied, the most outstanding political leaders showing that they and their experience still deserved to be taken seriously. Miguel Arrães, Leonel Brizola, Darcy Ribeiro, and various others, took their place among political activists. The most notable intellectuals returned to the universities and to the pages of the principal newspapers and journals. The majority, however, lived through great difficulties during this period, despite the academic and professional qualifications which they had often acquired abroad. The fact was that the amnesty had not changed the state, which kept its doors firmly barred to former exiles.

After the elections of 1982, with the victory of opposition governors in the majority of states, the outlook changed for the better. Brazil saw the political reintegration of exiles, who won elections (Leonel Brizola was elected Governor of Rio de Janeiro, with Darcy Ribeiro as Vice-Governor), or were absorbed through the opening-up of the state apparatus at state and municipal levels, to trained personnel, people in the liberal professions and intellectuals. In the three most important states, Rio de Janeiro, São Paulo and Minas Gerais, the opposition government became accessible to a substantial group of exiles, the same being the case at the level of local government. The election of 1982 also facilitated the election of people who had previously held office, and who were therefore able to regain the posts from which they had been ousted by earlier military governments. By these means, some of the

accumulated experience of exile found its way back into parliament.

With the end of the Figueiredo period, the indirect election of Tancredo Neves in 1984, and the direct election of mayors in 1985, the political opening-up of the state apparatus was complete: the work of politicians, previously deprived of political rights, and returning to political life, largely remains to be done, as does that of the formerly exiled political militants who hold key positions, both in the executive and in the legislature. The consequences of the amnesty did finally extend to offices of state and the universities, so that the fear of unemployment ceased to be a nightmare for former exiles. Obviously, the private sector had always absorbed qualified people, but the majority of Brazilian exiles were party leaders, members of political organisations and intellectuals, who had traditionally made their careers within the state apparatus or in academic research institutions. The eventual resolution of the employment problem is of major significance. It indicates that the process of re-integration of exiles into the life of the country has virtually been realised, enabling those who have returned to put the fact of exile behind them. Nonetheless, it took seven years to reach this point.

The politics of exile and the exile in politics

The coup of 1964 was radical. It signified that a choice had been made for Brazil in favour of transnationalising the country, and integrating its economy, in a subordinate position, within the system of world capital. This system was henceforth to have industrial capital in its transnationalised form as its modern mode and the national state as its primary agent. Brazil's integration into the world economy was not in itself a unique event, but the distinctiveness of Brazil's experience lay in the overtly political form taken by that process of integration.

In its first phase this radical transformation of Brazil took place through the 'dictatorship' (1964-74). In its second phase, through the process of transition (1974-84). We are currently living through the third phase in the form of the New Republic (1985-). In the first phase, the state submitted civil society to its arbitrary control and, by means of the doctrine of national security, defined mass mobilisation as the internal enemy of the state. The dominant class governed from 1964-74, by means of the Institutional Acts and by military and police coercion.

The second phase entailed an effort to overcome the absolute divorce

between state and society by institutionalising the authoritarian regime. In governing from 1974–84, the dominant class attempted to institutionalise its control without depriving itself of the arbitrary use of military coercion.

The third phase is characterised by the contradiction between the transnational and the national, the authoritarian and the liberal aspects of the state. The New Republic is, at the same time, both old and new in its content and form. If authoritarianism has been losing ground, transnationalism retains its strength and leads the government to speak the language of liberalism while often, at the same time, acting in an authoritarian manner.

The phenomenon of exile, seen as the political product of the state's policies, has been a boomerang. In the first phase it forced a whole generation into both internal exile (having to go underground) and exile abroad. This process affected thousands of people, and though regarded as irreversible, lasted for fifteen years (1964–79). The first phase initially involved reformists, liberal opposition members, who were soon followed by the leaders and militants linked to the armed struggle. The second phase involved the process of return of the more reformist exiles and, with the amnesty in 1979, the return of more 'revolutionary' exiles.

The boomerang brought back all those who had been expelled supposedly for ever, from politics. The election of Brizola as governor of Rio de Janeiro in 1982 showed that exiles themselves had returned to contest the power of the state. Social democracy, democratic socialism, revolutionary socialism, had entered the scene as political programmes by means of the returning exile. In the MDB, later the PMDB, the Partido Democrático Trabalhista and the PT, these various currents contend for hegemony, not to mention the radical proposals jostling for influence within different parties and popular movements. 'Revolutionary' exile is the other facet of the boomerang. The repression of the first phase killed various leaders of the radical militants, but failed to kill their aims and ideas. They, too, have returned.

From 1974–83, former exiles occupied an important place in parties and within the state: Miguel Arraes (ex Governor of Pernambuco, exiled for fifteen years in Algeria) was elected Federal Deputy and once again became a leader in the north-east. Leonel Brizola (ex-Governor of Rio Grande do Sul, exiled for fifteen years in Uruguay) was elected Governor of Rio de Janeiro. Exiles again became deputies, senators, councillors, mayors, teachers and leaders of political parties and

organisations. The ideas and people which the coup of 1964 had tried to expel from the country returned, together with new ideas, though admittedly, some died before they could return. João Goulart died in exile, and Juscelino Kubitschek and various other political leaders died prior to the amnesty.

In the third phase of the New Republic, 1984-86, former exiles entered the contest both for power in the state, and to elaborate new political programmes. Former exiles were appointed to ministerial positions (Celso Furtado, Waldir Pires) or won the posts as mayors. In the elections of November 1986, exiles are running for governor in three states: Miguel Arrães in Pernambuco; Waldir Pires in Bahia; Darcy Ribeiro and Fernando Gabeira in Rio de Janeiro. The majority of political leaders who were previously in exile are contesting elections for the Congress which will act as the Constituent Assembly.

In Brazil today the struggle between authoritarianism and democracy is being enacted through the competition between rival political programmes or tendencies: liberalism, social democracy, democratic socialism and revolutionary socialism. The contradictory liberalism of the PMDB, which, together with the PFL, today forms the Aliança Democrática, was born largely out of a struggle within the country against dictatorship. The other tendencies are in greater measure the fruit of exile, or are derived from it, and are represented in the Partido Democrático Trabalhista, Partido Socialista, the Communist parties, and various other small parties. In the New Republic, particularly after the elections of 1986, the political cycle of exile is reaching its end as exiles are being integrated into the political life of the country. This conclusion, however, does not mean that the nation has been reconciled with its people nor that the state has been reappropriated by civil society. If exile has come to an end, its fundamental causes may still be said to persist.

Fragments from a Paraguayan autobiography*

I was born in Asunción, Paraguay—at least, so I am told. It is impossible to be certain, given that real men (as opposed to characters in fiction) are always absent from the two most important moments in their life—birth and death. And there is something gratifying in that—it makes you feel ageless somehow.

I studied nothing in particular, other than a piecemeal introduction to music and painting. At the age of fourteen I enlisted as a volunteer in the Chaco War between Paraguay and Bolivia; my intention (though it never materialised) was to become a war correspondent. I was luckier in my twenties: I managed to be in London when the Second World War ended. I wrote reports, articles and a little book of my impressions. After the bombs were dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, I sent a dispatch to my agency called 'Not yet the end of the world', and another under the title 'Today the 21st century began'. Neither was published and my credentials were withdrawn. I wandered through a Europe in ruins. I walked through the clouds of smoke rising from the burning extermination camps. Then I returned to Paraguay, where concentration camps were being built for the first time. When I drew the parallels, they expelled me for the first time—that was forty years ago. The second time was thirty-seven years later.

And yet I have not been away from my native country for a single day. I brought with me into exile my language, always the refuge of the persecuted. And slowly, over time, exile enabled me to become the universal man we all aspire to become, whether we know it or not.

Why do I write? Perhaps because it is the least offensive thing I can do. But I am not a professional writer; indeed lately I have only written from time to time, to keep the habit at bay, you might say.

I write because the silence of the word inspires more fear in me than writing. Writing reduced to the status of a virus; the infinite reduced to silence. 'The infinite, my dear friend,' said Monsieur Teste, 'is no big

* Originally commissioned in Spanish and translated by Mike Gonzalez, Lecturer in the Department of Hispanic Studies, University of Glasgow.

thing; it's matter of writing. The infinite exists only on paper'. So: I write to try and prevent the fear of death from becoming, on this planet threatened with extinction, a fear of life itself.

Literature and exile in Latin America: the case of Paraguay

Exile is and always has been a constant in Latin America's political and socio-cultural history. It has arisen in a variety of contexts and has had the most far-reaching repercussions. And it has recurred with growing frequency ever since Independence—indeed even before that, since the idea of Independence itself, and the actions that flowed from it, were conceived and planned, for the most part, in exile.

From exile, internal and external, out of ostracism and banishment came the poets, writers, intellectuals, ideologues and military men, people from all social classes imbued with a consciousness of and a passion for liberty which moved them to fight for the independence of their native land. Many were to return into exile, cast out again by those laws of chance (for we must give it a name both vague and prestigious enough to embrace all the reverses and intensities of political struggle) that governed the emergence of those countries, those nebulae in the Latin American sky that are still in process of formation.

The experience of exile also stimulated and enriched Latin American social and cultural life, opening up new currents and directions. This seems to prove, at least, that however much the creative energies of social life are undermined—that progressive deterioration and collapse that has been called historical entropy—there is resistance to the toughest tests, to the alienation and fragmentation of creative, progressive thinking which reaction imposes.

Repression is by its very nature centrifugal and disintegrative. The creative power of social energies is, by *its* nature unifying, organic, analogous to the accumulation of biological energy. Despite constant impediments, interruptions, external interference and internal upheavals, despite all the apparently insuperable difficulties produced by the balkanisation of the continent, Latin America's historical destiny has continued to evolve between these two poles.

It thus remains historically possible that a system of autonomy and unity can be established; almost two centuries of emancipation struggles are the proof. It is true that the first independence struggle did not produce tangible results in a new objective historical reality—that was the issue posed at the political and cultural level. The neo-colonial pact

with the new dominant powers (the British Empire, and later the United States) overwhelmed the real interests of the national societies in formation, as a declining liberalism surrendered to domination and dependence.

Despite everything, the collective aspiration to independence and autonomy continued to find expression in an unending series of risings, rebellions and revolutions. This underlines the fact that the process of liberation does not consist solely of the revolutionary wars whose outbreak marks its final phase; on the contrary, it arises slowly and painfully at the very heart of the dominated, dependent societies. The coordinates of this process have defined the space where socio-political struggles together with cultural advances in the fields of art, literature and science have taken place. And they constitute the very essence of historical progress, despite occasional setbacks and downturns.

Exile is just one aspect of these struggles, just one component of the totality of Latin American liberation. In fact, it is the necessary consequences of the process, a symptom whose gravity stems from the sheer quantitative and qualitative proportions of that vast drain of human capital that the repressive regimes have imposed on Latin America, sapping its actual and potential capacities through this, the greatest exodus in its history. The 'open veins of Latin America', to use Galeano's powerful and now classic image, is not just a metaphor but a reality which has in turn become a metaphor for itself. These 'open veins' with their connotation of amputation, mutilation, tearing apart, of irreparable loss to the living organism of those societies, point also to the unstinted flow of exiles, whose loss is one more punitive cost demanded of the body politic by a repressive power. It affects the most sensitive tissues, the most active cells of the organism, the core of its political struggles and its intellectual and artistic creativity. It weighs down on political leaders and cadres, on writers and artists, on the priests who have converted their spiritual ministry into an incorruptible source of solidarity with the persecuted and a means of active participation in the struggle for liberation.

And there is more, a crucial aspect of exile which, in my view, is not given the importance it deserves. For if enforced exile as a form of punishment, reprisal or violence is one of the greatest aberrations of the repressive regimes, its effect is multiplied to the benefit of those who have seized power, because the victim himself or herself tends to experience exile as a punishment in itself. Consequently he or she exaggerates, in retrospect, his or her condition as a propitiatory victim.

The repressive powers try to turn the citizen who fights repression into a wandering shadow, a person without a country; the choice is physical elimination or civic death. If the exile acquiesces in this arbitrary condemnation, even if only psychologically, he plays into the hands of the oppressor and concedes victory to him, a victory that is even greater when it is won through oversight or because of a critical, deprecating attitude on the exile's part towards those who 'stayed behind' (I refer of course to those who stayed behind but neither compromised nor gave in). For it must be obvious that the situation of the internal exiles is the worst by far. It is they who require the greatest civic courage, the greatest capacity for physical resistance, the greatest resources of psychological and spiritual strength, not to speak of their readiness to accept the fact that it will be impossible for them to work in their respective creative field or keep open the channels of communication with their own collectivity. For the collective is enveloped in the same heavy cloud of silence and self-censorship which suffocates individuals, even when it is apparently diffuse.

It is in this dichotomy between internal and external exile, this marking out of two contrasting trajectories, that repression succeeds in creating a segregation, opening a yawning divide—and the totalitarian power reaps an extra triumph from this false opposition, this deep gaping incision. And it does so furthermore at the expense of the victims within and without, and at the cost of the global unity of the opposition. The external exiles find it hard to admit that some oppositionists might have survived in the concentration camps with their integrity and determination intact and still capable of underground cultural activity. This resentment confirms them in the belief that culture as such has been exiled with them, so that the only authentic cultural manifestations possible—in literature, art, or intellectual production generally—are those that arise in the realm of 'freedom' in exile. This superstition creates a kind of faith, a sort of Manichaeian oppositional masonic order that exchanges secret winks of complicity and recognition while publicly intoning its sad arias or triumphal anthems at international meetings and seminars.

The internal exiles, on the other hand, forced to act against their own better judgement, cannot but greet these arrogant assertions with an equal but inverse resentment and suspicion. And their response cannot simply be put down to excessively delicate sensibilities. Indeed there are those among the internal exiles—the completely marginalised layers of the peasants and the urban poor, and the indigenous groups and

cultures subject to an implacable process of extinction—who no longer own the land that once was theirs and who have neither a voice nor a future. Theirs is the oldest exile of all.

It is these irrational dichotomies, imposed without rhyme or reason, which have produced the greatest number of misunderstandings and the most persistent confusion in the cultural field, holding back as a result the convergence and unification of the different groups of exiles.

There is a further exile, one carefully removed from the statistics of the concentration camps—the ghostly legions of men, women and children kidnapped by the para-police brigades, taken from one place to another, whose file bears that euphemism born of the dirty war—the *disappeared*.

Despite the common graves in the cemeteries, the rubbish dumps and the barracks turned prisons and concentration camps uncovered in the obsessive searches of the relatives, despite the cargoes of human bodies tossed from warplanes over the sea, the jungles and the rivers, this legion of internal exiles continues to exist. We can see them given flesh in the tenacious Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo in Buenos Aires and their like in many other Latin American cities. There are thousands of these 'living dead', and their continuing absence cannot simply be wiped from the face of the earth, as they tried to obliterate Rodolfo Walsh's house using tanks. Their names cannot be erased by the fear of the torturers, kidnappers or military chiefs who were responsible.

Those disappeared internal exiles, locked in a death long postponed and perhaps already beyond rescue apart from small groups of survivors scattered in places that do not exist, will nevertheless have a part in the task ahead; thus the dead too can produce a living force.

It is hard for the imagination of a few generations to predict the outcome of this meeting and confluence of these dwellers in the underground—the internal exiles—with those who are waging war in the cities, the countryside and the jungles, and those who are already preparing transitional solutions to the problem of material reconstruction, of political pluralism, of intellectual and artistic creativity, added to the contribution that will be made by those bringing from distant countries the lessons and experiences of different fields of human activity.

This meeting of exiles, and their conversion into a full civic force involved in the tasks of tomorrow should give us hope as we confront the uncertain promises of the short and long term future. It will be a convergence and fusion of many perspectives, of new ways of seeing the

world and life from a distance and with objectivity, a new way of living together and acting in the space of historical time and in its as yet unrealised possibilities.

Writing in Paraguay: a metaphor for exile

Paraguay still lives under the oldest dictatorship on the Latin American continent; the havoc it has wreaked at the social, political and cultural level—indeed in every field of creative activity—is dramatically manifest. This is a backward society, dragging behind it like a punishment a history that has been described as a 'living nightmare', a century of intermittent and endemic dictatorships like tropical fiestas. And by this same historical perversion, exile has become part of its very nature and destiny.

It is, in the first instance, a physical exile from a landlocked country bounded by lost territories and marked by migrations, emigrations and mass exoduses like that of its indigenous population in the wake of the expulsion of the Jesuits in 1767—the first time that foreigners were exiled from colonial Paraguay. Yet none of this prevented it from becoming, on independence, the most advanced nation in the whole of Latin America in both material and cultural terms. Under the government of the famous Dr Francia, pioneer of the republic and builder of a Nation-State founded on the principles of the Enlightenment and the French Revolution, Paraguay experienced effective autonomy and independence before any other country on the continent. None of the Liberators were able to achieve anything similar as a result of the Emancipation struggles which they led.

The economic interests of the British Empire, which was penetrating the region and seeking dominion over it, could not allow the dangerous utopia of self-determination in this little landlocked country to continue to exist. Thus, at British instigation and with British support, the financial powers of the Brazilian Empire and the oligarchies of the River Plate (themselves dependent on England) planned the so-called War of the Triple Alliance. Over a five-year period, between 1865 and 1870, Paraguay was razed to the ground, two-thirds of its population was exterminated and more than half its territory stolen. The country was reduced to rubble, leaving this unfortunate nation with only 'memories of a great catastrophe' and a reality that raved and ranted and spat shafts of history into the face of the survivors, as the Spaniard Rafael Barret described it at the turn of the century.

Bereft of its past, isolated, cut off and besieged by neo-colonial interests, nothing got through to this island surrounded by land, turned inwards and absorbed in its own national disaster—not even the echo of the cultural currents that were transforming the ideas, art and literature of Latin America. And to all this must be added a second imprisonment within a bilingual culture. Paraguay is the only completely bilingual country in Latin America—for its true national popular language is Guaraní, the autochthonous oral language. It was the space where a *mestizo* culture evolved over four centuries, where orality made of writing an absent text—the root metaphor of exile.

This cultural and linguistic exile has thus aggravated from within the other forms of alienation that internal exile brings, for it has implied the annihilation of the ultimate freedom, a freedom devoured by fear transformed into the public consciousness of a country crushed by a system of totalitarian repression which makes a mockery of liberty.

The fragmentation of Paraguayan culture, the uneven growth of the productive forces, the great fear that has taken on the role of a consciousness at once public and secret, individual and collective, have deeply affected the creative potential of a society that lives, in a kind of banishment, on the banks of one of the most beautiful rivers on earth, which provides it with its mythic name—*Paragua'y* (crowned water or the river of crowns).

Brutality and terror have closed off the sources of inspiration that nourish writers and artists and which give expression to the originality of a people. Such creativity can only grow where it arises out of the social energy of the collective and is focused on its life—its essence, its reality, its history, its cultural, social and national myths fertilising the creative subjectivity of poets, novelists and artists. Their greatest estrangement is to live torn between the reality that ought to be and the reality that is, between the fullness of the life that has been taken from them and the monstrosity of a vegetable existence imposed upon that reality by forces alien to its social and historical nature.

The writer cannot pretend to be an ethnologist; neutrality or objectivity are not his forte. The writers, narrators and poets of Paraguay belong to a culture whose internal structure continues to derive from the oral, resisting the signs of 'cultured' writing, the sign of artificiality and domination. Thus imagination became the prisoner of a double alienation: from language, where the reality stretched far beyond those signs; and from the polyphonic reality that is revealed only in the oral culture, in the inflections and modulations of verbal

expression. Further, we know that the value of a work of literature derives not from its good intentions but from the significations of its internal structure, of the instinctive force that flows from it, through the mediation of an art 'that is certainly consciousness, yet in search of a form not conscious of itself', that is not ideology yet which cannot escape from ideology.

Of all the forms of exile that the Paraguayan writer must suffer—external or internal exile, the taking of a life not yet lived, the alienation from works not yet written, segregation from reality, isolation from a national public for those sent into exile and from other internal exiles for those banished to the remotest regions—linguistic exile is the paradigm, the truest metaphor of a reality transformed into unreality.

The problem of bilingual Spanish/Guaraní polarity may be the sign of this kind of linguistic schizophrenia. Which of the two should the Paraguayan writer use? If literature is fundamentally a linguistic fact, and thus an act of communication, the choice seems inescapable—Spanish. But when he writes in Spanish, the writer—and particularly the writer of fiction—feels himself to be suffering the most personal of alienations: linguistic exile. How far can he move from that part of reality and collective life that is expressed in Guaraní, from a Paraguayan culture marked indelibly with the sign of orality, of original mythic thought? As soon as the writer uses Spanish he feels he is translating part of the divided linguistic context; and in doing so, he is splitting himself in half. Something will always remain unexpressed. It is this that forces the Paraguayan writer to *make* a literature that goes beyond literature, to speak against the word and write against writing, to invent histories that directly transgress against the official history, to subvert through writing, demystifying the language that is shot through with the ideology of domination. In this sense, the new generations of novelists and poets are dedicated to the task of carrying forward this 'literature without a past' born of a past without literature, and to express it in their own language.

The Guaraní cosmogony conceived human language as the foundation of the cosmos and the pristine nature of man. The nucleus of this myth of origin is the esoteric and untranslatable *ayvu rapyta* or *ne'eng mbyte ra*, core of the soul-word; the *ayvu* of the beginning of time. A sound or noise imbued with the wisdom of nature and the cosmos reproducing itself through the austere and melodious Father of the beginning and the end, creator of the foundation word. A secret word, never used before strangers and which with *tataendy* ('flame-of-

the-sacred-fire') and *tatachina* ('mist-of-the-creator's-power') comprise the three primordial elements of the cosmogony of the ancient Guaraní. Their primogenic deities did not invoke the laws of punishment against those who aspired to wisdom, but forged instead the unity of knowing and doing, of oneness and plurality, of life and death. Every man was God on the road to purification, and God—or the many gods of that theogony—was the first man and the last. They did not impose exile but only the pilgrimage of the *mass-person* towards that *Land-without-evil* which each person carried within and which was shared by all.

In Paraguayan society today, unbalanced by oppression, the ancestral voice, that language in which a threatened and persecuted people has found final refuge, has also been misappropriated. It is a language without writing which in another time held within it the soul-word—the seed of the human and the sacred—which is now seeking a space for the word, the unfolding of reality through the unreality of the sign.

Today's Paraguayan writers are well aware that they have reached the limits of a historical process. It makes them abnormally aware of the problems of their society, and also of their artistic work. For the writers subject to internal exile, and those who have been forced to be part of the diaspora, literary activity once again carries within it the imperative to become the bearers of a destiny, to be reintegrated into the living reality of the collective—their own collectivity—to be nourished by its essence and its deepest aspirations and to embrace from there the universality of man.

The writers understand that these achievements, by their very nature, can only be realised on the aesthetic plane, at the level of literature and the word, in the very conception of the narrative art, ~~which is not~~ just (as is sometimes believed) the art of describing reality in words but the art of making the word reality.

This enterprise probes deep beneath the surface of human destiny in search of an image of individual and society that is at once the most complete and the most committed to the vital spiritual experience of the people of our time. It is here, in the alliance of subjectivity and socio-historical consciousness, of creative imagination and moral passion, that Paraguayan writers can overcome their dramatic alienation and isolation to take their full place in the body of literature in the Spanish language.

The section of the 'victors' who belonged to one of the old traditional parties was used as the political arm of a personal autocracy imposed by

way of a *coup d'état* and now methodically seizing control of all the instruments of power. A second (palace) coup took place shortly afterwards, enabling the dictator to eliminate the moderate wing of the government party, which was opposed to this double usurpation of power and the party, to the prostitution of this one hundred-year-old political grouping and to the obviously repressive intent implied in the Presidential slogan of 'victors and victims'.

The other half—the 'victims' (a term applied generically to all opponents of the dictatorship)—now expanded to include members of the governing party too. They became the crushed and silent legions of 'enemies' who for generations were to suffer persecution, prison, torture, exile and death.

The 'victors', on the other hand, are now constituted into that body of electors who from time to time re-enact the electoral farce on behalf of this curious dictator who has discovered a subtle method of ensuring the survival and pseudo-legitimation of his rule by recourse to the democratic procedure of the vote; it has enabled him both to represent himself as a constitutional president and to maintain the perpetual state of siege lifted only for twenty-four hours to permit the symbolic accession to power. All this has taken place under the aegis of a Magna Carta only two or three of whose articles function—namely those which consecrate the supreme and unquestionable authority of the chief executive. There are a number of additional laws with more or less idyllic titles like the 'Law for the Defence of Public Order and Individual Liberty' or the 'Law for the Defence of Democracy' which, together with legislation for the 'State of Siege' form the juridical triad on which the institutional structures of the system have rested.

This pollution of language by the dictator, imbuing it with elements of irony and parody in a kind of unconscious and equivocal black humour is perhaps the clearest indication of the totalitarian ideology of the regime and the climate of general degradation and impoverishment it has created within the country.

Politics and culture

A conceptual clarification is necessary at this point. If we consider the problem of repression and culture from an exclusively 'political' angle (we must use the word again, however inappropriate), the concept of politics as the art or science of good government becomes laughable. The passage of time and the terrible violence that dominates our world have combined to trivialise or indeed to wipe from the very face of the

earth the insular enclave of Paraguay. It has become, suddenly, an archaic realm, a kind of vanishing arcadia.

On the other hand, the so-called 'political' perspective could lead on to an insidious Manichaean proposition—namely the suggestion that these abuses should be laid exclusively at the door of the dictator as a kind of perverse, multi-faceted anti-hero. That misses the point, however; like all authoritarian regimes, his case leads on to wider questions of social and historical pathology. Its roots are anthropological—that is, cultural—the product of a degraded anti-culture which reflects on the whole of the society in which such phenomena occur, and which are defects in its very nature, part of that 'recurring nightmare that is its history'.

These facts incriminate their perpetrators—but they also bring into question the responsibility of the whole of the society in which they occur with increasing savagery. The question of why these phenomena occur and recur indefinitely is probably not often asked; they are accepted and tolerated where they occur. Of course it is easy to say that, and a great deal harder to have to live with the reality.

The question of historical responsibility (or its absence) and, let it be said, of guilt, is one that has to be faced honestly and self-critically. It is not a question of guilt in a penal nor a theological sense, but in its most concrete, anthropological expression. It must be confronted if we are to ensure that the experience of authoritarianism will yield lessons, warnings and perspectives that can help both to bring about its end and prevent its recurrence. Such an analysis should not be delivered in the tone of Job's laments. It is one thing to live with something, it is quite another to connive in it. Our memory should be trained to forget by remembering. 150,000 citizens have passed through the prisons of the dictatorship in the course of the last thirty years. In the same period more than one and a half million—half the population—have suffered expulsion and exile. Add to that the incalculable numbers who have died or disappeared after torture, who have been kidnapped or murdered, or the punitive and intimidatory attacks on peasant organisations struggling for their legitimate rights like the Agrarian Leagues of the 1960s and 1970s. Artists and intellectuals, workers and peasant leaders, human rights lawyers, even businessmen, are frequently imprisoned. Outstanding writers, intellectuals and artists have been sent to die in exile. The mortal remains of Agustín Barros, Paraguay's greatest musician, for example, have not yet been allowed back into his native country, though his music is played there every day.

It seems that what the regime fears are not the works themselves, but the physical presence of their author—a presence which remains dangerous even after death. The body of Elvio Romero, Paraguay's greatest contemporary poet and the remains of Gabriel Caccia, the founder of the Paraguayan novel, have been repatriated virtually in secret. And the writer of these words was expelled for the second time during a first visit home after thirty-seven years of exile, deprived of his identity documents and explicitly forbidden from returning to his country.

This degradation of the person, this removal of identity in something more than a simply formal or police sense, this severing of the individual from his existential and ontological roots, is precisely what the regime has set out to inflict at the collective level. And it can pride itself on having achieved its objective to some degree, just as it prides itself on those monumental public works financed, without exception, by the surrender of the actual and potential resources of the nation. The cost in terms of national sovereignty, territorial integrity, and the identity and autonomy of the nation are, of course, enormous.

Repression and culture, therefore, are two antagonistic but not equivalent universes. The most solid cultural tradition has proved incapable of preventing the transitory or permanent emergence of totalitarianism as anti-culture. On the other hand, that power *has* proved capable of destroying whole epochs of culture and preventing their slow evolution towards maturity and completion or their renaissance. The principal examples are Nazism and Fascism, which unleashed the Second World War and were defeated militarily but not ideologically. Their lethal effect derives precisely from their power to contaminate and even fascinate. For if it is true that time is not on the side of the oppressors but of their victims, it is the complicity of the victims, through their initial indifference or their failure to see, which allows their oppressors to exist and to maintain themselves in power by abolishing the fundamental rights and freedoms of other human beings. The opposition groups, or those who are critical of the society, are enclosed in a vacuum of total defencelessness, hostages to their own fear and prisoners of their own existence, made solely responsible for all transgressions. It is a situation at once real and unreal, a nightmare from which there is no awakening.

Authoritarianism in action

This power, usurping and oppressing the general will, has made it

impossible until now to carry through—even by stages—any project for a democratic pluralist society capable of guaranteeing social peace and achieving the coexistence of all social, political and cultural sectors on the basis of a respect for liberty and the rights of citizens in universal equality.

In many ways it is cultural activity that has been most directly affected—literature, audio-visual arts, music, theatre, collective theatre workshops, scientific research, cultural organisations, student groups etc—for all of them require an atmosphere of creative freedom in which these most delicate and fragile concentrations of individual energy can flourish. By nature and inclination they have a critical function—that is, they are subversive; they start from an unjust and anomalous reality and declare themselves in opposition to it. That artistic, literary and scientific groups not only still exist, but indeed are proliferating, or that individuals of great talent and prestige continue to refuse to sell out or compromise with the dictatorship, is testimony not to the tolerance of the oppressor but to the resolute vitality of a culture which, despite dislocation and abuse, has remained alive and fought to find creative space amid isolation and fragmentation, flying in the face of a brutal and menacing repression.

The observation is true of both hemispheres of this bilingual culture, from the popular to the highest levels of aesthetic refinement attuned to the universal *avant-garde*. The richness of the oral traditions and the ancient folk crafts which formed in the original clay of Latin America the dark suns sculpted on their pots, figures and textiles was born out of the darkest night and will survive into the dawn of rebirth. Aleijandinho modelled his temples with hands eaten up by leprosy, and raised imperishable monuments to the power of spirit over matter, of art over fatality. Their physical presence renders futile and empty the unreality of the lords of power.

The two exiles

This brief picture throws into sharp relief the difficulties faced by cultural workers in Paraguay, as writers, as intellectuals and as citizens.

As a cultural worker in external exile, I shall restrict myself to the situation of the writer—that does not imply that I see it as a priority, but only that it provides a concrete point of reference in personal experience. In fact it is the plastic artists, musicians and the audiovisual arts (including both cultured and popular theatre) which are today in the vanguard of artistic production. The arts of the word are the most

easily discovered by the agents of censorship and repression; thus the possibilities of reproduction or imitation, of 'smuggling in' the printed or written text, are far fewer.

Between the two groups of exiled cultural workers there has appeared a split akin to the divisions in national society maintained by dictatorial authoritarianism as I have described them; it is a dichotomy fomented by repression and to which the external exiles, whether knowingly or not, make concessions. This artificial segregation is one more turn of the screw, neither the worst nor the last twist of the garrotte around the throat of a humanity suffering socially and culturally. It was this same segregation which thirty years ago set in motion in Paraguay the Latin American diaspora, the greatest in its history, which has continued to the present.

The fragmentation of Paraguayan culture under the impact of the uneven development of the productive forces, of backwardness and the consequent repression at all levels have affected the creative potential of the whole society—yet it is that potential from which writers and artists draw nourishment and which express the originality of a nation. Obviously they can only do so when their works are focused on the social energy of the collectivity, a collectivity which by and large has not yet been exposed to the benefits or the dangers of culture. Paraguay is an agrarian, peasant country with a high percentage of real and functional illiteracy; its population and its cultural expression are immersed in an unreality which is the coagulation of its history. The artists and intellectuals who live in internal isolation feel dispirited and demoralised by the oppressive atmosphere of frustration and silence in which they must exist. And the most profound alienation of all is to live torn between the reality that ought to be and the reality that is, between the fullness of a life taken from them and obliterated and the abnormality of a vegetable life imposed by a repressive power that is everywhere.

The writer who must produce his work in enforced or voluntary exile pays the price of rootlessness which, for a Paraguayan in particular, because he is deeply rooted in his own medium, is traumatic. Separated from his reality and the nourishment it affords, the exiled writer becomes a stranger, belonging nowhere, refusing to accept the punishment of exile imposed by a corrupt power yet unable to return to a country where he would be even more of an outsider. Sometimes, it is true, he chooses to take the risk and return, taking upon himself the ravaging form of self-immolation which Jose Bergamin described on his

return to a country stifled by the authoritarianism of Franco: 'I prefer to be buried alive than to die and be left unburied'.

The writers, poets, artists and intellectuals of Paraguay, whether in internal or external exile, are well aware that they exist at the extremes of the historical process. This makes them abnormally conscious of the problems of their society and of their own responsibility to carry this fragmented, unbalanced and crushed culture forward, bring it up to date and put it on the same level as the other cultures on the continent, sharing their dynamic and the growth and chance that is the sign of the times. Their work, as Jose Marti described all cultural activity in an oppressed country, is the art of the cave and the anvil.

For the writers condemned to internal banishment and for those cast into the diaspora, artistic work once again signifies the imperative need to realise a destiny, to become again a part of their own collective experience, to rediscover the fraternal warmth of unity with their comrades in arms. This unity is not uniformity but the unfolding of a diversity of mental, ideological, experimental and spiritual horizons that mark the flowering of cultural life. As far as cultural workers are concerned, therefore, any hypothetical law of amnesty must mean an end to the state of siege and to repression at all levels.

Culture and democracy

Culture has a central orienting role in the process of recuperating democracy and in the transition from authoritarian regimes to pluralist systems, with all the juridical and constitutional reorganisation that such change must involve. It must be clearly said that the process of liberation does not swing between the two extremes of acceleration at all costs or slow, step-by-step change. These processes are not subject to some theoretical, abstract fatality which leads them inevitably towards the outbreak of armed struggle or to the blind terrorism of a violence from below arising as a counterthrust to the institutional terrorism of authoritarian or totalitarian powers. In Paraguay today the challenge is to avoid both outcomes in the concrete objective conditions of one particular society, above all in one dominated by and dependent on the imperial power. In these times the only possible or desirable response to oppressive regimes is one that is global and systematic, peaceful yet active.

Democratic citizens are demonstrating an increasing resolution to work in this direction towards the transition. Their will is strengthened by the knowledge that it is only with clear objectives and under the aegis

of solidarity between all democratic sectors that a truly effective strategy can be developed to roll back dictatorship and bring about the dissolution of its power. This aberrant autocratic and personalist form of government must be ended; but at this conjuncture political, economic and cultural liberation can and must be achieved by peaceful and democratic means. Cultural workers in every field must contribute to the creation of original models and proposals to ensure that this transition will be more than just a sterile crossing of the desert. The concrete and particular conditions of the transition in Paraguay make it a priority that the democratic forces forge an opening towards a peaceful and non-violent process of transition.

The silent dialogue

These possibilities are not yet on the agenda, despite the effort, the courage and the political maturity of the opposition—both leaders and masses. Cut off from their base, immobilised by the repression, the party organisations are nevertheless making efforts both within and outside the country to carry forward the difficult and arduous process of reunifying and drawing together their people. They do not avoid dialogue, but they are not prepared to enter it unconditionally, as if negotiating the transition were like resolving some crooked business deal.

What is required basically is a progressive conquest of the streets as a forum for political debate in the villages and towns, in the urban sprawl and the peasant communities. That much has been made clear in the paths towards the restoration of democracy taken today by the movements in our brother nations of the Southern Cone—Uruguay, Chile, Brazil. The culmination was the restoration of democracy in Argentina, a stimulating example and a pointer for all those peoples of Latin America who are living in a similar situation.

The dictatorship, for its part, does not admit the possibility of a confrontation of ideas (does it have any of its own?), nor is it disposed to dialogue, except in the sense of a delaying tactic in a desperate attempt to hold back the definitive crisis that provides the context of the debate. Even less is it prepared to entertain any possibility of changes or alternatives—even internal changes—which in any way presuppose a change in the leadership of the regime.

Under these conditions, the issue in the first place is how to force the dictatorship to acknowledge its true, totalitarian character, presently camouflaged behind an 'institutional' facade. Then, in the second place,

it can be forced to accept confrontation in debate in conditions of equality under the mounting pressure of public opinion, national and international, and of its own structural deterioration.

The future relations between culture, politics and economics—non-existent in a past where each was segregated into separate compartments—will play a key role in the establishment of this difficult but necessary equilibrium.

It is only this equilibrium of its political, economic and cultural forces, animated by a general social humanism, that will allow Paraguay to achieve the political objective which it can no longer postpone—its entry into modernity. Social humanism as the essence of a pluralist democracy implies the interplay of freedom and responsibility not as opposing concepts but as the full assumption by the individual of his civic rights and also of his obligations to society—a society based on a liberty understood and practised as an ethics of responsibility, in constant struggle against whatever threatens to degrade or destroy it.

Such a society is unthinkable under a state terrorism at the service of internal or external hegemonic ambitions. To overcome it in a spirit of collective cohesion, with the full force of a conviction in peaceful coexistence, is the only possibility for harmonious living, progress and perfection that is left to countries like Paraguay. There are no intermediate options—it is this one alone that can provide hope for the future.

Thresholds of identity: literature and exile in Latin America

Exile, internal and external, enforced and involuntary, has been a constant condition of Latin American experience. From the time of independence from Spain and Portugal to current struggles to break dependency on cultural imperialism, exile has intersected all phases of the construction of national cultures in the continent. A sign of the violence which has permeated cultural debate, exile has also been a place of transformations. This article will focus on the past thirteen years, i.e. those which followed the fall of Allende and have been marked by the establishment of dictatorships in the Southern Cone countries and the massive exodus of citizens provoked by these regimes.

Throughout Latin America the word 'exile' has lost its historical meaning. In Shakespeare's *Romeo and Juliet* Romeo kills a young man in a duel and is banished for his crime. The Prince, the arbiter of order in Verona, leaves no doubt as to the subject and object of the act of exile:

And for that offence
Immediately we do exile him hence.

Part of the fear associated with exile in Latin America is due to the fact that it has lost this clarity of status. Terms such as 'banishment' have no place in the discourse of witch-hunts and 'dirty wars' that have forced many thousands of Latin Americans to leave their countries in the last thirteen years. In place of the authoritative command of Shakespeare's Prince—a command which punishes a recognisable offence according to the laws of the land—there has been the darkness of secrecy and suspicion, of anonymous threats and the disappearances of friends and acquaintances. The act of exile itself has become something that was not legally imposed but rather undertaken 'voluntarily' to avoid persecution, imprisonment or death in the imminent but unknown future.

No recent event in Latin America had more immediate or more extreme consequences than the military coup that on 11 September

1973 overthrew Salvador Allende, Chile's elected Marxist President. Allende died in this burning palace and a period of relentlessly violent repression in which tens of thousands of Chileans were tortured and killed, imprisoned and forced abroad, began. In the ensuing witch-hunt the new regime, under General Pinochet, set out to erase the cultural activities that it associated with the recently overthrown government. By 1978 over 100,000 people had been forced to live outside the country. In February 1985 a list of 4,575 names of those not to be allowed back into Chile was published; but as those *not* on the list trickle back to join the swelling ranks of the opposition, the notorious Article 24 of the 1980 Constitution, allowing for the imprisonment and exile of the regime's enemies without charge or court appearance, still stands. Among Chilean writers in exile are Antonio Skármeta and Ariel Dorfman.

In Uruguay the Tupamaro guerrilla movement had come to dominate political life by the late 1960s. In 1972, as the armed forces broke the back of the guerrilla opposition, many innocent citizens suffered from the brutally violent security operation that led to the military take-over in 1973 and eclipsed a stable democratic system. Once known as 'the Switzerland of Latin America' Uruguay had become, in the words of Eduardo Galeano, 'a vast torture chamber'.¹ In the following years 300,000 people (20 per cent of Uruguay's population) left the country, driven out by the combined pressure of economic decline and a level of repression that made it necessary to have a political permit to celebrate a birthday. Uruguayan intellectuals forced into exile include Christina Peri Rossi, Juan Carlos Onetti and Eduardo Galeano (who has since returned).

The death of Juan Perón in 1974 led to the disintegration of Argentinian politics into factional warfare. Escalating instability and unbridled political violence culminated in the military coup of 24 March 1976. The horrific facts of the ensuing 'dirty war' waged against those whom the state considered to be spreading 'ideas that are contrary to Western and Christian civilisation' and in which between 9,000 and 30,000 so-called 'subversives' were illegally abducted and 'disappeared' have been chronicled in *Nunca Más*,² the report of the National Commission on Disappeared People. After 1976 many thousands of Argentinians—together with many others who had previously sought

¹ *South* (London) July 1986.

² London: Faber/*Index on Censorship*, 1986.

refuge in Buenos Aires—were forced out of the country to avoid the terror of the anonymous telephone call, the Ford Falcon without identifying number plates, the faceless torturer and the nameless end. Among Argentinian writers who were exiled are Manuel Puig, Marta Traba and Juan Gelman.

Exile in Paraguay takes more extreme forms than in any other Latin American country, although it is by no means a phenomenon of recent years alone. (The peculiarities of the Paraguayan situation will be further elaborated below in relation to Roa Bastos). An 'island surrounded by land', Paraguay's post-independence history has been one of cyclical exoduses, each of which has only served to highlight the isolation and exile of Paraguay itself. The most recent—and massive—exodus began after the bloody civil war of 1947, a civil war that was to culminate in the dictatorship of General Stroessner, who is still in power in 1986. Paraguay's tiny population of two million people is today complemented by the estimated one million more who have chosen, or have been forced, to live outside their country.

While the dramatic events in the countries of the Southern Cone and the sheer volume of exiles and emigrants that they inevitably gave rise to focus a consideration of recent Latin American exile on that area, it would be a callous misunderstanding of the phenomenon to ignore other countries where exile has been all too prevalent. The turbulent and coup-ridden history of Bolivia, for example, has been one in which exile has been one of the few constants of political and intellectual life. Many politicians found themselves forced not once, but many times to live abroad—which provided not only a refuge from political defeat, but also a platform for political come-back. The longest-serving presidency of recent times, the dictatorship of General Banzer (1971–78), was a period in which stability was maintained at the price of repression—and the numbers of people seeking refuge outside Bolivia rose accordingly.

Exile has long been the enforced condition of many of those who live in the struggling republics of Central America. While those whom the Somoza regime forced out of Nicaragua returned in triumph with the victory of the Sandinistas in 1979, countries such as El Salvador and Guatemala find their most prominent cultural activity outside national frontiers. In 1972 the Salvadorean writer Manlio Argueta was driven into exile in Costa Rica by the warning of a gun-waving policeman: 'This is what you'll get next time . . . we're sick and tired of poets in this country'.³ The threat was not empty: three years later the poet Roque

³ Amanda Hopkinson, 'Manlio Argueta', *Index on Censorship* 14(2) 1985, p. 49.

Dalton returned to El Salvador after many years of exile, only to be murdered there. The situation in Guatemala is no better and a whole generation of young writers has been forced abroad by the civil war conditions. The stream of exiles was swelled in 1980 when many intellectuals, writers and journalists became the targets of a purge.

While exile from Cuba was largely a phenomenon of the 1960s, the 1970s and 1980s have seen a rise in the number of writers (the poet Jorge Valls, for example) who have sought refuge outside Cuba after their release from lengthy terms as political prisoners. It has been asserted by Reynaldo Arenas among others that a state of 'intellectual repression' has caused the exile of a number of Cuban writers. The best-known Cuban authors living outside the country are probably Guillermo Cabrera Infante and Severo Sarduy. By the end of the 1970s it was estimated that one million Cubans, 10 per cent of the population, were living outside the island, mainly in the US, where the presence of such a large community of exiles has made a strong cultural and particularly musical impact.

Although international attention has not been focused on Haiti until recently, this diminutive island has seen a larger proportion of its population finding refuge elsewhere than any other Latin American country; the 300,000 Haitians in New York make it Haiti's 'second city'. The Duvalier dynasty, in power from 1957 until early 1986, effectively institutionalised the suppression of ideas; high levels of illiteracy, a complete lack of publishing possibilities and almost no public libraries ensured the exile, virtually in its entirety, of Haiti's literate culture.

The recurrent and widespread condition of exile forces a consideration of why nation-states in the continent have failed to foster a plural national culture, with room for all sectors of the population. A brief consideration of historical factors is relevant here. As against stereotyped views of the continent, it is important to stress the extreme heterogeneity of Latin American cultures. At the moment of the Conquest there was no unity, simply an enormous variety of cultures as yet unclassified by any universalising European discourse. There have been three main moments of unification: conquest, liberation from direct colonialism, and incorporation into international capitalist culture. Even in the second case, which includes the establishment of nation-states, the tendency has been for the terms of unification to be external: European or, more recently, North American. The possibility of other forms of autonomy and synthesis has been a main theme of Latin American literature in recent years. The experience of exile,

whether enforced or voluntary, has heightened consciousness of division, as well as demonstrating new possibilities of breaking down boundaries.

That exile can lead to the discovery of new identities is perhaps one of its constants throughout history. For Latin American literature, this process is charged with a sense of social necessity: the need to transform societies marked by oppression, scarcity and the absence of an autonomous national culture. The connections between exile, utopia and writing are traced by Augusto Roa Bastos in the revised edition of his novel *Hijo de hombre*. The protagonist, in prison, writes in his diary: An old vice, this one of writing. . . . A way of escaping from non-place to the stable space of signs: a way of searching for the place that took our place to another place. Isn't this perhaps the real meaning of utopia? The utopia of the Prodigal Son returning to the home which no longer exists; that of the banished, the exiled, the imprisoned who strive to return to the place they were uprooted from and know that even if they return it won't be theirs.⁴

Internal exile, in the sense of isolation, alienation, deprivation of means of production and communication, exclusion from public life, happens both to intellectuals and to whole communities. It can be no less dire than external exile. Roa Bastos has pointed out how writers in this situation have become trapped in protest literature:

The wilfully 'prophetic' word (with which the writer—a bourgeois or petit bourgeois by definition as well as by class consciousness—believes he can resolve and absolve his ideological contradictions) is the most ominous of all alienations and inner exiles . . . We all know that a genuine literary work has merit not for its good intentions . . . but rather for the truth or *force* of truth that emanates from the collective social energy unconsciously projected through the sensitive filter of subjectivity: that of the particular author.⁵

The exile of whole communities occurs when these are violently excluded from the terms of national identity, terms which can be genocidal (as has been the case of Indians in Peru, for instance). A main focus of exclusion is linguistic. Illiteracy enforces non-participation in the dominant forms of national culture, something of which writers in exile, cut off from their 'own' readers, have become particularly conscious. Secondly, in areas where the majority language is not Spanish (eg Paraguay or southern Andean Peru), writing in Spanish risks being isolated from the main communicative energies. Internal

⁴ *Hijo de hombre*, Madrid: Alfaguara, 1985, p 257.

⁵ *Review* (30) September – December 1981, p 19.

and external marginalisation are often closely connected, as in Paraguay and Haiti, both with approximately 90 per cent illiteracy and their large population living in external exile.

The last thirteen years have been the worst in Latin American history in terms of external exile, whether enforced or voluntary. In both cases exile reflects similar conditions: an environment which inhibits professional and artistic development is part of the same pattern of factors which spawn dictatorships and which dictatorships perpetuate. Thus the first cultural acts of post-revolutionary Cuba and Nicaragua were to carry out massive literacy campaigns.

A discussion of the effects of exile on literature must include the connected issues of internationalisation and dependency. The need to appropriate what is useful and liberating in European and North American culture involves the dangers of alienation from national cultures and a merely epigonal relationship with the appropriated culture. At the other extreme, popular oral cultures, while offering resources for opposition and resistance, cannot of themselves supply a language for literature. These two polar processes are not necessarily mutually exclusive, as Roa Bastos's writing shows. The most acute form of cultural dependency is on imperialist mass culture, something to which the exiled Chilean writer Ariel Dorfman has given special attention, in books on Donald Duck, the *Reader's Digest*, and the Lone Ranger and other comic strip heroes. Dorfman's manuals to the hidden messages in such works are a continuation of large-scale cultural programmes in Allende's Chile, one of the most important recent experiences in the struggle to undo cultural dependency. The Argentinian writer, Julio Cortázar, who lived in Paris for the last thirty years of his life, exemplifies one of the most fruitful appropriations of European cultural resources. On the other hand, as Roa Bastos has pointed out, there exists a type of 'exile industry', run by an internationalised elite, cut off from national cultures, and whose success in such circles is no indication of the quality of their work.

García Márquez, in his introduction to a book of short stories on exile, writes of 'the common and communal language of exile' which is capable of breaking down the barriers between separate national identities.⁶ This can be simultaneous with a discovery of differences, previously unrecognised. As Angel Rama has said, 'Argentine exiles who have recently settled in regions with which they have had no

⁶ *Exilio*, Mexico, 1981.

previous contact—the America of *mestizos* and *mulattos*—are discovering exotic realities similar to those encountered in the Orient by Europeans during the last century.⁷ The difference between exile in Europe and in Mexico or Brazil (places of Argentinian and Uruguayan diaspora) produces a change in the lines of communication. There is also the instance of the USA, which has welcomed Cuban exiles, but not others. To give one illustration, Angel Rama, exiled from Uruguay, was expelled from the US under McCarthyite legislation. One of the most important literary and social critics of twentieth-century Latin America, Rama held a Guggenheim Fellowship and was working at the University of Maryland. The US Immigration Authorities refused to renew his permit because he was classified as a 'communist subversive' under the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, known as the McCarran-Walters Act. But in all cases of displacement from his home country, the writer faces the constraining condition of having to negotiate between three possible readerships: the readers of his original country, those of the Latin American diaspora and those of his guest country. As Manuel Puig has pointed out, the loss of an original readership through censorship or exile (which often amount to the same thing) can pose serious problems.⁸

An exemplary instance of exile as the dismantling of frontier is the nomadism of a Henry Miller. But as well as an instigation to freeing, migratory movement powerfully demonstrated in the work, say, of Cortázar, exile also includes traps of staticity—such as that of nostalgia, which, as Cortázar points out, is precisely what the dictatorships want exiles to feel. The exile becomes caught up in the ahistorical thrust of nostalgia while the dictatorship makes history. Examples of the fixity whereby the exile's country becomes a place which does not change are documented in the fiction of exile. It can lead to the feeling that it is impossible ever to *really* go back or to bizarre insistences among groups of exiles about how Argentinians (etc) are supposed to speak or behave. Exile is a university (Roa Bastos), a freeing of boundaries, a place of cross-fertilisations previously impeded by political frontiers which do not correspond to cultural necessities. But it also includes the dangers of alienation, of separation from some of the main energies needed by the writer.

Literary explorations of the experience of exile embrace both its positive and its negative aspects, the most interesting writing coming

⁷ *Review* (30) p 11.

⁸ *Index on Censorship* 14(5) 1985.

from an awareness of the tensions between the two. As the Argentinian poet, Juan Gelman, has put it, 'exile is a cow which sometimes gives poisoned milk'⁹—as a purveyor of physical and cultural nourishment, it cannot be relied upon. The host country may provide freedom for its temporary guests, but, for a person displaced from their own country, that freedom is circumscribed. From a flat in Birmingham, England, the Chilean poet Alberto Santibañez wrote: 'Liberty cannot be understood merely as the freedom to walk down a street without someone checking your movements; it's also a question of your friends, your streets, your pavements, your family, and the possibility of doing something creative, making things, being a part of something.'¹⁰

Experiences of return provide a startling jolt to that part of the sensibility of an exile that can become bound up in memory. The novelist Osvaldo Soriano returned, in 1983, to the Argentina of his past with the human testimony of his distance from that past—a French wife whom he had married in exile. He found 'an Argentina I do not know, plundered, starving, humiliated', while she, for whom the journey was forwards rather than backwards, exclaimed that 'It's beautiful, there is still a feeling of *douceur de vivre*'.¹¹

For many writers the short story provides a genre where fiction can meet autobiography in an examination of the alienations that exile brings with it. In these semi-autobiographical pieces the experiences of displacement are confronted in a more directly thematic manner than would be sustainable in the richer dimensions of a novel. Thus Ana Vásquez, a Chilean novelist and, as a psychologist, student of the problems of exile, found, when she was asked to write an article on the exile's cultural displacement by the magazine *Index on Censorship*, that the form in which she felt herself most able to respond was that of the short story. In her story ('The doubts of a bigamist') the protagonist seeks out a bigamous relationship as a metaphor for her biculturalism.¹² The solution is one that both Gelman and Roa Bastos would find difficult to accept. For Gelman, writing from Rome where he continued to act as press secretary for the Montoneros (a banned political organisation), 'one man divided in two is not two men'.¹³ Roa Bastos

⁹ Juan Gelman and Osvaldo Bayer, *Exilio*, Buenos Aires, Legasa, 1984, p 13.

¹⁰ Alberto Santibañez, 'To return as a Chilean citizen', *Index on Censorship* 14(4) 1985, p 45.

¹¹ *Index on Censorship* 12(2) 1983.

¹² Ana Vásquez, 'The doubts of a bigamist', *Index on Censorship* 15(6) 1986, pp 31–3.

¹³ *op cit*, p 23.

expresses the conviction even more strongly: 'he who believes he has two countries has none'.¹⁴ In a story entitled 'The same corner of the world', Poli Délano, a Chilean writer, examines the extent to which the loss of one's country renders all exiles people of the same hazy territory of the diaspora. From a chance encounter on a street corner in Mexico City a Chilean strikes up a relationship with a Uruguayan woman—because they both 'smell of the South'.¹⁵ Gradually the girls and women he has known in the past, in Santiago, become subsumed into her, his compatriot in exile.

The traumas of exile are at their most acute, if perhaps not at their most deeply felt, at the time of arrival. This has a lot to do with what has been left behind—the sorrowful state of a native country whose mounting repression and persecution have been the impetus to fight. For Andrew Graham-Yooll, an Anglo-Argentine journalist and writer forced into exile by the military coup of 1976, 'arrival in exile is a passage from hysteria to *angst*'.¹⁶ The Uruguayan writer Cristina Peri Rossi exposes the multiplicity of the forms of a recently-arrived exile's *angst* in a vividly detailed story ('The influence of Edgar A Poe on the poetry of Raimundo Arias') in which the trials of an exiled father and his daughter take on proportions that are both terrible and darkly absurdist. Having left a past life where revolution was just one of the items on the daily routine, somewhat between queuing at the shops and cooking, the pair are afforded a very cool welcome by their new country (presumably Spain). All that is alienating about exile is presented through the relentlessly literal eyes of the precocious daughter who cannot be reconciled to the four days 'robbed' from them by their boat journey, 'What have they done with my five thousand, seven hundred and sixty minutes?'.¹⁷ In this new country where 'they' demand a mountain of paperwork and a blood test before entry is allowed, and where father and daughter have decided to come 'because they spoke the same language', even the Spanish is unfamiliar, a foreign language. Where a peach is not a peach and a strawberry not a strawberry, simple nouns can be as alienating as an unknown city.

Rather than assuming that there is a pre-defined 'Latin American Literature of Exile', taking as its limits the territory of experience as outlined in these short stories, we have preferred to take exile as a

¹⁴ *Review* (3) p 18.

¹⁵ Poli Délano, 'The same corner of the world', *Index on Censorship* 15(7) 1986, pp 17–19.

¹⁶ *A State of Fear*, London: Eland, 1986.

¹⁷ *La tarde del dinosaurio*, Barcelona: Plaza y Janés, 1980, p 52.

condition which cuts across the variety of Latin American literary production and introduce a set of crucial tensions. In this way it becomes feasible to discuss exile as a key condition of writing rather than simply as a theme. To give a range of exemplary instances, we propose to concentrate on three writers: Cortázar, Onetti and Roa Bastos. In all three of them there is a sense of a utopian reconquest of spaces occupied by oppression, where the pressures of displacement range from alienation and exclusion within everyday life to the marginalisation of mass populations. For instance, Cortázar, who has written of the need to move beyond national cultures to a notion of Latin American culture as a 'mosaic of heterogeneities', has produced a series of short stories and novels which are paradigms of breaking down frontiers. Onetti creates an imaginary city which is emblematic of a state of inner exile within a culture which can only offer failure to his urban characters. In Roa Bastos's work, the mass marginalisation of the native population inside Paraguay and the individual exile (internal and external) of the writer are the poles of necessary transformation. Their work as a whole traces a set of significant connections between enforced, external exile and its other forms (internal and voluntary), to the extent that the common idea of a 'literature of exile' written solely by those writers living in enforced banishment is a distortion of the much wider relevance of exile and its various connotations.

In the first sentence of Cortázar's story 'The Other Sky', the protagonist thinks 'Sometimes it used to happen to me that everything let itself be traversed, everything became soft and yielding, offering no resistance to shifts from one thing to another.'¹⁸ The dissolving of boundaries into porousness recurs throughout Cortázar's work; more than just a theme, it is conveyed through the verbal texture of his stories and novels. The dissolving process receives into itself the energies which were blocked by the imposition of frontiers between dream and reality, youth and age, past and present, male and female. The unblocking includes, very importantly, the divisions between one culture and another, an issue which had a direct biographical relevance for Cortázar, who was born in Brussels in 1914 (of Argentinian parents), lived in Argentina from 1918 until 1951, and remained in exile in Paris until his death in 1984. From 1976 until the fall of the Argentinian military dictatorship his exile became enforced rather than voluntary,



¹⁸ *Todos los fuegos el fuego*, Buenos Aires: Sudamericana, 1966, p 167.

a change which gave new meanings to cultural displacement in his life and writing.

A crucial strategy of the early stories (*End of the Game and Other Stories*) is to present normally separate realities as an unbroken continuity; disallowing the suppressions, exclusions and marginalisations through which tabooed areas are created and maintained. A metaphor of such exclusion is supplied in the title 'The false door', a door between two hotel rooms behind which a travelling businessman can hear the sound of a child crying, a sound which resists being placed either in the category of external reality or of a repressed part of the businessman himself. We are challenged to recognise there is an unbroken surface separate from the net of conventional cultural meanings which seeks to break it up and impose an immobilising grid upon it. Immobility and paralysis are the experience of the boy narrator of 'After lunch', who, caught between family loyalty and an urge to run away, is unable to find words for the unacceptable Other (possibly a monstrously deformed brother). Here, as elsewhere in Cortázar's writing, the frontier of exclusion leaks. In 'The other sky', mentioned above, the narrator drifts between a strait-laced bourgeois family existence in Buenos Aires and hanging out with prostitutes in Paris. Buenos Aires in 1945 and Paris in 1914 are woven together into a seamless web, an unbroken continuity whose smooth surface is dominated by the shopping arcades typical not just of Parisian architecture but of Buenos Aires too.

Migratory movement is expanded into greater complexity in *Hopscotch*, Cortázar's major novel. Dualisms of place (again, Buenos Aires and Paris) are extended through dualisms of characters, the main ones among them having their counterparts or doubles 'on the other side'. A major element in the polarities is rationalism versus the irrational, but it is in Paris and not in Argentina that Oliveira, the main character, discovers his need to yield to the irrational. Such inversions disallow the imperialist 'barbarisation' of Argentina and the reciprocal idealisation of Paris by Argentinian intellectuals. Living in Paris, Oliveira recognises the need to 'look at the world through the eye in your arse, and you'll see patterns pretty as can be'.¹⁹ Back in Buenos Aires, he finds himself further away from his country than he has been in Europe, no longer even a citizen. He becomes actively paranoid, but on the far side of his 'madness' there is the possibility of reconciliation, of undoing the various dualisms which have pressed upon his life.

¹⁹ *Rayuela*, Buenos Aires: Sudamericana, 1968, p 253 (ch 36).

At one point in Celine's *A Long Day's Journey into Night* the hero remarks pessimistically that when you move between countries there's a dangerous moment when you have left one culture behind but have not yet entered into another—the danger being that you might stop believing in culture altogether. For Cortázar's Oliveira however—or at least for the reader—the dizzying possibility of loss of all codes is in the end a positive, since it keeps open a utopian possibility—'the kibbutz of desire'. Cortázar's work opposes any relationship of dependency upon European culture. Unlike some writers of previous generations, he does not construct an imitative and epigonal version of Western culture. His position is active, critical and inventive, fuelled by the desire to oppose oppressive cultural grids of any kind. Which makes the word 'cosmopolitan', so often used of Cortázar, inappropriate; its connotations of packaged cultural elitism simply do not fit.

Throughout his career, Cortázar remained intensely committed to the Argentinian language and the Argentinian reader. All of his texts retained this vital connection. Thus when a book of his short stories was banned in Argentina because he refused to remove two of the stories which were found offensive by the military junta, it was a great shock. The two stories are 'Apocalypse in Solentiname' and 'Second time round', and refer to the repressive violence of Somoza in Nicaragua and the method of 'disappearing' people in Argentina. In both cases, Cortázar continues his strategy of showing a single, seamless reality, disallowing in this case the convenient separation of state violence and everyday life. The experience of enforced exile led him in the final years of his life into a deep involvement with the struggle to combat exile and other forms of political and cultural oppression emanating from the dictatorships of the 1970s in Latin America. As well as giving support to Cuba, he spoke unstintingly on behalf of revolutionary Nicaragua; his book of essays and stories, *Nicaragua tan violentamente dulce*,—was published in Managua in 1983. Commitments to writing and speaking on these issues did not in the end allow him to take the sabbatical he had wanted in order to write a final novel, knowing by then that he was ill with leukaemia and did not have long to live.

Among the reasons for Cortázar's original departure for France had been the rise of Perónism, which at the time he had felt to be a culturally destructive force. Later he commented that only by leaving Argentina did he come to understand Perónism—its reflection of other, more popular levels of Argentinian culture than those he had been brought up to accept in a middle-class suburb. The expanding sense of Latin

American culture is one of the most urgent themes of the essays he wrote after his stories were banned from publication in Argentina. He questions the very principle of single and separate national cultures: given the massive extent of illiteracy, and thus that the producers and consumers of literature are only a small and unrepresentative part of the whole, 'Is there any sense in going on talking about national identity and culture in the face of a mosaic of heterogeneities like that which Latin America presents?'²⁰ His sense of the importance of his readers becomes intensified. They are what matters most to him, his reason for going on writing. What distinguishes Latin American readers, he stresses, is that for them 'literature is part of life and not of leisure, part of politics and history'.²¹ The pleasure these readers experience in literature does not stop with itself but leads to vital issues of political necessity. This places a responsibility on the writer: 'He cannot speak only of books but of what is happening before, during and after the books in any one of our countries.'²²

The great Uruguayan novelist, Juan Carlos Onetti (born 1909), was expelled from his country in 1974 in circumstances which were grotesque and ridiculous. He had never been active in any left-wing organisation, he had not engaged in making political statements and his novels include no reference to Uruguayan politics. Nevertheless, in 1974, he was imprisoned for being one of the judges for a literary prize which was awarded to a story which the military decided they did not like. Subsequently, he went to live in Madrid. His fiction is set in the imaginary city of Santa María: an early work, *A Brief Life* (1950), traces the foundation of the city as a place which compensates for the existential frustration of failed desire—the hero embarks on creating the imaginary place after his wife has her breast removed because of cancer. In subsequent works such as *The Corpse-Gatherer* and *The Shipyard* (1961), Santa María acquires meanings beyond the existential: it becomes a site of failed utopian social projects and the location of the imitative rituals of a dependent culture, in the shape of a run-down shipyard which belongs to a failed entrepreneur ironically named Petrus, the last thing he inspires being faith. The shipyard is a grotesque and decrepit replica of what a capitalist enterprise should be. Onetti's technical innovations and his testing and questioning the relationships

²⁰ *Argentina: años de alambradas culturales*, Buenos Aires: Muchnik, 1984, pp 72–3.

²¹ *ibid.*, p 88.

²² *ibid.*, p 109.

between fiction and reality make him a key pioneer of the new Latin American novel.

In Madrid, Onetti wrote a story entitled 'Presencia',²³ which responds to the experience of exile by proposing a new reading of his previous work. It is a very moving story: a young man hires a seedy mendacious detective to follow his girl-friend, who is in prison in another country. The fantasy of having the girl tailed—the detective, greedy for money, invents the expected sightings—keeps her alive for him. The pathos of pretending Maria is in Madrid—an exile's desire to keep hold of what has been lost—encloses a larger necessity: to prevent the eradication of a whole country. In 'Presencia', Santa María has been burnt down by the military. Instead of the drive to dissolve social reality because of its resistance to desire, here the direction changes: the imaginary must be kept alive in order to rebuild the real. If Santa María before was an extended metaphor of inward and internal exile, where the drabness of a dependent culture could be faced, the necessity now is for the whole country to be reconstructed, and so the imaginary city becomes a resource, a utopia. Onetti's experience of enforced external exile confirms the extent to which his work is a record of internal exile.

It is difficult to approach the work of Augusto Roa Bastos, Paraguay's foremost writer and best-known exile, without a brief consideration of the events in Paraguayan history which have heightened its landlocked isolation and split its population in two in a diversity of exiles, internal and external. After independence Paraguay was quick to break away from the domination of the Río de la Plata and become, in 1811, the First Republic of the South. From the ruling junta there emerged a leader, Dr José Gaspar Rodríguez de Francia, who as 'Perpetual Dictator', was to impose his iron will upon Paraguay until his death, aged 74, in 1840. Francia, also known as *El Supremo*, made a nationalistic virtue of the necessity of Paraguay's isolation and effectively severed the country from the outside world by forbidding both foreign trade and foreign travel. Behind the walls he had thus erected, Francia ruled with a despotic populism in which the ideals he had drawn from the philosophers of the French Enlightenment were tempered by his aristocratic insistence on absolute rule.

What strengths there were in the independent republic forged by Francia were destroyed by the War of the Triple Alliance (1865–79). The Brazilian Empire joined with the oligarchies of Argentina and

²³ 'Presence', *Index on Censorship* 8(2) 1979.

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
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Uruguay to wreak havoc and destruction on a Paraguay that, though small, presented a threat through its autonomy. After five years of fighting, Paraguay's population had fallen by half and its insular exile was completed. In the words of Roa Bastos, Paraguay had become 'the land without men of the men without land'.

After the Chaco War in the 1930s Paraguay enjoyed a few years under a moderate, nationalist government. Civil war in 1947, however, was to destroy all parties of the centre and left and drive more than a third of Paraguay's population into exile as, in 1954, General Alfredo Stroessner came to power. He has been there ever since. Stroessner inherited Francia's despotism, but none of his populism; known as 'Tyrannosaurus', he rules over a country where human and civil rights are honoured only in their breach. The writers who have been forced into exile can find the 'provisional liberty' that Roa Bastos sees in the life of a writer such as himself, a writer 'who has written nearly all his work in the alienating and obsessive atmosphere of exile, in the unreal reality of his lost land, and the sorrowful knowledge that it has all been an "absentee's biography"'.²⁴ But for those left behind, exile by the constraints of self-censorship and the fragmentation of their national culture, liberty of any kind is an alien phenomenon.

A further dimension to the exiles of the Paraguayan writer, and one fundamental to the work of Roa Bastos, is that created by the linguistic context. Paraguay is the most deeply bilingual country in Latin America; the 1962 census showed that 43 per cent of the population spoke only Guaraní, 52 per cent were bilingual and a mere 5 per cent spoke only Spanish. That a writer must choose between the two languages of his people is problem enough; that the 'unavoidable choice' would appear to be the literate, international (and colonising) language of Spanish rather than the popular Guaraní, which is essentially a language of oral culture, leads a writer such as Roa Bastos to feel 'that he is performing a partial translation of the split linguistic context, in which he himself is split by the fact of his choice'. He concludes, 'this inevitably leads the Paraguayan writer to the necessity of creating a literature that goes beyond literature, of speaking against the word, or writing against writing: a literature that in the richness of a language drawn at its two sources, Spanish and Guaraní, expresses and signifies the world of the personal identity of its authors in connection with the real context in which they write.'²⁵

²⁴ *Review* (30) p 20.

²⁵ *ibid.*, p 20.

In his novel *Hijo de hombre* (*Son of Man*, 1960), the first of a trilogy on the life and history of Paraguayan society, to which *Yo, el Supremo* (I, The Supreme, 1974) has been added, but not yet *El Fiscal* (*the Prosecutor*), Roa Bastos addresses Paraguayan bilingualism directly. In his prologue to the revised edition of the novel he tells of how he has attempted to fuse the two cultural modes by means of a synthesis of the 'symbolic and semantic experiences' of the Paraguayan people. Such a synthesis reflects Roa Bastos's repeated insistence on the unimportance of individual writers, notwithstanding their all-importance as the creators of texts: 'it is superfluous and even shocking to privilege personal opinions, especially of writers who work in the field of fiction'.²⁶

The narrator/protagonist of *Hijo de hombre* is a writer whose life reflects the autobiographical details of Roa Bastos's own rural, but middle-class, background. His good intentions lead not to revolutionary action, but to wallowing self-analysis, despair and self-destruction. An almost incidental part of his story is that he betrays the redemptive figure of the book's title, Cristobal Jara, a man who has no time or inclination to do anything other than what must be done. Of few words, Jara will only use them to dismiss them: 'I don't understand what is said with words. I only understand what I am capable of doing. I have a task. I shall fulfil it. That is what I understand.'²⁷ As a secular and humanistic Christ-figure, Jara reveals that the way forward is in collective social action, that man will be saved by man alone. He is the utopia of 'man himself' which the writer can, in his 'old vice' of writing, prefigure, but never achieve.

In Roa Bastos's most recent, and most extraordinary novel, *Yo, el Supremo*, the nature of the relationship of the writer to his society is examined once more. Here, however, the issue, now seen in the context of the dictatorial power of Francia, has none of the clarity found in the idealised figure of Cristóbal Jara. From and beyond the end of his life the old dictator conducts a dialogue with Paraguayan history—and with himself, his secretary, his secretary Patiño and, at times, his dog Sultan—yet ultimately it is the text itself which conducts the dialogue, and this extends beyond the limits of Paraguay to debate with Fidel Castro, discuss French philosophy and challenge the latest developments of literary theory. Francia, *El Supremo*, is an obsessive producer of texts; the bulk of the book consists of transcripts of what he

²⁶ *Hijo de hombre*, Madrid: Alfaguara, 1984, p. 16.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 352.

has dictated to his secretary, though these are supplemented by his 'perpetual circular' of instructions and comments issued to his aides, what he writes in his private notebook, and a series of notes, quotations and commentaries on sources which have been added to 'his' texts. The whole purports to be assembled not by Roa Bastos the author but by a fictitious compiler, whose presentation of the collected texts denies the autonomy of any sole author, so that the book is made up of the collective voices of Paraguayan history.

Of *El Supremo* Roa Bastos has said: 'He came to represent the image of absolute power made real, an image that is, of course, always unreal.' In his hubris Francia forces a belief in his own omnipotence, an omnipotence which places him above all men: 'I don't write history. I make it. I can remake it as I please, adjusting, emphasising, enriching its meaning and truth'.²⁸ He claimed 'I am the director of the Revolution', yet as, in the course of the book, he battles with words in the crisis of his dictatorial voice, the pertinence of a note written in the margin becomes clear: 'You believed that Revolution is the work of one man—in himself, one man is always wrong, the truth begins with two or more'.²⁹ The writings assembled in the novel are presented as just such a beginning of a genuine history. In their collectivity they deny the illusion of absolute power whether the power be that of Francia the dictator or Roa Bastos the writer. The fluidity of Roa Bastos's own position within the book thus stands in direct opposition to any idea of exile lending a writer a privileged and absolute perspective on the country he has left behind.

The writing of Roa Bastos, with its direct engagement with Paraguayan history, is one that crosses the boundaries of exile, not only because of its relevance to the whole of Latin America and to the various publics that an exiled writer addresses, but, more importantly, because of his rigorous insistence that 'creativity must feed on the social energy of a people'. His 'absentee's biography' is a sad one—banished from Paraguay in 1947 and forced into a second exile from his host country Argentina by the atrocities of the mid-1970s. On a rare visit in 1982 to Paraguay from France (where he teaches Guaraní at Toulouse University), he was unjustly denounced as a 'Marxist subversive' and became 'one of three citizens forbidden to return'—yet he has remained, in a phrase he uses to describe one of the characters of *Hijo de hombre*, the 'living memory' of his people.

²⁸ *Yo, el Supremo*, Madrid: Cátedra, 1983, p. 325.

²⁹ *ibid.*, p. 209

The wild oats they sowed: Latin American exiles in Europe

The personal tragedy and historic irony of Ibero-American expatriation is that it has been a flowing and ebbing tide. The personal tragedy lies in the removal, the separation, the uncertainty. The historical irony is that each generation could have almost taken out a return ticket from one shore and used the outbound half in the confidence that the next generation would use the return half. The pattern can be traced, sometimes only tenuous it is true, through more than a century-and-a-half since the end of direct colonial domination. In more recent times it can be seen in the exodus of Europeans to Latin America—from Spain during and after the Civil War, from Germany during the 1930s, from Italy during the 1940s and 1950s—and the return to Spain, Germany, Italy, etc. of that generation's children, persecuted by the military tyrants of the 1970s in Latin America.

The coming and going has affected cultural evolution in some countries. Argentina, for example, is a country which lacks a cultural heritage; Venezuela, with a strong German community could be said to have only found the need for a cultural conscience with the advent of substantial income from oil. I have tried before to offer fundament for such a sweeping and negative view of what might be called Latin American rootlessness,¹ and it is only tangentially relevant here. What is relevant is the remark that the coming and going has affected the cultural evolution. While it can be said that some groups have benefited from the exchange and in cross-cultural experiences, it must also be seen that such proximity perpetuated does assure the sustenance of cultural colonialism.

The most recent experience of a Latin American diaspora took place in the 1970s. Military regimes in Chile, Uruguay, and Argentina provoked the largest exodus of their citizens to Europe. Of course, there had been forced departures from other countries before that: from Paraguay in the 1950s and 1960s, from Brazil in 1964, from Peru in 1968, etc. But at

¹ Andrew Graham-Yooll, 'Argentina: the state of transition 1983-85', *Third World Quarterly* 7(3) July 1985.

that time there were still doors open in Latin America. These were steadily closed as military mania spread. Hence, as the military takeovers became more vicious, Europe became a natural option. It was further away, but family links could be found. Although there are many stories of hardship and there is a continuing debate as to whether the exile is, within all the bitterness of expatriation, a more fortunate survivor than he or she who stayed behind in silence, Europe did come up to expectations.² It would require considerable study of Europe to say exactly why it did, but there are some pointers which can be offered in a superficial manner. The brutality of the Chilean military in September 1973 caused unprecedented revulsion in Europe, the pictures of people hounded into sports stadiums converted into concentration camps captured the imagination of people who had been brought up in the previous thirty years to believe that governments had to change by constitutional succession rather than by uniformed cut-throats. Also, unemployment was not as severe a decade ago as it is now, and a few thousand Latin Americans could be accommodated either in employment or on social security. Britain had then only one million unemployed, which even so caused the Labour government considerable embarrassment. Britain, for only the second time since 1945 (the previous occasion being in 1956, when Hungarians fled their country after the failure of Imre Nagy's revolution) opened its immigration barriers to the refugees from Chile. Most of Europe did the same for the Chileans, and later were asked to do the same yet again for the Uruguayans, and finally for Argentina's fugitives.

In spite of the often near-destitute nature of the Latin American arrivals, many of them were members of their countries' middle classes. Education, training, private resources, were all factors pertaining to their class which gave them a start in life in exile. However, this is not the same as evolving into integration. A majority did not integrate, as must be accepted. Those who have not returned as their countries take the road back to democracy, will see their children integrate and suffer the bitterness of a cultural chasm between them and their offspring, in addition to the distance from their countries of origin. After all, the children too are middle class and inherit the adaptability of their class.

As stated, the United Kingdom opened its doors to many Latin Americans. So did the Federal Republic of Germany—especially to the

² Eduardo Goligorsky, *Carta abierta de un expatriado a sus compatriotas*. Buenos Aires: Editorial Sudamericana, 1983.

many who could claim a German family connection—and so did the German Democratic Republic—especially to those with whom it could find an ideological kinship. And true to their adherence to the declaration of human rights, so did the Scandinavian countries, and the Netherlands.

But exiles found that Paris, Rome, Madrid and Barcelona were the most obvious choices, if they could be admitted for reasons of language and historical cultural links. All four cities became centres of reunion, political meeting-places for activists and launching-pads for their campaigns against the regimes in power in their countries. And in those cities, the servants of the military tyrants organised their sometimes deadly counter-intelligence operations.

Within the exile groups, factions sought to express their views. Their most immediate meeting points were the solidarity committees set up with the help of sympathetic Europeans. Within the committees political lines were soon drawn. The public expression of such factionalism was often by way of mimeographed or cyclostyled newsletters, some no more than a sheet, of erratic frequency, and of not very long existence. But that cascade of partisan paper did produce a substantial number of publications, books as well as periodicals, which must be seen as essential as much to the study of exile as to the more demanding study of national and international circumstances that led to the forcible exile of many.

Although the main intention of this brief article is to look at some of the publications of exiles in Europe, it would be as well to record some of the leading publications produced outside Europe because of the fluid exchange between expatriates in the Americas and Europe. There is, of course, an element of personal preference, as well as of availability in notes such as these. But with that caution it can be said that among the best of the batch was *Controversia*, a tabloid size magazine, at times monthly, at times quarterly, founded in 1979 in Mexico and which lasted a little over three years.³ *Denuncia*, published by what might be called a Latin American exile 'consortium' in New York, was a more 'popular' paper, also in tabloid size, which ran for several years, according to the availability of funds. Unlike *Controversia*, which had a very high ideological and analytical

³ Most of the magazines mentioned in this article and at one time collected by the author have been deposited in the Department of Printed Books (Hispanic Section), British Library, London.

standard, *Denuncia* went for the heart-strings. It carried poetry, stories, articles, exposés and interviews in line with a hard-hitting presentation. Funds decided the frequency and survival of these publications. In Mexico, the Argentine politician, Héctor Sandler, published *Democracia para la nueva Argentina* during 1982 and 1983 on a shoe-string budget. In contrast, the Argentine Solidarity Committee (CAS) in Mexico City formed in October 1975, produced a catalogue of publications of high quality and vehement politics. Their language can be compared with the Brechtians writing about Nazi Germany.⁴ In 1977 a rather poorly translated version of the CAS's Spanish-language bulletin was published in English for a time.⁵

Argentines in Mexico also formed a Union of Argentine Journalists for Liberation (UPAL) in 1976 which produced its newsletter as from January 1977, but which lasted no more than half a dozen issues.⁶ Mexico saw the rise of groups such as Writers in Exile, Poets in Exile, Scientists in Exile, etc. But the one 'great' publication the exiles produced there, which had a history and a continuity was the Uruguayan *Cuadernos de Marcha*. This was produced by the publishers and editors of the magazine *Marcha* of Montevideo. They had been imprisoned, murdered, banished and disbanded by the dictatorship that seized government in Uruguay in 1973.⁷ *Marcha* was produced as a weekly in Montevideo and during its decade or so in print in Uruguay was a left-wing, intellectual, popular standard-bearer for the whole continent.

What exile did encourage and which has a clear continuity—unlike the erratic and passing periodicals, many of which are lost—are the writers who developed their talents and careers while out of their countries. New writers and established authors found that in exile they enjoyed a certain peace because their politics were no longer on a collision course with those of the host country. So they were left to work. It was a case of 'distance makes the hand work harder'. Thus Oscar 'Mempo' Giardinelli, a little-known poet and journalist in Argentina, became a successful prize-winning writer in Mexico. Pedro Orgambide, an established writer in Argentina, found new horizons in Mexico. Humberto Costantini, a poet, writer and active member of the

⁴ *Argentina 1979, contra el terror, por la democracia*, Mexico City: CAS

⁵ *CAS Report No 1*, Bulletin of the Comisión Argentina de Solidaridad, Mexico, 1977.

⁶ *UPAL*, No 1, January 1977, Mexico.

⁷ The custodians of *Marcha* and *Cuadernos de Marcha* are the present editors and publishers of *Brecha*, a weekly tabloid newspaper, which started publication in Montevideo after the return of constitutional rule to Uruguay in 1985.

Argentine Writers Society (SADE), found translation into English and minor success. The Chilean Ariel Dorfman, living in Europe, also found publishers outside the Spanish language and thus a certain international renown; and the same goes for the Chilean writer, José Cayuela, the Chilean novelist and film script writer, Antonio Skarmeta, the Argentine novelist, Daniel Moyano, the Uruguayan journalist and author, Eduardo Galeano, and so on. It would be offensive to even hint that exile was a cause of success. This is not the case at all, but exile brought new outlooks and new pressures which forced the search for new outlets.

It would be remiss to close this section without briefly discussing the funding of exile publications. If the military criminals who hijacked government in Latin America were to be consulted, they would point to guerrilla organisations or to an 'international conspiracy'. No doubt they found a right-wing audience who believed this: bank holdups, holding wealthy businessmen to ransom and forcible fund-raising can raise substantial sums and can pay for many magazines. But a little analysis and the reality of political expediency in guerrilla organisations would support the argument that only a small fraction of funds could have come from guerrillas. It is in the nature of such groups, which constantly face political uncertainty in a strange country, to prefer the spontaneous one-off booklet rather than the journal of periodical appearance, whose operation is open to scrutiny by security agents.

For those authors who came from a continent not known for its generous advances to writers, it is safe to say they lived on their wits, on some teaching and on any other job they could find. For the magazines, including the solidarity committee publications, support came from subscriptions, fund-raising parties, raffles, concerts, etc, and the very rare wealthy sponsor.

The Argentine exiles arrived in Spain in 1976, with substantially more money and in many cases far better connections than other exile communities. After all, the late President Juan Domingo Perón had made the Puerta de Hierro district in Madrid his place of residence in exile from 1960 to 1974. Humour sometimes is best used to illustrate a situation, and in this case it illustrates the number of Argentines who went to Spain. It was said at the time that many psychoanalysts—persecuted in Argentina on suspicion of having had guerrillas among their patients—moved their practices to Spain complete with patients and all.

How many Latin Americans there were in Spain is not easy to

estimate. The Latin American PEN Centre in Madrid reported in 1979 that there were 120,000 Latin Americans resident in Spain.⁸ About 55,000 were Argentines, 25,000 were Chileans, and the remainder was taken up by Cubans, Venezuelans, and Uruguayans. Officially there were 11,118 Latin Americans who in 1977 held Spanish work permits (compared with 53,618 Europeans, including North Americans). Many in this group of 120,000 people were avid readers, and subscribers to the exile literature. As soon as one publication went under, another would be launched, with new-found injections of cash; or two would be started, as the publishers of the one closed down split along political lines and went different ways. One anecdote that shows the continuity of exile publications in spite of their short existence in print is given by the correspondence between Rodolfo Terragno, a lawyer and journalist, a founder of the daily newspaper *El Diario de Caracas* in Venezuela, and the well-known Argentine journalist and novelist, Osvaldo Bayer. The correspondence started early in 1980. It was the result of an article, 'The Privilege of exile' by Terragno in the newspaper *El Diario de Caracas*, reproduced by the exile paper *Sin Censura*, then published in Paris by an exile group among whom was the former Argentine Senator, Hipolito Solari Yrigoyen, before he relaunched the magazine *La República*. The article said that exiles should stop moaning about their lot and look back on those who stayed behind as the real heroes of the Latin American tragedy. Osvaldo Bayer, strongly refuted the idea that the exiles were privileged and called on those resident in Europe to make a mass return to Argentina. This was published in *La República*, and replied to by Rodolfo Terragno—who rejected the idea of a mass return as a useless self-immolation—in a letter published in *Controversia* (Mexico), where another letter from Bayer found space later. The Malvinas Islands conflict in April–June 1982, prompted Osvaldo Bayer to return to the subject of a mass return in an article in *Testimonio Latinoamericano*.⁹

There were numerous publications by the Latin American exiles in Europe, but again, concentrated in France and Spain. And again, the choice of the best will be, inevitably, made on personal observation. For the present purpose one of the best was the already mentioned *La República*, which represented the exiled members of the Civil Radical Union (UCR), whose candidate, Dr Raúl Alfonsín, is now President of

⁸ *Informe sobre Latinoamericanos en España*; por el PEN Club Latinoamericano en España, Barcelona, 1979.

⁹ *Testimonio Latinoamericano* 3(15/16) October 1982. Barcelona, Spain.

Argentina. The magazine ran for twenty-four issues and was published and edited by the aforementioned Dr Solari Yrigoyen, first in Mexico and then in Paris. The advantage of this publication for later researchers, is a) its continuity, as the twenty-fifth issue was published in Buenos Aires in October 1985, and b) that the editor was an avid collector of the ephemera of exile, carefully recording every book, pamphlet, or magazine that was published by Latin American exiles in general.¹⁰

The other favourite—chosen by personal preference, it must be emphasised—was *Testimonio Latinoamericano*, registered in Amsterdam, published in Barcelona and founded in 1980 by two men who served several years in Argentina's prisons. This publication, of fairly regular appearance printed in a slightly smaller size than that of the standard magazine, must be placed, ideologically and in presentation, in a class similar to *Controversia* in Mexico. It reflected a tendency that was nationalist left-wing, vehemently anti-military and strongly critical of Washington's policies in the Southern hemisphere. The standard of its book reviews, short essays, occasional short stories and poems was without doubt among the highest. In its pages the reader would find several writers of renown in Latin American politics debating the historical cause and outcome of the Malvinas conflict, or Chile's military monetarism, or the message contained in a popular cartoon strip. *La República*, and *Testimonio Latinoamericano* are not just material attractive to librarians or hoarders of ephemera. They must be seen as very useful research sources for study of Latin American politics. This high-sounding statement is supported by the fact that writing in exile recovered a certain liveliness, became controversial, and shed inhibitions which had been imposed on writing in Latin America under military dictatorship. Censorship, and, more important, self-censorship, reduced the press in much of Latin America to the reproduction of military decrees. The exiles, liberated from fear, regained a freedom to write which made entertaining debate.¹¹ One reason why some exile publications were lively and realistic, while others were bitter laments is that the good ones were written as short-term ventures, not as long-term whines. The liveliest were the exiles who were going home as soon as they could. The forgettable

¹⁰ *La República*, vocero de la democracia 8(25). Calle Rivadavia 1194, Buenos Aires, Argentina.

¹¹ Andrew Graham-Yooll, *The Press in Argentina 1973-8* (with additional material for 1979-81). London: Writers and Scholars Educational Trust, 1984.

essays on exile are the catalogue of regrets by those with no intention of returning and for whom their countries froze at the time of departure.

Active publishers of exile material in Spain were the Madrid-based Committee for Human Rights in Argentina, an organisation sometimes suspected of having strong guerrilla connections. However, their first expatriate broadside against the military government in Buenos Aires was *Argentina: inquiry into genocide*, a full-length book which reported the early cases of repression, torture and a catalogue of excesses by the military.¹² The committee went on to publish numerous books, apart from frequent pamphlets.¹³ With the approach of the World Cup football championships in June 1978 in Argentina, the exile propaganda machine went into top gear—as did the efforts to counter it. At the time, the military junta sought to overcome the image of torturers and criminals which they had acquired. The Montoneros guerrillas published a 40-page bilingual (English and Spanish) brochure entitled *Argentina '78* which under a football-shaped flap on the cover—the symbol of the World Cup—invited the reader to look into an Argentina of repression, terror and torture. The brochure was a professional job of high quality print on glossy paper. It did not record any printing address as some publications did.¹⁴ The Argentine government hit back, from its propaganda office in Madrid, with a semi-anonymous 100-page booklet, illustrated with the pictures of victims of attacks by the Baader-Meinhof gang in Germany, the Red Brigades in Italy, and the ERP in Argentina, as all being part of a coordinated international campaign.¹⁵ There were other government or intelligence agency publications printed in Buenos Aires in Spanish, English and French, and distributed to the governments and the editors of Europe.

These publications provided the livelier, and more aggressive, aspect of exile literature and government propaganda.

This article can only offer a superficial view of the rich variety of the Latin American exile literature in Europe. But it is hoped that this sampling will be enough to launch others in search of what is an area with a wealth of information and opportunities for academic discovery.

¹² Comisión Argentina por los Derechos Humanos, *Argentina: Proceso al Genocidio*, Madrid: Elias Querejeta Ediciones, 1977.

¹³ See, for example, the exposé of an Argentine torturer formerly employed by the military government, who turned against the authorities: *Ex-ayudante del General Harguindeguy acusa*, Madrid: CADHU, 1983.

¹⁴ For example, the Partido Revolucionario de los Trabajadores, the political leadership of the Ejército Revolucionario del Pueblo (ERP), published a 94-page booklet explaining in 1977 why its losses had forced withdrawal from battle.

¹⁵ Grupo Tamayo, *Argentina-Europa, ¿un mismo terrorismo?* Agosto 1978, Madrid.

Exile and dictatorship in Latin America since 1945: an annotated bibliography

Exile

The phenomenon of exile in Latin America is a complex one that cannot be defined as a single condition, the inevitable consequence of a particular form of government, or a specific response to certain socio-economic influences. The terms gathered around the notion of exile—'émigré', 'emigrant', 'refugee' and so on—tend to be vague and generalised. Exiles may be seen as alienated and dispossessed, or as voluntary or 'self-imposed' exiles because they have made a free and conscious choice to leave their homeland for political or economic motives. Intellectuals who remain in their country and yet have to work under the constraints of ideological coercion and censorship are often termed 'internal' exiles because they are culturally and ethically alienated.

The field, then, is a broad one. Augusto Roa Bastos's exile from Paraguay is not the same as was Julio Cortázar's self-imposed exile to Paris from his native Argentina. Such cases of disaffected intellectuals are, of course, very different issues from the tragic mass flight of refugees from General Pinochet's Chile to all parts of the world; or the case of the thousands of Argentines forced into exile from 1976 onwards by the repressive policies of the military's 'Process of National Reorganisation'. A very different phenomenon again is the mass exodus of disaffected Cubans to the United States in the wake of Fidel Castro's socialist revolution.

Yet if the causes of exile are almost immeasurably diverse, there is perhaps more common ground in the consequences. From the committed intellectual to the exploited slave labourer, the experience of being ousted from one's homeland produces feelings of bewilderment, betrayal and impotence. The exile has to countenance the anxieties of having to start again in an often alien culture as well as the uncertainty of ever being able to recover a lost identity by returning home. It would be mistaken, however, always to equate the exile's plight with defeat: the

expatriate is often what he is because he chooses to defy an unacceptable political reality rather than submit to it.

A significant corpus of material exists on the subject in Latin American studies and journalism, but much of it takes the form of brief articles and notes, and there appear to be few full-length socio-political or historical studies of exile in the continent. This is perhaps an indication of the disparate nature of the causes of exile and of its problematical manifestations, as well as the difficulty of assessing such a disturbing phenomenon dispassionately. The following is a selective list of items concerning exile. A few full-length studies dealing with political and economic issues relating to exile are included, but the majority of articles are concerned with creative literature on the subject, personal testimonies of the experience of living in exile, and discussions on the nature of political commitment for the exiled intellectual. The condition of the exile is only one manifestation of political intolerance and repression in Latin America, and cannot be wholly divorced from other horrors of authoritarian and dictatorial rule. A marginal number of articles are therefore concerned with political persecution, torture, censorship and 'disappearances'. This section is followed by one of critical articles on four major modern novels of dictatorship in Latin America, and a brief supplementary list of historical references.

Poetry and fiction on exile and political persecution

This is a rich but vague area, because the theme is marginally present in such a large number of works. The following list should be of specific interest:

Benedetti, Mario *La casa y el ladrillo*, Mexico: Siglo veintiuno editores, 1976. Collection of poems by the prominent Uruguayan writer.

— *Con y sin nostalgia*; Mexico: Siglo veintiuno editores, 1977. Stories.

Casaccia, Gabriel *Los exiliados*, Buenos Aires: Editorial Sudamericana, 1966. Novel by the noted Paraguayan writer.

Chávez, Lisandro *et al.* *¡Exilios!*, Mexico: Tinta Libre, 1977. Twelve short stories by six writers. With a prologue by Gabriel García Márquez and an epilogue by Adolfo Sánchez Vázquez.

Cortázar, Julio 'Second time', *Index on Censorship*, 8(2) 1979, pp 32–5. Short story about the Argentine 'desaparecidos'.

- Délano, Poli 'The same corner of the world', *Index on Censorship* 15(7) 1986, pp 17-19. Short story by a Chilean exile.
- Dorfman, Ariel 'Missing . . .', *Index on Censorship* 8(3) 1979, pp 12-16. Eight poems by the exiled Chilean writer on the subject of political disappearances, imprisonment and torture.
- Gelman, Juan and Osvaldo Bayer *Exilios*, Buenos Aires: Legasa, 1984. Selection of texts by two Argentines, exiled in Rome and Berlin after the 1976 military take-over in Argentina.
- Tizón, Hector *La casa y el viento*, Buenos Aires: Legasa, 1984. Novel by an Argentine, once exiled in Spain.
- Traba, Marta *Conversación al sur*, Mexico: Siglo veintiuno editores, 1981. English translation (by Jo Labanyi) *Mothers and Shadows*, London: Readers International, 1986. Story of the sufferings of the mothers of the *desaparecidos* and their resistance to the tyrannical regimes in Uruguay, Argentina and Chile in the 1970s.

GENERAL

- Avellaneda, Andrés 'Exilio y literatura latinoamericana', *Point of Contact* 2 (3-4) 1981, pp 81-92. Attempt to define some key structures and narrative devices in fiction about exile, largely using the collection *¡Exilios!* as its subject. Relates this to personal testimonies of exiled Latin American writers.
- Cortázar, Julio 'The fellowship of exile', *Review* (30) 1981, pp 14-16. The Argentine writer emphasises the need for resistance by the intellectual in exile to authoritarian regimes. Proposes that exile can be turned into a positive force against dictatorships through humour, solidarity and revolutionary literature.
- 'Realidad y literatura', *Texto Crítico* 7 (22-23) 1981, pp 5-13. Contains the essence of Cortázar's oft-expressed views on the nature of the artist's political commitment and the inseparability of literature and contemporary politics. Relates these to the situation of the Latin American in exile.
- Martz, John D 'Latin America's exile politics', *Latin American Research Review* 10 (1) 1975, pp 193-201. Judicious review of the books by Ameringer, Fagen, Lewis and Rogg (see below).
- Rama, Angel 'Founding the Latin American literary community', *Review* (30) 1981, pp 17-20. Concise analysis of political exile in Latin America. Evaluates and revises the various terms applied to exiles, the role played by economic and cultural factors in mass

migration, and considers the problems of 'transculturation' both for the intellectual and the people of the diaspora.

Rodríguez Monegal, Emir 'Literatura y exilio', *Vuelta* 6 (63) 1982, pp 45-7. General discussion of the problems and responsibilities of the exiled writer. Primarily concerned with those of the Latin American 'boom' of the 1960s.

Said, Edward 'Recuerdo del invierno', *Punto de Vista*, 7 (22) 1984, pp 3-7. Not specifically on Latin America, but raises useful questions on the causes and nature of exile.

ARGENTINA

Coad, Malcolm 'The "disappeared" in Argentina, 1976-1980', *Index on Censorship* 9 (3) 1980, pp 41-3.

Cox, Robert 'At least 10,000', *Index on Censorship* 9 (3) 1980, pp 43-52. The exiled ex-editor of the *Buenos Aires Herald* describes the effects of the abductions on the families of *desaparecidos*. There follows a list of writers and journalists who have disappeared in Argentina since March 1974.

Giardinelli, Mempo 'Dictaduras y el artista en el exilio', *Discurso Literario* 3 (1) 1985, pp 41-50. The author returns to Argentina after nine years of exile in Mexico. Describes some of the travails of exile. Originally a lecture to a North American audience, it calls for a more severe attitude from the US government to Latin American dictatorships.

Gilio, María Esther 'Los desterrados. Informe sobre la inmigración en la Argentina. I: bolivianos y chilenos', *Crisis* (18) 1974, pp 15-27.

— 'Los desterrados. Informe sobre la inmigración en la Argentina. II: uruguayos, paraguayos y brasileños', *Crisis* (19) 1974, pp 3-12. Collection of interviews with exiles and refugees, of varying ages and occupations, who have settled in Argentina. Each article is split into a discussion of the economic and political motives for immigration.

Graham-Yool, Andrew *Portrait of an Exile*, London: Junction Books, 1981. Personal and highly readable account by the Argentine author and journalist of the terror following the 1976 seizure of power in Argentina by the military junta; the author's personal experience of exile in London; and a return to Buenos Aires in 1980.

— *A State of Fear*, London: Eland Books, 1986. Expanded version of *Portrait of an Exile*. A 'Postscript to chapter three' describes the author's return to Buenos Aires in November 1984 to give evidence at

the trial of Mario Eduardo Firmanich, commander of Argentina's Montoneros guerrillas.

King, John *Argentine Cinema*, Plymouth Arts Centre, 1986. Brief study, with a section on exiles and the problems of return, and how these are portrayed in contemporary Argentine film.

Sarlo, Beatriz 'Una alucinación dispersa en agonía', *Punto de Vista* 7 (21) 1984. On the problems of recovery for Argentina after the years of military rule. Also examines *Exilios* (Gelman and Bayer) and *La casa y el viento* (Tizón).

Soriano, Osvaldo 'Return from sleeplessness', *Index on Censorship* 13 (1) 1984. After seven years in exile, an Argentine writer returns and describes his feelings as he re-discovers Buenos Aires.

BRAZIL

For a selection of introductory material, see *Index on Censorship*, 8 (4) 1979. Includes Leslie Bethell, 'Brazil-the last 15 years' (pp 3-7); Clovis Moura, 'Climate of terror' (pp 8-10); Alex Polari, 'Prison poems' (pp 11-12); Joan R Dassin, 'Press censorship—how and why' (pp 13-19); and Marcos Gomes, 'Movimento and the censors' (pp 20-6).

THE CARIBBEAN

Ameringer, Charles D *The Democratic Left in Exile: The Anti-dictatorial Struggle in the Caribbean, 1945-1959*, Coral Gables: University of Miami Press, 1974. Ambitious study of exiled opposition movements to dictatorial regimes, concerned mainly with Venezuela, Cuba, Guatemala, Costa Rica and the Dominican Republic. Discusses Venezuela's 'Acción Democrática'; the significance of the Cuban Revolution for the Caribbean; and the myth and reality of the anti-dictatorial 'Caribbean Legion'.

Bender, Lynn Darrell 'The Cuban exiles: an analytical sketch', *Journal of Latin American Studies* 5 (2) 1973, pp 271-78. Informative introduction to the mass migration of Cubans to the United States after the 1959 Revolution. Examines the circumstances of the US airlift operations, and discusses the motives of North American assistance in receiving refugees.

Cabrera Infante, Guillermo 'Bites from the bearded crocodile', *London Review of Books* 3 (10) 1981, pp 3-8. Entertaining account, by the Cuban author living in exile in London, of the cultural scene in

Cuba around the time of the Revolution and after. Talks of his editorship of *Lunes de Revolución*; his disaffection with the Revolution and departure from Cuba; the notorious 'Padilla Affair'; and discusses several Cuban writers. Is characteristically scathing about Castro and his Revolution.

Fagen, Richard, Richard A Brody and Thomas J O'Leary *Cubans in Exile: Disaffection and the Revolution*, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1968. Analysis of the reasons for the exodus of refugees from Castro's Cuba. Uses interviews and questionnaires to investigate individual motives for flight.

Franqui, Carlos *Retrato de familia con Fidel*, Barcelona: Seix Barral, 1980. English translation (by A MacAdam) *My Family Portrait with Fidel*, London: Jonathan Cape, 1983. Very readable memoirs of the disaffected revolutionary's days of intimacy with the leader of the Revolution. Is shrewdly critical of Castro and his government.

Rogg, Eleanor Meyer *The Assimilation of Cuban Exiles: The Role of Community and Class*, New York: Aberdeen Press, 1974. The USA provided asylum for hundreds of thousands of refugees following the 1959 revolution in Cuba. Concentrating on the area of West New York, New Jersey, the study analyses the processes of assimilation and acculturation of the refugees into the new community. Examines the significance of Cuban class status in terms of this adjustment, and considers the effectiveness of various programmes created to facilitate integration.

CENTRAL AMERICA

For a basic introduction, see *Out of the Ashes: the Lives and Hopes of Refugees from El Salvador and Guatemala*, London: War on Want, 1985, a collation of photographs, poems, testimonies, brief geographical and historical background, and statistics on the plight of refugees in the difficult political climate of the 1980s.

Argueta, Manlio 'War and the writer in El Salvador', *Index on Censorship*, 11 (2) 1982. On art and politics by a leading Salvadorean novelist in exile in Costa Rica.

Coad, Malcolm 'Murder on the campus', *Index on Censorship* 10 (1) 1981, pp 48-54. On the terror at San Carlos University in Guatemala, the scene in recent years of political assassinations and kidnappings.

Forché, Carolyn 'Interview with Claribel Alegría', *Index on Censorship* 13 (2) 1984, pp 11-14. The Salvadorean poet talks about

her work, political commitment and the dangers of return to El Salvador. Followed by poems.

Gunson, Phil 'Teachers in El Salvador', *Index on Censorship* 10 (2) 1981. On the political background to the violence on university campuses by repressive government forces.

CHILE

Alegría, Fernando 'One true sentence', *Review* (30) 1981, pp 21-3. Personal testimony of the Chilean novelist and critic who went into exile after the fall of Salvador Allende's government and the military take-over in September 1973. Emphasises the exile's desire to recover his heritage, the need for international solidarity in opposing the Chilean regime, and discusses some of the recent Chilean literature of testimony and resistance.

Dorfman, Ariel 'Los intelectuales en el exilio', *Cuadernos del Tercer Mundo* (19) 1978.

Droguett, Carlos 'Literatura del exilio', *Texto Crítico* 7 (22-3) 1981, pp 59-67. Essay by the Chilean novelist on the horrors of Pinochet's Chile and contemporary literature of protest.

Epple, Juan Armando 'La literatura chilena del exilio', *Texto Crítico*, 7 (22-3) 1981, pp 209-37. Interview with three noted Chilean writers in exile (Fernando Alegría, Poli Délano, Ariel Dorfman) about their experience of exile and its effect on their work. Another Chilean author, Antonio Skármeta, adds a note dealing with the same questions.

Henfrey, Colin, and Bernardo Sorj *Chilean Voices: Activists Describe their Experiences of the 'Popular Unity' Period*, London: Harvester Press, 1977. Seven interviews with individuals who were active in the coalition that had supported Allende. Divided into sections on industry, the countryside, the shanty-towns and the universities.

Sanders, Michael 'Book burning and brutality', *Index on Censorship* 3 (1) 1974, pp 7-13. On the early effects of the military dictatorship in Chile after the coup of 1973, and on the severe censorship of the press and intellectuals.

Skármeta, Antonio 'La nueva condición del escritor en el exilio', *Araucaria de Chile* (19) 1982, pp 133-41. Author in exile from Pinochet's regime. Points out some positive aspects of exile, and affirms the importance of the intellectual's role in the struggle against

dictatorship through the public denunciation of state violence and active representation of oppressed groups.

PARAGUAY

Bareiro Saguier, Rubén 'El tema del exilio en la narrativa paraguaya contemporánea', *Caravelle* (14) 1970, pp 79-96. Briefly outlines the political background of civil war in 1947 and subsequent state violence in Paraguay. Examines the plight of the exiled artist, and discusses the work of some of the country's writers in exile, notably Gabriel Casaccia and Augusto Roa Bastos.

— 'Paraguay—culture of fear', *Index on Censorship* 8 (1) 1979. On the censorship of literature, theatre, the press, and the suppression of the indigenous Guaraní culture, under General Stroessner's long-standing regime.

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Roa Bastos, Augusto 'The exiles of the Paraguayan writer', *Review* (30) 1981, pp 17-20. Denunciation of the regime which, over the past thirty years, has forced into exile nearly half the population of Paraguay. Considers the historical background of the country's political problems, the tragedy of modern Paraguay as an 'anti-nation', a culture without leaders, and the consequences of 'ethical alienation' of the writer in a totalitarian state.

PERU

Pásara, Luis 'Por qué no vivo en el Perú: I', *Hueso Húmero* (8) 1981, pp 108-21. Personal testimonies of various Peruvian writers, artists and scholars who have left their country. Replies from Juan Acna, Alfredo Bryce, Sara Castro-Klarén, Jorge Eduardo Eilson, Castón Fernández, Rodolfo Hinostroza, Carlos Menesco, Hugo Neira, Carlos Revilla, Joaquín Roca Rey.

— 'Por qué no vivo en el Perú: II', *Hueso Húmero* (9) 1981, pp 95-107. Replies on the same subject from Hernán Braun, José

Durand, Alberto Guzmán, Julio Ortega, Jose Miguel Oviedo, Julio Ramón Ribeyro, Manuel Scorza.

- 'Por qué no vivo en el Perú; comentarios a una encuesta', *Hueso Húmero* (11) 1981, pp 95–100. Summarises and analyses the responses of the above testimonies.

URUGUAY

Benedetti, Mario *El escritor latinoamericano y la revolución posible*, Buenos Aires: Editorial Alfar Argentina, 1974. See in particular the title essay and 'El testimonio y sus límites'.

- *El desexilio y otras conjeturas*, Madrid: Ediciones El País, 1985. The author's collected articles from *El País*, with several items on Latin American dictatorship and exile.

Galeano, Eduardo 'In defence of the word', *Index on Censorship* 6 (4) 1977, pp 15–20. On the problems of writing in an atmosphere of repression and persecution, by the exiled Uruguayan writer and founder of the important cultural magazine *Crisis*.

- 'Cemetery of words', *Index on Censorship* 7 (2) 1978, pp 3–5. On political persecution in Uruguay, Chile and Argentina.

— *Días y noches de amor y guerra*, Havana: Casa de las Américas, 1978. English translation (by Judith Brister) *Days and Nights of Love and War*, London: Pluto Press, 1983. Moving personal account of the writer's own exile, largely in Buenos Aires.

Goytisolo, Juan 'Uruguay's withering Culture', *Index on Censorship* 8 (2) 1979, pp 36–7. On the effects of military repression in Uruguay on national culture, and the demise of Uruguay's prestigious literary paper, *Marcha*.

López, Braulio 'Singing in exile', *Index on Censorship* 7 (4) 1978, pp 44–9. Account of his life and work in exile after the 1973 military coup by one of Uruguay's most popular singers.

Ruffinelli, Jorge 'Uruguay: literatura y militarismo', *Casa de las Américas* 20 (119) 1980, pp 128–33. Cultural persecution under Uruguay's 1973 dictatorship.

Torrents, Nissa 'Uruguay—getting rid of critics', *Index on Censorship* 6 (3) 1977, pp 9–11. Brief survey of the cultural impoverishment in Uruguay as a result of large-scale exile of artists, and fierce repression and censorship by the government.

Dictatorship in the modern Latin American novel

The novel of dictatorship has long been an established genre in Latin American writing, and the large number of novels this century which are set against the background of regimes of terror and individual tyrants constitutes a corpus of works too great to be covered in a brief survey. Moreover, many of these works are protest novels of a largely denunciatory and propagandist nature, and have temporary and pragmatic aims which often detract from their artistic quality and their interest today. The following, then, is a description of the four 'Dictator' novels generally considered to be the most important of the genre in the last century, followed by a selected critical bibliography.

El señor presidente (Buenos Aires: Losada, 1948. English translation *El Señor Presidente* by Frances Partridge, New York: Athenaeum, 1964) by the Guatemalan, Miguel Angel Asturias, winner of the 1967 Nobel Prize for Literature). The novel was written in the 1920s and early 1930s, but was not published until 1946, and serves as a suitable point of departure for a survey of the modern dictator novel. Its setting is the Guatemalan dictatorship of Estrada Cabrera in the early years of this century, but it attains universal significance in its horrific portrayal of the violence and humiliation suffered by a society under the rule of a vicious dictator. Unlike the other novels under consideration here, the tyrant's individual psychology is left unexplored, and he is characterised as a faceless, dehumanised force whose appearances in the novel are few, but whose all-seeing malignant presence is constantly felt.

El recurso del método (Mexico: Siglo veintiuno editores, 1974. English translation *Reasons of State* by Frances Partridge, New York: Knopf, 1976) by Alejo Carpentier of Cuba, is lighter in tone. Its title is an ironic reference to Descartes' *Discourse on Method*, epigrams from which introduce the chapters. Part of the significance of this is to present an opposition between the dictator's brutal recourses and the more clearly defined rationale of French and European institutions and culture. The 'First Magistrate', as he is called, is the dictator of an unnamed Caribbean country, and is a fictional synthesis of several real tyrants, the most clearly identifiable of which is Cuba's Machado, who ruled in the 1920s and 1930s. The novel sets up a polarity between the Latin American country and Paris (the dictatorship is a francophile of some culture), and this serves to portray his dual nature as the learned, refined European influence contrasts with his ruthless tyranny at home.

Like the Mexican dictator Porfirio Díaz, he ends his days in exile in Paris, alone, decrepit and forgotten.

El otoño patriarca (Barcelona: Plaza y Janés, 1975. English translation *The Autumn of the Patriarch* by Gregory Rabassa, New York: Harper and Row, 1976), is a linguistic *tour de force* of dense poetic prose by the Colombian Gabriel García Márquez, winner of the 1982 Nobel Prize for Literature. Through a series of narrative techniques using hyperbole, the Patriarch is presented as a larger-than-life figure of mythic proportions. Again the tyrant is a composite representation of several historical figures, and the setting, though not specified, is recognisably Caribbean. Márquez has described the work as 'a poem on the solitude of power': the great tyrant leads an existence of loneliness, suspicion and self-deception in the twilight of his life (because of the non-chronological organization of the narrative, the Patriarch is always presented in his decrepitude and decline). Through its hyperbolic rhetoric the novel expresses, to a more intense degree than *Reasons of State*, the paradox of the dictator's supreme dominion coupled with his lack of individual authenticity.

Yo el Supremo (Buenos Aires: Siglo veintiuno editores, 1974. English translation *I The Supreme* by Helen Lane due to be published in 1986 by Alfred Knopf) is by the Paraguayan novelist in exile, Augusto Roa Bastos. An extremely dense and complex narrative, its protagonist is a specific historical personage, the great Paraguayan dictator Dr Francia, who ruled the country from 1814 to his death in 1840. The text gives the illusion of a scholarly, documentary testimony comprising various narrative levels: the dictator's own voice, his written memoirs, and the scholarly apparatus of the editor-author. Roa's novel has been seen as a vindication of the regime of the formidable Francia, a severe and brutal dictator who was yet a man of great culture, and much influenced by the values of the French Enlightenment. Yet, as much as the other works, it is a study of the nature of power, and subtly explores the relation between myth and history within the general framework of an introspective fictional autobiography.

Selected critical works on novels of dictatorship

Amate Blanco, Juan José 'La novela del dictador en Hispanoamerica', *Cuadernos hispanoamericanos* (370) 1981, pp 85-102. General examination of the novel of dictatorship, from the mid-nineteenth century to *Otoño*.

- Apuleyo Mendoza, Plinio *The Fragrance of Guava*, London: Verso 1983. Series of conversations with García Márquez. Often rambling, but the section on *Otoño* contains some interesting background material.
- Benedetti, Mario *El recurso del supremo patriarca*, Mexico: Editorial Nueva Imagen, 1979. The title essay of this collection is a sensible study of the three dictator novels of the 1970s. Examines briefly their antecedents, analyses each novel in turn, and is least convinced by *Otoño*, which loses much by its hyperbole and lack of verisimilitude.
- Berger, J. 'Márquez's tolerance', *New Society* (London) 28 April 1977. Enthusiastic review of the English translation of *El otoño del patriarca*.
- Callan, Richard *Miguel Angel Asturias* Boston: Twayne, 1970. Biographical information on Asturias, critical survey of his work, with an analysis of *El señor presidente*, and a further chapter examining the use in the novel of the Babylonian fertility myth of Tammuz and Ishtar.
- Castellanos, Jorge, and Miguel Martinez 'El dictador hispano-americano como personaje literario', *Latin American Research Review*, 16 (2) 1981, pp 79-105. Informative article tracing the history of the novel of dictatorship, which in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries was often mere rhetorical propaganda; to *El señor presidente*, seen as a turning-point, to the novels of the 1970s. The tyrant is no longer an anonymous force, but a rounded character with his own psychology and motivations.
- Dellepiane, Angela B. 'Tres novelas de la dictadura: *El recurso del método*, *El otoño del patriarca*, *Yo el Supremo*', *Caravelle* (29) 1977, pp 65-87. Lengthy analysis of themes and narrative technique in the novels.
- Foster, David William 'Augusto Roa Bastos' *I the supreme*: the image of a dictator', *Latin American Literary Review* 4(7) 1975, pp 31-5. Presents the basic problems of reading the text, indicating its various narrative layers. Sees the book not as a defence of Francia's regime, but as a recreation of the dictator's voice.
- *Augusto Roa Bastos*, Boston: Twayne, 1978. General survey, structuralist-orientated, of Roa's works, with a chapter on *Yo el Supremo*.
- González Echevarría, Roberto *Alejo Carpentier: The Pilgrim at Home*, Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1977. A leading study on the writer, with a brief section on *El recurso del método*.

- 'The dictatorship of rhetoric/The rhetoric of dictatorship: Carpentier, García Márquez and Roa Bastos', *Latin American Research Review* 15 (3) 1980, pp 205–28. Post-structuralist study. Sees the 'erosion of authority' prevailing in post-modernist Western literature being played out in the Latin American dictator novel. The new novel demonstrates through its very structures that the dictator is no longer seen as a powerful telluric force, but 'phantoms cast by the true powers in today's world.'
- Himelblau, Jack 'El señor presidente: Antecedents, Sources and Reality', *Hispanic Review* 41 (1) 1973, pp 43–78. Concludes that the novel is particularly Guatemalan; that through his use of real personages and locations, Asturias endowed his novel with added force for those of his own generation who lived under the Estrada Cabrera regime between 1898 and 1920.
- Luna, Norman 'The Barbaric Dictator and the Enlightened Tyrant in *El otoño del patriarca* and *El recurso del método*', *Latin American Literary Review* 8 (15) 1979, 25–32. Carpentier's 'historico-ideological' vision of Latin American dictatorship has its 'mythico-legendary' parallel in García Márquez's novel. The latter is preferred for its depth of style and breadth of conception, whilst Carpentier's fails in its attempted polarisation of Cartesian discourse and pragmatic politics.
- Mallett, Brian J 'Dictadura e identidad en la novela latinoamericana', *Arbor* 101 (393–4) 1978, pp 59–73. Good study of the three novels of the 1970s, showing how, in spite of their differences, they all go beyond the presentation of the mythical archetype (as in, say, *El señor presidente*) through their closer psychological analyses of an individual tyrant.
- Martin, Gerald 'El señor presidente and How to Read It', *Bulletin of Hispanic Studies* 47 (2) 1970, pp 223–43. Thorough study of the main themes and patterns of imagery in the novel, which is seen in part as a poetic work in which the plot and characters become motifs in a complex study of the forces of good and evil.
- 'Yo el Supremo: The Dictator and his Script', *Forum for Modern Language Studies* 15 (2) 1979, pp 169–83. Praises Roa's work above the dictator novels of Márquez and Carpentier. Sees the novel as a 'meditation on the meaning of writing'.
- 'On dictatorship and rhetoric in Latin American writing: a counter-proposal', *Latin American Research Review* 17 (3) 1982, pp 208–27. Vigorous reply to the article by González Echevarría.

- Miliant, Domingo 'El dictador: objeto narrativo en *el recurso del método*', *Revista Iberoamericana* 47 (114-15) 1981, pp 189-95. Systematic attempt to examine the historical and etymological formation of the various types of tyrant, dictator, caudillo, etc. Interesting, though the technical jargon is hard work.
- Muller-Bergh, Klaus 'Vida y hechos de un tirano ilustrado', *Revista canadiense de estudios hispánicos* 3 (2) 1979, pp 189-95. Examines the historical background of *El recurso del método*, and largely identifies the dictator with Gerardo Machado of Cuba (1925-33).
- Ortega, Julio 'El otoño del patriarca: texto y cultura', *Hispanic Review* 46 (4) 1978, pp 421-46. Structuralist analysis of cultural and mythical elements in the novel.
- Peavler, Terry J 'A new novel by Alejo Carpentier', *Latin American Literary Review* 3 (6) 1975, pp 31-6. Review of *El recurso del método*, discussing historical background and various episodes in the novel.
- Pritchett, V S 'All the President's men', *New Statesman* (London), 22 April 1977. Review of *The Autumn of the Patriarch* (Gabriel García Márquez).
- Rama, Angel *Los dictadores latinoamericanos*, Mexico: Fondo de Cultura Económico, 1976. Examines *Otoño*, *Recurso* and *Supremo* in the context of the new Latin American novel. The dictator himself has become the object of artistic treatment instead of an explicitly condemned figure.
- Shaw, D L *Alejo Carpentier*, Boston: Twayne, 1985. Survey of the author's life and work, with a useful chapter on *El recurso del método*.
- Usabiaga, Mario 'Alejo Carpentier y su Primer Magistrado', *Texto Crítico* 2 (3) 1976, pp 128-40. Brief historical background to the dictator theme in Latin American literature and the emergence of the three important dictator novels of the 1970s. Is critical of Carpentier's characterisation of the First Magistrate: a comic version of the archetypal dictator is viewed as frivolous given the reality of brutal dictatorships in Latin America.
- Williams, Raymond L *Gabriel García Márquez*, Boston: Twayne, 1984. General introduction to the author and his work, with a chapter on *Otoño* providing a plot summary and a detailed analysis of the novel's themes and structure.
- Woods, M 'Unhappy dictators', *New York Review of Books*, 9 December 1976. Review of the English translations of *El recurso del método* and *El otoño del patriarca*.
- Zuluaga, Conrado *Novelas del dictador/Dictadores de novela*,

Bogotá: Carlos Valencia Editores, 1977. Thought-provoking essay examining the Latin American dictator in history and literature. Refers to a wide range of novels, though *Otoño*, *Recurso* and *Supremo* are the main subjects of discussion, is doubtful of the effectiveness of these three novels in reflecting the true nature of tyranny in Latin American history, and concludes that the truth of the continent is stranger and more horrifying than the fiction; that these writers have tried to evade reality rather than explore it.

Dictatorship in Latin America since 1945: an introductory bibliography

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Fraser, Nicholas, and Marysa Navarro *Eva Perón*, New York: Norton, 1980.

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Exile, dictatorship and the creative writer in Africa: a selective annotated bibliography

Relative to its population, Africa has produced more exiles than any other continent. The centuries of the Atlantic, Saharan, Red Sea and East African slave trades witnessed the involuntary and, in the vast majority of cases, irreversible exile of millions, and the indigenous use of slave labour inside Africa generated major long-distance population movements.¹ In the colonial period tens of thousands found their particular foreign oppressors wanting in basic humanity and choose the lesser evil by permanently crossing the nearest international boundary;² comparable numbers became (and still become) more-or-less voluntary migrant labourers, those who survived harsh working conditions being effectively exiled from their homes, farms and families for months, years or even decades.³ In Africa today—in addition to workers resident outside their own countries, the status of many of whom could be aptly

¹ The experience of being a slave inspired what must be the first African account of exile written in a European language in the work of Olaudah Equiano (c 1745–?1797), an Igbo from what is now Nigeria. *The Interesting Narrative of the Life of Olaudah Equiano or Gustavus Vassa the African, Written by Himself* (London: 1789) describes Equiano's boyhood in Nigeria, his kidnap and his life as a slave (and ultimately freedman) in the American South, the West Indies and England. For an abridged critical modern edition, see Paul Edwards (ed) *Equiano's Travels*, London: Heinemann, 1967.

For a convenient summary of the debate on the dimensions of the Atlantic slave trade, see Paul E Lovejoy, 'The volume of the Atlantic slave trade: a synthesis', *Journal of African History* 23 (4) 1982, pp 473–501. The literature on the other slave trades and on internal slave use is conveniently summarised in Paul E Lovejoy, *Transformations in Slavery. A History of Slavery in Africa*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983.

² For West African examples of a widespread phenomenon in colonial Africa, see A I Asiwaju, 'Migrations as revolt: the example of the Ivory Coast and the Upper Volta before 1945', *Journal of African History*, 17 (4) 1976, pp 577–94.

³ For a timely recent synthesis of the substantial literature on the origins and contemporary character of African migrant labour, see Sharon Stichter, *Migrant Laborers*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, African Society Today series, 1985.

covered by the term 'exile'⁴—there are some five million refugees, using the word in its strictest official sense.⁵ On this count, one African in a hundred is a refugee and one-third of all the world's refugees are Africans.⁶

Used in the senses outlined above, 'exile' is a broad and imprecise term. This article concentrates on a narrow part of the spectrum of meaning, concerned as it is with the published articulation, particularly in 'creative' writing, of both the causes of exile and the actual experience of exile. At first sight, this level of analysis seems to fit well with a particularly common popular usage of the term 'exile'; exiles are often portrayed as *individuals* in voluntary or involuntary flight from perceived political, racial or economic oppression which itself may have an individual focus. Often, again, they are characterised as educated and creative, likely to be overtly political, sometimes politicians in the strict sense of the term. As such they may have the financial means, or social, business or intellectual contacts abroad that ease the impact of exile if not exactly making it enjoyable. The implied contrast is with the

⁴ Over and above the by now well-ensconced 'traditional' (ie up to a century old) migration of unskilled and semi-skilled labour, especially in Southern African mining, I am thinking here of the relatively recent—in any significant numbers—situation of individuals, often professional, skilled or semi-skilled, being forced by economic collapse in their own countries to seek work as 'economic refugees' in a neighbouring state or even Europe, the USA or the Middle East. Hence, for example, the exodus in the last decade of university lecturers, doctors, nurses, teachers etc as well as the unskilled, from Ghana to Nigeria, Liberia, Libya and East and Central Africa. This has as yet been little analysed in academic writing, but see, for example, Lynne Brydon, 'Ghanaian responses to the Nigerian expulsions of 1983', *African Affairs*, 84 (337) 1985, pp 561–85. Black African workers in Libya are referred to *en passant* in Chris Dunton, 'Africans in Libya', *West Africa* (London) 1 September 1986, pp 1820–2. For an evocative literary account of the economic exile's plight (a Ghanaian in Nigeria) see Anon, *99 Days in Agege: Yaw Brenya's Experience*, Accra: Gapo Publications, nd (1985?).

The situation of the African economic exile outside Africa is even less well explored, not least, perhaps, because of the illegal status of many of those concerned. Typically, though, such exiles work long hours, sometimes in two or three menial jobs at once, for low pay, often in the 'black' or semi-'black' economy.

⁵ For a useful discussion of changing terminology in the African context, see Richard Greenfield, 'The OAU and Africa's refugees', in Yassin El-Ayouty and I William Zartman (eds), *The OAU After Twenty Years*. New York: Praeger, Johns Hopkins International Studies Series, 1984, pp 209–47.

⁶ Refugee numbers in Africa are a matter of debate, partly because of definitional problems and censal inadequacies, partly because of the suspicion that some recipient countries have inflated refugee numbers with the aim of boosting inputs from the UNHCR. As with the slave trade, however, the numbers are so irrefutably mind-boggling that for our present purposes precision is an 'academic' question. For recent discussions, see Greenfield, 'OAU and Africa's refugees', esp Table 11.1; Gaim Kibread, *Reflections on the African Refugee Problem: A Critical Analysis of the Basic Assumptions*, Uppsala, Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, Research Report no 67, 1983, pp 9–10, 23–36; Aderanti Adepoju, 'The dimensions of the refugee problem in Africa', *African Affairs* 81 (322) 1982, pp 21–35; CIMADE, INODEP, and MINK, *Africa's Refugee Crisis*, London: Zed Books, 1986; Gaim Kibread, *African Refugees: Reflections on the African Refugee Problem*, Trenton, NJ: Africa World Press, 1985.

'refugee' proper, still too often caricatured as a passive, faceless, inarticulate, skill-less individual, a member of a mass movement in almost lemming-like, barely comprehensible flight from disaster, oppression or 'instability', the causes of which are crudely defined, if at all.⁷

The dichotomy between 'exiles' as individuals and major 'refugee flows' is not, however, as clear-cut as this conventional wisdom implies. This is perhaps most obvious in the case of Southern Africa where the links between the systematic oppression of individuals and mass flight are too painfully plain. The causes of the numerically much more substantial dislocations of population elsewhere in Africa are diverse and have not received as much scholarly attention as they deserve, but they are also far from mysterious. Nor are they discrete, indeed they are often mutually reinforcing: political repression, lack of popular participation in decision-making, the ravages of undisciplined military and police forces, ethnic and regional conflict, secessionist movements, gross economic inequality, neo-colonial economic dependency, poorly planned economic transformation and sheer economic collapse, natural disasters such as drought and famine; all these interact to produce refugee situations.

Recently much more emphasis has begun to be placed—particularly by radical academics—on analysing these causes (as is unavoidable in the case of Southern Africa) in terms of the identifiable policies and responses of governments, rather than dumping them 'into one residual category that refers only, for example, to ambiguous "strains" faced by African states as they pass through the nation-building, modernizing stage of development.'⁸ Political scientists have, in other words, moved on from conceptualising African politics in terms of modernisation and institutional analysis, and there is also disillusionment with dependency theories that are mechanistic and take too little account of the options—however limited—that are open *within* Africa. They have, in a word, discovered (or rediscovered) the personal element in African

⁷ The caricature is not, sadly, solely the product of the mass media. Those responsible for 'aid' and 'resettlement' of refugees have often unquestioningly accepted or actively propagated the view of refugees as faceless groups *for* whom and *to* whom things are done, rather than collections of individuals with the broad range of usable skills and experience that are to be found in any community. This is, of course, but one aspect of the wider 'Western expert'-'untutored native' syndrome. For a critique of aid to refugees that develops these points, see Barbara E Harrell-Bond, *Imposing Aid. Emergency Aid to Refugees*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986.

⁸ Greenfield, 'OAU and Africa's refugees', p 216.

politics. Yet their professional proclivity to seek out regularities and isolate structural features still tends to leave them ill-equipped to put across the sheer bloody-mindedness of unshackled rulers.⁹ African creative writers—despite the clear limitations of range of experience that they have drawn upon—do offer an otherwise inaccessible dimension of understanding.

The bibliography

To categorise a writer as an exile is a somewhat arbitrary procedure and a word, however inadequate, should be said about the criteria used here. Many African writers—like African intellectuals and professionals in general—have spent extended periods abroad seeking education, particularly in their youth. Consequently, a large number of writers have produced at least one work with the theme 'African student abroad—encounters with racism—involvement with (white) women—loneliness—return home—disillusionment with political system/clash with traditional values . . .'. Such works have generally not found a place in this bibliography, which concentrates on the sort of exile that is caused by blatant oppression or persecution, the fear of this, or the fear that return will bring it down on the exile's head. This leaves us with a residual category of writers who also do not appear in this bibliography: those who have decided to remain outside their homes for extended periods for reasons—leaving aside education—other than real or perceived persecution.¹⁰

Exiles do not necessarily write overtly *about* the exile experience; it is for the literary critic or even the psychiatrist to decide the extent to which they may do so at a deeper, less overt level. For many, though, the exile experience is an unambiguous theme. Even more write about the sort of social and political phenomena that may cause exile, as do

⁹ For a recent general study that clearly analyses the character of personal rule in Africa and yet falls into the trap of over-rigid categorisation in the allocation of the ideal types listed in its sub-title, see Robert H Jackson and Carl G Rosberg, *Personal Rule in Black Africa: Prince, Autocrat, Prophet, Tyrant*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1982. For a contrasting approach, see Samuel Decalo, 'African personal dictatorships', *Journal of Modern African Studies*, 23 (2) pp 209–38.

¹⁰ It should be emphasised that the boundaries between these categories are extremely porous, and demarcating them is ultimately a more than usually subjective process. In the 'residual category' I would include, for example, two prolific novelists who have chosen to live for extended periods outside their home countries: the Nigerian, Buchi Emecheta and the Ghanaian, Ayi Kwei Armah. Armah, according to Robert Fraser (*The Novels of Ayi Kwei Armah*, London: Heinemann, 1981, p 10), 'strongly denies that [his sojourn abroad] represents any form of exile'.

many non-exiles. Hence the additional concern of this bibliography with exploring creative writers' responses to what, for want of a better term, we have labelled 'dictatorship'.

Finally, it should be noted that the term 'exile' has not been used rigidly here. It is contended that imprisonment for the writer—as for the 'ordinary' individual—represents a form of exile as do such practices as the banning of individual work, censorship or overall bans on publication by a specified individual.

The bibliography that follows is in three parts. The first is a check-list—with brief biographical and bibliographical details relevant to our themes—of major African writers who have experienced exile, have been otherwise affected by significant censorship or repression, or who have written works with the themes of 'dictatorship' and political repression. The second part is an additional bibliography concerned with these themes; it contains works by lesser-known authors or those about whom more detailed information is difficult to obtain. The third part consists of secondary material on the effects of exile and dictatorship on literary work in Africa.

Check-list of major authors

ABRAHAMS, Peter, b. 1919, Vrededorp, nr Johannesburg, South Africa

Classified as 'Coloured' in South Africa, Abrahams voluntarily left South Africa in 1939 feeling the 'need to write, to tell freedom and for this I needed to be personally free' (*Tell Freedom*, 1954, p 370). He worked first as a seaman and then, after settling in London, as a journalist while continuing to write books. He returned to South Africa briefly on a journalistic assignment in 1952; his horrified account of how apartheid had become entrenched in the years he had been away is *Return to Goli* (London: Faber, 1953). In the mid-1950s he spent some time in Ghana; his novel, *A Wreath for Udomo* (London: Faber, 1956) is a pioneer examination of the political changes wrought by independence that reflects this experience, as well as portraying exile African politics in London. Many of Abrahams's novels—*Dark Testament* (short stories) (London: Allen and Unwin, 1942); *Song of the City* (London: Crisp, 1945); *Mine Boy* (London: Crisp, 1946, Heinemann, 1963); *The Path of Thunder* (New York: Harper, 1948); *Tell Freedom* (autobiographical novel) (London: Faber, 1954); *A Night of Their Own* (London: Faber, 1965)—deal with aspects of the

oppression of non-whites in South Africa, and their response. *Wild Conquest* (New York: Harper, 1950) is a novel about the Afrikaners' Great Trek in the 1830s. In 1957 Abrahams moved from London to Jamaica, where he now lives. His writings are banned in South Africa.

BADIAN, Seydou, b. 1928, Bamako, Mali

After studying medicine in France, where he wrote his first novel (published 1956), Badian returned to Mali in 1955. In 1962 he became a minister in the Modibo Keita government and published his play *La mort de Chaka* (Paris: Présence Africaine). He left politics to return to medicine in 1965 but was arrested in 1968 when Keita was overthrown. He was imprisoned in a remote part of Mali, where he wrote his novel *Le sang des masques* (Paris: Laffont, 1975) and was not released until 1975. He now lives in Dakar, Senegal. Apart from his fictional work, Badian has published a book on African socialism, *Les dirigeants africains face à leur peuple* (Paris: Cahiers libres, 1965).

BETI, Mongo (pseudonym of Alexandre Biyidi), b. 1930, nr Yaoundé, Cameroon

After secondary education in Cameroon, Mongo Beti went to France to study at the University of Aix-en-Provence and the Sorbonne and now teaches in a lycée. He last visited Cameroon in 1959, shortly before independence. An avowed Marxist, he is a supporter of the radical Union des Populations du Cameroun (UPC) which was banned by the French but continued to wage guerrilla warfare against the first independence government of Amadou Ahidjo into the 1960s. His first novel (written under the pseudonym, Eza Boto), *Ville cruelle* was published in 1954 (Paris: Les Editions Africaines; reissued Paris: Présence Africaine, 1972) and deals with the experience of rural Africans in the European-owned logging industry. His first three novels written under the pseudonym Mongo Beti were all written before Cameroon's independence and are satirical studies of the idiocies and cruelties of colonial rule: *Le pauvre Christ de Bomba* (Paris: Laffont, 1956; Eng. edn, *The Poor Christ of Bomba*, London: Heinemann 1971)—banned in Cameroon on publication; *Mission terminée* (Paris: Corrêa, 1957; English editions, *Mission Accomplished*, London: Muller, 1958, *Mission to Kala*, London: Heinemann, 1964); *Le roi miraculé: chronique des Essazam* (Paris: Corrêa, 1958; English edition, *King Lazarus*, London: Muller, 1960; Heinemann, 1970). On 25 June 1972 the Paris house, Maspero published *Main basse sur le Cameroun*.

Autopsie d'une décolonisation, Beti's study of neo-colonialism and political repression in Ahidjo's Cameroon. On 30 June the book's sale was banned by the French government and all copies were seized under a nineteenth-century law (revised in 1939) that allowed the suppression of works 'de provenance étrangère'. After lengthy litigation that centred on Beti's nationality—he had held a French passport since the 1950s but its validity was contested—rather than questions of freedom of speech, the ban on *Main basse* was lifted in 1977 and the book was reissued by Maspero with a new introduction by Beti. Meanwhile the ban had encouraged him to write two novels that he has described as laying bare the truth about decolonisation in Cameroon, *Remember Ruben* (original French title, Paris: Union Générale d'Éditions, 1974; English edition, Heinemann, 1980) and *Perpetue et l'habitude du malheur* (Paris: Buchet-Chastel, 1974; English edition, *Perpetua and the Habit of Unhappiness*, London: Heinemann, 1978). These novels, dealing respectively with the UPC struggle just before independence and the impact on individuals of authoritarian rule have been followed by *La ruine presque cocasse d'un polichinelle* (Paris: Editions des Peuples Noirs, 1979—Beti's own publishing house) which takes the opposition theme of *Remember Ruben* into independence. Beti—whose novels are banned in Cameroon—is explicit about the political role he prescribes for the African novelist: 'In Europe writing has been the pretext of sophisticated uselessness, of gratuitous vulgarity, whereas in our land it can ruin tyrants, save children from massacres, tear a whole people away from ageless slavery, in a word, serve.'

BREYTENBACH, Breyten, b. 1939, South Africa

An Afrikaner poet, painter and prose writer, Breytenbach's marriage in Paris to a Vietnamese woman in 1961 turned a sojourn in Europe since 1959 into permanent exile because of South Africa's laws against mixed-race marriages. In 1964 he was refused a visa for his wife to accompany him to Johannesburg to receive a major literary prize awarded for his poetry but in 1972 he was allowed to visit South Africa for three months with her, a stay chronicled in *A Season in Paradise* (English editions, London: Cape, 1980; Faber, 1985). Increasingly involved in Paris in opposition to apartheid, Breytenbach returned to South Africa in 1975 with a false identity in a quixotic attempt to organise white opposition. After being followed by security police for nineteen days, he was arrested, charged with 'terrorism' and sentenced to nine years' imprisonment. Further bizarre charges were brought

while he was imprisoned on Robben Island; he had allegedly contravened the Riotous Assemblies Act by talking to his warder; he had planned a Soviet submarine attack on Robben Island. Only a charge of smuggling out letters and poems stuck. Released after French government pressure in December 1982, Breytenbach returned to Paris. His lengthy account of the 1975 visit and his prison experiences appears in *The True Confessions of an Albino Terrorist* (London: Faber, 1984). His book *Mouir. Mirrornotes of a Novel* (first published in French, Paris: Stock, 1983; English edition, London: Faber, 1984) was written in prison. The miscellaneous writings collected in his *End Papers: Essays, Letters, Articles of Faith, Workbook Notes* (London: Faber, 1986) are concerned with exile, imprisonment, dissidence, the responsibility of the writer and the South African situation. 'Nearly all South African writing,' Breytenbach remarks in this work, 'reflects varying stages of exile and alienation' for in such a fundamentally divided society there can be no real cultural creativity.

BRUTUS, Dennis. b. 1924, Salisbury (Harare), Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe)

Brought up near Port Elizabeth, South Africa, the poet Dennis Brutus is classified as a 'Coloured' in South Africa. A graduate of Fort Hare University, he taught for ten years in Port Elizabeth but was dismissed in 1962 because of his political activities. He was arrested in early 1963 but released on bail and then 'banned'. When the 'No Trial' Act (allowing repeated 90-day detentions) was passed, Brutus moved to Swaziland but was refused a residence permit. Detained in Mozambique en route to an Olympic meeting in Munich which he was to address on apartheid, he was handed over to the South African police. Subsequently sentenced to eighteen months' imprisonment on Robben Island, he was freed in 1965. He was immediately issued with a banning order forbidding him to write anything—including poetry—intended for publication but in 1966 obtained a Rhodesian passport and was granted a one-way exit permit. He lived for a number of years in England and subsequently taught at universities in the USA. In 1981 his continued residence in the USA came under threat from the immigration authorities but after litigation and pressure from supporters he was given leave to stay in 1983.

Brutus's first collection of poems, *Sirens, Knuckles and Boots* (Ibadan: Mbari, 1963) was published while he was in prison. His second, *Letters to Martha and Other Poems from a South African Prison*

(London: Heinemann, 1969) contains many poems about his prison experiences. Other collections include *Thoughts Abroad*, written under the pseudonym, John Bruin (Austin, Texas: Troubadour Press, 1970); *A Simple Lust* (London: Heinemann, 1973); *Strains* (Austin, Texas: Troubadour Press, 1975) and *Stubborn Hope* (London: Heinemann, 1978) and contain poems that deal, among other things, with the themes of revolution and liberation and with the experience of exile. In South Africa he is listed as a 'prohibited immigrant' and his work is therefore banned there.

CARDOSO, António, b. 1933, Luanda, Angola

Active in opposition to Portuguese colonialism, Cardoso was arrested in 1961 and sentenced to fourteen years' imprisonment in Cape Verde. His published collections of poems include *21 Poemas de Cadeia* (Luanda: Uniao do Escritores Angolanas, 1979) which were written in prison between 1970 and 1973.

CRAVEIRINHA, José, b. 1922, Lourenço Marques, Mozambique

A poet and journalist, Craveirinha's collection *Cela I* includes poems written while in prison.

FARAH, Nuruddin, b. 1945, Baidoa, Somalia

Farah studied in India in the 1960s before teaching in Mogadishu for four years. He left Somalia in 1974 and has not returned. Between 1974 and 1976 he studied in England and then moved to Rome where he wrote his third novel, *Sweet and Sour Milk* (London: Allison and Busby, 1979; Heinemann, 1980). This and two other novels, *Sardines* (London: Allison and Busby, 1981; Heinemann 1982) and *Close Sesame* (London: Allison and Busby, 1983) form a trilogy which Farah calls *Variations on the Theme of an African Dictatorship*. Explorations of personal relationships against the background of a critical portrayal of an African dictatorship that is undisguisedly Siad Barre's Somalia, Farah's trilogy is not available in Somalia. His most recent novel, *Maps* (London: Pan, 1986) is set in the context of the Western Somali Liberation Front's struggle for the Ogaden.

HEAD, Bessie, 1937-86, b. Pietermaritzburg, South Africa

The child of a white mother and a black father, South Africa's racial psychosis meant that Bessie Head was brought up in an orphanage. She left South Africa on a one-way exit permit in 1964 and spent most of the

rest of her life in the village of Serowe in Botswana. She was granted Botswanan citizenship in 1979. The themes of exile and alienation are central to her novels. *When Rainclouds Gather* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1968; London: Gollancz, 1971, Heinemann, 1972) is the story of a black South African nationalist who, after two years' imprisonment, flees to Botswana where he works with an English agriculturalist on village development; *Maru* (London: Gollancz, 1971, Heinemann, 1972) explores the experience of an 'untouchable' Masarwa (Bushman) woman educated to hold her head high in the Bantu society that despises her; *A Question of Power* (London: Davis-Poynter, 1974, Heinemann, 1974) is a harrowing, essentially autobiographical exploration of the life of an exile on the edge of sanity. In her non-fiction work, *Serowe: The Village of the Rainwind* (London: Heinemann, 1983) she chronicles the past and present of her adopted home.

HUTCHINSON, Alfred, 1924-72, b. Hectorspruit, South Africa
A Swazi with one English grandfather, Hutchinson was one of the defendants in the 1956 treason trials. Temporarily freed when the first indictment failed, he fled without a passport through Africa to Ghana, an escape to exile chronicled in *Road to Ghana* (London: Gollancz, 1960). He lived in England where he taught and wrote plays. In 1971 he moved to Nigeria to teach, and died there in 1972. His friend the poet Dennis Brutus wrote of him that 'the pressures of ghetto existence in South Africa, and the agonies and anxieties of exile prevented his talent from coming to full fruition. He is one of the long list of talented black writers driven into exile by the inhumanities of apartheid, and doomed to die there.'

KAYIRA, Legson, b. 1940, Malawi
Kayira's autobiography, *I Will Try* (London: Longmans, 1965) recounts his walk across Africa *en route* to America in search of education. He lives in England, and his fifth novel, *The Detainee* (London: Heinemann, 1974) portrays the way in which the lives of ordinary non-political individuals can be entrapped in the tentacles of an authoritarian state that is recognisably Kamuzu Banda's Malawi.

KGOSITSILE, Keorapetse, b. 1938, South Africa
A poet, Kgositile left South Africa in about 1960 to work for *Spearhead* magazine in Tanzania and then moved to the United States in 1962.

where he studied at several universities. He returned to Tanzania in 1975 to teach at the University of Dar es Salaam. His collections include *Spirits Unchained* (Detroit: Broadside Press, 1969); *For Melba* (Chicago: Third World Press, 1970); *My Name is Afrika* (New York: Doubleday, 1971); *The Present is a Dangerous Place to Live In* (Chicago: Third World Press, 1974); *Herzpuren* (Kirchberg: Federal Republic of Germany: Schwiftinger, 1981).

KUNENE, Mazisi (Raymond) b. 1930, Durban, South Africa

A poet and a student of Zulu literature who studied at Natal University, Kunene left South Africa in the early 1960s, studied at the School of Oriental and African Studies in London and was an official of the African National Congress there. He is a professor of African literature at the University of California, Los Angeles. His published work includes two epic poems, *Emperor Shaka the Great* (London: Heinemann, 1979) and *Anthem of the Decades* (London: Heinemann, 1981).

LA GUMA, Alex, 1925–85, b. District Six, Cape Town, South Africa
Classified as a 'Coloured' in South Africa, La Guma was a member of the South African Communist Party in the 1950s and a defendant in the 1956 Treason Trial. While working as a journalist, he was detained for five months in 1960 for being an executive member of the Coloured People's Congress. In 1962 he was sentenced to five years' house arrest and before it elapsed was arrested under the 'No Trial' Act. On release on bail La Guma was charged with possessing banned literature and again put under house arrest. In 1966 he was allowed to go into exile, lived for a number of years in London and then became the African National Congress representative in Cuba, where he died in 1985. His novella, *A Walk in the Night* (Ibadan: Mbari, 1962; republished with other stories by Heinemann, 1967) deals with life in a Coloured ghetto of Cape Town as does *And a Threefold Cord* (Berlin [GDR]: Seven Seas Books, 1964) which was written while he was under house arrest. *The Stone Country* (Berlin [GDR]: Seven Seas Books, 1967; Heinemann, 1974) is 'Dedicated to the daily average of 70,351 prisoners in South African gaols in 1964' and draws graphically on La Guma's experience of imprisonment. *In the Fog of the Season's End* (London: Heinemann, 1972) is a novel about the activist struggle in South Africa, and *Time of the Butcherbird* (London: Heinemann, 1979) takes up the theme of 'removals' of black Africans to the Bantustans.

LAYE, Camara, 1928–80, b. Kouroussa, Guinea

Camara Laye trained as an engineer in Paris where, at a time of extreme loneliness and penury, he wrote as a relief from the misery of exile, an autobiographical novel, *L'enfant noir* (Paris: Plon, 1953; English edition, *The African Child*, Glasgow: Collins, 1955). His second novel, *Le regard du roi* was published in 1954 (Paris: Plon; English edition, *The Radiance of the King*, Glasgow: Collins, 1956). In 1956 Laye returned to Guinea and in 1958 when the country became independent he was appointed to a post in the Ministry of Information. Disillusioned with Sekou Touré's government, in 1964 he fled to Ivory Coast and then to Dakar, Senegal where he died in 1980. His novel *Dramouss* (Paris: Plon, 1966; English edition, *A Dream of Africa*, London: Collins, 1970) is about an African dictatorship, transparently Guinea, and satirises Sekou Touré as 'Big Brute'. In an interview published in 1980, Laye accused Touré of having destroyed 'a society which is 1000 years old . . . replacing it with the worst aspects of Russia and Hitler's Germany. Before him, we did not have concentration camps, dictatorships and torture . . . I do not say that I want colonialism back. But I don't want black people in its place who destroy our liberty.'

MAIMANE, Arthur, b. 1932, South Africa

Maimane worked a journalist on *Drum* magazine in the 1950s. In 1958 he left South Africa, worked as a Reuter's correspondent in East Africa, lived briefly in Ghana and then moved to London. He has published short stories and a play, and his novel, *Victims* (London: Allison and Busby, 1976) deals with the impact of apartheid on personal relations between blacks and whites.

MAKOUTA-MBOUKOU, Jean-Pierre, b. 1929, Kindomba, Congo (Brazzaville)

A novelist, poet and literary critic, Makouta-Mboukou was educated at the University of Grenoble, taught in Cameroon and was a Congolese member of parliament between 1963 and 1968. His 1970 novel, *En quête de la liberté* (Yaoundé: CLE), deals with the return home after fifteen years in France of a Congolese whose outspoken criticisms of the political system ruin his political career and force him into exile. The novel was banned in Congo and Makouta-Mboukou voluntarily exiled himself to France to resume his teaching career. His fourth novel, *Les exiles de la forêt vierge ou le grand complôt* (Paris: Oswald, 1974, L'Harmattan, 1981) tells of a condemned poet in an imaginary African

republic who flees to the forest to escape death. Years later the forest becomes the scene of a reconciliation between him and the president—now deposed and himself forced into exile—who had ordered his death.

MARECHERA, Dambudzo, b. 1955, Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) Expelled from the University of Rhodesia, where he was involved in student protest against the Smith regime, Marechera came to England to take up a scholarship at the University of Oxford. Sent down after refusing to undergo psychiatric treatment, he lived a virtually vagrant life while writing his first book—a collection of stories—*The House of Hunger* (London: Heinemann, 1978). Its initial impulse was the feeling that he had lost everything: 'There I was in exile, seemingly no future, no nothing. I started asking myself what had happened to most of my generation, like those at the University of Rhodesia, who had been expelled with me, or jailed and detained, and those who gone to join the guerrillas. We had all been so scattered.' Marechera's second book, *Black Sunlight* (London: Heinemann) was published in 1981; Marechera returned to Zimbabwe in 1982 to find that it had been banned, a measure later lifted. His third book, *Mindblast* was published in Zimbabwe in 1984.

MATSHIKIZA, Todd, 1922–68, b. South Africa

Educated at the Lovedale Institute, Matshikiza wrote a column in *Drum* magazine in the 1950s and was a talented musician, writing the music for the black musical *King Kong*, which took London by storm in 1960. He told Anthony Sampson, who had been his editor on *Drum*, that there were many things about the South African system that he could have written a book about, but they made him so angry that he preferred to forget them and concentrate on his music. His spirits were lifted sufficiently by his visit to London in 1960 to encourage him to write a scintillatingly humorous account of it in *Chocolates for My Wife: Slices of My Life* (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1961). In 1965 he collaborated with Alan Paton on another musical, *Mkhumbane*, which was staged in South Africa. He then exiled himself to work for Radio Malawi, later moving to Radio Zambia in Lusaka, where he died in 1968.

MPHAHLELE, Es'kia (Ezekiel), b. 1919, Pretoria, South Africa

Mphahlele trained as a teacher but was banned from the occupation because of his outspoken opposition to the Bantu Education Act. He

worked on *Drum* magazine in the early 1950s while studying for external degrees. In 1957 he left South Africa for Nigeria, where he taught at the University of Ibadan. In the 1960s he worked in France, Kenya and Zambia and in 1970 went to the United States where he taught in various universities until 1977. Feeling disillusioned with his contribution to American culture and education he then decided to return to South Africa, a decision that has brought severe criticism from some of his fellow exiles. His first appointment at the black University of the North was vetoed and he became a schools inspector until his appointment to a post at the African Studies Institute at Witwatersrand University. Mphahlele's publications include an autobiography, *Down Second Avenue* (London: Faber, 1959) which gives the background to his decision to exile himself from South Africa; essays in literary criticism, *Voices in the Whirlwind and Other Essays* (London: Macmillan, 1973) and *The African Image* (London: Faber, 1962, new and revised edition, 1974); and two novels. Both novels explore the theme of exile: *The Wanderers* (New York: Macmillan, 1971; London: Macmillan, 1972) draws extensively on his own exile experience in West and East Africa, and *Chirundu* (Johannesburg: Ravan, 1979; London: Nelson, 1979), set in Zambia, is in part concerned with the fate of two black South African exiles whom political intrigue has consigned to jail; one of them concludes that a return to police custody and torture in South Africa are preferable to remaining abroad.

Since his return to South Africa the ban on Mphahlele's earlier writings has been lifted, and he has published a new autobiography, *Afrika My Music* (Johannesburg: Ravan Press, 1984) dealing mainly with the twenty years he was in exile. A biography, *Exiles and Homecomings: A Biography of Es'kia Mphahlele* (Johannesburg: Ravan Press, 1983) has been published by N Chabani Mangani and Mangani has also edited a collection of Mphahlele's letters, *Bury Me at the Marketplace: Selected Letters of Es'kia Mphahlele 1943-1980* (Johannesburg: Skotaville, 1984).

NGUGI wa Thiong'o, b. 1938, nr Limuru, Kenya

Educated at Makerere University College, Uganda and the University of Leeds, Ngugi published his first novel in 1964. He taught at University College, Nairobi, at Makerere and in the US, and in December 1977 when he was detained by the Kenya government he was head of the Department of Literature at the University of Nairobi. A committed critic of what he sees as neo-colonialism and the exploitation

of workers and peasants by a comprador bourgeoisie in Kenya, Ngugi moved on in his novels from settings in the colonial period to a penetrating critique of independent Kenya in *Petals of Blood* (London: Heinemann, 1977). This novel may in itself have upset members of Kenyatta's government but it appears to have been Ngugi's role in community activism and self-help in the village of Kamiriithu that led directly to his detention. In October 1977 the villagers gave a public performance of a play Ngugi had written with Ngugi wa Mirii, *Ngaahika Ndeenda* ('I Will Marry When I Want') which examined the history and contemporary conditions of the peasantry and openly anatomised class exploitation; in December further performances were banned and soon after Ngugi was arrested. Detained for almost a year, he was not charged or offered any explanation for his incarceration. *Detained: A Writer's Prison Diary* (London: Heinemann, 1981) integrates an account of his imprisonment with reflections on Kenya's continued cultural and political dependency. While in prison Ngugi wrote—on secreted toilet paper—a novel in Gikuyu, *Caitani Mutharaba-ini* which when published in 1980 (Nairobi: Heinemann) went through three printings. It was translated by Ngugi himself as *Devil on the Cross* (London: Heinemann, 1981). Ngugi was not allowed to resume his post at the University of Nairobi when he was released, and went into exile. His recent publications include *Barrel of a Pen: Resistance to Repression in Neo-colonial Kenya* (London and Port of Spain: New Beacon, 1983) which deals in part with intensified manifestations of political repression in Kenya, including the physical destruction by armed police of the open-air theatre that Ngugi had helped build at Kamiriithu.

NKOSI, Lewis, b. 1936, South Africa

In 1955 Nkosi became a journalist, working on *Ilanga lase Natal* (Natal Sun) and then on *Drum* magazine. In 1961 he was granted a one-way exit permit and went to the USA to study journalism. He has lived in London, working as a journalist and writer and is currently a Professor in the Department of Literature, University of Zambia. His two collections of essays, *Home and Exile* (London: Longmans, Green, 1965) and *Tasks and Masks* (Harlow: Longman, 1981) contain evocative studies of life in South Africa in the 1950s, experiences in New York, and penetrating examinations of state censorship in South Africa and of the work of Nkosi's fellow South African writers. His first novel, *Mating Birds*, which explores a disastrous black-white sexual encounter

in South Africa through the thoughts of the black participant, was published in 1986 (London: Constable).

NORTJE, Arthur, 1924-70, b. Oudtshoorn, South Africa

Described by Dennis Brutus as 'perhaps the best South African poet of our time', Nortje, a 'Coloured' was educated at Belleville College and then at the University of Oxford where he graduated in 1967. He taught in Canada and then returned to Oxford where he committed suicide in 1970. His poetry is collected in *Dead Roots* (London: Heinemann, 1973). Nadine Gordimer has written of him, quoting three of his lines, 'In the end he who has to make do with the crumbs from the white man's table at home may find no stomach left for Europe's bounty. "I drag my shunken corpulence/among the tables of rich libraries/Famous viands tasted like ash . . ." These are the terrors of exile for a writer; and the extinction of literature.'

OUSMANE, Sembene, b. 1923, Senegal

A film-maker and novelist, Ousmane is no stranger to censorship. His film, *Emitai* (1971) which depicted resistance to French military recruiting in the 1940s was almost banned in Senegal, apparently in part because of French pressure; *Xala* (1974) was shown in Senegal in a heavily cut version; and *Ceddo* (1977) on the controversial theme of animist resistance to Islamic proselytism, was banned in Senegal, ostensibly because of President Senghor's objection to the orthography of its title. Ousmane's 1981 novel, *Le dernier de l'empire* (Paris: L'Harmattan; Eng. edn, *The Last of the Empire*, London: Heinemann, 1983) is about political manoeuvrings in a guided democracy, clearly Senegal, whose octogenarian president has disappeared.

PHILOMBE, René (pseudonym of Philippe-Louis Ombede), b. 1930, Cameroon

A prolific Cameroonian poet, short-story writer and novelist, Philombe has been repeatedly arrested, released and re-arrested since 1960 because of his support for the Union des Populations du Cameroun. His poems, *Choc-anti-choc* (Yaoundé: Ed. Semences Africaines, 1978) were written while in prison in 1960. His play, *Africapolis* (Yaoundé: Editions Semences Africaines, 1978) is concerned with dictatorship, symbolised by the despotic King Ekamtid.

SEPAMLA, Siphon, b. 1932, Krugersdorp, South Africa

A trained teacher, Sepamla published three volumes of poetry in the 1970s, one of which, *The Soweto I Love* (Cape Town: Philip, 1977; London Rex Collings, 1978) was banned on publication. He has also written two novels, one of which, *A Ride on the Whirlwind* (Johannesburg: Donker, 1981; London: Heinemann, 1984), deals with the June 1976 Soweto riots, is also banned in South Africa. After having three applications for a passport turned down, Sepamla was eventually allowed to travel to the Frankfurt Book Fair in 1980 after pressure from the West German government. He held a writer's fellowship at Iowa University in 1981-2, then returning to South Africa where he is director of Johannesburg's Federated Union of Black Arts Centres.

SEROTE, Mongana, b. 1944, Sophiatown, South Africa

A poet and novelist, Serote was detained in solitary confinement for nine months in 1969, then released without charge. His second volume of poems, *Tsetlo* (Johannesburg: Donker, 1974) was banned in South Africa. His first novel, *To Every Birth its Blood* was published in 1981 (Johannesburg: Ravan, London: Heinemann, 1983). A Fulbright Scholar at Columbia University, he graduated in 1979 and since then has lived in exile in Gaborone, Botswana.

SOYINKA, Wole, b. 1934, Abeokuta, Nigeria

A prolific playwright, poet and novelist, Soyinka remarked in February 1967 that 'in new societies which begin the seductive experiment in authoritarianism, it has become a familiar experience to watch society crush the writer under a load of guilt for his daring to express a sensibility and an outlook apart from, and independent of, the mass direction.' In August, with the Nigerian Civil War in full spate, Soyinka was arrested for alleged pro-Biafra activities: what was apparently in fact an attempt to instigate peace talks. Detained in Kaduna until October 1969, Soyinka described his prison experiences in *The Man Died* (London: Rex Collings, 1972, Penguin, 1975). Two of his poems were smuggled out of prison and were published as a pamphlet (*Poems from Prison*, London: Rex Collings, 1969). They were later included in a larger collection of poems written in prison (*A Shuttle in the Crypt*, London: Rex Collings, 1971). In 1972 opposition to the military government led him to resign his post at the University of Ibadan and go into voluntary exile. He returned in 1976 after General

Gowon was ousted and is now head of the Department of Comparative Literature at the University of Ife. Soyinka's concern with the political and social responsibility of the 'intellectual' is implicit in much of his writing, as is the theme of political repression, corruption and injustice. His 1973 novel, *A Season of Anomy* (London: Rex Collings), for example, appears to be an allegory of Nigeria's experiences under authoritarian civilian and military governments. Two of his plays explicitly consider personal rule in Africa. *Kongi's Harvest* (London: Oxford University Press, 1965) is a portrayal of an African dictator and the excesses and personality cult that surround him; *A Play of Giants* (London: Methuen, 1984) concerns four African dictators, explicitly modelled on Idi Amin Dada, Jean-Bédél Bokassa, Mobutu Sese Seko and Francisco Macías Nguema, who have sought refuge together.

TCHICAYA U Tamsi, b. 1931, Mpili, Congo

One of Africa's most prolific poets, Tchicaya has spent most of his life in Paris; he settled there after accompanying his father, a Deputy to the National Assembly, in 1946. He has, however, frequently returned to Congo and travelled widely elsewhere in Africa. For the English reader Tchicaya's poems are most accessible in *Selected Poems* (tr. Gerald Moore, London: Heinemann, 1970). Moore writes that the 'tension between childhood memories of Africa and everyday mundane experience in an alien capital, between his passionate presence in the suffering Congo and his physical absence from it, is one of the dominating themes of his poetry.' Tchicaya's novel, *Le destin glorieux du Maréchal Nnikon Nniku, Prince qu'on sort: comédie—farce-sinistre en trois plans* (Paris: Présence Africaine, 1979) deals with the decline and fall of a dictator, Nnikon Nniku, the mentor of the 'Philosophy of Regression'.

THEMBA, Can, 1924–69, b. Pretoria, South Africa

A graduate of the University of Fort Hare (1947), Themba was a teacher and then wrote for *Drum* magazine and the *Golden City Post*. In 1963 he went into voluntary exile in Swaziland where he resumed teaching. He died there in 1969. A selection of his stories and press pieces—all of which are banned in South Africa—is to be found in *The Will to Die* (London: Heinemann, 1972).

VIEIRA, Luandino, b. 1935, Portugal

Vieira was taken to Angola at an early age. An active MPLA member, at

the age of twenty-six he was arrested for divulging information about Portuguese deserters in Angola to a BBC interviewer. He was sentenced to fourteen years' imprisonment and served eleven, mainly in Cape Verde. Released in 1972, on condition that he lived in Lisbon for five years, the 1974 Portuguese coup allowed him to return to Angola. His stories, *Luuanda* (Luanda: ABC, 1963; English edition, London: Heinemann 1980) written in prison were awarded a prize by the Sociedade Portuguesa de Escritores, a decision that led the Portuguese government to close down the society. His novel, *The Real Life of Domingos Xavier* (first edition in French, Paris: Présence Africaine, 1971; English edition, London: Heinemann, 1978) written in 1961, is the story of a truck-driver, an MPLA activist, who is arrested by the Portuguese, tortured and dies in prison.

Lesser-known authors

Awoonor, Kofi A Ghanaian poet, novelist and critic, his collection *The House by the Sea* (New York: Greenfield Review Press, 1978) contains poems written during the year in which he was imprisoned by the Ghanaian military government (1975-76), an experience that is also the subject of an as yet unpublished manuscript.

Bangui, Antoine *Prisonnier de Tombalbaye*, Paris: Hatier, 1980. Account by a former minister in Tombalbaye's Chad of his three years' imprisonment.

Bernstein, Hilda A South African activist exiled in Britain since 1964, she has written a number of non-fiction works on the South African freedom struggle and two novels, one of which, *Death Is Part of the Process* (London: Sinclair Browne, 1983) is concerned with the ANC sabotage campaign of the early 1960s.

Dogbé, Yves-Emmanuel *L'Incarcéré*, Paris: Akpagnon, 1980. A Togolese educationalist, now living in exile in Paris, Dogbé was imprisoned for six months in 1977 for preparing a paper for the 1977 FESTAC critical of President Eyadama's *authenticité* policy. For an extract from *L'Incarcéré*, a novel based on this experience, see 'The prisoner', *Index on Censorship*, 9 (3) 1980, pp 28-32.

Donkouré, Abdoul Donkouré is a Cameroonian writer whose novel *Le déboussolé* (Sherbrooke, Canada: Naaman, 1978) concerns an African student forced to flee his home country after being accused of organising strikes at the university. He ends up in Paris and becomes

involved in the 'counter-culture' practised by a young Frenchman he befriends.

Fantouré, Alioum The pseudonym of a Guinean author in exile in France. His novel, *Le Cercle des tropiques*, (Paris: Présence Africaine, 1972; Eng. edn, *Tropical Circle*, Harlow: Longman, 1981) which won the Grand Prix Littéraire d'Afrique Noire in 1973 describes the struggle for independence in an African state, after which a reign of terror begins as the personality cult of 'Messiahkoism', named after the 'divine leader', sweeps the land. His 1976 novel, *Le récit du cirque* (Paris: Buchet/Chastel) is a play within a novel. 'A captive audience locked literally into a theatre becomes gradually involved in the devastating spectacle being acted out on stage, a "circus" of horror and suffering in an African dictatorship complete with political trials and concentration camps. There is no final curtain, only newsreel shots being projected on to a screen as the actors turn to watch the panic-stricken spectators seek an exit which is not there.' (Hans M Zell, Carol Bundy and Virginia Coulon (eds), *A New Reader's Guide to African Literature*, London: Heinemann, 1983, p 244.)

Kapuscinski, Ryszard *The Emperor*, London: Quartet, 1983. An evocative account of the last days of Emperor Haile Sellassie, apparently based on interviews with some of his retainers.

Karone, Yodi The pseudonym of a Cameroonian author. His novel, *Le bal des caïmans* (Paris: Karthala, 1980) deals with detentions, torture, public execution and false charges in an independent African country.

Kunene, Daniel P A South African poet and critic in exile in the USA. His collected poems are *Pirates Have Become Our Kings* (Nairobi: East African Publishing House, 1978); *A Seed Must Seem to Die* (Johannesburg: Ravan, 1981).

Madingoane, Ingoapele A South African poet, the first edition of his poems *Africa My Beginning* (Johannesburg: Ravan, 1979; London: Rex Collings, 1980) sold out immediately in Soweto and was subsequently banned in South Africa.

Ndao, Cheik Aliou Ndao is a Senegalese writer. His play, *L'Île de Bahila* (Paris: Présence Africaine, 1975) is about an island-state ruled by a dictator.

N'dumbe III, Alexandre Kuma A Cameroonian writer. His play *Le soleil de l'aurore* (Paris: Oswald, 1976) portrays an un-named African country to which independence has come under the leadership of a

puppet regime tied to the former colonial power which seeks to put down the authentic nationalist forces.

Nguza Karl I Bond *Mobutu ou l'incarnation du mal Zairois*, London: Rex Collings, 1982. Account of Mobutu's dictatorship and the author's escape from it. A former minister, the author has since returned to Zaire and to politics under Mobutu.

Osinya, Alumidi (pseudonym) *The Amazing Saga of Field Marshal Abdulla Salim Fisi (or How the Hyena Got His!)*, Nairobi: Joe Magazine/Transafrica Publications, 1976.

Pheto, Molefe *And Night Fell*, London: Allison and Busby, 1983, Heinemann, 1985. An account of Pheto's 281 days' detention, all but ten in solitary confinement, in South Africa in 1975. Apparently arrested for challenging apartheid in the arts, no charge was ever upheld against him.

Tansi, Sony Labou Born in 1947, the author works for the Ministry of Information in Brazzaville, Congo. Two of his novels deal with fantastic events in fictional African dictatorships: *La vie et demie* (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1979) and *L'état honteux* (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1981). His most recent novel, *Les sept solitudes de Lorsa Lopez* (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1985) concerns the citizens of 'Valancia', a city recently 'decapitalised' by the dictatorial central government.

Zwelonke, D M (pseudonym of Daniel Mdluli) A South African now living in exile who was formerly imprisoned on Robben Island. His novel, *Robben Island* (London: Heinemann, 1973), described by Lewis Nkosi as 'as factual as its name' draws on his horrifying experience. It is banned in South Africa.

Secondary works

Abdul-Hai, Muhammad *Conflict and Identity: The Cultural Poetics of Contemporary Sudanese Poetry*, Khartoum: Khartoum University Press, 1977. Includes a section entitled 'The emigré poets'.

Alata, Jean-Paul 'African prison', *Index on Censorship* 6 (2) 1977, pp 13-18. A former adviser of Sekou Touré in Guinea, Alata spent four-and-a-half years as a political prisoner there. In July 1975 he was released and went to France where in 1976. Editions du Seuil published his book *Prison d'Afrique, 5 ans dans les geôles de Guinée*. The French Interior Minister ordered its seizure under the same legislation that had banned Mongo Beti's *Main basse* (see above)—

born in France, Alata had taken Guinean citizenship. Republication of Alata's book was not allowed until 1983 (see also A Blancard, below).

Alvarez-Pereyre, Jacques *The Poetry of Commitment in South Africa*, London: Heinemann, 1984.

Anderson, Susan 'Something in me died: autobiographies of South African writers in exile', *Books Abroad* 44 (3) 1970, pp 398-404.

Araujo, Norman 'Flight and fidelity in Cape Verdean poetry before independence: the revolutionary phase', *Research in African Literatures* 13 (3) 1982, pp 308-14. Explores the tension in Cape Verdean literature between flight from poverty and drought and fidelity to people, place and the struggle for independence from Portuguese colonial rule.

Austin, Dennis 'The darkling plain: literature and politics', in Dennis Austin, *Politics in Africa*, Hanover, New Hampshire: University of New England Press, 1978, pp 123-48.

Awoonor, Kofi 'The writer and politics in Africa', in Robert W July and Peter Benson (eds), *African Cultural and Intellectual Leaders and the Development of the New African Nations*, New York: Rockefeller Foundation/Ibadan University Press, 1982, pp 184-95.

Beti, Mongo 'René Philombe', *Index on Censorship* 13 (1) 1984, pp 31-3. Discusses the persecution of his compatriot, a Cameroonian writer.

— 'Human rights hypocrisy', *Index on Censorship* 10 (6) 1981, pp 77-9. Attacks what he regards as the double standards of the French state and French people, contrasting their attitudes to human rights violations in their former colonies in Africa and in other parts of the world.

Binder, Ellen (compiler) *Censorship and Apartheid in Africa*, New York: PEN American Center, 1975.

Bisikisi, Tandundu E A 'My theatre is my freedom', *Index on Censorship* 14 (1) 1985, pp 20-2. A Zairian dramatist, now in exile, describes his arrest after writing a play criticising the national university.

Blancard, A 'Entretien avec Jean-Paul Alata', *Politique Africaine* 2 (7) 1982, pp 17-39.

Booth, James *Writers and Politics in Nigeria*, London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1981.

Breytenbach, Breyten 'I am not an Afrikaner any more', *Index on Censorship* 12 (3) 1983, pp 3-6.

- Brutus, Dennis 'Shall I be deported from the USA?' *Index on Censorship*, 12 (3) 1983, pp 13–16.
- Dameron, Charles 'Arthur Nortje: craftsman for his muse', in Christopher Heywood (ed), *Aspects of South African Literature*, London: Heinemann, 1970, pp 155–62.
- Demafouth, Jean-Jacques 'Landlocked and uninformed', *Index on Censorship* 14 (5) 1985, pp 22–3. Discusses media censorship in Central African Republic.
- Egudu, R N 'Pictures of pain: the poetry of Dennis Brutus' in Christopher Heywood (ed), *Aspects of South African Literature*, London: Heinemann, 1970.
- Elansari, Nour al-Din 'A tale of two brothers', *Index on Censorship* 14 (3) 1985. Experiences as a poet in exile from Morocco: 'There are many kinds of death for a writer, poet, or artist, but all of them are achieved by isolating him or her from their source of inspiration.'
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- *The Grey Ones: Essays on Censorship*, Johannesburg, Ravan, 1974. See especially the essay entitled 'Apartheid and censorship'.
- Grant, Jane 'Silenced generation', *Index on Censorship* 6 (3) 1977, pp 38–43. On censorship and exiled writers in South Africa. Her views on the impact of their having been a 'silenced generation' should be compared with those of Daniel P Kunene (see below).
- Gurr, Andrew *Writers in Exile. The Identity of Home in Modern Literature*, Brighton: Harvester Press, 1981. Includes general critical considerations, and a brief section on the work of Ngugi wa Thiong'o.
- Henderson, George 'Free to agree with Colonel Qaddafi', *Index on Censorship* 9 (3) 1980, pp 18–22. Murders of Libyan exiles by agents of Qaddafi.
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- Kabeba, Don 'Uganda: no censors needed', *Index on Censorship* 8 (2), pp 18-21. Repression of the press and writers under Idi Amin.
- Kunene, Daniel P 'Ideas under arrest: censorship in South Africa', *Research in African Literatures* 12 (4) 1981, pp 421-39. Censorship and exile; includes a consideration of the impact of the silencing of the older generation of South African writers, and the return home of Es'kia Mphahlele.
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- Lindfors, Bernth 'The African politician's changing image in African literature in English', *Journal of Developing Areas* (4) 1969, pp 13-28.
- Mattera, Don 'Out of the Twilight', *Index on Censorship*, 12 (3) 1983, pp 7-10. Mattera (b. 1935) is a South African writer who was banned between 1973 and 1982 and therefore forbidden to publish. For an extract from his unpublished autobiography, *Gone with the Twilight*, see 'Scenes from a banned life', *Index on Censorship* 7 (5) 1978, pp 3-8.
- Mezgebe, Alem 'Ethiopia—the deadly game', *Index on Censorship*, 7 (4) 1978, pp 16-20. An account by an Ethiopian writer, now in exile in England, of his experiences of censorship in Ethiopia both under the Emperor and after the revolution. Mezgebe's unpublished play, *Pulse*, about an African dictator, was a prizewinner when performed at the 1980 Edinburgh Festival.
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- Mphahlele, Ezekiel 'Censorship in South Africa', in Ezekiel Mphahlele, *Voices in the Whirlwind*, London: Macmillan, 1973.
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- Ngugi wa Thiong'o 'The culture of silence and fear', *South* (London), May 1984, p 38. Discusses cultural and political oppression in Kenya.

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- Nkosi, Lewis 'Fiction by Black South Africans', in G D Killam (ed), *African Writers on African Writing*, London: Heinemann, 1973.
- 'Southern Africa; protest and commitment', in Lewis Nkosi, *Tasks and Masks*, Harlow: Longman, 1981, pp 76–106.
- Ntuli, Pikita 'Sculptor in prison', *Index on Censorship* 9 (3) 1980, pp 33–7. A South African sculptor and poet, Ntuli had been living in exile in Swaziland since 1963 when he was arrested in 1978, apparently as a result of a split in the Pan-Africanist Congress, of which he was a member. Held as a prohibited immigrant pending asylum in a third country, he is now living in exile in England. For more on Ntuli and others imprisoned under these circumstances including D M Zwelonke (pseudonym for Daniel Mdluli), author of *Robben Island*, see *Index on Censorship* 8 (1) 1979, p 52.
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- Waidhura, Livingstone Njomo 'Clampdown on drama', *Index on*

Censorship 14 (1) 1985, pp 23–4. Discusses government censorship of the arts in Kenya.

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'Writers workshop: poems', *Index on Censorship* 14 (3) 1985, pp 34–6. Discusses censorship in Malawi, in the context of poetry.

Zerrika, Abdullah 'Profile Abdullah Zerrika', *Index on Censorship* 9 (3) 1980, pp 38–40. Profile of a Moroccan poet arrested in September 1978.

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THE UN SYSTEM

▲ World Food Council (wfc)

Twelfth Ministerial Session

Rome, 16-19 June 1986

■ Representatives of the Council's thirty-six member-countries, including sixteen ministers, welcomed the adoption by the UN General Assembly in May 1986 of the UN Programme of Action for African Economic Recovery and Development 1989-90.¹ According to the wfc's Executive Director, Maurice Williams, it was now for the Council to assist African governments to implement their mutually agreed priorities through specific measures. While the meeting noted improvements in Africa's situation in the last year, with the ending of the drought, it recognised that African countries would continue to need massive external aid and debt relief until economic recovery could be achieved through improved trade earnings. The Council declared its intention to promote political support for agricultural priorities as a means of translating the UN Programme into action.

The Council also discussed the potential for increased South-South cooperation in pursuit of food and agricultural goals, particularly in the light of recent Council-sponsored workshops in China and India. These had allowed African food policy experts to learn from Asia's successes in raising food production, through its 'green revolution'.²

▲ Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO)

Fourteenth Regional Conference for Africa

Yamoussoukro, Ivory Coast, 2-11 September 1986

■ Representatives from forty-nine African countries, including some thirty agriculture ministers, adopted a Programme of Action for African Agriculture, proposed by FAO Director-General, Edouard Saouma. The Programme was the first attempt to translate into practical measures the policy guidelines provided by the UN General Assembly Special Session on Africa in May 1986.³

The conference considered a FAO report, 'African agriculture: the next twenty-five years.' The two-year study forecast a future of recurrent famine for the continent, with food imports bankrupting even relatively prosperous African countries and leaving only four states able to feed themselves in twenty-five years time, unless certain steps were taken. These steps, outlined in Edouard Saouma's strategy, could reverse the long-term decline in food output, making Africa self-sufficient in food by the year 2010.

The Programme of Action, adopted unanimously, had four points:

- internal policy reforms by African governments, to give agriculture absolute priority;

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- improved incentives, inputs, institutions and infrastructure, 'the four Is'. These improvements entailed better use of land, improved processing, marketing, and distribution, and increased use of irrigation, fertilisers and pesticides;
- conservation of natural resources, with measures against poor water management which results in desertification;
- a more favourable international economic environment, particularly in international trade, finance and aid.

The conference also called for increased international aid to combat the current plague of locusts and grasshoppers which has been threatening the continent since the end of the 1982-5 drought.⁴

● 'It makes no sense to offer aid with one hand and to restrict African exports with the other.' Edouard Saouma, FAO Director-General, speaking of the imperative need for improving the international economic and trading environment for developing countries, particularly in Africa. *Financial Times* (London) 3 September 1986.

▲ International Conference for the Immediate Independence of Namibia Vienna, 7-11 July 1986

■ The UN-sponsored conference adopted by acclamation a Programme of Action which called on the UN Security Council (SC) 'to immediately adopt and impose comprehensive mandatory sanctions' against South Africa. These sanctions, it said, should extend beyond economic measures, to curtail political and diplomatic relations with Pretoria.

The conference, called to increase public awareness of the plight of Namibia, while suggesting specific ways of furthering its independence, was opened by the UN Secretary-General, Javier Pérez de Cuéllar. Twenty years after the UN General Assembly resolution of 1966 terminating the League of Nations mandate placing 'South West Africa' under the administration of South Africa, Pérez de Cuéllar called on South Africa to implement UNSC Resolution 435 (1978). This resolution called for a UN-monitored ceasefire in Namibia, where the South West Africa People's Organisation (SWAPO) and its military wing, PLAN, were fighting occupying South African troops, followed by elections and independence for the territory.

In calling for mandatory sanctions, the conference urged the USA and Britain, 'permanent members of the Security Council which have thus far prevented the Council from acting effectively, to reconsider their position' and cease their vetoes. It explicitly condemned the US policy of 'constructive engagement' with South Africa, and dismissed attempts to link Namibian independence with the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola as 'irrelevant and extraneous'. Pretoria had made the withdrawal a condition for the implementation of UNSC Resolution 435 since 1982, and had reiterated it in March 1986 in proposing 1 August 1986 as the provisional date for commencing the Security Council's plan. The conference went on to reaffirm the legitimacy of the struggle of the Namibian people by every means at their disposal, urging governments to support SWAPO with moral and political as well as financial, military and other material resources.

The Namibian 'Contact Group', Britain, Canada, France, West Germany and the

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US, the five Western countries with the greatest economic interests in Namibia, did not send representatives to the meeting, though some had observers present. Some participants, which were not named, were reported to have expressed reservations about the final text, though these were not publicly specified.

The recommendations of the conference were to be conveyed to the UN General Assembly.⁵

▲ UN General Assembly (UNGA)
Special Session on the Question of Namibia
New York, 17-20 September 1986

■ The fourteenth UNGA Special Session was the fourth to have been devoted to Namibia, the others having been in 1967, 1978 and 1981. The UNGA heard from the UN Secretary-General, Javier Pérez de Cuéllar, that despite the resolution of all outstanding issues relating to Namibian independence, UN Security Council Resolution 435 (1978) had not yet been implemented (see above). In a letter of 28 July 1986, President P W Botha of South Africa had reaffirmed his insistence that the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola remained a precondition for Namibian independence.

The special session passed a resolution demanding that South Africa 'immediately and unconditionally withdraw' its illegal administration, occupation army and police force from Namibia. It condemned South Africa for defying the UN's termination of its mandate to rule the territory, rejecting the 'interim government' installed in June 1985 as 'null and void', and dismissing calls for 'linkage' with Cuban withdrawal. Reaffirming that Resolution 435 remained the only acceptable basis for a peaceful settlement of the Namibian question, the Assembly called on the Security Council to take immediate action towards its unconditional implementation. The resolution also reaffirmed the legitimacy of the struggle of the South West Africa People's Organisation (SWAPO), calling for international assistance for the organisation, and it urged that comprehensive mandatory sanctions be applied against South Africa as the most peaceful means of making it comply with international law.

The resolution was carried by a vote of 126 to none, with 24 abstentions. In the course of the debate, two paragraphs in the draft, explicitly naming the US in connection with 'constructive engagement' and 'linkage' were deleted.⁶

● 'The central issue in Namibia has always been clear and unambiguous, namely: securing the right to self-determination and independence for the people of Namibia. This right has been denied them far too long in an age when self-determination of peoples has become a universally accepted principle . . . The people of Namibia are suffering under colonial rule at a time when colonialism has become an anachronism.' Javier Pérez de Cuéllar, UN Secretary-General, in his opening speech to the UNGA. *UN Press Release GA/7320*, 17 September 1986.

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COMMODITIES

▲International Coffee Organisation (ICO)

Executive Board Meeting

London, 1-4 July 1986

■Representatives of coffee producer and consumer countries decided that a further emergency session of the Board should be convened as soon as it became apparent that coffee prices were about to reach the level at which export quotas are automatically introduced.

The coffee export quotas, in force since 1980, but suspended in February 1986 when prices rose at the prospect of a poor Brazilian crop, were due to expire at the end of September 1986. Previous meetings of the ICO had, however, failed to resolve the question of new percentage allocations of the global coffee market among producer countries.⁷ Further discussions on the distribution of quotas at the July 1986 meeting were equally inconclusive. Prices were, however, falling and seemed likely to reach the level of \$1.35 per pound, at which export quotas are automatically triggered. With differing assessments as to the likelihood of prices reaching the critical point, a decision on quotas was deferred until the ICO's main annual meeting, at the end of September 1986.⁸

▲UN Cocoa Conference 1984

Fifth Part

Geneva, 7-25 July 1986

■After two years of negotiations, representatives from some sixty cocoa producer and consumer countries adopted the International Cocoa Agreement (ICCA) 1986. It replaces the 1980 agreement which was due to expire on 30 September 1986, and was precluded by its terms from renewal.

Negotiations for a new cocoa pact began in May 1984, under the auspices of the UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). The fourth round of talks, in February-March 1986, had collapsed when the Ivory Coast, the world's largest cocoa producer, declared its intention to withdraw from the negotiations, in protest against consumer countries' proposals for a semi-automatic price adjustment mechanism.⁹ The EEC, collectively the largest consumer in the absence of the US, in turn refused to enter a new pact in which the Ivory Coast, absent from the 1980 pact, did not participate. By the time of the fifth round, however, the Ivory Coast had expressed a renewed willingness to negotiate an agreement with effective economic provisions, apparently after consultations with representatives of the EEC, and of France in particular.

The subsequent talks resulted by 16 July 1986 in agreement on the key issues of price structure, price levels and price adjustment mechanisms, though a further ten days were needed to resolve the remaining details. The resulting pact was due to enter into force on 1 October 1986 for a period of three years, with the possibility of extension for a further three years. The terms of the pact were such that:

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- Buffer stock operations were to remain the chief mechanism for price stabilisation. The size of the buffer stock was unchanged at 250,000 tons, possibly increased by 100,000 tons if the pact were extended beyond one year. The stock was still to be financed by a levy on trade of US2¢ per pound.

The buffer stock mechanism was to be supplemented to support prices not by export quotas, as producers had proposed, but by a scheme for withholding cocoa in national stocks, if the Council failed to agree on other supplementary measures once the buffer stock had reached a certain level. Producers would withhold cocoa from the market if the indicator price fell below the lower intervention level for five consecutive days, if the buffer stock were at 80 per cent of its capacity, or had cash enough only to buy 30,000 tons more cocoa. The scheme was limited to a maximum of 120,000 tons, with cocoa being held in 30,000 ton tranches at a time.

- The price range was centred on a free zone in which no intervention was to occur, of US30¢, around a median or reference price of 103¢ per pound. This price was a little higher than the consumers' ideal price of 100¢, but considerably lower than the producers' desired reference of 115¢. The new pact introduced the flexibility of 'may buy' and 'may sell' zones of 3¢ on either side of the free zone, where intervention by the Buffer Stock Manager was discretionary. Beyond this range, of 85¢ and 121¢, the buffer stock was obliged to buy or sell. The Cocoa Agreement became the first commodity pact in which prices were to be expressed in International Monetary Fund (IMF) Special Drawing Rights (SDRs), based on a basket of currencies, in order to minimise the distortions of currency fluctuations. The reference price of 103¢ per pound was equivalent to SDR 1.935 per ton.

- There were two price adjustment mechanisms, designed to keep the reference price adjusted to underlying market realities. First, the annual price review and possible revision of the International Cocoa Council. If no decision were reached, prices would automatically be adjusted by up to 6¢ per pound. Second, price review in the event of the buffer stock having bought or sold 75,000 tons of cocoa in six consecutive months after the pact's entry into force or since the last price review. If no decision were reached, the adjustment by 6¢ would be automatic.

In order for it to take effect, the agreement required ratification of five producer countries, accounting for 80 per cent of total exports, and consumer countries accounting for 65 per cent of total imports or 60 per cent for provisional entry into force. There was some concern that the requisite ratifications would not have been made by the deadline of 30 September 1986, though it was hoped that the ratifications of the Ivory Coast, Nigeria, Ghana, Brazil and Cameroon would at least fulfil the requirements for the producers. There was also concern about the decision by Malaysia, the world's fastest expanding cocoa producer, to remain outside the pact, along with the US, the largest consumer.¹⁰

- The new Cocoa Agreement is a 'dynamic compromise'. Denis Bra Kanon, agriculture minister of the Ivory Coast, whose withdrawal from the last negotiations had effectively curtailed them. *UNCTAD Bulletin* (Geneva) July/August 1986.

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▲ International Tropical Timber Organisation (ITTO) Council Meeting Geneva, 28 July–1 August 1986

■ The International Tropical Timber Agreement (ITTA), which took eight years to negotiate, was finally set to become operational after the resolution of a protracted deadlock among its forty-one member countries.

The ITTA was adopted in 1983 and came into force on 1 April 1985. Its operation was prevented, however, by a year-long dispute over the site of headquarters and the choice of Executive Director for the ITTO. Three cities were initially proposed at the July 1986 Council session, but the choice was narrowed when the EEC withdrew the candidacy of Amsterdam, leaving only Jakarta and Yokohama. The decision was made on 29 July 1986 to establish the ITTO headquarters in Yokohama; Japan being the largest importer of tropical timber. Meanwhile, the choice of Executive Director fell on Freezailah bin Che Yeom of Malaysia, his country being the world's largest tropical timber exporter.

The ITTA is considered to be an innovation in terms of commodity agreements. Negotiated under UNCTAD's auspices, it has no price-stabilising function, nor a mechanism such as a buffer stock or export quotas. It aims rather to conserve the world's fast diminishing tropical forests, promoting research and development, collecting market information and attempting to involve producers in timber processing, particularly as a means of making the best use of a natural resource for developing countries. Its forty-one member countries account for more than 95 per cent of world trade in tropical timber.

The financing of the pact remains uncertain, but the Council decided that its finances were to be provided by voluntary contributions from member countries and international organisations, as well as through the 'second window' of the Common Fund for Commodities, once it becomes operational.¹¹

▲ Wheat Producers' Meeting Cairns, Australia, 25 August 1986

■ Trade ministers from Argentina, Australia and Canada, accounting for 44 per cent of world wheat exports, met in the margins of the 'Fair Traders in Agriculture' conference in Cairns (see below). The meeting had been proposed in June 1986 by the Australian Foreign Minister, Bill Hayden, to discuss what was seen as a global trade crisis caused by subsidised wheat exports from the EEC and the USA. Observers from the EEC, Japan and the USA attended the meeting.

Australia's Trade Minister, John Dawkins, said that US attempts to regain by means of export subsidies wheat markets lost to the EEC through the operation of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) were encroaching on Australia's traditional markets. The USA had originally applied subsidies under the Bonus Incentive Commodity Export Programme (BICEP), subsequently renamed the Export Enhancement Programme (EEP) in order to win back markets (mainly in North Africa and the Middle East), lost through EEC subsidies. Through this programme, grain bonuses were supplied from government stocks to subsidise exports, in effect cutting the price by offering increased amounts of wheat at the same cost.¹² On 1

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August 1986, however, President Reagan had agreed in the face of domestic pressure from 'farm states' Congressmen, to extend the EEP to other markets, notably the Soviet Union, the world's largest grain purchaser, thus bringing the USA into direct competition with other major grain exporters. He had decided to offer the Soviet Union 3.85m tons of wheat, subsidised to a price of \$92 per ton (as opposed to the approximate market price of \$130), by the end of September 1986. In this move, he was opposed by US Secretary of State, George Shultz, who warned of the political strain risked with US allies who were also grain exporters. Shultz lodged this objection despite an apparent agreement between the USA and Australia to the effect that their joint defence facilities in Australia would not be used as a bargaining chip in any possible trade war.

The three countries represented at the meeting argued that they were effectively caught in the middle of EEC and US attempts to undercut each other in the world wheat market. Price-takers, which did not themselves offer subsidised rates, their economies were prey to the combined effects of the fall in wheat prices, the fall in the value of the US dollar, the currency of the world wheat market, and shrinking sales volume, as markets were lost to the subsidising trade blocs. John Dawkins said that the USA and EEC combined stockpile of wheat had grown from 100m metric tons in 1981-2 to 150m metric tons in 1985-6, while the market price had fallen from \$170 to \$130 per ton. He further accused the EEC of releasing 950,000 tons of stockpiled wheat on to the market in response to the US decision to subsidise sales to the Soviet Union, an accusation denied by the EEC representative.

The ministers agreed that in the short term the production and release of surplus stocks on to export market by the USA and the EEC needed to be restrained. According to John Dawkins, they also agreed in their rejection of EEC proposals for long-term market sharing, on the basis that the obligation to remedy the situation rested solely with those countries responsible for bringing it about. Notwithstanding efforts by Argentina and Australia to press Canada to adopt a harder line towards both the subsidising blocs, the Canadian Minister, Charles Mayer, said that the EEC was primarily to blame. The USA, he said, was at least prepared to discuss restraining production, while the EEC, by contrast, considered CAP to be sacrosanct.¹³

● 'The obligation rests with those who have engaged in market subsidies and created the problem.' John Dawkins, Australia's Trade Minister, rejecting the EEC proposal for market sharing. *Financial Times* (London) 26 August 1986.

The release of 950,000 tons of stockpiled EEC wheat on to the market was 'purely an internal operation to offset a significant reduction in this years EC crop'. Ove Juul Jorgensen, the EEC representative at the talks. *International Herald Tribune* (Paris) 27 August 1986.

DISARMAMENT

▲ Five Continent Peace Initiative Summit

Ixtapa, Mexico, 6-7 August 1986

■ The six leaders of the Five Continent Peace Initiative issued a call to the two

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superpowers for a mutual ban on nuclear testing, offering their own plan for verifying such a ban. The Initiative, formed in May 1984, had had its first summit in New Delhi in January 1985.¹⁴ The leaders (President Raúl Alfonsín of Argentina, Prime Minister (PM) Andreas Papandreu of Greece, PM Rajiv Gandhi of India, President Miguel de la Madrid of Mexico, PM Ingvar Carlsson of Sweden and former President Julius Nyerere of Tanzania) had apparently decided to call their second summit to coincide with the anniversary of Hiroshima and the expiry of the Soviet Union's unilateral moratorium on nuclear tests.¹⁵

In a final document,¹⁶ the leaders outlined specific proposals for verifying explosions of over one kiloton, over a period of one year. Though temporary, it was hoped that the verification scheme would build sufficient confidence between the superpowers to encourage them to enshrine a permanent nuclear test ban in treaty form. The main proposal was to install between five and eight seismographs at each of the three sites recently used by the superpowers: Nevada in the USA, Novayazemlya and Semipalatinsk in the Soviet Union. The composition of the scientific monitoring teams was left unspecified, but it was understood that the six countries were willing to augment US and Soviet teams with scientists of their own, if requested to do so. The six also planned to strengthen their own cooperation, for instance in the exchange of data on presumed explosions. The scheme was estimated to cost around \$10m, but it was suggested by the leaders at a subsequent press conference that they would not be financing the system themselves.¹⁷

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▲ General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)

Textiles Committee Meeting

Geneva, 21–31 July 1986

■ Representatives from forty-two countries and the EEC's twelve member-states concluded a year of negotiations by reviewing the Multi-Fibre Arrangement (MFA) governing world trade in textiles, for a further five years. In a protocol setting out the new terms of the agreement, developing countries conceded to most US and EEC demands, despite their persistent efforts to renegotiate an MFA which would better serve the interests of low-cost producers.

The MFA, which came into force in 1974 and was twice extended in 1978 and 1982, was due to expire on 31 August 1986. Its state-parties had begun reviewing the arrangement a year earlier.¹⁸ Low-cost producers, led by India, Brazil and Pakistan, had initially favoured the termination of the MFA altogether, on the basis that it was a protectionist derogation from GATT free trade rules, and that developing countries should be afforded free access to Western markets. They particularly objected to attempts by the US and the EEC to differentiate between low-cost producers, and to insist on a reciprocity of liberalisation. In the face of firm opposition from the USA and the EEC, however, the low-cost producers had gradually conceded the issue of the MFA's renewal, but were hoping to prolong the negotiations until the time of the

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arrangement's expiry, in order to secure substantive liberalisation of its terms, and a guarantee that it would be phased out on a fixed time-table. Their hand seemed strengthened by a general awareness that failure to agree to the terms of world trade in textiles might imperil the launching of the entire GATT round. This launch was scheduled to take place in Punta del Este in September 1986, and was understood to be a prime objective of the US Administration. (See below.)

US negotiators, on the other hand, invoked the spectre of a protectionist backlash within the US Congress, warning against liberalising the MFA and exposing the US markets to an influx of cheap Third World textiles. Though the 'Jenkins Bill' restricting US textile imports had been vetoed by President Reagan, having passed through both Houses of Congress, it was due to be reviewed by the House of Representatives on 6 August 1986, where a two-thirds majority in its favour would override the presidential veto.¹⁹ Both the US Administration and the EEC were also rapidly concluding bilateral market sharing arrangements with low-cost producers, on terms less favourable to the developing countries.²⁰ In the face of increasing Western protectionism, many Third World suppliers preferred even a restrictive agreement such as the MFA, as a guarantee for their exports, to the risks of the free market.

In the final negotiations, a group was established to draft the protocol for the extension of the MFA, led by M G Mathur, Deputy Secretary-General of GATT. The group included the US and the EEC with several leading low-cost producers, such as Hong Kong and South Korea. While the USA was pressing for a five-year extension, the EEC favouring four years and some developing countries willing to concede three, an extension of five years was eventually agreed in principle. However, the clock had to be 'stopped' by agreement at midnight on 31 July 1986, in order to settle the remaining contentious issues before the expiry of the current MFA. These issues were the question of procedures to combat sudden 'import surges' of Third World textiles to Western markets, and the scope of the new agreement. The USA insisted upon including the 'new' vegetable fibres such as ramie and silk blends in the MFA, even threatening to withdraw from the pact if they were not covered. Meanwhile, countries such as China, a chief supplier of ramie, opposed such an extension.

The MFA finally agreed that 'MFA 4' was to run for five years from 1 August 1986, until mid-1991. The terms of the new protocol included:

- the replacement of the original procedures for market disruption, or the risk of it, by terms permitting importing countries to apply restrictions selectively, following consultations with suppliers. Such restrictions could not be based solely on the level of growth of import surges, but had to give due consideration to the supplier's export performance, its market share and the general state of its industry.

- special consideration for the least developed countries such as Haiti, the Maldives and Bangladesh, and for small or new suppliers in the industry.

- the inclusion of natural fibres such as ramie, other vegetable fibres and silk blends, provided that their weight or value exceeded half that of the garment and that its export caused or risked major market disruption. Restrictions were not, however, applicable to textiles which were 'internationally traded in commercially significant quantities' before 1982. This provision was taken to cover such items as bags, sacks, matting, carpets, etc.

- special consideration for cotton-producing countries and developing countries highly dependent on wool exports.

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- more liberal terms for Third World exporters opening their markets to industrialised countries' exports and textiles and clothing.
- the promise of action against circumvention of the MFA, including international collaboration on false customs declarations on product origins.
- an injunction against counterfeiting of designs and trademarks.
- the observation that the MFA should ultimately be phased out, though no time-scale was suggested.

China expressed its reservations on the increased scope of the agreement, and India on its failure to set out a time-table for abolition. Elements within the US textile industry were reported to be incensed with the new agreement, though uncertainty prevailed over the exact scope of the protocol, as fibres covered were not explicitly named. The EEC, meanwhile, seemed concerned that the new restrictions covering ramie would divert them into European markets, by limiting their flow into the US.²¹

▲ Commonwealth Heads of Government Review Meeting London, 3-5 August 1986

■ A summit of seven Commonwealth member countries met to consider the crisis in Southern Africa in accordance with an agreement reached at the full Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting (CHOGM) in Nassau, in October 1985. There, a twin-track approach to South Africa had been evolved, entailing a diplomatic initiative to encourage political dialogue between Pretoria and representatives of the majority black population, through a Commonwealth Eminent Persons Group (CEPG), and a parallel programme of selective, progressive economic sanctions.²² The CEPG was chosen by the leaders of seven countries, Australia, Bahamas, Britain, Canada, India, Zambia and Zimbabwe, and these same leaders were mandated to determine whether the requisite diplomatic progress had been achieved after a period of six months.²³

According to its final communiqué,²⁴ the summit heard a report of the CEPG's mission to South Africa, in which it concluded that 'at present there is no genuine intention on the part of the South African government to dismantle apartheid and no present prospect of a process of dialogue leading to the establishment of a non-racial and representative government'. The leaders expressed profound disappointment that Pretoria had taken none of the five steps recommended at Nassau as conditions for the eradication of apartheid and the establishment of representative government. They deplored the government's actions, including its raids on the neighbouring states of Botswana, Zambia and Zimbabwe on 19 May 1986, which had effectively curtailed the efforts of the CEPG. The Group's conclusions as to the inadequacy of progress achieved by diplomacy were corroborated by a report from the British Foreign Secretary, Sir Geoffrey Howe, who had conducted his own mission to Southern Africa in his capacity as current President of the EEC Council of Ministers.²⁵

The leaders were unable to agree, however, on the measures to be recommended to the rest of the Commonwealth as a result of the CEPG's failure. The six leaders, other than Mrs Margaret Thatcher, were committed to a minimum position of adopting the eight-point programme formulated at Nassau. It had there been

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suggested that this programme should be considered in addition to the nine measures already advocated at Nassau, in the event of CERG's failure. The British Prime Minister, however, was isolated in her refusal to countenance the package of measures, despite a warning from Zambia that it would consider leaving the Commonwealth if the summit proved unsuccessful, and threats of economic reprisals against Britain from countries such as India and Nigeria, who hinted at relegating Britain to 'least favoured nation' status with them, instituting in effect a policy of 'Buy British Last'. Unlike the Nassau summit, where a compromise had been reached on sanctions through the device of the CERG, regarded by some as a mere delaying tactic, the London summit resulted in something of an agreement to differ.

The six countries other than Britain agreed that the adoption of further economic measures against South Africa was a moral and political imperative. Accordingly, they decided to adopt and commend to the rest of the Commonwealth and the wider international community, the eight-point programme:

- a ban on air links with South Africa;
- a ban on new investments or re-investment of profits earned there;
- a ban on the import of South African agricultural products;
- an end to double taxation agreements with South Africa;
- an end to all government assistance to, investment in, and trade with South Africa;
- a ban on all government procurement in South Africa;
- a ban on government contracts with majority-owned South African companies;
- a ban on the promotion of tourism to South Africa.

Going beyond the measures suggested at Nassau, they also agreed on:

- a ban on all new bank loans to South Africa, whether to public or private sectors;
- the withdrawal of all consular facilities in South Africa, except for their own nationals, or nationals of third countries to which they render consular services.

The British government, however, 'while taking a different view of the likely impact of economic sanctions', agreed to three measures:

- a voluntary ban on new investment in South Africa;
- a voluntary ban on the promotion of tourism to South Africa;
- acceptance of any EEC decision to ban the import of coal, iron, steel and Krugerrands from South Africa.

It was unclear, though, as to what precisely the 'voluntary' bans entailed, and how long it would take for guidelines to be formulated to govern them. The undertaking to be bound by any EEC decision on specific sanctions, though a greater concession, seemed to demonstrate the greater importance attached by Britain to the EEC than to the Commonwealth.

A proposal by President Kaunda of Zambia for a committee composed of the leaders of Australia, Canada and India, to coordinate measures against Pretoria with the EEC, the USA and Japan, was not directly taken up. The communiqué, did, however, point to future consultations with other countries, particularly those with significant economic relations with South Africa, presumably by means of bilateral contracts. The leaders specified their readiness to revoke the measures imposed if South Africa was observed to make progress, and they threatened further sanctions after a reasonable period, if none were achieved. In this connection, they warned South Africa against retaliation through economic or other acts of aggression against the neighbouring states.²⁶

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● 'We would prefer an outcome which can be unanimous. But I don't think that the six are going to accept the lowest common denominator position, which is not consistent with a position of integrity . . . We seek unity and credibility, but if it comes to a choice between the two, we must opt for credibility.' Remarks made during the summit by Prime Minister Bob Hawke of Australia, in which he argued against making a compromise with the British view. *Financial Times* (London) 5 August 1986 and *The Guardian* (London) 5 August 1986.

'If the Commonwealth stands for anything it must stand for strong moral principles which rise above balance sheets and commercial trading matters.' Prime Minister Brian Mulroney of Canada, indirectly criticising Britain's refusal to impose sanctions on South Africa. *The Observer* (London) 3 August 1986.

'Britain is not the leader any more, not in the Commonwealth. It is losing its position because it is compromising its position on moral principles over economic needs.' Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi of India, surmising that Britain's refusal to apply sanctions had caused it to forfeit its leadership within the Commonwealth. *The Times* (London) 6 August 1986.

'I wish to register my utter dismay and bitter disappointment with the position taken by Britain at this summit. This position will not bring comfort and consolation to the hearts of many in South Africa. They see in Mrs Thatcher's stand support for apartheid. So do we, the Front Line States.' Prime Minister Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe, after the summit. *Financial Times* (London) 6 August 1986.

▲ South Pacific Forum Seventeenth Annual Summit Suva, Fiji, 8-11 August 1986

■ The summit was attended by leaders from the thirteen member-states of the South Pacific Forum, which comprises Australia,²⁷ New Zealand, and the eleven independent Pacific states (Cook Islands, Fiji, Kiribati, Nauru, Niue, Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu, Vanuatu and Western Samoa).

The leaders considered the status of the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty, adopted at their previous year's summit at Rarotonga, Cook Islands.²⁸ The Treaty of Rarotonga had been signed by eight of the Forum's member-states, and had since received ten signatures and four ratifications. While the majority of leaders at the summit decided in favour of ratifying the treaty, three states (Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands and Vanuatu) maintained their opposition to it. They felt that it was not sufficiently comprehensive. Father Walter Lini, Prime Minister of Vanuatu, specifying that it should ban port calls by nuclear-powered and armed ships, and uranium mining in the South Pacific. The leaders finalised the wording of the treaty's protocols, which had already been tentatively presented by teams of the Forum's negotiators to the five nuclear weapon states: Britain, China, France, the Soviet Union and the USA. All five were being asked to recognise two protocols, while Britain, France and the US, which have territories in the region, were requested to endorse a third protocol. Their provisions would commit the nuclear powers not to locate, use, threaten to use or test nuclear weapons in the zone. In an effort to induce Britain and the US to sign the protocols, a withdrawal clause was inserted, allowing

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signatories to opt out of the treaty after a period of notice, if they decided that 'extraordinary events' jeopardised their supreme interests. David Lange, Prime Minister of New Zealand, apparently hoped that the concession to British and US requirements would persuade them to join China and the Soviet Union, which had already expressed support in principle for the treaty. Thus, the Forum would succeed in isolating France, which persisted in underground nuclear weapons testing at Mururoa Atoll, in French Polynesia.

In an important development, the leaders agreed unanimously to urge the UN Committee on Decolonisation to restore New Caledonia to the UN List of Colonised Territories, from which it had been removed by France in 1947, on the basis that the territory was in fact an integral part of France. The Forum's recommendation was to be drafted urgently and proposed for the agenda of the meeting of the UN Committee on 15 August 1986 in New York. In their joint communiqué, the leaders criticised as a 'significant backward step' the policy of the French Prime Minister, Jacques Chirac, in delaying the territory's progress towards independence. Originating as an election promise in March 1986, the policy reversed the moves of the French socialist government of President François Mitterrand towards regional autonomy for the Kanaks, and jeopardised a referendum on self-determination which had been scheduled for mid-1987. The Forum's decision reflected a victory for the views of the more radical Melanesian states of the Forum, led by Walter Lini, as opposed to the more conservative tendencies of some of the Polynesian states.

Walter Lini also defended his plan to enter into a fishing agreement with the Soviet Union, which for the first time would provide Soviet on-shore facilities in the South Pacific. Kiribati had already concluded a fishing agreement with the Soviet Union in August 1985, and Fiji was also expressing a willingness to consider such an offer. According to some countries, Soviet efforts to enter into commercial arrangements and diplomatic relations with Pacific Island countries constituted a threat to Western interests, particularly in the wake of the collapse of the ANZUS Treaty between Australia, New Zealand and the USA. Suspended since 1985 when New Zealand banned port calls by US nuclear-powered and armed ships, the treaty was effectively terminated in June 1986 when US Secretary of State, George Shultz, officially confirmed US withdrawal. Walter Lini, however, argued that the Soviet Union's presence in the region had already been assured by its diplomatic and trade relations with Australia and New Zealand. Along with other Pacific island states, Vanuatu argued that Soviet competition in the fishing sector was a legitimate and inevitable outcome of the failure of the USA to proffer adequate financial rewards. The Forum agreed, however, to press for the conclusion of a multilateral fisheries treaty with the US.

The future direction of the Forum became an issue towards the close of the summit, when Walter Lini suggested that its scope be broadened to allow it to deal directly with other international agencies and institutions, and to fight as a political bloc in the UN. He advocated its recognition of the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) and the South West Africa People's Organisation (SWAPO) as well as its application for membership of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM). (Vanuatu is at present the only Forum country with membership of NAM.) Prime Minister Lini's efforts to bring about a more political role for the Forum were scorned by David Lange. He suggested that the Forum's primary relevance was

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social and economic, and that as a 'mini-United Nations' it would lose its value, together with the attention of New Zealand. The final communiqué did, however, enter the international debate on sanctions against South Africa. It implicitly supported the call of a majority of countries at the Commonwealth 'mini-summit' in London in August 1986 (see above) for economic measures against Pretoria, urging all countries and in particular, South Africa's trading partners, to follow the recommendations of the Commonwealth.²⁹

● 'It is the Pacific way to be able to talk and settle our differences. It is not pretending you are a whole row of Pérez de Cuéllars.' David Lange, Prime Minister of New Zealand, referring to the UN Secretary-General, in opposing Walter Lini's call for an increasingly political South Pacific Forum. *The Times* (London) 12 August 1986.

▲ 'Fair Traders in Agriculture'
Ministerial Meeting
Cairns, Australia, 25-27 August 1986

■ A new alliance was formed on the issue of agricultural trade when trade ministers from fourteen industrialised and developing countries met in Queensland. The countries were Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Fiji, Hungary, Indonesia, Malaysia, New Zealand, Philippines, Thailand and Uruguay.

The ministers met at the invitation of the Australian government, to express their collective demand that trade in agriculture be accorded priority in the forthcoming round of General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) talks. These were due to be launched at Punta del Este in September 1986 (see below). As countries providing 22 per cent of world agricultural exports, and for whom agriculture accounted for an average of 50 per cent of their total exports, they were united in their condemnation of agricultural over-production and export subsidies, entailed in particular by the policies of the EEC and the USA. The EEC, Japan and the USA were not invited to participate in the meeting, but attended as observers.

In his opening address, the Australian Prime Minister, Bob Hawke, said that the EEC's direct subsidies and consumer transfers under the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) had amounted to \$100bn that year. The USA, he said, had retaliated with \$35bn of competing export subsidies under the Export Enhancement Programme (EEP). The efforts of these warring trade blocs to dump their surplus produce distorted global trade and artificially depressed prices, he said, unfairly forcing efficient yet less powerful agricultural exporters from their traditional markets, and severely damaging their agriculturally-dependent economies. Argentina's Agricultural Minister, Lucio Reca, furthermore called attention to the social and political consequences of such trade policies. Agricultural export subsidies undermined the capacity of many developing countries for economic growth, making it increasingly difficult for them to service their external debts, and even threatening stability and democracy.

The fourteen countries unanimously approved the 'Cairns Declaration' which committed its signatories to 'seek the removal of market access barriers, substantial reduction in agricultural subsidies and the elimination, within an agreed period, of

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subsidies affecting agricultural trade'. They agreed that agricultural trade should be made a priority in the forthcoming GATT talks, and went beyond existing provisions in the 'café au lait' draft agenda (see below) by calling specifically for the new round to combat subsidies and advocate agricultural adjustments in production. No formal organisation of the participants was formed, but they agreed to meet regularly and to monitor progress towards their goals.

The USA professed to welcome the Cairns Declaration, while a cautious note was sounded by the EEC representative, Ove Juul Jorgensen. He warned against placing unrealistically high expectations on the forthcoming talks in Punta del Este.³⁰

● 'Efficient agricultural exporting countries are the innocent victims of this trans-Atlantic trade war.' Bob Hawke, Australia's Prime Minister, in his opening speech to the meeting. *International Herald Tribune* (Paris) 26 August 1986.

'Our creditor-countries, which are symbols of democracy, do not understand that in order to strengthen democracy in developing countries, economic growth is essential and that agricultural growth is the key to it.' Lucio Reca, Argentina's Agriculture Minister. *International Herald Tribune* (Paris) 27 August 1986.

▲ GATT

Ministerial Session of the Contracting Parties

Punta del Este, Uruguay, 15-20 September 1986

■ Ministers and officials from seventy-four of GATT's ninety-two contracting parties participated in the session to agree terms for the launching of a new round of multilateral trade negotiations (MTNS). While the prospects of securing agreement had seemed slight before the meeting, it became apparent that most parties were more willing to compromise than to suffer the opprobrium of blocking the new round, crucial to halt the growing tendency towards protectionism in world trade. In a final ministerial declaration,³¹ they agreed to begin, before the end of 1986, the 'Uruguay Round' of MTNS, which was set to last until 1990.

The ministers were initially faced with three competing texts, the GATT Preparatory Committee in Geneva in July 1986 having failed to agree on a draft agenda for the new round. Alignments differed according to issues, but the two major subjects of contention were developed countries' efforts to enlarge the scope of GATT talks, and the insistence by an alliance of some developed and Third World countries that agricultural policies be subject to discussion during the round. At a preliminary meeting of Canada, the EEC, Japan and the USA in Sintra, Portugal in early September 1986, the US Trade representative, Clayton K Yeutter, had explicitly threatened to withdraw from any GATT round which failed to free trade in the US's priority areas, agriculture and services.³² The US also wished to extend GATT's purview to encompass the protection of intellectual property, trade-related foreign investment and trade in high technology goods. Such an extension was meanwhile opposed by a group of ten developing countries, led by Brazil and India.³³ They argued on legal grounds that GATT had no jurisdiction in trade other than that in goods. They apparently feared that, if discussed in the same negotiations, acceptance of developing countries' goods into Western markets would be made conditional on Third World concessions on services.

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One draft, known as the '*café au lait*' proposal on account of its backers, Colombia and Switzerland, had secured the most acceptance in the GATT Preparatory Committee, and the support of the USA, Canada, Australia and many developing countries.³⁴ It was prevented from gaining majority support, however, by objections from the EEC, primarily lodged by France, to its reference to agricultural export subsidies. The group of ten developing countries opposing the inclusion of services had proffered an alternative draft, and Argentina a third, which was even more radical in its drive to liberalise agricultural trade. It was the '*café au lait*' draft, however, which provided the working basis for the Punta del Este Ministerial Declaration. This fact was partly due to a compromise on the part of Brazil and India, which agreed to negotiate on the basis of the Colombian-Swiss proposal, provided that a number of amendments were considered.

The Punta del Este Ministerial Declaration required the creation of a Trade Negotiations Committee (TNC) which would hold its first meeting before the end of October 1986, in preparation for the launching of the Uruguay Round before 19 December 1986, to be completed in four years. Its provisions included:

- **Agriculture:** For the first time, agricultural trade was to be included in the GATT talks. Discipline was to be increased on the use of 'all direct and indirect subsidies and other measures affecting directly or indirectly agricultural trade, including the phased reduction of their negative effects and dealing with their causes'. This wording, stronger than that in the *café au lait* draft, was understood to cover both the EEC export subsidies, and US production aids, though the EEC resisted attempts to single out its Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) for particular criticism, as well as the fixing of a timetable for dealing with subsidies. The EEC had been weakened by internal dissension, with France, Greece, Denmark, Iceland and Belgium reaffirming the inviolability of CAP, while Britain and West Germany were known to favour reform of the policy. The chief critics of agricultural subsidies were the fourteen countries of the 'Cairns Group' the self-styled 'fair traders' amongst developed and developing countries (see above). Ironically, they found support from the USA, despite the fact that they were an alliance of countries suffering from the effects of the agricultural trade war between the EEC and its retaliating antagonist, the USA.

John Dawkins, the Australian Trade Minister and spokesman for the Cairns Group, understood the reference to 'causes' in the declaration to entail the progressive reduction of the export subsidies that cause surpluses that distort trade. The EEC Commissioner, Willy de Clercq, however, objected that tackling the negative effects of policies was not equivalent to tackling those policies themselves. The official EEC line remained that 'the fundamental objectives and mechanism' of CAP were non-negotiable.

- **Services:** A compromise was reached between the US demand for the inclusion of trade in services in 'single-track' GATT negotiations, and the desire of Brazil and India to keep services outside GATT. The ministers as representatives of their countries, rather than as GATT contracting parties, launched a round of trade in services outside the auspices of GATT, but parallel to the talks on goods. The TNC would coordinate both sets of negotiations, but only at their conclusion would a decision be taken on whether or not to incorporate the results into GATT rules. The compromise closely followed a provisional deal between the EEC Commissioner, Tran Van Tinh, and

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representatives of Brazil and India in Geneva, which had posited such a 'twin-track' approach. It had, however, subsequently been condemned by the USA and rejected by the EEC at their meeting in Sintra. The compromise allowed both the US on the one hand and the developing countries on the other to feel that their requirements had been met, the USA insisting that the outcome was merely a procedural convenience.

- *Intellectual property*: the USA secured agreement to negotiate a new framework of rules to curb piracy of patents and copyrights, and to restrain counterfeiting.

- *Foreign Investment*: the USA conceded on the third of the non-traditional issues which it had hoped to see included. It had wanted discipline exercised over trade-distorting investment policies such as export performance requirements and local content requirements. In the face of developing countries' trepidation at the implications for their sovereignty of such controls, it was decided that negotiations could not begin on the issue until after all parties had agreed that existing GATT rules were inadequate.

- *Standstill and Rollback*: the declaration committed parties to a standstill on new protectionist measures which were 'inconsistent' with GATT rules, and a rollback of existing measures over the period of the negotiations. This constituted a weaker obligation than developing countries had hoped for, in that the onus of proving 'inconsistency' appeared to be on the party lodging the complaint. Developing countries took the wording to cover the so-called 'grey measures' such as Voluntary Export Restraints (VERS) and Market Sharing Arrangements (MSAs), but the US response undermined this interpretation. Clayton Yeutter denied the relevance of the provision to most existing US measures, implying therefore that it did not cover 'grey' areas.

- *Dispute settlement*: despite the ministerial commitment to strengthen procedure for settling disputes, Yeutter said that the USA would continue to take unilateral action in retaliation for unfair trading practices, without recourse to protracted GATT procedures.

- *Safeguards*: Agreement was secured to renegotiate the terms of temporary import restrictions designed to protect threatened domestic industries from influxes of foreign goods.

- tariffs and non-tariff barriers were to be renegotiable, as were

- textiles and clothing;

- subsidies;

- tropical and natural resource based products—a particular demand of developing countries.

Developing countries also managed, with EEC support, to secure a statement making the improved functioning of the international monetary system and the flow of investment to the Third World, one of the objectives of the new round. Little, however, was said about the problems posed by the massive trade imbalances between the trading 'superpowers'. The USA backed Japan in excluding a reference to the need to achieve a 'balance of benefits', implicitly criticising Japan's trade surplus, on the grounds that the reference was discriminatory. The compromise was a mention of the need to tackle 'growing disequilibria' in world trade, in the closing speech of the meeting's Chairman, Uruguay's Foreign Minister, Enrique Iglesias.

The issue of participation failed to detract attention from the main task of the

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meeting, the setting of the new round's agenda. A bid by Nigeria, supported by Cameroon, Egypt, Gabon, Jamaica, Tanzania and Zimbabwe to exclude South Africa from GATT failed. Their case had been that no country against which international sanctions were to be applied should be eligible to participate in the new GATT round. A Czech motion to support the Soviet Union's application to join the round was similarly quashed by the US and the EEC. Objections raised to the proposal included the country's centralised economy and the spectre of increasing 'politicisation' of issues.³⁵

● 'We know exactly what we wanted. Our opponents only knew what they didn't want.' US Secretary of Commerce, Malcolm Baldrige, suggesting reasons after the meeting as to why many US views prevailed. *International Herald Tribune* (Paris) 22 September 1986.

'Brazil and India played chicken with the USA over the service issue.' Tony Hill of Jamaica, suggesting that the developing countries had in fact negotiated with the USA from a position of considerable strength, forcing the USA to concede on the question of services. *Financial Times* (London) 23 September 1986.

'We have opened the way for the most difficult, the most complex round in GATT history.' Enrique Iglesias, Uruguay's Foreign Minister and Chairman of the meeting. *Financial Times* (London) 22 September 1986.

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▲ Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC)
Reconvened Seventy-Eighth Ministerial Conference
Geneva, 28 July-5 August 1986

■ Oil ministers from OPEC's thirteen member countries reached an unexpected agreement to curb their production levels temporarily, in an effort to support oil prices. At the time of the meeting, prices had fallen below \$10 per barrel, and OPEC's total output was estimated at over 20m barrels per day (b/d), 2-3m b/d above estimated demand. The increase from the June 1986 level of 19m b/d was attributed almost entirely to a surge in Saudi Arabia's production.

The meeting followed a first session in Brioni, Yugoslavia, in June 1986, where a majority of nine OPEC members had decided on a target price range of \$17-\$19 per barrel, with a corresponding OPEC production ceiling of 17.6m b/d for 1986.³⁶ Agreement on how to distribute this output among individual members was, however, deferred until the Geneva meeting, where it remained elusive. The dissenting states at Brioni still favoured a larger cut in production to 15-16m b/d, in an attempt to defend still higher prices. Iran persisted in its demand for a quota of two extra barrels for every one accorded to Iraq, while, in a new development, Iraq insisted on parity in its quota with Iran. Despite the speculation that the United Arab Emirates (UAE) might prove more amenable than the warring Gulf states, it too maintained its official refusal to accept a quota of less than 1.5m b/d.³⁷

Faced with these obstacles, the ministers considered several proposals before arriving at their final decision. The original plan, formulated by Indonesia's Minister for Mines and Energy, Dr Subroto, for distributing an overall output of 17.6m b/d

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was summarily rejected by Iraq, Iran, Qatar and the UAE.³⁸ A subsequent proposal from Algeria's Oil Minister, Belkacem Nabi, to distribute production of 15–16m b/d was considered by a committee composed of the oil ministers of Nigeria, Indonesia, Algeria, Kuwait and Ecuador.³⁹ It was apparently blocked by the UAE, Kuwait and Qatar, and was unlikely to have found favour with Saudi Arabia and the other Gulf states.

Meanwhile, an interim compromise was being sought by a group consisting of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Venezuela, Nigeria and Indonesia, whereby oil prices would be supported by 'voluntary' production cuts by OPEC members until unanimous agreement could be secured on lowered quotas. This plan was based on acknowledgement of the fact that the differences between Iran and Iraq were such that any settlement would probably have to be confined to the remaining eleven OPEC members. On 31 July 1986, OPEC's President, Nigeria's Oil Minister, Rilwanu Lukman, announced that nine or ten members had together pledged voluntary curbs on their output amounting to 1.925m b/d for August 1986.

On 5 August 1986, however, it was announced that unanimous agreement had been reached on a proposal by the Iranian Oil Minister, Gholamreza Aghadeh. The proposal:

- allowed Iraq to continue producing at optimum levels;
- imposed on the other twelve members a return to their production levels when they were last determined by OPEC in October 1984, when the overall production ceiling was 16m b/d. In effect, the twelve countries other than Iraq were to share an output of 14.8m b/d;
- established a monitoring committee of marketing officials at OPEC headquarters in Vienna, to ensure compliance with the agreement;
- allowed the agreement to lapse in the face of any confirmed violation by a member country, though in those circumstances an extraordinary OPEC conference would have to be called;
- stated that the agreement was for a temporary period of two months, from 1 September 1986

While scepticism was expressed as to OPEC's ability to maintain discipline in line with the agreement, the compromise was seen as a considerable achievement. Iran's substantial concession, in allowing Iraq to continue producing without restraint in an effort to break the deadlock on quotas, was taken as indicative of the extreme pressure of the oil price collapse on Iran's financial resources. Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, however, made clear that the agreement was an interim one, which would not be extended beyond October 1986. An OPEC meeting, planned for 6 October 1986, would therefore have to result either in definitive quota arrangements to bring about a price of \$17–\$19, or a return to unrestrained production. Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states also overruled opposition from Algeria, Libya and Iran to a reference in the final OPEC communiqué⁴⁰ which restated OPEC's goal of securing a 'fair market share' for its member countries. This strategy had been decided by a majority at OPEC's meeting in December 1985,⁴¹ and had evidently not been abandoned by its advocates, despite their willingness to concede temporary constraints, avowedly to remove surplus oil from the market. The communiqué also reaffirmed the continuing need for cooperation from non-OPEC oil producing countries in restraining production to help to stabilise the market. On 6 August 1986, Mexico agreed to cut

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its output by 150,000 b/d and Malaysia by 50,000 b/d. While, however, Oman, Egypt and Norway also declared that they welcomed the OPEC agreement, they failed to commit themselves to specific reductions.⁴²

● 'A good proposal is a good proposal, no matter who makes it,' Qasim Taki, Iraq's Oil Minister, explaining his country's acceptance of Iran's proposal. *International Herald Tribune* (Paris) 6 August 1986.

The Iranians 'have the facilities to control Iraq's production by ourselves'. Gholamreza Aghazadeh, Iran's Minister of Petroleum, explaining that Iran's proposal did not constitute acceptance of a larger market share for Iraq, and implying that Iraq's oil facilities remained vulnerable to Iranian attack. *Financial Times* (London) 5 August 1986.

▲ Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)
Twentieth Ministerial Council Meeting
Abha, Saudi Arabia, 26-7 August 1986

■ Foreign and oil ministers from the GCC's six member states (Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates) issued a joint communiqué regretting the 'escalating Iranian threats' to GCC members, and expressing 'deep concern at the escalating Iranian interference with navigation to and from the ports of the member-states in the Gulf'.⁴³ Without mentioning Iraq's part in initiating and escalating the 'tanker war' which had already resulted in fifty-seven confirmed strikes against Gulf shipping in 1986, the communiqué called on Iran to cease its 'illegal activities'. The ministers were apparently concerned by Iran's threats to disrupt the oil exports of Gulf member-countries, following its accusations against them of complicity in the Iraqi raid on Iran's Sirri offshore terminal on 12 August 1986. They were also concerned that Iran might retaliate against some of the GCC's weaker member states, and therefore reaffirmed in their communiqué that the GCC was indivisible, and that a threat to one member-state would be regarded as a threat to them all. The ministers were also understood to be considering the establishment of a radar network, as well as a new system of naval escorts, to protect Gulf shipping. These proposals were reportedly referred to the GCC ministers of defence for further study.

The GCC also welcomed the recent interim agreement on production restraint, reached by OPEC in August 1986 (see above). Reaffirming their commitment to the target price for oil of \$17-\$19 per barrel, agreed by a majority of OPEC members, they emphasised that the OPEC agreement was of temporary duration only, and that OPEC was therefore obliged to reach a firm decision of a lasting nature on the issue of production quotas. The ministers expressed the hope in their communiqué that the resulting agreement would stabilise prices at the target level, and contribute towards market stability in general.

Finally, the Council discussed the state of contacts with the EEC, and was reported to have been concerned about the European customs duties being levied on Gulf petrochemical exports to the Community.⁴⁴

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▲ South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC)

First Ministerial Council Meeting

Dhaka, 12–13 August 1986

■ Foreign ministers from SAARC's seven member countries (Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka) met for their first Council meeting since the association was launched at its first summit in Dhaka in December 1985.⁴⁵ SAARC's chairman, President Ershad of Bangladesh, set the tone of the meeting in calling for increased cooperation amongst member states, and for the subduing of traditional tensions between them. Serious differences were, however, reported to have emerged during the Council's consideration of a possible common strategy against regional terrorism. India and Sri Lanka apparently differed sharply on whether or not the activities of Tamil separatists in the north of Sri Lanka could be termed 'acts of terrorism'. The Council simply approved the early convening of a group of experts to report on measures to control terrorism. A study group on drug trafficking and abuse was also proposed, and was to begin on 16 September 1986 in Dhaka.

In a joint communiqué, the ministers approved the creation of a regional agricultural information centre in Bangladesh and a regional meteorological research centre in Dhaka. They also approved their Standing Committee's recommendations on the establishment of a SAARC secretariat, deciding on Kathmandu, Nepal, as the site for the headquarters. The Standing Committee was specifically directed to ensure emphasis on the increasing participation of women in its plans for the various sectors of the integrated programme of action. The Council considered that areas such as education, trade, management of disaster relief, the establishment of investment companies and improvements in postal, telecommunications and air links between SAARC capitals, including special tariff rates, should gradually be introduced into the region's integrated programme. The Council also endorsed a proposal to convene a SAARC conference on South Asian children in New Delhi in November 1986, in collaboration with the UN Children's Fund (UNICEF). Other proposals for collaboration between SAARC and external agencies were to be initiated by SAARC itself, the Council stressed, and based on the association's own determination of its priorities.⁴⁶

▲ Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)

Nineteenth Annual Ministerial Meeting

Manila, 23–4 June 1986

ASEAN—Australia, Canada, EEC, Japan, New Zealand, USA

Meeting of Foreign Ministers

Manila, 26–8 June 1986

■ The regular meeting of foreign ministers from ASEAN's six member-countries (Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore and Thailand) was marked by calls for increased regional economic cooperation and less dependence on the Western industrialised powers.

In her opening speech, President Corazon Aquino of the Philippines criticised ASEAN for its failure to progress towards increased economic cooperation, nineteen

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years after its inception. Describing how growing protectionism in the industrialised countries and the collapse of oil and other commodity prices had stunted economic growth in ASEAN countries, she urged the organisation to look after the region's interests. Foreign ministers present echoed the demands for a reassessment of ASEAN's purpose and potential, expressing the hope that the organisation's forthcoming summit in Manila in June 1987 would stimulate renewed efforts at expanding trade, tourism, investment and other forms of economic cooperation, reinvigorating what many seemed to see as a torpid institution, which was in danger of losing its relevance amidst the region's economic crisis.

A final joint ministerial communiqué singled out Japan, the region's largest trading partner, for criticism on three particular counts: declining Japanese investment trends in ASEAN countries; poor access for ASEAN goods to Japanese markets; and the continuing structural imbalance of ASEAN-Japanese trade. Subsidised agricultural exports from the USA and the EEC, together with protectionist legislation pending in the US Congress, were described in the communiqué as potential problems for ASEAN-US relations. These themes were raised later between foreign ministers of ASEAN and of its six chief trading partners, or 'dialogue' partners. Japan was directly criticised by Malaysia's Foreign Minister, Tengku Ahmad Rithaudin, on behalf of ASEAN. He described how the sharp rise in the value of the yen against South-East Asian currencies had made Japanese loans 'a source of hardship', and also cited the tendency of Japanese companies to invest in the US and the EEC in order to evade their market tariffs and quotas, rather than in the Third World, where lower wages made a more obvious choice for a manufacturing base. Japan's Foreign Minister, Shintaro Abe, replied by promising to consider the broadening of official overseas development assistance to South-East Asia, to make it encompass local currency costs of aid projects, rather than simply covering foreign currency costs, which usually meant Japanese goods and services. He made no mention, however, of reducing restrictions on ASEAN or other Third World imports.

In the forum of ASEAN and its dialogue partners, ASEAN member countries were joined by Australia, Canada and New Zealand in attacking US and EEC export subsidies for causing severe damage to world commodity prices. The USA and the EEC countered by referring to ASEAN's own protectionist barriers. US Secretary of State, George Shultz, suggested that ASEAN's unwillingness to open its own markets to US goods was in fact undermining President Reagan's efforts to defuse protectionist pressures in the US Congress.

The ASEAN ministerial meeting also instructed its officials to draft a South-East Asian Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone Treaty 'as soon as possible', the Indonesian Foreign Minister, Mochtar Kusumaatmadja, remarking that the adoption of the equivalent Treaty of Rarotonga covering the South Pacific zone⁴⁷ had lent fresh impetus to ASEAN's long-standing efforts in this direction. While Indonesia and Malaysia were known to favour the project, Thailand and the Philippines apparently were more wary, fearing the creation of a strategic imbalance in the region between the two superpowers, and concerned about possible conflicts between the requirements of such a treaty and their existing obligations to the US under mutual defence pacts. George Shultz did his utmost to reinforce these doubts in the minds of the ministers present. It seemed, however, that the most immediate obstacle to the establishment of the region as a zone of peace was the issue of Kampuchea. Once

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again in their communiqué, the ministers condemned Vietnam for its occupation of the country, urging outside powers to exert pressure on Vietnam to withdraw its troops, and reaffirming their support for the eight-point proposal of the Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea (CGDK) directed to the settlement of the question.

The ASEAN ministers also signed two agreements: one on energy cooperation, and the other a petroleum securities agreement to share crude oil and petroleum products in times of shortages and gluts.⁴⁸

● 'After nineteen years of existence ASEAN should already be evaluating the impact of regional economic cooperation; instead it is endlessly discussing how to get it off the ground . . . [ASEAN has] problems which threaten to render meaningless our continued association.' President Corazon Aquino of the Philippines, in her opening speech to the ASEAN ministerial conference. *Far Eastern Economic Review* (Hong Kong) 10 July 1986.

There is 'no doubt that ASEAN has lost some sense of direction as well as its momentum'. Tengku Ahmad Rithauddin, Foreign Minister of Malaysia. *International Herald Tribune* (Paris) 24 June 1986.

▲ Kampuchea-Laos-Vietnam

Thirteenth Regular Ministerial Meeting

Hanoi, 17-18 August 1986

■ Foreign ministers of the three Indochinese states reaffirmed their position with regard to the issue of Kampuchea, as set out at previous ministerial conferences.⁴⁹ They repeated their long-standing demand for the elimination of the 'genocidal Pol Pot clique' as a precondition for a political settlement in the region, and reaffirmed the intention of Vietnamese troops to withdraw from Kampuchea by 1990. In a final joint ministerial communiqué, however, the ministers said that 'if the troop withdrawal is capitalised upon, running counter to the peace and stability of Cambodia, the Socialist Republic of Vietnam and the People's Republic of Kampuchea will exchange views and take appropriate steps'. If, the communiqué continued, there were agreement on these two key issues concerning the 'Pol Pot clique' and troop withdrawal, then the negotiation of a political settlement would immediately become possible. The communiqué also reaffirmed Vietnam's willingness to talk to China 'at any level and anywhere', and endorsed Kampuchea's proposal for the establishment of a 'zone of peace' along the Thai-Kampuchean border, which neither side would allow foreign forces to use as a basis for hostilities against the other side. A statement by the Thai Foreign Minister on 13 August 1986, saying that Thailand would not authorise its territory to be used for the purposes of destabilisation was noted.

In a second part of the joint communiqué, the ministers expressed support for the initiatives on the Asia-Pacific region advanced by the Soviet leader, Mikhail Gorbachev, in a speech in Vladivostok on 28 July 1986. The ministers regarded the proposals as 'an initial comprehensive peace plan' for the whole region. They also proposed, in order to avoid divisiveness over the issue of Kampuchea at the

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forthcoming Non-Aligned Summit in Harare in September 1986, that Kampuchea's seat should be left vacant at the UN. It is currently occupied by the UN-recognised Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea (CGDK), which is opposed to the Vietnamese-backed Heng Samrin regime in Phnom Penh.⁵⁰

▲ Argentina-Brazil

Summit

Buenos Aires, 28-30 July 1986

Brazil-Uruguay

Summit

Brasilia, 14 August 1986

■ During a state visit by President José Sarney of Brazil to President Raúl Alfonsín of Argentina, the leaders signed a series of agreements designed to integrate the two largest economies in South America, and possibly form the nucleus of a future Latin American common market.

The General Agreement on Integration and Development, signed on 29 July 1986, contained twelve protocols specifying areas of future cooperation, and was to take effect from 1 January 1987. Its aim was to expand and balance trade between Argentina and Brazil, which had been declining for the past five years, and was in deficit for Argentina, through granting preferential treatment to each others' exports over goods from third countries. The area chosen to spearhead this move towards integration in production and trade was the capital goods sector, involving a range of industries. Also the subject of increased cooperation were trade in primary products (notably involving an exchange of Argentinian wheat and Brazilian iron ore) and other sectors such as energy and aeronautics. The twelve protocols provided for:

- 1) a customs union in bilateral trade in capital goods, with the removal of all trade barriers, and the levying of a common duty on products from third countries. A list of products to be covered was to be compiled with private sector help by the end of 1986. The protocol included a mechanism for ensuring balanced trade in listed products. The stated target was the increase of bilateral trade to \$400m in 1987 and eventually to \$750m in 1990.
- 2) Brazilian purchases of Argentinian wheat to increase to 1.4m tons in 1987, rising to 2m tons in 1991.
- 3) Promotion of food security by increased bilateral trade in food products, in an effort to overcome seasonal shortages.
- 4) The general promotion of bilateral trade, including the elimination of trade imbalances.
- 5) Legislation to aid the formation of binational companies.
- 6) Support from both countries' central banks in securing balanced trade.
- 7) An investment fund of \$200m with equal contributions by both countries, to help expand production.
- 8) Cooperation in energy development to expand oil and gas production in Argentina, and possibly natural gas exports to Brazil, and in the generation of hydroelectricity.
- 9) Promotion of biotechnology.



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- 10) Economic research centres for monitoring the integration project.
- 11) Cooperation in the event of nuclear accidents.
- 12) Cooperation in aircraft manufacture.⁵¹

Some opposition was expressed from Argentinian industrialists, who feared that Argentina's traditionally protected markets were not ready to grant access to Brazil's rapidly expanding exports. Argentinian labour organisations were also wary of possible pressure to compete with Brazil's considerably lower wages. The impetus for this renewed effort at Latin American integration, in the wake of a series of failed attempts,⁵² seemed, however, to stem from the two countries' common problems, amongst which their joint external debt of \$150bn and increasing Western protectionism featured prominently. It was hoped that these cautious moves by two new democracies and traditional rivals for regional leadership, would, in the manner of French and West German integration in Europe, bring about the eventual creation of a common market, which could then fight the region's common problems on a status equivalent to that of the economic power blocs of the USA and the EEC.

The arrangement was declared open to all democratic states, with overtures being considered to Colombia, Mexico and Venezuela, to the exclusion of the military regimes of Chile and Paraguay. President Julio Sanguinetti of Uruguay, present at the summit in Buenos Aires, indicated his willingness to join the programme within ninety days. He subsequently signed six accords with President Sarney while on a visit to Brazil in August 1986. Covering cooperation in science, technology and agriculture, the agreements formed a continuing part of the effort towards regional integration.⁵³

● 'One of the indispensable conditions for Latin American integration is the existence of democratic regimes.' President Raúl Alfonsín of Argentina.

'The modern world is made up of economies operating in conjunction—Latin America is the only exception.' President José Sarney of Brazil. *South* (London) October 1986.

'What we are creating this week is the embryo of a common market in South America. . . . The plan is audacious in its conception and will be cautious in its implementation. But the formation of a common market in South America is now not only a need. It is a necessity to give our nations a greater capacity to negotiate on equal terms with the economic power blocs which have developed in North America and Europe.' Jorge Romero, Argentina's Vice-Minister of International Economic Relations, and one of the principal negotiators of the agreements. *Financial Times* (London) 29 July 1986.

'We have moved from words to action. Latin America is walking along a path towards integration that has superseded mere rhetoric.' President Julio Sanguinetti of Uruguay. *The Times* (London) 15 August 1986.

▲ Organisation of African Unity (OAU)

Liberation Committee: Forty-Sixth Ministerial Session
Arusha, Tanzania, 14–16 July 1986

■ In a final communiqué, the OAU's Liberation Committee called on Commonwealth members to boycott the thirteenth Commonwealth Games in

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Edinburgh in September 1986, in protest against Britain's refusal to impose economic sanctions against South Africa. The communiqué condemned Britain for ignoring the proposals of the Commonwealth Eminent Persons Group (CEPG) (see above) and, along with the US, France, West Germany and Israel, for continuing to cooperate with South Africa in the fields of economic affairs and nuclear weapons.

The committee also passed a resolution creating a special commission of military advisers to consider the needs of the Southern African liberation movements. It agreed on the need to encourage OAU member states to provide moral and material support to these movements.⁵⁴

▲ Organisation of African Unity (OAU)

Forty-Fourth Ministerial Council Meeting and Twenty-Second Annual Summit
Addis Ababa, 21-5 July and 28-30 July 1986

■ High-level representatives including twenty-two heads of state or government from the OAU's fifty member countries met for their annual summit. Zaire was prevailed upon by the outgoing OAU Chairman, President Abdou Diouf of Senegal, to resume its seat after an absence of two years. It had been boycotting the organisation, along with Morocco, in protest against the admission to the OAU of the Saharawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR). It was insisted, however, that Zaire's renewed participation in the organisation did not signal a change in its policy regarding SADR.⁵⁵ The leaders considered a number of resolutions proposed by the preceding Council of Ministers, though the dominant issues of the summit were Southern Africa and the continent's \$180bn external debt.

An unusual note was sounded at the meeting by President Yoweri Museveni, whose National Resistance Army had defeated Uganda's military government on 25 January 1986. In his first speech to the OAU, Africa's newest leader attacked the organisation's member countries for remaining silent over a period of twenty years while the successive governments of Idi Amin and Milton Obote killed vast numbers of Uganda's citizens. Insisting that 'tyranny is colour blind' and 'should be no less reprehensible when perpetrated by one of our kind', he said that Africa's failure to condemn such violations of human rights undermined its moral authority to criticise other abuses, particularly those of the South African government. Rejecting the habitual defence of dictators that the OAU and UN Charters forbid interference in the internal affairs of member states, he denied that such an argument could be used 'as a cloak to shield genocide from just censure'. President Museveni went on to reaffirm that it was the OAU's sacred duty to assist the people of South Africa, advocating armed struggle against Pretoria if it failed to dismantle apartheid. It was manifest that Museveni was issuing a plea for legitimate self-criticism within the OAU, to break the customary conspiracy of silence on violations of human rights, rather than offering a pretext for the apologists of the Pretoria regime to disregard the criticisms of Africa's leaders.

In his opening speech to the summit, Colonel Mengistu Haile Mariam of Ethiopia attacked the US and some Western European states which he said had entered into an unholy alliance with Pretoria by failing to impose sanctions. Among the resolutions on South Africa passed by the summit was that proposed by President Abdou Diouf, creating a committee of heads of state to follow events in South

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Africa. The committee, headed by the new OAU Chairman, President Denis Sassou Nguesso of Congo, was composed of the leaders of the six Frontline States (FLS) plus Nigeria, Senegal, Algeria, Ethiopia, Cape Verde and the Southern African liberation movements. The leaders adopted the resolutions formulated by their foreign ministers, condemning the five Western states, Britain, France, Israel, West Germany and the USA for their continued connections with South Africa. They singled out for criticism Britain's 'relentless campaign against the imposition of comprehensive and mandatory sanctions' against Pretoria, and the US policy of constructive engagement. A resolution proposed by Nigeria, spearheading the more militant OAU advocates of sanctions, condemned the recent speech by US President Reagan in which he reiterated his opposition to sanctions.

The leaders went on to advocate voluntary reprisals against Britain as a means of persuading the government to impose sanctions. The specific measures suggested included a sports boycott, economic measures and the severing of diplomatic relations. African countries were urged to increase their support for Southern African liberation movements and to withdraw from South Africa the use of their facilities for ships and aircraft. A proposal made by Zimbabwe's Prime Minister, Robert Mugabe, following the South African raids on neighbouring Botswana, Zambia and Zimbabwe in May 1986 was not taken up. Robert Mugabe had suggested the creation of a pan-African rapid deployment force to oppose South Africa and to help to defend the FLS. On Angola, the OAU approved a resolution saying that USA support for South African-backed rebels in Angola constituted an 'act of undeclared war'. In particular, the provision of Stinger missiles to UNITA was considered a hostile act, and an affront to the OAU. Such assistance was said to constitute a serious violation of the UN Charter and the regime on international aggression.

Following a speech on the economic situation in Africa by President Diouf, the leaders adopted a resolution calling for an international conference on debt. The OAU Secretary-General and the Executive Secretary of the UN Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) were mandated to compile reports on the debt crisis in preparation for such a conference. This call had however, previously met with the habitual opposition of Africa's creditor countries, which, as President Diouf observed, insisted on dealing with debtor countries on a case-by-case basis. The UN General Assembly Special Session on Africa in May 1986⁵⁶ was discussed, President Diouf recommending that contacts with Western governments be continued, in order to overcome their evident reticence in making specific commitments.

In his speech, the newly-elected OAU Chairman, President Sassou Nguesso, focused attention on solving regional conflicts within Africa, such as those in Chad and Western Sahara, as well as the guerrilla wars in Angola and Mozambique. He urged the creation of a 'Council of Wise Men', composed of former African heads of state, whose national and international reputations were untarnished. The OAU mediation, conciliation and arbitration commission would aid the council in reconciling Africa's conflicting parties.

The OAU Secretary-General was also mandated to study the possibility of holding a third Afro-Arab summit, the last one having been held in 1977 in Kampala. Other resolutions condemned the US raids on Libya in April 1986, with reservations by the Ivory Coast, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Egypt and Zaïre; appealed to France to return the island of Mayotte to the Comoros; called for the renewal of the

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mandate of Ahmadu Mahtar M'Bow as Director-General of UNESCO; and adopted an African anthem to be played at all future OAU summits.⁵⁷

● 'Over a period of twenty years nearly three quarters of a million Ugandans perished at the hands of governments that should have protected them. Ugandans feel a deep sense of betrayal that most of Africa kept silent while tyrants killed them.' President Yoweri Museveni of Uganda, in his maiden speech to the summit. *The Times* (London) 30 July 1986.

The alignment of the US and some Western European countries with Pretoria 'clearly demonstrates that their sole interest lies in promoting their economic interests at the expense of human rights'. Colonel Mengistu Haile Mariam of Ethiopia, in his opening speech. *The Guardian* (London) 29 July 1986.

Though Africa was always ready to honour its international commitments, 'the fact remained that our fragile economies are on the point of collapse under the heavy weight of foreign debt, so much so that all the efforts and sacrifices agreed will not achieve anything if the debt is not rescheduled'. President Abdou Diouf of Senegal, outgoing Chairman of the OAU. *West Africa* (London) 4 August 1986.

▲ Southern African Frontline States (FLS)

Summit

Harare, 18 July 1986

■ Leaders from the six FLS met to decide whether or not to join the boycott, led by Nigeria, of the thirteenth Commonwealth Games in Edinburgh, in protest at Britain's opposition to the application of Commonwealth sanctions against South Africa. Of the six states, Botswana, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe are Commonwealth members, while Angola and Mozambique, as former Portuguese colonies, are not.

No unanimous decision was taken, but according to a final communiqué, Zambia and Zimbabwe joined Tanzania (which had already decided in favour of a boycott) in withdrawing from the Games. They did, however, express their willingness to reconsider the decision, provided that the British Prime Minister, Margaret Thatcher, made 'a categorical statement before the start of the Games to the effect that the British Government would impose economic sanctions against South Africa'. The British government's refusal to do so, it said, constituted support for the racist Pretoria regime. Mandatory comprehensive economic sanctions, the communiqué continued, remained the only peaceful means left available of exerting pressure on Pretoria to dismantle apartheid. Botswana, meanwhile, remained undecided on the boycott. Subsequent to the meeting, it announced its intention to remain in the Games, while reaffirming its solidarity with the FLS.

The communiqué also expressed disappointment with the position of the EEC on South Africa, though without explicitly condemning the mission of the British Foreign Minister, Sir Geoffrey Howe, to South Africa, in the wake of the failed Commonwealth Eminent Persons Group (CEPG).⁵⁸

● 'The ball is in her court. We have not decided to boycott the Games. All of us are ready and willing to move.' President Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia, declining to

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answer specific questions as to the conditions of the FLS for participating in the Games, but suggesting instead that they would wait to hear the response of the British Prime Minister. *Financial Times* (London) 19 July 1986.

▲ FLS Summit

Luanda, 21 August 1986

Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC)

Sixth Annual Summit

Luanda, 22 August 1986

■ Leaders of the six FLS (Angola, Botswana, Mozambique, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe) attended an impromptu meeting which coincided with SADCC's annual summit. The FLA leaders were invited by their Chairman, President Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia, to coordinate their positions on the implementation of sanctions against South Africa, following the Commonwealth 'mini-summit' in London at which six of the seven leaders present had agreed on a joint course of economic measures. (See above.)

While President Kaunda had apparently hoped to secure a joint decision on cutting air links with South Africa, the FLS were unable to agree on specific measures. A final communiqué merely hailed Zambia and Zimbabwe for their part in the London summit, commending the measures adopted there to all countries. It was understood that the reticence on sanctions of Botswana and to some extent Mozambique, both heavily dependent economically on South Africa, had necessitated this compromise communiqué, despite the relatively forthcoming approach of Zambia and Zimbabwe.

Differences in the economic vulnerability of South Africa's neighbours were even more apparent at the SADCC summit, where the six FLS were joined by the remaining three SADCC member countries, Lesotho and Swaziland, whose geographical dependence on South Africa is self-evident, and Malawi, which maintains formal diplomatic ties with Pretoria and whose President Banda declined to attend the summit. The Kenyan President, Daniel arap Moi was also absent from the meeting, despite his having been offered an invitation, in the hope of discussing Kenya's substantial air links with South Africa.

Despite the reservations of several SADCC countries on the application of sanctions against South Africa, the SADCC communiqué said that 'vulnerability to South Africa's economy should not be used as an excuse . . . for not imposing sanctions'. The leaders also agreed that SADCC countries 'will do nothing to undermine the effectiveness of sanctions imposed on South Africa by the international community'. This assurance constituted a significant commitment not to assist Pretoria in possible 'sanctions-busting' efforts. The communiqué called on the international community to aid SADCC's attempts to further its economic independence from South Africa, and emphasised the need to increase agricultural production, encourage regional trade and improve transport. The leaders also condemned Pretoria for continued acts of aggression and destabilisation against SADCC members, in particular the attacks on Gaborone, Lusaka, Harare and Namibia in 1986 and the retaliatory economic

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measures against Zambia and Zimbabwe which immediately followed the London Commonwealth meeting.

It was decided that SADCC's forthcoming annual consultative conference in Gaborone in February 1987 would focus on investments for the production sector, within the Lusaka Programme of Action. SADCC's next annual summit was scheduled for August 1987, in Lusaka.

Soon after the meetings President Kaunda announced, during a visit to Lusaka by the Revd Jesse Jackson, the US civil rights activist, that the FLS had reached a further decision during their summit. They were preparing to invite US President Reagan to a summit in Southern Africa, or alternatively to visit Washington themselves.⁵⁹ The invitation was apparently being drafted for approval at the summit of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) in Harare in September 1986.⁶⁰

● 'If we fail, South Africa will make us bleed. If we succeed, our freedom and pride will be assured.' President Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia, speaking of SADCC's imperative need for economic independence from South Africa. *The Guardian* (London) 23 August 1986.

'The Pretoria government is casting about its eyes and aiming its guns around the region, looking for scapegoats for its internal problems and taking measures which will involve the rest of the region in conflict.' President Quett Masire of Botswana, Chairman of SADCC, warning of the prospect of further South African destabilisation. *The Guardian* (London) 23 August 1986.

▲ Malawi-Mozambique-Zambia-Zimbabwe Summit

Blantyre, Malawi, 11 September 1986

■ In an unprecedented summit, President Kamuzu Banda of Malawi held talks with three representatives of the six Southern African Frontline States (FLS). President Samora Machel of Mozambique, President Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia and Prime Minister Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe. The meeting followed the decision at an FLS summit in Luanda in August 1986 (see above) to take measures to strengthen regional cooperation in preparation for increasing pressure on the South African government.

The FLS leaders apparently criticised President Banda for maintaining links with Pretoria, failing to bring Malawi's trade to Mozambique's ports and railways, assisting Mozambique's South African-backed rebel movement (the MNR) and generally contributing to the destabilisation of the region. Malawi is the only member country of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) to maintain full diplomatic relations with Pretoria, and though a member of the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC), persists in using South Africa's ports in preference to Mozambique's, which are clearly closer. President Banda in turn denied aiding the MNR, despite evidence that South Africa's logistical support was being provided to the rebels through bases in Malawi. He also explained, ironically in the view of his accusers, that Malawi no longer used the rail links to Mozambique's ports of Beira and Nacala on account of their constant disruption by MNR activity.

President Machel, who was accompanied to the meeting by his defence and

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security ministers, replied by threatening to close the Mozambique-Malawi border and station missiles along it, unless Malawi ceased its destabilisation of the FLS. Such a move would severely disrupt Malawi's economy, in that much of the country's trade travels through Mozambique in transit to Zimbabwe and South Africa. The FLS leaders suggested that Malawi's other neighbours, Zambia and Tanzania, would also be prepared to close their borders if the need arose.

It was agreed that Malawi and Mozambique would hold a further ministerial meeting to discuss the problem of the MNR.⁶¹

● When ports belonged to the whites, Malawi liked it. When the ports of Beira, Maputo and Nacala belonged to the Portuguese colonialists, Malawi did its best so that the whole world would send the goods through those ports . . . This is an inferiority complex toward the Europeans . . . When we proclaimed the People's Republic of Mozambique, the ports of Beira and Nacala, which were totally geared to serve Malawi were no longer to Malawi's taste because they were in black hands.' President Samora Machel of Mozambique, at a press conference following his return to Maputo. *BBC Summary of World Broadcasts* ME/8364/B/1-2, 15 September 1986.

▲ Non-Aligned Movement (NAM)

Foreign Ministers' Meeting and Eighth Summit
Harare, 28-9 August and 1-7 September 1986

■ The NAM's triennial summit in Harare marked the movement's twenty-fifth anniversary since its inception in 1961. It was attended by representatives from 94 of NAM's 101 members (99 states together with the PLO and SWAPO), and of these representatives, fifty were heads of state or government. The summit, held in one of the six Southern African Frontline States (FLS) in order to focus the world's attention on the crisis in the region, produced the nine-page Harare Special Declaration on South Africa. In addition, it issued an appeal on disarmament to the superpower leaders, as well as separate economic and political declarations.⁶²

Prime Minister Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe, assuming the NAM chairmanship for the next three years from Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi of India, gave the summit's opening speech. In it, he struck an unexpected note in calling for the application by NAM members of voluntary, selective economic measures against South Africa as a pragmatic interim step towards mandatory international sanctions. The Harare meeting followed earlier summits of the FLS and the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) in Luanda, where the evident vulnerability of South Africa's neighbouring states to retaliation by Pretoria had precluded agreement on the adoption of specific sanctions. (See above.) Both Robert Mugabe and President Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia had firmly advocated the full application of sanctions against South Africa at the recent Commonwealth 'mini-summit' in London (see above), but in Harare, President Kaunda acknowledged the relative futility of sanctions in the absence of support from South Africa's major trading partners.

The NAM summit's resolutions on South Africa:

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- advocated that the UN Security Council (SC) prescribe comprehensive sanctions under the UN Charter's chapter VII, which would be mandatory on all members;
- urged NAM members to apply voluntary selective measures from a list of thirteen points contained in the Harare special declaration. The list embraced the sanctions advocated at the Commonwealth mini-summit and in the US Congress, as well as the cutting of shipping links with South Africa.
- proposed to send a group of eight foreign ministers (from Algeria, Argentina, Congo, India, Nigeria, Peru, Yugoslavia and Zimbabwe) to Britain, Japan, West Germany and the USA, South Africa's major trading partners, in an effort to persuade them to back comprehensive sanctions, and suspend the habitual vetoes of Britain and the USA in the UNSC.
- created a Solidarity Fund to provide assistance to the FLS. Fund-raising was to be on a regional basis, with Saudi Arabia and Iran concentrating on the Middle East effort, Cuba and Argentina on Latin America, Bhutan on Asia and Yugoslavia on Europe. A committee led by Rajiv Gandhi and President Kaunda produced a document detailing the future activities of the fund, chiefly concerned with strengthening the region's infrastructure and making it fully independent of South Africa. These activities were to be supervised by the same group of countries which was leading the diplomatic initiative to the Western states.
- urged an increase in international aid to Southern African liberation movements, including the groups banned in South Africa itself.

While Southern Africa was a key issue in President Mugabe's speech, he gave precedence to the general issues of disarmament and development.⁶³ In a special Harare Appeal to US President Reagan and the Soviet leader, Mikhail Gorbachev, the summit leaders urged a reduction in international tension, with a moratorium on the testing, production and deployment of nuclear weapons. In their economic declaration, they went on to suggest means of easing the crippling debt burden of developing countries, including limiting service repayments to a given percentage of export earnings, as Peru had done. The problems of Africa were given special mention in the context of external debt, and traditional Third World concerns were repeated, over falling commodity prices, increasing protectionism, and generally deteriorating terms of trade.

A specific outcome of the summit's deliberations on economic matters was the decision to create an Independent Commission of the South on Development Issues. The 'South Commission', it was announced by Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad of Malaysia, was to be headed by Dr Julius Nyerere. While President of Tanzania, Dr Nyerere had first suggested the establishment of such a commission to promote cooperation among developing countries at a conference in 1978 sponsored by the Third World Foundation.⁶⁴ It was hoped that the efforts of the independent commission, whose members would serve in their personal capacities, would be complementary to the work both of NAM and the Group of 77 (G77).

In their political declaration, the leaders urged the two antagonists in the Gulf War, Iran and Iraq, both NAM members, to 'summon the political will' to end the conflict. During the summit, however, President Ali Khamenei of Iran had called for the expulsion of Iraq from NAM, and for the execution of the country's leaders. Colonel Gadhafi of Libya spoke out during the summit against NAM members which had recognised Israel or were aligned with the USA. He called for the abolition of

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NAM in the sense that he advocated a positive alignment with 'liberation' against the opposing camp of 'imperialism'. It was observed that the Harare declaration contained a total of fifty-four separate attacks on aspects of US foreign policy, particularly in Southern Africa, Central America, the Middle East and the Mediterranean, where its raids on Libya in April 1986 were condemned as 'acts of state terrorism', and Britain was criticised along with the US. Conversely, it was observed, references were made to withdrawing foreign troops from Afghanistan and Kampuchea without explicit mention of the occupying powers, the Soviet Union and Vietnam. Despite consequent accusations that the movement was more aligned with the East against the West, than genuinely non-aligned, a bid by Nicaragua to host the next NAM summit in 1989 and hence assume the Chairmanship after Zimbabwe, failed. Apparent support for the chairmanship of President Daniel Saavedra Ortega by Angola, Mozambique, Cuba and North Korea failed to outweigh opposition from members including Kenya, Cameroon and many countries of Latin America. It was merely agreed that the NAM ministerial meeting which customarily precedes the summit would be held in Cyprus in 1988, while the issue of the chairmanship was left undecided.⁶⁵

● Without the major trading partners of South Africa participating, there are no sanctions at all . . . If Zimbabwe tomorrow applied sanctions on their own . . . it would be suicide on our part, it would be meaningless.' President Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia, speaking at a press conference on the need for Western support for sanctions. *Financial Times* (London) 6 September 1986.

'The debt crisis, in particular the debt service burden it imposes on economies of the debtor countries concerned, has reached grotesque proportions . . . To allow the monster to deal with us on a case-by-case basis is a recipe for disaster.' Prime Minister Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe, incoming chairman of NAM, in his opening speech. *Financial Times* (London) 2 September 1986.

'Non-alignment has become a word that should not be used. We are all aligned against the imperialist camp. There is no meaning to the word neutrality. We are all against the United States, Zionism and racism . . . The movement has reached a different stage from the great tradition of Tito and Nasser—the dream of neutrality is over.' Colonel Muammar Gadhafi of Libya, in his speech to the meeting. *The Guardian* (London) 5 September 1986.

'There has been an invasion of Grenada, Libya, support for the Contras in Nicaragua and El Salvador. The Soviet Union is in Afghanistan, yes, but how do you balance that?' Robert Mugabe, denying that the summit had been unbalanced in its criticism of the US rather than the Soviet Union. *The Times* (London) 8 September 1986.

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NOTES

In these notes the following abbreviations are used for newspapers and periodicals: *Econ* = The Economist (London); *FT* = Financial Times (London); *FEER* = Far Eastern Economic Review (Hong Kong); *Gma* = Granma (Havana); *G* = The Guardian (London); *IHT* = International Herald Tribune (Paris); *MEED* = Middle East Economic Digest (London); *MEER* = Middle East Economic Review (Washington, DC); *MEES* = Middle East Economic Survey (Nicosia); *Obs* = The Observer (London); *S* = South (London); *SN* = Soviet News (London); *SW* = Soviet Weekly (London); *ST* = Sunday Times (London); *SWB* = Summary of World Broadcasts (London); *T* = The Times (London); *TWQ* = Third World Quarterly (London); *UNPR* = UN Press Release; *USIS* = US Information Service; *WA* = West Africa (London); *XNA* = Xinhua News Agency.

- ¹ For the UN General Assembly Special Session on Africa, see *TWQ* 8(4) October 1986 pp 1372-4.
- ² *UNPR* FC/192 17 June 1986, FC/193 19 June 1986.
- ³ On the UN General Assembly Special Session on Africa, see *TWQ* 8(4) October 1986, pp 1372-4.
- ⁴ *FT* 3, 9 September 1986; *IHT* 3 September 1986; *T* 12 September 1986; *Obs* 31 August 1986, *WA* 8 August 1986, p 1889; *S* October 1986, p 16; *UNPR* FAO/3398 29 August 1986, FAO/3399 2 September 1986, FAO/3400 16 September 1986. On the current plague of locusts and grasshoppers, see *IHT* 8 August 1986; *T* 28 August 1986; *ST* 24 August 1986; *Obs* 24 August 1986.
- ⁵ *G* 7, 10, 12 July 1986; *IHT* 8 July 1986; *T* 27 August 1986; *UNPR* WS/86/21 17 July 1986.
- ⁶ *UNPR* GA/7320 17 September 1986, GA/7318 17 September 1986, GA/7324 19 September 1986, GA/7327 20 September 1986.
- ⁷ For the ico's last attempt to settle the issue of quotas, see *TWQ* 8(4) October 1986, pp 1376-7.
- ⁸ *G* 30 June 1986 and 14 July 1986; *IHT* 7 July 1986; *T* 7 July 1986.
- ⁹ On the UN Cocoa Conference, Part 4, see *TWQ*, 8(3) July 1986, pp 1037-8.
- ¹⁰ *FT* 5, 8, 9, 10, 11, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 28 July 1986; *G* 7, 21 July 1986, 1, 9, 22 September 1986; *T* 8 July 1986; *IHT* 28 July 1986; *WA* 21 July 1986, p 1533; *S* August 1986, p 13; *UNCTAD Bulletin* (Geneva) July/August 1986; *UNPR* TAD/INF/1804 7 July 1986, TAD/INF/1805 11 July 1986, TAD/INF/1807 16 July 1986, TAD/1430 29 July 1986.
- ¹¹ *FT* 10, 30 July 1986; *UNCTAD Bulletin* (Geneva) July/August 1986; *UNPR* TAD/1431 29 July 1986; *WA* 4 August 1986, p 1640.
- ¹² On the mechanics of the world wheat market, see feature in *FT* 8 August 1986.
- ¹³ *FT* 23, 26, 29 July 1986, 8, 26 August 1986; *G* 6 July 1986; *IHT* 25 August 1986.
- ¹⁴ For the first summit of the Five Continent Peace Initiative, see *TWQ* 7(3) July 1985, pp 699-70.
- ¹⁵ The Soviet unilateral moratorium on nuclear tests was subsequently extended on 18 August 1986 until 1 January 1987. *G* 19 August 1986; *FT* 19 August 1986; *T* 19 August 1986; *IHT* 19 August 1986.
- ¹⁶ The final document is in *Armament and Disarmament Information Unit (ADIU) Report* (Sussex) September-October 1986 and *SWB* ME/8335/D/1-2, 12 August 1986.
- ¹⁷ *FT* 6, 8 August 1986; *G* 8 August 1986; *T* 8 August 1986; *SWB* ME/8329/iii 5 August 1986, ME/8332/iii 8 August 1986; ME/8335/D/3 12 August 1986.
- ¹⁸ For previous rounds of MFA negotiations, see *TWQ* 8(1) January 1986, pp 299-300, 8(2) April 1986, pp 717-8, 8(4) October 1986, pp 1396-7.
- ¹⁹ The presidential veto of the Jenkins Bill was in fact sustained by the lack of eight votes in the House of Representatives on 6 August 1986. *FT* 8 August 1986; *IHT* 8 August 1986.
- ²⁰ For example the US had concluded bilateral agreements with Hong Kong and Taiwan (a non-MFA party) and subsequently did so with South Korea on 4 August 1986. See *FT* 1 July 1986, *IHT* 6 August 1986.
- ²¹ *GATT Focus* (Geneva) July-August-September 1986; *FT* 10, 23, 29, 30, 31 July 1986, 1, 2, 4, 5, 6 August 1986; *G* 19, 21 July 1986, 1, 2 August 1986; *IHT* 21 July 1986, 2-3 August 1986; *T* 28 July 1986, 1, 2 August 1986; *Econ* 26 July 1986; *WA* 11 August 1986, pp 1691-2.

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- ²² For the Nassau CHOOM see *TWQ* 8(2) April 1986, pp 711–15. The EFG members are listed at footnote 96, p 741.
- ²³ The leaders present at the London summit were Prime Minister (PM) Bob Hawke of Australia, PM Lynden Pindling of the Bahamas, PM Margaret Thatcher of Britain, PM Brian Mulroney of Canada, PM Rajiv Gandhi of India, President Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia and PM Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe.
- ²⁴ The summit communiqué is in *T* 6 August 1986. Excerpts are in *G* 5 August 1986 and *WA* 11 August 1986.
- ²⁵ Sir Geoffrey Howe's mission, similar to that of the CEPG, was determined at the EEC summit at The Hague in June 1986. He was due to report back to the EEC foreign ministers on 15–16 September 1986.
- ²⁶ *Commonwealth Currents* (London) August 1986; *FT* 2, 4, 5, 6 August 1986; *G* 2, 4, 5, 6 August 1986; *T* 2, 4, 5, 6 August; *ST* 3 August 1986; *Obs* 3 August 1986; *IHT* 6 August 1986; *S* September 1986; *WA* 4 August 1986, pp 1612–13 and 11 August 1986, pp 1600–2.
- ²⁷ Prime Minister Bob Hawke of Australia cancelled his attendance at the summit at the end of July 1986, because of the climate of economic crisis in Australia. *T* 29 July 1986; *FT* 30 July 1986.
- ²⁸ For the South Pacific Forum Summit at Rarotonga in August 1985, see *TWQ* 8(1) January 1986, pp 292–3.
- ²⁹ *T* 7, 9, 12, 13 August 1986; *FT* 9, 12 August 1986; *IHT* 9–10, 13 August 1986; *G* 12 August 1986; *SWB* FE/8333/A3/1–2 9 August 1986, FE/8334/A3/6 11 August 1986, FE/8335/A3/6–7 12 August 1986.
- ³⁰ *FT* 10 July 1986, 28 August 1986; *IHT* 26, 27, 28 August 1986; *G* 28 August 1986; *T* 28 August 1986; *Le Monde* (Paris) 27, 29 August 1986.
- ³¹ Excerpts of the Punta del Este Ministerial Declaration are in *FT* 22 September 1986.
- ³² At the Sintra 'quadrilateral talks', the parties reached agreement in principle to the inclusion of agriculture and services in the new GATT round, but failed to reach a consensus on how to approach them.
- ³³ The ten developing countries opposing services and other of the US demands were Argentina, Brazil, Cuba, Egypt, India, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Peru, Tanzania and Yugoslavia.
- ³⁴ These countries included Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Pakistan, Hong Kong, South Korea, Jamaica, Uruguay, Chile, Mexico, Turkey, the Ivory Coast, Zaire and the South-East Asian countries as well as Colombia.
- ³⁵ *FT* 6, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 22, 23 September 1986; *IHT* 8, 9, 15, 16, 19, 20–21, 22 September 1986; *G* 9, 10, 11, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 22 September 1986; *T* 11, 15, 17, 18, 20, 22 September 1986; *Econ* 13, 27 September 1986; *ST* 14 September 1986; *FEER* 2 October 1986, pp 100–1.
- ³⁶ For OPEC's Brioni meeting in June 1986, see *TWQ* 8(4) October 1986, pp 1403–5.
- ³⁷ The oil ministers of Saudi Arabia and Kuwait had met the UAE leader, Sheikh Zaid, in Abu Dhabi on 20 July 1986, apparently in an attempt to soften the UAE's hard line on its quota demands. *FT* 21 July 1986.
- ³⁸ On Dr Subroto's proposals, see *MEES* 4 August 1986, p A2.
- ³⁹ On the Algerian proposal, see *MEES* 4 August 1986, p A4.
- ⁴⁰ The OPEC communiqué is reproduced in *MEES* 11 August 1986, p A7.
- ⁴¹ On OPEC's December 1985 meeting, see *TWQ* 8(2) April 1986, pp 730–1.
- ⁴² *MEES* 28 July 1986, pp A1–4, 4 August 1986, pp A1–4 and 11 August 1986, pp A1–7; *FT* 28, 29, 30, 31 July 1986, 1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 August 1986; *G* 28, 29, 30, 31 July 1986, 1, 2, 4, 5, 6 August 1986; *IHT* 28, 29, 30, 31 July 1986, 1, 2–3, 4, 5, 7 August 1986; *T* 28 July 1986, 4, 5, 6 August 1986; *Obs* 3 August 1986; *WA* 11 August 1986 p 1667; *Econ* 9 August 1986.
- ⁴³ The gcc communiqué is in *MEES* 1 September 1986, p A3.
- ⁴⁴ *G* 27, 29 August 1986; *T* 27, 28 August 1986; *MEES* 1 September 1986, pp A2–3; *MEED* 30 August 1986 p 4; *SWB* ME/8350/A8–9 29 August 1986.
- ⁴⁵ On SAARC's first summit in December 1985, see *TWQ* 8(2) April 1986, pp 724–7.
- ⁴⁶ *T* 13 August 1986; *SWB* FE/8337/A3/2–3 14 August 1986 and FE/8338/A3/4 15 August 1986.
- ⁴⁷ On the South Pacific Forum's Treaty of Rarotonga, see *TWQ* 8(1) January 1986, pp 292–3.
- ⁴⁸ *FT* 25, 27 June 1986; *T* 24, 27 June 1986; *IHT* 24, 25, 26, 30 June 1986; *FEER* 10 July 1986, p 15; *SWB* FE/8294/A3/1–2 25 June 1986, FE/8295/A3/2–3 26 June 1986.

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- ⁴⁹ On the eleventh and twelfth Indochinese foreign ministers' conferences in Phnom Penh and Vientiane, see *TWQ* 8(1) January 1986, pp 322-3 and 8(3) July 1986, pp 1600-1.
- ⁵⁰ *SWB* FE/8341/1 19 August 1986, FE/8342/i and FE/8342/A3/1-5 20 August 1986.
- ⁵¹ For the details of the protocols, see *SWB* ME/8325/D/1-3 31 July 1986.
- ⁵² For a catalogue of Latin America's endeavours in the realm of regional integration, see *S* October 1986, pp 97-8.
- ⁵³ *FT* 23, 29, 31 July 1986, 1 August 1986; *T* 14, 28, 31 July 1986, 15 August 1986; *G* 29, 31 July 1986; *IHT* 30, 31 July 1986; *Econ* 2 August 1986; *S* October 1986.
- ⁵⁴ *SWB* ME/8312/ii 16 July 1986, ME/8313/ii 17 July 1986, ME/8314/ii and ME/8314/B/6-7 18 July 1986, ME/8315/ii 19 July 1986; *WA* 21 July 1986, p 1547.
- ⁵⁵ See remarks made by Zaire's head of diplomacy, Mandungu Bula Nyati, reported in *WA* 4 August 1986, pp 1651-2.
- ⁵⁶ See *TWQ* 8(4) October 1986, pp 1372-4.
- ⁵⁷ *FT* 28, 31 July 1986; *G* 24, 29, 30, 31 July 1986; *IHT* 29, 30, 31 July 1986; *IHT* 20, 30, 31 July 1986; *T* 28, 29, 30 July 1986; *ST* 20 July 1986; *WA* 4 August 1986, pp 1616-18 and 18 August 1986, pp 1721-2; *SWB* ME/8320/B/1, 25 July 1986, ME/8322/B1, 21 July 1986, ME/8323/B/7-8, 29 July 1986, ME/8324/B/1-4 30 July 1986, ME/8325/B/1-9 31 July 1986, ME/8326/B/1-6 1 August 1986.
- ⁵⁸ *FT* 18, 19 July 1986; *T* 18 July 1986; *G* 19 July 1986; *SWB* ME/8316/ii and ME/8316/B/1 21 July 1986, ME/8320/ii 25 July 1986.
- ⁵⁹ *IHT* 25 August 1986; *T* 25 August 1986.
- ⁶⁰ *FT* 21, 22, 23 August 1986; *G* 22, 23 August 1986; *T* 22, 25 August 1986; *IHT* 23-24 August 1986; *ST* 24 August 1986; *Econ* 30 August 1986; *WA* 1 September 1986, p 1849; *SWB* ME/8345/ii 23 August 1986, ME/8346/B/1-6 25 August, ME/8347/B/4-6 26 August 1986.
- ⁶¹ *FT* 12 September 1986, *T* 12 September 1986; *G* 12 September 1986; *SWB* ME/8363/ii and ME/8363/4-5 13 September 1986, ME/8364/ii and ME/8364/B/1-2 15 September 1986; *WA* 22 September 1986, pp 2000-1.
- ⁶² For details of these documents, see *SWB* ME/8362/E/1-12, 12 September 1986.
- ⁶³ Robert Mugabe's keynote address is in *SWB* ME/8354/E/1-6, 3 September 1986.
- ⁶⁴ On the genesis of the idea of a South Commission, see *S* October 1986, p 38 and *S* (Press Release) September 1986.
- ⁶⁵ *T* 25, 26, 27, 29, 30 August 1986, 1, 2, 3, 6, 8 September 1986; *G* 29, 30 August 1986, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 8, 11 September 1986; *FT* 30 August 1986, 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 8 September 1986; *IHT* 1, 2, 3, 4, 8 September 1986; *Obs* 7 September 1986; *WA* 8 September 1986, p 1866 and 22 September 1986, p 1969; *Econ* 6, 13 September 1986; *S* August 1986 and October 1986; *SWB* ME/8351/E/1-9, 30 August 1986, ME/8353/E/1-6, 2 September 1986, ME/8354/E/1-6, 2 September 1986, ME/8354/E/1-5, 3 September 1986, ME/8355/E/1-9, 4 September 1986, ME/8356/1-20, 5 September 1986, ME/8357/E/1-21, 6 September 1986, ME/8358/E/1-10, 8 September 1986, ME/8360/E/1, 10 September 1986.

Third World Foundation News

Independent Commission of the South on Development Issues Launched

Aspirations for a South Commission designed to promote cooperation between developing nations finally became a reality at the Eighth Summit of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), held in Harare, Zimbabwe, in September 1986. After several years of preparation and deliberation, there is now an Independent Commission of the South on Development Issues to be headed by Dr Julius Nyerere, the former President of Tanzania.

The Commission was unveiled by Datuk Seri Dr Mahathir Mohamad, Prime Minister of Malaysia and Chairman of the Steering Group which carried out the groundwork for the establishment of the new body. The Steering Group was formed last May at 'South-South II: charting the way forward', a conference of scholars and statesmen in Kuala Lumpur organised by the Third World Foundation and Malaysia's Institute of Strategic and International Studies (see 'Third World Foundation News', *Third World Quarterly*, October 1986).

'The main purpose (of the Commission) is to try and work out solutions to major economic problems faced by the South', said Dr Mohamad. The Commission is expected to take two years to complete its work, and its members will consist of some twenty eminent persons of the Third World who will serve in their personal capacities rather than representing governments and organisations.

Dr Mohamad is keen to prevent the Commission's report from being just another academic exercise to remain on bookshelves to gather dust. According to Dr Mohamad, it would need a Chairman who would not 'write a report and go to sleep', he said. 'Dr Nyerere was not, repeat not, that type of man.'

The choice of Dr Nyerere is particularly appropriate because it was he who first suggested setting up the Commission in December 1978 at a South-South conference sponsored by the Third World Foundation in Arusha, Tanzania. 'The Commission would examine the many different ideas which have been discussed over the years, the current and probable future organisational needs, and the priorities of intra-Third World action which are appropriate to dealing with the problem of world poverty', he commented at that time. The Third World Foundation helped develop the idea at the two South-South summits in Beijing (1983) and Kuala Lumpur (1986), and at regional conferences in Cartagena (1984) and Harare (1985).

Dr Nyerere, who was President of Tanzania from 1964 to 1985 and is founder-chairman of the country's ruling party, Chama Cha Mapinduzi, intends keeping Third World governments informed of the Commission's progress from the start. Recommendations will be made to governments in the South, and Dr Nyerere will campaign vigorously for implementation of his group's proposals. The members of the Commission were expected to be announced by the end of 1986, together with the formation of a small secretariat. An initial task is to find private organisations and international institutions in the South and North with which to coordinate a joint effort. The Commission will support the work of the NAM and Group of Seventy-Seven, but it will not be accountable to either body.

Given the probable difficulty of convincing governments to implement the Commission's recommendations, Dr Nyerere's diplomatic skills and powers of persuasion will be crucial. He was Chairman of the Organisation of African Unity in 1984 and is a widely respected politician in the South. Shridath Ramphal, the Commonwealth Secretary-General, presented the 1981 Third World Prize to Dr Nyerere and said of him: 'His people have honoured him with the simple soubriquet *Mwalimu*—the Swahili for teacher. A teacher he has been in the highest sense, a source of enlightenment, a fount of wisdom, an exemplar, not only to his fellow citizens but to all in the Third World of the poor and the dispossessed.' If Dr Nyerere displays such qualities in his role with the South Commission, real progress could be made towards greater cooperation between developing countries.

Book Reviews

The titles reviewed are listed below with names of authors and editors

Jenkins, David: **Suharto and his Generals: Indonesian Military Politics 1975-1983**

Crouch, Harold: **The Army and Politics in Indonesia**

Sundhaussen, Ulf: **The Road to Power: Indonesian Military Politics 1945-1967**

Department of State: **Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1985**

Department of State: **Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1985: Israel**

Humana, Charles: **The Economist Human Rights Guide**

McFarlane, S Neil: **Superpower Rivalry and Third World Radicalism: The Idea of National Liberation**

Osmanczyk, Edmund Jan: **Encyclopedia of the United Nations and International Agreements**

Fransman, Martin and King, Kenneth (eds): **Technological Capability in the Third World**

Walrond, Grantley W and Kumar, Raj: **Options for Developing Countries in Mining Development**

Taylor, Debbie (ed): **Women: A World Report**

Thomson, Marilyn: **Women of El Salvador: The Price of Freedom**

Bernstein, Hilda: **For Their Triumphs and For Their Tears: Women in Apartheid South Africa**

Allison, Caroline: **'It's Like Holding the Key to Your Own Jail': Women in Namibia**

Organisation of Angolan Women: **Angolan Women: Building the Future: From National Liberation to Women's Emancipation**

Ahmadu Bello University: **Women in Nigeria Today**

Verrier, Anthony: **The Road to Zimbabwe, 1890-1980**

Sesay, Amadu, Ojo, Olusola and Fasehun, Orobola: **The OAU After Twenty Years**

Rugh, Andrea B: **The Family in Contemporary Egypt**

Kapur, Rajiv A: **Sikh Separatism: The Politics of Faith**

Momen, Moojan: **An Introduction to Shi'i Islam: The History and Doctrines of Twelver Shi'ism**

Cole, Juan R I and Keddie, Nikki R (eds): **Shi'ism and Social Protest**

Tarbusch, Mohammad A: **The Role of the Military in Politics: A Case Study of Iraq to 1941**

Scoble, Harry M and Wiseman, Laurie S (eds): **Access to Justice: The Struggle for Human Rights in South East Asia**

Asian Coalition of Human Rights Organisations: **Human Rights Activism in Asia: Some Perspectives, Problems and Approaches**

Nathan, Andrew J: **Chinese Democracy: The Individual and the State in Twentieth-Century China**

Weeks, John: **The Economics of Central America**

Turton, Peter: **Jose Marti: Architect of Cuba's Freedom**

Alberts, Tom: **Agrarian Reform and Rural Poverty: A Case Study of Peru**

Long, Norman and Roberts, Bryan: **Miners, Peasants and Entrepreneurs: Regional Developments in the Central Highlands of Peru**

Stein, William (ed): **Peruvian Contexts of Change**

Roa Bastos, Augusto: **I The Supreme**

Uneasy lies the head that wears the crown: The armed forces and politics in Indonesia

William Boddy

Suharto and His Generals: Indonesian Military Politics 1975–1983

David Jenkins

New York and London: Cornell University Press. 1984. 280pp. \$12.50

The Army and Politics in Indonesia

Harold Crouch

New York and London: Cornell University Press. 1978. 377pp. \$37.50

The Road to Power. Indonesian Military Politics 1945–1967

Ulf Sundhaussen

Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press. 1982. 304pp. £28.00

With the general elections to be held in April 1987 looming large on the horizon, the political climate in Indonesia has begun to warm up. Officials within the armed forces concerned with internal security are becoming nervous—unnecessarily, since the elections are predetermined, and will pass off with only minor incidents with victory again going to the government-sponsored Golkar. One sign of pre-election nerves has been the reaction to a newspaper article¹ by David Jenkins, the writer of one of the books reviewed here. In the article Jenkins had presented a *réchauffé* version of an old story about the wealth of President Suharto and his close family. There was hardly anything new in his piece; much of the information, going into greater detail, had been published elsewhere by others, such as Harold Crouch whose book is also under review here.

The aggressive reaction to the Jenkins article and the temporary freeze in Australian–Indonesian relations were a surprise both to the diplomatic community in Jakarta and the academic world at large. Why risk drawing attention to oneself by giving so much attention to a minor piece of journalism? One interpretation might be that the howl of outrage which went up in Indonesia was deliberately orchestrated by those influential critics within military circles who shared Jenkin's perceptions and wanted to use the occasion to cause maximum embarrassment to President Suharto. If this sounds too

¹ 'After Marcos, now for the Suharto billions', *Sydney Morning Herald*, 10 April 1986.

implausible, another explanation might be that Suharto, who is known to be touchy where his family is concerned, simply exploded with anger and started shooting from the hip diplomatically. His anger in this instance was probably fuelled by the fact that the article was by Jenkins whose book had already led to a lot of red faces in Suharto's inner circle.

Whatever the correct explanation it is clear that neither a critical discussion of the role of the President and his family, nor an analysis of military power in Indonesia are subjects which are easily tolerated by the present regime. For anyone who wants to know why this should be so, a close reading of the three books here reviewed will provide the answer. There is some degree of overlap among them. Sundhaussen's book deals with the growth of the army and its increasing role in politics between its establishment in 1945 and the assumption of the Presidency by General Suharto in 1967. Crouch deals with the army's origins in a brief introductory chapter but his principal focus is the decade between 1964 and 1974. Jenkins is more concerned with recent history, and although he too describes the first few years after the 1965 coup, the main issues that concern him relate to rivalry and factionalism within the armed forces between 1975 and 1983.

Despite the slight overlap, however, and the apparent complementarity of the chronological frameworks of their narratives, there are marked differences in the way in which the three authors present their material. Hence the recommendation that their books should be read together should not be mistaken for a suggestion that information given in each simply adds to what one learns from the others in terms of an accumulation of facts. Rather, the complementarity of one to another is better perceived in terms of different perspectives, each of which yields a distinctive and intriguing insight not only into the complexity of the relationship between army and politics in Indonesia, but also into the way in which Western scholarship maps out an academic terrain and constructs an intellectual discourse. Before this begins to sound too pretentious, let me explain directly how the approaches of the three writers differ.

Crouch and Sundhaussen were postgraduate students together at Monash and both acknowledge a debt to their mentor, one of the most knowledgeable of all Western scholars of contemporary Indonesian politics, Herb Feith. Despite this intellectual heritage, however, and despite a close acquaintance with Indonesia and Indonesian personalities which they have in common, in their books (which derive from their doctoral theses) they appear to share little in their interpretation of the phenomena, the empirical details of which they both record assiduously. For one thing, Sundhaussen is anxious to situate his description and analysis within the context of comparative political theory relating to the role of the military in Third World countries. Hence the questions which he addresses are 'why did the Indonesian military intervene in politics; secondly, why did the supplanting of a civilian-led government come

BOOK REVIEWS

so late . . . and finally, to what extent must civilian leaders share responsibility for military intervention in Indonesian politics' (p 255). The phrasing of these questions in this manner already intimates his view concerning what occurred, and it comes as no surprise that his conclusion is that the military were reluctant to take over political power, and that they only did so after a longer period of forbearance towards civilian leaders, when they saw that the latter were bringing the country to political ruin. The bulk of his book is designed to prove this thesis, and in his concluding chapter he makes his views clear while dismissing alternative explanations in a cavalier fashion. For example, in rejecting the suggestion that personal interests played a major role in the army's assumption of power, he writes: 'Even if Soeharto is judged to be guided at least partly by individual interests—and one could support such a view by his persistence in office in the years to come—personal ambition cannot serve as the major explanatory tool for the ejection of Sukarno. Soeharto's position within the officer corps was not strong enough for him to use the army as the vehicle for personal aggrandisement: to replace Sukarno required concrete political issues and the failure of the President to come to grips with them' (p 259). To which weak line of reasoning one need only reply that the manufacturing of political issues and the cornering of one's opponents is, of course, the stock-in-trade of the ambitious politician with his eye on the main chance.

Crouch, on the other hand, avoids comparative political theory like the plague. Consequently, his book reads more like a documentary account of what happened with an occasional foray into interpretation and discussion. This lack of theoretical perspective sometimes leads him to digress into detail which clearly fascinates him, but which is sometimes irksome for a reader trying to follow or even identify some argument in the writing. For example, like Sundhaussen, Crouch rehearses in some detail interpretations over who was responsible for the coup. (This endeavour, incidentally, has led to some trouble with the Indonesian authorities recently. His book in translation was on the bookstalls in Jakarta last April and then immediately banned, since Crouch referred, albeit critically, to a theory of W F Wertheim's that Suharto was behind the coup, a suggestion that the authorities felt the Indonesian public was not yet ready for.) Fascinating as the subject is for Indonesian *cognoscenti*, one feels that the 120 pages which Crouch devotes to the coup, its immediate aftermath and the downfall of Sukarno could have been condensed to allow more discussion of substantive issues. Similarly, the chapter which he devotes to 'The Army's Economic Interests', although well researched and presented, is not sufficiently well integrated into a sustained analysis of power and politics, and the apparent lack of control over detail impedes his argument.

In so far as one can elicit an argument from his book it is that: 'The expansion of the army's political role had not been a planned process in which its leaders took deliberate steps to fulfil their political ambitions. Rather it took the form

of a series of responses to particular crises arising, in the main, from the actions of dissident officers. Although the circumstances that were favorable for the expression of their power were not essentially of their own making, the army leaders had always been ready to exploit unexpected opportunities to the full' (p 35). For Crouch, then, personal and corporate self-interest did play a major role and the professed altruistic concern for the preservation of the nation to a minor one. To substantiate his case Crouch is prepared to go into greater detail than Sundhaussen on the general political and economic background to the army's initiatives. Sundhaussen's forte is his knowledge of the internal dynamics of developments within the military, and hence, for the general reader with little knowledge of Indonesia, it is easier to perceive things in some sort of context from Crouch's account. He deliberately avoids burdening his text with the names of too many personalities, and indeed his careless misspelling of some names, surprising in so meticulous a scholar (the most glaring example of which is the name of Benny Murdani given by Crouch as Murnadi) indicates that for him it is not so much individuals as attitudes which concern him.

For Jenkins, on the other hand, it is very much the actors of the drama who command his attention, as the photographs in his text make clear. This emphasis on personalities is dictated by the two issues on which Jenkins pegs his narrative: 'the "challenge" posed to President Suharto within the Armed Forces of the Republic of Indonesia (ABRI) during the period 1975-82 and the debate that developed over ABRI's role in society' (p ix). In essence, what Jenkins demonstrates is that there was a series of challenges to Suharto's role on the part of those who were dissatisfied both by the policies which the latter adopted, and by the corruption within military circles which he appeared to condone, if not actively participate in, and that by skilful manoeuvring on the part of Suharto and his close advisers these challenges were successfully met. In addition to the issue of corruption, the matter which most exercised those who participated in the intra-elite struggles was the question of how far (not whether) ABRI should intervene in the democratic process to manipulate politics in favour of Suharto's strategies of government. In the unravelling of the complexity of the factionalism that arose, Jenkins has relied on published records and documents and also on a series of remarkably frank interviews with leading political figures—particularly those of the dissident groups—whose forthright comments have made the book a source of major irritation to the government.

Jenkins, then, is strong on personalities and for the sake of convenience he divides these into two groups, the 'pragmatists' around Suharto who are prepared to countenance a bending of the rules in order to ensure internal political stability and economic development, and the 'principled', sometimes called 'puritans', who were inspired both by professionalism and a sense of nationalistic idealism. Crouch, although he too uses labels—'political' and

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'financial' generals as opposed to 'professionals'—allows himself to be a bit more sceptical about motives. Sundhaussen, however, seemingly unconcerned over non-military issues, stresses not so much divisions within the armed forces, but the conflict between the military and civilian politicians.

Since the elections of 1983 much has happened, some of the events clearly buttressing the government's position, but some of sufficient weight to shake its self-confidence. The major triumph as far as the government is concerned has been the final emasculation of the political parties and quasi-political organisations by making them endorse as the fundamental principle of their constitution, the state ideology of *Pancasila*. To outsiders not familiar with Indonesian politics this might appear of little significance, but with Indonesia it is regarded as the culmination of a long struggle between the government and the political parties in which the latter have been routed. The cost of this victory may, however, ultimately prove to have been too great; for example the intense pressure exerted by the government has served to unite the dissident opposition as never before. An indication of this has been the publication of a pamphlet in 1984 entitled *Selamatkan Demokrasi* ('Save Democracy'), the authors of which were Nasution, Moh Natsir—a former Prime Minister of the Masyumi ('modernist') Islamic party—and Sanusi Bratadinata, a former Minister and a leading figure of the PNI (Nationalist Party).

The government's response to this opposition has been to try to discredit their opponents in two ways, first by trying to associate them with terrorist activities and bombings, and second by labelling them as *sakit hati* ('aggrieved') because they are no longer in positions of power. Furthermore, much more use has been made of the stick than the carrot. A former minister has been put on trial (twice, on different charges) and sentenced for complicity in acts of terrorism and attempted assassination of Suharto. Even more significant was the trial and conviction of General Dharsono, a former Secretary-General of ASEAN. Bringing Dharsono to trial surprised many observers since he was a figure who commanded considerable respect in Indonesia both within military circles and in the country at large.

The reason for these tough measures and the attempt to discredit the opposition seems to have been to alienate public sympathy from them, but in this respect the government appears to have miscalculated. Within the armed forces, it is true, the government's interpretations appear to have won wide acceptance among senior officers, many of whom have been now so thoroughly indoctrinated that they sincerely believe that there is no place for democracy in Indonesia at the present time. On the other hand, it is clear that the public at large is highly sceptical of the government's tactics, and there is a great deal of sympathy for men like Ali Sadikin who spoke out openly at Dharsono's trial attacking the government's record.

The gulf between the armed forces and the people is therefore widening, and

the government is aware of this. Again steps have been taken to try to remedy the situation. A thorough reorganisation of ABRI has been well publicised, and stress has been placed on professionalism and service to the nation. In a recent reshuffle, General Try Sutrisno, a devout Muslim, was appointed Army Head of Staff, an appointment which seems designed to appease those critics who have pointed out that senior positions in the armed forces are held disproportionately by non-Muslims.

Suharto's own position, however, is beginning to look more vulnerable. Two of his closest advisers, Ali Murtopo and Sudjono Humardhani, have died recently. A sign of his unease is perhaps the need that he felt to justify himself against the accusations in the Jenkins article. In an unprecedented step he summoned all the senior ABRI officers to a special meeting specifically to deny there was any truth in the allegations concerning his immediate family. However, despite these few indications that the government is not having things all its own way, it needs to be stressed that there is still no likelihood of any significant change. Although the Presidential Election is not until 1988, the electoral body within the Upper House has already made it clear that Suharto will be the only candidate for the position.

Undoubtedly, one of the reasons why the New Order government dominated by Suharto and his generals has been able to stay in power for so long, despite the criticisms that have been levelled at it by both civilian intellectuals and politicians and critics within the armed forces, has been the economic stability of the country and the tangible benefits of development to the country over the last twenty years. Criticism of the government's complicity in corruption, dissatisfaction at the financial manipulations of the enormously wealthy Jakarta elite and unhappiness with the government's human rights record may stir intellectuals to protest, but for the majority these issues are not of critical importance, provided that their own economic opportunities continue to expand. It is clear, however, that those opportunities are going to be dramatically curtailed in the near future. The fall in the price of oil has already had an impact, and the recent 45 per cent devaluation is going to hit salaried middle-class officials very hard. It is not hard to foresee that a deterioration of the economic status will affect the way in which the country will react both to future criticisms of the government and the government's attempts at self-justification. On the other hand, it would be foolish to predict anyone's downfall. As the books under review have shown the New Order government has remarkable powers of resilience, and the armed forces are still sufficiently united in outlook to take concerted action against any serious opposition.

Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1985

Department of State

Washington DC: Department of State, 1986. 1440pp. n/p

However the Administration of Ronald Reagan may have striven to reduce the weight of human rights in US foreign policy, it has greatly increased the weight of the State Department's yearly report on 'human rights practices'. With entries on 164 countries, an introduction, and four appendices, this is now the single most comprehensive regular report on human rights produced anywhere in the world.¹

The publication of these reports has resulted from the increased influence of Congress in American foreign policy since the Vietnam War. As a result of both the War and the Watergate scandals, pressure to reassert the role of ethics in politics became stronger. In order to strengthen Congressional oversight of American foreign aid, Congress required the State Department to submit annual reports on 'practices regarding the observance of and respect for internationally recognized human rights in each country proposed as a recipient of security assistance'. Subsequently, an amendment required reports on all members of the United Nations, leading to today's comprehensive coverage.

The first of such reports, reluctantly submitted by Henry Kissinger's State Department on 31 January 1976, were widely considered to be 'shoddy', in the words of one human rights lobbyist. As noted below, political bias persists. Nevertheless, the reports have improved to the point where human rights organisations who regularly monitor that bias state that most of the entries 'convey a fair impression of the human rights situation' and credit the State Department with 'increasing professionalisation of human rights monitoring'.²

To implement this Congressional mandate, the State Department has both made human rights monitoring into a new specialisation for embassy political officers and established the Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs in Washington. The human rights officers in the diplomatic mission prepare the first draft of the report in September. The Human Rights Bureau and the desk officers in Washington then finish the country entry for submission to Congress each 31 January, covering the preceding calendar year.

The reports follow a standard format (see Table 1). An introduction describes the country's political institutions, significant events of the previous year, and economic and social conditions. Then follows the section on 'Respect for Human Rights', divided into four sections. Finally, there is a section on the economic, social and cultural 'situation', indicating that the Reagan Administration rejects the concept of economic, social and cultural rights.

The reports fall short in two ways: the conception of human rights underlying them omits some important rights, and the reporting on those rights that are included is sometimes marred by political bias.

¹ Amnesty International's *Annual Report* for 1985, for instance, dealing with a more limited set of human rights, discusses 123 countries in a mere 359 pages. The major omission in the State Department reports, of course, is the USA.

² Americas Watch, Helsinki Watch, Lawyers Committee for International Human Rights, *Critique: Review of the Department of State's Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1984*, New York: May 1985, p 1.

Table 1: Standard format of State Department Country Reports on Human Rights Practices

Summary of Country Situation

RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom from:

- a. Political Killing
- b. Disappearance
- c. Torture and Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment
- d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile
- e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
- f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or Correspondence

Section 2 Respect for Civil Rights, Including:

- a. Freedom of Speech and Press
- b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
- c. Freedom of Religion
- d. Freedom of Movement within the Country, Foreign Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation

Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: the Right of Citizens to Change Their Government

Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and Non-governmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human Rights

ECONOMIC, SOCIAL, AND CULTURAL SITUATION

The major rights omitted are economic, social and cultural rights, and the right to self-determination. Omission of the former is a break with the Carter Administration, which had included 'government policies relating to the fulfilment of such vital needs as food, shelter, health care and education' as part of human rights practices. The current edition of the reports, however, opines (pp 2-3):

We have found that the concept of economic, social, and cultural rights is often confused, sometimes willfully, by repressive governments claiming that in order to promote these 'rights' they may deny their citizens the right to integrity of the person as well as political and civil rights.

Nowhere does the report explicitly mention the right of self-determination. The separate reports on Israel and the Occupied Territories describe violations of the rights of individual Arabs and some examples of discrimination, including the lack of political rights in the Territories, but do not mention collective self-determination. Despite the extensive documentation of violent repression and pervasive discrimination under apartheid, the report on South Africa similarly reduces the issue to one of individuals against the state. This omission is ideologically consistent, however; the entries on Romania and Bulgaria do not contain systematic descriptions of the violations of the collective rights of, respectively, Hungarians or Turks either.

As in previous years, sheer factual distortion is most egregious in the reports on Central America. The Department of State has spared no effort to depict Nicaragua as a

Tiny Satan; at twenty-four pages, its entry is the longest in the volume. El Salvador, however, benefits from considerable indulgence. Although reports from independent human rights groups (and even, in part, the Country Reports, carefully read) make clear, for instance, that there were far more political killings in El Salvador than in Nicaragua (and that most of such killings were perpetrated by, respectively, the US-backed military and the US-created 'contras'), the text strives mightily to convey the opposite impression.³

Nevertheless, many reports, even on governments friendly to (or dependent on) the USA, contain detailed information not easily available elsewhere on killings, disappearances, arrests, claims made by local human rights groups, trade union activity, and freedom of cultural life. In general, the report is least reliable when the country in question figures in a US domestic policy dispute related to human rights, such as that over aid to the Nicaraguan 'contras'. The reports on small, obscure countries are particularly useful; most human rights organisations deal little with many such countries, and the USA has relatively little reason to distort their records.

Many find these reports offensive, even (or in some cases, especially) when they are accurate. Since they judge all the nations except the most powerful one, which issues them, they inevitably emit a certain odour of self-righteousness, like a preacher peering into bedrooms all over town. Nevertheless, American power cannot help but affect human rights in much of the world, and the reports were imposed on an initially unwilling Executive by Americans who wished their country to use its power to promote human rights. While American hegemony has many harmful effects on the rest of humanity, the attempt to legitimate it in terms of human rights creates contradictions that make challenges possible. Rather than protest at the publication of these reports, those who contest that hegemony would do better to take their challenge by issuing alternative reports, thus promoting an international debate on the universal basic requirements of a decent public life.

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³ The range of techniques of distortion used in the Central American reports would require an essay in itself. For details see the *Critique* of the 1985 reports published by the same organisations whose review of the previous year's reports was cited in note 2.

Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1985: Israel

Department of State

Washington DC: Department of State. 1986. 25pp. n/p

'Israel is a parliamentary democracy which guarantees by law and reflects in practice the civil, political, and religious rights of its citizens.'¹ Thus declared the US Department of State in its report on human rights of 13 February 1986.

Yet the contents of the report refute this declaration which is intended to justify the

¹ Country reports on human rights practices for 1985: Submitted to the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations, US Senate by the Department of State. In Accordance with Sections 116(d) and 502B(b) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as Amended (February 1986) (Hereinafter referred to as 'The Report'), p 1257.

economic and military assistance appropriated by the US Congress for Israel in 1985, totalling, according to the report, \$3.35 billion. This is because, from the outset, the report recognises that emergency regulations have been in effect since 1948. It acknowledges that the possession and distribution of literature considered hostile to the state and issued by Israeli Arab organisations are punishable offences. Flying the Palestinian flag or displaying its colours or displaying Palestinian Nationalist slogans are strictly forbidden.

The report states that in June 1985, four Israeli Arabs received prison terms of three to six months for displaying Palestinian flags during a rally in September of 1982 which protested the massacre of Palestinians in the Sabra and Shatilla refugee camps in Beirut. The report also acknowledges that the Law of Return of 1950, which abolished all restrictions on Jewish immigration, and the Citizenship Law of 1952, which granted every Jew the right to citizenship upon arrival in Israel, confers an advantage on Israeli Jews denied to the Israeli Arabs. It further states that while Israeli Jews enjoy freedom of movement, the movements of Israeli Arabs are strictly limited. It cites the restrictions on the travel of an Arab Anglican priest to the Occupied Territories. These restrictions were imposed in 1984 and were extended by the military commander to January of 1986. The report also laments Israel's refusal to permit Palestinian refugees who left their homes in the 1947-48 fighting to return or to be compensated for their losses in accordance with the UN General Assembly Resolution 194 of 11 December 1948. It stresses that the Israeli Arabs are proportionally under-represented in the Knesset (Parliament). Lack of budget parity between Israeli Arab and Jewish municipalities of equal size, with favour shown to the Jewish ones, has been documented according to the report. The parallel educational systems in Israel for Jews and Arabs, conducted in Hebrew and Arabic respectively, show disparity in quality, with greater resources per student going into the Jewish system.

The most flagrant violation of human rights reported, however, is related to the use of land, where title to 93 per cent of the land is claimed by the state or by quasi-public organisations in trust, only 'for the Jewish people'.

Various other violations, such as the denial of equal access to education, housing, and other services are reported.

The Palestinians in the territories which Israel has been occupying since 1967 suffer from even more severe violations of human rights. The United States' view is that Israel's presence in the occupied territories is governed by the Hague regulations of 1907 and the 1949 Fourth Geneva Convention covering the protection of civilian populations under military occupation. The report thus rebukes Israel for the unilateral annexation of East Jerusalem and the Golan Heights, for the introduction of Jewish settlers into Occupied Territories, and the use of collective punishment. It stresses that the introduction of Jewish civilian settlers into the Occupied Territories is one of the main causes of friction.

Under occupation rules, military authorities can and do enter into private homes, places of worship, schools and other institutions without warrant or prior judicial approval. The report states that in 1985, at least seventeen houses of West Bank and Gaza residents suspected of involvement in security incidents were demolished and twenty were sealed before the suspects had been put on trial. Mail and telephone services are monitored in the Occupied Territories. Individuals can be and are questioned on their political views. All residents over 16 must carry identity documents

with them at all times and must show them to military officials whenever requested. Vehicles owned by Arab residents of the Occupied Territories are frequently stopped and searched by military officials and by armed Jewish civilian settlers.

The most offensive of Israel's violations of human rights in the Occupied Territories, according to the report, is the taking of land by Israeli authorities for settlements, military use, and in connection with major road plans, and the reclassification of communal areas as state land. These measures significantly affect the daily lives and economic activities of the Palestinians. The report states that the Palestinians have been precluded from use of an area approaching 50 per cent of the West Bank land and 15 per cent of the Gaza strip. The scarcity of water in most parts of the West Bank constrains agricultural and urban development and thus adds to the hardship of the Palestinians because of the disproportionate amount of water allocated for the Jewish settlers' use. Other violations include the closing of newspapers and universities.

Thus, despite the declaration that Israel 'by law' and 'in practice' guarantees human rights to its citizens, the contents of the report show that the Israeli Arabs in fact suffer severe human rights violations. It also shows flagrant human rights violations in the Occupied Territories.

It is difficult to find a plausible explanation for the State Department's seemingly contradictory positions, because Israel's human rights violations, as cited in the report, are so flagrant that the US government would be justified in denying further aid until they are remedied. The government should neither countenance nor reward these violations. In fact, an unequivocal declaration by the State Department, in accordance with the contents of the report, that Israel is in violation of human rights, may constitute an indirect move towards a peaceful solution of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict.

US aid to Israel is, by law, predicated on Israel's observance of human rights. If Israeli Arabs are accorded equality with Israeli Jews and their human rights are restored, the Palestinians of the West Bank and Gaza strip may not object to becoming part of a state which would respect their full rights. Gradually, Israel should then repatriate the Palestinians still living in refugee camps.

With the implementation of this approach, Israel will admittedly cease to be an exclusively Jewish state. Yet it is hardly exclusively Jewish now, since more than 20 per cent of its citizens are non-Jews. This may be an alternative to the continuing outbreaks of hostility which have plagued the region and threatened world peace for decades. It would also remove the United States from the uncomfortable position of accomplice to Israel's human rights violations.

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The Economist Human Rights Guide

Charles Humana

London: Hodder and Stoughton. 1986. 344pp. £19.95

Charles Humana will probably be known to readers of *Third World Quarterly* for his excellent 'Survey of Human Rights in the Third World' in the 1985 *Third World Affairs*.

The present volume is a greatly extended and updated edition of an earlier work of his, first published in 1983.

Essentially, it seeks to compare, rank, and measure the human rights performance of 120 of the world's sovereign states, as at 1 January 1986. For thirty of them, there are brief one-page summaries, and an overall rating of Bad, Poor, or (at best) Fair. For each of the other ninety, the author has asked forty standard questions and calculated a percentage rating from the answers. This yields results ranging from 98 per cent for Denmark, Finland, the Netherlands, and Sweden, down to 20 per cent for Romania and the USSR, 19 per cent for Iraq, 17 per cent for North Korea, and a wretched 13 per cent at the bottom of the league for Ethiopia. The average is 55 per cent.

The forty questions and answers, with brief comments, are displayed over three pages for each nation, together with a few leading statistics and a short paragraph headed 'Factors affecting human rights'. The results are shown again, in tabular form, across both of the volume's end-papers; there are some maps and charts and there are reprints of the operative parts of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, for some reason taken from the US State Department's *Selected Documents*, rather than the UN originals.

The preparation of any such work requires a great deal of industry and dedication, and the results here display both in full measure. As a broad guide for those unfamiliar with any particular country, the results are undoubtedly useful. But their value must depend critically on the accuracy and impartiality with which the primary facts are ascertained, the standards against which they are compared, and the method of comparison. So far as one can tell, there are no gross or obvious shortcomings in the first of these, but some reservations need to be expressed about the second and third.

Out of the twenty or more international instruments relating to human rights and fundamental freedoms, the author has chosen to select as his only standards the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and the UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (which he abbreviates to 'Convention on equality for women'). He leaves entirely out of account, for example, the Genocide Convention, the Apartheid Convention, the Convention against Racial Discrimination, and the judicially enforceable European, American, and African regional treaties. Indeed, on p 2 of his Introduction, he only mentions that the American Convention has been 'adopted' by the Organisation of American States, when it has in fact been *ratified* by no fewer than eighteen of its members. Worse, he claims that the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights 'has now been ratified by 51 countries of that continent' which, if it were true, would be splendid, since that continent only has fifty-one countries, including South Africa. In fact, only twenty-two African states have so far ratified the Charter, and it will not come into force until that figure reaches twenty-six.

Strangely, only three of the author's forty questions (on child labour, trade unions, and scientific progress) relate to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, a matter which is surely critical in judging the human rights performance of all developing countries, and of the developed ones no less. When the overriding objective of economic development is still so often cited as a pretext for trampling all over the individual human rights and fundamental freedoms of a nation's inhabitants, it is surely of the first importance to examine how the economic and social rights of those inhabitants have in fact fared under such a policy, and not to confine the

answers to a mere statement of the percentages of GNP spent by the state on health and education. However, the author appears to attach so little importance to this aspect of human rights that he does not even reprint the operative provisions of this Covenant in the Appendix.

As for the attempt at quantification, it is of course notorious that such an exercise can only be subjective, however hard an author tries to make it otherwise. In the present case, the author's forty questions are selected, in accordance with his own scale of values, from some (but only some) of the substantive Articles of the instruments which he has selected as his standards. Having made that selection, he then further selects seven of those questions as being three times as important as the other thirty-three. These are headed, in the end-paper tables, 'slavery', 'extra-judicial killing', 'torture/coercion', 'compulsory work', 'capital punishment', 'corporal punishment' and 'unlawful detention'. Indeed, all these are great evils, but not everyone would necessarily agree that they are the seven greatest evils in the canon. Besides, some of them overlap: compulsory work is usually regarded as a form of slavery; corporal punishment only constitutes a violation of human rights if it is 'cruel, inhuman or degrading punishment', which is included in the prohibition of torture; and capital punishment only constitutes a violation if it falls outside the categories permitted by the treaties themselves, in which case it would become a form of extra-judicial killing.

There are some minor reservations also for which there is not room here. Defects of this kind are probably unavoidable in any work which tries to collate and summarise such a vast and protean set of data. However, the author makes plain in his Introduction what he is trying to achieve, and how he has gone about his work. So long as the reader heeds the obvious warnings, therefore, he should run little risk of misjudging the results.

PAUL SIEGHART

London

Superpower Rivalry and Third World Radicalism: The Idea of National Liberation

S Neil McFarlane

London: Croom Helm. 1985. 238pp. £19.95

East-West competition in the Third World, although basically geopolitical in nature, involves a struggle for the minds of the newly independent nations as well. Both Washington and Moscow claim that their particular models of socio-economic and political development provide the answer or are in tandem with the aspirations and needs of the developing countries. Given this intense rivalry, it is salutary to have a book that provides a sensible and impartial examination of the basic question in this situation: what is the ideological affinity between the national liberation aspirations of the Third World and the panaceas offered by East and West?

McFarlane's inquiry is based on a triangular analysis. He examines the roots and the development of the national idea in the liberal West, the socialist East and the radical South, noting what principles they have in common, as well as the fundamental differences that divide them. The bulk of the book consists of a discussion and dissection of the ideological assumptions about national liberation in the three political divisions of

the world. It is based on an even-handed analysis of the basic theoretical writings that inform each grouping.

In each case McFarlane goes back to the historical roots. Thus he relates the current American conceptions of what political and social change in the Third World should be like to the thinking of Rousseau, Frederick List and Mazzini. He traces Soviet thinking to what Marx and Engels, and not just Lenin, had to say about the national question and the colonial revolution. And his presentation of Third World ideology touches on Kemalist Turkey and Kuomintang China.

The main burden and value of the study is an impartial discussion of the incompatibilities among the three doctrines. McFarlane wisely eschews the facile notion that there is a natural affinity between the South and either the West or the East. The American doctrine shares with the radical Third World writings only the commitment to national self-determination. It is indifferent or even opposed to the notions of economic independence and social revolution. Even though the USSR is committed to all three principles, the transnational universalism of its doctrine is incompatible with the national particularism of the African, Asian and Latin American theorists. Above all, the single-minded determination of the Third World political thinkers not to remain subordinate to outsiders, makes the attempts of Soviet and Western politicians, as well as political scientists, to assume or to impose affinities highly illusory.

This excellent short guide should prove valuable to Western students of East-West competition in the Third World, as well as to radical audiences in the developing countries. All should profit from the clear-headed, well-documented and impartial analysis of the highly emotional and often inflammatory ideological constructs that arise from and shape the issue of national liberation.

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Encyclopedia of the United Nations and International Agreements

Edmund Jan Osmanczyk

Philadelphia and London: Taylor and Francis. 1986. 1059pp. \$160

In recent years academic interest in the work of international organisations has declined significantly, particularly in the USA. In part this decline reflects a general diminution of faith in the benefits of multilateralism, a trend which is being greatly accelerated by the Reagan Administration's consistent spurning of international law and international organisations. In addition, it also reflects the growing complexity of the UN, the fairly rapid proliferation of agencies and the explosion of paper work that they have produced. As a result, it is difficult, if not impossible, for even the most ardent and conscientious student of international organisations to keep up with developments.

The UN itself seems congenitally incapable of responding to the many attacks which have been launched upon it in recent years and, perhaps more surprisingly, is equally unable to produce manageable, readable documentation detailing its various activities. Many of its publications are tedious, formalistic, and so densely bureaucratic as to be largely impenetrable.

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The Encyclopedia under review is thus a particularly welcome addition to the reference literature on the UN. It contains three categories of information: (1) data on the structure and mandate of the numerous UN bodies; (2) a description, and sometimes the entire text, of almost 3,000 agreements, conventions and treaties; and (3) explanations of widely used political, economic, military, geographical and sociological terms, as well as terms used in diplomacy and international law'.

It is probably in the second of these categories that it is of the most use. It reproduces the complete texts of, for example, the UN and OAS charters, the Law of the Sea Conventions of 1958 and 1982, the SALT II agreement, the Warsaw Pact and the SEATO treaty and the International Covenants on Human Rights. In dealing with the various parts of the UN system, the quality of the entries varies considerably. There are notable omissions such as the ACC (Administrative Committee on Coordination) and the powerful ACABQ (Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions) neither of which appears as an individual entry, although the latter is referred to briefly under the item on the 'Budget of the UN'. In most instances the bibliography is very useful and reasonably up-to-date. In others, such as the various entries dealing with the Secretariat, no reference is post-1959. For reasons which are not explained, no biographical notes whatsoever are included, so that one can only learn who Dag Hammarskjöld was from the entry dealing with the Library named in his honour.

Although the Encyclopedia has already been published in Polish and Spanish, the English edition is surprisingly current (often up to 1985) and the choice of entries is not politically skewed, the author having aimed at 'absolute objectivity', an interesting concept in the UN context. The small print enables an enormous amount of information to be included. It is regrettable that there is an astonishing number of misspellings of proper names (Janks, Turkin, Urgohart, Oppenheim, Brownloe, etc). Overall, however, while the price is certainly high enough to put the book out of the reach of most individual purchasers, it is nonetheless a very valuable compilation and should be considered an indispensable reference book for libraries.

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Technological Capability in the Third World

Edited by Martin Fransman and Kenneth King

London: Macmillan. 1984. 404pp. £29.50. £8.95pb

The excellent book contains a number of contributions to the debates about the role and context of technology in economic development by a number of the leading workers in the field. As the editors argue, there has been a significant shift in the focus of debate in the 1980s, occasioned in part by the decline in influence of both of the competing broader paradigms of neo-classical economics and dependency theory.

Previously the prime concern was with the terms of transfer of technology and capital to Third World countries; now there are two new major concerns derived from a recognition of the existence of significant technological capability in Third World countries (and not just the newly industrialising countries (NICs)). These concerns are:

First, to identify what are the major sources of successful growth in the Third World, and second, to understand the relationship between the acquisition of scientific knowledge and skills on the one hand, and the ability to innovate and grow on the other.

The first concern is tackled by a number of theoretical papers, often drawing on the neo-Schumpeterian approaches of Nelson, Winter and Rosenberg, and case studies, primarily drawing on evidence from the NICs, including India and Brazil. A market-oriented, free trade approach is represented in papers by Ronald Dore and Gustav Ranis, whereas many other authors emphasise the need for some restrictions on trade, and the importance of both the role of government and of cultural factors. The latter are represented by Frances Stewart, Jorge Katz, Sanjaya Lall and others.

But it is clear that simple dichotomies are not appropriate, either when categorising theorists or country experiences: thus the 'protectionists' generally accept that there are gains to be made from the import of technology and from increased exports, and the 'free traders' admit that Japan and other East Asian countries were initially protectionist (of both infant industry and of independent technological learning capacity). Similarly, there is probably only one clear example of a country succeeding with anything approaching a pure neo-classical strategy (market orientation, free trade, an 'open door' to foreign capital, minimal state interference, etc) and that is Hong Kong. Other NICs, such as Singapore and Brazil, have welcomed foreign capital, but in the context of an interventionist state with some protection; South Korea largely excluded foreign capital, and the state intervened dramatically, both positively and through quantitative import restrictions. On the other hand, protectionist states such as India and China are increasingly recognising the price they have paid for independent technological capacity, in the efficiencies of certain regions.

The importance of the role of the state is demonstrated for Brazil by Carl Dahlman and for South Korea by Larry Westphal. In the former, although there was more reliance than average on foreign technology, in certain important areas (particularly capital goods) there were state restrictions on imports, coupled with vigorous attempts to encourage the growth of indigenous expertise. In the latter, state intervention influenced the forms in which foreign technology was imported, and in particular limited the use of foreign direct investment.

Another important area of debate relating to the sources of the NICs' growth, and therefore the replicability of their example, is the rate of advance of the world technological frontier. Applying the Schumpeterian analysis of Freeman and others of long waves of economic activity, Kaplinsky queries whether the conditions still exist for a new wave of NICs. He illustrates his case with a discussion of the significance of micro-electronics and robotics, arguing that the technological gap between developed and developing countries is widening too fast for most of the latter to do other than develop Third World technologies which will not be competitive in developed world markets.

By contrast to this emphasis on external factors, Colin Leys argues for the primacy of the social relations of production in a country, which determine both the type of technology imported and the nature of developing indigenous capability. A country in which social forces are tending in the direction of socialism needs to be very careful about imported technology: the creation of socialist production relations might be ruled out either by the technology itself, or by requirements of competitiveness in the world market. He argues that if a high priority is given to such factors as a cleaner

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environment or more rewarding working relationships, competitiveness may have to be abandoned in a strategy of protection and technological dualism.

The book concludes with a number of case studies; in addition to those mentioned earlier, there are contributions from Thomas Eisenmon, Ashok Desai, Manfred Beinefeld and Martin Fransman. And, approaching the final question of what developing countries can learn, these include studies of Kenya (by Paul Bennell and Steven Langdon) and Tanzania (Jens Muller). There is a valuable bibliography compiled by Sheena Johnson.

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Options for Developing Countries in Mining Development

George W Walrond and Raj Kumar

London: Macmillan. 1986. 205pp. £27.50

According to its authors, this volume is designed to fill an important gap in the literature on mining in developing countries, by making available 'a comprehensive book to which a policy maker, student or negotiator of mining agreements could quickly refer to guide him or her on the practical issues facing mining development' (p xiii). It draws on case-study material from eight Commonwealth mineral producers: six less developed countries (Sierra Leone, Tanzania, Zambia, Botswana, Papua New Guinea and Malaysia) and the State of Western Australia and the Province of Québec.

The book contains four substantive chapters. Chapter 2 deals with mineral rights legislation and illustrates the various types of exploration licences and mineral leases issued by case-study governments during recent decades. Chapters 3 and 4 and the accompanying appendices form the core of the book; they deal with the fiscal regimes applied to mining projects, first by examining various types of mineral taxes in general terms, then by analysing the impact of specific tax regimes through use of a computer-based model. A long appendix of computer print-outs illustrates the method used and the way in which it has been applied. Chapter 5 deals with mineral development agreements, offering a brief discussion of their form and of some issues they cover.

The book is in fact more restricted in scope than its title suggests, and does not live up to its authors' claim to cover 'a full range of concerns relevant to today's world, covering both financial and non-financial issues at length' (p 3). Apart from the chapter on mining legislation, its primary focus is on the fiscal regime for mining. A range of other issues are either referred to very briefly (wage and employment policy in the minerals sector, mineral processing), or mentioned in passing but not discussed at all (establishment of input-supplying industries, provision of mine infrastructure, training and localisation, environmental protection). While it might not be possible to deal with all these issues 'at length' in a single volume, failure to at least discuss their implications and outline policy options can be criticised on two grounds. First, some of them are directly relevant to a host country's capacity to extract fiscal benefits from mining, a point very apparent from recent experience in the author's own case-study countries.

Zambia's wage and employment policies in the late 1960s and early 1970s increased production costs substantially, reducing profits and taxes; Botswana's provision of infrastructure for the Selebi-Pikwe mine significantly reduced its net fiscal returns from this project; Malaysia's establishment of a copper smelter has increased processing costs for its copper mines, reducing their capacity to generate revenues; Papua New Guinea has faced extremely difficult choices between insisting on environmental provisions and threatening the economic viability of the Ok Tedi project. Second, during the last decade many developing country mining projects (probably a majority) have failed to generate significant government revenues; in this situation, achievement of national economic benefits from mining will depend to an important extent on implementation of appropriate policies in areas such as training and localisation and development of efficient input-supplying industries.

It is to be regretted that the authors did not cast their net more widely, because their treatment of the issues they do deal with is clear, stimulating and to be of considerable value to students and policymakers in the Third World. In particular, they succeed in analysing taxation issues in a way which does not deny their complexity, but which should be easily understood by non-specialists. The presentation of a full computer-based analysis (rather than just the results of the authors' calculations) will be of particular value. In addition, the book provides considerable factual information on mining legislation, mineral agreements, and tax regimes in the case-study countries, using well-designed tables which permit quick comparisons between how each deals with a particular area. However, in this regard the authors' choice of case studies appears somewhat limiting; the exclusive focus on Commonwealth countries narrows the range of options which is outlined, and removes the possibility of referring to practices in many of the world's most important developing country mineral producers.

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Women: A World Report. A New Internationalist Book

Edited by Debbie Taylor

London: Methuen. 1985. 376pp. £4.95pb

Women of El Salvador: The Price of Freedom

Marilyn Thompson

London: Zed for Comision de Derechos Humanos de El Salvador and War on Want
1986. 165pp. £16.95. £5.95pb

For Their Triumphs and For Their Tears: Women in Apartheid South Africa

Hilda Bernstein

London: International Defence and Aid Fund for Southern Africa. 1985. 136pp.
£3.50pb

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'It's Like Holding the Key to Your Own Jail': Women in Namibia

Caroline Allison

Geneva: World Council of Churches. 1986. 71pp. £2.95pb

Angolan Women: Building the Future: From National Liberation to Women's Emancipation

Organisation of Angolan Women

London: Zed. 1984. 151pp. £14.95. £5.95pb

Women in Nigeria Today

Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria, Nigeria

London: Zed. 1985. 257pp. £18.95. £6.95pb

There are so many women in the world, around half of humanity, that even people who are not themselves women are all more or less intimately acquainted with some. This tends to convince us that we are all experts on the subject of what women are, how they should behave, and what they need, and that our opinions on these matters are self-evident truths, to be defended with great energy against all contrary views.

For those who favour a more balanced and realistic approach to the status and roles of women in society, growing numbers of detailed studies clearly demonstrate that the initial emotional and experiential reactions to these questions are not informed personal opinions and still less unassailable 'truths'. They are simply repetitions of the traditional clichés or dogma of whatever culture they form part. As cultures differ so do the formulations of women's status and roles in them, and so also do the practical opportunities open to women for the fulfilment of prescribed roles, or for developing new roles as they come into contact with the prescriptions of other cultural traditions through migration, education, and the increasing spread of news and entertainment media.

A third approach to women's studies, generally labelled 'feminist', is altogether more active. Rejecting all attempts at balanced analysis as a craven capitulation to the male-dominated status quo, it concentrates on exposing sexual inequalities as a universal phenomenon of discrimination against and exploitation of women by men. This must be resisted and overcome by women, who must be prepared for the fight by a process of 'consciousness raising', which is a new term for an old process of proselytism by a religious tradition or indoctrination by a political ideology. Measured in these terms, all the books in this group are feminist but tempered in varying degrees by academic balance or realism. None of them has any sympathy for traditional atavism.

Women: A World Report was compiled at the conclusion of the United Nations Decade for Women from the phenomenal accumulation of data relating to women gathered by the UN agencies and others, including questionnaires completed by 121 governments, for the final conference in 1985. By an unimaginable process of collective hard labour, given its final eloquent shape by Debbie Taylor, this mass of statistics and reports has been turned into a comprehensive, thoroughly documented report on women's lots throughout the world in relation to the family, agricultural and industrial work, health, sex, education, and politics, supplemented by a comprehensive tabulation of statistics in the final section. The written presentation combines meticulous accuracy

of detail with a dramatic, arresting style which never loses sight of the human dilemmas, failures, determined efforts and achievements which they represent in the lives of real women, centred first on securing a reasonable future for themselves and their children and, for the more fortunate, looking outwards to see what feminine values might contribute towards the regeneration of an international political ethos which seems hell-bent on the destruction of the entire planet.

As if that were not enough, a much longer second section is given to ten women of remarkable energy, perception, and writing ability to investigate personally the experience of women in relation to the family, work, education, politics or sex in one country each, with the added cultural impact that five women from the Third World were sent to developed countries and five from the rich world visited developing nations. With the exception of Nigerian Buchi Emecheta's contribution on women and education in the USA (consisting of a rambling and very personal account of early American history and the relationship between black and white women which concludes 'the Western woman should go back and re-learn how to be a woman, because she has so undervalued herself that . . . she seems to be losing her way. Her black sister has not completely done so.') this entire section is crammed with vivid detail, striking insights, and the liveliest entertainment based on unmistakably real and often bitter experience, which together illustrate women's best strength and resilience in an amazing variety of settings and conditions.

Other books deal with women's daily experience in extreme situations of civil war, made very much more violent by foreign, mainly US interference. Marilyn Thomson's powerfully written study of women in El Salvador, supplemented by an account of the country since Duarte's election by Mandy Macdonald of the El Salvador Human Rights Committee, conveys the stark horror of the situation simply by reporting facts, interspersed by extracts from official documents and interviews with a range of women from peasants to activists, many in exile or subsequently murdered. The contrast between the repressive brutality of the ruling oligarchy, with its armed forces and death squads, and the programme which the Democratic Revolutionary Front (the FDR-FNLM, a coalition of dissident organisations) is trying to implement under constant attack in the areas under its control and border refugee camps makes a copybook example of the differences between fascism and popular democracy. Quotations from their respective women supporters give a clear picture of the type of person who supports each system and what leads them to do it.

While both types of women find themselves in alliance with men against common political opponents, the two opposed parties also pay attention to feminist issues. The chapter on the government's contribution to 'development for women' is short, citing laws which are never invoked and the creation in 1983, by the OAS Inter-American Commission for Women, of a 'Women's Office' with an impressive number of projects to be carried out single-handedly by its Director. FDR-FNLM proposals and agencies set up by and for women are described in some detail in the rest of the book.

Hilda Bernstein's account of South African women—*For Their Triumphs and for Their Tears*—has been re-written to include the momentous changes still taking place in South Africa and new research on its women. Sponsored by the International Defence and Aid Fund for Southern Africa as part of their comprehensive information service, it provides a thorough survey of the effects on women of the undeclared civil war currently raging in South Africa and of their response to it. Concisely and with devastating effect,

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the book documents the cynical process whereby the government, another ruling oligarchy, developed from 1948 a state apparatus to control the country's black majority population as if they were cattle, corralling them in barren 'homelands' from which the fittest males could be selected to labour on short-term contracts in white mines and towns deprived of even the emotional and domestic security permitted under slavery: a speech by Nationalist MP, G F van L Froneman in Parliament on 23 May 1965 quoted in the book notes that 'The African labour force must not be burdened with superfluous appendages such as wives, children, and dependents who could not provide services'.

The failure of that policy stems from the refusal of the black victims to accept the bovine status and their will to assert their humanity and ambition by every means available to them. This is documented in accounts of women and the family, women and work, and women in the political struggle, including historical background and recent developments as well as aspects of male-female interrelation in all these areas. Above all, the book portrays the passionate determination of so many women to resist all attempts to crush their spirit and negate their humanity.

To read each of these three books is an education in itself, not least because they are all written in a clear, direct style whose impact relies on a simple but very vivid interweaving of fact, comment, and straight reporting of personal experience without pretence or sentimentality. That is to say they bear all the hallmarks of true feminine strength.

The interviews with Namibian women in '*It's Like Holding the Key to Your Own Jail*' (the title is a quotation from an interview) supplement Hilda Bernstein's book with vividly recounted experiences of village life under the constant threat of army raids, arrest, and imprisonment, but it is not well written. The style, even of the transcribed interviews, is stilted and pompous and the introductory and link passages are so full of meaningless jargon that they could pass for the report of some inferior male committee.

Angolan Women: Building the Future was written by a committee for the first Congress of the Organisation of Angolan Women in which the preparatory debates defining women's problems which formed the basis of the documents were conducted along strictly orthodox socialist lines. Problems arising among the small population of a sadly underdeveloped new (1975) nation facing constant attack from South Africa and US-backed rebels are touched on obliquely in the drive to involve women in the national defence effort and in 'building a socialist society' in which they count as an oppressed category meriting radical social and legal reform. The introduction by Marga Holness gives a rather more sophisticated but still ideologically correct presentation of the background to the conference.

The papers included in *Women in Nigeria Today*, being further away from armed conflict, are less intense but still very much dominated by the categories of neo-Marxist sociological theory. This is a pity, because the papers contain a good deal of new research data on different aspects of the female experience in contemporary Nigeria, including a hair-raising account of traditional Hausa birth practices and a range of women's work and political activity. The preoccupation with ideological purity and terminological hair-splitting vitiates the analysis of original data by forcing it into categories which do not accurately reflect social realities and effectively prevents creative or even accurate understanding of their significance.

Taken together these books demonstrate that true understanding of social reality is most nearly attained when the feminine preoccupation with lived experience is married to the masculine insistence on a strict discipline of logical perspective.

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The Road to Zimbabwe, 1890–1980

Anthony Verrier

London: Jonathan Cape. 1986. 364pp. £16.00

This is an odd book that has been even more oddly received. It sets out to be an account of the 'wider background—political, diplomatic, strategic and economic' to Zimbabwe's attainment of independence, and disavows any intention of describing black nationalism or the armed struggle. In practice it says very little about the involvement of South Africa or the USA and passes cursorily over long stretches of British activity, while having a great deal to say about African politics and about the war. As a result it falls between two stools. It will not replace existing accounts of the international manoeuvres around the Rhodesian issue nor existing accounts of the guerrilla war. Yet it has been very well received, especially in Zimbabwe itself, where it made the news pages of the *Harare Herald* and was later given a glowing review.

This Zimbabwean enthusiasm is something of a puzzle since what Verrier has to say about the African nationalist tradition in Zimbabwe, about the conduct of Zimbabwean leaders and about the pattern of the guerrilla war would seem likely to be at best controversial and at worst offensive to the Zimbabwean regime. Verrier is dismissive of the 'myth' of a continuous tradition of African resistance in Zimbabwe: 'the man with the sjambok usually dominates the helot', he writes characteristically. There was no real opposition to the creation of the Central African Federation, nor even to the unilateral declaration of independence. When at last—in the early 1970s—Zimbabwean Africans came reluctantly to emotions of nationalism, the exile political parties failed to make any effective connection with them. Guerrilla tactics outraged African rural opinion. ZANU / PF at last achieved its aim by superior ruthlessness:

ZANLA moved, in default of actively politicising the mass of [rural] Africans, into an onslaught on black subsistence and white administration. The resultant misery alienated many Africans from the PF. But the PF achieved its aim: the Smith [and Muzorewa] regimes were discredited because they could not protect the territories from guerrilla attack.

Verrier levels a series of astonishing charges against African leaders. He writes of 'the virtual recruitment' by the British Secret Service of Mboya, Nyerere, Banda, Kaunda and Nkomo. He asserts that at the end of 1974 Robert Mugabe 'became aware of Tongogara's plans for Chitepo's removal' and that his acquiescence in these plans 'was the first critical step taken by Mugabe in his rise to power.' Although he goes on to say that the truth of Herbert Chitepo's assassination is not known, there is the strongest possible implication that it was the work of Tongogara, endorsed by Mugabe. Tongogara and Mugabe were, says Verrier, the Trotsky and Lenin of the Zimbabwean revolution.

The nature of Zimbabwean reaction to all this matters less, of course, than whether or

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not it is true. Verrier produces no evidence for any of it. It is all a matter of assertion. The reader has to decide whether to accept Verrier as a man who knows; whether to trust his style of cynical certainty. I am prudish enough to suppose that charges of this sort require verification.

It may be that what he has to say about British policies and politicians is more securely founded. Certainly it is this part of the book which accounts for its popularity in Zimbabwe. Verrier reveals consistent British duplicity and self-interested manipulation. He asserts that ever since the 'decision by Attlee and Bevin to build a nuclear deterrent, South Africa acquired a power to determine what Britain would or, more usually, would not do concerning Southern Africa in general and Southern Rhodesia in particular.' At a time when Zimbabwe and other African states confront Britain over the issue of sanctions, Verrier is praised for having revealed the true and shabby nature of Britain's Southern Africa policy. I am as ready as the next man to believe badly of what has been on the whole a record of British incompetence and bad faith. But even here Verrier achieves many of his effects through a studied cynicism rather than through the production of new evidence.

But all my reservations disappear when it comes to chapter 19 on the 1980 elections. Here for once Verrier leaves himself enough space to deploy detailed and original evidence and the result is a fascinating and important account. Here there are even 'good guys', the Commonwealth Monitoring Force and the Commonwealth Observer Group. This is excellent contemporary history which goes a long way to redeem the rest of the book.

TERENCE RANGER

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The OAU After Twenty Years

Amadu Sesay, Olusola Ojo and Orobola Fasehun

Boulder, Colorado: Westview (distributed in the UK by IPI). 1984. 133p. £24.00pb

The 'Ife School', that most dynamic and prolific group of young Nigerian scholars associated with the Department of International Relations at the University of Ife, Nigeria, has come out with yet another study on African international relations and organisations. It is indeed fitting that in order to mark the twentieth anniversary of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), three of the most prominent members of that School decided to tackle a subject which is not really a favourite in the Africanist academic community. In *The OAU After Twenty Years*, Sesay, Ojo and Fasehun investigate the performance of the OAU since its inception, focusing on four areas of central concern to African states: decolonisation, conflict control, development and human rights. They examine the OAU's record against the challenge of apartheid and the OAU's lack of resources and effective sanctions. The authors make a number of suggestions for enhancing the OAU's future viability and its ability to address the continent's pressing economic and social needs. The 102 pages of text are usefully complemented by four appendices, including the complete text of the 'African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights'. The most glaring and unjustifiable omission is that of even a rudimentary bibliography.

Tackling the whole spectrum of the OAU's activities over a time-span of twenty years in about one hundred pages is quite a challenge in itself. The three authors valiantly rose to it in producing a fairly comprehensive, well documented and adequately argued account of the OAU's achievements in four crucial issue-areas. On the problem of decolonisation, they observe that 'soft options' such as moral persuasion and socio-political and economic sanctions failed to bring about any significant changes in the Southern African white minority regime's stubborn refusal to accept majority rule. Yet, while committed in principle to armed struggle as the only effective way of bringing about effective change in the region, the African states' support of this struggle, through the OAU's African Liberation Committee (ALC) was, according to the authors, 'feeble, inadequate, and intermittent' (p 19), essentially because of insufficient financing. Turning to the issue of inter-African conflicts, the authors find a similar lack of commitment and effectiveness. Looking at the OAU's attempts to find peaceful solutions to some of these conflicts—the Chad civil war, the Ethiopia–Somalia dispute, the Tanzania–Uganda conflict, and the conflict in Western Sahara—the authors conclude that all of these attempts have failed dismally, thus exposing the low resource base and powerlessness of the organisation. The OAU's record in the other two issue-areas tackled in the book—economic development and human rights—is equally poor. The global picture which emerges from this analysis is that of the OAU as a powerless and ineffectual organisation, due to a definite lack of political commitment on the part of the member-states resulting in vastly inadequate financial and human resources. It is interesting to note in this regard that in a recent study on his perceived role at the helm of the organisation (*Et demain l'Afrique*, Stock, 1985), the former Secretary-General of the OAU, Edem Kodjo, arrives at precisely the same conclusion.

In addition to providing us with an incisive and thought-provoking analysis of the OAU's activities and shortcomings, the authors should be credited with a most commendable effort at making their study policy-relevant by offering advice and suggestions as to how the OAU could be made more powerful and effective. In this regard, they suggest a number of constitutional and institutional changes, notably that the OAU Charter be revised in line with Africa's current and future political and economic needs, and that new organs, such as an African Security Council and a Court of Justice for Human Rights, be established. Whether these are acceptable and feasible options, given the political climate currently prevailing in Africa, remains to be seen. Yet in the end, there is no way that the African states can avoid confronting these issues which are crucial to the very survival of the OAU as a reasonably effective pan-African organisation.

It is only to be regretted that such recommendations are not based on an adequate analysis of the constitutional, institutional and financial deficiencies of the OAU, which is conspicuously lacking in this study, except for occasional references. Other shortcomings inherent in the book are: often superficial analysis leading to undocumented statements an obvious lack of precision and attention to detail, inadequate references and absence of bibliography. But in spite of these, Sesay, Ojo and Fasehun have provided us with a timely, informative and very readable account of this 'most important continental political organisation' (p 92).

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The Family in Contemporary Egypt

Andrea B Rugh

New York: Syracuse University Press. 1984. 305pp. \$32.00. \$14.95pb

This book provides the first in-depth and comprehensive analysis in English of the emotional relationship and social roles of family groups in Egypt. It is the view of an outsider who, however, has a thorough understanding of Egyptian society having lived and worked in the Middle East for fifteen years.

The main focus of this study is on lower- and middle-class urbanites and their adjustments to the contemporary conditions of cities as Egypt has become highly urbanised during the last decade. The great social cleavage in Egypt in terms of style of life, expectations and opportunities comes between the lower and middle urban classes.

Not only are family relationships discussed but also other influences on them. Marriage, divorce and family solidarity are thoroughly examined. While Christians invariably marry for life, Muslims can easily obtain a divorce. Vested interests of the family often dominate marriage decisions more than individual needs. While marriage to relatives is considered desirable to consolidate family solidarity, marriage to strangers can be more advantageous.

The family as a group has remained strong, reinforcing traditional values in the face of stresses caused by rapid economic changes and the ideological challenges of modernisation and Western influences. The traditional role of the women has changed from one of being a homemaker to one of the working mother supplementing the family income.

A few pages of the book are devoted to comparison with American society. It would have been a more interesting book if the comparative analysis with American society had been expanded. The Egyptian would see in American society a lack of social connection, a de-emphasis on family life, and minimal time spent by both males and females in demonstrating the affection they feel for one another, and regard this as a heavy and possibly even unacceptable social cost. The American can fall back on the informal 'we're all equal' stance when engaging a stranger, but for an Egyptian this never works. the person must respond correctly to status level in order to avoid unnecessary trouble. The stranger deliberately flaunts his status to avoid confusion by his dress, car, and mannerisms.

The book presents scholarly information in a fluent style. It achieves its objective of explaining Egyptian culture to Westerners.

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Sikh Separatism: The Politics of Faith

Rajiv A Kapur

London: Allen and Unwin. 1986. 272pp. £20.00

Terrorism is a world-wide phenomenon which dramatically captures headlines everywhere. Each occurrence, however, has its own historical, social and political

context. The one common element is that innocent people are killed in the process. The Punjab State in India presents what on the surface seems like an unlikely environment for a terrorist movement which has been conducted by followers of the Sikh religion since 1981. Sikhs represent a 60 per cent majority in the state, they are among the most economically prosperous communities in India, and, since September 1985, they have wielded political power through the leading Sikh party in the state, the moderate Akali Dal.

Rajiv Kapur treats one core element of the situation in a meticulous examination of the development of a Sikh identity which separates it from the other religions in the region, particularly Hinduism. India's newest religion, beginning in the fifteenth century, underwent a revival beginning in the late nineteenth century in the context of Hindu, Islamic, and Christian competition. That revivalism continues with militant, extremist and terrorist dimensions. Separatism in terms of identity is a crucial dimension to what are considered to be the mainstream or *keshdari* Sikhs, who follow the notions or practices established by the tenth and last Guru, Gobind Singh, in 1699. These *Tat Khalsa* Sikhs clearly became dominant during the temple reform movement in the 1920s, which is the focus of this volume.

Separatism in regard to an independent state for the Sikhs is another matter. Nor is separatism in terms of religious identity necessarily a part of terrorism. These distinctive elements of religious and political separatism lie at the core of the contemporary Punjab problem. How to distinguish between them in terms of public policy has been a long-term problem in the Punjab.

Rajiv Kapur tends to skirt this crucial issue in his carefully researched book based on his D.Phil. dissertation from the University of Oxford. By 1920, he concludes, the 'evolution of Sikh communal consciousness had led to political organisation' which 'bred militancy and saw the emergence of a Khalsa nationalism' (p 92). The establishment of the Shiromani Gurdwara Prabandhak Committee (SGPC) to manage Sikh temples and its driving force, the Akali Dal, certainly provided political institutions for the Sikhs, both for religious and political purposes. The case study provided here of the 1920-25 period is revealing as to how the revitalised Sikh identity and its new institutions were employed. In spite of the label 'Akali fanaticism' (p 105), and the acknowledged militancy of the temple reform movement, the *Akalis* essentially followed a Gandhian strategy of non-cooperation, non-violence, and at times, interrelated with the Congress nationalist movement (p 123). Opponents of the temple reform movement employed violence, as at Nankana Sahib, where at least 130 members of an Akali non-violent group were killed in February 1921 (p 110). Government repression of Sikh political activities also proved important in prolonging the movement. Negotiations between the Sikh reformers and the government were suspended in 1922 at least partly because of 'official repression' (p 49). It took three more years of massive Akali Dal-led agitations before a compromise could be effected, which in its major features conceded the SGPC/Akali demands. They gained control of their temples, but the cost was high. During the five year period of the movement, 30,000 Sikhs were arrested, 400 died, and 2,000 were wounded (p xv).

The author is correct in stating that the Sikh Gurdwaras Act of 1925 'provided an institutional structure for Sikh communal separatism' (p 7). It is also notable that this did not translate into political separatism even during the trauma associated with the uprooting of Sikhs from western Punjab during the partition between India and

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Pakistan in 1947. 'Political leverage as a community' (p 209) remained an important concern which resulted in Akali Dal agitations for a Punjabi-speaking state with a Sikh majority. That movement succeeded in 1966. The author briefly deals with this period in Chapter 7 as a lead-in to the contemporary problem of the 1980s. The analytical care given to the temple movement of the 1920s is replaced in this chapter, and in the succeeding epilogue, by a careful summary of the major events leading up to 26 January 1986, at which point Sikh extremists once again occupied the Golden Temple.

A concluding analytical chapter could have made a good scholarly book into an excellent one. What in terms of public policy can be learned from the 1920-25 movement that is relevant in the 1980s? Establishing the evolution of Sikh identity and its institutionalisation is important. But, existing scholarship has already accomplished that important task. Are the 1980s different to the 1920s with regard to Sikh separatism? Is Sikh terrorism in the 1980s a minor chord roughly equivalent to the Ghaddar revolutionary movement of the 1920s, or are there qualitative differences? Sikh institutionalisation in the SGPC for managing the temples and in the Akali Dal as a political party have been under attack by the extremists in the 1980s. Are Sikh channels for religious and political purposes being replaced by formerly obscure religious seminaries like the Damdami Taksal and the All India Sikh Students Federation? If the lessons from the 1920s movement are learned, it is more likely that reconciliation will be effected within the frame of the mainline institutions and the context of a dynamic Punjab. But, as in the 1920s, the cost is high.

PAUL WALLACE

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An Introduction to Shi'i Islam. The History and Doctrines of Twelver Shi'ism

Moojan Momen

London: Yale University Press. 1985. 397pp. £18.50

Shi'ism and Social Protest

Edited by Juan R I Cole and Nikki R Keddie

London: Yale University Press. 1986. 325pp. £35.00. £9.95pb

The reason for the virtually simultaneous publication of two books on Shi'i Islam by Yale University Press is not hard to fathom. As interest in contemporary Iran, the country of Shi'i Islam, remains high, the books are timely. But has the passing of the first flush of the Iranian revolution brought us any closer to a deeper understanding of its causes and nature?

Although the aim of the two books is similar, the content differentiates them. Momen sets out to describe the major features of Shi'i Islam. It is, as the title proclaims, an introduction. And a useful one. The title of Chapter Two—'The question of the succession to Muhammad'—is, as the first line states, 'clearly the key question in Shi'i Islam and the principal factor separating Shi'is from the Sunni majority' (Momen p 11).

Shi'i belief revolves around the figure of Ali, also widely revered by Sunnis. Ali's charisma, comprised of personal chivalry and charm, is undisputed. The Prophet said 'I

am the city of knowledge and Ali is its gate'. A sense of exclusiveness identifies the Shi'i. 'The Shi'is saw themselves as an "elect" (*al-khassa*) living among the generality (*al-'amma*) of the Muslims' (p 192). Characteristically Shi'i institutions which distinguish Shi'i from Sunni Islam are discussed, the Mut'a temporary marriage, for instance. 'Marriage for a fixed term and usually for a pre-determined financial arrangement is considered allowable by Shi'is. The marriage may be for any length of time, even for a matter of hours' (p 182). Sunnis scoff at the Mut'a, deriding it as a lustful act concealed under a religious cover. Also 'The more accommodating attitude to women expressed in Shi'i law over divorce and inheritance . . . attributed to the important position held by Fatima among Shi'is' (p 183). Shi'i women are more active than their Sunni sisters in other religious functions too: 'the *sufra* (literally tablecloth) . . . consists of an invitation by the hostess to a number of other women to join her for a meal which is usually preceded or followed by a discourse by a *mulla* (often female) on a religious theme' (p 243).

The appendices and photographs are helpful. The first appendix is a chronology of political and religious events in Shi'i history, the second lists Shi'i dynasties and the third contains biographies of prominent ulama.

Momen's detailed bibliography, which includes Arabic and Persian sources, has some strange omissions: for example, Professor Said Arjomand, himself an Iranian, edited *From Nationalism to Revolutionary Islam* which was published in 1984 and contains related material; also, only one of Ali Shariati's books is mentioned.

Thirdly, the low-key and descriptive nature of Momen's work balances the views of Shi'i Islam suggested by Professor Michael Fischer (*Iran: From Religious Dispute to Revolution*, 1980). Contemporary Iran, Fischer had argued, could be best understood in terms of what he called the 'Karbala paradigm'. Ecstasy, passion and a high degree of commitment were characteristics of the paradigm. Momen's view is a corrective to Fischer. But the book lacks a central focus. There are bits on Iraq, India—there was a flourishing Shi'i centre in Hyderabad—etc but they are not woven into broad, general arguments. No questions are answered as to what is causing the turbulence in Iranian society. Worse, questions are not even raised. It is to some of these questions that the contributors in *Shi'ism and Social Protest* turn.

The collection by the thirteen experts—a popular form of instant think-tank in contemporary Western social sciences—looks at Shi'ism from various angles: Iran's foreign policy, the Shi'i in Saudi Arabia and even sexuality in Shi'i Iran. Some of the authors are well-known—Professors Nikki Keddie and Fred Halliday, for example—others are still doctoral candidates, David Edward and Nahid Yeganeh. The collection suffers from uneven contributions. Old Middle East hands such as Fred Halliday are sure of themselves, others more tentative and groping.

The dedication to Malcolm Kerr who was killed in 1984 while President of the American University of Beirut may hint at an Orientalist predisposition. Although Orientalist clichés are in evidence in the arguments—in the introduction the editors talk of the 'Old World'—the contributors have kept a wary eye on Edward Said.

Cole and Keddie make three important points. First: 'Shi'ism is not now and never has been a monolithic movement, nor have either the ulama (religious scholars) or the followers of this branch of Islam always been activists or united in their views' (p 2). Second: 'Indeed, one of the conclusions indicated by several contributors . . . is that nationalism has often proven stronger than obvious religious or sectarian allegiances,

even in states with weak national identities' (*ibid*). The content of Imam Khomeini's foreign policy—*nah sharq, nah gharb*, 'neither East nor West'—is as much a nationalist reflex as an Islamic one. Third, acting as a corrective to the Fischer thesis:

In the past several years the word Shi'i has often, especially in the United States, taken on the connotation of 'fanatic' or 'terrorist', and we are often told that Shi'is have a 'martyr complex' that makes them welcome death in pursuit of their cause. In fact, the majority of the world's assassins in the past century have been Europeans of Christian background, and with the exception of the mediaeval 'Assassin' sect, which belonged to a different line than today's politicized Shi'is, Shi'is were not known until very recently for either terrorism or special devotion to offensive holy wars (which most Twelver ulama have held were forbidden during the occultation) (*ibid*. p 28).

The book contains a major methodological flaw. It ignores the historical continuity of Shi'i Islam that partly explains contemporary Iranian society and politics. Take, for example, Muhammad Majlisi, in the seventeenth century, who is a precursor of Imam Khomeini. Author of over sixty books he was the undisputed religious scholar of his time, the Shaykh al Islam. Leading the ulama he forced the Safavid court to empty its wine cellars. The oscillation in power between the imperial authority of a semi-divine monarch and an aggressive, meddlesome Shi'i ulama is one of the important features in Iranian history. Khomeini's victory over the Shah may thus be seen as a logical culmination of the historical movement of the ulama to power.

In their emphasis on the diversity and complexity of Shi'i Islam these books serve a useful function. However, we are still far from possessing a cogent analytic understanding of Shi'i Islam or contemporary Iran. The search must continue.

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The Role of the Military in Politics: A Case Study of Iraq to 1941

Mohammad A Tarbush

London: Kegan Paul International. 1982. 187pp. £8.95pb

Muhammad Tarbush's book is a meticulous and perceptive study of the first nine years of the state of Iraq, and in particular of the military coups that took place in Iraq between 1936 and 1941. The book is primarily based on British and Iraqi archival sources, Arabic memoirs and interviews with former politicians of the period.

Although Iraq gained a measure of political independence in 1932, the country remained firmly under British control until the Revolution of 1958. The main pillars of British control in Iraq were the monarchy—itself a British creation—and the tribal sheikhs. As a result of the gradual expansion of education and the growth of political awareness in the country as a whole, dissatisfaction with the narrow base and unrepresentative nature of the indigenous political system increased. Muhammad Tarbush shows convincingly the way in which the monarchy managed to hold the balance between the British and the various competing political groups and factions. King Faisal's death in 1933 left a political vacuum, and the newly created Iraqi army became an additional and influential source of power within the political system. Although a succession of army commanders were able to acquire influence and military authority for a time, British control continued behind the scenes.

It is a particular pleasure to read the complex story leading up to Bakir Sidqi's coup in 1936 and to that of Rashid 'Ali in 1941. Tarbush ably describes the composition and background of the various groups of army officers competing for power. Although the political complexion of the officers participating in the coup had not changed substantially by 1941, the idea of Arab nationalism had taken firmer root within the army, and the army itself had moved into the centre of the Iraqi political stage.

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Access to Justice—The Struggle for Human Rights in South East Asia

Edited by Harry M Scoble and Laurie S Wiseman

London: Zed. 1985. 224pp. £6.95

Over the past two years we have been treated to the spectacle of 'show trials' in Indonesia, in which many prominent dissidents have been imprisoned on patently trumped-up charges. What is striking is that President Suharto's regime should go to the trouble of immobilising its opponents through lengthy legal procedures when these only serve to give publicity to opposition charges against the government which would not otherwise have been heard. The key factor here is the search for 'legitimacy' among South East Asia's largely authoritarian governments. They have used references to ancient customs, modern legal practice or Western-inspired 'development' models to disguise political and human rights abuses as part of normal government conduct. Indeed, when challenged over specific examples of such abuses, many South East Asian governments have retorted that Western interpretations of democracy, press freedom and other human rights are irrelevant to the societies of South East Asia, without actually rejecting these concepts. Ruling elites in the region reserve for themselves, of course, the right to interpret how these concepts are put into practice.

The publication of *Access To Justice* is the outcome of a meeting of human rights activists from the member states of the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), held in the Philippines in 1982. The participants were all representatives of non-governmental organisations aiming to create a regional agency for the protection of human rights and their submissions make up the contents of the book. From the outset the contributors counter the common grounds on which governments in the region reject criticism of their human rights records, first by arguing that the principles of individual rights embodied in the UN Charter are rooted in general human experience, and are not merely a product of European culture. Then the articles analysing particular aspects of human rights in the ASEAN member states (Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand and the Philippines) demonstrate just how far individual rights can be and are subverted within the law in each country. No delegate to the meeting could be found to represent Singapore, the fifth ASEAN member at the time.

The core of *Access to Justice* is the series of articles describing legal anomalies in ASEAN countries. Many of the contributing writers are lawyers, and legal defence is a crucial part of human rights protection in a region where the law serves as an instrument of oppression. Besides varying degrees of state control over legal procedures, ASEAN

governments can use draconian legislation (for example Indonesia's Anti-Subversion Law, Malaysia's Internal Security Act and Thailand's *Lèse Majesté* law) to suppress opposition. The authors of these articles go further to acknowledge that infringements of more general rights, to education and subsistence for example, prevent most inhabitants of ASEAN countries from exercising the legal rights they do have.

Discussion of other human rights issues is confined to the last section of the book, covering freedom of the press and of association, and the special position of women in South East Asian societies. These are important issues but they do not fit in well with the rest of the book, and seem to reflect the specialised knowledge of other delegates to the meeting. It is also evident that the lawyers have restricted their debate to the limited areas where they can advance the cause of human rights while continuing to work, as they do, within the systems they criticise. No mention is made by the Indonesian contributors of the atrocities committed by Indonesian troops in East Timor and Irian Jaya, where rule of law is virtually non-existent. However, *Access to Justice* provides us with a striking picture of human rights problems as seen from inside South East Asian countries—something which has hitherto been badly needed.

JEREMY SMITH
London

Human Rights Activism in Asia: Some Perspectives, Problems and Approaches

Asian Coalition of Human Rights Organisations (ACHRO)

New York: Council on International and Public Affairs/International Center for Law and Development. 1984. 77pp. n/p

This short but enlightening publication summarises discussions held in Bangkok in December 1983 between human rights activists from seven Asian countries and from LAWASIA based in Australia. The meeting was convened by the International Center for Law in Development in New York, and led to the establishment of the Asian Coalition of Human Rights Organisations (ACHRO).

This is the second Asia-based human rights coalition to have been established in the last few years. The first was the Regional Council on Human Rights in Asia which came into being following a meeting in February 1982 of human rights non-governmental organisations (NGOs) from four South-East Asian countries, convened by the Washington-based Human Rights Internet. It would be easy to conclude that these are competing endeavours, but a more likely—and generous—explanation is that whereas the Regional Council concentrates on activities related to legal aid and access to justice, ACHRO seeks to deal with human rights activism around a far broader range of issues, encompassing social and economic rights and the right to enjoy the fruits of economic development. Whatever the differences, however, it seems difficult to justify the existence of two distinct bodies.

To judge by most of the contributions contained in this, ACHRO's first publication, it would appear that human rights activism is being promoted as an alternative to political activism. There is nothing wrong with trying to cope with the need for structural change through grass-roots organisations assisted by supporting organisations of human rights activists, the 'external catalysts' which concentrate on conscientisation, legal aid and so

on, provided, as one paper points out, 'they resolutely refrain from dominating the community they work with' (p 38). But the trouble with most Asian countries is that the right to organise in political parties and to contest for control of the state in free and democratic elections has been all but wiped out. It is a pity that this problem is not addressed by ACHRO.

As is to be expected, the country contributions are widely contrasting. The most impressive are the short contributions from the Philippines which are meaty and informative, describing specific struggles and discussing the dilemmas faced when a grass-roots campaign is initially successful, only to be thwarted by the lack of power to safeguard implementation. A contribution from Bangladesh provides a fascinating account of the activities of the Bangladesh Society for the Enforcement of Human Rights, in defence of women's rights against violence and coercion at the hands of their husbands.

At the other extreme is the Indonesian contribution which offers no information at all about specific human rights struggles in Indonesia, but concentrates rather on the need for ACHRO to engage in a study of human rights NGOs. This hardly seems the most useful way to use the limited resources of the embryonic regional human rights movement.

The various contributions reveal differing and often conflicting strategies over the right to development. One paper offered in the second part of the book dealing with the Coalition's future programme, advocates a campaign pressing for a criminal code for development, establishing penalties for 'agricrimes' (ie crimes relating to agrarian development), 'crimes against health' and 'crimes against the right to development'. This would only reduce social, economic and political activism to a preoccupation with legal and constitutional procedures, detracting attention from the crucial issue of statepower. If this is the direction chosen by those promoting ACHRO, it reinforces the impression that the Coalition could have a detrimental effect on human rights activism in Asia. If for no other reason, this publication is well worth studying in order to understand the problems raised by alternative strategies being advocated through regional councils that are being nurtured and promoted by US-based organisations. They too should not be allowed to exceed their role as 'external catalysts'.

CARMEL BUDIARDJO

London

Chinese Democracy: The Individual and the State in Twentieth-Century China

Andrew J Nathan

London: I B Tauris. 1986. 315pp. £16.50

Nathan's book is one of the most important on contemporary China to appear in a long time. The argument is unlikely to be of comfort to those who would hope to see a liberal transformation of China under the present reforming leadership, but it is presented with a rare sensitivity for the character and nuances of the Chinese tradition.

In an extraordinarily atmospheric first chapter Nathan sets the scene with an account of the brief efflorescence of the democracy wall movement in 1978-79. Neither dissidents nor dissenters, its participants were in a long tradition of loyal remonstrance invited by a regime which, confronted with seemingly intractable problems, had 'opened the road

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for speech'. This did not prevent Deng Xiaoping, his dominance confirmed at the plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of December 1978, from bringing the movement to a halt with a series of arrests and trials. Nathan develops a subtle series of parallels between these contemporary events and the activities and ideas of the reformers of 1898 (whose ascendancy lasted a mere 100 days). Liang Qichao, the most influential intellect amongst them, shared the major preoccupations of the democracy movement. Though experience tempered his early populism, he always assumed that there was no fundamental conflict between the individual and the state, the chief obstacle to the realisation of the public interest in China being the suffocating tradition of bureaucratic autocracy. It is unsurprising that the latter-day reformers should identify the same problem in the Chinese condition. As Nathan observes, in Liang's time the holders of official office in the bureaucracy numbered 27,000, though they were assisted by anything up to 1 million underlings. In the People's Republic, for a population twice the size, the number of cadres had swollen to around 75 million.

Deng Ziaoping's Gengshen reforms of 1980, in seeking to make the bureaucracy more responsive to the people's demands, went some of the way to accepting the case made by the democracy movement's writers. These reforms required the bureaucracy to deal rapidly and impartially with the complaints of the public, sought to revitalise the electoral base and the effectiveness of local and small unit government, and aimed to revive the investigative and critical role of the media. Although radical critics were quick to point out that these reforms were bound to be superficial, and some brave spirits within the party even sought a deeper explanation for China's malaise, Wei Jingsheng was almost alone in basing his critique of the communist monopoly of political power on a theory of individual human rights. Nathan points out the conceptual difficulty entailed in any discussion of 'rights' within the Chinese political vocabulary. Thus has the Chinese tradition neatly dovetailed with the Marxist view of this issue, Chinese constitutions before and after 1949 being unanimous that rights are defined and granted by the state and limited by law.

The sections of the book dealing with the role of the media are less compelling, but the argument is sustained that reformers for a century have expected the press to perform a role more or less propagandist. This has produced a jaded and sceptical public, though one awake to subtle nuances even if only to anticipate trouble. The final chapter on the local elections of 1980—tragedy or farce according to perspective—shows how few of the democracy movement's ideas have been permitted official currency despite the emergence of a reforming leadership. Chinese democracy is no closer to a realisation than it was in 1898.

JAMES COTTON

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The Economies of Central America

John Weeks

New York: Holmes and Meier. 1985. 209 pp. n/p

Although the amount of material published on Central America has risen dramatically in recent years, there is no standard work on the economics of the region. Professor

Weeks' book is timely, comprehensive and combines detailed empirical analysis with a keen appreciation of political economy. The book comprises eight chapters; the first is an historical introduction and this is followed by two chapters which consider the region's growth performance relative to that of Latin America and the Caribbean. Chapters 4, 5 and 6 examine in turn the region's external sector, agricultural development and the growth of manufacturing occasioned by the establishment of the Central American Common Market. The special position of Nicaragua is considered in chapter 7 while the final chapter reviews the causes of the present crisis in Central America and includes a short summary of the prospects for each of the five countries plus Panama.

The book gets off to a fine start with an essay on the history of the region which emphasises the peculiarities of its colonial legacy, discusses early attempts at regional unification and, in particular, avoids the temptation of reducing history to an account of US intervention. Professor Weeks then focuses on the current period, buttressing his arguments with generous supplies of empirical data covering the period 1960-80. Not only is Central America poor, he argues, but the standard of living of the majority of the region's population, as reflected by social indicators and income distribution statistics, is substantially below that of other Latin American countries at comparable per capita income levels. At the same time, the author qualifies his argument by pointing to the unevenness of development, Costa Rica standing in sharp contrast to Guatemala and Honduras. The central argument, however, which takes up the three middle chapters, is that 'underdevelopment' is critically linked to the vulnerability of a development model driven by a narrowly specialised agro-export sector, in most countries at the expense of peasant-based food agriculture. The argument is developed with skill, eschewing dependency-style generalisations for rigorous analysis of balance-of-payments data including terms-of-trade swings, the region's chronic deficit in services and the growing problem of net capital outflows.

Food agriculture, which employs the bulk of the peasantry, deserves more than one chapter since it is central to the author's argument; capitalist development of agro-exports, starting with coffee but then incorporating bananas, sugar, cotton and livestock has substituted a 'quasi-proletariat' for a 'quasi-feudal' rural labour force and, except in Costa Rica, short-circuited the development of an independent peasantry. This hypothesis, appropriately documented and qualified, contrasts with the more traditional account of peasant marginalisation. An interesting observation is that Central American agriculture does not obey the 'inverse-size law'; ie, the inverse relationship between yield and holding size. Nor has the development of manufacturing industry following the establishment of the Central American Common Market done much to correct the structural imbalances inherent in the agro-export model. As Professor Weeks shows, it is the vulnerability of the model to external shocks, and not the limited size of the domestic market, which has acted as the crucial constraint on industrialisation.

Nicaragua alone has attempted to break the mould through agrarian reform, trade and aid diversification and state-led accumulation. Unfortunately, this attempt was crippled at the outset by the economic and social costs of the war against Somoza, the collapse of commodity prices and of intra-regional trade and, since 1982, by US aggression. In the rest of the region, growth prospects are virtually nil; the CACM has collapsed, growing social conflict has led to massive capital flight and indebtedness.

Moreover, the US recipe for recovery is tending to undermine the basis of further industrialisation. Nowhere is this more evident than in Costa Rica, the country which has probably suffered most from 'structural adjustment' policies while least requiring them.

This is quite a good book, certainly the most comprehensive and detailed account of regional economics published to date. Although the argument is occasionally submerged by statistical detail, overall it is cohesive and convincing. It will become a standard work for students of the region and will be a valuable addition to the general reader's collection.

GEORGE IRVIN

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Jose Marti: Architect of Cuba's Freedom

Peter Turton

London: Zed. 1986. 159pp. £18.95. £6.95pb

There are many who claim the legacy of Jose Marti. In today's Cuba, he is regarded as the precursor of the 1959 Revolution, and it is hard to refute that viewpoint. For Marti was the leader of the movement that finally brought independence to Spain's last Latin American colony. Marti himself was killed early in the second Independence War (1895-98), but he was the acknowledged leader of the movement and its architect in both ideological and practical terms. Perhaps there was a compensation in his early death (at 42 years old), for he did not live to see Cuba's independence wrenched from it within a year by a rapacious USA anxious for a Cuban bridgehead to the southern continent. Marti's project, therefore, was not completed until the 26th July Movement led by Castro and Guevara entered Havana in 1959—ousting the dictatorship of Batista—and declared Cuba's political and economic separation from the USA two years later.

The metropolitan countries remain largely ignorant of the writings of the major thinkers of Latin American independence (Mariategui, Recabarren, Mella, Farabundo Marti, for example). So Peter Turton's book is a welcome addition to the bibliography (in English) on Marti, which is as scant as the work in Spanish is rich and varied. He addresses Marti as 'an intellectual phenomenon', emphasising the Cuban revolutionary's adherence to the idealism of Karl Krause, a philosopher popular in late nineteenth-century Spain. The influence is undeniable, but Turton gives it a priority which ends by misrepresenting Marti's political and theoretical evolution. In giving equal weight to all Marti's writings, and sticking to a fairly strict chronological approach, the final impression is that Marti remained an idealist philosopher.

Of course, Turton is at pains to emphasise Marti's significance as an *organiser* of the independence struggle, yet the weight of material and the stress on the continuity of Krausist influence is at odds with that assertion. In my view, Marti's most important work was concentrated into the last eight years of his life when (see Turton's interesting chapter on Marti and American Labour) 'Marti's revolutionary zeal forced him into a political praxis that . . . outstripped the ideological premises that formed his view of the world'. The necessities of the struggle itself led him to criticise his earlier idealism for its

failure to speak to his increasingly central political base among organised Cuban workers (especially the tobacco workers of Florida). It was in these last years that he levelled his sharpest attacks against racism (renouncing his earlier liberal view of the problem). And it was here too (after the Haymarket events in Chicago) that he came to acknowledge that change must be won through struggle, violent if necessary.

What is fascinating about Martí is not in his writings alone (which are often quite florid and confusing, the more so when the translations are rather awkward) but in the dynamic relations between the writer and the activist, whose ideas were always—in the end—forged in and for the coming struggle for Cuban independence, to which he finally gave his life.

MIKE GONZALEZ

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Agrarian Reform and Rural Poverty: A Case Study of Peru

Tom Alberts

Boulder, Colorado: Westview. 1983. 306pp. £19.75pb

Miners, Peasants and Entrepreneurs: Regional Developments in the Central Highlands of Peru

Norman Long and Bryan Roberts

Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 1984. 288pp. £25.00

One positive outcome of the reformist military government of General Juan Velasco that ruled Peru between 1968 and 1975 was to stimulate interest in that country's history, politics and development problems. The two volumes reviewed here are a product of the 1970s boom in Peruvian studies. Tom Alberts' study on the agrarian reform process, the most important policy implemented during the military *docenio*, addresses the question of agricultural growth prior to 1968, the long-term performance of Peruvian agriculture and its potential for higher growth, in addition to rural income distribution before and after the completion of the agrarian reform process.

Alberts was a UN employee posted to work on agricultural planning in Peru between 1968 and 1971. This provides a key to the strengths and weaknesses of the book. On the one hand, the author had access to a wealth of statistical data, which he presents to suggest that although the Peruvian military were concerned with both equity and growth, more stress was laid on the former policy objective. It is also argued that the agrarian reform failed to attain its goals with respect to income redistribution, the stimulation of higher agricultural productivity and growth, or the provision of markedly greater employment opportunities. Alberts suggests that this disappointing outcome was due mainly to a shortage of good farmland and the pursuance by the Velasco government of the long-established policy of favouring the town over the country, and industry over agriculture. In addition, land was most commonly distributed to permanent workers and tenants on the haciendas, to the exclusion of the poorest *minifundistas*. If this helped to reduce the impact of land reform in the spheres of income redistribution and employment, productivity and growth also stagnated due

to inadequate policies on prices, credit and shortcomings in the provision of extension services. All this is not controversial and is already common knowledge.

Other aspects of the book are less satisfactory. As an international bureaucrat, the author was parachuted into Peru and understandably does not have a good grasp of the nation's history, especially its rural history. This leads him to present an extremely simplistic and stereotyped view of rural society, one that adheres to the *hacienda-minifundia* dichotomy, to give one example. It also produces a number of erroneous statements, such as the claim that the sugar-cane plantation proletariat were not well organised until after World War II (p 127). Further evidence of the author's lack of a deep knowledge of Peruvian society and politics is his erroneous claim that in 1975 Velasco was replaced by General Maldonado (p 53). This deficiency is important because the author is as a consequence unable to place the agrarian reform in a historical perspective. He fails to realise that from at least the 1940s through to 1969 the hacienda in Peru was already in an (accelerating) process of dissolution. On the coast, for example, since the late 1950s landowners had been evicting tenants and reducing the number of permanent resident labourers in their employ. They had also begun to divide and sell off sections of their holdings to family members, outsiders or sitting tenants. The outcome of these trends was that when the military enacted land reform in 1969, a two-fold movement whereby the ranks of the casually employed rural proletariat were swollen, along with an expansion of a class of 'independent' relatively well-to-do farmers, was well under way. The agrarian reform did nothing substantial to alter these trends, which have gathered pace with the sub-dividing of many CAPs. Moreover, viewing the rural scene from his desk in the Ministry of Agriculture in Lima, it is hardly surprising that the author fails to adequately describe the dynamic of the various class conflicts taking place in the countryside over the years 1969-76, and the important effect of these on: (i) the implementation of reform; and (ii) the attainment of policy objectives. Another serious weakness of this book is that it completely fails to discuss in a meaningful fashion the cooperative structures established by the Velasco reform and the contradictions within them. These had important implications for productivity, employment and income distribution, which after all are some of the author's main concerns. Overall, this book says little that has not been more comprehensively described elsewhere by José María Caballero, Elena Alvarez, Mariano Valderrama, and others who possess a far better understanding of rural Peru. Finally, the volume is very repetitive, tedious and peppered with typographical errors.

The contributors to the volume edited by Norman Long and Bryan Roberts possess a far deeper knowledge of Peruvian history and contemporary society. This book sets out to explore 'whether integration into the international capitalist economy entails relative stagnation for underdeveloped economies or the possibility of sustained economic growth and diversification' (p 1). Through essays examining the impact of the mining sector on the urban and rural economy of the central highlands (social stratification in peasant villages, the creation of a labour market, migration, etc), the authors conclude that significant growth and diversification has occurred. This capitalist development, however, has not taken place along classical lines: a large proletariat has not been formed, nor has the peasantry been swept from the soil. A large middle class has failed to appear. Instead capitalist development in this region has spawned a diffuse class of small- and medium-scale entrepreneurs in town and country.

Remembering the pessimistic forecasts of the dependency school in the 1960s and

1970s, at a time when the Latin American economies were performing quite well, it is paradoxical that the authors reach optimistic conclusions about economic 'growth and diversification' during a period when these economies are in severe depression, especially Peru which is suffering its worst crisis since the War of the Pacific during the last century. Most of the research for this volume was conducted between 1970 and 1972. If they were working in Huancayo today, might the authors reach different conclusions? One weakness of the book is that it fails to theorise the economic circumstances leading to the form of capitalist development they describe, as well as the strengths and weaknesses of the regional elite in the economic and political sphere. In addition the chapters relating to the rural sector are less comprehensive than those on the towns, with the section on agrarian reform being particularly weak as it does not address the question of social conflict in the countryside in the post-reform era. Like the volume by Alberts, Long and Roberts also do not present an adequate discussion on the contradictions within the cooperative sector. Fortunately, Peruvian scholars are taking the lead in investigating such issues.

LEWIS TAYLOR

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Peruvian Contexts of Change

Edited by William Stein

Rutgers, New Jersey: Transaction Books (distributed in the UK by CLIO). 1985. £25.40

This collection of papers organised around the related themes of town and country, and metropolis-hinterland, opens with a long essay by the Peruvian anthropologist, Luis Millones, showing the role of colonial urban culture in moulding social attitudes towards *serranos*, *mestizos* and blacks in contemporary Lima. The article is particularly interesting insofar as it concentrates on life histories and social relations among slum-dwellers resident in the centre of Lima, a group that has tended to be ignored as research has concentrated on the shanty towns that encircle the Peruvian capital. The remaining essays address various aspects of life in the highlands. That by César Fonseca on peasant communities stresses the high degree of class differentiation within what were once regarded as egalitarian rural institutions. This is now common knowledge to anyone familiar with contemporary literature on the Andean peasantry, although Fonseca's case studies from the Callejón de Huaylas are of value as this is an understudied zone. Unfortunately, the author fails to back up many statements with empirical evidence. Nor does he rigorously explore the impact of demographic increase and growing integration into the capitalist market as factors undermining the *turno* system of land allocation in the communities, so contributing to a decline in communal work practices and landholding.

In her essay on women and men in Vicos, Florence Babb demonstrates that the end of landlord domination in the 1950s has not brought an advance in the position of women in that district of the northern highlands. Greater opportunity for involvement and economic gain in new activities once the landlord departed from the hacienda has resulted in a tendency for peasant men to move into these mercantile, waged

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employment and production spheres, so increasingly entrapping women in domestic functions, as well as reducing their role in agricultural decision-making. Not only have men tended to monopolise the expanding cash economy in Vicos, girls experience unequal access to schooling. The book concludes with an essay by William Stein on townspeople's attitudes to country dwellers and vice versa in the Gellejón de Huaylas, where stress is laid on feelings of mutual suspicion, prejudice and contempt. Although several of the essays are rambling, overall this volume is of use as a teaching aid as much of its contents relate to the department of Ancash, which has in the 1970s and 1980s been relatively neglected as a region for research.

LEWIS TAYLOR

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I The Supreme

Augusto Roa Bastos

New York: Knopf. 1986. 433pp. \$18.95

The work of the Paraguayan writer Augusto Roa Bastos cannot be understood without reference to the formative events of Paraguayan history. In his magisterial novel, *I The Supreme*, Roa takes as his focus the remarkable ruler Dr José Gaspar Rodríguez de Francia, who, after the independence of the country in 1811, established himself as the Perpetual Dictator of the Republic until his death in 1840. Francia inherited a divided and anarchic country and by systematic ruthlessness forged an independent republic. He destroyed the power of the creole elite, the Spanish merchants and the independence of the church, built up and strictly controlled an army, directed education, expropriated land for the national patrimony, fostered a process of miscegenation through enlightened racial laws, and created an egalitarian, rural-based, society. He limited foreign trade and encouraged economic self-sufficiency at a time when other republics were becoming dependent on the advancing British empire, and maintained the nation's boundaries despite the incursions of neighbouring Argentina and Brazil. Francia does not conform to our present-day stereotype of the cruel, selfish dictator: he was an extremely popular figure known in Guaraní as the Karai-Guasú (the 'great lord'). With these policies, Paraguay had become by the mid-nineteenth century a relatively advanced and prosperous nation.

Lack of space precludes an analysis of the destruction of this independence, which eventually led to the emergence, one hundred years later, of General Alfredo Stroessner, a grotesque parody of Francia's 'supreme' vision for Paraguay. Like Francia, he has developed the cult of personality. Unlike Francia, he has invited massive foreign investment benefitting a small, corrupt elite, allowed Brazil to make incursions in the country, waged war against the native Indian population, and increased an unequal system of land tenure. The country is ruled by fear, torture, imprisonment, and ruthless suppression of political parties, though there are signs that the system is beginning to break down. In such conditions there has been a mass exodus from the country: it is estimated that by 1979 almost a third of Paraguay's two million inhabitants lived outside the country.

The problem of exile is a dominant theme in Roa's work. The word exile has many connotations. It refers most explicitly to his own life as a writer, producing all his work

since 1947 in what he calls the obsessive and alienating atmosphere of exile. There is also the exile from one's audience. How to write, not just for a public subject to strict censorship, but also for a people who are largely illiterate and whose culture is mainly oral? Even the language a writer uses cannot be neutral: Spanish is the language of the coloniser; Guaraní, the native Indian language, survives with great strength (Paraguay is a predominantly bilingual country) as an oral rather than a written tradition. Roa also constantly points to the limitations of his own profession: for him, the intellectual will always play an ambiguous and minor role in the necessary struggle for social justice in Paraguay. In *The Supreme*, Roa positions himself as a 'compiler' of texts that deal with Dr Francia. With this device he seeks to deny the author as an entity who can work in complete autonomy, unconnected to reality. He speaks insisted of books written by the people, made up of different voices, cultured and uncultured.

The novel is a dialectic between the words that make up the title: I (the first person, Francia, the writer), The (the third person, the audience, the people), Supreme (the supreme power, of law and of imagination). For the most part the dictator is dictating to his scribe and to the people. He is in charge of the word, of law, and of history. By appropriating language, by narrating his own story, he can appropriate history. He attempts to fuse within himself theory and practice, necessary to preserve the independence and increase the prosperity of Paraguay. It is impossible to summarise this extraordinary novel in a few lines. It incorporates the latest developments in linguistic theory and practice, talks of the arbitrariness and unreliability of language which purports to describe reality, re-reads and comments upon the various histories and travellers' accounts of Paraguay, ranges across the breadth of Latin American history, implicitly condemning Stroessner and debating with Fidel Castro, and exploring once again the gap between writer and reader. In the end, Francia's task is doomed: the supreme imagination of one man must be fused with the aspirations of the people, who cannot be treated as mere passive recipients. The final anguish of the dictator is also the anguish of Roa the compiler: how to write a message that can be received, how to make one's own commitment honest and useful?

The translation of Roa's novel into English is a major achievement: it is an extraordinarily complex and inventive text, and Helen Lane, the translator, has produced a very competent version. It is also encouraging that the work is receiving wide distribution: published by Knopf in the United States in 1986 and by Faber and Faber in Britain early this year. Roa's novel is one of the major achievements of Latin American fiction.

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Vision of the future: an anthology of writings and speeches

The overwhelming and all-consuming desire to overthrow the apartheid regime has made opposition leaders reluctant to commit themselves to specific long-term policy objectives after the present system has been dismantled. Anxious both to preserve unity at all costs and devote themselves totally to the immediate struggle, most supporters of majority rule have preferred general statements condemning the current social order and emphasising the need for justice, equality and freedom for all.

The Freedom Charter, adopted at the Congress of the People in Kliptown, South Africa, on 26 June 1955, remains the official policy document of the African National Congress (ANC), the banned political movement which represents the aspirations of the vast majority of black South Africans. The Charter is the ANC's blueprint for a post-apartheid state, and it is therefore reproduced in full in this special issue of *TWQ*. In addition, certain speeches and writings of key opposition figures throw some light on how they perceive the task of building a new society. The following sections, which are divided into six major policy areas, are not intended as a comprehensive and definitive survey of their beliefs and favoured strategies. Rather, they are designed to suggest how possible future leaders might grapple with the thorny issues likely to face them, and to give some indication of the alternatives they may offer a free South Africa.

State structure and economy

'The ideological creed of the ANC is, and always has been, the creed of African Nationalism. It is not the concept of African Nationalism expressed in the cry, 'Drive the White man into the sea.' The African Nationalism for which the ANC stands is the concept of freedom and fulfilment for the African people in their own land. The most important political document ever adopted by the ANC is the Freedom Charter. It is by no means a blueprint for a socialist state. It calls for redistribution, but not nationalisation of land; it provides for

nationalisation of mines, banks, and monopoly industry, because big monopolies are owned by one race only, and without such nationalisation racial domination would be perpetuated despite the spread of political power. It would be a hollow gesture to repeal the Gold Law prohibitions against Africans when all gold mines are owned by European companies. In this respect the ANC's policy corresponds with the old policy of the present Nationalist Party which, for many years, had as part of its programme the nationalisation of the gold mines which, at that time, were controlled by foreign capital. Under the Freedom Charter, nationalisation would take place in an economy based on private enterprise. The realisation of the Freedom Charter would open up fresh fields for a prosperous African population of all classes, including the middle class. The ANC has never at any period of its history advocated a revolutionary change in the economic structure of the country, nor has it, to the best of my recollection, ever condemned capitalist society.²

(Nelson Mandela's statement from the dock in The Supreme Court of South Africa, Pretoria, 20 April 1964, at the opening of the defence case¹)

'The future government of this country is the African National Congress, which represents the majority of our land. We shall have a future South Africa where we shall have one person, one vote, we shall have a unitary state, we shall have a country which belongs to all the people who live in it, who have made the country what it is.'

(Winnie Mandela²)

'In the present political structure there is no room for dialogue any more. Not at all. The chapter was closed by the government on 12 June 1964, when they jailed the leadership. Dialogue can only take place on the release of all our leaders in prison, all the banned people and the return of all our exiled leaders. That's the only way to shape the country's future. Anything else is a sheer waste of time. And even then it is questionable whether they would still be prepared for the dialogue they were prepared for twenty years ago. Can you spend a quarter of your life in prison and still be prepared for the dialogue with your jailers that you called for twenty years ago, before they locked you up? The leadership would have to be involved in an entirely new kind of political thinking; perhaps a completely new basis for dialogue and negotiation.'

(Winnie Mandela³)

'In the newly independent Third World countries, we have often seen serious inroads into civil liberties and human rights. The position of the people has often been worse under their own rulers than it ever was under their colonial masters. There is often no freedom of speech, or press freedom. Criticism of the use of power by largely totalitarian military dictatorships is frowned on.

VISION OF THE FUTURE

Political dissent is not allowed on the pretence that developing countries cannot afford the luxury of having a democratic system, or that one-party states are not necessarily dictatorships.²

(Desmond Tutu, Anglican Archbishop of Cape Town⁴)

"We have to develop authentically African forms of democracy. Blacks believe in community. But we are now beginning to lose that and that is one reason why I loathe capitalism. It is against community, it is all competition and selfishness. You see blacks today who actually boast of their ulcers because that is a symbol of their success. As you know, I have seen this in America too, so I'm not just talking theoretically. Are people happy under capitalism? No, from everything I have seen capitalism gives unbridled licence to human cupidity, to the law of the jungle. Capitalism and the free enterprise system—it is un-freedom, it is morally repulsive."

(Desmond Tutu⁵)

"It (liberation) must be a totally new social order. We have to recapture what was sacred in the African community before the white man came. We have to recapture real community, solidarity, respect for life, all the things the modern world has destroyed . . . There are so many schools of thought about economics and I try not to talk about it in a detailed way. What I have said many times is that we have to find our own way, and it has to be an African way. It can't be the capitalism that oppresses people here or the system you have in the US where only the elite benefit from the wealth and it never reaches the masses."

(Allan Boesak, Senior Vice-President of the South African Council of Churches⁶)

"Our mission on the continent of Africa is to demonstrate the possibility of a nonracial democratic state," he asserts with an evident feeling of pride. There will be no confederation, no consociation, no qualified franchise, "nothing like that". Must it be one person, one vote? "Not necessarily. But these are all details that will be decided collectively. The important thing is that there will be a unitary state, a common citizenship, one South Africa." Somewhat surprisingly, since this is not usual in ANC literature, he says it could be a multiparty state. "Well, the whites, for example, are going to need their own party," he says. I note that there are few multiparty states in Africa. Yes, he knows that, probably no more than five. He includes Tanzania in his count and seems a bit miffed when I point out that Tanzania is a one-party state. "Never mind," he says somewhat defensively, "if democracy is a rare thing in Africa, then that's part of our revolutionary challenge." Evidently economic details will also have to await a collective decision. "My own contribution to the

decision would be that it should be a mixed economy, something like Sweden or China.”⁶

(Interview with Mfanafuthi Makatini, head of the ANC's observer mission at the UN, and member of the ANC's executive committee⁷)

‘Let me be explicit. For some while after apartheid falls there will undoubtedly be a mixed economy, implying a role for levels of non-monopoly private enterprise represented not only by the small racially oppressed black business sector but also by managers and business people of goodwill who have or are prepared to shed racism. It can only be an indigenous representative of the disastrous Pol Pot philosophy who can project a pole-vault into socialism and communism the day after overthrow of white rule. If the political domination of the old ruling class is ended and new state apparatus is constructed within the framework envisaged by the Freedom Charter, the existence of a mixed economy “controlled” in the words of the Charter “to assist the well-being of the people”, will facilitate rather than hinder the continuing drive towards a socialist future; a drive which, within a truly democratic framework, could well be settled in debate rather than on the streets.’

(Joe Slovo, Chairman of the South African Communist Party and member of the ANC Executive Committee⁸)

Foreign relations and investment

‘The starting point of African nationalism is the historical or even pre-historical position. Africa was, has been and still is the black man's continent. The Europeans, who have carved up and divided Africa among themselves, dispossessed, by force of arms, the rightful owners of the land—the children of the soil. Today they occupy large tracts of Africa. They have exploited and still are exploiting the labour power of Africans and natural resources of Africa, not for the benefit of the African peoples but for the benefit of the dominant white race and other white people across the sea. Although conquered and subjugated, the Africans have not given up, and they will never give up their claim and title to Africa. The fact that their land has been taken and their rights whittled down, does not take away or remove their right to the land of their forefathers. They will suffer white oppression, and tolerate European domination, only as long as they have not got the material force to overthrow it. There is, however, a possibility of a compromise, by which the Africans could admit the Europeans to a share of the fruits of Africa, and this is *inter alia*:

- a) that the Europeans completely abandon their domination of Africa;
- b) that they agree to an equitable and proportionate re-division of land;
- c) that they assist in establishing a free people's democracy in South Africa in particular and Africa in general.

VISION OF THE FUTURE

It is known, however, that a dominant group does not voluntarily give up its privileged position. That is why the Congress Youth puts forward African Nationalism as the militant outlook of an oppressed people seeking a solid basis for waging a long, bitter, and unrelenting struggle for its national freedom.' (Basic Policy Document, 1948, issued by the National Executive Committee of the ANC Youth League in 1948⁹)

'The multinational companies, as far as we are concerned, are political criminals in this country. We wouldn't be where we are today—politically—if it hadn't been for these foreign companies. The role they are playing is simply to defuse a militant situation. If you give a man a salary comparable to that of his white counterpart, and he goes back to the ghetto where he has no rights and remains a 'Bantu' and must carry that document of oppression, that *dompas* (literally, a 'damned pass'), you are only defusing and demoralising him into believing that his situation is normal, because you claim that his work situation is normal. But that's not true and it never can be.

'That is why foreign companies must get out. We are only interested in sanctions now. Every alternative has been examined by those men who have spent their lifetimes in prison. One doesn't dream for one minute that sanctions alone would bring the government down, or disinvestment alone. But it is part of a tool one can use. And in fact, tools of this nature which are instruments of liberation would lessen the bloodbath we are heading for, because you would expedite this long, long process of relieving the black man of his suffering. We know that foreign companies have literally financed our oppression; we know who our friends have been in the struggle . . . At the moment it's irrelevant who helps the black man to get rid of the shackles of oppression. There is yet that extremely difficult transition period which will be more difficult than in any other country. It will be our own Vietnam. Our suffering of today is absolutely nothing. We are facing a very, very grim future.'

(Winnie Mandela¹⁰)

'I would be more impressed with those (in the international community) who made no bones about the reason they remain in South Africa and said, honestly, "We are concerned for our profits," instead of the baloney that the businesses are there for our benefit. We don't want you there. Please do us a favour: get out and come back when we have a democratic and just South Africa.'

(Desmond Tutu¹¹)

' . . . we in South Africa share the experience of virtually every other liberation movement in the world, of the most consistent and generous support from the Soviet Union and other socialist nations. Today our cause is becoming more

fashionable and we are certainly gathering more friends. But neither we nor our people will forget or allow themselves to be separated from those who have been consistently with them from the very beginning. This includes our African brothers who have sacrificed so much in support of our struggle.'

(Joe Slovo¹²)

'... we should note and pay tribute to the sterling role that the independent states of our region have played in the furtherance of our struggle. . . . All these countries have, each according to its ability, including the latest among them to achieve independence, made it possible for us to survive outside the borders of our country and to advance our cause at home and abroad. We have to ensure that, at all times, we guard the fraternal relations that exist between them and ourselves, whatever strains these relations may come under now and again. Other countries in our continent and Africa as a whole have also played an important role in the struggle against the apartheid regime, confirming the primary importance of our continent as our first rear base.'

(ANC's National Executive Committee Report, June 1985, presented by Oliver Tambo, President¹³)

Labour and trade unions

'The workers are the principal force upon which the democratic movement should rely . . .'

(Nelson Mandela¹⁴)

'Nothing is more important than what is happening in the labour movement. We are the wealth of this country. We dig the wealth of this land. We could bring this country down through our labour—these black hands. We have made it what it is and we can bring it down in the same way. The people are there in industry—starving. They are there in the mines—starving. They are there as domestic servants—starving. It is not a question of outside agitators or communists from Russia. It is us, the people. We don't have to be told we are hungry. We *are* hungry. The government thinks it can divide us—separate the trade unions from the man in the township, when in fact the trade union is made up of the same people—the worker is the same man who leaves Soweto at one in the morning to be at the white man's factory at five, because the trains are chock-a-block. The worker is the same man who has been removed physically from his roots, from his father's land, a so-called "black spot", and has been placed by a white man in an arid, uninhabitable place, a so-called "homeland"; and this worker looks across and sees the graves of his children who have died of malnutrition in a land that is one of the richest in the world.'

(Winnie Mandela¹⁵)

VISION OF THE FUTURE

'He (President P W Botha) is too late because he has not come to terms with the determination, bordering on recklessness, of black youth who flaunt ANC emblems openly. He cannot control the militancy of black labour unions which are going to be the power to watch.'
(Desmond Tutu¹⁶)

'A wide range of resolutions were dealt with at the launching congress of COSATU (Congress of South African Trade Unions), such as to fight for a national minimum wage; to demand the right to work for all; to call for disinvestment and to support sanctions against the regime . . . Our revolution requires a united and strong trade union movement—South Africa's future lies in the hands of its workers.'

(Communiqué issued by SACTU (South African Congress of Trade Unions), COSATU and ANC¹⁷)

Attitudes to communism

'As far as the Communist Party is concerned, and if I understand its policy correctly, it stands for the establishment of a state based on the principles of Marxism. Although it is prepared to work for the Freedom Charter, as a short-term solution to the problems created by white supremacy, it regards the Freedom Charter as the beginning, and not the end, of its programme. The ANC, unlike the Communist Party, admitted Africans only as members. Its chief goal was, and is, for the African people to win unity and full political rights. The Communist Party's main aim, on the other hand, was to remove the capitalists and to replace them with a working-class government. The Communist Party sought to emphasise class distinctions whilst the ANC seeks to harmonise them. This is a vital distinction. It is true that there has been close cooperation between the ANC and the Communist Party. But cooperation is merely proof of a common goal—in this case the removal of white supremacy—and is not proof of a complete community of interests.'

(Nelson Mandela¹⁸)

'There can be no doubt at all that the most serious challenge facing the world today is not communism, despite the adventures of Soviet Russia in Afghanistan, which have given South Africa a temporary breathing space. Most of the Westerners who have tended to have an obsession with the threat of world domination posed by communism, would like us to believe that that is in fact the case. South Africa has capitalised on this by describing herself, and trying to project herself, as the last bastion of Christian Western civilisation, against the predatory advances of communism. It has passed such laws as the Suppression of Communism Act and other viciously repressive legislation, and many in the West have been duped. "Communist" in South Africa has become

the favourite swearword of those who support apartheid and the Nationalist government. Any opponent of apartheid could fall foul of the Suppression of Communism Act, even if he was known to be an ordained minister of a Christian denomination, who believed in God and who worshipped regularly. Very few in South Africa care to point out the blatant contradiction in all this.

'We have had to tell our white fellow South African that for blacks, the immediate concern is not with communism, however defined. For us it is but a future and hypothetical threat. Our priority concern as blacks, is the harsh reality of the present, which we experience every day of our lives at nearly every point.'

(Desmond Tutu¹⁹)

'I am opposed to communism, I am opposed to anything that is atheistic and I would not myself want to live in a communist society . . . I abhor capitalism. The way the West has operated by and large in the matter of apartheid gives me no reason to want to change my views about capitalism. My own preference would be for some form of socialism.'

(Desmond Tutu²⁰)

'I am sorry, talk about communism is unreal to me. Maybe there are communists and communist conspiracies, but that's all we hear about here and it's always the language of reaction and racism.'

(Allan Boesak²¹)

'It is not correct to say that the ANC is communist-oriented. We are a liberation movement and our direction is socialist. It's got to be, it could not be anything else, otherwise you sit down and accept the status quo. But as for the idea that the ANC is controlled by communists, or is communist-oriented, I reject it outright.'

(Oliver Tambo²²)

The Law

'In its proper meaning equality before the law means the right to participate in the making of the laws by which one is governed, a constitution which guarantees democratic rights to all sections of the population, the right to approach the court for protection or relief in the case of the violation of rights guaranteed in the constitution, and the right to take part in the administration of justice as judges, magistrates, attorneys-general, law advisers and similar positions. In the absence of these safeguards, the phrase 'equality before the law', in so far as it is pretended to apply to us, is meaningless and misleading. All the rights and privileges to which I have referred are monopolised by whites, and we enjoy none of them.'

(Nelson Mandela²³)

‘When the laws have been passed by the people, or through their democratically elected representatives, and when the laws are just, then they must be obeyed. But South Africa’s laws fail to pass that stringent test. None of them have been passed by the people’s democratically elected representatives, because 80 per cent of the people are excluded from the democratic process of law-making, and many of the laws, the whole apartheid system, is patently unjust.’

(Desmond Tutu²⁴)

‘When we oppose the State and resist its oppression, the State makes use of the idea of *law and order* to try to make us feel guilty and sinful. But “law” here is the unjust and discriminatory laws of apartheid and “order” here is the disorder of oppression and exploitation. We must as Christians resist this type of “law” and “order” and obey the law and order of God.’

(The Kairos Theologians²⁵)

The white population

‘The ANC is committed to non-racialism. The ANC cannot imagine a situation in which the white man does not exist. We never look at the people as black or white; it is the enemy who compels us to use those terms. The umbrella organisation of the ANC (the United Democratic Front) embodies everyone who is fighting side by side with us against oppression. The white student at Wits or Cape Town University who is beaten up by the same system that is beating up my people here in the Free State—must I ignore him? He is fighting the same cause as me. That is a fellow comrade. And you can’t ignore those students who today are so brave as to hold anti-Republic demonstrations with a vacant chair labelled “Nelson Mandela”. They are fellow human beings who are fighting side by side in our struggle. The South Africa of tomorrow that I’m fighting for will include that white child who has been so brave defying his Broederbond parents and shouting the slogans of my movement on the campus. I can’t ignore him. He is part of us.’

(Winnie Mandela²⁶)

‘It is not us, but the white man, who should be thinking of how he will fit into our future society. It’s his problem. He has the audacity to talk about the protection of minority groups when he is oppressing the majority. The arrogance! That he sits there in power for over four hundred years, legislating against millions and millions of people and oppressing us for all these generations, and now we must worry about the protection of minority rights, and of his property and his culture.’

(Winnie Mandela²⁷)

'To talk of white minority rights is to propagate an anti-democratic principle. The government of our unitary, non-racial, democratic state will be based on the will of all our people exercised through one person one vote. To categorise the population of South Africa in racial or ethnic terms and advance a perspective of a federation of such entities is to seek to perpetuate apartheid and deny our own people a democratic system.'

(Alfred Nzo, Secretary-General of the ANC²⁸)

'For years we have tried to make white South Africa understand that what we want is not to drive white people into the sea, but that we want a share in the decision-making processes of our country, a full and meaningful participation in government, what we want is the recognition that we are people that belong to that land, which is, after all, the land of our birth.'

(Allan Boesak²⁹)

'I don't think that white people in South Africa will want to die simply to remain white. I think that when they are faced with the reality of one violent confrontation after another, or even with the reality that they will have to kill wave after wave of black people simply to remain in power, I don't think that in the end that is what the majority of the white people want. I am quite willing to accept that there might be a substantial minority who will want that and be prepared to go through with it. I believe that whatever happens within the next ten years South Africa will still have to go through what I could call our Ku-Klux-Klan period, both in terms of individual actions and a broadening of the violent front that we are facing right now; but in the end white South Africans have to come to terms with realities. It is a question of what pressures can be put on the South African government both internally and externally and how effectively. When they face those realities they will change and they will accept that they have to live in a country where 80 per cent of the population is black, and they will have to accept that there will have to be some way of finding a form of government in which everybody is represented, in which there is full and meaningful participation for every South African. I don't think they will do that simply through a change of heart. I think that we still have to find meaningful ways of exercising pressure to force the South African government to realise that the only alternative to coming to grips with the realities of the South African situation is the kind of senseless ongoing killing that would finally result in greater chaos.'

(Allan Boesak³⁰)

Notes

- ¹ Nelson Mandela, *The Struggle is My life*, London: International Defence and Aid Fund for Southern Africa, 1986, p 173. This book is a compilation of Mandela's speeches and writings, together with historical documents and accounts of Mandela's life in prison by fellow inmates.
- ² Interview with Winnie Mandela on Granada Television (UK) *World in Action*, 23 June 1986.
- ³ *Part of My Soul*, London: Penguin, 1985, pp 127-8.
- ⁴ Desmond Tutu, *Crying in the Wilderness*, Oxford: Mowbray, 1982, pp 113-14.
- ⁵ Interview with Desmond Tutu in Richard John Neuhaus, *Dispensations: The Future of South Africa as South Africans See It*, Grand Rapids, Michigan: Eerdmans, 1986, pp 131-2.
- ⁶ Interview with Allan Boesak in *Dispensations*, pp 198-9.
- ⁷ Interview with Mfanafuthi Makatini in *Dispensations*, pp 287-8.
- ⁸ Speech by Joe Slovo at the 65th Anniversary Meeting of the South African Communist Party in London on 30 July 1986. This speech, and the one made by Alfred Nzo, Secretary General of the ANC, are published by Inkululeko Publications; 39 Goodge Street, London W1P 1FD.
- ⁹ *The Struggle is My Life*, p 25.
- ¹⁰ *Part of My Soul*, pp 124-5.
- ¹¹ *New York Times*, 16 June 1986, 'Sanctions vs apartheid'; this article by Desmond Tutu was adapted from a Commencement Address at Hunter College, New York City.
- ¹² Speech by Joe Slovo at the 65th Anniversary Meeting.
- ¹³ *Documents of the Second National Consultative Conference of the ANC, Zambia, 16-23 June 1985*, Lusaka/London: ANC, 1985, p 10.
- ¹⁴ *The Struggle is My Life*, p 57.
- ¹⁵ *Part of My Soul*, p 124.
- ¹⁶ Desmond Tutu, *Hope and Suffering*, London: Fount Paperbacks, and Grand Rapids, Michigan: Eerdmans, 1985, pp 128-9.
- ¹⁷ Published by SACTU in the pamphlet called *Workers' Unity* (60, 61) 1986.
- ¹⁸ Statement from the dock on 20 April 1964; *The Struggle is My Life*, pp 173-4.
- ¹⁹ *Crying in the Wilderness*, pp 106-7.
- ²⁰ *The Guardian* (London), 11 August 1986.
- ²¹ *Dispensations*, p 249.
- ²² *New York Times*, 7 February 1982.
- ²³ 'Black man in a white court', Nelson Mandela's first court statement made in the Old Synagogue Court, Pretoria, in 1962; *The Struggle is My Life*, p 135.
- ²⁴ *Crying in the Wilderness*, p 54.
- ²⁵ *South Africa in the 1980s*, London: Catholic Institute for International Relations, 1986, pp 68-72. The KAIROS Document was released by the Kairos Theologians in Braamfontein, South Africa, and is 'a Christian, biblical and theological comment on the political crisis in South Africa today. It is an attempt by concerned Christians in South Africa to reflect on the situation of death in our country. It is a critique of the current theological models that determine the type of activities the Church engages in to try to resolve the problems of the country. It is an attempt to develop, out of this perplexing situation, an alternative biblical and theological model that will in turn lead to forms of activity that will make a real difference to the future of our country.' (Preamble to the Document).
- ²⁶ *Part of My Soul*, p 120.
- ²⁷ *ibid.*, p 125.
- ²⁸ Speech by Alfred Nzo at the 65th Anniversary Meeting of SACP on 30 July 1986.
- ²⁹ *Let us rise up and walk together*, Allan Boesak's speech at the 75th Anniversary Conference of the National Urban League in Washington DC on 23 July 1985.
- ³⁰ Interview with Allan Boesak in *Third World Quarterly* 7(4) October 1985, pp 794-5.

South Africa's tomorrow

Liberalism and apartheid

The South African state is a British colonial creation embedded in the liberal ideology. Whatever the egalitarian claims of that ideology, its very emphasis on individualism made it prone to differentiation and discrimination. Discrimination is in fact the essence of liberalism—discrimination between individuals on the basis of their faculty of reason: 'Blessed are the reasonable for they will acquire the earth,' which is a restatement of the Calvinist doctrine 'Blessed are the wealthy for in them is the sign of the Lord's election.'

Humanitarian liberalism, especially in the form of Christian missionaries, attempted to raise the heathen from his ignorance, but rarely believed that he could be so raised: apartheid set its doubts at rest. It confirmed for it that it could not be so raised. Class and race groupings are an inevitable result of the liberal ideology. The liberal British parliament was privy to the 1910 Act of Union which excluded all 'non-Europeans' from franchise rights in the new South African state.

It is not racism that is alien to the liberal tradition, but the damming up of social mobility within racial enclosures, for that goes against its deepest belief, the freedom of the individual, albeit in an unfree society, to develop his faculty of reason, and enter into free competition.

Liberalism partnered apartheid, almost unquestioningly, up to at least 1976. While it periodically expressed horror at the violence that erupted, it sustained that partnership because it served its ends. Liberalism in fact has no great horror of violence and uses it as brutally as any, as it has in recent years in the Middle and Far East.

It was only after Soweto 1976, after the revolt of school children and the crumbling of Bantu education designed to socialise blacks for subservience, after the revolt of workers in the 1970s, and after the collapse of Bantu authorities in the townships, that international liberalism began to doubt the capacity of the Nationalists to secure the country and the interests of international capitalism. For the first time it began to see apartheid as a real threat to the economy. The argument that free enterprise was eroding apartheid anyhow, and that there was thus no need for sanctions or popular resistance, is no longer heard.

Foremost today on the liberal front within the country is an important group of businessmen who see economic disaster already on the doorstep. They are pressing the government to negotiate with the ANC. Tony Bloom, Chairman of the Premier Group, warns:

Unless something is done now South Africa may not have the luxury of a choice between P W Botha and the ANC; it may well be faced with a choice between a group far to the right of the present government, and the steely eyes of kids who are facing the police in the townships on a daily basis and who are rapidly getting out of control.¹

The President of the Azanian People's Organisation (AZAPO), Saths Cooper, shares this concern when he asks what kind of society this is where not only has a war been declared on school children but where we fear our children, and states: 'If a massive national intervention is not undertaken soon the likelihood of the country emerging whole at the dawn of liberation is remote.'²

Capitalism's immediate fear is the fear of sanctions. It has up to now relied to some considerable extent on Chief Buthelezi to allay sanctions. But Buthelezi's star is hitched to the Nationalist wagon; when that stalls, he too stalls and the stalling has not only begun, it is grinding to a halt. Few understand this as well as the liberal capitalist, and so it is that they are poised to back the ANC, inhibited only by one concern: the ANC's link with the South African Communist Party (SACP).

The Communist Link

The ANC's communist link goes back to the early part of the century, and has at all times been an uneasy one due to the conflicting interests of socialism and nationalism. But the conflict has been restrained by the fact that they share a common constituency. In mobilising Africans, the ANC mobilised an almost totally working-class population. The SACP, failing in its appeal to white workers turned its revolutionary task to the 'natives' as early as 1924 and became actively involved with the most popular African movement of the time, Clements Kadalie's Industrial and Commercial Workers' Union (ICU), but the involvement soon struck a precarious note with accusations of incompetence from the SACP and interference from the Africans. Similar conflicts were repeated in the relationship with the ANC. But there has always been the overlapping

¹ *Sunday Tribune* (Durban) 24 August 1986.

² *Post* (Durban) 3 August 1986.

and shared leadership, and the unquestionable commitment of the SACP to Black Liberation, along with the material support the external movement has had from the Soviet Union, has maintained a healthy alliance for almost half-a-century. The tensions too have remained. In the past, rooted as the SACP was in the white political structure, and hopeful of uniting black and white workers, the SACP accepted those structures and worked through and within them, thereby conflicting with the strong boycott tendency of the radicalised ANC youth. Finally, the SACP's aim is a workers' revolution, and the establishment of a workers' state; that of the ANC, a populist national revolution.

The SACP strives to contain this ideological conflict by its thesis of a two-stage revolution in colonial situations: first, national liberation from imperialism, and then, the establishment of a bourgeois democracy; finally, a workers' and peasants' republic. However, the SACP sees itself as the party of the working class and in this it remains in continuous conflict with the ANC. Communist expectations of a take-over from the Islamic state did not materialise in Iran, and are not likely to do so in South Africa. A recent survey by the Institute for Black Research (IBR) reveals a 2 per cent support for the SACP as against 20 per cent for the ANC.

The Freedom Charter

The ANC is criticised for its absence of clearly formulated political and economic policies. The closest it has come to such a formulation has been in the adoption of the Freedom Charter in 1956. The policy adopted therein satisfies neither the extreme left nor the extreme right, asserting by that fact alone its middle-ground position. Its economic policy supports both limited nationalisation and private enterprise, the relevant clauses stating: 'The Mineral Wealth beneath the soil, the banks and monopoly industry shall be transferred to the ownership of the people as a whole.' But it quickly adds, 'All people shall have equal rights to trade when they choose, to manufacture and to enter all trades, crafts and professions.'

The Charter is thus not against private enterprise, but against monopoly capitalism. The liberal dilemma is then not whether the ANC will accommodate big business, but how far will the radicalised black electorate go in supporting the ANC in such an accommodation.

Recent surveys show that South African black people identify capitalism with white domination. They do not believe that racial

inequality can be adjusted without state intervention; that if left to 'free' competition, the existing imbalance in the share of resources will be corrected. An IBR survey in December 1985 (1786 respondents) revealed 20 per cent in favour of non-racial capitalism, 74 per cent in favour of socialism, 3 per cent favouring total state control and 37 per cent favouring a mixed economy similar to the one outlined in the Freedom Charter. In September 1985, a survey of 800 respondents conducted by IBR and Mark Orkin of the Community Agency for Social Enquiry (CASE) found that 77 per cent of the sample supported socialism and 22 per cent capitalism.

Politically, the Charter supports a multiracial democracy with universal adult franchise: 'Every man and woman shall have the right to vote for and stand as a candidate for all bodies making laws', 'All native groups shall have equal rights.' The Freedom Charter, however, is only a guideline—it is not a constitution for the new society. That constitution will have to be adopted by a national convention, or a body representative of all South Africans. The participants of that body will in all probability be drawn from the existing political groupings.

White political groupings

White politics is broadly classified into its historic Afrikaner/English segments, but such ethnicity has little political significance today. The Nationalists have a clear mandate from a unified white electorate, whose main concern is to defend white power.

Afrikaner racism (apartheid) has dominated over English racism (segregation) only because the former has been so much more effective. It continued to be supported by Europe and the US despite Sharpeville and Biko, so long as it secured a stable economy and stable profits. It is no longer able to secure that stability, and hence the vigorous pressure for reform, and the mounting threats of sanctions forcing the Nationalists to begin their reform moves. But the inadequacy of those moves has provoked a virtual revolution in the townships and, to the extent that they threaten the integrity of the apartheid ideology, a serious splintering within the Nationalist Party.

The National Party (NP) remained a cohesive Afrikaner force so long as its nationalisation was based on white working-class racist interests. But as South African capitalism became Afrikanerised, so the NP came more and more to represent white bourgeois interests and its international capital links. And as the Afrikaner worker under

protective custody and privileged wages moved into technical, professional and management jobs and thereby became absorbed into the capitalist fraternity, so the government began to modify the industrial colour bar that had become practically dysfunctional; but even that small step towards economic rationality threatened Afrikaner strife that the Botha government dared not ignore. Emotionally fixated to its archaic ideology, and caught between the fear of the *Swart Gevaar* (Black Threat) and the *verkrampste* (conservative) Afrikaner backlash, it remains today incapable of making the necessary intellectual leap to real change. So it continues worshipping the carcass when the holy cow is dead.

It is the worship of that carcass that many Western observers support when they warn that the Afrikaner will never give up, that he will fight to the last, his back to the wall, in the process ruining the whole country. The Afrikaner parted company with his tough frontier forebears who had fought to the last, because they had nothing to lose anyway. The present Afrikaner has accumulated so many creature comforts that he will ultimately bargain to save some of them rather than lose all. He will respond to the pressure of sanctions. There is no special mystique about the Afrikaner as some liberal commentators would have us believe. Had the British not returned his political power after conquering him at the end of the last century there may well have been no history of his ethnic unity, and no myth of his impregnability. Afrikanerdom, which rode to power through the political process, has lost faith in that process precisely because that process can no longer work for it. It has abdicated power to the military and the police and converted its parliament into a forum of meaningless words, or a wordless forum. The official opposition remains helpless, and even if it does not admit it, finds little if any function in parliament.

Black political groupings

The historical ideological strands in modern black politics are liberalism, nationalism and Marxism, (Leninist and Trotskyite). To these were added Africanism in the 1950s, and Black Consciousness in the 1970s.

African politics became modernised at the beginning of the century in response to acts that deprived the African people of land, and franchise rights. It saw an early splintering in the 1930s with the formation of the All-African Convention and in the 1950s with the Pan Africanist

Congress (PAC), in opposition to the Freedom Charter and its non-African influences.

Cape Coloured politics was initially concentrated in the Non-European Unity Movement (NEUM), noted for its Trotskyite leanings. It affiliated to the All-African Convention and with it introduced the boycott strategy into black radical politics.

Indian politics concentrated in the Gandhi-founded Natal Indian Congress, its 'militant' phase being expressed by passive resistance, and by conservatism in negotiation. Like the ANC it became radicalised after the First World War and was influenced by socialist and Marxist doctrines. By the 1950s, the African and Indian Congress and the SACP constituted the Congress Alliance. The NEUM was strong in the Cape and adopted a position of hostile radical criticism.

The distinct feature of black politics is its insecurity, and the lack of inter-generational continuity as a result of bannings, banishments and detentions. The post-1960 generation was cut off from the traditions of the PAC, the ANC and the SACP. The vacuum created by the banning of the ANC and PAC in 1960 was filled for a period by the Black Consciousness movement which was acceptable to neither the ANC or the NEUM in exile though accommodated by the PAC. Black Consciousness too was suppressed in the 1970s, but the reform measures of the mid-1980s, and particularly the need to give credibility to the new constitution through 'free elections' created new space for black political alignments. Two distinct groupings emerged in the mid-1980s, those identified with the ANC and the Freedom Charter under the umbrella of the United Democratic Front (UDF) (Azanian Students' Organisation (AZASO) and the Congress of South African Students (COSAS)) and the NEUM Black Consciousness grouping under the National Forum (AZAPO, Students of Young Azania (SOYA) and Coloured Action League (CAL)). While leaders and activists draw fine distinctions between these components, the mass psyche sees them as cut from one radical cloth.

Intervening and mediating between these two black radical coalitions is the Church, headed above all by Allan Boesak and Desmond Tutu and operating through the South African Council of Churches (SACC) and the Christian Institute. The new trade unions—the gigantic Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) identifying with the UDF, the ANC and the banned South African Congress of Trade Unions (SACTU), and the Council of Unions of South Africa (CUSA) identifying with the National Forum—constitute a third vital force.

The children

The fourth and presently most important political force in the country is that of the youth. This force burst on to the South African scene in 1976 when the security forces opened fire on school children peacefully resisting the imposition of Afrikaans as a medium of instruction. It resulted in the internal collapse of Bantu Education and unleashed the phenomenon of 'child power'.

After ten years of that sustained power, the whole fabric of township life has changed. Quite literally, the child has become the father of the man. Heroic at the outset, and heroic still to some considerable extent, the children's movement remains uneasy in discipline, partly because discipline is not a child's quality. It is acquired from teachers and parents. In 1976 teachers and parents, too overwhelmed by both the suffering of the children and the children's capacity to cope with that suffering, and to avenge it, stepped aside and the youth took over the leadership and in the process lost respect for authority; both for parental authority because it proved incapable of defending them, and secular authority because it declared war on them. No generation of blacks have hated the white state as wholly as the present generation of child-activists.

The youth of 1976 are today in their late twenties, and for the last ten years each generation entering its teen years has had this volatile youth as a reference model. With Bantu Education discredited, and the whole school system in a state of collapse, the townships are charged today with the explosive energy of the youth who form the single most populous group and who are neither at school nor in formal employment. They generate both political and criminal leadership and it is difficult at times to distinguish between the two. The youth who have assumed political responsibility work under the most hazardous conditions, are under constant police and military surveillance, and subjected to brutal attack from both the state and state-instigated black vigilantes. Many live precariously, too fearful of living in their own homes for fear of reprisals and detentions. They organise through fragile, makeshift structures, and strive to set up channels of consultation with the parent generations in nocturnal, candle-light meetings. They organise consumer and rent boycotts and set up street barricades and take on the military and the police and suspected informers. They have been criticised for high-handed action, for inflicting political decisions on the people and for employing coercive

and terror tactics. There is truth in this, but it would be unrealistic to expect the youth to adopt conventional procedures in the circumstances in which they are forced to operate. They have been literally hurled into anarchy by a state which has blocked all access to democratic institutions.

The co-opted black bourgeoisie

The fifth black political grouping is made up of the co-opted salaried black bourgeoisie which fits into the administrative network of apartheid through the homelands, township and local affairs committees, and the Indian and coloured houses of the tricameral parliament. The institutions they man were popularly resisted at the time of their creation and continue to be deeply resented. The salaried incumbents commonly referred to as 'stooges' and 'quislings' by the radicals, constitute the most readily accessible 'Government' targets of black anger.

The roots of the present so-called 'black-on-black' confrontation are to be found in this hostility. When repression reaches unbearable proportions, when resistance against rent and transport price rises (and the government is both landlord and transporter) is met with military fire and death, retaliation is sought on government targets in the townships, on the administrative buildings and on the persons and property of the black police and community councillors who live there. Such retaliation has always been on a small scale in the past, confined to one or two targets, the anger apparently subsiding with the attack. Since 1985, however, retaliatory violence has taken a new turn, primarily because for the first time the government has incorporated its co-opted black leadership into its army and police, incorporating it into the first flank of its violent repression in the townships.

This was the anatomy of the violence inflicted by Chief Buthelezi's Inkatha, under the guise of bringing order to the townships in Natal and of a great deal of the black-on-black violence in Soweto and Mamelodi and at Crossroads. The lines are drawn between UDF and Inkatha, and 'Fathers' and 'Comrades' (counter-revolutionary forces and vigilantes who are usually manipulated by the government). In addition to this ongoing violence there has been ongoing dissension between radical groups, between members of the UDF and AZAPO. The latter violence is however no longer heard of and many believe that that too was state-instigated.

The future Parliament

It is against this political dynamic that one must consider South Africa's tomorrow. While economic changes may well proceed slowly, political changes will be immediate, and a forecast may be attempted on the basis of existing black and white political forces.

The post-apartheid constituencies will continue to be characterised by ethnicity for a considerable time. If the political structure is based on universal adult franchise, whites would have 14 per cent of the votes, blacks 73 per cent, Indians 3 per cent and Coloureds 10 per cent.

The political affiliations of South Africa's disenfranchised were most recently recorded in a national sample survey (1786 interviews) conducted by the Institute for Black Research in four regions: Durban, Johannesburg, and the Eastern and the Western Cape in December 1985. The results demonstrate a UDF and ANC majority of 45 per cent, leaving a splintered opposition of 55 per cent, the overwhelming tendency of the disenfranchised being to vote for groupings with socialist leanings, ranging from those supporting the Freedom Charter to communism. They also reaffirm that the vast majority of black South Africans support a socialist economy, 74 per cent opting for socialist models almost equally divided between those favouring total state control and those favouring a mixed economy.

Although only 4 per cent voted for religious parties (mostly Christian) 30 per cent expressed support for the two religious personalities Tutu and Boesak, and 35 per cent for ANC leaders Mandela (24 per cent), Sisulu (7 per cent) and Tambo (10 per cent). Both Tutu and Boesak are highly esteemed not as religious leaders *per se* but as religious leaders taking a positive stand against apartheid and in sympathy with the ANC. It seems probable that these church leaders would command considerable support even if they stood independently of the ANC for political office, but not sufficient, even if they combined, to counteract an ANC majority in parliament.

What is important is that with over 50 per cent of the disenfranchised inclined towards parties other than the ANC, and 65 per cent towards non-ANC leaders, an election fought on the basis of universal adult franchise would produce very varied results far from the monolithic expectations of anxious whites. Integrating the white vote on the basis of recent expectations published in *Rapport* (a Sunday newspaper with pro-government sympathies published in Johannesburg) 20 July 1986 (Table 1) and incorporating the black vote as indicated in the IBR sample

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
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survey of December 1985 (Table 2), the following distribution of parliamentary power emerges:

ANC group, inclusive of UDF and AZASO:	39.3% or
Above inclusive of COSATU and Socialists:	48.0%
Afrikaner Nationalist and other ethnic minorities including Inkatha and PFP:	21.6%
Marxist (SACP, NEUM, Trade Unions, AZAPO, African Peoples' Democratic Union of South Africa (APDUSA))	12.3%
Conservative white (CP, HNP)	8.0%

It is conceivable that faced with an ANC with considerable non-African support, but primarily African and fundamentally responsible to an electorate constituted in the main of African workers supporting a socialist economy, the official opposition, while apparently a coalition of ethnic minorities, would simultaneously also be a coalition of capitalist 'free-enterprise' supporters. The Progressive Federal Party (PFP) estimates its present membership to be 10 per cent black. The anti-racist Marxist groupings such as the Communist, AZAPO, NEUM, and the trade unions might well form a coalition to the left of the ANC. It is unlikely that the element of extreme right Afrikaner conservatism will disappear overnight. Their present parliamentary strength is about 9 per cent, but this could be expected to dwindle considerably, losing out to the nationalist-capitalist fraternity.

Clearly then, there is available immediately to the South African people a parliamentary alternative to the existing one where a single party representing a small white minority has for decades held a majority of all seats and consequently monopolised all power. In the post-apartheid parliament the ruling party would hold a minority of seats but it would be constrained by a majority dispersed among a wide range of ideological and ethnic interests with opportunities for effective coalitions. This parliament, which would be based on a unitary political structure on the Westminster model (for this is the overwhelming choice of the disenfranchised, supported by 68 per cent in the IBR survey), would almost certainly be acceptable to all segments of the disenfranchised, including the homelands, dependent and independent, and to liberal capitalism. It would immediately remove from the country the stigma of a pariah nation, bestow on it the honour of legitimacy, and end all sanctions, operative and threatened. The war between the ANC and the Nationalists would end and the emergent new non-racial democracy would enter into friendly accord with its

Table 1

White voting behaviour

	1981(1)	1986(2)	Members of Parliament 1986
Nationalist	56.1	51.9	127
Progressive Party	19.1	16.2	27
HNP	13.9	2.2	1
NRP	7.7	2.7	8
Conservative Party	1.4	13.4	18

(1): Nic Olivier's analysis after 1981 elections.

(2): *Rapport* survey, 20 July 1986.

Table 2

Black voting behaviour as projected by December 1985 survey		Integrated black/white voting behaviour	
UDF	23.5	ANC/UDF/AZASO	39.3
ANC	20.0	AZAPO	8.6
AZAPO	10.1	NRP	1.5
AZASO	0.7	Afrikaner Nationalist	8.1
PAC	2.6	Afrikaner Conservative	2.8
Socialist	6.7	PFP	7.2
PFP	6.4	Socialist	5.7
Inkatha	3.7	Inkatha	2.9
Coloured Tricameral	1.2	PAC	2.2
Indian Tricameral	1.2	COSATU	0.3
NEUM	0.5	CUSA	1.4
Communist	2.0	Coloured Tricameral	1.8
CUSA	0.4	Indian Tricameral	1.0
COSATU	1.7	Unity Movement	0.4
Christian	3.3	Christian	2.8
Muslim	0.4	Muslim	0.3
Hindu	0.4	Hindu	0.3
Nationalist	2.7	Communist	1.7
Other	11.7	Other	11.7
Total	99.2	Total	100.0

neighbouring states, liberating them from the economic stranglehold and military oppression of the apartheid society which imprisons them today.

The new government would in all probability pursue a non-aligned foreign policy, would become a strong member of the OAU and of the

UN and undertake international trade which would be geared to benefit the people rather than specific interest groups. It would confront the enormous task of de-racialising the country materially, intellectually and emotionally, a task which is long overdue and for which time has already run out.

For all the violence that characterises South African society, an astonishing level of goodwill still remains. The vast majority of black South Africans do not want punitive action against white South Africans (IBR survey 1985). On such black goodwill towards whites, South Africans of all colour can confidently stride forward to a new society.

Living in the interregnum: crisis, reform and the socialist alternative in South Africa

'The crisis consists precisely in the fact that the old is dying and the new cannot be born; in this interregnum a great variety of morbid symptoms appear.'

Antonio Gramsci, *Prison Notebooks*

As apartheid goes through its terminal phase, a vigorous debate has emerged concerning the type of structures that should be established in a post-apartheid South Africa. To date this debate has to a large extent been dominated by liberal capitalist positions preoccupied with the problem of how to de-racialise South Africa's political economy without dismantling the capitalist economy. These positions, however, stand opposed to the demands and interests of the black majority whose popular organisations have in theory and in practice articulated a socialist rather than a capitalist solution to South Africa's fundamental problems.

This paper will analyse the major social processes that have shaped South African society over the last decade. The basic aim will be to explain these processes as the outcome of intense social conflicts over the goals of structural change and the means to achieve them. The paper will have four parts. Firstly, I will start with the unusual practice of stating what these goals should in principle be, rather than what they may be in reality. Secondly, I will provide an analysis of structural and political changes that have taken place since 1976. Thirdly, I will link an evaluation of the dynamics of the current interregnum to a prognosis for the future. Finally, proposals for how a socialist system could be constructed are briefly discussed.

Goals

The major organisations that represent the interests of the oppressed are in some way committed to a socialist future. Two documents articulate the demands around which they intend to build a socialist or at least a non-capitalist post-apartheid society. The first is the Freedom

Charter that was adopted by the ANC and its allies in 1955 and the second are the May Day demands that were drawn up by political organisations and trade unions in May 1985. Four sets of demands are contained in these documents. They are:

- 1) the restructuring of work and employment, eg the right to work, a living wage, a forty-hour week, the right to strike, maternity leave and control over prices;
- 2) the reorganisation of the provision of the means of collective consumption, eg transport, housing, social services and food;
- 3) the thorough democratisation of the political economy—the Freedom Charter talks about political rights and ‘democratic organs of self-government’ and the May Day demands refer to the creation of a system that holds ‘the interests of the working class paramount’;
- 4) the substantial redistribution of land and wealth coupled to the socialisation of the means of production, starting with the nationalisation of monopolies.

Much depends on the fundamental principles that will shape the way these objectives are realised. ‘To obtain the opportunity to govern at all,’ John Dunn argues, ‘socialists who do overtly intend to transform an existing society must appear *capable* of transforming it very broadly as they intend.’¹ Rather than present a coherent model, I will assert a few key principles drawn from contemporary socialist practice and theory.²

The first precondition for substantive social change in South Africa is the creation of a non-racial majoritarian unitary state. This will more than likely be constructed within a ‘national democratic’ framework which does not exclude the possibility of significant socialist forms of social regulation.³

Secondly, Gelb and Innes have argued that to realise the above demands a new ‘social structure of accumulation’ needs to be created that is regulated by socio-political institutions rather than by the market. Social regulation will

enable the productive structure and the process of accumulation to be shaped and directed, so as to achieve social objectives . . . When regulation is

¹ J Dunn, *The Politics of Socialism*, London: Cambridge University Press, 1983, p 72.

² I will ignore for the moment the problem of transition.

³ P Hudson, ‘The Freedom Charter and socialist strategy in South Africa’, *Politikon* (13) 1 June 1986, pp 75–91.

dominated by the market, the accumulation process is instead directed towards the achievement of *private* objectives, such as profitability, growth in firm size, etc.⁴

The weight of evidence from Third World development experiences suggests that structural inequality cannot be overcome without substantial social regulation.

Thirdly, it is now accepted by socialist writers that social regulation (and nationalisation in particular) cannot work without substantial decentralisation of economic and political power to local and regional organs of popular decision-making. Without worker control over productive units and citizen control over cities, social regulation has proven to be both economically inefficient and undemocratic.⁵ Where participation in production has been maximised, productivity has increased and democracy extended (eg in Chile under Allende, Russia in 1918, and in Algeria before Boumedienne).⁶

Fourthly, the history of socialism has shown that the market cannot be completely abolished, not only because this results in economic inefficiency, but also because socialist states have not turned out to be omniscient rational embodiments of the general proletarian will. Brus' perceptive analysis of the economic problems of state socialism has led him to conclude that the answer lies in a 'planned economy with a built-in market mechanism'.⁷ However, the market under socialism can only work when decentralisation and popular participation are maximised. Gelb and Innes point out that '[i]t is by no means contradictory to combine democratic control within the enterprise and over the accumulation process, with market relations between enterprises'.⁸

Fifthly, given that socialists wish to replace market regulation with social regulation via the intervention of rational political institutions, this will more than likely degenerate into authoritarianism if socialists

⁴ S Gelb, and D Innes, 'Towards a democratic economy in South Africa', *Third World Quarterly* 9(2) April 1987, p 562.

For comparative studies of the Third World, see also G White, *et al.* (eds), *Revolutionary Socialist Development in the Third World*, Brighton: Wheatsheaf Books, 1983.

⁵ On the importance of decentralisation see W Brus, *The Economics and Politics of Socialism*, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1973.

⁶ See J Espinosa and A Zimbalist, *Economic Democracy: Workers' Participation in Chilean Industry, 1970-1973*, London: Academic Press, 1978; C Sirrianni, *Workers Control and Socialist Democracy: The Soviet Experience*, London: 1982; and I Clegg, *Workers' Self-management in Algeria*, London: Allen Lane, 1971.

⁷ W Brus, *op. cit.*, p 18.

⁸ S Gelb and D Innes, *op. cit.*, p 30.

do not have a greater respect than their capitalist forebears for the liberal tradition: the rule of law, governmental accountability, democratic freedoms, and constitutionalism.⁹ However, Eurocommunists have suggested that parliamentary-type institutions have to be complemented by controlling organs that represent the interests of the working class *per se*. The relationship between the Soviets and the Constituent Assembly in Russia before the latter was disbanded by the Bolsheviks is frequently referred to as a model for a post-capitalist socialist democracy.

Finally, socialists have begun to realise that they must jettison their utopian ignorance of the problems of scarcity and the realities of power relations by recognising that these cannot always be reduced to class forces.¹⁰ Socialist utopianism has frequently resulted in despotism because, in Kolakowski's brutally honest words, 'despotism is a desperate simulation of paradise.'¹¹

In short, in my view, the May Day demands and the aims of the Freedom Charter can only be realised in a democratic socialist post-apartheid society based on a complex synthesis of national democracy, social regulation, decentralisation, substantive democratisation, market relations and constitutionalism. This will ensure that capitalist social relations and racism are replaced with full political rights and a democratically organised economy without sacrificing either one of these objectives.¹²

Social Change 1976-85

It is commonly accepted that the 1976 Soweto uprisings were a turning-point in South African history. On the one hand, they brought to an end more than a decade of black political quiescence and forcefully reflected mass popular rejection of apartheid. Secondly, they were sufficiently serious to make an impact on South Africa's white political institutions which were forced to recognise that the uprisings

⁹ J Dunn, *op. cit.*, p 81.

¹⁰ C Sirrianni, 'Production and power in a classless society: a critical analysis of the Utopian dimensions of Marxist theory', *Socialist Review* (59) 1981.

¹¹ L Kolakowski, 'The myth of human self-identity: unity if civil and political society in socialist thought', in L Kolakowski and S Hampshire, *The Socialist Idea: A Reappraisal*, London: Quartet Books, 1977, p 35.

¹² A Stalinist or authoritarian nationalist state may sacrifice the rule of law and political rights, whereas a mild nationalist capitalist state will probably sacrifice economic democracy and social regulation.

were a manifestation of a deeper crisis that needed to be resolved by reforming key components of traditional apartheid.¹³

After 1976, politically sophisticated and moderate elements in the military, foreign policy, academic and constitutional organs of the state (the so-called '*verligtes*') began to formulate policies that would modify apartheid structures and rationalise state controls by way of a more sophisticated cooption-repression formula.¹⁴ This approach (which military officials referred to as a 'total strategy', designed to counter what they believed was a total internal and international onslaught against South Africa) was an aggressive reformist initiative that became the corner-stone of state policy after P W Botha became Prime Minister in 1978. (Botha came to power after his rivals were implicated in an extensive corruption scandal that the *verligtes* exploited to their own advantage. This was known as the 'Muldergate' scandal after Connie Mulder, until then a prime candidate for the premiership.)

'Total strategy' was an ambitious reform package involving four basic dimensions. First, the modification of key aspects of urban policy. The Commission of Inquiry into Legislation Affecting the Utilisation of Manpower (conducted by Dr P J Riekert) was mandated to re-examine urban policy, in particular influx control, and made its recommendations in 1979. Secondly, the Commission of Inquiry into Labour Legislation (headed by Professor N E Wiehahn) was instructed to review and recommend changes to the industrial relations system that had existed since 1924. Thirdly, a complex institutional structure was established under the President's Council to facilitate the formulation of a new constitutional dispensation to incorporate Coloureds and Indians into representative institutions at central government level. Fourthly, the military was put in charge of reorganising the security apparatuses.

To summarise the outcome of these four reformist initiatives. Following the Riekert Commission, the state accepted in principle that Africans living in and around the white urban areas should be recognised as permanent urban dwellers with the right to property,

¹³ See, for example, J Saul, & S Gelb, *The Crisis in South Africa*, New York: Monthly Review Press 1981; G Moss, 'Total strategy', *Work in Progress* (11) 1980; S O'Meara, 'Muldergate and the politics of Afrikaner nationalism', *Work in Progress* (22) 1982; R Davies, & D O'Meara, 'The state of analysis of the South African region: issues raised by South African strategy', *Review of African Political Economy* (29) 1984; D Glaser, 'The state, the market and the crisis', *Work in Progress* (34) 1984.

¹⁴ D O'Meara, *op. cit.*

association, movement, and representation that they had hitherto been denied because of their status as 'temporary sojourners' in white South Africa. This group was seen as potentially co-optable and hence needed to be divided off from the rural majority by implementing even harsher controls over rural-urban migration. As far as industrial relations was concerned, the state accepted the Wiehahn Commission's recommendation that blacks should be recognised by statute as *bona fide* employees and hence legally eligible to join registered and recognised trade unions—a right that has been effectively denied to blacks since 1924.

The new constitutional dispensation that the President's Council formulated amounted to the creation of a consociational constitutional framework for whites, Coloureds and Indians linked to African organs of representation in the bantustans via an overarching confederal structure. The military, in turn, succeeded in rationalising the security apparatuses under the auspices of the State Security Council (ssc). The ssc is an extremely powerful structure with several hundred regional and local committees comprising security, government and business representatives who all share the desire to streamline and render more effective the structures of state control to cope with unstable political conditions.

Although these reforms were new, they addressed problems that plagued apartheid policy-makers since the early 1950s. Township resistance served to highlight these internal contradictions bringing them to the fore of political conflict.

The business community, who were initially dazed by the township conflicts, responded by demanding political reforms and gave their support to extra-state reformist initiatives, eg the Urban Foundation funded by the private business sector. The politicisation of the business community coupled to the pressures from the international community helped foster a reformist climate within which *verligte* policy makers in the state could proceed. The reforms, however, began to be introduced during the late 1970s when the balance of forces differed markedly from the 1976-77 period. The Black Consciousness movement had been decimated by arrests, bannings, deaths and a mass exodus of activists fleeing the country. Although the trade unions were the only mass-based black movement capable of resisting the reforms at this stage, their relative weakness and the absence of a political organisation prevented them from contesting the reforms outside the work-place. Consequently, the reforms were shaped to a large extent by the new

verligte elements in the state and the demands of the business community.

Each dimension of 'total strategy' contained internal contradictions that lie at the heart of the current crisis in South Africa. After mapping out the broad parameters of state policy during the 1978-84 period, I will explain the demise of 'total strategy' in terms of a) the urban social movements that emerged in the 1980s and b) the persistence of structural forces that these reforms ignored.

The Riekert and Wiehahn strategy should be seen as complementary. In order to give urban blacks the right to live permanently in the urban areas, this needed to be complemented by rights that traditional apartheid had hitherto denied to 'temporary sojourners': trade union rights, property rights and (limited) political rights. Superficial liberal interpretations of these reforms at the time presented them as a major departure from traditional apartheid. However, they were constructed as part of an offensive designed to bolster the privileges of urban insiders at the expense of rural outsiders.¹⁵ The Riekert Commission did not question the 'homeland' system and hence implied that although urban blacks should obtain local political rights, national political rights should still be expressed through the (independent) bantustans.

As far as Coloureds and Indians were concerned, the tricameral parliament was designed to incorporate them into a 'consociational' central state structure without threatening the autonomy of the white parliamentary system.¹⁶ In other words, whites would continue to vote for their own house in parliament, whereas Coloureds and Indians respectively would each vote for their own houses. This resulted in a parliament with three houses with the whites having the largest number of representatives, followed by the Coloureds and then the Indians according to a ratio 4:2:1. The decision-making process involved a complex procedure whereby legislation would be worked out in multi-racial Standing Committees and then passed by each of the three houses of parliament deliberating in separate sessions. If all three houses could not reach agreement, the legislation would then be passed to the President's Council which could make recommendations or pass

¹⁵ D Hindson & M Lacey, 'Influx control and labour allocation: policy and practice since the Riekert Commission', South African Research Services, (eds), *South African Review* (1) Johannesburg, 1983.

¹⁶ Republic of South Africa, 'Joint Report of the Committee for Economic Affairs and the Constitutional Committee of the President's Council on Local and Regional Management Systems in the Republic of South Africa', PC 1/1982.

it without the legislation having to go back through all three houses. This is what government ideologues call 'consensual decision-making'. It is designed to give the appearance of consensus politics despite the fact that whites have the majority in the Standing Committees and President's Council.

Although Africans were excluded from the consociational structures of the tricameral parliament, the state continued to insist that this did not mean they were excluded from political power. Whereas the consociational structures were designed to facilitate joint decision-making between whites, Coloureds and Indians, a new overarching confederal structure was devised to link the South African consociational state to the 'independent' ethnic states in the bantustans. In other words, the South African state would be fragmented into relatively independent states and then integrated into a confederal arrangement that state officials frequently equated to the European Economic Community.

The confederal structure complemented the Riekert strategy in two ways. Firstly, during the early 1980s policymakers were trying to find a way to link up the non-bantustan based urban Africans to higher forms of political representation. To achieve this, the state created fully-fledged municipal authorities in the major urban African centres (eg Soweto)—the so-called Black Local Authorities (BLAS). These BLAS were given complete political and fiscal autonomy to run the townships. It was frequently suggested by officials that the BLAS should be used to link urban Africans to the confederal authorities at higher levels by creating 'city-states' which would then be entitled to representation in the central confederal decision-making body.

Secondly, the confederal schema (that was initially articulated as the 'constellation of states' idea), provided the framework for the formulation of a new regional development policy that was based on the concept of 'economic interdependence and political independence'—what the Buthelezi Commission described as the 'economic route' to power-sharing.¹⁷ The regional development policy was designed to make sure that the bantustans were economically viable confederal units and hence capable of coping with the rural outsiders—an extension of the Verwoerdian scheme to limit the rate of urbanisation.

In short, the confederal schema was designed to accomplish three

¹⁷ The Report of the Buthelezi Commission, *The Requirements for Stability and Development in KwaZulu and Natal*, Durban: H and H Publications, 1982.

things: to legitimise the South African state by softening the meaning of 'separate' political development; to provide a framework for granting urban rights while simultaneously retaining bantustans as the only form of central political representation for Africans; and, to rationalise industrial dispersal policy to slow down urbanisation. Whereas confederalism was aimed at streamlining the regional foundations of apartheid, the new labour dispensation and the legislation that emerged from the Riekert Commissions' policy framework (ie the Black Local Authorities Act and the Orderly Movement and Settlement of Black Persons Bill, which was shelved before it could be implemented) were designed to rationalise and stabilise the African urban areas.

The intentions of state policy, however, differ markedly from the way policies are implemented and the social processes they give rise to. State policy cannot take account of all the structural forces that impinge on a given field of intervention, nor can the responses of a range of social actors be predicted. The fate of 'total strategy' is a particularly illuminating example of how the combined effect of structural forces and social conflict can substantially inhibit the implementation of a reformist strategy and, in the end force the state to change tack. Although there were numerous political interests that opposed the implementation of 'total strategy', their reasons were as varied as their agenda and practices. The most aggressive opposition came from the major trade union federations and community organisations, most of the latter being affiliated to the UDF. Ironically, these forces were complemented by some bantustan leaders, the business community, and the international community.

The major achievement of the trade unions was to oppose the state's intention to exclude migrant workers from the trade unions. After refusing to register until the relevant clauses of the legislation had been removed, the state backed down soon after the legislation was passed in 1979. Consequently, migrant workers, who were in any case the backbone of the new unions, began to organise and mobilise alongside urban insiders thus undermining the Riekert strategy that attempted to divide the working class along urban-rural lines. Trade unions have since given expression to the central political demand of migrant workers: the right to live and vote in the metropolitan political economies instead of being defined as members of a bankrupt bantustan.¹⁸

¹⁸ M Swilling, 'The politics of working class struggles in Germiston, 1979-1983', paper presented to the History Workshop, University of Witwatersrand, February 1984.

Furthermore, by emphasising the need to establish strong democratic organisations, the unions thwarted the state's attempt to bring the unions under control by institutionalising industrial conflict. Instead, beginning in late 1979, the unions took advantage of the 1979–82 boom to wage protracted shop-floor battles to win recognition, wage increases, maternity rights, pension pay-outs, and a range of concessions that challenged, in the words of Mike Rosholt (the head of the largest manufacturing monopoly), 'management's right to manage'. Even during the recession, strike levels rose and union membership increased dramatically.¹⁹

The growth of the unions was significant for three reasons:

- 1) the socialist leadership within the unions meant that workers were drawn into highly politicised organisations opposed to the perpetuation of apartheid;
- 2) in many areas unions provided the organisation training for a new generation of community activists who subsequently played leading roles in powerful community organisations;
- 3) during 1979–82, the rolling general strikes that rocked the Eastern and Western Cape, Natal, and the East Rand forged a space for the re-emergence of political organisations such as the UDF and National Forum (NF) in 1983.

Community organisations first emerged in Port Elizabeth and Soweto towards the end of 1979 (Soweto Civic Association (SCA) and the Port Elizabeth Black Civic Organisation (PEBCO)).²⁰ This was followed by the emergence of powerful student organisations in the Cape during the 1980 Cape Town schools boycott. This boycott marked a turning point because its leaders repeatedly emphasised the need to 'learn from the mistakes of '76'. These were perceived to be black exclusivism, student vanguardism, voluntarism, and the failure to recognise the leading role of the working class. Democratically organised neighbourhood-based 'civics' (community organisations) first emerged in Cape Town in the wake of the 1980 boycott. Although community organisations also

¹⁹ See R & L Lambert, 'State reform and working class resistance, 1982', South African Research Services, *op. cit.*; E Webster 'New frontiers of control', South African Research Services, *South African Review* (2) 1983; J Lewis & E Randall 'Survey: the state of the unions', *South African Labour Bulletin* 11(2) October–December 1985.

²⁰ C Cooper and L Ensor, *PEBCO: A Black Mass Movement*, Johannesburg: South African Institute of Race Relations 1981.

emerged in the other provinces, it was not until 1983 that they became a generalised phenomenon.²¹

Civics and Youth Congresses came to dominate the political terrain in the townships during 1983–85. The reasons for this were two-fold: the exclusion of Africans from the new Constitution and the failure of the BLAS. The BLAS that were introduced in 1983 were politically illegitimate because they were not linked up to higher forms of political representation. The boycott of the elections for the tricameral parliament was explicitly coupled to the boycott of the elections for the BLAS because the UDF was keen to use the inadequacy of these structures to demand substantive political rights for all—an agenda that facilitated the re-emergence of the Freedom Charter.

Mobilisation around the demand for political rights alone would not have resulted in the mass-based community organisations that exist today. Equally important was the fiscal crisis of the BLAS and the central government as the recession took its toll. In order to withdraw from the politically volatile task of providing the means of collective consumption, the central government built into the logic of 'self-government' the provision that BLAS should be self-financing. However, the townships do not have a viable tax base. Consequently, to improve township conditions, the BLAS were forced to increase rent and service charges, in some cases by 100 per cent. This triggered off dramatic township conflicts involving protracted rent boycotts, squatter movements, housing struggles and stay-aways. The final result has been the total collapse of the BLAS, as councillors resigned *en masse* or fled the townships in fear of their lives. State officials have now acknowledged that it was a mistake to give the BLAS inadequate fiscal resources.²²

At the central government level, the successful boycotts of the elections for the tricameral parliament were obviously a severe blow for the reform strategy. This was compounded by the fact that prominent bantustan leaders rejected the confederal schema preferring a more integrated federal option as suggested by the Buthelezi Commission. Moderate and radical black political organisations were not the only groups that opposed the consociational/confederal solution. As the

²¹ M Swilling, 'Stayaways, urban protest and the state', South African Research Services (eds), *South African Review* (3) 1986.

²² W Cobbett, D Glaser, D Hindson & M Swilling, 'South Africa's regional political economy: a critical analysis of reform strategy in the 1980s', South African Research Services (eds), *South African Review* (3) 1986.

crisis continued well into the 1980s, a growing caucus of disaffected Afrikaners in the National Party, the universities and certain branches of the state apparatus (referred to as the '*neo-verligtes*') also began to admit that the bantustan system had failed and that blacks needed to be accommodated in new central government structures.²³ This was reinforced by the vocal liberal intellectual community and organised commerce and industry who took advantage of the cracks within Afrikanerdom and the bankruptcy of the reforms to demand far-reaching changes in a federalist direction.²⁴

The complex social conflicts described above did not determine state policy in a structural vacuum. Nor are structural forces apolitical processes moving relentlessly through history behind the backs of human agencies. Rather, new social conflicts bring into relief structural forces that were either hidden from view by discourses incapable of 'thinking' these processes, or else they were simply ignored by discourses that focused on 'more important' processes. Recent social conflicts have focused attention on the 'urban question' precisely because of the activities of the urban social movements (both union and community-based) which in turn reinforced the initiatives of organisations such as the Urban Foundation lobbying on behalf of big business. During 1984-85, the 'urban question' did not refer to the narrow problem of how to incorporate 'urban blacks' into a revamped apartheid structure as was the case in the post-1976 era, but rather on how the entire urban and regional system of production and reproduction can be restructured to cope with the 'realities of urbanisation'. Before this issue is addressed, a brief analysis of these structural forces is necessary.²⁵

The thrust of the argument in Cobbett *et al* is that the apartheid policy inadvertently created regional patterns of population movement and industrial location that undercut what state policy and analysts have hitherto assumed are the foundations of apartheid: a dual economy,

²³ For the most articulate presentation of this view see C Heunis, 'In search of democracy', *Leadership SA* (special international edition) January 1986; '... and what about the blacks?' (pamphlet published by the National Party, 1985).

²⁴ See, for example, J Lombard and J Pisanie, 'Removal of racial discrimination against blacks in the political economy of the Republic of South Africa', (memorandum published by the Associated Chambers of Commerce, 1985); L Louw and F Kendall, *South Africa: The Solution*, Johannesburg: Amagi Publications, 1986; J Lombard, *Alternatives to the Consolidation of KwaZulu*, Pretoria: University of Pretoria Press, 1980.

²⁵ W Cobbett, D Glaser, P Hindson and M Swilling, *op. cit.*

cheap labour and de-urbanisation. We argue that influx control and industrial dispersal policy have combined to extend the metropolitan space-economies in a way that enmeshes and incorporates populations located behind bantustan boundaries into systems of production and reproduction that cannot be separated into rural-urban categories.

These extended metropolitan economies or regions have not developed outside state policy. In fact, recent shifts in state policy have been shaped directly by the exigencies of these spatial forms. Some of the more important shifts are firstly, the absolute and relative quantitative decline of long distance oscillatory migration and the massive increase in the number of 'cross-border commuters'. Development Boards have for some years now tended to decrease the number of migrants employed in the metropolises while simultaneously granting commuters 'administrative section 10 rights', effectively giving rural outsiders (commuters) and urban insiders equal access to the labour market. This blurring of the distinction between rural and urban labour markets contradicts the logic of the Riekert Commission which in any case virtually ignored commuters as a factor. Geographically, these new labour supply patterns correspond with regional rather than racial coordinates giving rise to what may be called 'regional proletariats'. The new urbanisation policies as articulated in the President's Council Report on Urbanisation and the 1986 White Paper on Urbanisation are clearly designed to reinforce and rationalise this process.²⁶

Secondly, industrial dispersal policy since 1982 has also been shaped by the need to manage the new metropolitan space-economies. It is quite clear that although rhetorical allegiance is still paid to traditional industrial decentralisation policy to satisfy the demands of bantustan elites for 'development', in practice there have been two important shifts. First, the focus is no longer on industrial decentralisation to outlying rural peripheries, but rather on industrial deconcentration to the metropolitan peripheries. Secondly, the number of industrial development points have been scaled down to seven or eight key 'growth poles'. In short, industrial dispersal policy is firmly linked to the dispersal of industrial activities within the extended metropolitan space-economies, rather than acting as a component of the confederal

²⁶ See D Hindson, 'Orderly urbanisation and influx control: from territorial apartheid to regional spatial ordering in South Africa', in M Addleson and R Tomlinson, *Industrial Decentralisation and the South African State*, Johannesburg: Ravan Press (forthcoming).

schema based on spatially coherent bantustan economies. Once again, the geographical pattern that this produces corresponds with regional rather than racial coordinates—a process that is inscribed in the boundaries of the nine Development Regions.

Thirdly, the new Regional Services Councils Act of 1985 explicitly states that sections of the bantustans will be incorporated into the area of jurisdiction of these new multi-racial metropolitan governments. The RSCs, therefore, are the institutional expression of these extended metropolitan space-economies. They are aimed at providing substantial fiscal resources for restructuring and managing the metropolitan areas by cutting across traditional Group Area and bantustan boundaries—the so-called ‘soft borders’ approach.

To sum up: massive structural changes have taken place that state policy has been responding to for some years now. However, this has not been expressed in a new or coherent ideological package that could serve as an alternative to apartheid. Instead, the state is caught between the exigencies of structural needs that transcend traditional apartheid boundaries and the vicissitudes of the political terrain where it defends the need for ‘orderly reform’—a euphemism for white and capitalist interests—against right-wing pressure for the retention of ‘grand apartheid’ and the demands emanating from the large majority of South Africans for the transfer of power to those parties that represent this constituency.

The interregnum

The interregnum consists of a social stalemate where ‘the old is dying and the new cannot be born’. The organisations and movements that represent the interests of the oppressed majority do not possess the organisational capacity, political power or coercive strength to overthrow the state. Nor does the state have the ideological and political resources required to re-establish its dominance without coercion. ‘Where . . . the hegemony of a dominant class is persistently and strongly challenged,’ Miliband argues, ‘the autonomy of the state is likely to be substantial, to the point where, in conditions of intense class struggle and political instability, it may assume “Bonapartist” and authoritarian forms, and emancipate itself from constraining constitutional checks and controls.’²⁷ This is where we are now: a social

²⁷ R Miliband, *Class Power and State Power*, London: 1983, p 68.

stalemate presided over by a defensive state constantly seeking to regain the initiative by liberating itself from the last remaining constitutional and political constraints on arbitrary power.

The demise of 'total strategy' has been registered by key branches of the state that have since begun to formulate an alternative. However, unlike 'total strategy', current reforms have not been presented at the outset as a coherent package.²⁸ This means that state policy is not systematically organised around a single guiding principle, but rather around a few power axes that correspond with different modes of formative action. There are at least four main power axes: the coercive apparatuses governed by the logic of maintaining 'law and order'; the traditional apartheid apparatuses epitomised by the ailing Department of Cooperation and Development; some of the independent bantustan states who are resisting threats to their sovereignty (eg Bophuthatswana); and the reformist apparatuses concerned with the restructuring of the political economy, eg the Department of Constitutional Development and Planning. The State Security Council presides over the points of intersection of these axes attempting to retain the internal coherence of the state as the pressure builds up on the outside.

Although the relationships between these different power-axes depend on a range of subjective and objective factors, they essentially revolve around the conflict between officials genuinely committed to substantially restructuring political institutions and economic systems and those who remain reluctant to face the fact that, to use the words of a prominent National Party ideologue, Willie Esterhuyse, 'a point has been reached where a clearer articulation of long-term goals and more daring thought about possible models have become essential'.²⁹ This ideological hiatus within the state as a whole explains its incapacity decisively to transcend the Catch-22 position in which it currently finds itself: on the one hand it wants to end political instability to create the conditions conducive for the imposition of reforms from above, while, on the other hand, escalating repression fuels political instability. To

²⁸ Some newspaper journalists have suggested that policy makers are using the Samuel Huntington game plan for reformers which posits that reformers should not reveal their hand *before* the reform process, but only after it has been implemented. This prevents the radical left and right from shooting it down before its 'benefits' have been felt. There may be some truth in the notion that the South African state may present civil society with a *fait accompli* at a later stage, but this assumes that the state is more coherent and directed than it really is.

²⁹ *Sunday Times* (London) 20 November 1985.

escape from the paralysis of this internal crisis, the repressive and reformist branches have become increasingly 'autonomous' in order to break free from the fetters that proscribe certain actions, eg the more liberal demands of big business. Whether this will lead to real reform will depend on whether the actions of the reformist and repressive apparatuses begin to complement rather than contradict one another. The fact of the matter is that the capacity of black resistance organisations to oppose state policy directly affects the relationship between the reformist and repressive apparatuses: the more opposition there is the more repression is used which in turn destabilises the conditions for reform; as opposition diminishes, repression becomes increasingly functional to reform and so the resulting greater unity of purpose within the state reinforces the chances of success of reformist initiatives.

State policy, therefore, is a curious mixture of reformist and repressive practices. The most coherent reforms, however, are clearly moving in a federalist direction. These include the granting of citizenship to most Africans, replacing Provincial Councils with a number of multi-racial Executive Committees at second-tier level, the introduction of Regional Service Councils at third-tier level, official acceptance that blacks need to be incorporated into 'higher levels of decision-making', and all the talk of creating a 'unified' South Africa that transcends the cardinal principle of bantustan sovereignty. The fact that the state is dusting the covers of the Buthelezi Commission and allowing white political parties and Inkatha to move towards establishing 'Kwa-Natal', reinforces the view that important sections of the state are willing to allow current reforms to move in a federal solution. The Kwa-Natal proposal (to merge Natal province and the KwaZulu 'homeland') was approved at an *Indaba* (conference) in Durban on 28 November 1986 by representatives of the whites, Indians and Zulus by a 24-2 majority with three abstentions.

The ingenuity of these reforms lies in the fact that instead of beginning by restructuring the central state, policymakers are focusing on the third and second tiers of government—the so-called 'bottom up approach' which lies at the heart of the state's strategy of repressive reform. The proposed structure of these tiers correspond to the technical and managerial requirements of metropolitan and regional space-economies that have turned out to be the unintended consequence of years of influx control, industrial dispersal policy and bantustan development. In other words, the state can establish these

apparatuses under the depoliticised rubric of 'general affairs' in order to administer what the new generation of technocrats define as the 'realities of change'. These changes are tightly controlled by the Department of Constitutional Development and Planning which presides over the nexus between regional development policy, constitutional planning and labour movement and settlement controls. The pace and nature of the reforms will depend to a large extent on whether this department can gain the strategic initiative within the state as a whole.

The state cannot choose the terrain on which it intends to impose reforms. It will continue to do battle with the mass-based movements of the oppressed majority that are calling for completely different solutions to the crisis. If we take into account the squatter movements, bus boycotts, rent boycotts, stay-aways, strikes, school boycotts, housing struggles, anti-removal struggles, consumer boycotts and the electoral boycotts of the tricameral parliament and BLAS, we are talking about the mobilisation of enormous numbers of people around demands for change that affect the entire social structure. The logic of these struggles has produced a new political culture centred around the demand for popular control over the systems that govern the daily lives of ordinary people. This is why the Freedom Charter and the May Day demands are such crucial points of departure for meaningful change in South Africa.

Future directions

Social change will be determined by the relations of power between three major social actors: the state, capital and the popular organisations representing the interests of the oppressed majority. There are two dominant conceptions of what these relations are. First, there is the view that the state is monolithic and incapable of reforming itself. Consequently, community and work-place organisation and mobilisation are only significant insofar as they contribute to the power of a national movement that will eventually detonate the total collapse of the state. Although capital is seen as the state's ambiguous partner, the divisions between state and capital are seen as important to the extent that this weakens the state and hence hastens the moment of eventual collapse.

Secondly, there is the view that the state can reform itself. Ironically, what many liberal and Marxist analyses have in common is the view that the state is susceptible to capital's demands for reforms—although they

differ on the reasons. The political and strategic implications of this view are that popular organisations are less important than the relations of power between capital and the state. Popular organisations are only significant as catalysts of social change—a process which will ultimately be controlled and directed by the ruling groups.

I would like to propose an alternative view. The relations of power between the state, capital and the popular organisations during the current conjuncture revolve primarily around the struggle over the goals of structural change.³⁰ The conflictive processes and struggle that generated 'total strategy' were rooted in the township revolts of the mid-1970s, the responses of the 'post-Muldergate' state and the reformist interventions of capital.

The current conjuncture is marked by the demise of 'total strategy' that was designed to reconstitute the ideological and material goals of the urban areas without restructuring the urban and regional foundations of apartheid. The popular organisations that emerged in the 1980s were 'aimed at the transformation of the institutionalised urban meaning against the logic, interest, and values of the dominant class.'³¹ The ruling groups have responded to these successful challenges from below with new discourses that transcend the structural goals institutionalised by apartheid. However, neither the popular organisations nor the state have managed to mobilise sufficient ideological and political power decisively to impose their respective frameworks on civil society. This has given rise to a social stalemate that is steadily pulling the country into a quagmire of violence, economic collapse, political bankruptcy and socio-psychological breakdown.

The downward cycle of social collapse, however, rarely develops without the emergence of countervailing forces that eventually give shape to a resolution of conflict that becomes the basis for a future consensus. In the South African context, this is clearly evident. As the crisis intensifies, the state institutions have become increasingly isolated from the main constituents of civil society. Although this is obvious as far as the black population is concerned,³² major white interests have more recently become increasingly disaffected. White business leaders

³⁰ I am borrowing here from a theory of social change that has been developed by Manuel Castells, *The City and the Grassroots*, Los Angeles: 1983.

³¹ *ibid.*, p 305.

³² For an attitudinal reflection of black political attitudes, see articles by Kock *et al.*, Schutte and Couper in D J van Vuuren, *et al.* (eds), *South Africa: A Plural Society in Transition*, Durban: 1985.

have defied the government by going to speak to the ANC and, unlike 1985, they have not supported the 1986 State of Emergency. Evidence of significant disaffection is also evident amongst white students (including Afrikaners), Churches, academics, the press, political parties and even within National Party circles. The logical conclusion of the process is a point where the state can no longer govern because the distance between itself and civil society has become unbridgeable. At that point, the interregnum must give way to a transitional period.

The politics of transition—the phase that follows the capitulation of the old state and precedes the establishment of a new state—involves the creation of ground-rules to govern the relationship between conflicting parties as they hammer out the constitutional and related structures of a new system of political power. The minimum requirements needed to facilitate a transitional phase in South Africa have been stated often enough: release of all political prisoners, unbanning of banned organisations, the dismantling of apartheid structures, and a commitment to a national convention to negotiate the terms of transfer of power to the majority.

Contrary to the predictions of the first approach outlined above, a revolutionary rupture is unlikely. For a revolutionary rupture to occur the security forces need to collapse, the state's social base must disintegrate and reformist attempts to reconstitute the goals of structural change must be an unmitigated failure.³³ Whereas the last two conditions may exist, the possibility of the first will remain remote. Instead, we can expect the future to hold in store, to use Stanley Uys' words, 'a mighty upwelling of black rage that, over the years rather than months, will sap and haemorrhage the white power structure until it falls in on itself.'³⁴

The future, therefore, will revolve around social actors committed to contesting the meaning of social change over a prolonged period of time. On the one hand, the popular organisations will strive to impose a vision of social change based on the principles expressed in the Freedom

³³ A distinction should be made between a revolutionary rupture and a revolutionary process. A revolutionary process, ie the transformation of social structures, can occur without a revolutionary rupture that is centred around the seizure of state power. The storming of the Bastille or the Winter Palace—the classic vision of what a revolutionary rupture entails—has only tended to happen in relatively undeveloped societies where the state is not integral to the cohesion of social relations. Consequently, sufficient power can be mobilised outside state structures to launch a final assault on the fortress-type state. See N Poulantzas, *State Power Socialism*, London: 1980.

³⁴ S Uys, 'Blacks now know that they are going to win', *The Guardian* (London) 1 June 1986, p 7.

Charter and the May Day demands, while, on the other, capital and the state will attempt in different ways to restructure the urban and regional foundations of apartheid on their own terms. However, given that a revolutionary rupture is unlikely, the final outcome will not be a system that reflects the paradigmatic interests of a single class or group.

The meaning of social change will be shot through with symbols, interests, and processes that may reflect racist, capitalist or socialist discourses in differing degrees depending on the organisational capacities of the parties, movements and organisations involved. The socialist alternative formulated in the first part of the paper will, in my opinion, enable the oppressed and exploited classes to dominate the process that will shape the structures of a post-apartheid South African society. This is, after all, the fundamental demand that has emerged from the townships, factories and schools in recent years. The socialist alternative does not automatically guarantee that this will happen, but it does provide a framework for thinking how it can happen. Under the present circumstances this alternative may appear utopian, but if we can move beyond the current interregnum into the politics of transition, socialism will more than likely become the corner-stone of South African political discourse.

Visions of the future: a socialist perspective

Two basic points were made at the outset of this paper. These were, first, that the Freedom Charter and May Day Demands articulate four sets of demands:

- 1) the restructuring of work and employment;
- 2) the reorganisation of the provision of the means of collective consumption;
- 3) the democratisation of political and economic decision-making;
- 4) the redistribution of the land and wealth and the nationalisation of monopolies.

Secondly, that for these demands to be translated into a functioning political economy, six basic guiding principles will be necessary: These include:

- 1) The creation of a democratically elected unitary majoritarian state;
- 2) the establishment of a politically regulated social structure of accumulation;

- 3) the decentralisation of political and economic decision-making in order to maximise participation;
- 4) a balanced relationship between social regulation and market mechanisms;
- 5) constitutional checks and controls; and
- 6) economic policies that do not abstract out the problems of scarcity.

The following points will assume that we are looking at a post-transitional stage and for the sake of argument, the probable balance of power and class forces have been purposefully excluded from the discussion. Furthermore, what follows is not a blueprint but a discussion of some options. It is therefore not designed to pre-empt the broad-based popular discussions that are bound to take place when power is eventually transferred to the majority, but rather to aid and enrich these discussions.

Our understanding of the alternatives must be shaped by an understanding of the popular demands contained in the Freedom Charter and the May Day Demands. The most striking feature about these demands is that they all involve the rejection of structures that have been forged by South Africa's unique combination of capitalist exploitation and racial oppression. The central feature of this combination has been the direct intervention of the state in all aspects of social existence: work, living, representation and wealth generation. It was only by means of this intervention that the ruling classes were able to structure society so dramatically along racial lines.³⁵ It is not surprising, therefore, that the popular demands of the majority of South Africans will require massive state intervention in these self-same fields to redress the imbalances and inequalities that decades of racial capitalism have created.

This brings us to the need for alternatives. During the last few years, a range of books have been published arguing for a post-apartheid solution based essentially on the principles of 'free enterprise', minimal state intervention and maximum decentralisation of decision-making.³⁶ The logic at the heart of this view is that the racial structure of South African capitalism can be blamed on state intervention. It follows,

³⁵ See, for example, M Legassick, 'South Africa: capital accumulation and violence', *Economy and Society* 3(3) 1974; H Wolpe, 'Capitalism and cheap labour power in South Africa: from segregation to apartheid', *Economy and Society*, 1(4) 1972; D Hindson, 'The pass system and the formation of the urban African proletariat in South Africa', unpublished doctoral thesis, University of Sussex, 1983; M Lipton, *Capitalism and Apartheid*, London: 1985.

³⁶ J Lombard & J Du Pisannie, *op. cit.*; Buthelezi Commission, L Louw & F Kendall *op. cit.*

therefore, that the answer lies in bringing state intervention to an end and allowing socio-political relationships to be governed by the same mechanism that governs the economy—the market. De-regulation will in turn balance the economic inequalities and if local or regional political entities are allowed to hammer out their own means of co-existence in a federal framework, racial domination will give way to 'multi-ethnic' harmony.

Coupled to the anti-statist rhetoric of this view is the apparently democratic notion that 'minorities need to be protected'. Federalism is put forward as a system that is capable of entrenching these principles: 'economic freedom and the private enterprise ethic—as well as the norms with which they are associated—are best entrenched in a future political system embodying the principles of federalism or confederalism.'³⁷ Furthermore, federalism is regarded as preferable to both apartheid and a majoritarian unitary state, because it allows for the creation of a new nation-state which grants political rights to all its subjects while simultaneously 'protecting minorities'.

At the moment there are in fact two opposing reformist conceptions of how state structures can be de-racialised. The one can most accurately be called 'federalist' because it envisages the horizontal division of sovereignty, ie the creation of local, regional and central states each with their own inviolable spheres of authority. The other is modelled more on the principles of consociational democracy because it envisages the vertical division of sovereignty, ie the retention of the existing centralised structures with the pinnacles of each level of government providing a forum for 'joint decision-making' while the lower levels remain racially defined. The starting point of both models, however, is the need to protect 'group rights'. In reality, the concern for group rights is not unrelated to the desire to protect the capitalist system and its hierarchy of racial privileges, albeit in a legitimised form. The ideology of anti-statism and group rights masks more fundamental fears. First, that a state dominated by a black majority could begin building socialism, or at least impose a welfare state system that entails 'confiscatory taxation',³⁸ fiscal indiscipline, high minimum wages and nationalisation. Secondly, the too rapid advancement of an inexperienced black elite into senior positions in the civil service, government and business could lead to managerial inefficiency and

³⁷ J Lombard & J Du Pisanie, *op. cit.*, p 2.

³⁸ *ibid.*, p 24.

administrative 'chaos'.³⁹ The third fear is that ethnic conflicts under majority rule (including violence directed at whites) could lead to economic and political breakdown.

Proponents of federalism argue that the only way to prevent a black majoritarian state imposing socialism or welfarism from above is to establish relatively autonomous local and regional political entities. These would hold sovereign power over limited coercive apparatuses and economic policies, fragmenting a national majority regionally. The consociationalists have the same objective in mind; however, with them it is to be achieved by creating a political system dominated by ethnic elites each representing their respective ethnic constituencies. Federalism, and to a lesser extent consociationalism, also lends itself to a system of institutional checks and balances both regionally and within the central state. These include structures such as an independent federal reserve bank, separate legislative houses with one of them having a white veto, and a separated legislature, executive and judiciary. Further, entrenched constitutional provisions could protect freedom of contract, the status of the currency, minority veto rights, the right to property, and so on. A federal system would thus limit any one national group's access to political power.

A central government operating according to these principles might for example have to:

- accept unpopular monetary measures imposed by the (ostensibly apolitical and neutral) federal reserve bank; and/or
- secure acceptance of legislation from two legislative houses, one of which may have a white minority veto; and/or
- accept limits on its power to impose its policies on particular regions or localities; and/or
- allow the constitutionality of its policies to be tested by an independent judiciary.

This is what Lombard and Du Pisanie call 'polycentrism'.⁴⁰ Such 'division of sovereignty' is a prescription for minimal or limited government, which leaves the state incapable of affecting radical changes. Reformers hope a federal system would place the central state above political conflict, making it difficult to mobilise nation-wide forces around demands with national scope. A federal state would by intended default leave intact the foundations of the economy and

³⁹ S van der Merwe, *op. cit.*

⁴⁰ J Lombard & J Du Pisanie, *op. cit.*

relations of production, and expose only marginal or localised elements of the economic system to modification. The meaning of 'group rights', anti-statism and 'free enterprise' thus becomes apparent.

A willingness to use state power in an interventionist manner to redress political and economic inequalities will have to be the starting point of any government that is seriously committed to meeting the popular demands outlined at the outset. Extensive state intervention is not, however, synonymous with socialism. The creation of a non-capitalist non-socialist 'national democracy'—the immediate objective of the main national liberation organisations—is consistent with the type of state intervention necessary to meet most popular demands.⁴¹

What follows is an interpretation of national democracy from what may be called a democratic socialist perspective.

Majoritarianism—the defining feature of national democracy—is the political precondition for a more just and equitable future South Africa: the right of the majority to rule remains non-negotiable, no matter how unpopular the present rulers and their liberal shadows waiting in the wings may find it. The form this takes, however, is another matter. The principal characteristic of majoritarianism is a unitary state. By this is meant the creation of a central state that has sovereignty over a geographically unified South Africa and powers over the subordinate organs of government at local and regional level. This implies the legislature is sovereign and this sovereignty cannot be divided into local or regional components with totally autonomous decision-making powers that may be used by local constituencies to oppose central government policy. Furthermore, the legislature should be elected on a direct (and preferably proportional) basis. This will ensure that central government represents the will of the majority.

Three basic forms of representation at central government level are worth considering. These are a Westminster-type parliament, a federal structure with two houses elected on a direct and geographical basis respectively, and an Assembly elected by local popular Assemblies. They are all appropriate for giving institutional expression to a national democratic state. However, the constitutional format eventually adopted will depend to a large extent on the mode of economic organisation.

The economic foundation of national democracy will most likely be a 'mixed economy' that may, depending on whether socialists are

⁴¹ For a full discussion of this subject, see P Hudson, *op. cit.*

dominant in the state, gradually make the transition to socialism. What is certain, however, is that if nationalisation is taken seriously, it will be necessary to strengthen the authority of the executive. This may militate against a federal-type structure based on the principle that 'many and smaller is better than fewer and larger' state authorities. If the new government comes to power with the belief that its role is to initiate substantial changes to the foundations of the system, it is more likely to tend towards concentrating than dispersing power. However, this should not preclude the necessity for the decentralisation of administration and representation.

A distinction should be made between policy formulation and policy implementation. The formulation of national policy should take place at central government level. These policies should then be binding on the local regional government structures. Although some might argue this encourages top-down control and eventually authoritarianism, it must be admitted that it can only work democratically if the system of representation is effective and if central government is firmly based on sound local and regional government foundations that link local and regional constituencies with central policymaking apparatuses on a regular basis. As far as the implementation of policy is concerned, local and regional bodies should play the dominant role.

This brings us to the question of social regulation. Social regulation of the economy basically amounts to the right of the state to nationalise sectors of the economy. This means that this will have to be provided for in the constitution, or at least, should not be prevented by entrenched constitutional provisions. This raises the question of the protection of property. Does the right of the state to nationalise violate the right of the individual to own property? Many socialists currently agree that a distinction can be drawn between private property owned by an individual and corporate property used to produce surplus value. If this distinction is constitutionally entrenched then it is possible to provide for the nationalisation of economic enterprises. The protection of the right of the individual to own property for non-accumulative purposes remains an important safeguard for individual freedoms.

Nationalisation, however, is by no means the end point for most socialists. Nationalisation is perfectly consistent with an essentially capitalist economy. As far as socialists are concerned, nationalisation is the first step towards 'socialisation', ie true democratic and direct control of production by the producers themselves. This can take one of two forms. Either through elected committees of workers which run

the enterprises; or, if the enterprises are run by state-appointed managers, through state bodies elected by the producers themselves. The former option amounts to direct economic control, while the latter is a more indirect form of political control. (European social democrats have argued that socialisation can also be achieved by joint management-worker control where both management and workers have to agree before any policy can be implemented.)

If we assume that the future state is going to nationalise the 'commanding heights of the economy', it follows that it will require an extensive bureaucracy to manage various branches of the public sector. It is conceivable that the working-class movement (represented both by the trade unions and explicitly socialist parties) will have serious objections if the only decision-making bodies at central government level are national democratic ones. It is therefore possible that it may become appropriate to complement the national democratic organs of representation with an institution that specifically represents the interests of the working class, particularly in matters related to economic policy (eg minimum wages, productivity, investment, distribution and consumption). If this is the case, then we should consider a form of central government representation based on a popularly elected Assembly or Parliament coupled to an Assembly elected specifically by the working class. (The relationship between the Constituent Assembly and the Soviets after the 1917 Revolution in Russia comes to mind as an example. The Constitutional Assembly, however, was soon abolished.)

It is important to note that nationalisation does not only affect the organisation of the work-place and employment. Nationalisation is one of the ways that could be used to affect the redistribution of the land, a demand that *all* the oppressed classes share. Nationalisation also relates to the provision of the means of collective consumption, another sphere that affects all classes. The nationalisation of the transport industry, for example, has enormous implications for the daily lives of most people. The same applies to health care, education, housing, and other bulk services. This raises a fundamental question: although the nationalisation of the provision of collective consumption affects the relationship between workers in these sectors and their workplaces, it more importantly affects the relationship between these sectors and the consumers themselves. How this relationship is structured will shape the entire organisation of the post-apartheid city: the cost of transport (subsidised or not?), the quantity, quality and location of housing, the

organisation of health care, and so on. It is clear, therefore, that it is not just the working class that is affected by nationalisation. It would therefore be inappropriate to believe that the working class should entirely dominate the economic organs of the state that will invariably be involved in running the nationalised sector.

This leads us to the problem of decentralisation. It is obvious that an enormous amount of power will be concentrated at the central government level in a unitary majoritarian state that also controls the most important sectors of the economy. Now although this can severely undermine democracy, this need not necessarily be the case. The most effective way of ensuring that majoritarian government and nationalised economic sectors run efficiently and democratically is by maximising the decentralisation of representation and administration. As the Cubans came to realise, the most important counter-weight against central power is the self-activity of local and regional constituencies.

As mentioned above, although national policy should be formulated at central government level, local and regional bodies should dominate the implementation processes. This implies that national policy should be formulated in such a way that it allows for variations in the way it is implemented. The reason why implementation should be decentralised is that this can give local and regional bodies a significant degree of control over policies that affect their constituencies. Now if these bodies are popularly elected and truly representative, this may help to facilitate broad participation in the implementation process.

Two forms of decentralised representation may be necessary. First, city government (or its equivalent in non-metropolitan areas) will have to involve a high degree of citizen participation in the running of cities. This is so because if the provision of the means of collective consumption are nationalised, the relationship between the supplier and consumer will have to be regulated by political rather than market mechanisms. How democratic and hence effective this form of regulation will be depends on the level of popular participation. City government will therefore need to be both manager of the means of consumption and political mobiliser. Secondly, the workers in nationalised enterprises located within geographically-bound regions may need to form local and regional councils concerned more directly with production.

Historical evidence suggests that decentralisation encourages and facilitates greater popular participation and this in turn raises

productivity and efficiency levels. If the decentralisation of representation and administration is accepted as a necessary counter-weight to central power, then this may provide the basis for a unitary federal state which is not based on race/ethnicity, but rather on the necessity for decentralised authorities to manage local and regional space-economies as democratically as possible.

As far as the market is concerned, there is a popular misconception that the market is by definition a capitalist mechanism that socialists will immediately abolish as soon as they get into power. There is general acceptance now that although this view was held by socialists during the first half of the century and to some extent today, historical experience (particularly in Eastern Europe) has shown that the elimination of the market may abolish the 'anarchy of the market' but has tended to lead to a situation that one writer described as 'planned chaos'. Even those states that did attempt to abolish the market have recognised that the state is not omniscient and therefore the perfect central plan is impossible. It was in response to this problem that many socialists came round to the view that in order to maximise the efficient use of scarce or ('relatively abundant') resources, central planning must be coupled to market mechanisms in such a way that planning sets the basic parameters of economic policy while the market regulates economic relationships at lower levels. At all times, however, central planning policies must subordinate market-type decisions at the lower individualised levels of the economy. The aim is to achieve a balance: the market without planning leaves the producers and consumers at the mercy of dominant classes who make decisions based on profit, while planning without the market results in the subordination of all economic relationships to direct coordination and commands from above. The basic point is that central planning and the market are not incompatible. For example, there is no reason why market relations cannot exist between factories which are controlled and run by the workers. In the end, any attempt to abolish the market entirely will result in the over-dominance of the state and hence limit democracy, while the subordination of policy to the dictates of the market will leave the foundations of class inequality intact.

Finally, the concentration of power in the state makes it imperative that democratic freedoms including freedom of speech, association, press, culture, religion and so on are vigorously defended. These freedoms must in turn be defended by an independent judiciary that can test both the constitutionality of any public action or its validity in terms

of a Bill of Rights. These freedoms and rights are the lifeblood of socialist democracy: if they are abolished in the name of socialism, then it is not socialism that will remain, but a new despotism. The more power concentrated in the state, the greater the necessity for ensuring that democratic freedoms are not violated by the expediencies of power.

This brings us to the question of race and the popular liberal wisdom that minorities (ie the whites) must be protected from 'majority domination'. And, indeed, one can readily concede that minorities should have 'rights'—rights to freedom of speech, press, association, religion, petition, to practise their own culture, to equal political rights, to safeguard their material well-being. But minorities do not have the 'right' to entrench their political and economic privileges at the expense of the majority. This boils down to racism, and in a post-apartheid South Africa, racism may well become a criminal offence. It would be wrong to conclude, however, that majoritarianism excludes by definition provision for the protection of minorities. However, when it comes to the protection of white minority interests, a clear distinction will have to be made between the interests of (white) capital and the symbols and traditions of white culture. There is no way a majoritarian government can afford to protect the former in the name of the latter.

Conclusion

The debate about post-apartheid alternatives is currently dominated by liberal capitalist positions. This essay has attempted to enter this field by critically analysing reformist solutions to the current crisis and making tentative suggestions as to how a socialist alternative might address some of the key demands of the majority. Because these proposals were made without reference to the structural constraints and probable balance of power in a post-transition future, the possibilities and limitations that will face a future government seeking to implement these kinds of policies have also not been dealt with. This does not, however, negate the validity of the exercise. The proposals were based on an understanding of what structures will be required to meet the demands contained in the Freedom Charter and the May Day Demands. They are therefore an interpretation of what policies may be pursued by a government dominated by the organisations that currently represent the interests of the majority of black South Africans. What the actual outcome may be in reality will depend entirely on future social struggles.

Post-apartheid South Africa and its neighbours

Apartheid South Africa is waging war on its neighbours. This raises the question: What will be the relationship of a majority-ruled South Africa to those neighbours?

The answer depends less on the political colour of the new government and more on whether that government sees itself as a 'regional power' which will be politically and economically dominant over all southern Africa. The present apartheid government has argued that it has the right to dominance over the region, and it is quite possible that a majority government of whatever political colour would have the same view. Many South Africans, even in the liberation movements, are surprisingly insular. They are demeaning about the neighbouring states and arrogantly assume that a more sophisticated and more industrialised majority-ruled South Africa would 'naturally' lead the region.

Elsewhere in the region, history shows a mixed picture; all too often liberation movements forget the friends that sacrificed for them. Zimbabweans quickly adopted an arrogant and dismissive attitude to Mozambique, and were very slow to reorientate trade patterns away from South Africa and toward Mozambique. Only in 1985—with the growing pressure of South African destabilisation, and with sanctions becoming a serious possibility—did Zimbabwe realise that it needed Mozambique, and this caused it to change its attitude.

Finally, any government in South Africa will face heavy internal demands for jobs and for increased spending on health, education and development. There will be little room to manoeuvre and limited scope for making concessions to the neighbouring states. Here the nature of the government could make a difference—a one-party state may feel more able to make initial concessions to build a better long-term relationship with the neighbouring states, whereas a governing party or

The statistics and much of the detail about the present regional situation is taken from *Beggar Your Neighbours* by Joseph Hanlon (London: James Currey, 1986). The article was written in September 1986.

coalition in a multi-party system will be under more pressure to come up with immediate results, even at the expense of relations with the neighbouring states.

What kind of handover?

The other key factor in determining relationships will be the nature of the handover of power in South Africa itself. If majority rule comes about reasonably soon through a Lancaster House-type of conference, then the South African economy and its links with the neighbouring states will be more-or-less intact, and would probably continue after independence. Even if there were a limited period of sanctions and isolation, many of the old patterns would remain.

On the other hand, if there is a long and bitter revolution, it is harder to predict what the political economy of the region will look like when majority rule finally comes. Normal relations between most of the states and South Africa will have totally broken down, due to closed borders and stepped-up South African attacks and destabilisation. There is a real possibility that South Africa will have overthrown or suborned the governments of some of the neighbouring states. Particularly vulnerable will be the three countries which have at one time or another had close links with South Africa: Lesotho, Swaziland, and Malawi. All three possess different groups which support and oppose South African links, and Pretoria has already interfered in the internal politics of all three countries. Continued support from South Africa (and perhaps the United States) for the MNR, UNITA and other 'dissidents' would ensure that chaos continues to reign in parts of Mozambique and Angola, and possibly Zimbabwe and Zambia. In that case, there will also be large-scale destruction and destitution both in South Africa and in the neighbouring states. This will require some form of international 'Marshall Plan'. Much would then depend on how large the aid package was, how much went to the neighbours (as distinct from South Africa) and to what extent international donors forced the integration of the neighbouring states back into the South African economy.

The worst possibilities would involve continued fighting. One possible outcome is the 'Lebanon scenario', with no formal handover of power at all, but rather a collapse in which different armies and militias controlled different sectors of the country. Foreign powers would no doubt support different factions. Indeed, as in Angola, the USA may see this as preferable to the ANC taking power and could actively

intervene to provide military and political support to Inkatha or other groups. Alternatively, as in Nicaragua, the USA might support 'contras' to attack a majority-ruled South Africa, perhaps working through neighbouring governments previously put into power by the apartheid regime.

The 'Lebanon', 'Angola' or 'Nicaragua' scenarios would ensure chaos for decades to come, and it would be impossible to predict what role such a divided South Africa would have in the region. Therefore, in the rest of this article, I assume at a minimum that there is some internationally accepted transfer of power to a majority-rule government. On that assumption, I will next consider economic relations between South Africa and the Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference (SADCC). Finally, I will deal with five specific and difficult areas which will cause problems in the first years after majority rule: demobilising 'puppet' groups and reparations, migrant labour, the four smallest neighbouring states, water, and, finally, the private sector and possible nationalisations.

SADCC and South Africa

The neighbouring states are economically very important to South Africa, which earns more than \$1,000 million per year from them. This is profit, after deducting customs union payments and mine remittances. The neighbouring states are South Africa's main export market for manufactured goods, and the neighbours account for all the foreign earnings of South African railways.

It is highly unlikely that the neighbouring states (other than Lesotho) would continue to use South African ports and railways. The ports of Mozambique and Angola are closer and thus cheaper; these neighbours use South Africa now only because South Africa has blown up and closed some railways in Angola and Mozambique.

The issue of manufactured goods is much more complex. In general, South Africa is a high-cost producer, although the plummeting Rand has changed this somewhat, and its market in the neighbouring states is not 'natural'. Rather it is maintained by a collection of economic and political means, ranging from destabilisation to the dominance of key economic sectors by South African companies. These manufactured goods cannot, in general, be sold elsewhere. Thus, the market in the neighbouring states is important not simply as a way of earning foreign exchange, but also as a way of providing a larger market and facilitating

local South African production of more goods. The main objection of the neighbours is that this dominance of South African industry hinders their own industrialisation.

For a post-apartheid South Africa, there will be conflicting pressures. On the one hand, local demand for consumer goods will rise rapidly, stretching industrial capacity to the limit. This would tend to reduce exports to the neighbouring states. On the other hand, a post-apartheid South Africa will be in financial difficulties, caused in part by the long independence struggle, and it will need foreign exchange; thus, a strong push for exports can be expected. Furthermore, South African industrialists (whether they are private or parastatal) will be anxious to continue exporting in order to maintain long term dominance of the region. These needs conflict, and imply that industrial export policy will be erratic and confused.

For their part, the nine majority-ruled states have formed SADCC, which is designed to promote regional development through economic cooperation. One fundamental purpose is 'to liberate our economies from their dependence on the Republic of South Africa'. In its founding declaration, SADCC explained that

this dependence is not a natural phenomenon nor is it simply the result of a free market economy. The nine states and one occupied territory . . . were, in varying degrees, deliberately incorporated—by metropolitan powers, colonial rulers, and large corporations—into the colonial and sub-colonial structures centring in general on the Republic of South Africa. The development of national economies as balanced units, let alone the welfare of the people of Southern Africa, played no part in the economic integration strategy.¹

Majority rule in South Africa will not change the nature of this artificial dependence, nor the need to reverse it. Indeed, the SADCC states will expect a majority-rule South Africa to be more sympathetic to their demands to reduce the trade imbalance.

A basic element of SADCC is that it is not a free trade zone like the Southern African Customs Union or the Preferential Trade Area for Eastern and Southern Africa. Instead, it is based on negotiating bilateral balanced trade agreements. SADCC will want to negotiate such agreements with South Africa and thus reduce the huge trade deficit. In part this can be done simply by a majority-ruled South Africa making

¹ *Southern Africa: Toward Economic Liberation*, a declaration by the governments of the independent states of southern Africa made at the founding conference of SADCC in Lusaka, 1 April 1980.

fuller use of structures created by the apartheid state—for example, buying electricity from Mozambique and Angola, water from Lesotho, prawns from Mozambique, and so on. South Africa may also need to buy grain from Zimbabwe, at least in the short term, but this will not be sufficient to meet its needs. Reducing the trade deficit will require South Africa to buy more raw materials and manufactured goods from the neighbouring states, as well as an agreement that certain factories will be developed in the SADCC states and not in South Africa. Similarly, South Africa will be asked to return to the use of Maputo port for substantial amounts of cargo. (Maputo is the closest port to the Transvaal, and is the historic port for the Rand, but as part of its sanctions against Mozambique, apartheid South Africa has substantially expanded the port facilities at Durban and Richards Bay.)

It is highly unlikely that South Africa would be asked to join SADCC. Precisely because of its size and economic power, it would dominate SADCC. Rather, the neighbouring states are more likely to see SADCC as a vehicle which gives them equal bargaining power with a more sympathetic South Africa.

South Africa will need to create jobs and earn foreign exchange, and will be loath to give up industries and exports, even for the long-term benefit of the region. A centrally planned, one-party state would be in a better position to take such long-term policy decisions; a government holding only a narrow majority in a multi-party parliament will feel compelled to sacrifice its neighbours to satisfy immediate local demands. Thus, even if the demand to use Maputo port is seen as justified (and is cheaper), the demand by dock workers for jobs in Durban will probably take precedence.

Meanwhile, the ending of apartheid will withdraw the common enemy which has been part of the glue that binds SADCC. This will strengthen the hand of those bourgeois (and petty bourgeois and bureaucratic bourgeois) forces which have continued to support trade with, and dependence on, South Africa, despite destabilisation. They would rather have luxury goods from South Africa than support the development of local industry making mass consumer goods and intermediate goods. They will argue that the ending of apartheid removes the need for SADCC, and that it is sensible to allow South African economic dominance.

Thus, both sides will face conflicting economic and political pressures, and a key factor will probably be how long it takes for majority rule to come to South Africa. The longer the struggle

continues, the more the SADCC states will integrate their own economies and strengthen the institutions of SADCC. At the same time, they will steadily de-link from South Africa—spurred on by international sanctions and South African retaliation. If majority rule came by 1990, many trade links would still be intact and the pressure to allow South Africa to re-assert regional economic dominance would be stronger. If the struggle is still underway in 1995 or 2000, many more ties will have broken and are less likely to be re-established.

Another factor is the extent of South African destabilisation, which will surely increase in the coming years. This has already caused substantial damage and is the main factor in the economic crisis of several SADCC states. An end to apartheid will mean an end to destabilisation, and thus a chance for reconstruction. This could provide a substantial market for South Africa, but again there will be conflicting pressures. 'Marshall Plan'-type aid will probably be tied to purchases in donor countries, and thus will not help South African industry. Furthermore, the end of destabilisation will allow the SADCC states to buy on the world market. Until now South Africa has been an expensive supplier, and even its proximity may not make it competitive.

Destabilisation and 'puppet' armies

Part of the Lancaster House package was the rapid end to Rhodesian support for the MNR, and this in turn largely halted MNR activity in Mozambique. But Zimbabwe paid Zambia and Mozambique no reparations for the substantial damage (over \$500 million in Mozambique alone), and South Africa quickly picked up support of the MNR and reopened the war in Mozambique.

Any proper settlement in South Africa will similarly end support for UNITA, the MNR and other 'puppet' groups (including those being set up in Namibia). But the MNR and UNITA now have both the infrastructure and supply of arms to allow them to continue fighting for some time on their own. It would be possible for white officials in military intelligence, as well as men in the reconnaissance commandos and other special units (some of whom had previously come from Rhodesia or colonial Mozambique and Angola) to move on to Mozambique, Angola and Namibia. International right-wing groups might provide them with support, and they might also gain covert (or overt) help from the CIA. Thus, an early military demand on the new majority government of South Africa will be to help to suppress the MNR and UNITA—probably at

the same time that it will face continued pockets of white armed resistance inside South Africa.

It seems unlikely that the new government would be prepared to pay for the damage done to the neighbouring states (\$15 billion between 1980 and 1986), and that repairs, especially to essential infrastructure like railway bridges, will depend on foreign aid. South Africa will be under pressure from its neighbours to ensure them a prominent place in any 'Marshall Plan' for the region.

The 'puppet' groups and past destabilisation could therefore be a source of tension, especially at first, between the neighbouring states and the new majority government.

Migrant labour

Perhaps the most obvious and demeaning form of dependence is migrant labour. There are nearly 300,000 migrant workers in South Africa. They are from Lesotho (140,000 in 1984, which is 69 per cent of the wage-labour force of Lesotho), Mozambique (60,000, 5 per cent of the Mozambican wage-labour force), Malawi (29,000, 8 per cent), Botswana (26,000, 18 per cent) and Swaziland (14,000, 15 per cent). The vast majority are gold miners. This number is sharply down (from 462,000 in 1974), as apartheid South Africa moved to give more jobs to South Africans. Nevertheless, it remains an important source of both jobs and foreign exchange (roughly \$250 million per year), and is absolutely essential to Lesotho, and important to Mozambique, Botswana and Swaziland.

A majority-ruled South Africa would be under very strong pressure to give these jobs to South Africans. But the apartheid government has frequently threatened to send these workers home in retaliation for sanctions, which has been staunchly resisted by the mine operators who cannot afford to lose some of their most skilled workers. This argument will still be true in a few years time, so if independence comes soon, South Africa will have to continue with a high level of migrant miners.

On the other hand, as these men become older and retire, they are being replaced by South Africans. By the mid-1990s the numbers will be very much less in any case; this reduction will be speeded up by sanctions and retaliation. In all states except Lesotho, alternative jobs can (and should) be created, and this is dependent on foreign aid and on government priorities. But Lesotho is a special problem—its workers must be based in South Africa. It seems unlikely that, even as

retaliation, South Africa would send home the Basotho miners, because hundreds of thousands of starving Basotho (Lesotho nationals) in its midst would only fuel the chaos. A majority-ruled South Africa would probably take a similar view. Thus the best guess is that migrant labour would be phased out, except for perhaps 75,000 Basotho.

Namibia and BLS

South Africa will probably retain some sort of special relationship with its four smallest neighbours—Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland (BLS), and Namibia. Together they have a population of less than five million, a combined total which is smaller than the population of any other single state in the region. Furthermore, they all have a colonial history of being administered in conjunction with South Africa. Their small population and colonial history means their economies are almost totally integrated with that of South Africa. BLS are members of the South African-controlled Southern African Customs Union, while Lesotho and Swaziland are members of the Common Monetary Area (which until 1986 made the Rand legal tender in those two countries).

If, as now seems likely, Namibia does not gain independence before majority rule in South Africa, then its status could also be a source of problems. The neighbouring states will welcome Namibia into SADCC. But there will be a strong pressure from the new majority government for Namibia to retain its present integration into the South African economy, perhaps through some special status, or through membership in the Monetary Area and the Customs Union.

Similar problems relate to BLS. Their close integration into the South African economy has been of substantial benefit to South African capital, as they still provide the largest regional market. It has manifestly not been in the interests of BLS; the Customs Union is a free trade zone which has ensured that industry only developed in South Africa and not in the peripheral BLS area.

However, many South Africans see BLS as being historically and economically part of South Africa, and as being little more than glorified bantustans. The Freedom Charter specifically states that the people of BLS 'shall be free to decide for themselves their own future', but their inclusion in a charter for South Africa shows the assumption that they should choose to become part of a free South Africa.² This

² Under the heading 'There shall be peace and friendship!' in *The Freedom Charter*, adopted at The Congress of the People, 26 June 1955.

may have been a possibility when the charter was approved in 1955, but BLS all have clear and well-defined national identities now and would be most unlikely to give up their independence to South Africa. But they will be under strong pressure to remain in the Customs Union (and in the case of Swaziland and Lesotho, the Monetary Area).

Namibia and BLS cannot ever be genuinely independent or self-sufficient economies, but they can be substantially more independent than they are now. Inevitably, they will assert their independence and allegiance to SADCC. At the very least, they will expect a majority-rule government in South Africa totally to renegotiate the customs union and accept a much less one-sided relationship. This could bring them into sharp conflict with the new majority government.

Lesotho is perhaps the most serious problem. Namibia, Botswana and Swaziland all have viable economies and sufficient land, and can survive and grow independently. For Lesotho, this is probably not true. Lesotho exists precisely because it was so mountainous that King Moshoeshoe I was able to hold out against the advancing Boers a century ago. But he was forced to give up the best farmland, and present-day Lesotho does not have the resources (in terms of farmland and minerals) to support its people. More than half of the labour force now work in South Africa. The proposed Highland Water Scheme would earn some money for Lesotho, and agricultural development could provide more jobs and food, but it seems that even with substantial development assistance, Lesotho will remain dependent on South Africa. Thus, Lesotho must have some special arrangement which guarantees it continued access to South Africa for jobs. How will the majority rule government respond to this? As already noted, there will be strong demands inside South Africa to take over jobs now held by Basotho. Will the new majority government be able to make sufficient concessions to Lesotho, or will it simply demand that Lesotho become part of South Africa?

This also points to possible border difficulties between South Africa and its small neighbours. Both Lesotho and Swaziland have historic claims to land in South Africa. Indeed, Lesotho was a food surplus producer before its best farmland was incorporated into the Orange Free State. And the apartheid regime actually entered into negotiations with Swaziland in 1981 for the possible handover of some South African territory claimed by the Swazis, although this never actually occurred. Swaziland and Lesotho can be expected to at least restate their claims to the new majority government. Some of Lesotho's economic problems

would be resolved if Lesotho were given some land, thus perhaps dispensing with any continuing South African responsibility. This seems unlikely, however. In any case, OAU policy is to accept colonial boundaries, and a majority-ruled South Africa would surely join the OAU.

Namibia's boundaries are a different problem. South Africa has always claimed the enclave of Walvis Bay, and has said that the boundary between Namibia and South Africa was the north bank of the Orange River. Any Namibian government would insist, and a majority-ruled South Africa would probably accept, that Walvis Bay was part of Namibia and the boundary runs down the middle of the river (as is normal international practice). Much less clear, however, is the position of the seabed boundary between Namibia and South Africa. This is still undefined, and the meanderings of the Orange River mean that there are no clear international rules. A large economic zone, with possible gas fields and fishing potential, is at stake. This could be a source of serious tensions and might need to go to international mediation.

Water

Water is one of the region's most scarce resources and has already been the source of considerable tension. South Africa's lack of oil increases the problem, because coal-fired power stations and the Sasol oil-from-coal plants both consume massive amounts of water. Most of the key rivers rise in South Africa, and there are no firm international agreements, so South Africa has been taking more than what would be considered internationally acceptable from rivers flowing into Botswana, Swaziland and Mozambique. For example, the Nkomati River is often dry where it crosses into Mozambique. Lesotho is in the opposite position, having the headwaters of the Orange River. Proposals are now far advanced to buy water from Lesotho, without consultation with Namibia which is at the downstream end of the Orange River.

Thus South Africa will come to majority-rule having already taken more than its fair share of water from certain rivers, and with a still growing demand for more water (although the Sasol plants might be closed down because the oil they produce is so expensive and there would be no need for it after the end of sanctions). Mozambique, Swaziland, Botswana and Namibia will all demand negotiated water treaties with more water being left for the downstream countries. It

might be possible, however, to negotiate a treaty with Botswana, Zimbabwe and Mozambique to allow South Africa more water from the Limpopo River. But for the SADCC states, an important test of the good intentions of the new majority government will be its willingness to give up some of the ill-gotten gains of its apartheid predecessors.

The monopoly groups

The Anglo American Corporation of South Africa (AACSA) and several other South African monopoly groups play central roles in the economies of BLS, Namibia, Zimbabwe, and Zambia. There is already some pressure to reduce this, and that pressure must increase after majority rule is achieved and there is a more 'sympathetic' government in South Africa.

The ANC has said it will nationalise AACSA, and there are strong reasons for any majority-rule government to want to nationalise the monopoly groups. On the other hand, if there is a negotiated settlement, the ANC may be forced to accept a new Constitution with entrenched property rights that make nationalisation difficult; this happened with the Lancaster House Constitution for Zimbabwe. Even if nationalisation is possible, the new government may feel the need to retain white 'confidence', as happened in Zimbabwe, in order to prevent the flight of essential technicians and managers. This could cause a delay in nationalisation, or a decision to take only a part share.

On the other hand, AACSA may move in advance of majority rule to ensure that its offshore companies such as Minorco are sufficiently separate that they cannot be nationalised. If that occurred, holdings in neighbouring states would surely be controlled from outside South Africa.

Finally, there is already pressure on the monopoly groups. One of the sanctions proposed by the Commonwealth in 1985 is 'a ban on government contracts with majority-owned South African companies.'³ Furthermore, the benefits of the Preferential Trade Area for Eastern and Southern Africa are restricted to majority locally-owned companies. AACSA has already shown in Zambia and Zimbabwe that it can retain effective control without majority ownership, and there is already a move by some South African companies to reduce their holdings to 49 per cent.

³ Paragraph 7 of the statement issued by the Commonwealth meeting in Nassau, 20 October 1985, under the category 'Some of us would, in the event, consider the following'.

Thus the response of the majority government in South Africa to attempts by its neighbours to take further control of 'South African companies' will be influenced both by the degree of South African government involvement in those firms, and by the level of continued South African involvement. But it is not hard to see the majority-ruled government becoming angry at neighbours' attempts to nationalise a South African government-owned firm, as happened in Mozambique and Angola, where the 1974 Portuguese coup which led to independence for the colonies also led to a nationalisation of Portuguese banks. This meant that the Portuguese state, through the nationalised banks, had large holdings in companies in independent Mozambique and Angola. More than a decade later, this tangle had still not been successfully unravelled.

Two examples will serve to show the difficulties involved. DeBeers, which is owned by AACSA, controls diamond production and marketing in Botswana, Namibia and South Africa. Through its monopoly control of the world market, it manipulates supply and inflates the price. It is in the interests of all three that this system should continue after majority rule. On the other hand, Old Mutual's (South African Mutual Life Assurance Society) Renfreight is the dominant freight and forwarding agency in the region and is mainly responsible for the continued flow of Zimbabwean cargo through South African instead of Mozambican ports. The SADCC states want a non-South African-controlled freight and forwarding agency, but changing ownership is not enough. Renfreight in Zimbabwe uses the firm's South African computer; indeed, the computer runs a pool of shipping containers for the entire region. Advocates of continued links with a majority-ruled South Africa will use this as a strong argument not to delink, while the pro-SADCC lobby will push for a regional computer and separate container pool. De-linking from South Africa is likely to involve thousands of similar small battles. In any solution, much will depend on how sympathetic the new South African parastatals are to demands for delinking and a different kind of relationship.

Dominance or cooperation?

There are always difficulties between large countries and smaller neighbours, because what is a big problem for a small country will be a small problem for the big country. It will require a foreign policy commitment by the new government to treat its smaller neighbours as

equals and take their demands seriously. The neighbours' position may be helped if they can use SADCC as their negotiating body, because taken together the SADCC states are larger than South Africa. That in turn depends on the political will of the SADCC states themselves—will they be able to resist manipulation by the new majority-rule government and prevent themselves from being played off one against another?

However, resolution of all these problems hinges most directly on the attitude of the new South African government. Will its leaders see themselves as the 'obvious' political and economic leaders of southern Africa? Will they see South Africa as having a pre-ordained place as the 'regional power', a view some nationalist leaders seem to hold now? If that happens, tensions and conflicts with the neighbours seem inevitable.

The real question is whether the new leaders will argue that the imbalances created by a century of colonisation and apartheid are 'history' and are the unalterable basis from which the region must build, and thus that the rest of the region must accept the continued dominance of South Africa. Or will they listen to the SADCC view that these imbalances must be redressed, and that future development in the region must be more equitable and take into account the needs and demands of everyone in the region?

Giving up the White Man's Burden? Western relations with a free South Africa

When Rudyard Kipling (1865–1936) exhorted his readers to 'take up the white man's burden' in 1899, his poem's subtitle cited the USA and the Philippine Islands. As Britain fought an unexpectedly long war with Afrikaners for control of what the British government regarded as the 'richest spot on earth', the Imperial bard called on the Anglo-Saxon Americans, then fighting to acquire portions of the Spanish Empire, to join their elder siblings in world management. Kipling's friend, Cecil Rhodes, had already scribbled his first will calling for a global condominium of English-speaking white countries. The Afrikaners, like the Spanish, were regarded by the imperialists in London and Washington as not quite white enough to take on such responsibilities in the modern world.

Nevertheless, the constitutional planners of the Union of South Africa, formed in 1910, envisaged that the two white races—British and Boer—would take charge of their own 'natives'. Jan Smuts who had commanded troops against the British at the turn of the century, became not only the leader of white South Africa, but also an international statesman. Smuts played a leadership role in the British Commonwealth and in the League of Nations. He also participated in the drafting of the UN Charter, without noticeable awareness in that organisation's first gathering that the document's human-rights provisions might have some relevance to Smuts's own country.

In the four decades since the Second World War and the founding of the UN, the rigid racism of the National Party government in Pretoria has come into dramatic opposition to the Third World drive for freedom and the heightened international consciousness of racial injustice. Even Pretoria's allies have been dragged step by step into verbal condemnation and then into token sanctions against the apartheid regime. But the *de facto* alliance between the major Western powers and Pretoria is still largely intact, in economic and even military spheres. Even when the regime is condemned for its intransigence that mocks Western pleas for reform, Western statesmen are more likely to

take their cues from English-speaking white businessmen in Johannesburg than from representatives of the majority of South Africans.

What then would the West do if confronted with a democratic South Africa in which the weight of political power shifted to blacks? Could Western countries adjust to a system in which white skin no longer granted special privilege? Could they live with a South African government trying its best to redress past grievances under undoubtedly different conditions?

There are no simple answers, for surely in the event the West will be divided, as today. Some will welcome the new order and others will adjust pragmatically. Yet others will resist bitterly, seeking to destroy the future even if they cannot preserve the past. Nor is detailed scenario-building likely to prove accurate as prediction. Yet considering some of the possibilities for cooperation, and for conflict, may help to prepare now for a constructive relationship with the future free South Africa.

A vision of friendly commerce

Seeking to reinforce ties with the South African regime, conservatives conjure up a nightmare of the West's industries deprived of vital mineral resources by a cartel of the Soviet Union and black-ruled South Africa. South African propaganda repeatedly stresses the figures: 90 per cent of the Western world's production of platinum, 45 per cent of vanadium, 39 per cent of chrome, 20 per cent of antimony and 19 per cent of manganese, not to mention gold and the domination of diamond marketing by the South African-based De Beers Consolidated Mines, which is controlled by Harry Oppenheimer's Anglo American Corporation.

One might argue about the inclusion of diamonds in such a list of strategic commodities, despite US Treasury Secretary Regan's lament about American women potentially deprived of jewellery. Still, the totals are impressive. Just imagine, the alarmists argue, the potential for blackmail should Moscow and Soweto decide to withhold supplies.

The same possibility of a cut-off arises in the sanctions debate. And the answer is that Western countries could indeed do without South Africa, making use of stockpiles, substitution of other minerals and expansion of supplies from new producers anxious to break into the world market. The same applies even more strongly in the long term. If

Soviet and South African supplies were cut off, world prices would go up; prospecting and production elsewhere in the world would become more viable. A successful long-term cartel would be difficult to maintain, and of doubtful long-term advantage to either the Soviet Union or South Africa.¹

More important, it is highly unlikely that any South African government, of whatever political or racial complexion, would want to cut off such commerce. A free South Africa, in fact, is likely to need immediate revenue even more urgently, to address the economic and social needs of the majority of its citizens. Nor is it probable that it would be much more successful than the present regime and white-owned mining industry in extracting higher prices from the world market. The Soviet Union, spanning two continents, may be able to regard exports as supplementary to its domestic economy. But a country the size of South Africa, so richly endowed with minerals, will for the foreseeable future need to sell the bulk of its output on the world market.

African countries of the most diverse political orientation—Zaire, Angola, Zambia—continue to sell their oil and copper primarily to Western countries, at the best prices they can get. That is because that is where the markets are. Diversification of trading partners is certainly a goal, but its achievement is constrained by the realities of the world economy. There is no reason to assume South Africa would be different.

The mineral sector, moreover, is more capable of maintaining production under changing political conditions than agriculture, for example. Major purchasers, multinational companies, host governments and workers have a joint interest in keeping the mines going, however great may be the disputes over division of the proceeds.

The capacity to maintain production under a new order, and the cost structure of production, would depend on many variables, political and economic. Phasing out the system of compulsory migratory labour, redressing black/white wage differentials, abolishing the racial monopoly on mine management, coping with the possible flight of skilled white labour—all would pose complex problems. Such issues will arise whether the mines are nationalised or simply taxed and regulated. Balancing equity and production will be political as well as management issues.

¹ The minerals debate has a long history; see, for a clear discussion, Larry W Bowman, 'The strategic significance of South Africa to the United States', *African Affairs* (81) 1982, pp 159-91.

The greatest threat to production is likely to come, not from the accession to power of a representative South African government, but from the prolongation of conflict beforehand. So long as the Pretoria regime refuses to surrender power, violence will continue to escalate. The fact that no political movement wants to destroy the long-term productive capacity of the economy may not prevent damage that would be extremely costly. At some stage there will probably be a real danger of sabotage by recalcitrant racists on the verge of defeat. If the Western countries seek long-term security of mineral supplies, they should join in forcing Pretoria to accept a negotiated transfer of power sooner rather than later.

It might make sense to rely on the white regime to defend the sources of minerals for the West, if one assumes that white domination should and can endure forever, successfully repressing or diverting black aspirations for freedom. Even setting aside moral judgements, however, that choice provides no long-term assurance. Instead of shoring up crumbling white supremacy, the West would do better to help to lay the foundations of a new democratic order.

Similar considerations hold if one looks at South Africa as a market for Western exports. As long ago as 1954, the US Department of Commerce noted in a report that the apartheid system 'leads to inefficiency and [reduces] internal consumption levels and the size of the market'.² A prosperous white South Africa may itself be a significant market for imported consumer goods and 'high-tech' capital inputs. The lack of a wider market as an indication of apartheid's economic irrationality should not be exaggerated, for the system has clearly provided many compensating advantages for foreign and domestic capitalists.

It is true, nevertheless, that a white community of less than 5 million is in the long run a less attractive market than a nation of almost 35 million, black and white, with purchasing power distributed more equally. If one envisages such a transformation, the market would change, accelerating the trend toward increased black purchasing power. There is no reason to think that Western exporters would not get their share of the sales.

Certainly a non-aligned South Africa would turn to other countries for imports as well, as the options of trade with the Soviet bloc and Third

² US Department of Commerce, *Investment in Union of South Africa*, Washington DC: Government Printing Office, 1954, p 60.

World countries were explored. But the principal competition would probably be, as now, from East Asia, for reasons having little to do with the colour of the South African government. Factories importing machinery or spare parts would face constraints similar to those faced now, and there would be incentives to remain with familiar suppliers having the necessary experience and expertise. Attractive products at competitive prices would still be sold, and deals for imported technology sealed on strictly business terms.

But it is also likely that those countries seen as the most stubborn defenders of white minority rule would suffer a comparative disadvantage. When a question of choice emerged, such factors could count. Those companies, or countries, most identified with the old order could easily lose out to others with more foresight and willingness to plan for a non-racial future.

Commercial ties between the West and a free South Africa could continue and expand on the basis of mutual benefit and profit. There would be trauma in the transition, but the prospects on the other side could be bright. Less material exchange too could flow freely, as sports and arts boycotts were lifted. South African athletes and musicians could make even more significant contributions to the world than when hampered by exile or separated by the apartheid curtain. The West too would be enriched.

Would those who rule the West be content with such mutually beneficial trade? Such a vision is attractive. But despite its elements of truth it neglects another level of economic ties. The question of ownership—of property rights, past, present and future—is inevitable. And it will be contentious.

The property question

Direct investment by foreign companies amounts to about 10 per cent of all investment in South Africa, and foreign share holdings—principally in the gold mines—come to another 20 per cent. This share, a far smaller proportion than in most other African countries at independence, is nevertheless an essential component of the South African economy. Given a new government's determination to gain control over national resources, whether or not specific sectors are nationalised, it is easy to predict conflict. Analysing that conflict's potential shape and intensity is more complex. It will depend on the reaction of overseas investors to government measures and the consequent movements of capital. Even

more decisive will be the extent to which South African owners of capital—overwhelmingly white—opt for ‘foreign’ status, taking themselves and as much of their assets as they can into exile.

Since the discovery of diamonds and gold a century ago, control of South Africa’s wealth has been shared among foreign investors, white capitalists and the white-run state. Foreign investors had a relatively minor role in ownership of agricultural resources, predominantly in the hands of local whites. The mines were another story. As much as 60 per cent of the £200 million in capital invested in the gold mines from 1887 to 1932 came from overseas, according to Frankel’s classic study. After the Second World War the development of new gold fields drew on foreign capital for roughly half of the massive new investment of £370 million. In 1986, even after significant recent selling of shares, foreign holdings in the gold mines amounted to almost 27 per cent of the total shares, or more than \$5 billion.³

In contrast to mining enclaves elsewhere in Africa and the Third World, however, organisational control of the industry came to be rooted in a locally-based capitalist class. Companies were registered and shares traded in London as well as Johannesburg, but those firms that gave priority to local investments, led by Oppenheimer’s Anglo American empire, dominated the industry. As an Anglo American official put it, ‘the local community was financially strong enough and wide awake enough to take advantage of the situation created by the two world wars to re-purchase control of its own economy from Britain.’⁴

The result is that the bulk of overseas capital in South African gold mines is portfolio capital rather than controlling direct investment. Consolidated Gold Fields is the only major mining house not based in South Africa. Multinational mining companies from Europe or North America are more important in base metals and coal, but even here South African-based firms have the dominant role.

The Freedom Charter, the most widely accepted statement of the goals of liberation, despite its studied ambiguity on the building of socialism, does posit the need for the state to assume control of the nation’s natural resources for the benefit of the people. The mines are

³ S Herbert Frankel, *Capital Investment in Africa*, London: Oxford University Press, 1954, pp 89, 93; also Duncan Innes, *Anglo-American and the Rise of Modern South Africa*, New York: Monthly Review, 1984; and *The Star* (Johannesburg) 14 July 1986.

⁴ In André de Villiers (ed), *English-speaking South Africa Today*, Cape Town: Oxford University Press, 1979, p 234.

clearly one of the principal sectors at issue. In taking control, however, the greatest problem for a new state will be dealing with South Africa's own capitalist class. The issue of negotiating with overseas investors will be a secondary concern.

The question of nationalisation is often misleadingly presented as a one-time all-or-nothing decision, a presumed measure of radicalism for both advocates and opponents. Even in retrospect, it may become a misleading myth.

In Mozambique, for example, the FRELIMO government nationalised such sectors as banks, insurance and rental housing shortly after independence. But there was no general decision to nationalise industrial, agricultural or even mining firms. The bulk of state property in these sectors was acquired after proprietors fled or were discovered surreptitiously draining capital out of the country. The state, with a crippling lack of technical and managerial personnel, took over enterprises that were in many cases already bankrupt. Nationalisation could hardly work well without the resources for effective control and management, not to mention the sabotage carried out in leaving or in subsequent attacks. The failures were predictable, but the reasons are far more complex than a mythical decision to nationalise everything, a decision that never took place.

If a new government moves with extreme caution, however, as in the case of Zimbabwe's stance toward the white farming sector, it may be at the price of locking in previous patterns of oppression, with a new ideological cover. The growing strength of the black trade union movement may make possible a different dynamic in a free South Africa, but the same dilemma is inevitable. How fast can the popular forces and a newly representative government take control of productive resources, without provoking sabotage by previous owners or a devastating exodus of technical and managerial personnel?

In theory, the large state and parastatal sector in South Africa—electricity, iron and steel, transport and more—should give a new government considerable leverage over the private sector. Indeed, the Afrikaner strategy after political victory in 1948 provides a certain precedent. The state, which had already been used to subsidise white agriculture and employ unskilled whites, took on an even larger role. New parastatals were formed, and the old ones expanded, as part of the Afrikaner drive to benefit their community and redress their economic disadvantages *vis-à-vis* the dominant English.

But however much 'free enterprise' ideologues may complain about

the National Party's state socialism, its strategies were rooted in cooperation, not conflict, with domestic and foreign capitalists. In contrast, more than three-quarters of urban black South Africans support a socialist future for South Africa, according to recent surveys.⁵ And, though the exact definition of socialism may be disputed, so does the African National Congress, as well as virtually all other credible black political groupings. The socialism of a free South Africa may range from a social democratic model to one based on strict Marxist principles. But in either case popular demands would require a far greater challenge to capital's prerogatives than the concessions exacted by Afrikaner nationalists.

In addition, to talk of the 'state's' capacity to use its influence is a deceptive abstraction, which ignores the key issues of personnel and structures. 'Taking power' at the top by no means ensures that the organs of state power will respond to the new direction or indeed work at all.

The precise strategies for maximising popular and state leverage *vis-à-vis* capital is a topic beyond the scope of this brief essay. But perhaps some clues can be found in one wit's quip about Oppenheimer's financial empire, describing his policies as 'multifacialism'.⁶ The occasion was Anglo-American's effort to adjust to Zambian independence and to retain its dominant position in the copper industry under a new political order. But the idea may be more general. At least some sections of capital that have benefited from white supremacy will make efforts to outlive it, adjusting to a post-apartheid order. Indeed, this is already happening, as witnessed by the recent trek of leading businessmen to Lusaka to talk with the African National Congress.

It would be a gross exaggeration to say that capital now has a foot in both camps, for and against the old order in South Africa. The South African capitalist class and its overseas allies are more like a centipede than a biped, with ninety of its appendages still firm in the white supremacist order (albeit shuffling around to adjust their footing), the remainder tentatively placed in the anti-apartheid camp or waving undecidedly in the air. As the struggle intensifies, the balance will shift. The challenge for the liberation forces, before or after a transfer of state power, will be to play on the tensions between this giant force and the

⁵ Mark Orkin, *Divestment: The Struggle and the Future*, Johannesburg: Ravan Press, 1986, p 52.

⁶ Ruth First, Jonathan Steele and Cristabel Gurney, *The South African Connection*, Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1973, p 203.

apartheid state, without making compromises so great that the objectives of liberation are betrayed.

For a free South Africa, a policy of no cooperation at all with big capital, domestic or foreign, is a sectarian fantasy. Somehow or other, deals will be made. Events may well pre-empt strategic planning. But success in taking control of South Africa's resources is likely to require taking medium-size steps, large enough to make a difference, while not so large as to provoke overwhelming opposition. Gaining effective control of the state's own parastatals may be the first priority, without directly raising the ideologically explosive issue of nationalisation. Questions of management—and of the relationship between the state and the unions—would be complex enough to work out here without over-extending the state even further.

Control over the private sector would probably be better exercised at first by taxation, regulation and promotion of workers' rights than by a formal nationalisation that might be ineffective both financially and socially. Selective foreign investment might well continue to be welcomed, although it would have to meet conditions imposed as part of the new government's reconstruction programme. In strictly economic terms, it is likely that foreign investors and a new South Africa could still do mutually profitable business.

Such pragmatic accommodation may, however, be as much a fantasy as the one of immediate successful nationalisation. For the scenario to work, capitalists must be willing to lose many of their prerogatives and to accept lower profits, in favour of a proffered share in future development.

Western capitalists, it is true, have shown the capacity to work out profitable business relationships with regimes of the left, from Western European social democracies to the Soviet Union or China. But such pragmatism tends to prevail only after the new order has survived repeated attempts to overthrow it. Bitter exiles, expropriated or harbouring other real and imagined grievances, seek and find patrons among their previous allies abroad. Such efforts may last a generation—or longer. There is little indication that South Africa would be different in this respect.

Kith, kin and other alliances

There is a misleading tendency in much popular talk of 'revolution' to focus almost exclusively on the moment of seizure of state power. The human need to commemorate significant dates and the importance of

such turning points reinforces such a narrowed vision, which may obscure much of the critical but less dramatic process before and after. Among the aspects often neglected is the fact that the former rulers and other beneficiaries of the *ancien régime* rarely simply 'fade away'.

They may remain, embittered by their losses and the faults of the new order, or they may flee. Such exiles may succeed in taking with them substantial assets; some never abandon the dream of returning in triumph or at least exacting vengeance. They may keep up contact with dissidents at home, rejoice in the mistakes of the new rulers and campaign for sympathy or active support from international opinion.

An exclusive focus on the Afrikaners may underestimate the potential for such developments in the South African case. They have no home in Europe to go to, it is said, and the hardliners will commit suicide rather than abandon their country or live in a universal franchise state. Such attitudes do exist, of course, but to assume their permanence is to accept a false myth of Afrikaner uniqueness and uniformity.

After the Anglo-Boer War (1899–1902) the vast majority of Afrikaners adjusted to British rule; large numbers voted for parties advocating British/Boer cooperation. Following the narrow Nationalist election victory in 1948, a powerful patronage machine helped to reinforce the drive for unity. But today, the situation of many Afrikaners has changed, and the zigzag policies of the regime indicate a growing vulnerability. The Afrikaner constituency is already fragmenting under pressure, as some seek to reinforce the laager while others seek ways to escape. And the trend will accelerate.

Among the Afrikaner leadership, in particular, there may be many who will leave—professionals able to employ their skills elsewhere, politicians or businessmen who even now are reported to be building up Swiss bank accounts, ordinary families panicked into seeking an uncertain future as refugees. In 1986, the balance of white immigration turned negative, as it first did in Rhodesia in the mid-1970s. And although the majority of the emigrants were not Afrikaners, some of them were. If the regime were seriously close to losing power, it would be naive not to expect an escalation of this trend.

Even more numerous, of course, will be the exodus of English-speaking South Africans. In 1985 a *Sunday Times* (London) poll revealed that some 10 per cent of white South Africans expected to leave the country within ten years.⁷ Many in this stream will be liberal or

⁷ *Sunday Times* (London), 1 September 1985. The sample comprised 500 white South Africans polled at 100 places on 19–21 August 1985.

apolitical, but there will be some available for plots or even mercenary adventures, particularly if turmoil in South Africa seems to offer opportunities. The same applies to the community of Portuguese-speaking South African residents, now as many as one in seven whites in the country.

White South African exiles would not be uniform in their views toward the country they left. But the community of exiles would be fertile ground for intrigue and, perhaps even more important, for forming public opinion in the West about the new South Africa. This effect would be intensified if, as is likely, the exiles also included a significant number of blacks. Some of that number will have cast their lot with the white regime in the struggle. Others will have other grievances, or simply have found it too hard to live in a country rebuilding from the devastation of apartheid and the years of struggle against it.

Just as this struggle has been waged internationally as well as within the boundaries of South Africa, so will be the struggle for reconstruction and development in a post-apartheid society. In Western countries, racial ties and conservative ideologies will continue to influence the media, government policies and public opinion. This tendency will be even stronger once the apartheid regime no longer exists to discredit itself with heavy-handed repression and crude racist ideology.

It would be utopian not to expect many problems and mistakes in a free South Africa. Neither economic structures of inequality nor social barriers will disappear by magic. Millions will have been scarred not only by the history of apartheid but also by the vicissitudes of the struggle against it. Those with negative expectations about black rule or radical regimes will doubtless be able to find much material to confirm their predictions. Some who naively idealised the freedom struggle, seeing not human beings but saints who would produce miracles overnight, will become disillusioned and cynical.

A future South African government, moreover, is virtually certain to take a non-aligned position in world politics. Some in the West may recommend pragmatic adjustment to such independence. But others, still unaccepting of any stance other than pro-Western exclusion of Soviet bloc ties, will see such policies as a defeat to be reversed.

Then as now, Western understanding of relations with South Africa will depend largely on political developments within each Western country. To what extent is there commitment to social justice, at home

and abroad? To what extent is opinion about South Africa formed on the basis of real contact with the majority of South Africans, or derived from images and slogans easily changed or manipulated? It will also depend, profoundly, on events in the meantime, before the definitive end of white-minority rule.

Variations in the end game

The increasingly frequent discussions about 'post-apartheid' South Africa, of which this special issue is one example, are an important development, one indicator that the system is challenged as never before. The debate itself is part of the process of advancing the date as well as shaping the character of the new order. But it may also be deceptive; apartheid, its death repeatedly announced, may yet assume many guises before it is finally buried.

One of the stages which seems virtually inevitable in some form is an analogue of the internal settlement in Rhodesia. In such a scenario minority rule is officially renounced. Reforms have gone far enough to attract some black leaders with some previous credibility and capacity to impress foreign observers. It is no longer a white-minority regime, propagandists proclaim, but moderates of all races defending the hope of reform against 'extremists' and 'terrorists'. Yet the core power remains with white state officials, and the violence even intensifies.

The failure of this option in Rhodesia, with the dramatic discrediting of Bishop Abel Muzorewa and the others as figure-heads for the Smith regime, has been well noted by all sides in South Africa. It is said that this should be sufficient for politicians to have learned to stay away from such an obvious dead-end strategy. Perhaps. Certainly the details of the scenario would not be identical, both because of the precedent and because in any case the South African situation is different.

And yet, when the Pretoria regime is significantly weaker than now, but not yet ready to accept serious negotiations for an unrestricted universal franchise, such options will be explored. The fact that they will lack credibility with the majority will not prevent them being tried. The need to find such a solution—felt both by 'moderate' whites and opinion-leaders in the West—will help to rekindle illusions. At some point it is quite possible that P W Botha (or some *verligte* successor) will make Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi (or some other candidate for the 'moderate' label) an offer he cannot refuse.

One indicator that such a scenario might be plausible is Chief Buthelezi's rising popularity among South African whites even as his standing among blacks deteriorates. In a survey among Afrikaner businessmen, for example, 83 per cent rated Buthelezi a 'good leader' as compared to only a 67 per cent rating for President Botha.⁸ The fact that Buthelezi is discredited among even a majority of urban Zulus should not obscure the fact that he does have followers who can be mobilised for a display of support. And even as ties with the regime have increasingly become a liability, he seems to be toying with a closer embrace.

Detailed predictions about Buthelezi's future, or who else might plausibly take such a step, are likely to be over-speculative. But it is probable that the white power-structure will offer more and more attractive carrots to potential black allies as its own position weakens. Some may result in temporary agreements.

To be sure, such settlements will not produce 'solutions' or an end to violence. They will, however, strengthen the propaganda portraying liberation forces as 'terrorists' intent on 'black-on-black' violence for ulterior motives. The swift switch in overseas opinion after the Rhodesian internal settlement should be a cautionary lesson. Opinion in key Western circles, including the US Congress, was clearly moving towards acceptance of 'Zimbabwe-Rhodesia', toward lifting sanctions and writing off the guerrilla opposition as 'external nationalists'. This trend was checked with the Lancaster House settlement, and soon forgotten. But it revealed underlying forces that could easily be revived in the case of South Africa.

So far the Botha regime has been the most effective saboteur of the credibility of its reform claims. That may not always be the case. In Western public opinion, opposition to apartheid is far from equivalent to support for liberation. The image of 'necklacing' is already a powerful propaganda weapon in the West against the liberation struggle. As escalating violence claims a larger number of white victims, the well-established racial bias in media coverage will further identify

⁸ Unisa (University of South Africa) School of Business Leadership survey, reported in *The Star* (Johannesburg) 3 May 1986. For more on Buthelezi's social base and declining support, see Paul A. Wellings and Michael Sutcliffe, 'The widening rift: Buthelezi, Inkatha, and anti-apartheid politics in South Africa', *TransAfrica Forum* 3(4) Summer 1986, pp 51-82.

the liberation struggle with 'terrorism'.⁹ The regime's control over the media, meanwhile, may moderate the visual impact of state violence.

The anti-communist card

If there is some kind of 'internal settlement' with superficially credible black participation, anti-communism will become a powerful weapon in its favour in the West. This is not only because of the near-paranoid reaction so common in Washington, but also because the anti-apartheid movement itself has inadequately prepared public opinion to understand the complexity of the struggle.

It is easiest, and most effective in the short run, to stress the extreme actions of the apartheid state. The image of the racist Boer shooting unarmed black protesters is compelling, and it is real. But anti-apartheid sympathy based only on such images is superficial, and can itself reflect a simplistic race-based analysis. When black police, homeland leaders or vigilantes appear on the scene defending Pretoria, or whites turn up on the list of those dying in apartheid's prisons, this kind of anti-apartheid advocate is confused. The establishment media talk of 'black-on-black' violence, as if race should be sufficient to predict one's views and actions in a conflict. Even less naive observers may fail to ask why there are structures of collaboration, not just isolated traitors to the cause.

If the real reasons for such conflict are not understood—that some blacks do have a stake in the apartheid order, that political movements of any nationality or race are split by enemy action and by internal divisions of class, tactics and personal rivalries—then the gate is wide open for simplistic labelling. In the sanctions legislation (Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986) passed by the US Congress in October 1986, conservatives inserted a clause requiring government investigation of communist influence in the ANC. Few liberal Congressional representatives had the courage to oppose the measure, for fear of being thought 'soft on communism'.

⁹ To cite only one example from more than a century of selective perception, the images of the Mau Mau revolt diffused around the world in the 1950s left an overwhelming impression of black violence against whites. Yet only 32 white civilians and 63 white soldiers were killed during the four years of revolt. Meanwhile the British counted over 11,000 'insurgents' killed and more than 1,000 'legally' executed, some for offences as vague as 'consorting with terrorists'. See Chapter 4 of William Minter, *King Solomon's Mines Revisited*, New York: Basic Books, 1986.

There are real issues, of course, in the relative influence of different classes and ideological influences in a future South Africa. But these issues have little to do with the head-counting of members of the Communist Party in the ANC leadership. Such simplistic thinking—and more general labelling of opponents of a potential internal settlement as 'extremists'—puts South Africa into the context of a Cold War crusade to defend 'Western values'. The real debates over the best way to advance the interests of the majority disappear from view.

It would be a mistake to underestimate the potency of such anti-communist appeals, particularly in the USA. Overseas observers were baffled in 1985 and 1986 when the US Congress simultaneously imposed sanctions on South Africa and endorsed the far-right campaign to join in Pretoria's support of Jonas Savimbi in Angola. In terms of southern Africa reality, the two moves were obviously contradictory.

But decisions on foreign policy, even more than domestic issues, are based not on reality alone, but on the prisms through which that reality is seen. Because of Pretoria's media-reflected extremes of repression and of anti-apartheid efforts with a depth of organisation in every part of the US, the sanctions issue became one of racism as such; only the die-hards could avoid reaffirming the values of equality. On Angola, in contrast, the mainstream media collaborated with the far-right in portraying the issue as the 'Soviet-Cuban' threat. The connection with South Africa was relegated to an afterthought that politicians could ignore. Even on Mozambique, where the Reagan Administration took a more pragmatic line, Congress repeatedly restricted aid, bizarrely presenting itself as more anti-communist than the President himself.

South Africa is far closer to US public consciousness than Portuguese-speaking Angola or Mozambique, which are known directly to only a minuscule number of Americans. There are more people with direct contact and knowledge about South Africa, making such ploys more difficult. But it would be a serious mistake to underestimate the possibilities. The majority of the American people can identify with struggles for justice and get beyond labels, but only if they have access to the information, and it is not drowned out by official disinformation. The will to misunderstand and misrepresent is particularly strong among those with power to shape the debates and filter the information that reaches large numbers of people.

Distance and history alike place the United States and Western Europe in different positions *vis-à-vis* the future South African struggle, whether in some 'internal settlement' phase or in the phase of

reconstruction of a free South Africa. The density of counter-revolutionary exiles and plots may be greater in the Old World, but the alliances may also be more predictable and understandable. On the other side of the Atlantic, the complex currents of symbolism, ideology, domestic politics and ignorance may produce unexpected peril as well as promise. Those concerned with South Africa's future relations with the West would do well to remember that neither the West's different countries nor the political forces within them are likely to react uniformly or consistently.

Are we the world?

In 1985, a group of musicians calling themselves 'USA for Africa' produced a hit record which sold more than eleven million copies in the first three months and raised \$50 million for victims of African famine. Preceded by a parallel effort in London and emulated by a host of other ventures, the song 'We are the World' captured a vivid sense of interconnection between the consumer society in the West and those dying a continent away.

Yet the ephemeral character of such media-promoted musical togetherness in the USA also reveals the structural chasm separating the Third World and the industrial West. Apartheid replicates within a single country the global history of Western domination. And the struggle against it is part and parcel of the wider movement to substitute solidarity and mutual respect for domination and disdain.

This historical process of domination and freedom has its unity, but it also reflects an incredible diversity of experiences which labels such as 'Third World' and 'First World' may easily obscure. The response in the West to the anguished birth of a free South Africa will be as diverse as the histories of the different Western countries and their component classes and peoples, many themselves 'Third World' in origin.

The contrasts between Scandinavia and the German Federal Republic, for example, or between the Netherlands and Great Britain, are obvious to liberation movement activists seeking support for sanctions or other backing. So is the general difference between Western Europe, where each country has a politically significant socialist or communist party, and the USA, where the left in any guise is politically marginalised. Yet there is an Old World tendency, shared by European and African alike, to exaggerate the uniformity in the North American colossus. The dominant political tendencies in the USA, with

their powerful media echo, often deceive not only their domestic opponents but also observers abroad.

To take only one example among many, the shift to the right in US policy, domestic and foreign, is often portrayed as a shift of mass opinion. Pundits echo the president himself in taking Reagan's electorala landslides and popularity polls as representing the majority of the American people. Yet because of low turnouts of potential voters, disinclined to accept either of the candidates offered, Reagan's victories in fact represent a maximum of 32 per cent of the eligible voters. Two-thirds majorities in opinion polls consistently disapprove of the Administration's war on Nicaragua. In general, public opinion on major domestic issues has remained stable or become slightly more liberal during the Reagan years.¹⁰

The right has indeed won impressive policy victories, but not by changing 'mass' opinion. Its success has come from successful mobilisation of conservative forces among 'opinion leaders', in the capitalist class, in both parties and in the media. The victories of the grass-roots anti-apartheid movement show that with extraordinary effort it is still sometimes possible to win against that current. They also show that the White House, despite its undoubted dominance in foreign policy, is not the only force that can have some effect.

In the United States, as well as in Canada or Europe, the Western response to the South African struggle is being fought out on countless fronts, not just in cabinet committees. And so it will be when a free South Africa begins its struggle for reconstruction. In the West, as in South Africa, there will be those who resist the struggle. And there will be those who try to understand and to lend a hand. Not carrying on the 'White Man's Burden', but joining with sisters and brothers in a common effort.

In 1973 a Mozambican poet penned lines that stand as a fitting reply to the paternalism of Kipling, or of those who today hold power in the West:

¹⁰ See the detailed analyses in Thomas Byrne Edsall, *The New Politics of Inequality*, New York: W W Norton and Company, 1984, and Thomas Ferguson and Joel Rogers, *Right Turn*, New York: Hill and Wang, 1986.

Brother from the West—

(How can we explain that you are our brother?)
the world does not end at the threshold of your house
nor at the stream which marks the border of your country
nor in the sea
in whose vastness you sometimes think
that you have discovered the meaning of the infinite.
Beyond your threshold, beyond the sea
the great struggle continues.

From you, brother, we expect
and to you we offer
not the hand of charity
 which misleads and humiliates
but the hand of comradeship
 committed, conscious.

How can you refuse, brother from the West?

The dismantling of the apartheid war machine

The present extensive war in southern Africa is at the centre of any discussion of change and transformation in Africa. Apartheid has not only separated different 'racial groups' but has evolved a system of super exploitation of the labour power of the African majority. Segregation and exploitation has necessitated legal and other forms of coercion, and throughout the history of South Africa force and the threat of force has remained central to the social reproduction of the system. Free labour relations have not been allowed to develop and this has led to a major contradiction in South African society, where the majority are called upon to subsidise their own oppression. The subsidies from the producing classes provide the surpluses necessary to maintain the South African Defence Force (SADF). This armed force both protects apartheid and capitalism in South Africa and seeks to extend the region of South African capital accumulation. Since the tide of decolonisation has swept the region, the expansion of South African capital has been conceived of in the form of a Constellation of Southern African States (CONSAS). However, the determination of the people of Southern Africa to fight the spread of the apartheid monster has led the South African regime to seek to militarily destabilise neighbouring states while unleashing troops and police against the black majority in South Africa.

The South African armed forces, like swarms of locusts, leave death and destruction in their wake. Preliminary estimates are that by the end of 1985 over \$10 billion worth of economic and infrastructural damage has been wrought on the Frontline states (FLS). Over one million persons have been killed, maimed, displaced or made refugees as the SADF has fought across the breadth of southern Africa. In Angola the SADF has fought both a conventional and an irregular war, (justified in the West as a fight against a Soviet/Cuban threat to Western strategic resources) and in Namibia the South Africans have deployed over 100,000 troops to fight a counter-insurgency war against the South West African Peoples' Organisation (SWAPO of Namibia). In Mozambique the South Africans have organised a war to destabilise Frelimo and in the other FLS the South African regime has carried out economic,

political and psychological warfare. This has been justified under the military doctrine of 'total strategy'; the apartheid regime's response to what it sees as a multi-dimensional 'total onslaught' against the South African state.

To carry forward this strategy the military has become central to the reproduction of state power. This is reflected not only in the links between the military and industry, epitomised in the state armaments corporation Armscor, but also in the militarisation of the state and society. The management techniques of the SADF have been harnessed to militarise the state under a National Security Management System. An inner war cabinet called the State Security Council links the military to local administrative structures through joint management committees and a decentralised system of 'security management' at all levels.

Despite this 'total strategy' the military has failed to crush the rebellion of the South African masses at their places of work, in the townships and in schools. The ruthless repression of the regime has precipitated an international outcry against apartheid. As part of this outcry the call for comprehensive and mandatory sanctions against the system has developed. In response to the accelerated call for sanctions the South African regime has intensified its war against the FLS. In this heightened war President Samora Machel of Mozambique has fallen, killed in the struggle to transform Africa. But the South Africans have failed to achieve one of their most important tasks: to break the spirit of resistance. It is this resistance which has precipitated the international outcry against apartheid and the present intense discussions on the kind of South Africa 'after apartheid'. In the words of Fanon, describing another war of resistance in Algeria: 'In the course of the multiple episodes of the war, the people came to realise that if they wished to bring a new world with them they would have to create a new Algerian society from top to bottom.'

The possibility of creating a new society 'from top to bottom' in South Africa is on the agenda. The SADF and its place in the new post-apartheid society is part of this discussion, in which there are differing conceptions of the process of transformation and the dismantling of the apartheid war machine. To conceptualise the programme of change is a central concern of those social forces which seek to create a new society 'from top to bottom'. Other social forces see the problem in terms of structural reforms which would at most require an Africanisation of the state, including the military.

The literature on the SADF from the South African state, which has been developed in the mould of strategic analysis, deals with the function of the military not in terms of the relations of production but in terms of the defence of the ideas of anti-communism. Anti-apartheid scholarship in the IDAF publication, *Brutal Force*, and the literature emanating from the UN Centre Against Apartheid provide an alternative perspective on the place of militarism in the South African economy and society. This intellectual work has been a major advance beyond the modernisation theories which spawned studies of the military in independent Africa in the 1960s and 1970s. It is in part this new scholarship plus the history of transformations in other post-revolutionary societies which provides the starting-point for an analysis of the process of demilitarising the South African state. Such an understanding is a vital component of the gigantic undertaking now underway in South Africa to rid the society of racial capitalism.

The links between militarism, industry, the labour process and social reproduction in South Africa are explicit. This short inquiry into the post-apartheid process can in no way exhaust the range of questions generated by the requirements of the anti-apartheid struggle. Scenario-planning and damage-limitation are now established components of the risk consultancy business of Western scholarship. This intellectual tradition draws from the resources of those in power. Unfortunately in Africa, and in particular in South Africa, the exclusion of the African masses from institutions of higher learning means that the intellectual culture of that society is impoverished. For intellectuals to develop a coherent and consistent conception of the state after apartheid, whether of the coercive apparatus or the ideological apparatus, requires in essence an organic link with the oppressed classes. In the absence of this organic bond one can draw from other experiences to raise a number of issues which could stimulate further debate, discussion and research, especially by those locked in the quest to create a new society 'from top to bottom'.

The experiences of other African States and other oppressed societies which have engaged in armed struggle at once becomes pertinent. In the past capital has sought to recoup through negotiations and reforms what it has lost through battle. Under the umbrella of reforms, sections of South African capital are already calling for structural changes which would save capitalism, preserve the present military-industrial complex and recruit more blacks into the armed forces. However it is the view of this paper that a strategy to Africanise the structures of coercion is

substantially different to a process of disentangling the link between race, capital, militarism and accumulation. For the whole structure of capital accumulation in South Africa shows that the system is in crisis and more profound changes are needed beyond the Africanisation of the state.

Far from being seduced by the reform process there is a heightened spirit of resistance among the producers. The translation of this spirit into concrete forms of popular power is part of the project of establishing a non-racial society after apartheid. The embryo of this new society which is slowly emerging in the street committees, amongst the organised workers and the organised students opens vast possibilities for the conceptualisation of a new society. The initiatives unleashed by the popular struggle could threaten the future of capitalism in Africa.

The forms of military organisation open to a popular government in South Africa are considerable, given the depth of the contradictions of the present mode of social organisation. Transitional forms of military training and sources of military capital will be part of the process of the dismantling of the SADF if the popular forces aim to break the integration of South Africa with NATO and the Western Powers. Such a break would inevitably invite hostile military acts; the low intensity war against Nicaragua shows that imperialism seeks to destroy popular experiments. The Nicaraguan experience has shown that it is necessary to transform a guerrilla army into a standing army capable of defending the people from external aggression after liberation.

A slow but popularly based dismantling of the SADF could release major resources presently tied up by the military, and unleash the potential of the masses in a manner that was not possible elsewhere in Africa during the period of decolonisation. South Africa after apartheid could be the foundation for the process of change in Africa or the basis for the recomposition and reconstruction of capitalism in Africa. Profound transformations are possible and regressions are also possible. Unless clear ideas are marshalled on how to dismantle apartheid, the outcome could be the integration of the freedom fighters into the old system. Whether this possibility exists will be dependent on the pace and the intensity of the strengthening of popular power. Experience elsewhere since the Bolshevik revolution, and more recently in Zimbabwe, shows that guerrilla armies can be integrated into the old weapons system and thus maintain the lopsided requirements of the military.

The contradictions of the apartheid war machine

According to Lenin, 'The bureaucracy and the standing army are a parasite on the body of bourgeois society—a parasite created by the internal antagonisms which rend that society, but a parasite which chokes all its vital forces.'

This conception of the standing army as a parasite on society properly grasps the essence of the South African Defence Force. For in South African society the military is not only a parasite but a destructive force. The developed literature on the organisation and structure of the SADF has shown clearly the way in which the South African military is at the centre of economic planning, investment patterns and the present use of resources in the society. This literature has illuminated the size, composition and external linkages of the SADF in the destructive war now unleashed in southern Africa.¹ The SADF is divided into four principal arms: the army, the navy, the air force and the medical services. Through the Joint Management Committees the defence establishment of the South African state is linked to the police and administrative structures of apartheid to form an integrated security system.² At the apex of this system is the State Security Council which coordinates the war effort.

Most of the literature on the SADF, even the house journals, points to the fact that the South African military structure emerged out of the traditions of European militarism with clear links to the armaments manufacturers of the West. Even though the nationalism and chauvinism of the Afrikaner journals masks it, the continuity in the form and structure of the armed forces can be seen in the way in which the South African soldier is still subordinate to the weapons system.

Of the armed forces, the army is the largest component with over 80 per cent of the total men under arms. In this army the brigade structure is organised around the concept of the 'mechanised battlefield' with a

¹ There is considerable literature on the South African armed forces emanating from both the South African state, centres for strategic studies and from anti-apartheid centres. Three books which are particularly useful are a) Gavin Cawthra, *Brutal Force: The Apartheid War Machine*. London: International Defence and Aid Fund, 1986; b) Philip H Frankel, *Pretoria's Praetorians: Civil-Military Relations in South Africa*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984; c) Phyllis Johnson and David Martin (eds) *Destructive Engagement: Southern Africa at War*. Harare: Zimbabwe Publishing House, 1986.

² In September 1986 the *Weekly Mail* (Johannesburg) brought out a lengthy article on the JMCS as the new shadow government in South Africa. As early as 1984 the implications of the NSMS were analysed for the US Naval College. See James M Roherty, 'Managing the security power base in South Africa', *South Africa International Quarterly*, October 1984.

vast array of tanks, armoured cars, armoured personnel carriers and heavy artillery. This mechanised army is integrated into an air force which boasts over 250 combat aircraft in a number of squadrons. Behind the army and the air force lags the navy with obsolete patrol boats, frigates and a few submarines. The whole armed structure is very capital intensive, with vast sums being poured into the establishment of a domestic arms industry. The military budget thus reflects the links between the relations of warfare, industry and the social system.

In this capital-intensive and socially destructive military system the soldier is defined in relation to the weapons.³ Since the era of monopoly capitalism, a characteristic of the modern army is the way in which it has shared the style of capitalist production, in that the means of warfare have been capital-intensive. The modern army employs the management techniques of the large corporation; in South Africa this management technique is now manifest in the National Security Management System. Soldiers are organised around the fetish of equipment, around specific weapons in the same way that workers are organised in the factory. In capitalist industry the embodiment of technology is in the machine, which dominates human beings in the labour process; in the military the equivalent of the machine is the weapons system. In her book, *The Baroque Arsenal*, Mary Kaldor developed the concept of a weapons system which combines a weapon platform (ship, aircraft or tank, gun, missile or torpedo); and the means of command and communication.⁴

South African society is today organised around the conception of the weapons system of the West (as characterised by Kaldor) along with the industrial and technological imperatives demanded by this system. The drive for technological improvement and absolute destructive power which has been justified in the West by the jargon of 'strategic edge' has found its place in South Africa with the attempt by the regime to develop nuclear weapons. The South African regime has initiated a military technological infrastructure in an effort to generalise the development of the modern skills of military science in the society. Hence today the SADF embraces the entire political economy of the society in that the missiles and armoured cars are assembled in factories by workers while soldiers are trained to use these weapons on the very same workers and their children.

³ Mary Kaldor, 'Warfare and capitalism' in E P Thompson *et al.*, *Exterminism and Cold War*, London: Verso Books, 1983.

⁴ Mary Kaldor, *The Baroque Arsenal*, London: Sphere Books, 1983, p 7.

In the advanced capitalist centres there was a spin-off of consumer items from the factories of military production. In these societies the surpluses earned from international trade allowed the state to integrate the producers as consumers and as citizens with basic democratic rights. The working class as a whole could be persuaded to part with labour for the purposes of fighting foreign powers or to produce armaments. This same citizen could be persuaded to kill or risk getting killed in the national interest. This form of ideological reproduction served as a buffer to the system, for the forms of the subordination of labour ensured the dominance of ideological forms of subordination over the direct use of force or non-economic forms of subordination. In South Africa the state cannot mobilise the African majority on the emotive appeals of loyalty, patriotism and anti-communism. The SADF is maintained as a modern, mechanised army primarily through its technological and political links with the West, despite the UN's mandatory Arms Embargo.

The capital intensity of the SADF increased dramatically after the crisis in the open procurement of Western arms following the UN arms embargo of 1977. As early as the Second World War, through the establishment of the Munitions Production Office, South African capitalists were mobilised to respond to the defence needs of the state. This was transformed in the post-Soweto period when local capital needed the protection of the military inside South Africa and in order to maintain or expand their influence in the liberated states of the region. The interconnections between the industrial magnates and Armscor helped to define the nature of industrial development in South Africa. Guided by common interests, capital and the military both espoused the 'total strategy' which incorporated the concept of a regional security and economic zone for South African capital. This zone of capital, conceived as the Constellation of Southern African States, would serve to secure the subcontinental military, political and economic objectives of apartheid.⁵

Apartheid in South Africa emerged out of racial discrimination, job reservation, influx control and a system which structured the relations of production in the society. The historic and contemporary forms of apartheid have been adequately documented and do not bear repetition here. What is of importance for this article is the role of force in the

⁵ M Evans, *The Frontline States, South Africa and Southern African Security: Military Prospects and Perspectives*, University of Zimbabwe, 1986.

society and how the South African capitalist class grew fat on bonded labour. Bonded, cheap, migrant and coerced labour provided sufficient capital for South African manufacturers to develop a type of industrialisation where free capitalist labour relations were not present. This industrialisation was comparable to the form of industrialisation of those states in the Third World which industrialised after the Second World War with the technology of the Second Industrial Revolution, the era of electricity, railways, iron and steel. While the advanced capitalist states were forging ahead in the new era of space research, micro-electronics, bio-technology and solar energy, a few Third World economies were able to industrialise on the basis of some of the old industries of the West.⁶

The bantustan strategy of the South African state met the needs of the kind of industrialisation carried out in the South African economy where cheap labour and low wages guaranteed high profits to strengthen the pace of industrial accumulation. However, the narrow domestic market meant that the whole subcontinent was viewed as a region for the expansion of South African capital.

The military-industrial complex was oiled to guarantee the supremacy of South African capital in the region.

Yet the rigidity of apartheid and the coercive instruments developed in its wake dictated the limits of the kind of industrialisation possible in the racially divided society. The conception of racial superiority/inferiority meant that the form of industrialisation was not based on a pool of skilled black labour but was dependent on the importation of skilled labour from Europe. But black labour could not be totally suppressed. Inevitably the bureaucracy of the Bantu Administration Boards and the apparatus built up to enforce the Group Areas Act and influx control could not contain the tide of resistance, rebellion and protest. From the formation of the ANC in 1912 to the present, the spontaneous and organised resistance of the majority has sharpened the divide between the rulers and the ruled. And for the rulers to continue to rule, especially after the resistance of Soweto and the independence of Mozambique and Angola, the military has become central to the system of governance. This has led to the articulation of a total strategy.⁷

⁶ R Kaplinsky, 'The international context for industrialisation in the coming decade', *Development and Change*, October 1984.

⁷ H Campbell, 'Total strategy and total failure', *Zimbabwe Herald* (Harare) 9 December 1983. See also R Davies, D O'Meara and S Dlamini, *South Africa's Strategy in the Southern Africa Region*, Centre of African Studies, Mozambique, 1984.

Total strategy as a counter-revolutionary doctrine was developed by the French military specialist Andre Beaufre in a failed effort to turn the tide of decolonisation. After Soweto in 1976 the militarists and the industrialists developed an explicit conception of how military institutions were to 'stimulate economic growth in the industrial sectors linked to production and technology of the national war machine. . . . The South African military today is not only an army of soldiers . . . but an army of industrialists, financiers, economists and other business personnel.'⁸ At the centre of this national war machine is the Armaments Development and Production Corporation, Armscor.

Armscor and industry

Today Armscor is central to the subsidies provided by the state for local capitalists to maintain a certain level of industrial activity. This industrial activity is a necessary logistic component of the mechanised army. Armscor is one of the largest industrial concerns in South Africa with assets of over R1,600m, and with over nine subsidiaries. Over fifty main private sector contractors are engaged in producing components and military materials and over 400 sub-contractors service the Armscor subsidiaries. However, behind the metal factories, engineering works, aircraft assembly factory and vehicle assembly plants lies one fact. Armscor was integrated into a licensing arrangement with Western arms manufacturers and did not engender a local scientific and technological capacity. One critical assessment of Armscor has observed that:

Despite its size, Armscor's capabilities are restricted by the limited technological base of South Africa's domestic industry as a whole and its subsidiaries remain dependent on components and technology imported from other countries. While it has managed to provide the SADF with some of its basic arms requirements, largely as a result of licensing arrangements with Western countries during the 1960s and 1970s, Armscor is unable to assemble or manufacture more sophisticated military equipment, leading to serious shortages, especially in the airforce.⁹

While South African state intellectuals have attempted to sell the myth of military self-sufficiency, they have been forced to decry the aged

⁸ Philip H Frankel, *Pretoria's Praetorians*, p 81.

⁹ 'South Africa's military capacity', International Seminar on the UN arms embargo against South Africa, London, May 1986. For a list of companies of Armscor see *Brutal Force*, Table XIII p 275. 'Major armaments producers in South Africa.'

nature of key military equipment in the air force and the navy. Even recently when the South African air force launched its much heralded combat aircraft the *Cheetah*, the *SA Digest* admitted that this aircraft was a Mirage III converted and upgraded by the Atlas Aircraft Corporation, a subsidiary of Armscor.¹⁰ The South African economy does not have the expertise to design, develop and build sophisticated aircraft engines.¹¹ Even in Western Europe the effort to build modern jet fighters to compete with the US aerospace industry involves multi-national cooperation within the EEC

Armscor is capable of making weapons consistent with the level of industrialisation of South African society but the military industry of South Africa has been built through its integration into the Western military order. Armscor was essentially an assembly point for the prime contractors of armaments in the West and this state controlled corporation in turn became the pivot for local subsidiaries to take over some arms production and to build the nuts and bolts. This much was clear in the loudly heralded artillery system which was developed after the South African defeat in Angola in 1976:

The manufacture of the SADF's 155 mm artillery system, the G5, is dependent on imported machine lines and technology and the same applies to its mortars and other equipment. South African claims to have made major breakthroughs in the fields of missile research and development appear on the surface to be impressive, but in every case the missiles turn out to be modifications of equipment obtained from other countries.¹²

This technological weakness reflects the way in which the organic composition of capital could not develop under the conditions of job reservation, segregated schools and cheap, unskilled black labour. Instead, Armscor and South African industry enjoyed the advantage of cheap labour while at the same time using the surpluses generated to import skilled labour and white scientists from Western Europe and adapting the technology of the West to the production of armaments. Current research underway in South Africa by scholars associated with the *South Africa Labour Bulletin* seeks to underscore and highlight the limited extent to which the state has been able to adapt sophisticated technology for local use. This exposition is not central to our discussion

¹⁰ 'New Milestones for South Africa', *SA Digest*, 18 July 1986, p 640.

¹¹ South Africa's air force is a particularly vulnerable part of the war machine. The weaknesses of the air force are examined from time to time in international defence journals. See *Flight International*, January 1985.

¹² *Brual Force*, pp 97-103.

of the process of demilitarisation except in so far as it has restricted a wider diffusion of skills and knowledge needed for building a new society after apartheid. The fact is that the racist ideology of the present state hinders the development of a modern scientific culture among the African majority.

A second and related feature of the links between Armscor and industry in South Africa is the relationship between military research, military spending and economic growth. More than thirty years ago Baran & Sweezy in *Monopoly Capital* tried to show a positive correlation between defence spending and economic growth. They argued that defence spending, development and research into new weapons and the defence industry provided a powerful motor of technological and economic growth.¹³ More recent studies on the British and US economies have pointed to a negative correlation between defence spending and economic growth. A very recent and persuasive study on the British economy showed that defence spending must be by definition non-productive, with a perverse effect on economic growth. This study showed that in the areas of industrial production in the capital goods sector which is dependent on military sales, productivity growth was negative.¹⁴ The questions raised by the present research are profound and it is significant that those in the forefront of this research are those in the campaign for nuclear disarmament.

In the South African economy the work on the military has not yet disaggregated the share of military output of commodities in the military industrial complex.¹⁵ Such a disaggregation between sectors of the economy and the economic and strategic roles of military expenditure has not yet been documented. This future documentation will be an essential requirement in the process of conversion; of changing over the production of sophisticated weapons of death to creating commodities for the well-being of the majority.

The experience of the South African military industrial sector shows that despite the claims made in the South African military magazines *Paratus* and *Armed Forces*, there is very little product innovation by Armscor. In essence, the monopoly conditions of South African capital

¹³ R Smith, 'Military expenditure and capitalism' *Cambridge Journal of Economics*, March 1977

¹⁴ Mary Kaldor, Margaret Sharp and William Walker, 'Industrial competitiveness and Britain's defence commitments', *Lloyds Bank Review*, September 1986.

¹⁵ This has been done in Western Europe. See the work of R Smith *op. cit.* 'Military Expenditure and Capitalism'.

and the limited nature of the domestic market mean that there is no real market for the products of Armscor. Capitalist and socialist arms manufacturers operate in conditions of fierce international competition. Thus despite the attempted forays of Armscor to the arms bazaar of the West the principal market for the products of Armscor is the SADF. This was so especially after the political independence of Zimbabwe in 1980; prior to this international sanctions against the Rhodesian regime made it a captive market for the products of the armaments sector of the South African economy. Today South Africa boasts of the sales of weapons to Africa and Latin America but this has not been verified by the centres that monitor international arms transfers, except in isolated cases.

Because of the local use of arms by the SADF South African society is in the position where the armaments factories are subsidised by workers on whom the same arms are being used. The extent of the subsidy can be measured by the relationship between social expenditures and military expenditures. Current research by the *Counter Information Services* in London exposes the extent to which the social wage of African workers is depressed so that the state can maintain and replenish the coercive apparatus. This situation can be compared to the production of armaments in the advanced capitalist countries where the changing organic composition of capital led to commensurate changes in the skill, knowledge and organisational capacities of the working class. Hence the process of military expansion was effected by mobilising the political support of the dominated classes. This was done through major concessions to the working class such as the redistribution of income, trade union rights, the right to the franchise, subsidised housing, pensions, technical education and those elements of state rule which have come to be associated with the welfare state. These concessions have allowed for the basis of ideological coercion so that the workers in the capitalist states have been willing to fight for and to defend capitalism. South African black workers are super-exploited in the foundries which are part of the weapons industry and these same weapons are used to kill their children and to unleash terror and war in the Frontline states.

The subsidies of the workers to the capitalist class

As the working class movement develops in South Africa and a corresponding intellectual culture is harnessed it will be possible to

quantify the full extent of the depression of the social wage to subsidise the state. For these workers the task of dismantling the war machine is urgent, but the local monopoly capitalists do not have an interest in the total dismantling of the military industrial complex. The total military expenditure of the South African state is difficult to measure because security expenditures—including police, intelligence, paramilitary and other security expenditures—are significantly higher than the published estimates of military spending. In the ten-year period since the South African defeat in Angola and the Soweto uprisings, official defence spending has increased by over 500 per cent. By 1986–87 the official defence budget had reached R5,123.3m, a 19.9 per cent increase over the 1985–86 budget of R4,274.1m. Comparisons can be made from the official figures on the amount spent on the military as opposed to housing, health, education, and other forms of social reproduction. The 1986–87 budget for defence was almost five times the amount budgeted for black education and nearly nine times the amount spent on housing. The official figures for defence do not include:

- 1) The police budget of R1,071.2m.
- 2) The amount spent on defence buildings and property, for the Department of Public Works pays for the construction of military bases.
- 3) The amount spent on the South West African Territorial Force for the illegal occupation of Namibia.
- 4) Defence and police expenditures in the so-called independent bantustans.
- 5) The costs of intelligence gathering which are incorporated under the treasury.
- 6) Loans to the Atomic Energy Commission for the nuclear industry and
- 7) The direct subsidies to industry under the heading of the 'transfer of technology'.¹⁶

The defence budget represents only a fraction of total military expenditure and excludes support to industrialists who provide clothing, buildings, food and other equipment for the more than half a million persons under arms in South Africa and in occupied Angola and Namibia. Under the National Security Management System implemented by P W Botha it is impossible to distinguish military and

¹⁶ *Weekly Mail* 27 March 1986.

non-military expenditure as all departments are integrated into the defence effort.

One important question which arises from this vast expenditure where defence spending is about 20 per cent of the official budget is: Does militarism in South Africa create the conditions for industrial production and thus facilitate accumulation? On the contrary, militarism in South Africa registers itself as a destructive factor in the process of accumulation. The military-industrial complex subsists in an economy where the wage rate is lowered beneath the physical capacity of reproduction for the workers. Moreover, in the words of one study, 'Modern military technology is not advanced, it is decadent.'¹⁷ The decadence of this technology is evident in South Africa as it is in those states of the Third World which have industrialised since the Second World War. This decadent industrialisation is interconnected to the rhythm of capital accumulation in the capitalist centres. Secondly the licensing arrangements and reliance on foreign imports create conditions for the direct military intervention and/or collaboration with the advanced capitalist countries. For these reasons all the major Western countries collude to break the UN arms embargo against South Africa. This was clearest in the way in which the South Africans built up a capacity to produce nuclear weapons.

Through financial, military, scientific and cultural links with the West, the South African capitalist class survives. Under state protection South African capital has blossomed and the effect of the political hegemony of the ruling class has generated monopoly conditions. This concentration and centralisation has led to the situation where four of the large monopolies control over 80 per cent of the shares on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange. Of these four, Barlow Rand is heavily involved in the military-industrial complex, producing armoured vehicles and electronic and communication equipment originally under licence from Marconi, a British military electronics firm.¹⁸

The degree of monopolisation in South Africa means that the potential for the shift from monopoly control to popular control could be greater than anywhere else in Africa. For this reason those who organise for the transition to a non-racial society pose the question of the socialisation of the ownership of the means of production, beyond the simple nationalisation of existing industries.¹⁹ Faced with the clear

¹⁷ *The Baroque Arsenal*, p 1.

¹⁸ See *Register*, June-July 1986, pp 12-16.

¹⁹ Robert Davies, 'Nationalisation, socialisation and The Freedom Charter', paper presented at 'The Southern African Economy After Apartheid Conference', York University, 1986.

and developing consciousness of the workers, the South African capitalists seek reform so that ideological control can take the place of physical coercion. For this reason the class which was nurtured under monopoly conditions now speaks of free enterprise. Free enterprise never existed in South Africa, because the racial barriers to accumulation were always present. This debate on free enterprise is of interest however in so far as this is part of an overall reform process which would want to see an Africanisation of political power. This would then provide for the release of white labour from the military to be available for industry. The integration of Africans into the military has so far been articulated under the homelands policy and the SADF has established nominally separate military forces in the so-called independent bantustans. But the representatives of the Progressive Federal Party, the party of reform, seek a process where blacks would provide the bulk of the manpower for the army. In early 1984 the parliamentary defence spokesperson for the PFP argued:

We need to consider the advisability of scaling down the conventional forces and/or replacing them with a highly mobile, full-time professional army. This together with national servicemen drawn from all groups who enjoy full citizenship rights ought to provide sufficient manpower to counter the objective threats against our freedom and sovereignty.²⁰

At the core of the present discussions on federalism and other political reform strategies is the concern to maintain the present military industrial complex, releasing white manpower for industry while recruiting larger numbers of Africans, and at the same time maintaining the bantustans.

The need to expand the armed forces

The totality of the crisis of the South African society can be seen on all levels. The political and economic crisis has forced the oppressed to register their opposition in the factories, in their communities, in the schools and in the fight against the SADF occupying the townships. That the strategic initiative is in the hands of the oppressed can be seen from the way the state has resorted to the use of more and more force, yet being less able to resolve the contradictions. Two states of emergency and tens of thousands of troops deployed in the townships have failed to stem the resistance and the armed struggle. Faced with this

²⁰ Quoted in *Armed Forces*, July 1984.

unprecedented resistance the coherence of the ruling class has fragmented so that the economic and political crisis is now compounded by an ideological crisis.

No ruling class rules simply by force. There must be a coherent ideology to motivate those who carry the arms to defend the state. The ideas of white superiority, of separate development and of civilising Africans are now dysfunctional for the reform process necessary to give capital a new lease of life. An army trained in conventional war and counter-insurgency warfare is confronted by the very people that it is supposed to be protecting. In this battle the state finds that it cannot cope with the requirements of a modern army and its weapons needs when race constraints prevent the mobilisation of skilled labour from among the black population. The SADF is fighting on too many fronts, in the ungovernable townships, in occupied Namibia, in Angola and at the same time destabilising the other Frontline states. Over-stretched and weakened by the unabating industrial and political struggles inside South Africa the South Africans have called on the Pentagon to give more open support to the perceived war against communism. Some support was offered in the guise of support for UNITA but the heightened sanctions debate in the West has isolated the South African racists.²¹

Neither covert nor overt Western military support could solve the problems of the apartheid war machine. Once the South African defence structure was organised on the basis of the mechanised battlefield the SADF needed the complete mobilisation of the citizens. In the absence of majority support the manpower requirements of the army had a negative effect on industry, the military and the state. This crisis is already evident in the shortage of skilled labour for industry—job reservation excludes black workers from the higher skilled jobs and the military machine enmeshes every white male in some form of military service from the ages of eighteen to fifty-five. With the addition of the various police and armed administrative functionaries, up to 25 per cent of the active white male population is directly under arms to defend apartheid. The *Military Balance*, produced by the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London, estimated the total mobilisable force in 1986 at 404,500, with a standing force of 83,400

²¹ This came in the form of US support for UNITA. However UNITA did not have the logistics or command structure for the kind of aid offered by the US military. In this case the support was a hardly concealed support for South Africa. For details of the links between UNITA and the South African armed forces, see *Destructive Engagement*, pp 73–111.

which includes 53,000 conscripts. Alternative figures from the International Defence and Aid Fund concluded that the total mobilisable strength of the SADF in 1986 was 639,000 with a standing force of 178,000 (including the bantustan forces and the South West African Territorial Force). With the addition of the various police forces the total strength of the apartheid armed forces was calculated at 755,000.²²

No society with 4.5 million whites can continuously sustain an armed force of this size when the majority of the population is in the midst of armed resistance. Not even the attempt to rationalise the competing demands of industry and the military through a Defence Advisory Council solved the problem of labour and skills shortages, although it exposed the way many of the luminaries of the corporate world were incorporated in defence planning. The military permeates all areas of society and 'the SADF has become an important source of semi-permanent bureaucratic labour. In the Department of Inland Revenue, SADF accountants are active as sales tax inspectors and in the Department of Cooperation and Development military doctors and agronomists have emerged as important, if seconded elements in the process of "homeland" development.' The placing of soldier-teachers in the schools also reflects the depth of the militarisation of the state and the society.

Police and army violence, and the states of emergency all pointed to the struggle for a new system as the decadance of militarism has degenerated with mass shootings at Langa, Mamelodi, Alexandra and Soweto. The pressures for reforms led to a new constitutional dispensation in an attempt to win allies among non-whites and to solve the manpower crisis by providing the ideological legitimacy for greater co-optation of Indians and Coloureds in the armed forces. But the inbuilt racism of the society acted as a disincentive. By the end of April 1986, after massive recruitment drives, the South African army comprised 76 per cent whites, 12 per cent Africans, 11 per cent coloured and 1 per cent Indian. A growing campaign of war resistance has sapped the morale of the SADF as the cohesion of the white laager has come under pressure.

The racism and bigotry unleashed by apartheid means that many whites recoil at the idea of arming Africans. This historical fact was grasped by George Orwell:

²² 'South Africa's military capacity', p 3.

There is one thought which every white man thinks when he sees a black army marching past. How much longer can we go on kidding these people? How long before they turn their guns in the other direction?²³

This fear continues to permeate the reformers, so much so that it was only in 1986 that the first black officers were commissioned. Apart from the black chaplains whose task it is to minister to the spiritual needs of the blacks mobilised in the army, the officers even of the elite black 21 Battalion and the regional ethnic armies, are white. Kenneth Grundy in his book, *Soldiers Without Politics: Blacks in the South African Armed Forces*, has documented the contradictory nature of the place of Africans in the armed forces. In the struggle to dismantle apartheid more studies will be necessary not just to quantify the numbers of Africans but to identify those social forces now in the SADF capable of revolting against the system. Previously in other post-colonial societies there was an explicit plan to build local armies complete with socialisation in Western military academies to ensure that Africa remained within the military culture of Western capitalism. Zimbabwe is the most recent example—a British Military Training Scheme was brought in as a last ditch effort to retain the weapons system and military integration into Western Europe and North America. With the concrete lessons of Zimbabwe, the reformers are pushing for more Coloureds and Indians to be trained for the air force and the navy. The effort to Africanise the SADF has reached the furthest point in occupied Namibia with the swift Africanisation of the SWATF. The core of the SWATF, 911 Battalion, is the most integrated of the units of the SADF. And here the haste is precisely to present the future independent government of Namibia with an army ready to defend the interests of the West.²⁴

The creation of the SWATF was a result of the perception of the South African generals that the present form of apartheid in South Africa and Namibia will be transcended. The SADF has built up its forces in Namibia so that today Namibia is one of the most militarised countries on earth with one armed person to every twelve civilians. Yet even this level of militarisation has not been able to defeat SWAPO.

The present war in southern Africa, the resistance in the townships and the collapse of the reform process have been major steps towards liberation which will lead to the dismantling of the apartheid war

²³ Quoted in K Grundy, *Soldiers Without Politics: Blacks in the South African Armed Forces*, University of California Press, 1983.

²⁴ H Campbell, 'The decolonisation process in Namibia', *Maji Maji*, July 1986.

machine. The war in the streets has placed the issue beyond a debate on restructuring. By 1986 the direction of the struggle was manifestly towards the seizure of power. The President of the ANC asserted in January 1986:

Our strategic goal must be to shift the balance of strength decisively in favour of our struggle, through the further ripening of the revolutionary situation beyond the point where it is in fact able to govern. Thus, we must continue to make South Africa ungovernable and apartheid unworkable. . . . We must build our forces into an ever more formidable united mass army of liberation, an army that must grow in strength continuously, able to deliver and actually delivering bigger blows at every stage and fighting as a conscious force with its eyes firmly fixed on the goal of the destruction of apartheid and the transfer of power to the people.²⁵

The kind of liberation army built in the process of the war and the nature of the transfer of power to the majority will be central to the manner in which the SADF will be dismantled.

The transfer of power

The war in the region and the organised resistance of the popular forces in South Africa places that country in a revolutionary situation. With more repression, the youths and workers move from spontaneity to organised action. 'Comrades' taking over townships and the organised workers mobilising the workforce are the hallmarks of this transition period. Faced with this revolutionary situation, international capital has been seeking solutions based on the concept of power sharing and the assurance of guarantees for minorities.²⁶ These initiatives and the growing support for sanctions in the Western establishment are part of the recognition that every day of the survival of the Botha-Malan regime the alternatives towards popular power are sharpened. Capitalism is caught in a fundamental contradiction, for while there is need to further dismantle the racial manifestations of apartheid, it is this very form of exploitation which has guaranteed super-profits for local and foreign capital. Capitalism and warfare in South Africa have proved incompatible with democracy for the concrete conditions of reproduction have required force or the threat of force to alienate the labour power of Africans. It is for these reasons that the method of

²⁵ Message of the National Executive of the ANC on 8 January 1986, delivered by the President, O R Tambo.

²⁶ *Mission to South Africa*, The Commonwealth Report, Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1986.

defeating the regime is now interwoven with the question of how to dismantle the structures of warfare and repression. Already there is a growing discussion on the tactics and strategies needed for the seizure of power.²⁷

This discussion on people's war and insurrection is a necessary step in the process of enhancing resistance and must form the basis for rendering the apartheid war machine ineffective. But whether these efforts will lead to a defeat of the enemy or a negotiated settlement will in part rest on the strategies adopted by the liberation forces. Already there are formulations by Marxists and non-Marxists (on the development of the productive forces) which could justify the retention of the present capital-intensive armed structure, except that this structure would be Africanised. Secondly and more profoundly are the limitations and problems of the transition of a guerrilla army into an army for national defence. In the past many socialists tended to assume that a guerrilla army or a citizens militia could represent a new form of defence. But because the guerrilla army is simply insurgent and establishes a framework for countering established armies, the transition to new forms of defence has always been problematic. This has been so since the Bolshevik Revolution in 1917 and even more vividly so in southern Africa recently. Many questions will emerge in the process of dismantling the SADF but the fundamental issues will be decided by the political and military preparedness of the popular masses. This will be dependent on how the concept of a people's army takes root among the people and is actually translated in the ensuing battles. It is here that many lessons can be learnt from the debates among the popular forces of the different branches of the Sandinista army during the Nicaraguan Revolution.

In essence, the fact is that in a post-apartheid South Africa, imperialism could accept the integration of the fighters of the ANC into the present structure of the SADF. The form of warfare adopted by the ANC and the links to the popular organs of power now emerging in the townships will sharpen the options and limit the room for planning by imperialism. Guerrillas in all revolutionary situations have shown that without superior military technology they can win by forcing their opponents to fight under conditions which neutralise the technological advantages of sophisticated weaponry. A people's army which, after

²⁷ This discussion is most developed in *Sechaba*. Most of the issues in 1986 were caught up with this issue. See in particular May and March 1986. See also the *African Communist* No. 104, First Quarter, 1986.

liberation, seeks to use the existing military-industrial complex will be forced to maintain the despotism of the factory and the social relations where the workers subsidise the armaments sector.

Other experiences this century in the fight against oppression provide various examples of how to dismantle an old army, or incorporate freedom fighters in a new army. South African freedom fighters are faced with the need to build a people's army, yet one with the resources and skills to guard against external aggression after liberation. It is here that the recent revolutionary experiences in Cuba, Nicaragua and El Salvador become relevant to African revolutionaries. The Cubans were able to develop the concept of the civic soldier who was both capable of defending the community yet handle very sophisticated weaponry, and to be able to do this without becoming merely a cog in a mechanised weapon system. In Nicaragua the guerrilla army has developed into a fighting force capable of withstanding extensive military aggression sponsored by the USA. But the illuminating experience is that of El Salvador where the guerrillas and the popular organs have been able to form a common front to transcend the divisions which historically prevented the full mobilisation of the oppressed.

Conclusion

The debate and discussion on the future dismantling of the apartheid war machine is taking place at a time when the war in Southern Africa is at the centre of the world stage. The persistence of apartheid and war saps the energy of the people as the popular masses seek alternatives to poverty, job reservation, racial discrimination and the military destabilisation of the region. This reality calls for prompt action and at the same time issues new challenges to those in combat. For the transformation of South African society is inextricably bound up with the process of organisation and mobilisation of those with an objective interest in creating a new social order. The emergence of street committees, peoples' courts, popular forms of defence, and other grassroots forms of democracy has made the system ungovernable and unworkable. These committees which form the embryo of a new popular state after apartheid, have eroded the conventional methods of administration and forced the military to bare its fangs in the Joint Management Committees. How the embryo will develop will depend on the extent to which the broad masses are drawn into the process of the transfer of power.

All the social forces with a vested interest in the region recognise that the present structure of governance cannot survive. From the Georgetown Centre for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, to the South African Institute for Race Relations, to the Commonwealth leaders, there is a recognition of the fact that the South African struggle is in a revolutionary stage. The economic crisis, the flight of international capital (epitomised by Barclays, IBM, Kodak, etc), the sanctions campaign added to the continuous uprisings in townships, force international capital to seek alternatives to the present form of the subordination of labour. The military is central to non-economic forms of coercion in South Africa. This, plus the place of the military-industrial complex in the South African economy, makes the dismantling of the SADF central to a discussion of the society after apartheid. In this paper three broad possibilities were developed:

- 1) A reform process which could spread the ideas of capitalism among blacks, to bring about some devolution of power without changing the present relations of production. This would serve to release more black labour for the military.
- 2) The coming to power of the liberation movements with the integration of the present freedom fighters into the weapons system of the SADF (even with a diversified source of military capital).
- 3) The development of a popular army based on the popular alliance now emerging in the struggle. This army would combine the best traditions of guerrilla and conventional forces and draw from the experiences of other revolutionary transformations this century. Such a popular army would also progressively withdraw the subsidies of the working poor for the military-industrial complex and lay a programme for the conversion of some of the factories in the military-industrial complex.

Western capital and the local monopolists are the social forces with the greatest interest in a reform strategy to defuse the present militancy and political organisation among the people. Already in Western Europe and North America the transnational corporations have given notice of their intention to economically and politically dominate southern Africa. The West would like to be able to chart a reform process which excludes the broad masses from real democracy while paving the way for more overt military links between the West and a reformed South African military. For these elements the promotion of a black capitalist class with full economic participation would ensure the survival of the

monopolies and the subsidies of the working class to the mechanised army. However the racism which up to this point has excluded potential black capitalists from political power dictates that the process of creating African allies for the survival of capital has started too late to be of any *lasting* political significance in the society.

The tremendous energy being channelled into the present reform strategies from both inside and outside South Africa should sharpen the need for clarity by those in combat on the questions of insurrection, wearing down the enemy and the seizure of power. This discussion is carried on in the pages of *Sechaba* but there is a need for a more generalised debate on the processes involved and the centrality of the popular masses.²⁸ One section of international capital with foresight saw the implications of the developing popular organs of power. The report of the Eminent Persons Group (EPG) in 1986 did not shirk from mooting the question of the West supporting an ANC government in Pretoria. It was significant that this report made profound suggestions for the peaceful negotiation process.²⁹ There was no conception in the EPG report of a move away from capitalism even with an ANC led government. Moreover progressive elements within the South African struggle have raised questions on the experience of nationalisation in other Frontline states and how this nationalisation is far from the process of socialisation.³⁰

Socialisation with regard to the military in this context requires that a thorough discussion of the dismantling of the apartheid forces lays bare the implications for an African government. It was Lenin at the dawn of the Bolshevik Revolution who declared: 'the working class cannot simply lay hold of the ready-made state machinery and wield it for its own purposes.'³¹ Lenin was referring to the experience of the Paris Commune in 1871.

The concrete experiences of the transition period in post revolutionary societies have shown the potentialities towards retaining a lopsided military structure, particularly because by its very nature a revolution invites attack from the old and dying social forces. Beginning with the first socialist state, the Bolshevik Revolution had to fall back on the military-political traditions of the former Tsarist army in the very

²⁸ At a recent conference in the UK on the *Southern African Economy after Apartheid* there was a lively debate on 'workerism' and 'populism' in South Africa. Unfortunately none of the principle debaters were Africans.

²⁹ See *Mission to South Africa*, pp 130-41.

³⁰ R Davies, *op. cit.*, pp 17-25.

³¹ V Lenin, *The State and Revolution*, in *Selected Works—Volume 2*, Moscow: Progressive Publishers 1963, p 263.

process of consolidating Soviet power against internal and external enemies. These traditions had important consequences for the shaping of the socialist economy.³² The lessons learnt in building popular armies in Vietnam, Cuba and Nicaragua should form an indispensable part of the present anti-apartheid war.

Recent experiences in Africa from Algeria to Zimbabwe should show that the problem of the dismantling of the apartheid economy and military is not simply one of the seizure of power. Though this is essential to any programme of transformation, the very process of the capture of power must in essence determine how power will be transformed to the people. Liberation is not simply a military/technical question but is linked to the consciousness and political mobilisation of the broad masses. Unfortunately, the legacy of racist education ensures that the present intellectual debate on post-apartheid society does not sufficiently draw the African majority into a discussion of the full implications of the transfer of power and the retooling and conversion of the factories.³³

Monopoly capital in South Africa has created large scale production and on this basis the majority of the functions of the old state could be democratised and socialised in a very short period. This process of democratisation of the economy requires not only a discussion on the political reorganisation of society but a full analysis of the present structure of the society. And in South Africa it must also break the alienation embodied in the structures of the state as well as deracialise and demystify science and technology. This process must, in the words of Franz Fanon, lead to a 'situation where the people who take their destiny into their own hands assimilate the most modern forms of technology at an extraordinary rate.'³⁴ Questions of the place of nuclear energy, of the method of the mining of minerals, of the surpluses from agriculture and mining to industry, are all related to the discussion of the war machine. However, it is not in the scope of this short commentary to make meaningful statements on these questions. My effort has been to stimulate greater discussion and future research by the oppressed Africans in South Africa and their allies on the tasks ahead.

³² David Holloway, *War, Militarism and the Soviet State*, Working Paper No. 17, World Models project.

³³ The discussion on conversion is part of the discussion on demilitarisation in Western Europe. For one interesting study see *Lucas Aerospace: Turning Industrial Decline into Expansion*, Lucas Aerospace Confederation Trade Union Committee, London, 1979.

³⁴ Franz Fanon, *Studies in a Dying Colonialism*, New York: Monthly Review Press, 1965, p 145.

In South Africa the failure of apartheid has been compounded by the failure of the army to suppress the urban uprisings. The youths, students, workers and guerrillas have not been intimidated by the South African military arsenal. And not even the massive destabilisation campaigns nor the killing of Samora Machel have crippled the peoples of neighbouring states. These episodes in the war point to the way in which the ideas of social emancipation have taken root in southern Africa. African workers have given notice that they will not continue to subsidise their own repression. But the experience of popular alliances elsewhere in Africa during the decolonisation process shows to the working poor that even after liberation they can continue to subsidise their own repression by African governments. The health, safety and security of the working people plus the collective security for the oppressed Africans must be the basis for the creation of a new armed force after apartheid. The evolution of this force is tied up to the present struggle and to the process of the self emancipation and self organisation of the people.

South Africa: assistance and aid programmes

The economy of South Africa is the most developed as well as the most technologically sophisticated in all of Africa. With an annual per capita income of \$2,340,¹ a state-of-the-art transportation and communication system, a highly advanced medical sector, and a substantial nuclear capability, South Africa might appear to be a developed rather than an underdeveloped economy. That impression, however, is misleading.

Apartheid South Africa is perhaps the supreme example of the dualist pattern of economic development so often cited in development theory. The misleading nature of 'average income' figures is never more dramatically illustrated than by the bi-polar reality which lies behind South Africa's \$2,340 per capita income. This \$2,340 constitutes an averaging of an income of over \$8,000 for whites, with an average of less than \$1,000 per year for blacks. In the bantustans, where nearly half of the black population is obliged to live, per capita income is believed to average less than \$400 per year. The misleading aggregated statistic thus hides massive disparities. It also serves the convenient political purpose of enabling smug South African officials to brag that, economically speaking, blacks are much better off in South Africa than anywhere else on the continent.

When we disaggregate the income figure and focus on the actual plight of the people of South Africa, we soon understand why South Africa must be perceived as an underdeveloped economy, as an economy as desperately in need of restructuring and of development as any in the Third World. The eradication of the gross income disparity (and of the even larger disparity in wealth which inevitably lies behind it) will certainly be a priority goal of the post-apartheid South African government. The achievement of such a goal will require more than a little skill, plenty of luck, and ideally, a measure of foreign assistance.

In this paper we will explore what the role of foreign assistance might most appropriately be in aiding a post-apartheid South African government to build an economy which meets the needs of its people.

¹ Measured in gross national income per capita; The World Bank, *The World Development Report 1986*, London: Oxford University Press, 1986.

The opinion expressed in this article are the author's own and do not necessarily reflect those of the institutions with which he is affiliated.

This is, of course, a highly speculative exercise, for we cannot know when the post-apartheid South Africa will become a reality, the condition of the economy and of the national infrastructure which will survive the liberation struggle, the nature of the human relationship which will characterise the new society, nor the type of economic and political system which post-apartheid South Africa may choose to pursue. Lacking this information, we will assume that liberation occurs within the next five years and that it is achieved without serious destruction of the basic physical infrastructure.

Because these assumptions are heroic and somewhat optimistic, there is a high risk of understatement in any attempt to attach dollar figures to the aid recommendations. A Johannesburg in ruins is quite a different proposition from a Johannesburg intact, and its revitalisation would entail aid figures of a totally different order of magnitude. For this reason, no effort will be made to quantify foreign assistance needs.

Uneasiness in the aid relationship

Among the many massive tasks which the post-apartheid government will face are three² in which foreign assistance could be particularly helpful:

- 1) Ensuring that the economy continues to function while the reins of control are being transferred to new hands and while the grosser economic inequities of the past are being expunged.
- 2) Bringing the ten million bantustan residents into a more normal relationship with the national economy, whether by bringing productive agriculture and industry to the bantustan areas or by transferring the residents to more viable sites.
- 3) Harmonising the South African economy with those of its neighbours to create a viable southern Africa regional economy.

The installation of democratic government in South Africa will mean that twenty-three million black people, the vast majority of whom have been deliberately denied education and the training and experience of running a modern economy, will be enabled to assume control of a highly sophisticated and technologically advanced society. Having been

² If Namibia's independence is not achieved prior to the arrival of a post-apartheid South Africa, then it is likely Namibia will be a valid claimant for foreign assistance, alongside post-apartheid South Africa. This paper does not include a discussion of independent Namibia.

the victims of the most vicious exploitation and the most inequitable allocation of rewards devised by modern man, the black South Africans' post-apartheid demands for a redistribution of income and wealth are likely to be as strident as is their clamour for majority control of the government. To accommodate these demands while maintaining the operations of government and of the economy will be no mean feat.

Outsiders can be of invaluable assistance in this process though the aid relationship may initially be extremely perilous. In its relationships with outside creditors, the new South African government would likely be highly protective of its newly-achieved sovereignty and suspicious of possible subversion. There might be tension over any debt which might be outstanding at the time of the transition. In addition, the government would likely be sensitive to exploitation through profiteering and manipulation by the industrialised nations.

South Africa's past history of racial relationships may also interfere with an effective harnessing of Western finance and technical assistance to the cause of South Africa's development, the role of *race* being one of the two wild cards in the post-apartheid South African deck (although the African National Congress, the pre-eminent organisation in the liberation struggle, has steadfastly articulated a non-racial basis for the future of the country).

The other wild card is the role of *ideology*, which could become an even greater deterrent to a substantial foreign assistance linkage than race. In today's climate, both bilateral and multilateral assistance to Third World countries is increasingly conditioned on movement by the recipient country towards the free market model. This has intensified in recent years, as demonstrated by the increasing prominence of free market and privatisation requirements (a) among IMF conditionalities; (b) as part of the structural assistance loans increasingly favoured by the World Bank; and (c) as the principal criteria for determining eligibility for both United States and the World Bank's special programmes for African Development.

With capitalist ideology so clearly in control of most aid sources, the prospects for foreign assistance to a South African government whose embrace of capitalism is likely to be lukewarm at best, should not be exaggerated. It will not take long for the post-apartheid government to recognise that the tension between its own ideology and that of the foreign aid community may translate into much of the aid being made available on terms or for purposes which fundamentally conflict with its development plans. The less post-apartheid South Africa must depend

on foreign aid, the greater its freedom in choosing its own path of economic and social development.

At the same time it would be a dis-service to exaggerate the roles which race and ideology may play in post-apartheid South Africa. In this regard, the post-revolutionary experiences of Zimbabwe may provide some indication as to how post-apartheid South Africa may work with the West. Both of the socialist parties (Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) under Robert Mugabe and Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU) under Joshua Nkomo) were cautious in articulating economic development strategy.

The practice of socialism in Zimbabwe has been implemented over time. It is likely that the outcome of a more radical transformation, in which industries were nationalised in the absence of compensation, would have polarised the society along class and race lines; Zimbabwe appears to have successfully avoided such a path, and post-apartheid South Africa should be careful to do the same. In addition, the Zimbabwean experience reflects an awareness of the need for a sophisticated modern capitalist sector in which the retention of white skilled manpower was essential to the long-term transition to socialism.

Despite the dangers inherent in accepting foreign aid, however, the magnitude of the tasks which will confront the new government as it attempts to remedy the prevailing inequities will be such that assistance from external sources will be essential. But precisely *because* of the dangers, it is imperative that the post-apartheid government be extremely selective in seeking aid and in establishing the 'conditions' for that aid. In Table I, we have attempted to identify the principal aid sources and to suggest those types which might be most suitable for South Africa to consider seeking.

Selecting the proper type of aid

The concept of international aid emerged in the aftermath of the Second World War. The USA, finding itself to be the only operational major economy as well as the holder of the bulk of the world's sound monetary assets, realised that if the global trading system were to be restored and a stable international economy re-established, the shattered economies of Europe and Japan would have to be rebuilt. The funds could only come from the USA and thus the concept of foreign assistance was launched. As the European and the Japanese economies recovered, aid

was subsequently extended to the newly-emerging countries of the Third World.

Throughout most of the next forty years there was a general consensus that foreign aid made a useful and positive contribution both for donors and recipients. Had it been otherwise, the aid would have ceased or declined precipitously. There have, of course, always been sceptics in both the donor and the recipient camps, but the overall commitment to the aid concept has proved surprisingly hardy, and while aid levels have consistently fallen short of targets, the absolute level, at least in nominal terms, has not suffered noticeably.

In recent years, however, the cries of the doubters have become more strident and the terms on which aid is offered have become more stringent. The major donors have been increasingly obliged to face criticisms that the aid has not been effective and that it is contrary to the national interest (more precisely, contrary to the interests of certain groups within the nation). The recipient countries, on the other hand, have come to realise that foreign aid is a double-edged sword which can have substantial negative consequences for them. While outright refusal to accept foreign aid remains rare among Third World leaders, the increasing scepticism about it among the masses has led Third World politicians to exercise greater selectivity in accepting the aid offered them.

Despite this scepticism, the need for aid, especially in Africa, is enormous. With the possible exception of British policy in its West African and Caribbean colonies, traditional colonialism consistently pursued a myopic pattern of deliberate refusal to train and prepare its subject peoples for assumption of the reins of government. A comparable pattern has been pursued by South Africa where, despite the unmistakable indications that majority rule is moving inexorably toward realisation, the ruling whites have persisted in leaving the African population ill-prepared for assuming control. The mass black population enjoys meagre educational opportunities, and while the stream of college-trained blacks is growing, it is small compared to the needs.

At least equally handicapping to blacks has been the denial of any opportunity to acquire experience in running either government or major business units. (It is probably too late for gestures in this direction now, and any black who deigned to participate in them would risk being viewed as a 'collaborator'.) In fact, the business sector has probably offered more opportunities for advancement than has government,

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Table I: Major types of concessional and non-concessional foreign assistance

Type of Assistance	Typical Form	Principal Sources	Comment
<i>Education and Training:</i> Scholarships and bursaries to enable participants to acquire training within and outside the country.	Grant	Bilateral; PVO; WB; ADB	Necessary
<i>Technical Assistance:</i> Provision of teachers, trainers, experts, craftsmen and management personnel Provision of technical advice and evaluation of current practices.	Sale and/or Grant	Bilateral; PVO; WB; ADB; UNDP	Necessary
<i>Project Aid:</i> Financing construction of social and physical infrastructure; also available to assist in institution building.	Loan or Grant	WB; ADB; Bilateral; PVO; UNDP; IFAD	Desirable, if it can be tailored to needs of recipient rather than of donor
<i>Capital Transfer:</i> To buy out property and businesses of whites who want to emigrate.	Grant	Bilateral	A one-time political decision
<i>Structural Adjustment Loans</i> (including sectoral loans and export rehabilitation credits): loans linked to policy changes desired by the donor.	Loan or Grant	WB; ADB; bilateral	Useful for post-struggle rehabilitation. Can also be highly useful to SADCC if donors are willing to cooperate
<i>Commercial loans:</i> Conventional bank loans, extended either to the government or to the private sector.	Loan	Commercial banks	Acceptable for self-liquidating undertakings only

ASSISTANCE AND AID PROGRAMMES

Table I: continued

Type of Assistance	Typical Form	Principal Sources	Comment
<i>Private investment:</i>			
May take form of direct investment in a new or existing enterprise, or of purchase of debt or equity in a South African corporation.	Equity or Loan	ifc; transnational corporations venture capital firms; private corporations	Potentially very useful, but must be treated with great caution
<i>Military Assistance:</i>			
May take an infinite variety of forms. Entails heavy political cost.	Loan or Grant	Bilateral	Unnecessary. To be avoided
<i>Food Aid/Emergency Relief:</i>			
Humanitarian response, as appropriate, to specific crises.	Loan or Grant	Bilateral; pvo	Only as a last resort
Key ADB African Development Bank IFAD International Fund for Agricultural Development IFC International Finance Corporation PVO Private Voluntary Organisation UNDP UN Development Programme WB World Bank			

although such opportunities have been confined to relatively few firms.

The installation of a post-apartheid government will abruptly change this situation as the government will be under great pressure to Africanise critical sectors of government, much of the civil service, and at least a portion of the 'commanding heights' of the economy. Failure to do so would not only subject the government to serious criticism from its constituency but would also risk continuing sabotage (by unsympathetic incumbents) of its efforts to implement whatever policies and programmes it might hope to launch. Meanwhile, the strain placed on society by the need to replace experienced personnel with inexperienced people can itself become a major threat to the new government, for if the economy collapses then the new policies and programmes may prove unrealisable in any case.

It is in the resolution of this dilemma that foreign assistance may have its greatest role to play. In the remainder of this paper, we will examine the following types of concessional and non-concessional foreign assistance in terms of their likely availability and suitability in aiding the economic and social development of post-apartheid South Africa.

Education and training

Black South Africans have for many years benefited from a variety of education and training programmes supplied by foreign governments. Under these programmes, black South Africans have been able to pursue pre- and post-baccalaureate education both within and outside South Africa. Such programmes have become controversial in some anti-apartheid circles for fear that they could be construed as lending support to the apartheid government and because it was felt that blacks returning home with such training might be easily co-opted by the government.

Private industry has also sent a few of its blacks abroad for training and groomed them for middle management slots in the corporate world—a practice viewed with ambivalence by some of the more thoughtful anti-apartheid cadres. A prominent black labour leader, in expressing his opposition to such programmes, flatly declared to the author that 'We don't want the whites creating a black middle class here in South Africa. They're likely to become traitors to the struggle.' An official of the ANC, when apprised of this exchange, indicated that he was familiar with that perspective but that the ANC did not necessarily endorse it because it recognised the importance of having adequate numbers of blacks capable of assuming the controls in all sectors of the society.

The ambivalence which surrounds the issue of foreign financed education and training in apartheid South Africa will likely find little quarter in post-apartheid society, where the demand for education and training can be expected to exceed the supply. This would seem to be one area where foreign aid will be welcomed without dissent, and where donors can be supportive with a minimum of odious conditionalities. Even so, one can anticipate some disagreement as to where education of various types can best be provided—within South Africa, elsewhere in Africa or the Third World, or in other industrialised countries. These controversies are mild, and with the need so vast there should be plenty of candidates to utilise all resources which are made available.

Technical assistance

Closely related to the education and training type of aid is that of technical assistance. This generally refers to the provision of expatriate personnel to fill positions for which there are no available local persons with the requisite training and experience. These may be teachers, agronomists, engineers, economists, doctors, well-drillers—indeed experts in any occupation. They may be assigned as advisers to ministries or to parastatal organisations or they may actually be placed in operating positions in government or in the parastatal sector. Such teachers and experts have been used widely in independent Africa, perhaps most widely in the former French colonies (where they are referred to as ‘cooperants’).

Their utilisation has not been without controversy. Although these technicians are sometimes supplied under grant aid programmes, they are primarily a charge on the domestic economy, at least for their local currency costs. Such costs can be substantial, for these expatriates generally expect to be provided with a level of living and benefits which greatly surpass the local standard. Besides being costly, the foreign technicians are also frequently criticised for not being sufficiently in touch with and respectful of the local customs and aspirations. The competence of many of the expatriate technicians who have been sent to Africa has also been questioned, but all in all there would appear to be a consensus that technical assistance is on balance a valuable resource for a newly independent country.

Technical assistance is almost always available—bilaterally and via various UN agencies, the World Bank and private voluntary organisations. Donor governments are usually pleased to provide such aid because of the opportunity it affords for national penetration into the operation of the host country. For this reason, beneficiary governments are well advised to exercise some caution in accepting expatriate technicians, though when properly monitored, technical assistance can provide benefits far exceeding the costs.

The extent of South Africa's need for expatriate personnel will be determined by the manner in which South Africa's white community reacts to the introduction of majority rule. The 4.5 million whites are already running the South Africa economy in a productive fashion. Clearly it is not as productive as it might be were the black community not excluded from so many aspects of it. Nor is it as productive as it might be were the rewards more equitably distributed. But it is a productive and profitable economy as it stands, so the need for

expatriate technical assistance is somewhat artificial. Artificial because, if the white labour force could be miraculously transformed into egalitarian non-racists, eager to remedy the inequities of which they have long been the beneficiaries, there would be no need for expatriate technicians. The skills are already within the country.

Unfortunately, human nature assures us that no such miracle will happen, so a clearly defined need for external help will certainly exist. Because the white South Africans have few options in terms of emigration, it is likely that most will remain. However, even if we assume an accommodationist transformation in their racial attitudes sufficient to allow them to work harmoniously in a relationship of equality with blacks, a significant percentage of them will certainly balk if they are obliged to accept sizeable cuts in their standards of living.

Yet, such cuts are inevitable, a reality which explains the intransigence displayed by white South Africans toward the yielding of power to majority rule. Without the benefit of theoretical constructs or statistical analysis, the white South Africans have instinctively understood that their high standard of living is the counterpart of and directly traceable to the desperate poverty of South Africa's black millions. To attempt to shrink this disparity exclusively through a process of 'levelling up', (ie paying the newly-hired blacks in the public sector salaries equal to whites performing the same job) would destabilise the economy. In addition, it would transform the lopsided income disparity between the races into a dangerous disparity within the black population itself, gravely exacerbating a stratification which has already begun to appear. This could in turn lead to a potentially explosive situation.

One is left, then, with the option of 'levelling down', that is reducing the salaries and wages of whites employed in the public sector to a level which would be sustainable for both blacks and whites. But is this any less dangerous than the first option? Would the white labour force, embodying the skills, the technology, the experience which the economy must have to maintain its momentum, be willing to acquiesce to a massive cut in its income, especially within the climate of sullen defeat which would most probably characterise the white community's frame of mind in a post-apartheid South Africa? In the face of such circumstances, would the economy experience a decline in the productivity of the whites parallel to the reduction in their income, or perhaps worse, would the whites withhold their labour, whether by strike or by emigration?

Considering only the public sector, which is substantial in South Africa and includes such vital sectors as iron and steel, power, and transportation, the implications of a 'white strike' are enormous. Nor would the private sector be unaffected. Presumably, it could handle the wage and salary issue as it pleased; but if the government were really determined simultaneously to eliminate the dual wage system and enforce fair employment practices, private employers would face a dilemma similar to government's—to level wages upward or downward.

Foreign technical assistance could potentially play a major role in addressing this complex and delicate issue. Launching the post-apartheid economy on a sustainable growth path while introducing: (a) fair employment practices (Africanisation of the public sector), and (b) a unified wage and salary scale, will clearly entail a reduction in wages for many, perhaps for most, whites. Perhaps the only way to implement so drastic a change would be with external assistance in the form of either expatriate personnel or wage and salary supplements.

If the industrialised countries were to agree to make their nationals available to fill positions in South Africa, the local whites, seeing their leverage thus weakened, might be persuaded to acquiesce in wage and salary adjustments. (In Zimbabwe, for example, real income cuts were successfully imposed after independence with only a modest reliance on expatriate technical assistance.) There are real limits to the number of technicians available globally, so only a portion of South African whites could be replaced by foreign nationals in any case.

A more feasible and considerably less expensive tactic (although perhaps not properly classified as technical assistance) would be for concerned foreign governments to provide funds for a wage subsidy to those South African whites holding critical jobs for which black personnel were not available. These subsidies would supplement the newly-lowered wage and would enable the employee to continue to receive his former income, or a significant portion thereof, but only for a specified period. Additionally, he would be obliged to train an apprentice. The problem with such a scheme, however, is that the South African government could afford to bear these (essentially local currency) costs itself. But if it did so, it would bear the full onus of perpetuating a dual wage scale, a charge which would be softened somewhat were the wage supplement provided from abroad.

However it is achieved, maintenance of an effective work force at all levels of the society is a *sine qua non* for a successful transition to a healthy post-apartheid society. To the extent that the white South

African community is unwilling to aid and abet the transition to fair employment practices and a unified pay scale, then foreign expatriates will have to be relied upon to fill the gap and to train the new personnel.

Project aid

The type of aid which comes to most persons' minds when they hear the term 'foreign aid' is likely to be project aid—roads and bridges, dams and power plants, schools and hospitals. This is the most visible type of aid, absorbs the most money, and carries a certain dramatic flavour not enjoyed by other types of aid. Project aid has been particularly needed in Africa because the colonial governments built so little in the way of social and physical infrastructure there.

South Africa may find that its greatest need for project aid will arise from its effort to address the mammoth problem of creating employment and decent living conditions for roughly one-half of the black population which resides in the bantustans, or 'homelands'. Some ten million people—predominantly women, children and the elderly—currently strive to eke a living out of some of South Africa's least promising real estate, where they are confined by law.

In a few cases there are limited employment opportunities to be found in adjacent white communities, but in most bantustans the men must live elsewhere, in distant cities, and send home such money as they succeed in earning. The normalisation of this vast population's relationship to the larger society will be a task requiring economic wizardry of the highest order. The cessation of white rule will trigger a clamour to leave these dreary enclaves, but the impact of 10 million persons descending on South Africa's urban areas *en masse* could seriously disrupt the society. On the other hand, any restrictions on movement which smack of influx control would be socially distasteful, if not politically impossible in post-apartheid South Africa. Serious discussion and contingency planning should already be under way with regard to this highly explosive problem.

To the extent that any of the homelands have potential viability as areas for permanent habitation, efforts to retain the inhabitants and to create on-site livelihoods for them should be encouraged. Such programmes would be natural candidates for project aid, which can build the needed infrastructures and help to create the other community institutions (such as schools and clinics) which the people would require. Similarly, for those areas where a determination was made that no heavy concentration of population could be sustained, project aid

could assist in the development of promising alternative sites to which the displaced persons could be moved.

The single most frequent type of project aid currently being provided in Africa is aid to large-scale and subsistence agriculture, designed to encourage the more efficient production of food and cash crops. Historically, large-scale agriculture in South Africa has been highly successful, although it has fallen on hard times in recent years. The transition to majority rule will almost certainly entail some transformation in this sector, but it can conceivably survive without foreign assistance.

Peasant agriculture in South Africa, however, has low productivity and foreign assistance can play a significant role here—in research, in the improvement of current farmer practices, in land reform, and in provision of government services to agriculture. Such aid has become increasingly conditional in recent years though the conditions have generally not been too objectionable to the recipient community. The World Bank and the African Development Bank will almost certainly be in the forefront in making such aid available.

Capital transfer

During the Lancaster House negotiations surrounding the independence of Zimbabwe, the key Western powers agreed in principle to make a one-time capital grant to the new government to permit it to purchase land from large landowners and redistribute it to landless blacks. This programme was never funded and the inequitable distribution of land in Zimbabwe has continued as a cause for internal unrest.

In South Africa the situation is far more serious than it was in Southern Rhodesia. Although it is unrealistic to think of a fund of sufficient magnitude to buy out all large landowners, a fund of £1,000 million (pounds sterling), such as was proposed for Zimbabwe, would at least permit the post-apartheid government to begin to address the issue without having to tap its regular budgetary resources, which will be overtaxed in any case.

Western donor nations could justify their contributions to such a fund (as well as aid to post-apartheid South Africa generally) both on the basis of equity (returning some of the benefits which they have been enjoying) and of security interests. For at least two decades, investment in South Africa has yielded the highest, or nearly the highest, return on investment in the world. These profits are directly traceable to the

impoverishment forced upon the black population. They are an index of the exploitation which underlies the production of the gold, platinum, chromium, manganese and other minerals which the West considers to be so vital to its survival.

A massive capital transfer from the Western industrialised nations to the post-apartheid government offers a concrete means by which this historical injustice might be acknowledged, if not compensated for. It would, at the same time, help immeasurably in the peaceful restructuring of the distortions in South African society, thus contributing to stability, which is in the Western interest.

Conceivably there might be resistance to such a transfer on the part of the post-apartheid government, especially if it were tied to compensating the Boers for land rather than for structures. The government could reasonably argue that since the whites had effectively stolen whatever land they have, any effort to compensate them for it would be an unacceptable admission of the validity of their land titles. Thus the question of a buy-out fund along the lines proposed for Zimbabwe may be a non-starter within the South African context. It is a decision to be made by politicians, not by economists.

Structural adjustment loans

Structural Adjustment and other forms of policy-based lending constitute a relatively recent addition to the menu of foreign aid offerings. They are particularly associated with the World Bank, although the African Development Bank and some bilateral donors are beginning to find them useful as well. The growth in popularity of these loans can be traced to the efforts to deal with the Third World debt problem in the 1980s.

The inappropriateness of the IMF's short-term lending programmes for countries which were suffering from ills requiring major restructuring in their economies led to the popularity of policy-based types of loans. These loans provide for rapid disbursement of the funds and permit them to be used within a broad range of activity. The borrower must, however, agree to adopt certain mutually agreed policies which are meant to facilitate the necessary restructuring.

It is possible that post-apartheid South Africa may find itself in need of this type of assistance. The type of restructuring which the South African economy will need is rather unlike that which is currently being demanded of most Third World borrowers, but there is every reason to believe that the multilateral financial institutions would be forthcoming

with structural assistance loans for South Africa if the need were demonstrated.

South Africa's neighbouring states, are particularly suitable candidates for structural assistance lending, very largely because of the events associated with the struggle in South Africa. The BLS countries (Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland), for example, have had their trade and their monetary systems linked to South Africa so intimately that should the liberation struggle lead to a break in this linkage, it would entail a major readjustment of their economies. To varying degrees, the other front-line states face similar problems, relating to their dependence on South Africa for the transit and the transport of their imports and exports and for supplying a host of other services and products.

The creation of SADCC (the Southern African Development Coordinating Conference) was inspired by a desire to weaken the dependence of the SADCC members on their powerful racist neighbour. Several of these states are currently suffering extensive physical damage as a result of South Africa's destabilisation tactics and its efforts to destroy the ANC.

The reality of the southern African cone is that the SADCC countries enjoy natural linkages to one another and to South Africa, linkages whose encouragement can rebound to all parties concerned. Some of the linkages, however, are politically—rather than economically—based (ie, the North-South transportation corridors) and have been used as political weapons by the South Africans.

A post-apartheid South Africa should indeed be an integral part of a grouping of southern African states, unified for the avowed purposes of mutual reinforcement of their economic strengths. The current efforts of SADCC to provide alternative transportation routes via Mozambican ports for the land-locked economies of Zambia, Zimbabwe and Malawi are probably justified on economic grounds because of the shorter distances involved and also because such projects serve to open up the neglected hinterlands of these countries. For land-locked Botswana, however, it may be that trade can more efficiently be handled through the traditional South African arteries than by any likely alternative, although transit via Walvis Bay, or even Beira, deserves further exploration. Similarly, the South African Rand, now used by Lesotho and Swaziland but shunned by others, may in fact be a logical currency to use throughout the SADCC region at some future date. The treatment of the half million black expatriate miners currently employed in South

Africa has strong implications for several SADCC nations (assuming President Botha has not already expelled them), and the economic viability of Lesotho without direct or indirect support from South Africa may be brought into bold relief. Clearly, democratisation of South Africa will have major ramifications through the entire region.

These future relationships between the economy of South Africa and those of her neighbours is of such over-riding importance for the SADCC nations that it would be extremely useful for the major South African liberation groups to assign a permanent delegate/observer to SADCC so as to begin the important liaison work which can pave the way for a harmonious and effective integration of South Africa into SADCC.³ Past experience with regional organisations has already clearly demonstrated the difficulties which arise from major disparities between the size, wealth, or level of development of the members of such organisations. The problem of Kenya in the (now defunct) East African Community and of Nigeria in ECOWAS are two well-known African examples. Because the South African economy will inevitably overshadow those of its neighbours, under black rule just as it has under white rule, the integration of South Africa into SADCC promises to be one of the most delicate transitions which post-apartheid South Africa will be called upon to make.

Early participation of black South African representatives in SADCC's deliberations would permit that organisation to address the problem in a preliminary way without waiting until majority rule is actually achieved. In the aftermath of liberation, the availability of substantial Structural Adjustment lending to SADCC and its members can provide additional lubrication to facilitate the emergence of a harmoniously integrated sub-regional economy for the southern African cone.

Commercial loans: private investment

The extent of the financial linkages between South Africa and the industrialised nations is already massive, though the liberation struggle is precipitating a major shrinkage of foreign lending and investment within South Africa. Nonetheless, the international lending community is sufficiently familiar with the South African economy that the foundation clearly exists for a swift resumption of commercial lending and investment once an attractive political climate is restored to the

³ The same may be said for Namibia, whose admission to SADCC would bring the organisation's membership to eleven (ten if Namibian independence preceded the democratisation of South Africa).

country. The creation of such a climate will not be a simple task, however, and in its broadest sense it depends upon virtually everything else the post-apartheid government does in both the political and the economic spheres (as well as upon the status of South Africa's credit when the transition takes place). Commercial loans are more easily obtained than foreign investment, although the continuing crisis created by the Third World debt overhang has unquestionably cooled the ardour of the international lenders toward Third World borrowers in general. At the same time, Third World borrowers have presumably learned something from recent history as well, such as the maxim that the use of commercial loans should be reserved for self-liquidating purposes only. With a modicum of good judgement on the part of both lenders and borrowers, there should be ample scope for the use of commercial credit in post-apartheid South Africa.

The case of foreign investment is somewhat more complex. The extent to which a post-apartheid South Africa will be amenable to foreign private investment is not clear at this time. The Freedom Charter of the ANC is not explicit on this point, and it is probably an issue which has not yet been definitively dealt with by the black leadership. Even if the official position of the government is favourable toward foreign private investment, the experience in other African countries has been that foreign private investment is viewed with some suspicion, and not without reason in many cases.

While South Africa has arguably not endured a colonial experience similar to that of the rest of Africa, the foreign private sector is probably not held in higher esteem in South Africa than it is elsewhere on the Continent. There has been little involvement of the foreign private sector in the liberation struggle, and except for the few companies which have genuinely embraced the Sullivan Principles,⁴ there has been little to distinguish the policies of the foreign private sector from those of the other oppressive sectors of the apartheid society.

Foreign capital came to South Africa because the return on investment was very attractive there. These overseas investors had no difficulty in closing their eyes to the inequitable political, economic, and social reality which characterised South Africa. Indeed, they were well aware that the reason they enjoyed above average earnings was precisely because the powerlessness of blacks permitted their labour to

⁴ The Sullivan Principles were formulated in 1977 to set standards for US companies operating in South Africa. They are a private initiative of Reverend Leon Sullivan, a director of General Motors.

be grossly exploited for the benefit of capital. More recently, foreign capital has recognised that the apartheid system is no longer in its best interest and has spoken out against it. Whether this history will influence the receptivity of post-apartheid South Africa to foreign private investment remains to be seen. This issue will undoubtedly be the source of tremendous tension during the early years of post-apartheid South Africa.

There is, at present, a move afoot to create a black-controlled entity to take title to those properties being divested by foreigners as the situation within the country continues to deteriorate. If such a movement should establish itself—and the odds are heavily against it—ownership of a number of significant foreign-owned firms could pass into black hands prior to liberation and a promising base be laid for post-apartheid expansion of these firms on a joint-venture basis. Clearly, the entire matter of foreign investment must await the unfolding of the struggle, for the manner by which liberation is achieved is likely to be a major factor determining the flavour and ideology of the new regime.

Balance of payments financing

From time to time even the best managed economies are likely to encounter liquidity problems in their international accounts. The IMF was created to provide the funds necessary to steer countries through such temporary disequilibria in their balance of payments. In recent years, the IMF has been perceived as an ogre by some Third World nations due to the conditionalities which it has imposed on its borrowers. These conditions have often incited social unrest, rioting, and even overthrow of governments.

The IMF deserves much of the criticism which it has received insofar as its demands on clients have often been inappropriate, excessive, and over-concerned with ensuring that the borrower service his debt while reflecting an insufficient concern for the welfare of the populace. In defence of the IMF, however, it should be noted that the recent and current indebtedness of many of the Third World countries reflect problems of insolvency rather than of liquidity. The IMF was never designed to deal with problems of insolvency.

South Africa will almost certainly encounter balance-of-payments deficits and liquidity shortages, and at such times it should freely call upon the IMF to assist it on reasonable terms. The new South African government should studiously avoid insolvency. However, should

insolvency occur, South Africa should not seek assistance from the IMF (as it is currently structured). Structural Adjustment Loans (SAL), discussed earlier, would then be appropriate. It is to be hoped that by then a suitable international agency will have been created to help countries in distress to make the adjustments necessary to return them to a satisfactory growth path.

Military assistance

Military assistance is often the type of foreign aid most readily available to Third World countries. It takes many forms: outright provision of weapons and related hardware; training of military and paramilitary personnel; construction of roads, telecommunications and other infrastructures; and even the provision of balance-of-payments support—allegedly to counter inflationary pressures which may be created by other parts of the military aid programme.

It is difficult to foresee any serious external military threat to a post-apartheid South Africa. Certainly none of South Africa's neighbours would be in a position to threaten her, nor is it likely that such a threat would come from outside the continent. On the contrary, a heavily-armed post-apartheid South Africa could be cause for concern to its neighbours.

It is, of course, not unreasonable to expect post-apartheid South Africa to be confronted with internal dissension. The containment of internal dissension can best be handled through democratic procedures or through minimally armed civilian police forces. No case can be made for the use of military forces for the suppression of either internal or external threats to post-apartheid South Africa. Given the myriad dangers which are an inseparable part of foreign military assistance, it is hoped that South Africa will not accept this type of aid.

Food aid/emergency relief

South Africa is currently a self-sufficient producer of food and, indeed exports food products. Unless the liberation struggle devastates the agricultural sector, there should be no need for food and emergency relief for post-apartheid South Africa. If the need arises, such aid should be carefully monitored and held to a minimum. In the current situation of global food surpluses, food aid is almost too readily available, with the attendant danger of the recipient developing an excessive dependency on food imports. Food self-sufficiency in the entire southern Africa cone is a necessary underpinning to a sound and

independent economy in that region, and while most of the countries in the region have the potential for food self-sufficiency, South Africa is well placed to fill the gaps in the short run.

Conclusion

The extent to which foreign assistance will be necessary for creating and maintaining an economically sound and growing post-apartheid South Africa will depend largely on the manner by which the post-apartheid society is achieved. If majority rule comes to South Africa with the races genuinely committed to creating an equitable society, and without extensive human and physical destruction resulting from a full-scale civil war, then the outlook for a viable and healthy post-apartheid economy is encouraging. Extensive foreign assistance will not be needed.

That is not a very realistic scenario, however. Even if civil war and massive physical destruction can somehow be avoided, it overtaxes one's imagination to expect that the mass of white South Africans will voluntarily cooperate to keep the economy functioning at maximum efficiency while simultaneously acquiescing to the elimination of their privileged status. Consequently, there is likely to be a need for foreign assistance. This need will be increased, the greater the destructiveness of the liberation struggle and the greater the recalcitrance of the whites toward acceptance of their new status.

The South African economy has consistently demonstrated its ability to generate a healthy surplus even during periods of moderate social unrest, although the events of the 1980s have on occasion shrunk the growth rate to near stagnation levels. Its commodities-based economy is highly diversified, and gold—its major export item—appears to have established a floor in the neighbourhood of \$300 per ounce. However, the markets for its strategic minerals may or may not remain strong. One effect of the sanctions movement may be to drive the industrialised countries to find substitutes or alternative sources for South African platinum, chromium, and manganese, thus resulting in some permanent loss of markets for South Africa. On the other hand, sanctions may drive the industrialised countries to seek more temporary solutions, such as drawing down their stockpiles, opening/reopening high cost mines, and recycling existing metal. This would result in a sizeable pent-up demand awaiting the removal of sanctions.

Even assuming that the demand continues for South Africa's

traditional exports, there will be a need for South Africa to expand its manufacturing sector if it expects to speed up the growth of its economy sufficiently to achieve its presumed social and economic targets. The minerals sector is not likely to experience massive growth unless war breaks out among the industrialised countries. Simply regaining an efficient level of operations in mining, mineral processing and shipping may prove to be problematic. Presumably, these operations will have been eroded moderately if the liberation comes relatively peacefully, or eroded seriously if there is extensive warfare. In the latter case, the need for extensive foreign assistance will be virtually inescapable.

Much the same may be said for the other sectors. The need for foreign aid in a form other than technical assistance (and, of course, education and training) will depend on the severity of the destruction and the ability of the economy to return to previous levels of foreign exchange earnings. Some project aid may well be needed.

Improving the living conditions of the 10 to 11 million blacks now confined to the bantustans and integrating them into a more normal relationship with the national economy will be the most massive and complex task which post-apartheid South Africa will face. It is in this undertaking that foreign assistance will be most needed. Statistically, South Africa is a food-surplus country, although with so much of its population under-fed and under-nourished, one is obliged to question this characterisation. It is perhaps more correct to call it a net food exporter. Since a post-apartheid South Africa will almost certainly seek to eliminate the most egregious instances of hunger and malnutrition, this alleged food surplus will probably disappear in the domestic market. If project aid is sought for the remediation of the bantustan problem, the dollar figures could become astronomical merely for providing minimum adequate nutrition, health care, education and housing for so many people.

The Frontline States, most of which have suffered mightily at the hands of South Africa because of their support for the liberation struggle, deserve to be included in the planning for economic rejuvenation of post-apartheid South Africa. The SADCC countries are presently on record as experiencing in excess of \$2,000 million in damages annually at the hands of South Africa.⁵ This figure is believed to be an understatement, and some estimates go as high as \$7,000

⁵ 'An illustrative assessment of the cost of destabilisation on the member states of the Southern African Development Coordination Conference,' pages 1 and 2, a SADCC paper submitted to the OAU summit, Addis Ababa, July 1985.

million. To help compensate these beleaguered nations for their sacrifices on behalf of South African liberation, the developed countries and the multilateral financial institutions should be generous in providing them assistance. Together with South Africa and Namibia, this cluster of countries constitutes a coherent sub-region whose economic integration can offer substantial benefits to all of its members.

The recession and stagnation which has characterised most of the global economy during the 1980s has sharply restrained foreign assistance spending by the developed countries. When the Third World's debt servicing obligations are considered, net foreign aid flows to many developing countries, including some of the neediest, are negligible and in some cases negative. There is, thus, little reason to expect that the foreign aid made available for post-apartheid South Africa will be large, regardless of the magnitude of the need. Because of its high per capita income, South Africa may not easily qualify for the more concessional types of aid such as that offered by IDA (International Development Association, the soft-loan window of the World Bank) and the ADF (African Development Fund, the soft-loan window of the African Development Bank). It may have to settle for the less concessional loans of the World Bank and the ADB, together with bilateral aid funds, commercial loans and private investment. Such indebtedness should be incurred with considerable caution. Fortunately, the underlying solidarity and resiliency of the South African economy should enable it to thrive reasonably well on its own resources and productive efforts without becoming overly dependent on foreign financial and technical assistance. All the more reason for the liberation to be achieved with as little destruction and ill-will as possible. But, of course, the struggle must be won regardless of what the cost is.

From apartheid to neocolonialism?

Within the next decade the South African apartheid system will join German nazism and Italian fascism in the history books. Like them it will be used as an illustration of the horrific aberrations that the manipulation of nationalism can produce in the hands of a threatened class in control of a powerful state apparatus. But what is the mainstream that South Africa will return to or join?

Will it be liberal capitalism in its current international form, in which the market (aided by the IMF) sets the same rules for landless peasants as for Silicon Valley entrepreneurs? If so, the operation of 'the imperialism of free trade' will bring most of South Africa's population into the same condition of exploitation as the majority of the Third World's masses; except for the rising bourgeoisie, the presently exploited will continue to be exploited, but there will no longer be an identifiable enemy to fight. Instead the enemy will be abstractions like 'market forces', 'international capitalism', or 'neocapitalism'.

Or will it be a form of centralised state socialism, similar to that in Eastern Europe, which has proved itself as a method of bringing rapid fundamental structural change and economic growth to backward or exploited societies, but equally has shown itself incapable of meeting either democratic or economic aspirations at higher levels of development.

Or is there a democratic socialist alternative adumbrated in different ways for short periods in Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, Chile, maybe at Mondragon in Spain, in which the market is partially displaced or controlled by economic democracy in a decentralised planning system? The outlines of such an alternative system are described in the article by Innes and Gelb, whose overall thrust we fully support. The purpose of the present article is to probe, largely in the dark, into the domestic and foreign social forces that may develop to make such a transition possible—or alternatively, (and more likely), to retain South Africa for neocolonialism. First, we need to outline the main dimensions of neocolonialism that distinguish it from formal colonialism on the one

hand and meaningful economic and political independence on the other.

What is neocolonialism? How can it be avoided?

An imperial power that loses colonies from which it had previously been extracting economic benefits will naturally seek to continue the process by other means. Usually the process of decolonisation opens the area to other imperial powers which had previously been wholly or partially excluded. 'Free trade' under which the new nation can apparently for the first time strike free bargains in a market, causes many to deny the reality of neocolonialism, but although there are likely to be some benefits as compared with earlier naked exploitation, the poverty and structural characteristics of most ex-colonies makes a mockery of market freedom.

This is most simply demonstrated by inquiring how the economic structure of such a country arose: Cuba, for instance, over-specialised in sugar through the will of colonial masters in Spain and later the USA. An independent country would have tried to industrialise on the basis of the sugar revenues (which in the event went to Spain). Collectively, the capitalist countries have an interest in maintaining cheap supplies of primary commodities for their industries. Whether or not Prebisch was correct in holding that there is a structural reason why the terms of trade should secularly turn against primary producers, the fact is that since the end of the great European empires, most of the commodities produced by the erstwhile colonies have declined greatly both in real value, and in relation to manufactured goods. A unit of Zambian copper or Ghanaian cocoa now buys half the number of tractors it did at independence. And the trend continues: in 1986 the dollar price of manufactured exports from the eight major OECD exporters rose 17 per cent (and is expected to rise a further 5 per cent in 1987); meanwhile the dollar prices of Third World commodity exports declined 2 per cent (with a further 4 per cent expected in 1987).

It is not necessary to claim that neocolonialism is a conspiracy on the part of imperialist powers that consciously set about producing such results. The outcome however is probably much the same as if they had, for we observe that we are dealing with ex-colonies whose economic structures were usually formed expressly to supply cheap commodities to the imperial power (so that this is what they are *currently* most efficient at doing); that they have been thrown into a market which is

either controlled by a few transnational corporations (TNCs), or in which they are bidding each other down¹ and finally that 'international' organisations (in reality organisations of the advanced capitalist powers), insist on a package of inappropriate policies from which we will focus on three. These require first, the pursuit of static comparative advantage (ie continue producing the same primary commodities as before, in competition with other poor countries) instead of 'inefficient' industry; second, a respect for property rights (ie allow continued profit extraction by TNCs); third, a reduction in subsidies, controls, and state interference generally (ie allow market concentration and inequality to increase, partly to the benefit of an internal bourgeoisie, itself heavily compromised by association with the main beneficiary, the foreign traders and owners).

This is necessarily (in the space available) a highly schematic and generalising account; but it is near enough the truth to provide us with an illuminating contrast to the situation which has arisen in those countries which have managed to escape from neocolonialism, most notably those in Eastern Europe, Japan and the so-called NICS (newly industrialised countries). In *all* these cases (sometimes directly contrary to the World Bank/IMF message), there was a deliberate attempt to transcend existing comparative advantage (which for them also was originally in the primary and labour-intensive products), which required protection of the new (inefficient) industries for long periods; second, there was a relatively slight role for foreign direct investment (near zero in Eastern Europe, Japan and South Korea), and recourse to other forms of financing (grant aid or debt) which have closed instead of open-ended implications for debt-servicing, and avoid the illicit additional drain of surplus through transfer pricing; third, (and this is also a condition for the first two), a central role for the state in changing the economic structure away from the underdeveloped mode to an industrialised one, through planning the development of capital goods industries, picking winners in export industries, protecting domestic industry and subsidising exports, directing investment or making its own investments in default.

South Africa, having had a high level of settlement from the imperial powers, and formal independence since 1910, naturally does not fit exactly into the standard neocolonial pattern. Indeed the high level of state involvement in the economy, and its attempts to force

¹ Small quotas into Europe hardly compensate even for the ending of the exploitative contracts with the former colonial master.

industrialisation, invite comparison with the NICs. However, whether because of apartheid, or for whatever reason, the structural changes have largely aborted, leaving South Africa still heavily dependent on exports of primary commodities, with an inefficient industry, and with a relatively high level of dependence on foreign capital.

In summary, we are maintaining that if the future independent South Africa is to escape neocolonialism, it needs both highly developed internal social forces capable of recognising and meeting the challenge it will face from international capital (as well as from its internal allies), and an international environment in which it has some leverage, either through the protection of another power (the role that the Soviet Union played for Cuba) or through the sort of special dispensation that was granted to South Korea and Taiwan as show-cases (although there seems no reason why South Africa should command such special concessions). It will also need a strong central government with a clear plan for raising the integration and efficiency of industry and reducing dependence on gold and other primary exports by promotion of manufactured exports. The role of foreign capital will also need close scrutiny, although its earlier dominance has already been somewhat reduced by economic nationalism; nevertheless, control of investment decisions—in terms of both what technologies are to be employed and what products are to be made—is not a matter that is left largely to the decision of outsiders of world markets in any state that has any pretensions to economic independence.

The present balance of forces inside South Africa

If we are to discuss realistically how any transition may proceed, our starting point must be the present disposition of forces inside South Africa. This is not to suggest that during the period of transition to a liberated society the present balance will not be radically transformed, but it would be rash to assume that free South Africa will begin with a *tabula rasa*; depending on the actual scenario there will be some traces of the existing structures which will continue to exert influence over events.

Given the small size and underdevelopment of the South African economy, dependence on external markets for realisation of surplus value has been inevitable.² By restricting the internal market, apartheid

² Although its GDP of about US\$50 bn is large in African terms, it is very small in world terms, about half that of Belgium, for instance.

has slowed down forces reducing dependence, thereby slowing the gradual growth of an indigenous capitalism. On the other hand, within the limits set, Afrikaner capital, both through the state and increasingly at the private level also, has succeeded in challenging and displacing a proportion of English capital in a process that may have lessons to teach to other national capitalisms. This dramatic growth has not, however, been matched by a proportionate decrease in foreign dependence: the economy's main motor is still external demand, with exports accounting for 30 per cent of GDP (1980–85), and gold and other primary products providing 80 per cent (1985).

Despite this, South Africa has still generally run heavy current account deficits with the developed world, covered partially by its surplus with neighbouring states, partially by foreign capital inflows. The result of the latter has been a rising invisible balance, which has prompted moves to reduce the foreign share in key industries, especially banks, which have been required to reduce their foreign shareholding progressively to below 50 per cent. In the past year or two the outflow of foreign capital has become significant,³ especially on the part of US companies.

A rough token of real independence would be given by the existence of an internationally competitive industrial sector. South Africa in fact has a large and quite well integrated industrial sector, but it is inefficient and still requires protection long after it could reasonably claim 'infant industry' status. Only about 11 per cent of exports are of manufactured goods (in 1985), and most of these have to be sold at about half the internal price. This situation can be attributed to the feather-bedding of industry allowed by gold exports, especially after the price rises of the early 1970s. Although Japan and the NICs were equally protectionist towards their industries during early phases of development, because they lacked any exportable primary products they were obliged to force the process of raising efficiency.

The economic power of capital in present-day South Africa is exercised through a number of different institutions with different implications for future attitudes to neocolonialism. Starting with those least dependent on the South African economy we can distinguish:

- 1) TNCs with firm foreign control of ownership and technology;
- 2) semi-indigenised TNCs, quoted on the South African Stock

³ In 1985 the private long-term capital outflow was over R500 mn; short-term outflows have been much greater, reflecting reduced access to export and other forms of short-term credit. South African Reserve Bank, *Quarterly Bulletin*.

Exchange, though with a 40-70 per cent of the shares still held by the foreign parent, sometimes with local partners, and usually with local management;

- 3) locally owned and controlled companies, including the big monopolies such as the Anglo American Corporation, often with widespread shareholdings in the white population and institutions, plus minority foreign holdings, and with increasing foreign investments of their own;
- 4) locally owned companies, including the Afrikaner-dominated institutions, with few foreign connections;
- 5) state and parastatal organisations, such as Iscor and Sasol and infrastructural institutions;
- 6) businesses owned by non-white South Africans.

The further down this list we go, the less is likely to be the interest in collusion with a neocolonialist outcome. In particular, we assume that the state apparatus, including the civil service and state industry and utilities will be rapidly Africanised in a process similar to that which occurred in Zimbabwe.

The key problem areas will be in the attitudes of companies in groups 3 and 4. In Zimbabwe, companies analogous to those in 4, have since independence developed marked economic nationalist characteristics, involving increasingly close relationships to government (which controls their foreign exchange allocations), and exhibiting hostility to foreign capital incursions and World Bank ideology (with the exception of the clearly beneficial export-revolving funds). To date little Africanisation has occurred in this group, but the dominant white (and formerly racist) owners and managers have found no viable alternative to cooperation with government, certainly not in any neocolonial direction. Group 3 companies are more problematic; are we to interpret the approach of Anglo American's Gavin Relly to the ANC as in this category, or, given the company's profound international connections, the first step in a concerted neocolonial programme?

At present, however, the South African economy is such that if liberation occurred without further changes it would be unlikely that neocolonial status could be avoided. The effect of sanctions, however, might, on the basis of Zimbabwean experience, *both* increase the ability of the economy to behave self-sufficiently, using trade and foreign investment for calculated benefits rather than live-or-die necessities, *and* reduce the integration of companies with the world economy. It was

widely predicted by orthodox economists that Southern Rhodesia would not survive sanctions for many weeks, as it was a smaller, less developed and even more externally dependent country than South Africa. In the event, even though exports fell by a half, GDP fell only one or two per cent in the first year, and after two years the economy entered on a rapid growth path averaging 7 per cent per annum for six years. Zimbabwean subsidiaries of foreign capital behaved (and to some extent behave to this day) as if they were local.

Might such an experience recur in South Africa? Although the economy is larger and more industrialised, it seems unlikely. We take up the possible effects of sanctions in the next section, but here it is appropriate to point out that Southern Rhodesia had two advantages denied to South Africa: two neighbouring countries that refused to apply sanctions, and that indeed were prepared to cooperate in disguising exports and ordering imports; and a relatively unmilitant black population that failed to mobilise for nearly a decade in face of intensified repression designed to guarantee white living standards. The drop in export earnings and consequent import capacity might therefore be much more serious in South Africa; and although the economy is widely diversified and manufacturing industry could (at a cost) meet most of the demands made on it for import substitutes, a range of critical bottlenecks could soon develop; indeed this is more likely in a more advanced industry used to availability of high technology from abroad, than in the mine-and-farm based industry of Southern Rhodesia.

How the transition to independence might affect the outcome

The trajectory of the transition is clearly unpredictable, but there are a number of (in themselves unlikely) extreme paths which may contribute elements to the actual path. Taking them in order of increasing length of the time taken for transition, there may be:

- 1) an immediate military imposition of majority rule by external forces;
- 2) immediate and effective economic sanctions which bring down the regime, leading to an ANC takeover;
- 3) an early negotiated settlement leading to a coalition government with power-sharing between the races on the Zimbabwe model;
- 4) a gathering revolution which would ultimately unite the country under a government involving the liberation movements and other internal forces such as the UDF, unions etc.

- 5) protracted violence from all communities, leading to independence in a chaotic, balkanised situation.

Let us look at the consequences of these briefly, before moving to a more detailed consideration of a more likely combination of several elements. On present evidence this combination would draw most from the last on the list, with progressively smaller contributions from earlier items.

A military solution?

There is clearly no prospect of an early military success by the liberation movements or an alliance of African forces because of their relative weakness as compared with the SADF; for political reasons there is also no serious prospect of military intervention by the West, which failed to take such action in the case of clear-cut rebellion in Southern Rhodesia. Hardly more likely is intervention by the Soviet Union or another East European power. Just conceivable, after a major massacre by the SADF (or use of atomic weapons), would be a combined operation, possibly under UN auspices. More plausibly, but again requiring a major South African crime (to guarantee at least acquiescence from the West), would be a Non-Aligned Movement intervention, with India and Nigeria carrying the burden.

If such action were quickly successful, with little damage to industry and infrastructure, it seems likely that the immediate post-independence situation would be one of 'pragmatism', with increasing Western influence (for financial reasons). The emphasis would be on rebuilding the economy and reconciliation between the races, with radicals being marginalised. Although Indian influence (with its experience of self-reliance and independent technological development), might colour many aspects of the political economy, it would remain a basically neocolonial context.

Rapid and successful sanctions

In the unlikely event of the key trading countries of North America, Western Europe and Japan resolving to institute economic sanctions of immediate, comprehensive and mandatory nature (all three adjectives being necessary), there would be a measurable chance of effective capitulation by the regime inside a year. Sanctions would have to be introduced *rapidly* to reduce the economy's ability to adjust (as happened in Southern Rhodesia over the period 1966 to 1970); they would need to be *comprehensive*, reducing the regime's ability to import, both through a reduction in its export earnings and through

direct prohibitions on exports to it, and through such measures as releasing a proportion of the world's gold stocks on to the market to cause a significant drop in the gold price (probably the only realistic way to prevent the rapid growth of smuggled South African gold); and they would have to be *mandatory* to prevent (if necessary by a naval blockade of South African ports) countries like South Korea, Taiwan, Israel and Switzerland filling a high proportion of the vacuum.

Could all these conditions be met, the regime would be faced quite early with a decision as to whether to continue its intransigence in the face of worsening economic and security positions and the prospect of a more radical eventual outcome, or whether to seek a compromise whilst its Western allies were still likely to be playing a major role in determining the outcome (as they did for Zimbabwe at Lancaster House). A related consideration here is the prospect of changes of government in the UK and the USA in the next two years.

Such a 'Lancaster House' type settlement would undoubtedly parallel the one for Zimbabwe in important respects, ie it would seek to tie the new country firmly in a neocolonial status by a combination of aid, trade and investment inducements (with their denial coupled with unspecified sanctions as the obverse), plus guarantees of property rights safeguarding landowners and capitalists from both economic nationalism and socialisation.

As we are concerned with a 'pure' extreme, we again assume that radical forces would not yet be powerful enough to shift this outcome significantly in the direction of a more independent policy. They would however be more strongly placed than in the next scenario, and, as in Zimbabwe, might be strong enough to gain acceptance of socialism as an ultimate aim, although the growing black bourgeoisie would gradually undermine any such thrust.

An early negotiated settlement under the threat of sanctions

South Africa's economy has been in decline for most of the 1980s, and three factors suggest that this decline will continue: first, the costs of apartheid itself, rising steeply because of the increasing militancy of blacks; second, the increasing cost of sanctions; and, third, the costs of repression, and destabilisation of neighbouring states. However much the economy may be able to bear such costs, and no matter for how long, it is clear to all observers and most participants inside the country that the system has nowhere to go, and will sooner or later be replaced, either as a result of *force majeure* (sanctions or revolution), or through

compromise. As the former could lead to a non-capitalist outcome, whereas the latter stands at least a good chance of steering South African capitalism nearer to the Western norm, a number of white South Africans, particularly big businessmen, and especially those with international interests or connections, see merit in making significant concessions to the liberation movements very early, before the economy is seriously damaged.

The white electorate, and especially Afrikaner workers and small farmers, feel that they have most to lose, and the signs are that they will prevent such a settlement until the situation has become much worse. Around a third of the white electorate are directly or indirectly employed in privileged positions by the state, and recognise that they would almost certainly be displaced fairly rapidly under the majority rule on to the wider job market, as occurred in Zimbabwe. The other two-thirds have more economic independence, and their skills would remain at a premium for some time to come; an early settlement would seem to be in their best long-term interests, as well as that of capital. Clearly, considerable pressure is likely to be applied from within and without the country to achieve this. Indeed, the threat of sanctions (but not their actual implementation) may be seen as the most potent force towards bringing about such a settlement. It is most unlikely that the liberation movements would be prepared to accept the severe constraints that such a settlement would involve, but the pressure on them could be severe, and in the short run they might have few alternative options.

If foreign and domestic capital were able to persuade the white electorate of this case, a settlement might possibly be achieved which would make a number of concessions to the liberation movements (such as a unitary state) in return for the safeguarding of property rights and a *de facto* confirmation of South Africa's continuance in the Western camp. Such a settlement, in the context of a white South Africa that was undefeated either politically or militarily, would undoubtedly result in the most thoroughgoing neocolonial outcome, in which even the political power of the new government would be tightly constrained (for a long interim period) by various international guarantees. These would probably be similar to the provisions in the Lancaster House Agreement for Zimbabwe, in which racism remained built into the system for the first seven years of independence, giving the 3 per cent of whites 20 per cent of parliamentary seats and a veto over constitutional change. Although the first aim of the constitution-mongering—to keep

Robert Mugabe's ZANU-PF out of power by building a majority coalition of the whites, ZANU and the UANC—failed, such provisions in the South African case could work much more easily than in Zimbabwe. Given the greater proportion of whites and the greater number of distinct groups on which to appeal to sectional or ethnic interests against a supposed 'tyranny' of a unitary party like the ANC, a conservative coalition that excluded the ANC or at any rate the radical part of it, might be forged. Constituents of the coalition might include whites, Inkatha, some 'homeland' groups, and sections of the Coloured and Indian communities. Most workers and the more politically conscious would undoubtedly go into opposition in such a scenario, but they would not necessarily have good immediate prospects of winning power given the greater, and internationally supported, legitimacy of the new government.

It should again be emphasised that we are not *predicting* such an outcome, merely stating that it would be more likely in the event of an early settlement imposed by the major capitalist powers.

A revolutionary outcome

However, the intransigence of a majority of whites, and the failure of the UK and US governments to bring sufficient pressure to bear on the regime, may force the liberation and workers' movements into ever more radical positions. The outcome could be increasing urban guerrilla warfare, coupled with industrial action, possibly leading to general strikes, and ultimately as the downward economic spiral worsened, defection of key sections of the white population, and even sections of the state apparatus.

This would undoubtedly be a long and bloody process, but it could lead to a genuinely independent and socialist outcome, offering the chance of rapid economic growth through restructuring industry under democratic control. Initial disruptions might be severe, with most whites leaving, committing sabotage and theft as in Mozambique, and even then there would remain the risk of outside intervention which might drive the country into seeking protection from the Soviet Union; this would probably result in a more centralised and less democratic society, and ultimately a less flexible and dynamic one, but neocolonialism would be avoided.

Protracted violence with inconclusive sanctions and balkanisation

Already tendencies to secession can be discerned in some quarters

(proposals for federal solutions may be seen as first steps), and in the absence of either determined international action or a single force strong enough to impose its will, these tendencies may well grow. The Afrikaners have a history of seceding from rule they dislike, and rebelling to preserve their hegemony in what they regard as their heartlands. It is inevitable that proposals will be heard for the preservation of the Orange Free State or parts of the Transvaal, as 'whites only' reserves, maintained by military force. It is less likely that such areas could be viable, especially without access to the sea. Clearly also, certain black groups are susceptible to ethnic appeals, or may support them through the force of intimidation and patronage. In these cases as well, some may be tempted to go it alone in an attempt to opt out of the sharpening struggle and enter fundamentally neocolonial relationships with outside powers.

Ultimately such a process, with balkanisation and inconclusive struggles, and no side being able to come out definitively on top, could lead to a downward spiral of directionless violence between groups identified as the enemy or as collaborators. This has been characterised as the 'Lebanon' outcome; in broad terms it seems, depressingly, more likely than any of the other extremes of prediction in attempting to construct a more plausible scenario.

The 'most likely' scenario: escalating sanctions with increasing black militancy and external intervention

A number of ingredients, most of them mentioned in the preceding five sections will almost certainly be involved in the actual outcome; none will occur in the extreme forms outlined above, and interactions between them may be of great significance. The following should not be taken as a prediction, for the relative weights of the factors influencing the situation are unpredictable, as are the degrees of interaction, but it is to be hoped that this exercise will set 'confidence limits' to the infinite range of possibilities. Statisticians will of course be familiar with the fact that once (or five times) in a hundred trials, the rogue result will occur; in this type of exercise there is of course only one trial.

We will therefore assume from (1) above that the first ingredient in our scenario is growing military pressure from the liberation movements; this will gradually increase in effectiveness and impact on the white population and the economy, although there will be reverses; it is not likely to prove a decisive factor on its own, at any rate in the short run. Partly because of continuing attacks by the SADF on South

Africa's neighbours and bases in their countries, a second ingredient may eventually be more direct support for liberation from other African countries, and (in declining order of likelihood) India, Cuba, the socialist countries, the Nordic countries, and the West. The possibility or threat of an escalation of such support, may be a more significant factor in the short run.

As a corollary, the regime's military excursions into other countries, in particular Angola and Mozambique, (especially if it installs an MNR government in the latter and then finds itself in military conflict with Frelimo supported by Zimbabwe) could, through the resulting military and economic costs, produce major domestic consequences, as American involvement in Vietnam showed.

The second ingredient, already operating, is sanctions, and the threat of more severe sanctions. They will almost certainly not meet the three conditions for early success laid down in (2) above, in that they will continue to be introduced in piecemeal fashion, with key countries like the UK, USA and West Germany resisting all the way, just as if they wished to ensure the survival of the regime by giving it ample time to adjust and find alternative sources of supply and markets. They will thus be neither rapidly introduced nor comprehensive; they may however eventually become fairly comprehensive and even be made mandatory by the United Nations (as occurred in the case of Southern Rhodesia); it is much less likely, however, that effective policing will occur, and less likely still that a naval blockade would be instituted to stop continuing trade with Switzerland, Taiwan, etc, or through the criminal circles that would be attracted by the higher profits to be expected when (as with drugs) attempts are made at international action to stop a trade.

Nevertheless, sanctions will impose a rising cost on the regime and on white living standards, which may eventually prove crucial. They will also impose costs on blacks, especially workers; on balance this may increase solidarity, as the distinction between those in relatively secure jobs and the unemployed majority is blurred.

Along with official sanctions we may include disinvestment by private companies, which will have similar effects on economic activity and morale. As with sanctions, the slow rate of withdrawal will give the economy time to adjust, but however much it increases domestic control of the economy (which could be beneficial in the long run), the immediate effect will be to reduce the level of investment in the country and to harm the balance of payments.

The third ingredient is pressure for a negotiated settlement from

capital, both internal and external, which having benefited from apartheid's cheap labour policies is unwilling to pay the cost of repression now that the demise of white supremacy is seen as inevitable. As we have argued in (3) above, this ingredient alone is also unlikely to prove sufficient to produce a settlement, both because black militancy has gone beyond acceptance of any possible compromise that could currently be proposed, and because a majority of whites would also still reject it, too many feeling that they have too much to lose. This latter position could change over the next two or three years, with the one third in state employment possibly becoming isolated from the majority who may come to feel that they would lose less from an accommodation.

Perhaps the major ingredient of present and future scenarios is the increasing black militancy being exhibited in the townships and in the rapidly radicalising trade union movement in particular. This has gained the crucial psychological dimension in the last few years of a belief that majority rule is inevitable within our own lifetime, in fact probably within a decade. As townships become ungovernable, and fewer and fewer collaborators with apartheid can be found, confidence grows, and with it economic boycotts of white businesses, municipal transport services and state education, and strikes and other forms of industrial action. Before long there could be serious economic costs arising from such causes, possibly culminating in widespread strikes and disruptions, although the prevailing economic insecurity makes such action very costly for the strikers. Clearly, there is some way to go yet before the labour movement is wholly dedicated to liberation; the intrinsic limitations of trade union activity force an essentially economic approach, with concentration on issues of pay and job security. However, the South African context is forcing increasing politicisation of trade union activity and COSATU, with its links to the UDF (and thereby ultimately the ANC) may come to determine the future style.

The interaction of the above ingredients seems likely to produce a strong incentive towards seeking a compromise settlement from sections of the ruling class in South Africa, but how long it will take for this to lead to majority white willingness to compromise depends not only on the degree of pressure from these various ingredients but also a resolution of two conflicting tendencies in the white population: a large minority will undoubtedly continue to believe that it has nothing to lose by fighting on, whereas another large minority may already have learned the lesson of Zimbabwe, in which the roughly 50 per cent of

whites who remained have retained a higher standard of living than they could maintain anywhere else (including South Africa).

But it is not simply a matter of which minority becomes the majority and when, for the whites are divided on other grounds, with many Afrikaners being both more vulnerable to black competition and psychologically more willing to fight on. This will probably manifest itself in the rise of vigilante groups and terror squads, attacking blacks at random and black leaders in particular, but also no doubt those whites who are seen as traitors. At the same time, these divisions are already reflected in the growing hostility between the military and Nationalist politicians. Indeed it is not clear that the politicians fully approved some recent military actions which undercut more conciliatory approaches; for instance, the raids on neighbouring countries timed to destroy the pressure for further negotiations with the 'Eminent Persons' Group'; equally the dishonouring of the Nkomati Accord and (if not accidental) the death of President Samora Machel, may have been the result of military challenges that the politicians would not have initiated, but as they were in no position to attempt to repair the damage they were forced to concede the *fait accompli*. Such actions by the military and semi-official vigilante groups and terror squads could significantly delay the time of any serious settlement negotiations, and might furthermore ultimately be the precursor of actual secessionist attempts to set up 'pure' white homelands or laagers, possibly in association with compromised leaders of neighbouring bantustans.

It seems quite likely that such events will have occurred or will be developing before serious attempts to reach a settlement are made; by then a number of abortive meetings may have already have been held between certain parties—possibly the leaders of the regime with the sanctioning powers, but without the liberation movements, and with the military reserving their position—before any viable meeting of all relevant parties is convened. And, as with Zimbabwe, it may take several turns of the screw, with the regime's case visibly weakening, before they are prepared to negotiate seriously. In the meantime, centrifugal tendencies in the white population may be advancing, so that the regime's authority over its own people comes into question. The longer is the delay, the stronger and more revolutionary is the side of the liberation forces likely to be, and the less is the regime going to be able to negotiate for all whites. A distinctly possible outcome, at any rate for a period, is a large ingredient of the fifth scenario, in which

right-wing whites and corrupt bantustan leaders will have actually seceded or rejected any discussions.

If the whites are so divided towards the end, and the West has been unable to impose a solution, a civil war may develop in which a significantly revolutionary liberation movement attempts police action against a seceding region, possibly like the Indian occupation of the princely states after independence. This must be regarded as unlikely as there is certain to be considerable pressure towards compromise on the part of the West, whose calculation is likely to take the form of allowing the major costs of weakening the regime to be carried by the blacks (again as in Zimbabwe), only turning the economic (or conceivably military) screws as a *coup de grace* in time to prevent the further evolution of the liberation movement in a revolutionary direction. In the case of Zimbabwe there was a serious miscalculation in this strategy in that the first line of defence was demolished by Robert Mugabe's victory in the elections; the second line of defence for a neocolonialist solution in that case was the Lancaster House agreement tying British guarantees of sovereignty and aid to respect for property rights; and the third line of defence was in fact the still undefeated Rhodesian army, backed up by South African force if necessary. For there to be a clear possibility of avoiding a similar neocolonialist outcome in South Africa, therefore, more serious miscalculations from the West need to be assumed, and these could arise if intransigence on the part of sections of the white population resulted in a hardening of black attitudes, coupled with balkanisation. Although it is hard to conceive of a situation in which the SADF were destroyed as an effective force, it might well find itself diverted into defending a white heartland, leaving large liberated areas, intermittently attacked, which would eventually starve it into compromise. If the Western hand in this process were too slight, there would be no other power to hand to back up its will, and a likely preoccupation, on this scenario, would be the evacuation of the intransigent elements from the continent, leaving promises of reconstruction aid as the main instrument of policy.

Inevitably there will be a final settlement conference at which compromises will have to be made by both sides. But it may be predicted that the West, whether the UK or the USA, will play a lesser role than in the Zimbabwe settlement. In the latter, both the liberation movements and the regime were under severe pressure from outside forces in the region; Britain was able to extract concessions from the former through the Frontline States, and from the latter through South Africa. In South

Africa's settlement, the Frontline States may again be under severe military and economic pressure, but may well be receiving significant aid from overseas to enable them to withstand it. And of course, South Africa itself has no 'big brother' to force it to make concessions. As a consequence the final settlement may well be very largely between South Africans, and therefore may revolve around guarantees of a future white role in the country (which the ANC would certainly give). It cannot of course be guessed how strong the various parties will be relatively, but two of the major actors will undoubtedly be the liberation movements and local capital, both likely to be fairly hostile to neocolonial moves; the military and internationally oriented capital (like the Anglo American Corporation) will also be likely to be present, but both probably significantly weakened relative to their present position.

In summary, the likely balance of forces at the time that the liberation movements come to form the first majority government in South Africa, is likely to be significantly less inclined to accept a neocolonialist outcome than in other cases. Depending on the level of popular pressure, there thus could be a powerful impetus to follow the type of democratic socialist policy outlined by Innes and Gelb.

How secure will be the initial post-independence trajectory?

If we now assume that liberated South Africa's first government proposes a socialist programme, how successful is it likely to be, and what will be the pressure on it? There can be little doubt that even if, as we have argued, Western leverage to re-incorporate the country is less than in other cases, its determination not to lose so valuable a source of surplus value may intensify its efforts. In any case it is a matter of observation that any country proclaiming socialism or even economic nationalism rapidly attracts unfavourable attention from the USA and the IMF, with modes of leverage being rapidly devised.

To take the example of Zimbabwe: according to orthodox tenets its relative isolation for 15 years, during which trade declined greatly in importance as a share of national income and import substituting industrialisation was taken further than would otherwise have been possible, should have produced a very inefficient economy. The World Bank and the USA assumed that this was the case, and much of the initial aid was related to rehabilitation, which was welcome, but there were also recommendations for closure of 'inefficient' industry (almost

anything that was inconsistent with preconceived ideas of what a poor country should have a comparative advantage in); and aid programmes aimed at export promotion, and competitive international tendering for World Bank projects, all pushed against the proclaimed intention to promote self-reliance.

Meanwhile the IMF, having told the new-born Zimbabwe that it was 'under-borrowed' by Third World standards, encouraged unwise borrowing, and then imposed its usual package of conditions once the country needed an IMF loan. As the causes of the imbalance were only partly the overborrowing but also the consequences of South African destabilisation (including excessive freight charges through being forced to use the long routes through South Africa), a three-year drought and the world slump, these conditions were largely irrelevant to Zimbabwe's problems as it itself perceived them, but related rather more obviously to the IMF's desire to increase the country's integration into the world market through wider use of international prices; this would of course have the consequence of aborting any too ambitious industrialisation proposals, especially those emphasising capital goods or any endeavour in which the country did not yet have a comparative advantage (ie precisely the successful strategy of Japan or South Korea!); however, Zimbabwe took matters into its own hands and corrected its balance-of-payments problems through a temporary suspension of profit and dividend payments to foreign shareholders; three years later, and following a number of good harvests which have eased the balance of payments (though with both exports and imports down in real terms), the IMF programme remains suspended, with the fund having again lost its leverage.

How might a newly independent South Africa take a similar and hopefully more pronounced course of action? And under what conditions will she have to do so? The independence path envisaged above in many ways mirrors that of Zimbabwe. There may be additional constraints to those that faced Zimbabwe and some conditions are likely to be exacerbated in the South African case. The principal causes of such conditions are likely to lie first in the impact of the sanctions process and second in the destructive impact of the war of liberation.

Sanctions will probably produce the following effects on the South African economy:

- 1) there will be reduced dependence on world trade in the sense that the ratios of imports and exports to GDP will fall markedly;
- 2) exports will still depend overwhelmingly on primary goods whilst the

- import pattern will shift towards intermediate and capital goods inputs;
- 3) nevertheless, import substitution will be carried much further than at present;
 - 4) effective control of TNCs is likely to pass to domestic managers, either because as at present TNCs are allowing control to pass to domestic capital, or because TNCs still nominally owned and controlled by their parent company will be subject to legislation that will locate decision-making power firmly in the local management structure;
 - 5) there will be in existence a battery of administrative controls developed under sanctions that will enable control of the foreign sector in pursuit of domestically determined objectives;
 - 6) there will be a run down of the capital stock. Whilst the economy will be able to maintain the existing capital stock albeit at increasing cost, it will not be possible to replace existing machinery with more up to date technology. Indigenous technology may as in the Zimbabwe example receive a substantial boost. This run-down is likely to precipitate a post independence surge in the demand for capital goods imports;
 - 7) the outflow of profits, interest payments etc will have been curtailed under sanctions and more locally generated surplus will have been invested. Foreign debts will probably not be repaid in the interim, but nor will new loans be possible, so total foreign indebtedness will not increase. Under a negotiated settlement blocked transfers may have to be paid though probably via a Zimbabwe-type mechanism, ie repatriation over a period of time.

On the face of it an independent South Africa would have the potential of undermining one of the two main pillars of neocolonial domination, viz., that of control of substantial sections of the economy by external capital. In the immediate post independence period the domestic economy will be under a greater degree of local control than at any point in South African history since prior to the discovery of diamonds. More important too will be the battery of administrative systems built to handle the foreign exchange problem. It may well be that the objectives of the new government may change in terms of foreign exchange priorities but the all-important allocative mechanism will be in existence, subject of course to provisos about the continued functioning of the bureaucracy.

The second pillar would still exist in the structure of imports and exports, the inability of the industrial sector to compete fully in the

international market, and indirectly in the structure of consumption and investment demand resulting from a highly unequal income distribution. Adjusting to changes that will alter the export position is a long term aim. However, depending on the balance of post-independence forces, ie the conflict between the economy as it exists and operates, and the aims of the popularly elected government, changes in the structure of imports and changes in the distribution of income towards a more equal society could come about in the short term.

Against this background must be set the immediate domestic political demands that will face a majority government and the constraints that may be set in attempting to achieve these ends.

Taking the immediate demands first, we consider the removal of the legislation controlling the freedom of movement and settlement of non-whites. What one can be sure of here is that such an abolition will precipitate a massive rural-urban population shift as families seek to be reunited, and forcibly relocated peoples seek to return to their original abodes or seek work in the urban economy. Such shifts will only be tempered by migration within rural areas as the policies of forced removals are reversed. Second, there will be a compelling need to start the process of redistributing incomes, wealth, including land, and social incomes. And, third, will be the need to generate employment, formal or informal, for the growing numbers of unemployed and under-employed.

Urbanisation

The apartheid system has exacerbated the expected rural-urban divide for a country at South Africa's stage of development. Not only is the proportion of the population urbanised less than elsewhere, but the rural-urban imbalance in terms of incomes and production opportunities is greater. Coupled with this there will be both pressures to undo the effects of deliberate apartheid social engineering, and also the costs and consequences of a rapid urbanisation. The present position is as follows: the urbanisation rates for non-blacks from 77 per cent for 'coloureds' to 90 per cent for whites. And these urbanisation figures are normal in that the figures refer to the permanent residence of whole families and not as in the case of blacks where single temporary migrants are a significant proportion of the black percentage. Official estimates of the black urbanisation ratio are around 33 per cent, unofficial estimates put the figure at 43 per cent. Not only is this figure low but it masks the

disproportionately high number of wage earners without families. It also masks the corresponding age and sex structure in the bantustans where family structure is dominated by mothers, children and the elderly. The costs of reversing this situation are twofold. First the straightforward costs of creating the necessary urban infrastructure and job opportunities for a family-based urban population. These costs will increase considerably since immigration and urban births will increase the urban population by a million or more every year for the next ten years at least. For example, such an increase requires say 200,000 new housing units per year when the existing construction rate is only 10,000. Second is the more difficult task of remedying the impact of forced removals into areas incapable of meeting minimum levels of nutrition, let alone other basic needs. Children in particular are suffering from malnutrition, and to the educational consequences of malnutrition must be added the low level of provision of rural education and those factors hindering school attendance. In addition, there will be the lost generation of children and adults in the townships who, lacking education, skills and employment, may well be as much alienated from the new South Africa as the old.

Redistribution

Much has been made in recent years of the increase in black wages since 1970, and of a parallel decline in the white share of total income. These figures are useful in throwing light on some aspects of the current political struggle in South Africa, most notably on the increasing power of the black trade unions, and the consequent move of relatively disadvantaged whites into yet more extreme forms of politics. They have little bearing however on the overwhelming necessity for a redistribution of income in South Africa.

The ratio between black and white incomes in 1984 was 1:7, with average black households earning R3,300 and white households R22,000. 'Asian' and 'coloured' household incomes averaged about R8,800. These contrasts, stark in themselves, nevertheless understate the true division of income in South Africa and the scale of current poverty. White incomes, for instance, are supplemented and buttressed in various ways, from fringe benefits in employment, from state expenditure on education and health, from the ownership of assets such as land, property, shares and pensions, as well as from the general impact of white dominance of government and parastatal employment, firm-employee agreements, and the framework of racial discrimination.

In all these areas blacks are disadvantaged, and black wage rates are further affected by much higher dependency ratios, and by the recent removal of subsidies on basic foodstuffs, commuter transport and housing, which have hit black purchasing power. These figures relate primarily to the formal sector, mainly male employment and make little reference to the distribution of incomes within the black community, or to the incidence of poverty in South Africa. Black women in particular form the lowest paid category of formal employment, they also dominate amongst the low-income people in the informal sector in urban areas, and the poverty-stricken households in the bantustans. To quote from the findings of the second Carnegie Commission, the proportion of families below the poverty line is 7 per cent in the cities, 14 per cent in the platteland, and 80 per cent in the reserves. So some 93 per cent of poverty is outside the major cities.

Social income is that income received by households in the form of the provision of various services by local and central government: education, health and social services. As with ordinary income, considerable inequality exists between whites and non-whites in the provision of services by the government. Starting with expenditure on education in 1984-85, R2,645mn was spent on white education, R2,290 mn on non-white. These totals hide a sevenfold discrepancy between expenditure per caput on white and black children.⁴ Whatever provisos are made over the interpretation of such figures, the raising of per caput expenditure for black children to the levels for white children would require a black education budget of some R5.9 bn per year.

The state of health and healthcare is characterised by the following distinguishing features: white and 'Asians' get roughly the same access to health care, and measures of health status such as the incidence of disease and infant mortality, throw up similar values. The health status of blacks and 'coloureds' is markedly inferior. For example the proportional incidence of diseases such as cholera, TB and measles is higher for these groups than for whites and 'Asians'. Infant mortality rates in 1982 were as follows: blacks 80 per 1000, 'coloureds' 60, 'Asians' 21, whites 13. Much of the health status of blacks and 'coloureds' can be explained by poverty-related factors such as malnutrition, unsafe water, lack of sanitation and inadequate housing. Health care provision itself is highly unequally distributed with respect to the urban-rural division of

⁴ In 1982-83, R234 per caput was spent on black education in the white areas and the non-independent homelands, whilst R1,654 per caput was spent on white education; expenditure on black children in the bantustans was well below R234. South African Institute of Race Relations, *Annual Report*, 1985.

medical manpower. The urban doctor population ratio is 1:750, in the rural areas 1:25,000. These ratios conceal the differential access by race in the urban areas and by distance in the rural areas. The provision of curative medicine is concentrated in large technologically sophisticated hospitals and staffed by personnel requiring long and expensive periods of training. In addition preventive medicine and public health provision is concentrated in urban rather than rural areas.

The black-white divide exists in the provision of welfare services as in other features of South African life. Two main features are apparent. First, that the per caput provision of funds and facilities is weighted in favour of whites and the take-up rate is inversely related to need. Blacks, with the greatest needs, have the least spent per head, and the numbers eligible for and taking up welfare benefits is well under their proportion in the population.

The last major area of redistribution is that of land. The 87:13 ratio in the division of the land area in South Africa is well known. Taking the view that land is a resource yielding income to those who own or work it, then the unequal distribution of land is reflected as follows: with respect to urban land distribution, inequality is apparent in the location, population density and associated social infrastructures in the black townships, plus the racially based restrictions on forms of land ownership and tenure. Distribution of land in the rural areas is characterised by much higher population densities in black areas: population density in the bantustans is approximately 68 people per square kilometre compared with the overall population density in South Africa of 20 people per square kilometre. The division of land quality is unequal too: white South Africa has a higher proportion of its land area in the arable category, and lies in better watered areas. Lastly, white agriculturalists have differential access to such agricultural inputs as credit, water, technical advice, and transport, and also to marketing services—cooperatives, price support schemes, and transport subsidies.

To be successful rural redistribution will thus involve three major facets. First, the movement of displaced non-whites to white rural South Africa with all the implications for land ownership and the form it should take, compensation (if any), ownership of farm capital etc. Second, the extension of existing and/or new forms of agricultural support programmes to all agriculture. And, third, the extension of the modern infrastructure into the present bantustan areas.

Employment

The third major problem facing a post-apartheid government will be the need to create employment, including self-employment. The employment problem in South Africa is not that there is a gap between rich and poor, or between modern and developing sectors, or even between capitalist and pre-capitalist modes of production. It is that the state in various degrees of alliance with capitalism has engineered an economy in which a large and increasing proportion of the population is regarded as surplus.

In 1980 the population of South Africa was just under 30 million, of whom 25 million were non-white. In 1982 the economically active population was given as 11.5 million blacks and roughly 2 million whites. Of the economically active blacks, two-thirds were in formal sector employment, while the remainder were either unemployed or earning low incomes in the informal sector. The official 1985 unemployment figure was 600,000. Unofficial estimates put it at 3 million.

The longer the present regime survives the worse unemployment is likely to become. By 1990 the estimated population will be 36 million of which 31.1 million will be non-white. These estimates assume a growth rate of 2.3 per cent and 0.7 per cent for non-whites and whites respectively.⁵ Both the absolute numbers and the growth rates are dominated by non-whites, and it is clear too that dependency ratios are higher for non-whites, and that by 1990 some 40 per cent of blacks will be under fifteen years of age. This under-fifteen group includes potential mothers of the next generation so even if crude birth-rates fall, overall population growth rates will not decline for ten to fifteen years.

With a stable age distribution the economically active population grows at the same rate as the overall population; as the age distribution moves down, so the economically active population increases faster. In addition, participation rates of both female and male blacks is increasing. Thus, the number of job-seekers are predicted to be in the region of 300,000 per year to the year 2000.⁶ By that year and given that

⁵ Economist Intelligence Unit, *South Africa to 1990: Growing to Survive*, London: Economist Publications, 1986, p 41. The growth rate for blacks 1970-80 was in fact 3.4 per cent per annum, so the figures quoted may be serious underestimates.

⁶ *ibid*, pp 41-3. The average number of jobs created in the 1970s was about 120,000 a year, or half the increase in job seekers. However it is clear that these figures refer to the urban sector only: in the black population as a whole, the age cohorts are approaching 1 million for the under-15s, so by 2000 the potential number of new job-seekers each year could be a million.

present trends and policies continue only half the economically non-white population will be in formal employment. Thirty-six per cent will be unemployed and 13 per cent in informal sector employment.

Thus a majority rule government will be under strong pressure to generate wider production opportunities, not only to cater for the expanding population but also to incorporate the existing surplus peoples.

The implications for neo-colonialism

Within the context of the existing economic system the implications of these three major demands are: first, the need for rapid economic growth and thus capital accumulation, and, second, the need to increase government expenditure and cope with the cost of rapid urbanisation and the provision of social income in education, health and welfare services. Whilst there may be some scope for redistributing within current government expenditure, for example, away from defence towards education, considerable increases in tax revenue will be necessary, with all that that entails for the various tax bases that exist and the incidence of various tax types.

If the economy on independence has much the same system as now then two major problems arise. First, given the trend of the aggregate capital-labour ratio of the past few years, to create sufficient new formal employment job opportunities and to replace depreciated capital will require an aggregate savings ratio of at least 30 per cent of GDP; to absorb all school leavers would require approaching 40 per cent. Though these figures may fall as the distribution of income and thus expenditure moves in favour of more basic goods, there will be pressure for the government to seek foreign assistance to achieve this savings target. Such pressure will be increased by the need to rebuild those sections of the economy damaged in the struggle for independence. And it is worth remembering here that there is the view that Zimbabwe's transition to independence stemmed as much from economic pressures in which the ageing of capital stock played an important role, as from military pressure. Remember, too, that much of the promised post-independence reconstruction aid to Zimbabwe has never been made available, in part due to Zimbabwe's independent stance in international affairs. Finally, and again drawing on Zimbabwe's post-independence experience, there is a danger that the country could become over-borrowed and that the conditions attached

for example to World Bank loans may be inimical to the growth of the industrial sector.

Second, the present tax base is very narrow. Present South African income tax rates are very low and based on a narrow section of income earners. The raising of income tax rates may have disincentive effects for high income earners when in the transition period itself their skills and experience will be necessary until such skills can be transferred to the wider body of the people. Indirect taxes, if broadly based, would strike at the very people in need of help; indirect taxes on luxury goods may reinforce the disincentive effects outlined above and depress investment and employment in those sectors of the economy. This may be no bad thing as the consumption patterns of high income South Africans reflect those of high-income mixed economies. Such a demonstration effect serves only to distort the composition of demand and to encourage the use of inappropriate technologies in the pattern of production.

Lurking in here too is the role of the IMF. If government spending runs out of control, ie expenditure exceeds taxation by an excessive margin, the government will be forced to borrow locally or overseas, or to print money. Crowding out, inflation and balance-of-payments crises are all possible outcomes, and their correction is generally painful, not least because IMF conditions for help are characterised by recommendations to return to market forces, the removal of subsidies and reductions in government spending.

There may be appropriate solutions based on a mix of the above policies. The core of the problem is income distribution and the resulting composition of demand, which together with factor prices dominates the production technology, in turn affecting employment and so on. A judicious mix of indirect taxes, appropriate interest rates and wage policies could be used to shift the balance of demand away from high technology goods to a lower key and more broadly based pattern of demand and the lower capital/labour ratios such production might imply. At the same time informal sector employment has to be encouraged if only as a short run stop-gap measure.

The conflicts inherent in this type of policy are manifest. Will skilled whites stay in a South Africa where their standard of living at best remains static and where the initial effect of transition is likely to reduce the quality of state education and health care provision? And how important are high-technology industries to future growth? Will appropriate technologies be available from other developing countries

as India or China? The experience of the non-socialist NICs suggests a manufacturing export-led growth strategy is possible under in circumstances, though one of the conditions may be a large inflow of capital, either in the form of grant aid (as for South and Taiwan) or through considerable foreign private capital tration (as in Brazil). The problem here is that to compete in the market for many manufactures requires state of the art ology. Such technology is overwhelmingly developed in the OECD of countries and reflects their factor mix, one not necessarily ppropriate to the factor availability in South Africa. Not only that, but s to such technology either means inward investment by TNCs or ment to conditions about use and trade that reduce the value of technology to the recipient.

possibility of a radical alternative

e constraints that are inseparable from any neocolonial policy will inevitably prevent majority aspirations in the three areas discussed being met. The bind that open capitalist economies are in is that is a straight contradiction between the need to compete on national markets (including the market for skills) and employment e mass of the population. Where half or more of the wage and y bill is the cost of skilled labour and professionals at near national rates, the benefits of even the cheapest unskilled labour to alists is marginal. The outcome is that unless *all* employment costs e kept down (as in South Korea and Taiwan in the 1960s), the mass e population becomes excluded from the job market permanently. h Africa's racial domination allows the ruling race to find this ome acceptable, but after liberation, a capitalist South Africa d find itself in a similar dilemma to Zimbabwe's, in which tenance of the living standards of the elite (white and black) and terests of capital, demand international competitiveness at the cost ployment for the majority.

e solution to this dilemma may only be through socialism (but one ct to the constraints caused by existing white skill domination and tial for sabotage as discussed below). Its components will have to de an at least temporary withdrawal from the world market during tructuring period (ultimately even socialist countries will not wish main isolated from world markets), allowing an approach which in t treats every person on the job market as already in a job, albeit in / cases with extreme low productivity. With such a reorientation of

thinking, the productivity of each person becomes central, suggesting the use of capital investment not to 'create' jobs, but to raise the productivity of existing jobs. That is labour, measured by the total number of jobs, has a demand for capital, rather than the number of jobs being determined by capital's demands. In part, the viability of such an approach is clarified by a change in accounting procedures. Most countries cannot simply expatriate guest workers when labour is no longer required, imposing the costs of social security on the countries of origin; South Africa's attempt at this through the 'homelands' policy has clearly failed. Private firms however have a high incentive to 'repatriate' superfluous workers to the charge of the state, and yet the unemployed remain a charge on the country as a whole; this charge rises as education, health, housing and social services become institutionalised. So international competitiveness, bought at the expense of greater unemployment, through the higher productivity of those remaining in work, is in large part an accounting trick, because the country's productivity is not equal to the average of its firms' productivities. Of course in the end it may cost a welfare state only half as much to keep a person unemployed as it would to keep them on full pay where their marginal output was zero, so the benefit is not only to the private employer; but the *social cost* of an employment-oriented policy is also much less than the private cost to employers, even at the first-order direct level. Zimbabwe's experience in preventing retrenchment in recent years has shown that there are numerous second-order benefits, both through maintenance of demand, but also through the diversification forced on previously unenterprising companies feather-bedded by secure monopolies, which have been obliged to find ways of creating productive employment for workers who have become a fixed cost. This may be seen as a paradigm for the future: when the South African state can no longer 'sack' workers and their dependents by sending them to the 'homelands', and when it is committed in any case to redistribution, it has an economic incentive to help them produce something rather than nothing.

If the resulting labour-intensive economy is not internationally competitive 'because of overmanning', the long-run remedy is clearly the provision of more capital per worker, to raise productivity. The short-run palliatives are either devaluation, which in principle for a country exporting manufactures in a competitive market, can always be continued until the price of the goods becomes competitive. More appropriate in most developing country contexts might be export

dies or wage subsidies. Again, planning to counter the external position this would meet through ideologically loaded free market rhetoric, would be important: it should be pointed out that the counting could be recast with a proportion of the workers notionally referred to direct state support equal to the value of the subsidy, making the firm in question competitive by orthodox standards; or alternatively it could be pointed out that a disguised subsidy is received by firms in market economies providing social security for the unemployed out of the common exchequer.

radicalising South Africa with sufficient political will could easily devise a strategy that progressively and irreversibly weakened white economic ownership and control, and foreign influence, at a pace just slow enough to avoid serious sanctions. The existence of an implicit threat or option to move much faster—and if necessary into alliance with the USSR—would be a key factor.

It is not to minimise the potential weight of the constraints that will be faced. It is easy to envisage a West which had refused to stop buying South African gold severely damaging a socialist South Africa by such means. Most other trade would be much less vulnerable. Sabotage, capital flight by capital and skilled whites could also be disastrous as the ambiguous showed. But most whites will find it hard if not impossible to leave and would be highly susceptible to a strategy which in effect exceeded their expectations but still left them with a lot more to lose if it failed to cooperate.

Here we may begin to pick out some key requirements for a successful radical strategy. Given the necessary condition of a high level of political will on a base of popular support, technical planning for land reform, socialisation of production under workers' self-management, national planning of trade and investment to meet popular needs, and so on, could proceed, but only if coupled with equally careful planning to flank the internal and external opposition or sabotage that would be inevitable. The essence of this planning would have to be to induce entrenched interests to cut their losses. As should be obvious, but is demonstrated well by the Zimbabwean case, a relatively poor country cannot sustain developed world per caput incomes and wealth concentration for a minority without extreme exploitation of the majority, and even successful capitalist development requires redistribution. An approach which always threatens redistribution without actually doing much about it (as in Zimbabwe) seems to get the worst of both worlds: the bourgeoisie and their international supporters think that

they are suffering but the poor feel no benefit and become demoralised. On the other hand a confiscatory policy would produce immediate non-cooperation and sabotage.

If, on the contrary, the policy were spelt out in such a way as to emphasise the benefits that would be left to the elite in a context of radical redistribution, those amongst the skilled whites with few prospects elsewhere (probably the majority) would choose not to lose everything. With the resulting freedom to manoeuvre, the state could then keep the option to marginally *relax* the impact of the policies on cooperating whites, psychologically a better way of reforming them than having undefined threats hanging over their heads, always feared, and sapping initiative. In more precise terms, white (and other high-paid) workers might be told that although (as in China after the revolution) the rate for the job was being greatly reduced to levels consistent with the country's wealth, this would not apply (or else only to a reduced degree) for present incumbents.

Owners of capital would need different treatment: they could be formally expropriated, but then paid in government bonds redeemable according to a strict timetable, and under conditions related to how cooperative owners are during a transition period in aiding planning for a reorientation of investment; owners of small businesses, farms etc, might become *de facto* managers of their former businesses.

It can be argued that, in a decision-making sense, a post-apartheid South Africa will be able to take such decisions. Given the current and continuing rate of withdrawal of foreign companies and capital, much of the power to make decisions is passing to domestic capital and managers, so that an independent government is likely to face more pressures from its own capitalists than from those outside. This circumstance, in conjunction with the present role of a broadly defined public sector, would mean that South Africa's dependency would lie primarily in the structure of her foreign trade and not in decisions made outside the country about TNC operations within it. The issue then to be faced is how to increase the importance of industrial goods in trade outside Africa itself. Her regional position dictates that South Africa may be able to maintain her existing competitive position within southern Africa.

In general and given the assumptions made about the transition of South Africa to majority rule, she will have achieved many of the necessary conditions to avoid neocolonial domination. However these achievements although necessary will not be sufficient; sufficiency lies in political will.

Towards a democratic economy in South Africa

Over the past few years the South African economy has variously been described as being in recession, in the worst depression since 1932 and in crisis. While all these descriptions broadly reflect the fact that the economy has experienced a negative real growth rate since 1982,¹ it is important for analytical reasons to clarify precisely the nature of the current malaise.

In this article we distinguish between an economic recession, which we define as a short-term process lasting approximately a year or two, and an economic crisis, which is a longer term phenomenon lasting as much as twenty-five years. However, the distinction between recession and crisis is not simply one of duration, but refers more fundamentally to the distinction between a relatively minor cyclical downswing and a more serious, and therefore longer term, disruption to accumulation. While the former problem may be redressed by fiscal and monetary tinkering which leaves the existing system more or less unchanged, the latter requires a major restructuring of the accumulation process, in its social and political as well as economic forms, before accumulation can advance rapidly again.²

Our argument is that the South African economy is currently experiencing both these phenomena: that is, it is undergoing a short-term recession, but is also trapped in a long-term decline.³ While certain of the economic measures carried out by the South African authorities since 1984 seem to be having some success in starting to lift the economy out of recession, the longer term crisis remains essentially intact. Empirical confirmation for this lies in the fact that, despite the economy having recently experienced its ~~worst~~ recession since 1932, inflation remains high (at around 20 per cent), the surplus on the

¹ Since 1980 South Africa's GDP grew in real terms as follows: 1980 7.8 per cent; 1981 5.1 per cent; 1982 -0.9 per cent; 1983 -3.3 per cent; 1984 -4.7 per cent; 1985 -1.1 per cent.

² See Ernest Mandel, *Late Capitalism*, London: New Left Books, 1975.

³ See Stephen Gelb and Duncan Innes, 'Economic crisis in South Africa: monetarism's double-bind', *Work in Progress* (36) 1985.

balance of payments is too small to sustain a significant upswing unemployment continues to rise to new highs, business confidence remains at an all-time low and real fixed investment continues to decline.⁴ Thus, while the economy may well experience a slight upturn over the next year or two, this will not be strong enough to break the crisis.⁵

How, then, can the crisis be broken? It is our contention that in order for the present South African state to pull the economy out of the crisis the state would need to extricate itself from the double-bind in which it is trapped. A sustained economic upswing can only be secured through a restructuring of social relations which would create favourable conditions for economic growth; but in order for such a restructuring to have any chance of success, a vibrant and expanding economy is needed. This is because no political solution can be achieved in South Africa unless the fundamental issues of mass poverty and huge disparities in wealth and income are addressed. Any attempt to resolve the crisis without addressing these issues must of necessity rely on direct repression, but here again a vibrant economy is necessary to finance such repression.⁶ It is precisely the government's failure to extricate itself from this vicious circle which lies behind its inept attempts to create a black middle class through reform on the one hand and, on the other, its increasingly desperate and vicious responses to township opposition, trade union militancy and foreign pressure.

Yet it is important not to be swept along by current events and not to assume that because the government, and for that matter the state, is in crisis, it is about to collapse. Although a number of townships are now ungovernable and resistance continues to spread, this situation appears to be leading to a stalemate with the state rather than to its imminent collapse. As yet the alternative to apartheid state policy remains at a very general level and there is surprisingly little debate around the issue of concrete alternative proposals.

⁴ Recent research estimates black unemployment to be running at 3-5 million. In some cities, such as Port Elizabeth, unemployment is over 50 per cent of the economically active population in the area. Since 1982 real fixed investment has fallen by over 20 per cent. In manufacturing, the largest sector of production, real fixed investment has fallen by 50 per cent since 1980. (The figures refer to new investment only.)

⁵ Short-term upswings may continue to occur during a long-term crisis just as short-term recessions occur during longer term growth phases. Preliminary indications are that the South African economy remained stagnant during 1986, while projections for 1987 suggest a modest real growth rate of 2-3 per cent. As foreign sanctions begin to take hold and even intensify it is possible that this increase may not be achieved.

⁶ See Gelb and Innes, *Economic Crisis* . . . for details.

Nowhere is this more obvious than in the sphere of economic policy. Despite the fact that South Africa is currently experiencing an economic crisis, no coherent alternative to government policy is being developed. Certainly, there is no shortage of criticism but, as we intend to show, such criticism in the main does not radically depart from the premises of the government's own standpoint.

Current alternatives and their 'solutions'

Egged on by private sector business leaders and like-minded economists, the English-language press is constantly lambasting the government's handling—or, as they see it, mishandling—of the economy. But these attacks invariably confine themselves to the government's approach to stabilisation: issues such as too much government spending (a favourite theme), too much taxation and too much intervention hold the headlines and dominate the debate.

Some economists have sought to go beyond this superficial reading of the problem. Jill Nattrass and Charles Simkins have attempted to probe below surface appearances to reveal underlying structural trends. Rejecting the hollow arguments that see high unemployment levels among blacks as a temporary response to the recession, these writers have all sought structural causes for the phenomenon. Nattrass, for example, has suggested four causes of the high level of black unemployment: high population growth rates; a slowing down of economic growth; an increasing tendency towards economic concentration; and the use of more capital-intensive production methods. While we would agree that these factors do play a part in creating unemployment, Nattrass herself fails to see the link between these phenomena and the capitalist relations which form the material foundations of South African society. For Nattrass the only conflicts which arise in the economy occur around the distribution of resources. Thus she states that:

Finally, it is also essential that the union movement continues to grow, as this will provide both the workforce and employers with a platform on which to negotiate the differences that are bound to arise⁷ as the power of the black workforce increases. The National Manpower Commission estimated that in 1981 only 9 per cent of the African workforce were members of trade unions. As an essential element in a healthy economy is a smoothly operating labour relations system, it is important that this percentage increases.⁷

⁷ J Nattrass, 'Black economic power grew in past decade . . . but recession is eroding gains', *Indicator South Africa*, January 1983, p 16.

Here a 'healthy economy' is one which has an institutional mechanism for smoothing over the conflicts that arise between capital and labour around the distribution of resources. The contradictions inherent in capitalist production relations are ignored and instead such relations appear as basically 'healthy'.

In this model unemployment is seen as a response to a particular form of capitalist industrialisation (for example, one which is too capital-intensive). All that has to be done to erase this unpleasant friction is simply to embark upon a different—for instance, more labour-intensive—form of capitalist industrialisation. As Nattrass puts it: '... the South African economy must continue to grow and to do so in a manner that will generate the jobs necessary to prevent rapid increases in black unemployment levels ...'⁸

Certainly, unemployment is in part a consequence of a trend towards capital-intensity, but at a more fundamental level unemployment is also a crucial condition of the very process of accumulation itself under capitalism. The creation of an army of unemployed, sometimes referred to as the industrial reserve army, plays a key role in disciplining those in employment: for example, in preventing their wages from rising too rapidly, inhibiting their use of strikes as a weapon and controlling them on the shop floor. The effect of this, of course, is to promote production in the interests of capital. Thus unemployment is not simply a product of a particular form of capitalist accumulation; it is a *sine qua non* of advanced capitalist accumulation in general.⁹

By missing this point economists like Nattrass fail to understand the key role which the unemployed are being forced to play in the current process of restructuring in this country. The restructuring which is necessary to generate sustained economic growth in South Africa involves creating a permanent industrial reserve army to carry out the disciplining functions mentioned above. It is thus difficult to see how proposals for more labour-intensity in industry can be reconciled with Nattrass's proposition that economic reform must be 'built squarely upon the existing capitalist structures of production.'¹⁰

Other economists working from within a similar paradigm have also sought to resolve some of the 'injustices' in South Africa's economic

⁸ *ibid.*, p 16.

⁹ See M Legassick and H Wolpe, 'The bantustans and capital accumulation in South Africa', *Review of African Political Economy* (7) 1976.

¹⁰ J Nattrass, *The South African Economy: its Growth and Change*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982, p 304.

structure. For instance, Simkins *et al.* put forward detailed proposals for a redistribution of income and fiscal spending which is to be achieved largely through increased taxation on the rich and greater public spending on education, health services, social welfare and housing for blacks.¹¹ Such demands, if enacted, are presented as opening up the possibility of 'rapid progress . . . in the direction of justice and development.'¹² As in Natrass's argument, this presentation sees conflict and inequalities as lying in the area of the distribution of resources and not in the realm of capitalist production relations. These latter are assumed to be not only 'healthy' but presumably 'just' as well.

Thus what the above arguments are suggesting is that South Africa's capitalist economy should be reformed in the direction of the 'distribution of economic power on a more equitable basis', towards what Natrass calls 'the creation of some type of social democracy.'¹³ It is thus in part a form of 'welfare capitalism' which is being propounded. We say 'in part' since the argument is not confined to the economic level, but also involves for Simkins *et al.* a 'political commitment' to justice and development¹⁴ and for Natrass 'the decentralisation of political power into mutually non-dominating sectors.'¹⁵ In other words, the movement is towards a democratic form of welfare capitalism. Laudable though such an aim may be, the fact that these analyses commence from an incorrect understanding of the location and cause of the problems they address means that the 'solutions' they propound can only be partial and temporary—which in the end means they are not solutions at all.

The government, on the other hand, has recognised the inadequacy of this position, as well as that of the stabilisation critics. The government clearly understands the need to confront the issue of class power directly, or, to put it crudely, to limit the power of the working class. Hence, the government does not seek, as in social democracy, a compromise between classes, but rather it seeks a fundamental reallocation of power between classes. In doing this the South African government is moving in a similar direction to that of the US and British governments. However, unlike South Africa, serious attempts are being

¹¹ See, for instance, C Simkins, D Hendrie, I Afedian and P le Roux, 'Justice, Development and the National Budget', Second Carnegie Inquiry into Poverty and Development in South Africa, *Post-Conference Series No 6*, 1985.

¹² *ibid.*, pp 17–18.

¹³ Natrass, *The South African Economy* . . . , p 304.

¹⁴ Simkins, *et al.*, 'Justice . . .', p 18.

¹⁵ Natrass, *The South African Economy* . . . , p 304.

made by radical intellectuals in these other countries to begin both to challenge monetarist orthodoxies and to propose alternatives which seek to reallocate power towards the side of the working class and popular forces.¹⁶

What is enlightening about these attempts from a South African point of view is that they begin from a similar standpoint to that in which we presently find ourselves: that is, in a monetarist-induced recession within the context of a longer term downswing. While these alternatives are not intended as blueprints for a socialist economic policy nor even strategies 'that will . . . create a socialist society',¹⁷ neither do they seek to salvage capitalism from the ravages of its own internal contradictions, as does for example Keynesian theory. Instead, they offer 'a more radical programme than that offered by Social Democracy': that is, a programme which 'seeks not to work within the constraints imposed by the logic of the capitalist economy but to transform those constraints'.¹⁸ This they aim to do by anticipating, challenging and progressively dismantling those constraints and substituting new forms of control, especially 'in the form of greater working class control over production'.¹⁹

It would of course be foolish to assume that proposed democratic solutions formulated for the USA and Britain can be crudely imposed on South Africa. There are such vast disparities of a political, economic and social kind between the countries in question that such an undertaking would be meaningless. At the same time it is becoming increasingly clear that, within South Africa, the majority of both the working class and the poor have no commitment to ruling class ideology in its entirety and in fact are consistently calling for alternatives. For instance, a recent nationwide survey of urban-based black South Africans found that 77 per cent favoured 'the socialist vision . . . on the economic future of the country,' compared with only 22 per cent who favoured the capitalist vision.²⁰ Thus while it may be true that there is

¹⁶ Two important works to have emerged over the last few years are CSE London Working Group, *The Alternative Economic Strategy: a Labour Movement Response to the Economic Crisis*, CSE Books and the Labour Coordinating Committee, 1980 and S Bowles, D Gordon and T Weisskopf, *Beyond the Wasteland: A Democratic Alternative to Economic Decline*, New York: Anchor Press/Doubleday, 1983.

¹⁷ CSE Group, p 7.

¹⁸ CSE Group, p 4.

¹⁹ CSE Group, pp 4 and 7.

²⁰ Mark Orkin, *Disinvestment: The Struggle and the Future*, Johannesburg: Ravan Press, 1986, p 52.

not much clarity on precisely what form the alternative economy should take the fact remains that the majority of South Africans are calling for an alternative.

We would argue that the emphasis placed in the American and European debates on the broad notion of a democratic economy has much relevance to South Africa. Not only has the question of democracy assumed centre-stage in South Africa, but demands which are currently emanating from within the ranks of the oppressed, especially among the working class, point to the need for a far more radical approach to the issue of the post-apartheid economy than is to be found in the standard theoretical literature. For this reason we believe that debates analogous to those occurring in Europe and the USA need to be raised inside South Africa as well, though obviously the form and content would be very different.

Some possible objections

As in any situation in which an attempt is made to shift the terrain of debate within the workers' movement, there will obviously be differences of opinion, some of which will be held with deep conviction. Such differences should not be swept under the carpet but need to be aired openly and systematically worked through. Unless the workers' movement in general is clear both that it wants to embark in a particular direction and also precisely why it is doing so, there is little point in undertaking any new project.

It is common knowledge that the workers' movement in South Africa has had, and continues to have, differences over a range of issues. Some of these have been largely worked through, such as the differences over whether or not formal unions should be established, whether these should be industrial or general unions, whether unions should register under the Industrial Relations Act and whether unions should participate in Industrial Councils. However, as these differences were resolved, so new issues came to the fore, such as questions of how to link shop floor struggles to community problems and of how the trade union movement should respond to popular political organisations. The fact that it took almost five years of talks before a new federation of trade unions could be formed points to the problems such differences pose for the movement. On the other hand, the fact that a new federation combining many of the unions which participated in these talks was

eventually formed points to the capacity inherent in the workers' movement to overcome differences within it.

By throwing up new issues for debate we have no wish to add to existing problems in the movement, nor to create new differences. However, perhaps it is worth emphasising that the workers' movement can simply not avoid tackling new and contentious issues. The progress of the workers' struggle means by definition that new issues constantly present themselves for debate and resolution. Our argument, then, is that it is the current recession and crisis in South Africa which is confronting the workers' movement directly with the question of how it should respond. If that movement is to advance this question can not be avoided. We hope through this paper to assist in the process of developing that response. As an initial step it is perhaps necessary to take up the question of looking at possible objections to the particular form of response we are arguing for here: that is seeking to develop an alternative economic strategy. These objections may be broadly classified into three groups which we will examine in turn.

The first objection relates to the issue of how the workers' movement perceives its role at present and is therefore largely a strategic objection. The argument here is that the role of the workers' movement is to constantly criticise and attack government and employers' policies but not to develop a coherent alternative to such policies. In other words, such critiques should be *ad hoc*, attacking this or that aspect of policy, rather than developing a coherent theoretical alternative which can be counterposed to existing policies. According to this argument, to pose such an alternative is not the task of the worker's movements in opposition. Furthermore, it carries with it certain dangers that need to be avoided. First, that in posing an alternative the workers' movement runs the risk of being incorporated by the state which will attempt to draw workers into the realm of policy formulation. Secondly, and in a sense alternatively, the state and private economists will attack the workers' alternative, thus putting the workers' on the defensive and diverting the debate away from state policies. Furthermore, as worker leaders and sympathetic intellectuals get pulled into increasingly complex debates around these issues, so they will become more and more divorced from the masses who will regard the debates as increasingly irrelevant.

These arguments do spell out some real dangers that exist for the course we are suggesting. There should be no doubt that the danger of incorporation is there, just as it exists in other realms of workers'

struggle, such as agreeing to register or work within Industrial Councils or even enter into negotiations with management. But to argue that there are risks involved in a strategy is not sufficient reason that it should not be undertaken. Similarly, it is true that the workers' alternative may well come under attack, but such an attack need not necessarily divert attention away from state policies nor lead to workers' disillusionment. The question here is one of working out the appropriate tactics, an issue to which we will return in looking at the third objection.

At a more general level our response to this argument would be to point out that the workers' and popular movement in South Africa has already raised the issue of alternatives.²¹ So it is already on the agenda and not to follow it through and assist in its development means in effect that one is constraining the progress of the movement. Before one embarks upon such a hazardous constraint one needs to be absolutely sure of one's position, for one runs the clear risk of alienating oneself from the masses. As we have said, we are not yet convinced by the arguments. Furthermore, we need to understand why the workers' and popular movement has placed the issue on the agenda. It is because they recognise, especially at a time of falling standards of living and increasing immiseration, the dangers these pose for political and trade union organisation. Without economic growth the oppressed are forced onto the defensive, seeking to salvage what they can. What is needed is a campaign to ensure that economic growth occurs, but on terms which are more favourable to the workers and the poor.

Of course such a campaign will find itself under attack from capital and the state, who will seek both to repress it politically and discredit it ideologically. But such struggles cannot be avoided. In fact, we would argue there is an urgent necessity to oppose capital in the ideological arena of broad solutions to the crisis, for unless one does so, one concedes an important area of struggle. The problem with allowing capitalist ideology to rule unchallenged by any coherent alternative is that the dominant ideology becomes internalised in individual consciousness as 'common sense'. The danger is that it may become 'common sense' for workers and the poor to accept that in a time of recession 'we' all need to tighten our belts and that retrenchments are 'necessary'. In order to challenge capitalist 'common sense' successfully workers need to develop their own coherent ideology which can win

²¹ As just one example, see the Orkin survey mentioned above. See also recent calls by some black unions to construct a workers' programme to build a new South Africa.

acceptance at the level of 'common sense'. This alternative will then feed into national and local struggles around political issues as well as into union negotiations.

The kind of ideological coherence to which we refer cannot come simply from *ad hoc* critiques nor even from looking solely at the causes of the crisis. Identifying the causes and form of the crisis as well as criticising the state's response to it is not sufficient to develop a coherent and substantial alternative (though it is of course a part of the process). To create such an alternative is an entirely different intellectual exercise.

A second objection which is sometimes raised to the exercise we are undertaking relates to the question of state power. Essentially, this argument is that since the state plays such a key role in capitalist society all energies must be devoted to the question of winning state power and that there is therefore simply no point in raising the issue of alternative economic strategies until this has been achieved. Such objections amount to saying that we are putting the cart before the horse. Again we take such criticisms seriously and agree that the question of state power is crucial and cannot be ignored. However, the winning of state power is but one moment in a broad and ongoing process of social transformation and we would resist any attempt to artificially delimit that process into phases: first the political phase; then the economic. On the contrary, we would argue that the question of developing an alternative economic strategy is crucial to political mobilisation at this point in time. Furthermore, it should be remembered that we are not proposing that a blueprint for an alternative economy be created, but only that a debate be commenced. We are aware that, as the struggle develops, so needs and problems will change and new issues emerge. But this is not an argument for putting off the point at which the debate commences. Such changes as emerge can easily be incorporated into the ongoing discussions.

Another aspect of this argument which it is important to consider is that, as any social movement develops, so it inevitably raises demands and sketches out broad goals, often of an economic, as well as political and social, kind. Around these demands and goals people are mobilised and expectations created. The problem is that some of these goals may not be realistic or, at any rate, not achievable in the near future. There may also be conflicts between goals and potential conflicts between social groups around certain demands. This can occur even within a class, such as the working class, where there is a potential conflict

between the producers and consumers of a product or service in that the former may want to raise its price in order to cover a wage increase while the latter may want its price reduced.

Debates around these issues need to be commenced as soon as possible so that the feasibility and coherence of demands and goals can be carefully scrutinised. Are they realistic and, if so, in what time frame? What potential conflicts exist between goals and which are the priorities? And where conflicts remain, how can these be institutionalised and regulated? It is only by commencing such debates now that we can hope to avoid the dangers of unrealistic expectations being created and of the political problems which arise when they are not fulfilled. The example of Allende's Chile, where the governing coalition's support was fatally fractured, expresses the dangers that exist if such groundwork has not been done.

One final objection that needs to be dealt with relates to the issue of how one goes about constructing an alternative strategy. The argument here is that any attempt by university-based intellectuals to construct a theory of this kind means that such a theory does not originate among the masses. It therefore has to be conveyed to the masses and injected into their organisations. Here, then, is a clear danger that such intellectuals are actually guilty of elitism in that they are attempting to impose their ideas on the masses. The only way to avoid this charge, so the argument goes, is to wait until the workers' and popular movements themselves construct such a theory.

Clearly, there is a potential hazard here and there is certainly no shortage of examples, particularly from the capitalist centres, of the occurrence of practices similar to those described above. However, it would seem to us that there is a problem in the formulation of the objection: namely, that it displays a workerist tendency which undervalues the role of intellectuals. Certainly, the broad mass of the workers' movement is composed of workers, but it is wrong to assume that intellectuals have no place in a workers' movement. On the contrary, certain tasks which face that movement, especially those relating to education and theorisation, cannot be carried out by workers alone, particularly in the early phase of the struggle when their lack of education is most sorely felt. In these spheres sympathetic intellectuals have an important role to play. The issue, then, is not one of arguing that intellectuals have no role to play in such a movement but rather, given that they do have a role to play, how do the workers control them in the exercise of that role? We would argue broadly, that such control

can only be secured if intellectuals are submitted to the democratic control of those in the organisations in which they are involved.

At this point a number of problems immediately suggest themselves. First, it is of course possible to envisage this in the case of intellectuals, regardless of colour, who are actually employed in a worker organisation. It is relatively straightforward to subordinate this group to *formal* democratic control, though we would argue it is far more difficult to subordinate them to *actual* democratic control. But in the case of sympathetic intellectuals employed outside the worker organisation the situation is not so straightforward. Because they are not formally part of the organisation they cannot be subordinated to the same form of organisational discipline, but this hardly means that they are free to do as they wish. On the contrary, the organisation presumably only calls on their services if and when it needs them. In this sense, they too are subordinated to the democratic control of those in the organisation who are free to dispense with their services and/or replace them whenever they choose. The criterion for the retention of their services then becomes the extent to which the organisation values their contribution.

It is precisely this criterion which must be applied in assessing intellectuals' contributions to the construction of an alternative economic strategy. If such an alternative is constructed from the actual demands of the workers and circulated through their organisations, it is they who will finally decide on its value to their struggle. By testing it in debate themselves and, most important, by applying it actively in their day-to-day struggles workers will come to know whether or not it is useful to them or to what extent it needs to be modified or strengthened. In other words, it is the workers themselves through their organisations, who will decide on whether or not to make the strategy theirs.

We intend in the rest of this article to begin to construct a broad framework for an alternative economic strategy in South Africa. It should be said at the outset that our aim is essentially to initiate a debate around the issues we raise and that we are not proposing a blueprint for such an alternative. Partly because there has been no serious attempt to do this up until now there is a marked scarcity of empirical material to draw on, and therefore of necessity much of what we have to say will be quite abstract and theoretical. One of the benefits which we hope will flow from the commencement of a debate around these issues should be the initiation of research into some of the areas specified in this article.

Hopefully, such research could be carried out with the active participation of those in the labour and popular movements.

We shall begin by examining the Freedom Charter, a manifesto with wide support in South Africa which has emerged from the struggle, to see whether a basis exists here for an alternative democratic economic programme. Although the intention behind constructing the Freedom Charter was not simply to focus on economic issues, but rather to present a broader manifesto for a democratic society, nonetheless sections of the Charter do refer specifically to economic policy. Thus the germ of a democratic economic programme is to be found here. By focusing on this aspect of the Charter we are, of course, interpreting it in a particular way. We would argue that not only is such interpretation inevitable, but it is also desirable. The Freedom Charter is constructed in terms of general principles and therefore requires interpretation and elaboration. There are, of course, a number of directions in which such interpretation may lead and in this article we identify three broad possibilities. We then seek to examine these possibilities in terms of our stated requirements for what we term a democratic economy and to elaborate the approach which, in our view, best meets these requirements.

The structure of a democratic economy

In this section, we attempt to draw out a broad economic framework which would satisfy the demands raised in the Freedom Charter. It is worth emphasising that the very general terms in which the demands are framed means that they are potentially compatible with more than one combination of socio-economic structures and institutions. What we present here is our interpretation of a structure that we feel would be *sufficient* to fulfil these demands. There are, of course, other interpretations of the demands suggesting structures different from ours. We briefly examine two of these in the course of our discussion—social democracy and state socialism—arguing that ultimately neither is capable of meeting the demands. Further, we examine here only the structure itself of a democratic economy, leaving the all-important issue of transition—‘how do we get there from here’—to another occasion.

In the first part of this section, we discuss social relations in ‘the

economy' as suggested by the Charter.²² The demands, we suggest, emphasise above all that these relations must be *democratic* in both the determination of objectives, and in the process of regulation, or directing the economy towards these objectives at the same time as reproducing its basic social relations. The meaning of the term 'democracy' will become clearer as we elaborate our argument.

Secondly, we look at the productive structure of the economy, its material organisation. Here the Charter suggests, perhaps not surprisingly, a bias towards the production of 'basic' goods and services, rather than production of investment goods. In other words, the bias is toward current consumption, rather than accumulation and growth in the present, with consumption postponed to an (unspecified) future date.²³ The implications of such a bias for income distribution, growth and other issues will be spelled out in the second part of this section.

The various demands in the Freedom Charter can be grouped into four sets: The first concerns security of employment with adequate wages. Included here are not only the right to a job, and a minimum wage at an appropriate level, but also demands for a 40-hour week, unemployment benefits, and paid leave, including maternity leave. The second set of demands is for the increased (and affordable) provision of basic goods and services, most importantly food and clothing, housing, transport and social services.

While the above all relate to the standard of living, the other two sets of demands relate more directly to social relations. They focus on full democratic rights, including 'democratic organs of self-government' (clause 1). The final set of demands is contained in clauses 3 and 4 of the Freedom Charter, which demand socialisation ('transferred to the ownership of the people') of the mines, financial institutions and monopoly industry, controls over other productive and distributive activities, and the redistribution of land amongst the agricultural proletariat and peasantry.

Stated in the above fashion, these demands might seem to be

²² The concept of 'the economy' is a problematic one, since it carries the connotation that it is a separable social region, which contains no political processes. One of the major assumptions implicit in our approach is that politics are part and parcel of economic activity, so that politics and economics cannot be completely separated. However, we use the term 'the economy' to indicate that we are concerned with non-economic issues only to the extent they impinge on economic ones.

²³ For a discussion of 'accumulation bias' in Eastern European Socialist economies, see D M Nuti, 'The contradictions of socialist economies: a Marxian interpretation', *Socialist Register* 1979, London.

somewhat utopian. It is important, for this reason, to underline their relevance to the black working class today as they find themselves under attack from the economic crisis as well as from state policies in response to the crisis. It hardly needs repeating that the primary factors underpinning current high levels of militancy in the townships and at the workplace are a combination of, on the one hand, unemployment and the rising cost of living (leading to falling living standards) and, on the other, continued exclusion of black people from political representation at all levels of society.

Therefore the elaboration of a democratic economic structure able to fulfil these demands is not a process of abstract speculation about a distant future. Rather, these demands are immediately linked to the concrete actions and immediate concerns of the working class and others *at the present time*. Fulfilling these demands is arguably the most appropriate route to resolving the present long-term crisis. Certainly it is not the only route: the state appears to have chosen an alternative approach of physically suppressing these demands.

Repression is, of course, the flip side of ruling class attempts to implement its *own* policy of restructuring a wide range of institutions and structures which have characterised South African capitalism for decades. Although 'restructuring' can be understood in a number of different ways, from a political-economic perspective it is useful to examine it as the attempt to develop a new 'social structure of accumulation' (SSA) for South African capitalism. The SSA 'consists of all the institutions [and practices] which impinge upon the accumulation process.'²⁴ They serve the function of *regulating* economic processes. Within and through these institutions and practices, capitalist social relations can be reproduced over time, because social conflict of all types is regulated and channelled within their determined bounds. For a high rate of accumulation and economic growth to be achieved in the long-run, the various institutions of the SSA should be functioning smoothly, both individually and as a coherent group. In such a situation accumulation would be greatly facilitated,

²⁴ G Gordon, R Edwards and M Reich, *Segmented Work Divided Workers*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982, p 23. The concept is discussed more generally here. It has considerable affinity with the concept 'mode of regulation' used by the French *regulation* school, and originally developed by M Aglietta, *A Theory of Capitalist Regulation*, London: New Left Books, 1979. It should be noted that while there is a certain purpose in ruling class efforts to develop a new structure of accumulation, the rationale for specific policies and actions cannot be reduced to such an intention. The SSA is an example of a *posteriori* functionalism, rather than a *priori* functionalism.

since capitalists' confidence is boosted and uncertainty about the future reduced. The lower rate of growth characteristic of the long-term economic crisis is associated with difficulties in the functioning of some of the SSA's institutional elements, as well as with the collapse of its internal coherence.²⁵

The central feature of the 'apartheid SSA' in South Africa which underpinned the high rate of economic growth from the early 1960s until the mid-1970s, was the tight control over Africans and suppression of their organisations, by means of the institutional structuring of, *inter alia*, the labour process, the labour market and the sphere of political representation. This cannot be discussed here, but what is important to note is that these institutions were not put in place without a long process of struggle and resistance which affected their original conception by policymakers, and thus the nature of the apartheid SSA as a whole.

Nevertheless, the 'apartheid SSA' functioned well once it was finally in place. But by the late 1970s economic and political realities clearly indicated that the SSA was exhausted, and needed rebuilding. The attempt to develop what can be labelled a 'free market' or monetarist SSA²⁶ is a response to this. The demands being made by trade unions and political organisations, when they take the form of documents concerned with the whole of society (like the Freedom Charter or the 1985 May Day demands), can be seen as demanding an *alternative* SSA to that which the ruling class is attempting to put in place at the moment. In elaborating these demands, we will in effect be spelling out the SSA which is implicit in them. In taking this theoretical direction, we are of course transforming the concept of the SSA, developed originally to help in understanding the behaviour of individual capitalist firms. As will be seen, the agents whose economic behaviour we are concerned with in the context of what we call a 'democratic SSA' are very different from capitalist firms. However, the concept is both relevant and useful. It is intended primarily to illuminate and systematise the *social* factors which influence individual behaviour. Since the democratic economy, and society, envisaged in both documents aims to facilitate people acting as

²⁵ The development of the economic crisis should be seen both as being caused, in part, by the degeneration of some of the institutions, and causing in turn the degeneration of others. It should be noted however that there are coherent accounts of economic crisis which have no need of a concept such as the SSA.

²⁶ The notion of a 'free market' SSA might at first seem contradictory. However, 'free' markets are not free, merely regulated in a different way (see note 22).

social beings, the concept is appropriate. In addition, the idea behind the SSA is that the actions of individuals and of groups in conflict do not simply occur in a 'black box' (sometimes labelled class struggle), but are regulated, most of the time, through formal and informal institutions. This is not specific to any particular type of economic system—it is true of all: for a society to get on with its business, social conflict must be somehow contained. Thus the democratic economy also requires regulation, since social conflict will not disappear, but growth and accumulation must continue, if the demands are to be fulfilled. The SSA is a valuable conceptual tool with which to analyse the appropriate form of regulation.

To develop some of the basic principles of the SSA based on our approach to the demands, we will examine briefly the other two possible interpretations identified above, beginning with social democracy, as in the Swedish economy. Despite the public ownership of a fairly wide range of industry in most social democracies,²⁷ as well as the exercise of control over capital by the state, particularly in the labour market, the market remains the dominant principle of regulation. In other words, the institutions of the SSA achieve their effects *primarily* by the regulating *market* forces, shaping and defining various markets as the context for the interaction of social groups.

Thus, attempts to guarantee full employment, to take the first set of demands, have involved primarily a 'Keynesian' concern with state intervention on the demand-side of the economy: the public sector expands to fill the gap as private sector demand for labour (but *not* necessarily its overall growth) shrinks.²⁸ There is little difference in regulation of the labour process itself between the two sectors, an issue which relates to demands for full democratic rights. But even full employment becomes impossible to maintain in the long run via market-dominated regulation, the Swedish experience suggests. As that economy, together with the rest of the capitalist world, moved into crisis in the 1970s the demand for labour by private capital shrank too quickly to be absorbed by the expansion of state economic activity, which was already creating its own problems of inflation and fiscal difficulty.

²⁷ For a useful critical discussion of the nature of Swedish social democracy, see J Pontusson, 'Behind and beyond Social Democracy in Sweden', *New Left Review* (143) January–February 1984.

²⁸ *ibid.*, p 83

The above argument suggests that an SSA capable of fulfilling the four sets of demands coming out of the Freedom Charter needs to be dominated by institutions which enable regulation to take a *social* (or public) form, rather than being limited to trying to shape the private, atomised forces of 'the market'. This requires some clarification, since 'the market' is itself a social phenomenon, its existence being premised on the social interaction of private entities.

Regulation must be primarily social, firstly, in order to enable the productive structure and the process of accumulation to be shaped and directed, so as to achieve social objectives, such as employment security or adequate provision of basic goods and services. When regulation is dominated by the market, the accumulation process is instead directed towards the achievement of *private* objectives, such as profitability, growth in firm size, etc. While the first two sets of demands imply that social regulation is necessary, the other two, and especially those concerned with transformation of the structure of ownership, demand it explicitly. Thus, the Freedom Charter talks of non-monopoly enterprises being 'controlled to assist the well-being of the people'. In addition to demanding social regulation in this way, the Freedom Charter also spells out one of its essential preconditions: social ownership of, and control over, all or most of production. Without this, no attempt to institutionalise control over accumulation can be successful in the long term, since conflict between specific and general objectives would likely be resolved in favour of the former.

One important implication of social ownership of the means of production is the 'fusion' of state politics and production politics.²⁹ Because enterprises are socially-owned, the state, whatever its form, is necessarily present at the point of production, as representative of 'the people as a whole'.³⁰ Thus confrontations of authority in the workplace are also confrontations with the state and can quickly develop into wider challenges to it. This is in contrast to market-dominated regulation, where the atomised structure means that confrontations with management—production politics—are structurally insulated from state politics.³¹ In South Africa, racial oppression is a common feature of both state politics and production politics. Nevertheless, the two arenas

²⁹ See M Burawoy, *The Politics of Production*, London: Verso, 1985, pp 157–8.

³⁰ It is only through the state that the entire population could act as owner. A comparison can be made with a cooperative owned by its members, where the state is not necessarily present.

³¹ This insulation of the two political arenas from each other is often elided into a supposed separation of 'politics' from 'the economy'.

of politics are not institutionally fused, as under social regulation. Thus although workers' challenges in production may often lead quickly to challenges to the state, a successful broad-based challenge to the state, involving its transformation, would not necessarily involve the simultaneous transformation of enterprise management.

The other central feature of social regulation is that the institutions through which it is expressed are those in which economic agents (groups or individuals) act, and interact, socially or publicly, rather than privately, as in market regulation. In other words they are defined within such institutions in their social role (as producers, consumers or whatever), rather than as owners of private property, buying or selling in the market. Although negotiations (and thus a political process) are part of the interaction of such publicly defined agents, the outcomes are not linked to the relative market powers of the participants. This is in contrast to a regulatory institution such as the Industrial Council, which cannot be regarded as part of a system of social regulation, since it in effect merely facilitates the operation of the labour market.

The central institution in a framework of social regulation is inevitably a plan, which unites the two features of this form of regulation discussed above. The planning process incorporates the intentionality inherent in the need to achieve specific objectives through production and accumulation over time, with the public character of economic agents, in both the formulation and execution of the plan.

For an economy able to fulfil the four sets of demands with which we are concerned, on the other hand, it seems that an SSA whose central principle is social regulation is necessary. Examination of one such SSA—that of Eastern European-style 'state socialism'—provides a negative example which sheds useful light on some further basic principles necessary to satisfy all these demands. In state socialism, the political principle of democratic centralism has resulted in a system of economic regulation dominated by a highly centralised planning process. This is enabled by state ownership of wealth, while through planning, the economy's supply-side is controlled. On this basis, long run full employment is made possible, though often only by hiring of excess labour which is in fact underemployed.³² In addition, this form of social regulation allows the productive structure to be adapted, and the social surplus allocated, to those ends the central planners consider

³² See M Ellman, *Socialist Planning*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979, chapter 6, especially pp 158 ff.

appropriate. However, these economies have tended to die 'accumulation bias', invariably choosing investment over consumption when this key planning choice is made. While such a 'socialist' economy in South Africa might conceivably be able to satisfy the first, second and fourth of our sets of demands (relating to employment and wages, basic goods and services and social ownership and control), it founders on the rocks of the third, the demand for full democratic rights. The issues here are twofold.

First, the planning process is not achieved through a process which can be regarded as democratic. Rather, it is centralised and hierarchical,³³ despite the existence of 'bargaining' between enterprise managers and planning bureaux. But, in addition, relations in production³⁵ under state socialism are undemocratic: as Burawoy has argued, they can be seen as taking the form of 'bureaucratic despotism', 'because coercion prevails over consent . . . [and] because it [is] constituted by the administrative hierarchy of the state.'³⁶ For both of these reasons, state socialism is unable to fulfil the demands arising out of the documents 'democratic rights'.

Behind this conclusion lies a conception of what constitutes 'democracy': this deserves elaboration. As was noted above, if democracy is based upon social regulation, there is a fusion of politics in production with global politics. For this reason, a particular form of politics, 'democracy', cannot be restricted to one arena; it will be common to all, though perhaps differentially institutionalised. Thus, in state socialist societies, the absence of democracy in production is connected with the absence in the process of economic regulation, and in other aspects of society. As Alec Nove has pointed out; 'The hierarchical structure of the planned non-market economy is paralleled by a similar hierarchical structure of society as a whole.'³⁷

Conversely, political democracy—universal suffrage and accountable representative bodies—can only remain meaningful in a context of social regulation of the economy, if it is complemented by economic democracy. In other words, the institutions and practice.

³³ *ibid.*, chapter 2.

³⁴ Burawoy, *The Politics of Production*, p 160.

³⁵ For the distinction between relations in production and relations of production, see pp 13–14 and 29. It is elaborated below.

³⁶ Burawoy, *The Politics of Production*, p 12. See also pp 180 ff.

³⁷ A Nove, *The Economics of Feasible Socialism*, London: George Allen and Unwin, 19

constitute the SSA (including those that regulate the labour process itself) must be based not simply on mass participation,³⁸ but on the active exercise of power by those whose economic circumstances are affected by the relevant institution. Under social regulation, political democracy without economic democracy would involve the contradictory situation where those formally in control of the state within one sphere of their lives (political representation) are dictated to by it in another sphere (their work).

There are other reasons why meaningful democracy should include not only representation at various levels of the state (local, regional and national), but also power in the workplace and as consumers (especially of basic commodities and social services). First, there is a long tradition going back to Rousseau³⁹ within the political theory of democracy which argues that there is a close link between individuals' attitude towards, and participation in, formally democratic structures of representation, and the authority structures in their workplace. Thus the 'crisis' of liberal democracy, involving widespread apathy towards political participation in many advanced capitalist societies,⁴⁰ may well be linked to the increasingly authoritarian and hierarchical nature of the labour process as capital has tried, in its usual ham-fisted fashion, to raise productivity. Conversely, greater democratic control over work is the most promising route to wider political participation, because of its educative potential. As C B MacPherson has pointed out, shop-floor democracy provides people with

experience of participation in that side of their lives—their lives at work—where their concern is greater, or at least more immediately and directly felt, than in any other. They can see at first hand just how far their participation is effective . . . an appetite for participation, based on the very experience of it, may well carry over from the workplace to wider political areas.⁴¹

In South Africa, of course, the reasons for lack of democratic participation have little to do with apathy. But a high degree of

³⁸ 'Participation' is a highly ambiguous concept and it can take a variety of forms. For discussions of participation in capitalist enterprises, see J G Espinosa and A Zimbalist, *Economic Democracy: Workers' Participation in Chilean Industry, 1970-1973*, New York: Academic Press, 1978, pp 20-4. See also C Pateman, *Participation and Democratic Theory*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970.

³⁹ Pateman, *Participation* . . . , chapter 2.

⁴⁰ This has led rightwing analysts to argue for the further limitation of democracy. For a critical discussion of this response, see G Hodgson, *The Democratic Economy: A New Look at Planning, Markets and Power*, Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1984, pp 33 ff.

⁴¹ C B MacPherson, *The life and times of liberal democracy*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977, p 104.

participation would not be automatic, if the society were to be democratised. Both the desire for, and especially the practice of, democratic behaviour would need to be learned by a people deprived of such rights. In this process, democracy in the workplace could play a very practical part.

An additional argument in favour of workplace democracy is its very positive effect on productivity levels. For several reasons productivity increases are absolutely crucial to the growth necessary during the transitional phase. As many elements of capital are once again discovering in the current economic crisis, 'worker participation' (ie incorporation) through schemes like 'quality circles' can be as effective (and often cheaper in the long run) in raising productivity, as more authoritarian approaches to work intensification. But there is substantial empirical evidence showing that more genuine efforts at worker democracy have raised productivity.

In their detailed quantitative study of socialised enterprises in Chile between 1970 and 1973, Espinosa and Zimbalist found that productivity either went up or remained constant in four-fifths of their sample. In 40 per cent of the firms, it rose by over 6 per cent annually. They point out also that the 'positive association between productivity and participation has been found by many authors under widely varying conditions, and no major study has found there to be a negative association between the two.'⁴²

The third additional reason for the extension of democracy goes beyond the workplace, and relates to society generally. Several commentators have pointed to the physical impossibility of a 'total' plan for a large and complex economy producing millions of different goods and services.⁴³ Decentralisation of decisionmaking is thus inevitable, and has occurred in state socialism, though not on a democratic basis.

Democratic decentralisation is an important counter to the 'statism'—the excessive reliance on, and power of, the central state—which is common to state socialism and social democracy. The restoration of power to those affected by its use, and a smaller involvement of the central state in peoples' lives is an important political consideration in South Africa, which has its own form of statism: state controls of a more or less direct nature are the daily experience of most of the population. This has in fact been recognised by the ruling class:

⁴² Espinosa and Zimbalist, *Economic Democracy* . . . p 185. See also Pateman, *Participation* . . . chapters 4 and 5.

⁴³ See A Nove, 'The Soviet Economy: problems and prospects', *New Left Review* (119) 1980

one justification made for their 'free market' strategy is precisely the high government profile in the economy, and the consequent expressed desire to 'depoliticise' it. This is myth-making; no economy can be depoliticised. Nevertheless, the politics that are involved need not be statist: they can be of a very different nature from either the existing statism, or the direction the ruling class is moving in, which is towards increasing the power of the central state. The need for democratisation in this sense is explicitly recognised by the Freedom Charter, in its demand for 'democratic organs of self-government' (Clause 1).

It is worth underlining again that this discussion of economic democracy concerns not only workers, but social agents in other capacities also, as consumers or as citizens, for example. The arguments here are not suggesting that unqualified priority should be given to the location of power in the production process. There are potential conflicts of interest between various social groups, which should not necessarily be resolved in the same direction each time. For example, without some intervention in prices, workers producing a commodity have an opposite interest to its consumers in relation to wage increases, which can then become a price increase. Although a price increase could be avoided through price controls, this reduces the overall social surplus available for accumulation, which may be detrimental to yet other groups in society. Democratic resolution of such difficulties means that the various interests involved need to be weighed up, rather than simply taking one into consideration.

While several arguments have been adduced in favour of 'democracy', little has been said as to how it might actually operate. History is littered with examples of societies, and organisations, where lip service is paid to democracy through formal structures, but power is actually wielded in a highly authoritarian fashion. There can of course be no iron-clad guarantee against any erosion of democratic practice: the best hope lies with the continued interest, and active participation, of the mass of the population, defending against any chipping away at their 'full democratic rights'.

Two features of decentralised democracy can be raised, though, which relate to these concerns. First, *direct* democracy in so large and complex a society as this one is impossible; the quantity of information required would simply be too large, even more so than in the case of overall planning.⁴⁴ Elected representatives in all institutions and at all

⁴⁴ See C Sirianni, 'Production and power in a classless society: a critical analysis of the utopian dimensions of Marxist theory', *Socialist Review* (59) 1981.

levels are thus necessary. However, these representatives must be accountable to those who elected them. This is greatly facilitated by the relatively small distance, in a decentralised system, between representative and represented.

Secondly, it should hardly need emphasising that democracy necessarily involves space for the organisation and expression of differing ideas and attitudes. The point was made long ago by Rosa Luxemburg, in criticising Lenin:

without general elections, without unrestricted freedom of press and assembly, without a free struggle of opinion, life dies out in every public institution, becomes a mere semblance of life, in which only the bureaucracy remains as the active element.⁴⁵

The role of the state, in her view, was not to eliminate democracy by becoming identified with one grouping; rather, it is to enforce the application of democracy—'freedom in other words for a plurality of parties and tendencies'—within the operation of public life.⁴⁶

In turning now to look in more detail at the institutions which might constitute a 'democratic SSA', both productive enterprises and those with a specifically regulatory function, it should again be emphasised that our discussion is not proposed as a 'blueprint'. It is intended merely to outline, schematically and tentatively, a direction of analysis in response to some of the issues which necessarily arise in any attempt to restructure an economy. This direction of analysis is guided, in broad terms, by the demands we are considering.

When the Freedom Charter was formulated thirty years ago, its demand that the mines, banks and monopoly industry should 'be transferred to the ownership of the people as a whole' applied only to a very small proportion of the corporations in the South African economy. The mining and banking sectors were, of course, highly concentrated, and had been for decades. But industry remained a sector of primarily small-scale establishments owned by individual capitalists: in 1953–54, 92 per cent of industrial enterprises employed no more than forty-nine workers.⁴⁷ The situation today is fundamentally different—not only is privately-owned industry highly concentrated (as is commerce), but a small number of major interconnected corporate empires control industry, mining and the now highly-diversified

⁴⁵ Quoted in N Poulantzas, *State, Power, Socialism*, London: Verso, 1980, p 253.

⁴⁶ N Geras (1976), *The Legacy of Rosa Luxemburg*, London: Verso, 1983, p 188–9. See also pp 172–3, and chapter 4 *passim*.

⁴⁷ Duncan Innes, *Anglo, Johannesburg*: Ravan Press, 1984, p. 169.

financial sector.⁴⁸ In addition, there are the massive corporations owned by the state: such as SAIS, ISCOR and ESCOM.

The demand for social ownership therefore applies now to the overwhelming majority of economic activity in the country. Once transferred to social ownership (a process that will doubtless entail substantial difficulty), there can be no good reason for the various productive units and control structures to remain intact. The decentralisation of power discussed above demands not only that auto manufacturing plants currently owned by the Anglo American Group be entirely independent from Anglo's gold mines, but also that many gold mines be independent from one another as well (to mention a few examples from within the Anglo American Empire). Enterprise boundaries would thus be closely tailored to the actual activity undertaken, as well as to the location of that activity. Thus there is no necessary connection between Tiger Oats Mills in the Orange Free State and another in the Transvaal. On the other hand, there is a useful link between branches of the same bank, or the same supermarkets, in a single town or city.

Thus, in some industries, enterprises could consist of a number of productive units, in various locations, with a single administrative and control structure. Examples of industries where this would be sensible are electrical power, media and communication, transport, finance and, to some degree, distribution of commodities.⁴⁹ In all of these, networks are required to distribute some item, while information needs to be centralised for coordination of the activity.

In other industries, the enterprise could be based on a single productive unit. However, the concept of a 'productive unit' remains somewhat blurred. For example, do enterprises producing cars or washing machines include the production of the components, or does this fall under a separate enterprise from the assembly operation? In practice, of course, it would vary, depending on a number of factors, from the existing situation when the industry was transferred to social ownership, to the decision on investment in the industry made through the planning process. What is important to note here, however, is that there is no need to distinguish between the control structures of different types of enterprise on the basis of size of investment or potential scale economies, as is suggested by some commentators on the

⁴⁸ See Innes, *Anglo*, chapter 8, and 'Monopoly Capitalism in South Africa', *South African Review One*, Johannesburg: Ravan Press, 1983, pp 171-83.

⁴⁹ See J Kornai, *Anti-equilibrium*, North-Holland, 1971, pp 339-41.

issue.⁵⁰ There seems to us to be no good reason why a chemical corporation like AECI with several large, capital-intensive plants should not be divided into several enterprises, one per plant, with some perhaps providing inputs into the production processes of others. The nature of investment in such enterprises does involve substantial costs in a context of uncertainty, as Nove points out. But a coordinated investment process across enterprises and industries, as will be discussed below, would eliminate the need for greater centralisation of control over production, which such uncertainty might otherwise emphasise.

The most important issue at stake in relation to the management and control structures of socially-owned enterprises is the division between those decisions which should be under the sole control of the workers in the enterprise (naturally including the administrative workers performing some of the management functions of a privately-owned firm), and those decisions which should be made jointly by the workers, the central and local state planning bodies and also, perhaps, the consumers of the particular product or service.

A useful approximation to an appropriate division is provided by Burawoy's theoretical distinction between relations *in* production and relations *of* production.⁵¹ The former refers to the social relations in the productive process itself, involving the organisation and execution of tasks. Relations of production, on the other hand, concern the appropriation and distribution of the surplus. In this context, therefore, they refer to the relations between workers and 'society' (the owners of the means of production, represented inevitably by the state), as well as relations between enterprises.

Using this distinction as a basis, control over relations in production would best lie with the workers in the relevant production process themselves, while control over relations of production should be more broadly based. Factory direction should thus be based on a two-tier structure.⁵² At the first level would be a workers' council, with representatives of different sanctions of the enterprise. This would have control over the division of labour within the enterprise, working

⁵⁰ This appears to be the basis of Nove's distinction between 'centralised state corporations' and worker-controlled 'socialised enterprises' in A Nove, *The Economics of Feasible Socialism*. London: George Allen and Unwin, 1983, pp 200-203.

⁵¹ See above, note 29.

⁵² For an example of such a structure, see the outline of the *normas basicas* in socialised enterprises in Chile between 1970 and 1973, in Espinosa and Zimbalist, *Economic Democracy* . . . pp 52-3.

conditions, quality control, and the intensity of work. The latter would provide at least partial control over the level of output. The second tier would be an overall administrative council with members of the workers' council, as well as perhaps workers elected directly, together with representatives from central and local state planning bodies. There could also be other members in particular circumstances, for example, representatives from the foreign trade ministry in the case of enterprises producing export commodities, or representatives from civic associations in the case of those making consumer goods.

The function of this higher council would be, firstly, to negotiate wages and certain other conditions of the wage contract with the union, such as leave, length of working-time, and so on. Issues which are the prerogative of the workers' council could also be included. There are of course demands around these issues in the Freedom Charter, so that there would certainly be a minimum legal requirement. Also, the Charter demands trade union rights, so unions should continue to exist, despite the existence of the workers' council. (Also, though the Charter is silent on the issue of the right to strike, we would argue that this should also exist. The scope of the control to be exercised by the workers' council is somewhat limited, and it would operate within some partially flexible constraints specified by the administrative council (on which it has representatives). Thus there is no guarantee that the workers in an enterprise would feel satisfied that they could achieve their aims and fulfil their interests solely via the enterprise structures. For this reason, independent representation in unions able to act in the interests of workers is an essential feature of the democratic SSA. Their continued existence and activity would reflect the fact that workers' control is not absolute, and could not be (for reasons already outlined). Conflicts of interest would continue to exist, and workers (like community residents and other groups) need organisations *independent* of the regulatory structures themselves, so that there is some structure over which they do have full control (at least in principle), and which can act on their behalf.

There is a common perception that with both a union able to press for higher wages and worker representation in the managing structures, wages would automatically increase faster than productivity, pushing up costs and squeezing the social surplus. However, quite the opposite is more likely to occur. Precisely because of their role in managing the enterprise and having access to key information, workers are likely to tie their wage demands to the situation of the enterprise (*their*

enterprise), and underrate them when other, less controllable costs are rising or other problems present themselves. Espinosa and Zimbalist (p 185) found that enterprises with a high degree of worker control also had a high rate of investment, indicating that earnings were not simply diverted towards wages. This suggests also that workers did not oppose the introduction of new technologies, since there was security of employment.

To return to the functions of the administrative council, it would also have the task of managing relations with other enterprises, and be the arena in which the state would act in order to direct and shape production and accumulation. In order to discuss these processes further, we need again to distinguish between enterprises according to the nature of product (or service) they produce, but here according to the function of the product in social reproduction.

The essential division here is between producer goods and consumer goods. However, it is necessary to make a further division between 'basic' and non-essential consumer goods. In this way, the economy is divided up into three departments, in the same way as Marx analysed certain aspects of capitalism. Although Marx' main model of the capitalist economy used only two departments, he did in certain places further divide Department II into 'basics' and 'luxuries'. We will do the same, though commodities produced in what we will call Department III (rather than Marx' Department IIa) can by no means be generally regarded as 'luxuries'.⁵³ Some enterprises will, of course, produce commodities that belong in more than one department, but for our present purposes we can ignore this, and divide enterprises into the different departments also.

Looking first at Department I, where capital goods and raw materials are produced, we need also to consider foreign trade. While a broad range of material inputs into production are produced in South Africa, the capital goods sector is not as well developed, so that imports are largely composed of a high proportion of machinery and equipment. On the other hand, South African exports are dominated by partially processed minerals, whose production is also part of Department I. The mediation of international trade in the provision of capital goods is critical to the functioning of the democratic SSA (as to the present

⁵³ See Marx, *Capital*, vol 2. An interesting recent article making use of this approach is E V K Fitzgerald, 'The problem of balance in a peripheral socialist economy', *World Development*, 13(1) 1985.

functioning of the South African economy), since it implies that exchanges between the departments are not fully determined through local regulatory structures, but are subject to variations in international commodity prices.

Since foreign exchange obtained from sales of minerals and other exports will be part of the social surplus available for accumulation, this will fluctuate with commodity prices. Export commodities should be sold to the central state which will also handle imports of capital goods. Because the social surplus is closely tied to foreign trade, by controlling the latter the state will be able to achieve substantial control over the accumulation process. Allocation of capital goods can then take place through the planning process, to be discussed below. The price at which minerals are purchased from the mining enterprises should be related to their cost of production, so that the overall surplus obtained will be determined by the price at which they are sold on international commodity markets. However, if the latter drops below costs, these should still be covered, and production cut back for the moment.

The administrative council in enterprises producing export commodities will thus have limited control over both production and pricing. The products of other enterprises in Department I are inputs for either other Department I enterprises or Department II or III enterprises. Transactions between enterprises should generally be left to the enterprises involved themselves. Within enterprises, such transactions should be the responsibility of the administrative council, which would negotiate over price, quantity, delivery date and so on with the administrative council of the other enterprise.

What is being suggested here is that inter-enterprise transactions occur within a market situation. This would be most consistent with the overall approach of decentralisation as far as is possible. It is by no means contradictory to combine democratic control within the enterprise and over the accumulation process, with market relations between enterprises. In any economic system, there is necessarily a mix of different structures of regulation.⁵⁴ However, as Hodgson points out, 'in a stable and viable system, one [principle of regulation] must prevail'.⁵⁵ In the democratic SSA, while it is a social regulation that is dominant, this does not mean that market forms should be completely

⁵⁴ See G Hodgson, *The Democratic Economy: A New Look at Planning, Markets and Power*, Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1984, p 85 ff.

⁵⁵ *ibid.*, p 187.

excluded, only that they should be subordinate to social forms. The presence of worker representatives on the administrative council would help to ensure that pressures emanating from the market did not result in interference in the production process which was beyond their control. At the same time, such pressures would create constraints within which their control over production, as well as the wage determination process, would have to operate. This, in turn, might help to limit any significant deviation which might develop between their sectional interests and the more general social interest. Furthermore, one function of the state representatives, both local and central, on the administrative council would be to ensure 'rationality' in the enterprise's market transactions. For example, purchases and sales should be local, wherever possible. Beyond this, there would be a process of auditing of enterprises carried out at least annually by the planning apparatus of the central state, with one of the purposes being to obtain information on the market transactions of the enterprise. The planners would thus have fairly immediate information available on pricing, sources of supply, and destination of sales. This could be used both in the planning process itself, and to propose necessary changes in enterprise policy.

Not all market transactions would be carried out by means of negotiation between enterprise administrative councils, as suggested above. In many cases this would be both practically impossible and inappropriate. This would apply especially to transactions between 'monopoly' enterprises, the first type discussed above, and others. The nature of the commodity here, such as electrical power, dictates that rates be set for purchasers, though these could of course be differential for different categories of buyers. The central planning apparatus would necessarily play a role in price determination by such enterprises, since in general essential inputs for all other enterprises would be involved.

The central state would also play a role in price determination for enterprises in Department II, producing basic consumer goods and services. This follows directly from demands in the Freedom Charter for controls over prices. Of course, input prices for these enterprises, and those in Department III, would be determined in ways already outlined. As with productive inputs, prices would be set to match costs as closely as possible. The enterprises making up this Department would be those producing consumer goods, such as food, clothing, housing (including some level of household goods), and those providing various services, such as education, health, basic community infrastructure and human

transport. The division between basic and non-basic consumer goods is clearly somewhat arbitrary (though not necessarily any more arbitrary than that between consumer goods and producer goods, since a large grey area exists here too). What constitutes 'basic needs', that is, minimally adequate provision of these items, is socially determined, via the same institutional process which makes another central and all-encompassing social decision: that concerning the division between current consumption and accumulation.

The emphasis given in the Freedom Charter to adequate provision of goods and services in this department suggests that it should take priority in the planning process. It must be assumed therefore that this sector will be much larger than its present size, so that these demands are able to be fulfilled, or close to it. There is in general significantly less dependence (at least potentially) in many of the industrial sectors in this department on imported capital equipment than in the other two. Relatively labour-intensive technologies can be adopted in a number of production processes, thereby tying in the demand for full employment with that for provision of basic goods and services. The generally higher cost of this type of technique will imply a reduced social surplus, and thus a lower overall rate of accumulation, but this is precisely the implication of the demands.

On the other hand, the increased emphasis on this department means that enterprises supplying machinery and especially raw materials to it from Department I will also need to be adapted and their output substantially increased. The possibility arises here in particular of supply bottlenecks, which are potentially inflationary. In addition, they could be politically problematic if aroused expectations are not satisfied. Avoiding these problems may require the importation of capital equipment to allow the adoption of more capital-intensive techniques in Department I enterprises supplying Department II, to achieve increased productivity. For Department II, lower costs of other inputs may to some extent offset the higher costs of employing more labour.

Costs of production within Department II can be expected to be quite variable, because there will be different types of enterprise here, in addition to socialised ones. These would include cooperatives, small private traders and manufacturers and perhaps also individual artisans. There is at present in South Africa a large 'informal sector' providing a wide range of goods and services to consumers in black townships and squatter settlements. Rather than simply eliminating this by absorption

into formal industrial enterprise, it seems more sensible to evolve it into a cooperative sector in which the workers would themselves own their means of production. Some would inevitably be privately owned, though a limit could be placed on how large such enterprises could grow.

Equally important to consider here is the distribution network of small traders. The distribution of commodities, especially to consumers, is a notorious problem in directed economies, with food often rotting because it cannot be transported to, and distributed in, areas where it is desperately needed. Existing networks should therefore be maintained wherever possible. This also applies to systems of human transport. At the same time, one objective for the long term should be to replace these privately-operated enterprises with worker-run socialised ones. As the Freedom Charter demands, non-socially owned enterprises should be controlled 'to assist the well-being of the people'. This applies, of course, in particular to their pricing policies, since the high prices of small traders have been a longstanding problem for workers and other poor people. They would thus have to be incorporated into a more general system of price controls over consumer goods and services, posing special problems of administration within this, given the large number of such small non-socialised enterprises that there would be.

Price controls are highly controversial policies, and potentially subject to much abuse, including the development of black markets to subvert them. Nevertheless, the alternative of a continually rising cost of living and falling real wages is equally problematic, so that some workable scheme must be developed. Two aspects are necessary. Firstly, costs of production for each particular commodity must be maintained within some determinate range. For socialised enterprises, this can be achieved by allocating investment funds for new technologies which could lower costs, and in extreme cases by closing down plants. (In either case, workers made redundant would have to be employed elsewhere in the enterprise.) For non-socialised enterprises, the process would be considerably more complex. The overall process of monitoring and adjusting production costs would be carried out through the auditing process referred to above, and the planning process.

The second step would be to limit price increases to a given percentage annually, with exemptions where larger rises were unavoidable (for example where imported inputs increased by a larger

percentage). Within these ceilings enterprises could determine their own policies as to levels of output, work intensity, and other factors, which could enable them to earn a limited enterprise surplus. Such a surplus would then be allocated by the workers' council in the enterprise, to wage bonuses, some improvement of working conditions, or to investment.

In Department III, non-basic consumer goods, would be found many items considered essential in advanced capitalist economies as well as many services, especially recreational. These would have a significantly lower priority, in terms of resource allocation, though presumably over the long run, many items initially regarded as non-basic would come to be seen as basic, as the latter were increasingly available for most of the population. The production process for many of the commodities here are more capital-intensive, and therefore a greater drain on foreign exchange, than those in Department II. The main issue is therefore not so much price control, as output control, that is, limiting the quantity produced. One way of doing this might be to raise the prices of some of these items substantially, in order to cut the demand for them. The excess of revenue over costs could be appropriated by the state, if the price rise took the form of a sales tax. In this way the state could obtain control of some of the unsaved surplus income received by those at the upper end of the wage and salary scale. However, there remains a delicate political issue here, since the opposition of the middle classes could be aroused by such a policy relating to what can not, in the main, be regarded as real luxuries.

The fact remains, however, that many of these 'non-basic' items would be produced by the same enterprises that were producing basics. For example, buses and kombis would be produced in the same plants that produced small cars, which are more costly for society, if numbers transportable are the criterion. It is thus somehow necessary to have such enterprises devote their resources to producing items for more collective consumption, without setting specific enforced production targets. It seems that the most appropriate way of doing this is by shrinking the market for the less desirable item.

The state and the transition

The viability of an economic framework, such as the one sketched out above, depends crucially on the role played by the central state. It will have to maintain a dynamic equilibrium or tension between, on the one

hand, the democratic decentralisation necessary for worker and community control over production as well as consumption decisions and, on the other, the achievement of the objectives of the central plan in relation to employment, the 'use-values' produced and investment and growth. The role of the central state lies essentially in setting targets for these and other basic macroeconomic variables, as well as in conflict regulation, in other words, managing the process of negotiation among enterprises and communities. Crucial to this role is the redistribution of data collected through auditing procedures and through the state's operation of the financial system.

The state, then, is at the nexus of the conflict between the two logics—of centralisation and decentralisation—which is inherent in the concept of a democratic economy. The feasibility of the concept—that is, whether it can be achieved in practice—depends in large measure on the way the relationship between these tendencies develops during the transitional process, starting 'the day after liberation'. At this point the central state is the main locus of political power for those forces seeking a transition away from the domination of the market, or, to use Joseph Schumpeter's terminology, from the private to the public sphere.⁵⁶ The need both to expand and to transform material production towards popular basic needs (along the lines discussed earlier) and to obtain the conformity of still-private decisionmakers to this objective means that mobilising and allocating resources depends almost entirely on the state. There is as a result a powerful tendency towards over-centralisation which is greatly reinforced by the opposition corporations inevitably mount to the challenge to their power and profits.

The real challenge during the transitional period is therefore not to lose sight of the other major goal, which is to infuse the process of economic development and upliftment of living standards with a meaningful democratic content. The experiences of other societies which have attempted such a transformation suggests that the perceived imperatives of growth and industrialisation quickly come to dominate, at least for a protracted initial phase, any decentralising impulses which exist.⁵⁷ The pattern is both familiar and depressing, but on this issue the South African case has always seemed to hold some grounds for optimism. This is not simply because of the relatively high level of

⁵⁶ W Brus, 'Socialism—Feasible and Viable?' *New Left Review* (153) 1985.

⁵⁷ G White, et al. (eds), *Revolutionary Socialist Development in the Third World*, Brighton, England: Harvester Press, 1982.

capitalist development in the country, but also because of the realisation that the arrival of 'the day of liberation' is itself contingent on the active participation of very wide layers of the black population and the accompanying development of at least some tradition of localised decisionmaking and execution.

However, the contradictions of the transitional process also need to be discussed at a more concrete level. First, we will examine this issue as it affects productive enterprises. While the Freedom Charter calls for the commanding heights of the economy to be 'transferred to the ownership of the people as a whole', this should in our view remain the goal of a long term and cautious process. Precipitous action in this regard would be counter-productive in that it would arouse significant opposition, encourage sabotage and lead to a further drain of capital and skills causing bottlenecks and shortages. In the perspective adopted here the immediate priority is not the transfer of the structure of ownership and property rights (though this is necessary over the longer term), but rather to gain control over the application of economic resources. Thus a first step would be to ensure that companies be required to enter into planning agreements, specifying at least the nature and levels of their output and employment as well as their plans for future expansion and technical change. In negotiating these agreements with management and trade unions central planners could make use of the tax, credit, pricing and wage systems to provide incentives to corporations. The high degree of concentration in most South African industries should facilitate the drawing up of such agreements.

The primary weapon for enforcing these agreements could well be the implementation of a 'socialisation' procedure as a penalty for repeated contraventions.⁵⁸ In terms of this penalty the management of the firm could be replaced, while at the same time making it possible for workers and consumers to play a much greater participatory role in running the enterprise. Obviously, the capacity to enforce such a penalty depends crucially on having the political weight to overcome corporate resistance.

Such a gradualist approach towards 'socialisation' of the productive sector cannot, however, be extended to the financial system. The nature of financial assets themselves makes private financial institutions notoriously difficult to regulate, whether via direct controls and

⁵⁸ A Glyn, *A Million Jobs a Year: The Case for Planning Full Employment*, London: Verso, 1985.

agreements or through market intervention. This is particularly true of the process of credit creation. For this reason nationalisation of the banking and credit system (as demanded in the third clause of the Freedom Charter) at an early stage can only be advantageous, providing it is politically feasible, that is. While this will enable the state to control the level of credit, it must also be recognised that there remains a real need for caution and vigilance,⁵⁹ since entirely reasonable demands for rapid and significant improvements in wage levels, living standards and job prospects will inevitably produce substantial pressure 'from below' on any new government. The temptation will be to allow normal aggregate demand to outstrip the constraints on supply, but should this occur then the outcome can only be runaway inflation and economic crisis. As Ellman puts it: 'Socialist monetarism is entirely rational.'⁶⁰ In other words, the money supply and creation of credit will need to be strictly controlled.

Of course, the financing of economic growth during the transition cannot rest only on the money supply process. An additional key objective must be to bring to bear the massive cash flows presently controlled by the handful of giant financial conglomerates which dominate South Africa's peculiar corporate structure. Probably the most appropriate method to employ here, initially at any rate, would be to raise the prescribed asset requirements and extend them to financial institutions to which they do not apply at present, particularly the mining finance houses.

Finally in relation to financial questions, central state control over foreign trade would necessarily be linked to a substantial tightening of controls over foreign exchange flows, so as to minimise capital leakage and optimise the use of scarce foreign currency.

At the same time as the central state intervened heavily to transform existing economic activity it would also have to massively expand its own role in providing infrastructure and social services. By approaching the issue of upgrading communities and the construction of housing, schools, clinics and so on in a decentralised and participatory fashion a counterweight may be developed to any statist trends which occur in the industrial and financial sectors.

The production of goods and resources in the transitional economy

⁵⁹ S Griffith-Jones, *The Role of Finance in the Transition to Socialism*, Allanheld & Osman, 1981.

⁶⁰ M Ellman, 'Monetarism and the state socialist world' in K Jansen (ed), *Monetarism, Economic Crisis and the Third World*, London: Frank Cass, 1983.

will undoubtedly be characterised by the shortages and bottlenecks which are all too familiar in centrally planned economies. However, it must be recognised that the economic structures which produce such unevenness and difficulty on the supply-side also make possible the fuller utilisation of unemployed and underemployed resources, especially labour. The major sources of economic growth and expansion of output over this transitional period are likely to derive, not from higher productivity based on technological progress, but from employing previously unemployed workers and from reallocating currently unproductive resources, such as those used for so-called 'defence'. Furthermore, improving the quality of life of the black population should raise the productivity of the labour force over time.

While the process of growth within the democratic economy requires far more consideration than it has received here, it is evident that the balance between centralisation and decentralisation is a crucial factor. The experiences of state socialist economies up to the present have resulted, in general, in an emphasis on statism accompanied by an investment bias. While this has enabled a phase of rapid growth and movement to full employment, once this latter point has been reached slower growth has produced pressures towards decentralisation and a return to market-based incentives to encourage productivity improvements.⁶¹ Our argument here is that wider democratic participation in the process of production and consumption itself during the transition-*cum*-reflation process may make possible a continuation of adequate growth rates once full employment is reached. This in turn may lead to an avoidance of the social difficulties associated with a slowdown in expansion.

Conclusion

By its very nature this article cannot really have a conclusion since our aim has been to open up a new terrain of discussion, not close off the debate. What we can perhaps do by way of a conclusion is to take note of some of the many missing elements in our analysis as presented here.

First, there is the issue of whether the schematic outline of a democratic economy as presented here is in fact feasible and, more concretely, attainable? In this regard, there is no doubt that our discussion of the transition to a democratic economy is far too brief to

⁶¹ J Kornai, *Growth, Shortage and Efficiency*, London: Basil Blackwell, 1982.

cover all the issues that need addressing and, therefore, much more detailed work is required in this area. Furthermore, our article focuses on the issue of constructing a democratic economy in which the organised working class plays a vital role. But what of other sections of the South African population, such as women, rural workers and peasants? What role would they play in a democratic economy and how would their interests be articulated? Such questions are not peripheral to the discussion at hand, but need to be centrally located in the debate. And again, while we have focused mainly on the formal processes involved in constructing a democratic economy, a key question not fully covered here concerns the role the informal sector would play in such an economy. It may be envisaged that in a post-apartheid society a much larger informal sector than currently exists would develop. How would such a sector be incorporated within a framework of democratic participation?

In addition to the above social issues are a host of more specifically economic questions not covered by our article which, nonetheless, require answering. What, for example, are the different conditions of accumulation in agriculture, mining and manufacturing industry and how does a democratic economy relate to these? For instance, how can the specific labour supply requirements of each sector be met without resorting exclusively to administrative controls on the one hand or market incentives on the other? How should the income differential between black and white South Africans be bridged without jeopardising prospects for growth? And what are the most likely areas of potential conflict in a post-apartheid economy?

To answer these and other related questions requires input at two levels. First, there is a crucial need to gather and analyse a mass of empirical data about the economy's present material structure, as well as its capital structure. As we have found in writing this article, without this data the issues cannot be concretely addressed and the debate will tend to assume an abstract, and even speculative direction.

Secondly, it is crucial that the issue of a democratic economy should be taken up directly within the ranks of the workers' and popular movements. The South African economy will never come under the control of democratic social forces unless those forces themselves are sufficiently organised and conscientised to take control. It is thus crucial that they actively participate in debates around these issues. The extent to which a post-apartheid economy becomes democratic rests ultimately in the hands of the South African people.

Alternative urbanisation strategies in South Africa: a critical evaluation*

This article evaluates the South African state's official strategy of *orderly urbanisation* and compares it with the policy of *positive urbanisation* advocated by the Urban Foundation, a body representing the interests of big business in South Africa. The paper argues that both these policies fail to address adequately either the causes of urban problems or the demands and needs of the majority of South Africa's population. An alternative approach to urban problems is set out and the question of a post-apartheid urban policy is taken up.

Part 1 examines the recent debate about the extent and pattern of African urbanisation in South Africa. It concludes that the effect of apartheid policies has been to displace urbanisation geographically and promote the development of quasi-urban forms of settlement in the countryside rather than to retard or stall these processes. Parts 2 and 3 examine the theoretical underpinnings and policy implications of orderly and positive urbanisation. Part 4 puts forward an alternative approach to the urban question in South Africa and takes up some of the major policy issues which flow from it.

1) The impact of apartheid on African urbanisation

In common with all semi-industrialised, or peripheral, capitalist countries, urbanisation in South Africa has been accompanied by the concentration of industry and wealth in a few major urban areas, and control over this wealth in the hands of a small section of the population.¹ It has been associated with the rapid growth of unemployment, chronic shortages of housing, inadequate services,

* This article is based on a lecture given to the Senate Special Lecture series at the University of the Witwatersrand in September 1986, and a paper presented to the 'Southern African Economy after Apartheid' Conference at the University of York, England, September/October, 1986.

¹ D Slater, 'Towards a political economy of urbanisation in peripheral capitalist societies: problems of theory and method with illustrations from Latin America', *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research* 2(1), 1978.

extremes of wealth and poverty, and widening social and regional inequalities. What differs about South Africa is not the presence of inequalities as such, but the extent to which state policy has given these inequalities a specific racial and geographical imprint.

For three and a half decades, urbanisation policy in South Africa has been framed in terms of the objectives of territorial apartheid. Official policy has sought to restrict and eventually to reverse the flow of Africans into the designated white urban areas by means of influx control, removal and resettlement. Temporary migrants in towns have been confined to single-sex hostels and families to residentially segregated townships with government built and owned matchbox houses. The corollary has been the bantustan and border industry policies which sought to re-create the bantustans as economically and politically independent entities, thereby justifying the removal of Africans from the rest of the country.

What impact did apartheid have on the extent and pattern of African urbanisation? One influential view, advanced by Charles Simkins, is that influx controls have delayed this process.² Simkins estimates that the level of urbanisation in South Africa in 1980 was 12 per cent below the international average for countries with similar levels of industrialisation.³ This, he argues, was the result of influx controls, which prevented African settlement in urban areas. In 1980, after three decades of influx control, only 31.9 per cent of the African population was living in urban areas.⁴ But these estimates are based on the population census of 1980 which defines an urban area as an area with an officially recognised local authority. Thus, only people living in proclaimed townships with officially approved housing, infrastructure, services and administration are defined as urban.

The inadequacies of the official definition have been pointed out by a number of writers, including Simkins himself.⁵ Its chief weakness is that

² C Simkins, *Four Essays on the Past, Present and Possible Future of the Distribution of the Black Population of South Africa*, Cape Town: South African Labour and Development Research Unit, University of Cape Town, 1983, p 84.

³ C Simkins, *Four Essays* . . . , p 115, Table 1.

⁴ C Simkins, *Four Essays* . . . , p 76, Table 6.

⁵ In his first three essays, Simkins uses official definitions of urban areas and finds that urbanisation in South Africa has been held up. As an afterthought his fourth essay discusses the status of unrecorded quasi-urban areas in the bantustans and here he concedes that their inclusion would result in a 'spectacular' change in his earlier results (*Four Essays*, pp 151-7). J de Villiers Graaf has estimated urbanisation levels on the assumption that quasi-urban settlements with a population above 5,000 should be regarded as urban. The status of 'semi-urban' areas in the bantustans is also discussed by A Mabin in 'Material and political factors in South African urbanisation, with some illustrations from the Transvaal', unpublished paper presented at University of Natal, Durban, 30 May 1986.

it fails to take account of the burgeoning population living in quasi-urban settlements both on the peripheries of the cities and in remoter areas of the bantustans. Exclusion of people living under these conditions fosters misperceptions about the impact of apartheid policies on patterns of urbanisation. It also results in gross underestimation of the extent of African urbanisation.

Apartheid policies have influenced African settlement in complex and often contradictory ways. The first decade of apartheid—from the late 1940s to the late 1950s—witnessed the rapid growth and residential stabilisation of an urban African proletariat, albeit mainly in segregated locations on the outskirts of the major industrial centres. I have argued elsewhere that the effect of influx controls in this period was to foster the reproduction of differentiated African labour power: a permanent urban proletariat and temporary migrant labour.⁶ Between 1950 and 1960, a decade when influx controls were relatively ineffective, the number of Africans living in proclaimed urban areas (inside and outside the bantustans) increased from 2.4 to 3.9 million, or from 29 to 32 per cent of the total African population (domestic and foreign). The proportion living in households (as against single persons) increased from 45 to 65 per cent in the metropolitan areas and from 72 to 84 per cent in towns.⁷ These results indicate that a process of growth and residential stabilisation took place in the urban areas during the 1950s, despite the aims of apartheid.

From the 1960s a policy of relocating urban Africans to commuter areas in the bantustans was pursued. Existing townships were either 'deproclaimed' and their residents removed or they were incorporated into bantustans by redefining boundaries. The outcome was the creation of urban townships within the bantustans from which Africans were forced to commute to work in white designated urban areas, sometimes over very long distances. In 1960 there were only 639,000 Africans living in towns in the bantustans but by 1970 there were 774,900, an increase of 28 per cent per annum.⁸ Most of these people lived in commuter belts abutting on the metropolitan areas. The effect of urban relocation of this kind was clearly not to stall or retard urbanisation, but rather to displace it spatially.⁹

⁶ D Hindson, 'The Pass System and the formation of an urban African proletariat in South Africa, a critique of the cheap labour-power thesis', DPhil thesis, University of Sussex, 1983, ch 3.

⁷ C Simkins, *Four Essays* . . . , p 76, Table 6.

⁸ C Simkins, *Four Essays* . . . , p 75, Table 5.

⁹ This term was coined by P Smit and J J Booysen, in *Swart Verstedeliking: Proses, Patroon en Strategie*, Tafelberg: Kaapstad 1981.

Influx controls were applied more comprehensively and effectively in the 1960s than in the 1950s.¹⁰ Rights of permanent residence under Section 10 of the Urban Areas Act were undercut by placing further obstacles in the way of settlement of women and children, and by preventing men from qualifying for permanent residence exemptions.¹¹ Did these measures prevent urbanisation? The effect was to enforce temporary migration and prevent permanent settlement of families in towns, and to that extent urbanisation in existing centres was retarded. But it does not follow that influx control thereby preserved the conditions of rural life in the bantustans.

From the mid-1950s the rural material basis of temporary migration was rapidly diminished as agricultural production and incomes within the bantustans dropped.¹² Temporary migrants became migrating proletarians dependent on employment and incomes in urban areas yet unable to settle there with their families because of influx controls and shortages of housing and social services for family life. From the 1960s, the impact of enforced temporary migration was to dissolve rural society from within, to transform and supplant pre-existing economic and social relations with forms generated within the urban centres. Studies of African villagers in the 1970s show that even in cultural terms the influence of the urban areas had penetrated deeply, if unevenly, into previously rural communities.¹³

Conditions within the bantustans were influenced as much by the rural policies of the apartheid period as by urban policies. Under the Land Act of 1937 thousands of African squatters and labour tenants on white capitalist farms were removed and relocated to areas known as 'closer settlements' within the bantustans. Many African land owners in the white rural districts, on farms officially termed 'black spots', were also resettled. Most of these removals took place in the 1960s. This resulted in the formation of quasi-urban settlements of various kinds within the bantustans in which population density was high and access to agricultural land minimal or absent.¹⁴ Land and population settlement policies pursued within the bantustans had similar effects. The so-called

¹⁰ D Hindson, 'The Pass System . . .', pp 240-55.

¹¹ D Hindson, 'The Pass System . . .', pp 255-75.

¹² C Simkins, 'Agricultural production in the African reserves of South Africa, 1918-1969', in *Journal of Southern African Studies* (7) 1981.

¹³ P Mayer (ed), *Black Villagers in an Industrial Society*, Cape Town: Oxford University Press. See especially the Introduction by Mayer.

¹⁴ Many examples of such areas are described in the *Surplus People Project, Forced Removals in South Africa*, Cape Town: Surplus People Project, 1983 (5 volumes).

land rehabilitation and betterment schemes of the 1960s and 70s produced quasi-urban settlements, many of whose residents were cut off from access to land and became increasingly dependent on urban employment and incomes.¹⁵

Apartheid policies not only displaced urbanisation spatially by physically resettling populations within the bantustans, it also dammed up urban populations by creating barriers to movement out of the bantustans. Since the 1970s a process of internal migration has occurred within the bantustans from rural districts to areas within commuting distance of the major urban centres. Examples of peri-urban commuter areas of this kind are Umlazi (near Durban) and Winterveld (near Pretoria), which have grown massively during the late 1970s and 1980s.¹⁶

Exclusion of informal peri-urban commuter settlements and quasi-urban settlements in areas which are more remote from the cities leads to serious under-estimation of the extent of African urbanisation. Johann de Villiers Graaf has shown that if settlements with 5,000 or more people and informal peri-urban commuter settlements in bantustans are included as urban areas, the level of African urbanisation in South Africa as a whole in 1980 was 66 per cent, this being double Simkins' estimate.¹⁷ This finding obviously overturns the idea that urbanisation in any simplistic sense has been stalled. It calls for serious reconsideration of the meaning of the terms 'rural' and 'urban' in South Africa.

Since the late 1970s, influx and efflux controls in some areas have begun to break down, especially where distances between urban centres and bantustans make commuting impossible.¹⁸ There has consequently been rapid growth of illegal squatter settlements on urban peripheries in places such as Crossroads in the Western Cape and Soweto-by-the-Sea near Port Elizabeth. These movements have occurred despite the continued application of influx controls and reflect the failure of this policy in the 1980s.

Clearly then, it should not be assumed that the major urban problems

¹⁵ J Yawich, *Betterment, the Myth of Homeland Agriculture*, Johannesburg: South African Institute of Race Relations.

¹⁶ J de Villiers Graaf estimates that there were 1.7 million Africans living in peri-urban areas in the bantustans in 1980. See his article entitled 'The present state of urbanisation in the South African homelands and some future scenarios', paper to Development Society Conference, Cape Town, September 1985, p 12, Table 2.

¹⁷ J D Villiers Graaf, 'The present state of urbanisation . . .', pp 1-2.

¹⁸ D Hindson, *Pass Controls and the Urban African Proletariat in South Africa*, Johannesburg: Ravan Press, forthcoming, 1987, ch 5.

in South Africa spring from under-urbanisation, or that an exceptionally high proportion of the population lives, works and subsists in the rural areas, except in the sense that their wider geographical setting is rural. Rather, apartheid policies have displaced urbanisation spatially and promoted forms of geographically dispersed quasi-urban settlement through influx control, enforced temporary migration and agricultural resettlement policies. Border industrialisation policy and internal migration within the bantustans have promoted dispersed urban and industrial growth especially in places where parts of bantustans lie on the fringes of the metropolitan areas. This legacy of apartheid confronts future planners with specific problems and challenges.

2) Orderly urbanisation

The assumption underlying both 'orderly' and 'positive' urbanisation is that racial and regional inequalities in South Africa are essentially the outcome of misplaced state interference in the economic system.¹⁹ Racial state policies over three decades—influx control, bantustans and industrial decentralisation—are the root cause of unemployment, poverty and inequality. These policies have resulted in the misallocation of labour and other resources sectorally and regionally and have prevented the South African economy from attaining levels of output, employment and welfare consistent with its endowment of natural and human resources. Today's urban crisis is the result of prejudice and state mismanagement.

The policy implications flowing from this view are that South Africa's major economic problems—unemployment, poverty, and regional and racial inequalities—can best be resolved by abolishing apartheid and allowing market forces and individual choice to determine where population and industry are located. The role of the state should be limited to the planning of residential and industrial sites and the correction of market failures where urbanisation leads to a divergence between private and social cost. Deregulated urbanisation, it is argued,

¹⁹ The term 'orderly urbanisation' is associated with the Report of the Committee for Constitutional Affairs of the President's Council on An Urbanisation Strategy for the Republic of South Africa, (PC 3-1985). The term positive urbanisation has been coined by the Urban Foundation to distinguish its policy from that of the state. See for example 'A Statement by the Private Sector Council on Urbanisation', issued at its first meeting on November 1, 1985, The Urbanisation Unit, Urban Foundation, Johannesburg, 1985.

ALTERNATIVE URBANISATION STRATEGIES

will automatically stimulate capital accumulation, employment and income growth. Regional and other inequalities will gradually disappear as the barriers to movement are dismantled and labour and other resources move to the cities where productivity, incomes and employment are highest.²⁰

The policy of 'orderly urbanisation' was set out in the President's Council Report, 'An Urbanisation Strategy for the Republic of South Africa', and adopted in a government White Paper in this year.²¹ 'Orderly urbanisation' replaces traditional apartheid with a policy which accepts African urbanisation as inevitable, but seeks to reorder this process within a regional planning framework. It conceives of the economic re-integration of the bantustans into nine new development planning regions which cross-cut and supersede the existing boundaries of the bantustans and provinces. Within each development region one or more 'metropolitan' region will provide the framework for the organisation of third tier government, fiscal and administrative structures and the planning of industrial and residential siting within the larger development regions.

In the form currently being implemented by the state, the strategy of orderly urbanisation is based on five fundamental principles: racial residential segregation; social differentiation within residential areas; industrial and residential deconcentration within and between development regions; privatisation of house ownership; and devolution of provision of municipal services. In short, 'orderly urbanisation' represents a form of decentralised apartheid in which market forces are to be given play within a regional planning framework based on the principles of racial residential segregation and the spatial dispersal of industry and population.

In a significant departure from orthodox apartheid, 'orderly urbanisation' entails the abolition of traditional influx and pass controls. But it replaces these with new measures to control movement from the bantustans to the rest of South Africa, and to control movement and settlement within the non-bantustan areas.

The Aliens Act is, for example, being used to prevent citizens of independent bantustans from settling permanently and acquiring

²⁰ Variants of these ideas underlie the President's Council Report on urbanisation and are present in the publication of the Urban Foundation. See, for example, A Bernstein, 'The abolition of influx control and the development of a new urbanisation strategy', Speech to the 1986 Manufacturing Strategy Convention, Sandton, 11 March 1986, pp 5-14.

²¹ White Paper on *An Urbanisation Strategy for the Republic of South Africa*, WP 1986.

citizenship rights outside the areas designated as their national states.²² Within non-bantustan South Africa, traditional pass and influx control measures have been replaced with squatter, health and trespass law. These are being used to restrict urbanisation in metropolitan centres and channel new urban settlers to ethnically ordered settlements or metropolitan peripheries, both within and outside the bantustans. Examples of the new deconcentration areas to which Africans are being removed are Onverwacht, Khayelitsha, Ekangala and KwaNdebele. These are areas such as these that Cosmos Desmond in his book *The Discarded People* termed 'dumping grounds'.²³ However, unlike the dumping grounds of the 1960s and 1970s, these areas are being integrated into labour markets centred on metropolitan and deconcentrated industrial and commercial areas.²⁴ The opening up of urban labour markets to workers living in peri-urban settlements does not, of course, guarantee that more jobs become available to previously excluded workers. The aim is to subject relatively protected urban labour markets to competition from impoverished workers located residentially on the peripheries of the metropolitan centres.

Under the *Urban Areas Act* which governed African urbanisation until 1986, a distinction was drawn between permanent and temporary African populations in towns. Permanent residents with Section 10 rights were given a degree of protection from removal while they remained in employment.²⁵ The principle underlying the new official housing policy is that residential differentiation should be encouraged to promote class stratification within racially segregated areas. Housing and services are to be tailored to income levels, so that better serviced suburbs will be created for the relatively well-off residents, while the poor will be confined to areas with less developed residential infrastructure and poorer services.

An implication of the new housing strategy is that economically inactive, unemployed and low income groups—the majority of urban Africans—have all become vulnerable to eviction and removal. Since March 1986, major confrontations have occurred between rent

²² G Budlender, 'Influx control in the Western Cape: from pass laws to passports', *South African Labour Bulletin* 11(8) 1986.

²³ C Desmond, *The Discarded People*, Harmondsworth: Penguin 1971.

²⁴ W Cobbett, 'Orderly urbanisation: continuity and change in influx control', in *South African Labour Bulletin*, 11(8) 1986.

²⁵ Section 10, *Black (Urban Areas) Act*, Act 25 of 1945.

boycotting residents and township authorities bent on enforcing payment of rents. This battle is decisive for the strategy of orderly urbanisation. It is only if progressive township organisations are defeated that the state can remove poorer sections of the urban African population to deconcentrated areas, end housing subsidies and implement the policy of private ownership and social differentiation. It is decisive for township organisations, too, for survival will be difficult if the state succeeds in sifting out, evicting and removing the poorest and most militant township residents.

Within the deconcentrated areas a policy of 'ordered informal settlement' has been adopted. Apartheid housing policy involved the provision of subsidised housing and services for permanent urban Africans, hostels for migrants and, from the 1960s, housing expansion only in the bantustans. The present policy of ordered informal settlement envisages the growth of African urban settlement through the designation of new residential sites on metropolitan peripheries in which basic infrastructure and serviced sites will be provided by the state. State construction and subsidisation of housing will be phased out and replaced by a policy of privatisation and self-help.

Ordered informal settlement represents a form of controlled slum development. The strategy is rationalised in terms of an ideology of upgrading. Individuals, it is argued, will be able to upgrade their homes, and communities upgrade their infrastructure and services, as employment and incomes rise. In this way, so it is argued, informal settlements will be transformed ultimately into fully serviced suburbs with high housing standards.

A third element in the 'orderly urbanisation' strategy is the use of fiscal measures to discourage the concentration of labour-intensive, low-skill industries in metropolitan centres and to promote their dispersal to de-concentrated residential areas. It is here that the small business and informal sector strategies lock into 'orderly' urbanisation. Small businesses are officially defined as independent enterprises with less than a given number of employees—for example fifty in the manufacturing sector and a hundred in mining—whereas the informal sector refers to enterprises which are not registered as businesses. Official policy since 1984 is to promote such enterprises, especially in deconcentrated industrial areas, in the hope that they will generate high levels of employment and incomes. Measures to promote informal and small businesses include de-regulating economic activities, lowering health and safety standards, relaxing legally determined wages and

other conditions of employment, and the provision of cheap loans to individual businessmen.²⁶

Experience elsewhere shows that only a minority are capable of raising their living standards above the level of the mass of population through such means. The primary function of strategies of this kind is to secure the existence of surplus and marginalised sections of the working class. The growth of surplus population, and its maintenance at or below subsistence levels, ensures that wages of organised workers within the formal sector are held in check.²⁷

Seen from this perspective, ordered informal settlement and the informal sector strategies are means of restructuring and sustaining reserve armies of labour at or below subsistence levels. They release the state and employers from meeting costs of reproduction of labour-power and shift this burden directly on to the working class. This is not being done, as in the past, by conserving pre-capitalist production relations and re-distributive networks in the bantustans, but by dismantling state housing and service subsidies within the urban townships and allowing market forces, coupled with property rights, trespass and squatter laws, to sift out and stratify the African population.

Finally, the orderly urbanisation strategy is linked to a political strategy in which Africans are to be formally incorporated into local and regional political structures on a racial basis. The aim is for the white ruling groups to accommodate the demand for political participation, but in a manner which fragments national politics racially and regionally.²⁸ Powers over the provision of municipal services are to be devolved on a group (ie racial) basis to local and metropolitan government, while the key security and order functions of the state—monetary policy, the judiciary, army, national police—are to be concentrated in centralised national structures sealed off from majority access and accountability.

²⁶ Department of Manpower, National Manpower Commission, *Report on an Investigation into the Small Business Sector in the Republic of South Africa, with Specific Reference to Factors that may affect the growth and development thereof*, Report 1, 1984; and White Paper on *A Strategy for Creating Employment Opportunities in the Republic of South Africa*, WP C-1984.

²⁷ A debate occurred in the early 1970s as to the theoretical standing of the concepts of marginalisation, the reserve army of labour and surplus population. See for example A Quijano, 'The marginal pole of the economy and the marginalised labour force', *Economy and Society*, (5) 1974 and M Legassick and H Wolpe, 'The bantustans and capital accumulation in South Africa', *Review of African Political Economy* (7) 1976.

²⁸ W Cobbett et al., 'South Africa's Regional Political Economy, A Critical Analysis of Reform Strategy in the 1980s', in *South African Review* (3) 1986.

3) Positive urbanisation

Until recently the Urban Foundation has been amongst the most vocal of critics of government—albeit from a reformist stance—for its failure to abolish influx control and promote African urbanisation. However, with the official adoption of the President's Council Report a convergence appears to be taking place in the views of the Urban Foundation and reformers within government. This is no doubt in part because the policy of orderly urbanisation set out in the President's Council Report was heavily based on the positive urbanisation strategy of the Urban Foundation, and the state's adoption of this strategy implies broad acceptance of Urban Foundation policy. However, certain differences in their positions remain.

Prior to the publication of the White Paper on Urbanisation, the Urban Foundation had publically rejected the *Group Areas Act*, the *Population Registration Act* and the use of the *Aliens Act* to prevent citizens of independent bantustans from acquiring South African citizenship.²⁹ All these racial laws, for the time being at least, remain foundations of state policy.

Apart from the question of race, there is also an important difference between the Urban Foundation and government reformers over industrial and residential deconcentration. Official policy rests on the argument that urbanisation should be regulated to correct for divergences between the private cost of newly urbanising people and the social costs to the existing urban populations. Unregulated urbanisation, the state planners argue, would lead to overcrowding, pollution and the deterioration of living conditions in existing residential areas. Vigorous state intervention is needed, not to override market forces, but to correct the market's failure to signal to individuals the true social costs of moving to cities. On these grounds the policies of industrial dispersal and residential deconcentration both within and between regions are justified.

In contrast, the Urban Foundation is sceptical about the extent to which urbanisation raises social costs and emphasises instead the economic advantages of heavy urban concentration in terms of ease of communication, specialisation, markets and so on. It is suspicious of vigorous state intervention to effect spatial redistribution of industry

²⁹ J H Steyn, 'South Africa 1986: a watershed year', address to National African Federated Chamber of Commerce and Industries Conference, Cape Town, 8 July 1986.

and population. It argues that problems of regional inequalities can best be addressed by allowing the poor to move to the cities, and providing them with jobs and houses there. It favours, at most, mild intervention to promote existing growth points close to the major metropolitan centres.³⁰

While these differences remain, it is significant that the Urban Foundation has recently been reorganised to concentrate on residential development and construction in African townships.³¹ What this seems to indicate is broad acceptance of the state's orderly urbanisation strategy—subject to outstanding criticisms over its racial and regional dimensions—and commitment to assisting the state in implementing its housing strategy.³²

The corner-stone of this strategy and a point at which state and Urban Foundation policy meet is the policy of developing low cost and informal housing. The flaw in this policy is that it seeks to develop a short-term expedient into a principle of urban strategy, and to bolster this with an ideology of individual initiative and upgrading.

In circumstances of widespread unemployment and poverty, the concept of self-help seems the least appropriate of all approaches to a rational housing programme. It places the burden of providing adequate shelter on individuals and communities with the least access to the material resources necessary for such a task, and at the same time releases from all social obligation individuals and social classes over-endowed with these material resources.

4) Alternatives to orderly and positive urbanisation

Alternatives to official and business-backed urban strategies must clearly be grounded in an understanding of the causes of racial, regional and social inequalities in South Africa. A well-established body of literature holds that apartheid policies developed originally to support and extend capitalist development in South Africa and that the two have historically been mutually reinforcing rather than antagonistic.³³

³⁰ A Bernstein, 'The Abolition of Influx Control . . .', p 37.

³¹ J H Steyn, 'South Africa 1986 . . .', p 2.

³² J H Steyn, 'Statement issued on behalf of the Private Sector Council on the 23 April 1986 on the White Paper on Urbanisation', issued by the Urban Foundation, 1986.

³³ I am referring to the revisionist and Marxist writings which appeared from the late 1960s. For example, F A Johnstone, 'White prosperity and white supremacy in South Africa today', *African Affairs* 69 (275) 1970; M Legassick, 'South Africa: capital accumulation and violence' in *Economy and Society* (3) 1974.

Capitalist expansion has been fuelled by policies which sought to retard urbanisation because the perpetuation of temporary migration and the tribal authority system in the bantustans released capital and state from costs of reproduction of labour power and the maintenance of surplus population.³⁴ However, with the collapse of the reserves as reproductive bases for African migrant labour, and with the modernisation and increasing sophistication of the industrial sector, it can be argued that apartheid policies have subsequently become increasingly dysfunctional to capitalism.³⁵

In this approach it is the system of production and distribution that is the underlying determinant of racial and regional inequalities, the growth of unemployment and poverty. State policy provides a framework within which capitalist development takes place. State intervention can influence patterns of urbanisation and the social and regional distribution of wealth and poverty, but only within limits dictated by tendencies inherent in capitalism. Thus, displaced urban development and the concentration of impoverished populations in quasi-urban settlements in the bantustans are made possible by the tendency of capitalist development to generate a surplus population relative to its needs for labour. The bantustan strategy represents the specific form in which state policy has sought to manage the social and regional inequalities of accumulation in the context of this particular peripheral capitalist society.

It follows that the mere abolition of apartheid cannot be expected to resolve the major social and economic problems associated with urbanisation. The relaxation of influx controls will undoubtedly alleviate racial inequalities to a degree, and will certainly lead to greater concentration of population and industry within metropolitan areas. However, unrestrained, market-directed urbanisation is likely to reproduce social and regional differentiation, albeit in forms which cross-cut the racial and regional matrices of capitalism under apartheid. Therefore, the resolution of social, racial and regional inequalities must be sought not in removal of the state from the market, but in urban and regional planning within the framework of a transformed state and economy.

Debate on alternatives to orderly and positive urbanisation is as yet in

³⁴ For example, H Wolpe, 'Capitalism and cheap labour-power: from segregation to apartheid', *Economy and Society* (1) 1972.

³⁵ D Hindson, *Pass Controls* . . . , ch 5.

its infancy. These two strategies have been met with scepticism and suspicion by progressive organisations within South Africa, but not as yet with coherent critical responses, let alone rational alternatives.³⁶ What is clear from these organisations is that it is not merely the intrinsic merits of alternative blueprints that will determine their reception, but also the method by which they are arrived at. Progressive organisations are hostile to policies imposed on them by unrepresentative state authorities. Their demand for full participation in the formulation and implementation of policies affecting their members is unlikely to be abandoned under a post-apartheid state.

Alternatives must clearly arise out of the demands, needs and active participation of local communities, but the formulation of an alternative national urbanisation strategy also presupposes the existence of national democratic political processes. Without this there is no legitimate mechanism capable of expressing and weighing the needs of different communities, urban and rural, against each other, and residential needs against other national objectives. Until the present regime is dismantled, there will be severe constraints on the capacity to formulate, let alone implement, acceptable alternatives based on national economic priorities. Nevertheless, a start may be made by examining the Freedom Charter adopted at the Congress of People in 1955, and weighing its declared aims against the urban conditions and demands of urban people in present-day South Africa.³⁷

The Freedom Charter sets out an ideal towards which an urbanisation strategy should strive. It states that all shall have the right to live where they choose and to be decently housed. Rents should be controlled and unused housing space made available. Slums should be demolished and new suburbs built with adequate infrastructural provisions and social amenities. It declares that the right and duty of all to work shall be recognised by the state.

This statement of rights and aims points to an urbanisation strategy which differs radically from orderly urbanisation, especially on the question of race, and from positive urbanisation, especially on the question of state intervention. But these broad principles are compatible with different degrees and forms of state intervention and a range of concrete mechanisms and institutions. They do not, and

³⁶ Statements from organisations in special edition in *Influx Control and Reform*, *South African Labour Bulletin* 11(8) 1986.

³⁷ The Freedom Charter, adopted at the Congress of the People, Kliptown, 26 June 1955.

umably were not intended to, represent a policy programme able of grappling with the details of urban and regional development.

My aim in the last section of this article is not to try to read into the Freedom Charter a possible urbanisation strategy or to offer an alternative blueprint, but to raise some broad issues that must be pressed in formulating a national urban strategy capable of meeting needs of the majority of South Africans. I will limit myself to three in issues: regional policy, housing and employment.

Should a planned approach to urbanisation be based on abandonment of efforts to decentralise industry and population or should further decentralisation be encouraged? In taking this question a distinction should be drawn between industrial decentralisation to areas remote from the metropolitan centres, and concentration, much of which has taken place within areas—inside and outside the bantustans—which are extensions of existing metropolitan areas. A considerable degree of dispersal of industry and residential infrastructure in the latter areas has already taken place in South Africa, in part as a consequence of state inducement, but also due to spontaneous capital movements.³⁸ Furthermore, migration within bantustans has resulted in family settlement on a large scale in metropolitan fringes surrounding these dispersed industrial areas. In these metropolitan peripheries there has also been considerable investment in housing and amenities and the development of transport works and social amenities such as schools.

The existence of this industrial and residential infrastructure, and the presence of settled, family-based communities, provides grounds for planned development and expansion of such areas, rather than their abandonment. This should be done by means of measures to promote employment through industrial siting, and through the provision of improved housing (including means for improving existing housing stock), social services and amenities such as schools, crèches and recreational facilities.

In contrast, there seems far less scope for promotion of far-flung industrialisation to communities in the quasi-urban settlements in the areas remote from the major urban centres. A large proportion of this population must inevitably be catered for within the centres of mining

³⁸ T Bell, 'The new inter-regional division of labour in South Africa', *Journal of Southern African Studies* 12(2) 1986.

and industrial employment. Here there is a need for measures to promote family migration to the urban-industrial centres through a vigorous programme of housing construction, including the conversion of hostels and compounds into married quarters.

It is probable that many, but not all, migrant workers and their families would choose this option. Given the investment of many migrants in homes in the bantustans, and retention of ties to land and means of rural production for a remaining few, voluntary temporary migration and weekly and monthly commuting can be expected to continue for a long time to come for a section of the contract labour force in the towns and in the mines. Positive incentives (such as access to improved housing and services in urban areas and agricultural support in rural areas), rather than force, should be used to encourage the gradual separation of the migrant work-force into stable urban and rural communities.

Clearly, the question of land tenure systems and the mode of organisation of agricultural production—in the capitalist and subsistence sectors—will have a major bearing on the nature and scale of the urban problem, not only because of their influence on migration, but also, and crucially, because of their effects on the availability of agricultural surpluses and scope for balanced development of industry and agriculture and trade between these sectors. Attempts to increase agricultural productivity within the bantustans are likely to reduce rather than increase the scope for local employment and may well increase the outflow of population to the cities. In contrast, there may be considerable scope for reabsorption of African cultivators in agricultural areas presently owned by whites.

The movement of population out of concentrated settlements in the bantustans would allow for the reallocation of rural resources, the reorganisations of rural production and the formation of permanent agriculture work-forces. Increased specialisation, and rising levels of productivity and improvement in output and income levels would lead ultimately to a narrowing of the gap between rural and urban living conditions. But it can be anticipated that the reconstruction of agriculture in the bantustan areas will require substantial state redistributive economic assistance: agricultural training, expenditure on physical and social infrastructure and communications, financial and other assistance.

The dismantling of apartheid and reconstruction of African agriculture will undoubtedly result in a very substantial migration out of

the bantustans into South Africa's cities. It is thus unquestionably within the major metropolitan areas, and on their peripheries, that homes and jobs will have to be provided for the vast majority of South Africa's presently unemployed and impoverished people. And it is here that the greatest efforts will have to be made to provide adequate living conditions, services and social amenities and expand employment.

The starting point for an alternative housing strategy for the urban areas will have to be the abolition of the Group Areas Act and any other future measures which restrict residential areas to racially defined groups. This will immediately make available considerable vacant accommodation to families previously excluded from the market on grounds of race. But housing prices in these areas are likely to continue to exclude all but the privileged few. Thus, it will be necessary to adopt measures in these areas to promote increased housing density and higher occupation rates. This can be done by increasing the effective costs of large residential sites and homes and by taxing large sites and unused housing space and by reallocating public expenditure on infrastructure such as urban road networks to higher density residential areas.

However, the housing needs of the mass of urban people in South Africa go way beyond the existing housing stock, even if this were to be more equitably and rationally distributed. These needs can only be met by a massive housing and residential programme which harnesses the resources of the state, industry and local communities. Alternatives to apartheid housing policy and the shack strategy of orderly and positive urbanisation must be based on public acquisition and planning of residential sites close to employment, the provision of residential infrastructure and services and the building and provision of assistance in building of housing. This will require research and experimentation into a wide range of housing types and methods of construction including large-scale contracting, and collective and community based construction.

The non-monopoly sector of the economy is likely to continue to play a major part in creating employment within the metropolitan centres and will undoubtedly expand rapidly once racial barriers such as those provided under the Group Areas Act are dismantled. However it will be important to ensure that minimum standards of wages and working conditions are set to prevent its use as a cheap labour sector. Solutions for the problems of unemployment and poverty which a post-apartheid economy will face must be sought also in the reorganisation of the

large-scale industrial, mining and commercial sectors. It is here that the bulk of the material resources of the economy are concentrated and here that the surpluses needed to build up South Africa's economic and social system will be generated. Employment creation on a scale capable of resolving South Africa's unemployment crisis can only be effected through a major reorganisation of production methods and priorities and through the redistribution of work. This presupposes social ownership of the means of production, democratic forms of organisation and control of the labour process and the subordination of market forces to social needs.

It is only through the development of a national urban and regional plan, democratically formulated and implemented, that a beginning can be made to the resolution of South Africa's racial, regional and social inequalities and the construction of a non-racial society.

The cost of apartheid

The magnitude of the problems to be dealt with by a future government in a post-apartheid South Africa will be vast. The purpose of what follows is to provide some indication of the size and complexity of these problems in what can be termed the welfare arena. This arena is so broad and involves so many major issues that discussion will be restricted to five areas within it: poverty, migrant labour, unemployment, housing and nutrition. A descriptive emphasis will be used, not in order to document the obvious inequalities that will be inherited by a future South Africa, but to highlight their extent and emphasise that few of the problems associated with these inequalities are amenable to easy solutions.¹

Although South Africa is ranked by the World Bank as a middle-income country—and the ninth wealthiest of the oil importing ones—the actual average level of development places the country much lower than such an income measure suggests.² When contrasted with other countries of similar average income South Africa falls behind them in terms of welfare indicators, such as average life expectancy of the population, infant and child mortality rates. This gap between economic indicators and welfare ones is a clear reflection of the extreme inequality in the distribution of income and production capacity in South Africa. Income is unequal between colour groups, the sexes, and the urban and rural areas, and production capacity unequal between the metropolitan regions (particularly Pretoria, Witwatersrand and Vereeniging area) and between urban areas and the rest of the country.³ The gross skewness of distribution of economic and welfare resources between groups and geographical areas is fuelling a widening divide between rich and poor, between urban and rural areas and between bantustans and their inhabitants and other areas.

¹ Roger Southall in 'South Africa: constraints on socialism' (paper at 'The Southern African Economy After Apartheid' Conference at University of York, England, October 1986) provides a broad ranging discussion of political and economic problems that will face South Africa and is useful background to a discussion of this future.

² See Jill Nattrass 'South Africa's status in the international development stakes', *Indicator SA* 1(3) 3-9, 1983.

³ *ibid.*, p 8.

Apartheid has exacerbated the already serious problems associated with economic development. South Africa has a population that is increasing by 2.3 per cent per year and is expected to increase in size by almost 40 per cent between 1980 and the year 2000, (adding an average of about 800 thousand people a year to existing population figures over the period.)⁴ Its urban population is expected to increase by ten million by the year 2000, and by that year South Africa will need to have provided four million new housing units and six million new jobs to meet the needs of its population. Such demands on economic resources due to population growth are to be expected in a relatively new industrial economy. By themselves these demands place great strains on the ability of the economy to provide a widely acceptable minimum living level for all South Africans.

The apartheid regime, being based on the politics of racial exclusion, has shown itself to be unable to redistribute resources to meet the basic welfare needs of the population. It is improbable that it could 'reform' itself to do so, by significantly redirecting resources from the white and affluent towards the poor and excluded. In addition, apartheid has produced a serious economic crisis in which there is a minimal economic growth rate, an inflation rate hovering around 20 per cent, a withdrawal of foreign investment and an escalating application of boycotts and sanctions. The crisis which apartheid has produced is deep-seated, severely aggravating the problems associated with industrial and population growth and lessening the ability of the economy to finance the welfare services required by the population either now, or in the future.

Poverty and inequality

The high levels of racial inequality and poverty in South Africa point to a diseased economic and political system and to severe economic problems ahead. The magnitude of economic inequality is made clear by examining figures in three areas: the distribution of income, wealth and poverty in contemporary South Africa. In the first areas, inequality in the distribution of personal incomes between households is best

⁴ P Spies 'South Africa in the year 2000: society will decide', *Energos* (10) Part 2, 1984, p 154 and also Herman Giliomee 'Afrikaner nationalism and the fable of the Sultan's horse', *Energos* (13) 1986, p 38.

summarised in the Gini coefficient of inequality, which in 1975 stood at 0.68 (zero being perfect equality), giving South Africa the unenviable distinction of having the most unequal distribution of income for any economy for which data is currently available.⁵ Other studies of income demonstrate a notable skewness of its distribution by colour and indicate that in 1980 white per capita incomes were 12.9 times higher than African incomes; 5.3 times higher than 'coloured' incomes and 3.9 times higher than Indian ones.⁶ In other terms, the average per capita income of whites was almost thirteen times greater than the African average. A more recent summary measure of income inequality indicates that in 1985 11 per cent of households had incomes of over R1400 per month, 33 per cent of households had incomes of between R400 and R1400 per month, while the bulk of households in South Africa (56 per cent) had incomes below R400 per month, with 40 per cent of households having incomes below R280 per month.⁷

Wealth distribution figures are similarly markedly skewed, with the top 5 per cent of wealth-holders having 88 per cent of personally owned wealth.⁸ This pattern is writ large in the corporate economy where a growing pattern of concentration of ownership has led to six groups of business companies controlling 84 per cent of the assets on the stock exchange. Associated with this concentrated ownership has been a concentration of economic power and decisionmaking, as indicated by such findings that a mere 704 persons hold some 60 per cent of the directorships of all public companies in South Africa.⁹

It is within this setting of severely unequal incomes, wealth and economic power that massive poverty exists. Almost half of all households in South Africa live below the least generously defined poverty level, with poverty being most widespread and acute in the rural

⁵ Merle Holden and Mike McGrath, 'Economic outlook: retrospect', *Indicator SA* (34) 1986, p 44.

⁶ D W Williams *et al.*, 'The realities of social security in South Africa' (mimeo), The Actuarial Society of South Africa, October 1986, p 4.

⁷ Charles Simkins 'How much socialism will be needed to end poverty in South Africa?' Paper at 'The Southern African Economy after Apartheid' University of York Conference, October 1986.

⁸ Jan Lombard (ed) 'Power in the market economy', *Focus Key Economic Issues* (34) 1984 (Johannesburg: Mercabank).

⁹ Michael Savage 'An anatomy of the South African corporate economy: ownership, control and the interlocking directorate', Seminar paper, Centre for African Studies, University of Cape Town, 1985.

areas and among the African population. McGrath provides careful calculations to show that 30 per cent of African households in metropolitan areas live below the poverty level and that this figure rises to over 70 per cent in rural areas and the bantustans.¹⁰ Reynolds provides a summary figure of those families living below a poverty line, to show that 7 per cent are found in the cities, 13 per cent in 'white' rural areas and 83 per cent in the bantustans.¹¹ In other words, despite the pressing and evident nature of poverty in urban areas, 93 per cent of poverty in South Africa is outside the major cities and is concentrated within the bantustans.

The level of poverty in the bantustans, where more than half the African population live, has been documented in several studies that show meagre household incomes and a measure of the extent to which these incomes fall below survival levels. Thus, a recent study by Simkins indicates that in 1980 8.9 million people in the bantustans, or 81 per cent of their population, had incomes below a harshly drawn minimum living level. The extent of absolute poverty within the bantustans has been increasing since 1960 as then 250 thousand people (5 per cent of the population) were in households that had no income at all, by 1980 such poverty had grown with 1.4 million people (13 per cent of the population) having no measurable income.¹²

While groups of government functionaries, limited numbers of workers on the fringes of the bantustans near 'white' towns, together with some migrant mine workers may have been improving their incomes, the depth of overall poverty in these areas appears to have deepened as most probably has the proportion of people living in poverty. Detailed studies point to the severity of poverty in particular areas. A study of the Mahlabitini district of KwaZulu in 1981 shows the mean household income, including the small value of agricultural production, to be R114 per month—with 43 per cent of this income coming from remittances by migrant labourers and 16 per cent coming from pensions. It is clear that the majority of households in Mahlabatini live in grinding poverty (with incomes below a notional subsistence level

¹⁰ Mike McGrath, 'Global poverty in South Africa', *Social Dynamics* 10(2) 1984, pp 38–48.

¹¹ N Reynolds 'Citizens, the state and employment', Paper presented to Carnegie Conference on Poverty, University of Cape Town, April 1984.

¹² Charles Simkins, 'What has been happening to income distribution and poverty in the homelands', *Development Southern Africa* 1(2), 1984, pp 142–52.

of R184 per month) and that people's survival in this area is dependent on cash transfers from migrants.¹³

There is no absence of black poverty in the cities but the figures cited suggest that even the widespread nature of urban poverty pales into near insignificance compared to what is found in the bantustans and the 'white' rural areas of South Africa.

Studies in all areas of South Africa point to the multi-dimensional nature of poverty and of the need to examine factors other than income to understand its extent and depth. The recent Carnegie conference on poverty in South Africa drew together research throughout the country to indicate that it was not merely in terms of income but also in terms of access to fuel, transport, food, water supplies and health, that poverty has to be examined and understood.

Buch and his colleagues provided a penetrating insight into the poverty of one rural African community—Mhala in the Eastern Transvaal. In this area an average of 706 people share a water tap; a study of 2,609 sub A and sub B schoolchildren showed that 16 per cent of them had bilharzia, 39 per cent of them had no breakfast prior to coming to school and that 46 per cent of them were suffering from active tuberculosis.¹⁴ In the Transkei, a study of five villages showed that an average family spent 187 minutes a day fetching water; and in the Manguzi area of KwaZulu more than 60 per cent of the households are more than a one-hour round trip to water and for those too crippled to walk who have to pay someone to draw water, the cost is 1 cent per litre, which is approximately thirty-three times more expensive than running tap-water in the urban homes of metropolitan South Africa. Other studies have pointed to the inadequacy of basic sanitation. In Alexandra, on the edge of the affluent suburbs of northern Johannesburg, there is an absence of adequate sanitation and one report for the Carnegie conference described 'sewage flowing in the streets' as a result of the overloading of the existing bucket system. In the small town of Clarens in the Orange Free State the 800 residents of the black township have only twelve pit latrines to use, an average of sixty-six persons to each toilet, but 'Permission now (1984) has been given by the Oranje Vaal Board for residents to dig a pit toilet in each stand.' Other studies point

¹³ M Gandar and N Bromberger, 'Economic and demographic functioning of rural households in the Mahlabatini district', *Social Dynamics* 10(2), 1984, pp 20-37.

¹⁴ These and the following figures are drawn from overviews of the Carnegie Inquiry Conference by Francis Wilson contained in 'South African poverty major issues', *Social Dynamics* 10(2) 1984, pp 61-69; and 'Water, Sewerage and Fuel', *RSA* 2,000 8(1) 1986, pp 53-58.

to the connections between poverty and fuel resources available to the mass of the population. In the valley lowveld of KwaZulu the average distance walked in collecting one headload of firewood is 3.6 km and the time taken in collecting the load is over 2.5 hours. In the grassland area the distance and time are 8.3 km and 4.5 hours. In Cape Town, in Valhalla Park, it has been found that fuel for cooking, lighting and heating costs more per unit for the poor, (who have to use paraffin and candles at a monthly average cost of R65 per household) than for the better-off, who can afford the electricity connection fee and who then spend on average R25 a month on fuel.

All such studies point to the widespread and multi-dimensional nature of poverty and indicate that a fundamental redistribution of resources is required in a future South Africa if all its people are to live with even their most basic needs being adequately met.

Migrant labour

The pervasive system of migrant labour in South Africa rests upon the political fragmentation of the country into 'black' and 'white' geographical areas and the stringent controls governing movement between these areas. There presently exist three main categories of migrant workers in the economy. The first and major category of migrants are those workers migrating from places within South Africa usually on labour contracts as 'single labour units', to live and work in 'white' areas. In 1985 there were 1,842,240 such internal migrants, 82 per cent of whom were male, and approximately half of them worked on the Witwatersrand or in the gold-mines.¹⁵ The second category consists of migrants officially classified as 'commuters', who live in the bantustans but travel on a daily basis to work in 'white' areas. Some 614,847 African workers were classified as commuters in 1985 and while some of these workers live in areas such as Mdantsane or Umlazi, relatively close to major metropolitan centres, many of them are forced into travelling long hours on a daily basis between work and home. At present 400,000 African workers in this category travel more than thirty km per day and recently there has been an appreciable shift to medium and long-distance commuting. Thus, for example, in north-eastern Bophuthatswana a survey of 100 Pretoria commuters

¹⁵ Figures drawn from Central Statistical Services Reports and Reports of the Department of Cooperation and Development.

revealed that their average travel time to work was 7 hours 19 minutes, which was longer than the average time these workers spent sleeping.¹⁶ Overall, 20 per cent of 'commuting migrants' travel on average between 3.5 and 7 hours a day, the other 80 per cent travelling on average 2.5 hours a day.¹⁷ Thirdly, there are 371,008 foreign migrants coming from neighbouring countries to work in South Africa. The great majority of these migrants are employed in the mining industry and originate from three neighbouring countries—Lesotho (140,000), Mozambique (69,000) and Malawi (30,000). Thus, in total the South African economy contains over 2.2 million migrant workers who are employed and live in 'white' South Africa on a semi-permanent basis. In addition, it contains over 600,000 'commuting migrants' from the bantustans and large numbers of workers who are forced through having to live far from their work, into becoming what could be termed 'daily migrants'. It is not unrealistic to state that approximately one out of every three workers in South Africa can be classified as a migrant worker.

The impact that the migrant labour system has had, and continues to have, on South Africa is vast. The system has generated grossly distorted patterns of population settlement, has significantly contributed to the undermining of stable community and family life, contributed to the failure to provide adequate wages and social security, as well as having had serious effects on the provision of adequate housing for workers, on worker organisation and on worker health. The ravages of the system will take decades to repair and will involve massive fiscal expenditures.

The recent Abolition of Influx Control Act of 1986 does not significantly alter the compulsory underpinnings of the migrant labour system as it has been associated with new legal and administrative mechanisms controlling freedom of movement. The Act affects only those persons classified as permanent residents in 'white' South Africa and does not affect those stripped of their South African citizenship when the TBVC areas were proclaimed 'independent'. Thus seven million South Africans remain aliens in the country of their birth, subject to the provisions of the Aliens and Immigration Laws Amendment Act of 1984 which require them to obtain permission to live in, or work in, 'white' South Africa.¹⁸ In addition, the abolition of pass laws has also

¹⁶ J Cameron and A Naude, 'A dependence on subsidised transport', *Indicator SA* 4(1) 1986, p 79.

¹⁷ Report of the President's Council on 'An Urbanisation Strategy for the Republic of South Africa', 3/1985, p 95.

¹⁸ *Cape Times*, 23 September 1986.

been accompanied by the introduction of administrative measures consciously manipulating black access to land, housing and jobs in urban areas (under the umbrella of the 'orderly urbanisation policy' enunciated by the President's Council) and by a firm implementation of the Trespass Act. Thus, while the legal and administrative underpinnings of the migrant labour system have undergone surface changes, the system remains intact to be inherited by a future South Africa.

One of the gravest effects of enforced migrancy is found in the distorted patterns of population settlement existing in South Africa that it has helped to produce. Starkly put, this pattern has led to gross overcrowding in the bantustans, an under-urbanisation of South African cities and a marked decline in the proportion of blacks in rural areas outside of the bantustans. Since 1950 there has been a massive shift of population location toward the bantustans. The proportion of the population living in bantustans, after dropping slightly between 1950 and 1960 (from 39.7 per cent to 39.2 per cent of the total African population), rose rapidly to 47.4 per cent in 1970 and to 52.7 per cent in 1980.¹⁹ Presently, over 11.8 million persons live in these areas, which constitute only 13 per cent of the surface area of South Africa. Many of the inhabitants of these areas have been forcibly removed to them (in the Ciskei one out of every four persons living within its borders, or some 161 thousand people have been dumped there since 1970) under policies that have resulted in the uprooting and removal of three and a half million persons in South Africa since 1960.²⁰

A 1980 estimate of the distribution of the population within the bantustans indicated that 1.9 million people live in urban areas within them (many of these areas being vast dormitory towns attached to 'white' cities); 2 million persons live in peri-urban areas in them; 1.1 million live in semi-urban areas, and 6.8 million in rural areas.²¹ It is particularly this last grouping of rural bantustan inhabitants that are cut off from the mainstream economy. Among them unemployment and poverty is endemic and their living conditions, as the recent nation-wide Surplus Peoples Project stated, 'must be seen to be believed'. With this group the importance of households having a remittance income from a

¹⁹ C Simkins, *Four Essays on the Past, Present and Possible Future of the Distribution of the Black Population in South Africa*, Saldru, University of Cape Town, 1983.

²⁰ Laurine Platzky and Cherryl Walker, *The Surplus People: Forced Removals in South Africa*, Johannesburg: Raven Press, 1986.

²¹ D W Williams *et al.*, *op. cit.*, p 8.

migrant, or of having an income from a pensioner, is critical to physical survival. The dynamic underlying the migrant labour system has helped lock these people into the 'dark recesses of the labour market', yet has made them desperately depend upon migrancy to survive in the rural slums in which they are trapped.

Enforced migrancy has also resulted in the under-urbanisation of South African society. In 1980 some 13.6 million people lived in urban areas (46 per cent of the total population) with the majority of white, 'coloured' and Indian South Africans being urban residents. However only 6.8 million Africans lived in urban areas (32 per cent of the African population). While absolute figures for urban African population growth indicates a steady increase in the number of Africans in towns, these figures are misleading as they obscure a declining urban growth rate which is particularly marked from 1951 onwards. In the three periods 1951-60, 1960-70 and 1970-80 urban African growth rates show this declining rate to be 4.5 per cent, 3.9 per cent and 2.3 per cent.²² Much of this decline is attributable to the strict application of influx controls, although the failure to provide adequate urban housing and schools also contributed to the decline. Recently several estimates of the extent of under urbanisation have been made, against the backdrop of changes in influx measures. Simkins has calculated that the impact of influx controls currently is keeping 'between 1.5 and 3 million people out of the metropolitan/"white" urban areas, in the sense that the African population would rise by that number in the short and medium terms' with free movement of the population. On the assumption that if all African dependants were to join their breadwinners, Simkins argues that the urban/metropolitan population would now rise by 2.3 million.²³ Cameron and Naude provide a larger estimate, stating that if a true 'laissez-faire' pattern of urban settlement took place 'then the 1980 urban population would be swelled by between 4.5 and 7 million migrants and their offspring'.²⁴ Precise estimates either of under-urbanisation, or of possible urban size in the true absence of influx control measures, are impossible to make. But it is clear that if freedom of movement to the towns was to exist there would be enormous immediate needs for housing, schools, employment and basic community facilities for the new residents entrants to urban areas. Such needs would be in addition to those already existing in these areas.

²² C Simkins, *Four Essays* . . . , *op. cit.*

²³ C Simkins, *Four Essays* . . . , *op. cit.*

²⁴ *op. cit.*, p 81.

In the search for survival and for a family life many people presently are entering the urban areas, despite often facing the risk of prosecution for illegal squatting (if they live in an unproclaimed black area) or of being fined up to R600 (if they are TBVC 'citizens' without permission to be in the area) and then 'deported'. In Cape Town the Western Cape Administration Board has released figures indicating a dramatic increase in African migration into the city over the past year. According to the Board figures, the net migration into the greater Cape Town area in February 1985 was about 9,000 persons per month. However, between December 1985 and May 1986 some 130,000 people entered the area, that is about 26,000 people per month, or almost three times the estimate at the beginning of 1985.²⁵ Such migration is placing considerable strains on facilities already chronically under-supplied and is leading to a rapid growth of squatter communities. Much of the movement into the Cape Town area consists of women and children joining breadwinners. The skewed sex and age ratios of the African population in Cape Town (a feature of most 'white' urban areas) help to point to why this is taking place. In 1980 in Cape Town among the African population there were 1.95 males to every 1 female, and the population predominantly consisted of men of working age.²⁶ The movement into cities is clearly a desperate search for family life as well as for survival by the unemployed and by those dependent upon the earnings of breadwinners in the area.

With one out of three African workers being migrant labourers the migrant labour system cannot be dismantled overnight. Given freedom of movement not all migrants will wish to live in family circumstances near their place of work; their living conditions as migrants however will require urgent upgrading. Freedom of movement will lead naturally to many migrants and their families settling permanently in urban areas. While this will increase the pressures on the already under-supplied facilities in the urban areas it will go some way to repairing the damage to the fabric of family life that generations of migrancy has wrought. The full cost of repairing this damage in a future South Africa will be of enormous magnitude and can be repaired only over many years.

Unemployment

The South African economy is characterised by widespread and

²⁵ Cape Town City Council, *Low Cost Job Creation in Cape Town*, July 1986, p 17.

²⁶ *Annual Report of the Medical Officer of Health, Cape Town*, 1985.

growing unemployment. In the past decade only half of the necessary jobs to provide work for those entering the labour force and for the unemployed have been created. It is impossible to obtain an accurate picture of the extent of unemployment and under-employment in South Africa as official figures are both inadequate and unreliable. Several estimates of unemployment exist, with Nattrass estimating there to be 1 million unemployed black workers in 1985, and Giliomee indicating that the pool of black unemployed and under-employed workers now has swollen 'to nearly 3 million, or 25 per cent of the black population' (of working age).²⁷ Most recently a report compiled by eight actuaries has indicated that 37 per cent, or 4.5 million persons, of the working age population are either unemployed or under-employed. Detailed surveys give support to these figures.²⁸ A Vista university survey in the Port Elizabeth-Uitenhage area in 1985 indicates that black unemployment stood at 50 per cent; a self-survey in 1985 by residents of Atlantis near Cape Town revealed a 50 per cent unemployment figure; a 1983 survey in Grahamstown indicated a 30 per cent unemployment rate.²⁹

Projections of future unemployment provide an even bleaker picture. By the year 2000 an additional 3.6 million new jobs will have to be created merely to absorb new work-seekers entering the job market, that is 250,000 jobs per year. However a total of 6.8 million new jobs will be needed if unemployment and under-employment is to be eliminated, that is over 450,000 jobs a year.³⁰ Other projections to the year 2000 point to there then being 8.07 million employed persons and 9.85 million unemployed or under-employed workers. In other terms this projection indicates that in 2000 some 55 per cent of the South African population of working age will be unemployed or under-employed.³¹ This projection is by no means conservative, for it is based on the assumption of a 2 per cent economic growth rate over the period 1985-2000. As a result of the current economic recession and increasing isolation of the South African economy this growth rate is unlikely to be met and it is probable that the level of unemployment therefore will be greater than this estimate.

²⁷ Jill Nattrass, 'The year 2000 from the 1986 viewpoint', *Energos* (13) 1986, p 17; Giliomee, *op. cit.* (1986), p 38.

²⁸ D W Williams *et al.*, *op. cit.*, p 7.

²⁹ Vista survey reported in *Cape Times*, 5 August 1985; Atlantis in *Argus*, 12 August 1985; Grahamstown in D Gilmour and A Roux 'Urban black unemployment and education in the Eastern Cape', Carnegie Conference on Poverty, Paper 120, University of Cape Town, 1984.

³⁰ Bureau of Market Research Report, 1984.

³¹ D W Williams *et al.*, *op. cit.*, p 7.

Three groups in particular are currently hard hit by unemployment. First the young, among whom unemployment is concentrated. A recent survey of Mdantsane found that school leavers had a one-in-three chance of finding employment and that the duration of their unemployment frequently exceeds one year. Experience in other countries points to the conclusion that school leavers who do not quickly obtain jobs are less likely to then obtain them in a climate of general unemployment. Other South African studies have shown that the chances of finding employment on leaving school are not greatly affected by the length of schooling and a projection has been made that if present trends continue by the year 2000 some 3.5 million black South Africans with Standard 8 to Standard 10 qualifications will fail to find employment customarily associated with that level of education.³² South Africa therefore potentially faces the prospect of a rapid growth in the numbers of unemployed youth, including those who are fairly well educated. This, as Giliomee notes, is a potential political time-bomb of the most serious dimensions.

A second group hard hit by unemployment are women, particularly those in the depths of the rural areas. In the economically buoyant 1960s the proportion of women in employment grew considerably, with the rise slowing in the 1970s and 1980s. The rise was particularly marked in the metropolitan areas among black women and Simkins currently estimates that women in this group who are age 15-59 are three times as likely to find employment as their bantustan counterparts.³³ No accurate figures exist of unemployment or under-employment among women, in either the urban or rural areas. However it is evident that declining employment opportunities have an immediate and harsh impact on women, as is shown by even the unreliable official figures on unemployment indicating that in 1985 some 54 per cent of the African unemployed were women and that the proportion of 'coloured' women classified as unemployed exceeded the male unemployment rate (8.5 per cent versus 7.9 per cent).

A third group among whom unemployment and under-employment is most prevalent are those living in the rural areas, and here it is probable that the 'deeper' a person lives in a rural area the more likely he or she is to experience or be affected by unemployment. Again no firm figures exist of rural unemployment but informed estimates, such as that made by Keenan for 1984, indicate that there is a 50 per cent

³² H Giliomee, *op. cit.*, (1986), p 38.

³³ *ibid* (1986), p 9.

unemployment rate in the Ciskei, Bophuthatswana, Lebowa, KwaZulu and Gazankulu areas.³⁴ In such areas a high proportion of households have females as their heads, because of migrant husbands, and survive on the remittances from them. A survey of 4,500 Transkei households found that more than half of the households survived on a cash income of R80 per month and that more than 90 per cent of this income came from migrants. Some 300 per cent of the families survived on less than R50 per month, 95 per cent of this coming from migrant remittances.³⁵ Unemployment among migrant workers thus has immediate and devastating effects on those living in rural areas.

It is clear that a massive programme of job creation requires to be undertaken. Only a handful of estimates of differing reliability and accuracy exist concerning the cost of job creation. Such estimates vary according to the assumptions made about the capital and labour requirements of differing economic sectors and areas, and the ability of parts of the economy to absorb labour. One calculation points out that between R4,000 million and R6,000 million annually is required to provide the 1,500 jobs per day needed to meet the demands of work-seekers.³⁶ Most calculations are agreed in identifying a need to create a minimum of between 1,000 and 1,500 jobs per working day to meet the need for work among the South African population.

In an important study by Abedian and Standish of the University of Cape Town, an estimate is made on the costs of starting to address the problem of unemployment.³⁷ They take two sets of figures: first the figures used in the ineffectual Unemployment Relief Programme in October 1985 of the cost per head in creating a job, which amounted to R2,036, and also the cost per head of creating a training position, which amounted to R1,333. Next they then calculated the percentage of the 1932 budget spent on the poor white problem at the height of the attack on it and conclude that 15.8 per cent of the budget was devoted to financing 'a gigantic and well orchestrated public works programme that set in motion a process which succeeded in eradicating white poverty'. If a similar proportion of the 1986 South African budget, namely 15.8 per cent, was devoted to generating jobs, then R5,936 million would become available. This sum would generate a total of either 2,920,000

³⁴ *Argus* (Cape Town) 29 October 1985.

³⁵ Reported in *Race Relations Survey* 1983, p 365.

³⁶ Reported in *Race Relations Survey* 1984, p 217.

³⁷ Iraj Abedian and Barry Standish, 'An economic inquiry into the poor White saga', Saldru Working Paper No. 64, University of Cape Town, November 1985.

jobs, or 5,240,000 training positions—for electricians, secretaries, bricklayers, book-keepers and so forth.

The attack in the 1930s on the 'poor white' problem involved both the political power and determination to gather economic resources (from a combination of tax increases, budget reallocation and borrowing) to devote to combating and eventually eradicating 'white' poverty. The 1930s experience demonstrated, among other things, that a fundamental reallocation of economic resources is required if unemployment and the poverty associated with it are to be eradicated. Without such determined reallocation, the spectre of South Africa that in little more than fourteen years time, more than half of every two South Africans of working age will be unemployed or under-employed. Employment in the informal sector of the economy will not provide the solution to this critical problem. Lange calculates that by the year 2000 the informal sector of the economy will provide employment for 13 per cent of economically active persons, leaving 36 per cent of persons of working age unemployed.³⁸ It is reasonable to conclude that between one-third and one-half of the South African population wishing to be economically active will be unemployed by the year 2000 unless radical measures are taken to address this situation. Even given a completely changed political and economic system the creation of sufficient employment for the South African population forms a major challenge that will be difficult to meet.

Housing

Figures from all sources are agreed that the housing shortage in South Africa is gigantic and growing annually. A variety of different estimates exist of the size of this shortage and of the projected need for housing. One estimate, by the Venter Commission, placed the size of the housing shortage in 1980 at 6,130 units for whites, 51,780 for 'coloured' persons and at 160,540 units for the African population (outside 'independent' bantustans).³⁹ The Commission noted that these are low estimates and that different calculations would change these figures to shortages of 18,000 units for whites, 80,000 units for 'coloured' persons, 240,000 for Indians and 240,000 for Africans.

³⁸ A Rouwkens de Lange, *Rand Daily Mail* (Johannesburg) 18 July 1984.

³⁹ *Survey of Race Relations 1984*, p. 375.

A more recent National Building Research Institute report places the existing shortage of housing in the urban areas of 'white' South Africa in March 1985 at 634,000 units and indicates that there is a surplus of 37,000 thousand houses for whites, while shortages for the 'Coloured', Indian and African population are placed respectively at 52,000; 44,000 and 538,000.⁴⁰ This report states that 'Overcrowded conditions are particularly severe in the urban black townships. The fact that 7.4 million people presently live in only 466,000 relatively small housing units, ie on average nearly 16 persons per dwelling, is indicative of the seriousness of the situation.'⁴¹

Other figures cited by Kentridge indicate that in 1984 there were only 421,000 family housing units for blacks in the urban areas, giving a figure of twelve people per unit, or three people per room. International standards generally consider that more than 1.5 persons per room constitutes overcrowding.⁴²

However measured, the existing housing shortage is acute and growing. By the year 2000 it has been estimated that 4 million new housing units will be needed, which will require the construction of 600 housing units per working day until that point. The present building rate is below twenty units a working day.⁴³ The Venter Commission report states that between 1980 and 2000 an estimated 3,551,500 houses will have to be built, at an annual cost of R8,749 million (in 1981 prices) in order to provide for the increase in the urban population and to eliminate existing shortages.

In face of the existing shortages, the overall quality of housing, particularly for the African population, is declining. Increasing numbers of people are being forced to seek shelter in squatter areas. As such squatter camps generally are 'illegal' if they are built in 'white' South Africa, these camps have grown primarily within the bantustan borders. Sutcliffe provides examples of such areas and their population: Greater Inanda in the Durban region (500,000); Edendale-Zwartkops near Pietermaritzburg (over 250,000); Winterveld in Bophuthatswana (over 300,000); Mdantsane in the Ciskei (over 100,000) and within 'white' South Africa, Crossroads near Cape Town (over 60,000).⁴⁴

⁴⁰ *Housing Research Review* (8) National Building Research Institute, 1986.

⁴¹ *ibid.*, p 1.

⁴² M Kentridge, 'Housing in South Africa: from political privilege to basic right', Carnegie Post-Conference Paper, Saldru, University of Cape Town, November 1986.

⁴³ *ibid.*, p 7.

⁴⁴ *ibid.*, p 7.

These squatter areas are packed with poverty and unemployment and their growth is testimony to the realities underlying the abstract figures of housing shortages.

The decline in the already low quality of formal urban housing is also marked. As Kentridge points out 'many urban black houses are in serious state of disrepair and a gigantic programme of renovation is needed to make these houses decent habitations.'⁴⁵ He emphasises that it is not merely the houses in these areas that are in need of upgrading, but the total environment in which they are set, which lacks basic facilities and an adequate infrastructure. The bulk of black townships were designed in the 1950s as instruments to facilitate control of the black population (the number of entrances into them is limited and they are generally surrounded by buffer strips of land) and they were principally constructed as dormitory suburbs for black workers required in the economy. They form sterile and overcrowded environments which

are totally unscaled in terms of the human activities which they must accommodate. Each area, in terms of its feel and the opportunities it offers, is the same as the others. They are simply uni-functional sleeping areas with little or no sense of place. There is nowhere to escape the privations of the overcrowded private dwellings, save the scaleless streets or the wind-swept 'open spaces', which are in reality, simply unsightly and dangerous dumping grounds for rubbish.⁴⁶

A revealing study of Nyanga, a black residential area 20 km from central Cape Town, by Sikwebu documents the low quality and inadequacy of housing and facilities in one such area.⁴⁷ The official population size of Nyanga in 1980 was 24,020 (although the population, as in all urban areas, is considerably greater than the official figure due to the presence of people living in the area 'illegally') and is accommodated in both hostels and houses. In 1984, Sikwebu indicates that there were 1,838 houses, having a total of 5,260 rooms, and using the 1980 official population figure for those living in houses in the area this reveals there to be three people per room for each small house. The real figure of people per room is inevitably higher than this. In addition Nyanga contains 336 hostel units for migrant workers, which have 1,314

⁴⁵ *ibid.*, p 8.

⁴⁶ David Dewar, 'Urban poverty and city development: some perspectives', Carnegie Conference Paper No. 163, Saldru, University of Cape Town.

⁴⁷ Dinga Sikwebu, 'Area Study of Cape Town: profile of Nyanga', Carnegie Conference Paper No. 10a, Saldru, University of Cape Town, April 1984.

rooms and 8,138 beds, giving an average of over seven people per room. All formal housing in the area is bleak and drably uniform, with the hostels providing a particularly harsh physical environment in which to attempt to live. Up to twenty-two people share the use of one toilet, and basic necessities such as ceilings and internal doors are not provided in most council hostels and have to be installed by the occupants at their own expense. The cumulative effect of poor pay, squalid living conditions and migrancy is socially devastating on the inhabitants of Nyanga.

Facilities within Nyanga equally are undersupplied or do not exist. The area contains only three formal pre-schools that cater for 241 children with the result that many young children roam the streets while their parents are at work. A one day clinic operates in Nyanga and Sikwebu reports that on a daily basis people start to queue for attention outside it at 6 am, two hours before it opens its doors. There are only five sports fields for the Nyanga population; there is no children's playground, no post office; no chemist; no public library; no dentist and no railway line running into the township. The area, nevertheless, has thirty-three shebeens selling liquor and a mobile police station.

Nyanga forms a microcosm of the housing crisis in black urban areas and demonstrates that this crisis does not only involve a shortage of housing but is a deeper one, involving a lack of elementary community facilities, the existence of hostile physical surroundings and an absence of choice and control by the inhabitants over the environment in which they live. It is not possible thus to speak of the housing crisis that South Africa is in, as if it involves only the provision of physical housing stock.

Nutrition

The quality of any nation's health, and the adequacy of its nutrition, are overwhelmingly determined by the nature of its economic and political structure. Measures of under-nutrition and ill-health provide a clear indication of the depth of inequalities in South Africa and point to the size of the task ahead in creating an equitable society.

Poor nutrition is a key factor in infant mortality, as it is with a range of other diseases. In an important study Hansen has estimated that about one-third of all black children in South Africa under the age of fourteen are under-weight and stunted for their age. Currently this means that some 2.9 million children are below international height-weight-age

standards and suffer from malnutrition.⁴⁸ Other research has shown that on average about 3 per cent of the population under 5 years suffered from acute nutritional diseases such as kwashiorkor or pellagra and it is estimated that each year between fifteen to thirty thousand children die as a direct result of starvation and illnesses related to under-nutrition.⁴⁹ These figures find direct reflection in the infant mortality rates, which form an indicator of nutritional status. The nation-wide infant mortality rate among the African population in 1982 was 80 per 1,000 live births, among the 'Coloured' population 59 per 1,000, as contrasted to the rate of 13 per 1,000 among whites.⁵⁰ National infant mortality figures however disguise the important feature that geographical location is a crucial variable in determining the chances of a child surviving their first year of life.

There is evidence that the nutritional status of black children is improving in the metropolitan areas of South Africa. The infant mortality rate among African children has dropped in Soweto from 232 in 1950, to 35 in 1979 and in Cape Town the rate has dropped from 59 in 1975 to 37.8 in 1985 among permanent urban residents.⁵¹ However rural bantustan areas contain rates far in excess of the national average, with Knutzen and Bourne indicating among rural families with no access to migrant earnings the infant mortality rate to be 282 per 1,000 live births, and among children of migrants in rural areas to be 227 per 1,000.⁵² Bantustan areas are clearly among the worst environments in which to raise children.

Within the bantustans, Fincham reports community surveys of ambulant pre-school children that showed in the Elim Hospital area of Gazankulu one-third of children to be under-weight, and in the Gelukspan area of Bophuthatswana that half the children were under-weight.⁵³ These figures point to serious nutritional problems in these areas and comparable figures are reported in surveys of the Ciskei, Transkei and KwaZulu. The nutritional status of African adults likewise reflects the urban rural divide—with rural adults tending to be

⁴⁸ J D L Hansen, 'The child malnutrition problem in South Africa', Carnegie Conference Paper No. 208, Saldru, University of Cape Town.

⁴⁹ R J Fincham, 'Food and Nutrition in South Africa', Carnegie Post-Conference Paper No. 1, February 1985.

⁵⁰ *Survey of Race Relations* 1984, p 723.

⁵¹ Soweto figures provided by Hansen *op. cit.*, Cape Town, in the *Annual Report of the Medical Officer of Health* 1985, p 2.

⁵² V K Knutzen and D E Bourne, *South Africa Medical Journal* (51) 1977, p 392.

⁵³ *op. cit.*, p 4.

more stunted in their growth than their urban counterparts (and about a quarter of rural males being more than 20 per cent under-weight).

Fincham surveys several recent research papers on nutrition in South Africa and draws out four features of South Africa's nutritional status. First, that while severe forms of malnutrition exist, particularly in the bantustans, the gravest nutritional problem is under-nutrition, the lack of adequate food supplies within the black population. Second, that nutritional conditions vary geographically and that the further people are removed from a stable urban community the worse their nutrition is. Third, a lack of sufficient protein and an excess of carbohydrates are producing obesity, particularly among urban black women. Finally, 'There is evidence to suggest that levels of nutrition of people in rural areas have been static over time or have declined' and when people move to urban areas their nutritional status invariably improves.⁵⁴ Clearly, a basic necessity is to have a nutrition policy that can deliver adequate food to all the population.

Conclusion

The extent and depth of problems to be tackled in the welfare arena in a future South Africa is daunting. The dismal catalogue of human need that it will face is reflected in the widespread poverty present in South Africa, with half of all households living below the least generously drawn poverty line; in a migrant labour system that has made one of every three African workers a migrant and which has wreaked havoc on family life; in growing unemployment that has currently resulted in three million persons being without work; in the present shortage of housing in urban areas of 630 thousand units, and in the inadequate nutritional status of the black population that has meant that some 3 million children suffer from under-nutrition.

Decades of minority rule have resulted in a gross maldistribution of resources and produced inequalities which are structured, deep and tenaciously defended by their beneficiaries. South Africa's steady descent into a state of overt and endemic violence is one measure of the price that is being paid as a result of apartheid. In the welfare arena the impact of minority rule will leave South Africa with a bitter legacy of deep seated problems and it is virtually certain that even the best intentioned and well organised post-apartheid government will be

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, p 7.

unable to muster the resources to deal with these problems in less than two generations.

At this point a note of optimism can be injected. A future South Africa that excises apartheid from its structures will release the resources that this policy consumes, which then could be directed toward meeting the basic needs of its people for food, employment, housing and education. The direct costs involved in maintaining and operating apartheid programmes are enormous. They include the costs of ten bantustan governments; of providing duplicated services in such areas as health and education; of supporting a swollen bureaucracy, administering apartheid laws; of paying for police, courts, magistrates, prisons and defence forces, who are all involved to greater or lesser degrees in enforcing the policy, and the costs of carrying out such policies as population removals from 'white' areas and implementing Group Areas legislation.

It can be currently calculated that the direct annual cost of apartheid in budgeted state expenditure, in the 1985-86 financial year amounted on a low estimate to R2,800 million, on a medium estimate to R3,900 million and on a high estimate to R5,700 million. These estimates are cautious and include neither past capital costs of items such as buildings, nor any of the economic costs born by individuals and non-State bodies in having to operate under the apartheid system. Yet these figures indicate that between 10 and 21 per cent of the annual budget is devoted to financing apartheid machinery. In other terms, some twelve cents out of every rand spent by the State in 1985-86 was directed toward maintaining and enforcing segregation, in imposing apartheid programmes and on policing the system.⁵⁵

The end of apartheid rule will release considerable financial resources that can be directed toward the very problems that apartheid has aggravated and produced. The size of the resources released will be dependent upon many factors but with the excision of apartheid they will form part of any redistributive efforts to provide basic welfare for the population.

When the deadening grip of apartheid is released, and the creative potential and imagination of South Africans allowed proper scope, many of the inequalities to be dealt with could become more manageable. For example, widespread public works programmes could

⁵⁵ M Savage, *The Cost of Apartheid*, University of Cape Town Inaugural Lecture series, No. 121, August 1986.

be instituted which would both build up needed facilities such as houses, schools and community centres and provide employment and training for many. Similarly, a movement of resources from curative to preventive medicine could have an immediate impact on infant mortality and lead to far greater community involvement in health care and in efforts to eradicate disease. Similarly, there exists at present much vacant land around even the major urban areas on which to put 'site and service' schemes for housing. These, if well organised on the principle of secure tenure and provided with adequate basic services, would reduce the pressure on the supply and maintenance of formal housing units. This would be one way forward that would harness considerable human potential in the search for solutions to this critical problem of providing shelter and housing.

In themselves none of these proposals seems capable of redressing the grotesque imbalances of a society that has been seriously ravaged and haemorrhaged. But it should be recalled that South Africa has a rich resource base and its economy is only semi-developed. To begin seriously the task of addressing its welfare problems South Africa must first reach a domestic political accommodation, only then will its economic potential be able to be harnessed for the benefit of its people and, indeed for the entire region.

South Africa's post-apartheid constitution

The post-apartheid South African government will inherit probably the most authoritarian and centralised political structure on the continent. Just what use is made of that system, developed to implement, maintain and then 'reform' white minority rule, will determine the success of a non-racial, democratic society. There are both dangers and opportunities for the new rulers. Those, to some extent, will be determined by the way power is handed over. Will it be by negotiation? When will those negotiations take place? Will it be through a collapse of the white government in the face of international sanctions and a massive increase in guerrilla activity and civil unrest? Or—in the least-likely scenario at the moment—will it be through the world community, or a part of it, intervening militarily?

The difficulty of predicting with any confidence how and when—or if—negotiations for the new South Africa will take place complicates the scenario of future constitutional development. It is assumed that the 1984 Constitution will still be in place, perhaps adapted further to meet the needs of P W Botha's 'reforms'. This constitution, with its racist base and all its unsatisfactory aspects, is unlikely to be a foundation for the non-racial, democratic state that will follow apartheid. Its predecessor, the 1961 Constitution that was introduced when South Africa became a republic, is, perhaps, closer to the model that the majority of South Africans would like, shorn, of course, of its racial exclusions. But whatever constitution is eventually introduced, the white establishment—or what is left of it—will presumably be governed by the 1984 model.

Negotiation, from the perspective of early 1987, seems an unlikely possibility. Pretoria is defiant; 'reform' has ground to a halt at least until after the whites-only election called for this year, two years ahead of schedule; civil unrest is being handled at a cost that is not yet too great for the country's security budget or white morale; sanctions have still to prove themselves; the divestment campaign is gaining ground but often merely transfers ownership from one group of whites to another; and there has been a significant lowering of expectations that Nelson

Mandela will be freed, the essential first of many steps needed before any negotiations begin. The most likely group to be at the negotiating table is the ANC. But two of the ruling National Party's hardliners, Minister of Defence Magnus Malan and former Law and Order Minister Louis le Grange (now moved, in a gesture of contempt to parliamentary democracy, to Speaker of the House of Assembly) spelled out the government's thinking during the party's federal congress in August 1986: 'To the ANC, violence is simply an extension of the political process,' Malan said. 'That is why there can be no possibility of talking to the ANC. If one removes violence from the ANC, there is very little left of the organisation.' Le Grange added: 'We don't negotiate with terrorists. We fight them.'¹ P W Botha's attitude when, on 31 December 1986, announcing the election, was no less hostile. From the ANC's side there are no signs that the government is prepared to reconsider its conditions for negotiation: the unconditional release of Mandela and all other political prisoners; the release of all detainees; the halting of all treason and political trials; the ending of the State of Emergency; the withdrawal of police from black townships; and the recognition of the ANC as a legitimate political party.²

Pretoria's rhetoric does not always match its actions, but since the collapse of the Commonwealth Eminent Persons' Group mission in mid-1986, this appears to be a period when it does. P W Botha is now electioneering and may retire after his expected triumph at the polls. The jockeying for the succession assumes a new importance in the National Party caucus. Right-wing Afrikanerdom is still perceived, or is meant to be perceived, as a threat to the National Party. Until the election is safely out of the way, a qualitative leap in government thinking is unlikely, although some as yet unspecified 'reforms' are to be put to the white electorate for approval. But even the Group Areas Act, now under investigation by the President's Council preparatory to changes or (less likely) its abolition, is now apparently to be retained intact.³

The decision to keep, at least for the present, the Group Areas Act illustrates the workings of what South Africa's former Ambassador to Britain, Denis Worrall, calls 'the limited democracy which we have at

¹ AP (Johannesburg), 13 August 1986.

² AP 20 January 1986.

³ *The Guardian* (London) 26 November 1986.

the moment'.⁴ It points to some dangers facing any post-apartheid government of taking over any of the legislative structures at present in existence, even as a temporary expedient. It will take a determined exercise of will to implement a democratic government in conditions of probable chaos, bitterness and uncertainty when strong government will be essential.

The President's Council, with a membership of sixty, has an in-built government majority: twenty are elected by majority vote of the House of Assembly and another fifteen are nominated by the State President. The other twenty-five members come from direct elections by the House of Representatives (the Coloured chamber) and the House of Delegates (the Indian chamber) and from opposition ranks in all three houses.⁵ In the case of the Group Areas Act, the council's constitutional committee spent two years reviewing the legislation. Its recommendations may include a 'local option' that municipalities shall be able to take their own decisions about de-segregating suburbs. The government majority simply referred the report back to the committee for 'further investigation'.⁶ This prompted the three Progressive Federal Party members of the Council to withdraw temporarily, and put the Coloured and Asian members in some difficulty. Both the two Coloured and Indian members of the Cabinet are committed to abolition of the Act⁷ and their parties' representatives on the President's Council were expected to withdraw as well: the Reverend Alan Hendrickse has even threatened to pull out of the House of Representatives unless the Act is scrapped.⁸

But a boycott of one of the three houses—or the President's Council—will not prove fatal. Provision is made for reduced participation: the legislative function continues through any house that can still sit. In the event of a partial boycott of any of the three houses, a reduced quorum is permitted.⁹ If there is an opposition boycott of the President's Council, it can still function: the quorum is 30, five less than the number of government supporters. Further, the constitution allows

⁴ Sixth Report from the Foreign Affairs Committee, House of Commons, London, Vol 2, 1986 [FAC] p 123.

⁵ *South Africa 1985: Official Yearbook of the Republic of South Africa*, Pretoria: Department of Foreign Affairs, 1985, [Yearbook] p 127.

⁶ *The Guardian*, 26 November 1986.

⁷ Roger Omond, *The Apartheid Handbook*, London: Penguin, 1986, [Apartheid] p 36.

⁸ *The Guardian*, 26 November 1986.

⁹ *Apartheid* . . . p 45; *Yearbook* . . . p 126.

any house to appoint fewer members than its quota, so a refusal to name members of the President's Council will not cripple that forum either.¹⁰

The 'new' 1984 constitution was drafted with all these eventualities in mind based on past experience—the boycott of the Native Representative Council in the late 1940s and the refusal of the Coloured Representative Council in the 1960s to pass a budget, for example—and future possibilities. In most other countries, parliamentary boycotts would provoke severe constitutional crises: in South Africa they are anticipated by legislation and the semblance of democracy maintained. That is important both to keep Pretoria's few remaining allies friendly and for internal reasons as well. However parliament is re-constituted, there may well be temptations to copy some of the provisions that allow for the legislative process to continue in the event of boycotts—and it does not take a great imaginative leap to anticipate walkouts by different groups in the post-apartheid parliament.

The Group Areas Act is not the first item of legislation to have its fate decided by a handful of people. The constitution provides for several different ways to resolve conflicts between the three chambers. One such route is to refer a disputed 'general affairs' Bill, ie one that is deemed to affect more than one race or, in the stilted words of the constitution, 'matters which are not own affairs of a population group', to the President's Council for arbitration. The Council decides on one version which is 'deemed to have been passed by parliament'.¹¹ Several Bills have been so deemed: the South African Police Special Account Bill which allowed for secret projects by the police; the Local Government Affairs Amendment Bill,¹² the Internal Security Amendment Bill, providing for detention without trial of up to 180 days; and the Public Safety Amendment Bill. In the last two cases the Bills were supported only by the National Party members of the Council.¹³

This useful way of forcing legislation through the tricameral parliament has some drawbacks in constitutional theory and practice. Collective cabinet responsibility is one, although one that has long been a dead letter. J H Hofmeyr, as Minister of the Interior, voted against the legislation depriving Africans in the Cape Province of their common roll vote in 1936.¹⁴ More recently, in 1978 a demand that the cabinet

¹⁰ *Ibid.*

¹¹ *Apartheid* . . . pp 42–4; *Yearbook* . . . pp 125–6.

¹² *Apartheid* . . . p 44.

¹³ South African Press Association, Johannesburg [SAPA] 20 June 1986.

¹⁴ Leonard Thompson and Andrew Prior, *South African Politics*, New Haven and London: Yale University Press, p 73–4.

should resign because of its collective responsibility for the Muldergate scandal was rejected on the grounds that a judicial commission of inquiry exonerated other ministers.¹⁵

The Reverend Alan Hendrickse said in January 1986: 'It does not mean that because I am a member of the Cabinet that I endorse decisions of the Cabinet or the policy of the National Party. . . . Our participation in that particularly high echelon of government must be seen in terms of seeking for change.'¹⁶ The sole Indian cabinet minister, Amichand Rajbansi, and Mr Hendrickse both dissociated themselves from the President Council's decision to pass the two security laws in June 1986.¹⁷ This, in fact, was foreshadowed when they were appointed: P W Botha said that the rigid application of collective cabinet responsibility would no longer apply and that members of the cabinet could disagree with a cabinet decision provided they cleared it first with the State President. This, Mr Botha said, departed from the Westminster system of collective responsibility but was in line with countries having coalition governments.¹⁸

The converse of this departure, as Professor John Dugard of the University of the Witwatersrand argues, is that 'the cabinet minister, white or brown, who does not publicly dissociate himself from a cabinet or ministerial decision violating human rights must be seen to give it his positive support. He cannot evade moral or political responsibility for his conduct by invoking the doctrine of collective responsibility.'¹⁹ Just what kind of government will emerge in the days after apartheid has been ended is, at best, unclear but some kind of coalition is likely. Collective cabinet responsibility will again, inevitably, be raised as an issue.

The 1984 constitution, like its predecessors, is flexible—but now even more so—and the question of a rigid or flexible post-apartheid constitution will be one of the most important decisions to make. Bearing in mind the history of South Africa since the establishment of the Union in 1910, the arguments for a rigid constitution with built-in safeguards against the kinds of abuses that have been seen in the past decades are strong. The original South Africa Act laid down entrenched clauses that could not be changed 'unless the Bill embodying such repeal

¹⁵ *ibid.*

¹⁶ South African television (Johannesburg) 7 January 1986.

¹⁷ *Sunday Times* (Johannesburg) 22 January 1986.

¹⁸ *South African Journal on Human Rights* (Johannesburg) May 1985, p 52-4.

¹⁹ *ibid.*

or alterations shall be passed by both Houses of Parliament sitting together, and at its third reading be agreed to by not less than two-thirds of the total number of members of both Houses.²⁰ These clauses protected the franchise rights of the Africans and Coloureds in the Cape Province (those in the other three provinces had no rights to protect) and the equality of the two official languages. Both have been changed: Afrikaans was substituted for Dutch in 1925, Africans were removed from the common voters roll in 1936, and Coloureds, after a long legal battle in 1956.²¹ The Senate was abolished from the beginning of 1981²² to make way for the President's Council and now the entrenched clauses guaranteeing equality of English and Afrikaans can be amended by a two-thirds majority of the House of Assembly alone.²³

As if this increased constitutional flexibility was not enough, the courts cannot 'inquire into or pronounce upon the validity of any Act passed by parliament' apart from the sole remaining language equality clauses.²⁴ The role of the courts in validating or invalidating post-apartheid legislation is also an issue that will have to be examined. The ANC, in the words of Jack Simons in the June 1985 issue of *Sechaba*, official organ of the ANC, seeks formal equality 'guaranteed by law and providing equal rights to all people'. Some kind of independent arbiter apart from a democratically-elected legislature will be essential.

Even legislatures can be manipulated, as history has shown. In 1981 the government loaded the parliamentary arithmetic even more in its favour through a constitutional amendment providing for four nominated members to the House of Assembly and another eight elected by MPs on the basis of proportional representation for the parties in the Assembly.²⁵ Further, rural constituencies have been 'loaded' since 1910 by up to 15 per cent fewer voters than required for urban seats, giving these voters—mainly Afrikaners—undue strength.²⁶ Any similar loading in the post-apartheid constitution will favour Africans—

²⁰ *South Africa Act*, section 152

²¹ Thompson and Prior, *op. cit.*, pp 85–8. The long Nationalist campaign to remove the Coloureds from the Cape common voters roll has been written about extensively. In brief, the government had to resort to enlarging the Senate to get its two-thirds majority at a joint sitting with the House of Assembly and to packing the Supreme Court with government supporters so that the removal of the Coloureds would not (again) be overturned.

²² *Yearbook* . . . p 139.

²³ *Ibid.*, p 140.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, p 136.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, p 140.

²⁶ Thompson and Prior . . . pp 76–7.

perhaps even people like Chief Gatsha Buthelezi whose power base is stronger in the rural areas of KwaZulu than in urban areas.

The 'first-past-the-post' electoral system is another issue: it helped the National Party whose support has been spread fairly evenly throughout rural constituencies and in some urban ones while opposition voters have been more widely dispersed: by some estimates the first National Party government with a majority of voter support was in 1961—that is thirteen years and three general elections of minority government. To what extent the 'first-past-the-post' system will help or hinder an organisation like the ANC is another area that will have to be considered.

It seems likely that proportional representation will not be favoured by the ANC. Such a system might well be considered to run the danger of fragmenting the black vote, although the converse of this argument would be that minorities would be more adequately represented.

The flexible constitution, the government's lack of inhibitions in abandoning parliamentary conventions when judged suitable and rigid party discipline ensured that an increasingly authoritarian state was relatively easy to put into place, particularly after 1948. All these factors that militate against the democratic process need careful thought in the post-apartheid constitution.

Parliament has become increasingly irrelevant except as a legislative rubber stamp or as a forum for opposition questions which sometimes unearth information the government would rather keep hidden. Even the National Party caucus, bound by strict party discipline, has lost authority. The Prime Minister, and now the State President, have accrued more power at the expense of the caucus, parliament and finally the cabinet. The trend became marked under Hendrik Verwoerd, the architect of classical apartheid. He was due to make a major speech on 6 September 1966 spelling out his vision—and therefore his future policy—on the black homelands: neither his cabinet colleagues nor the caucus were reported to know what this was. But he was assassinated shortly before he was due to speak, and his vision went unrecorded. His successor, B J Vorster, reverted more to a 'chairman of the board' approach to cabinet business, but the trend towards even greater powers for the police and defence force accelerated. Under P W Botha, the constitution was changed to provide for an executive presidency with powers akin to, and even exceeding, those of De Gaulle.

These authoritarian trends have been aided by the establishment and

increasing prominence of the State Security Council. Its members include the President; the Ministers of Defence, Foreign Affairs and Law and Order; the head of the National Intelligence Service, the chief of the Defence Force, the Director-General of Foreign Affairs, the Director-General of Justice and the Commissioner of Police. Other ministers and senior officials can be asked to attend meetings.²⁷ Co-opted ministers now include those responsible for constitutional development, education and finance. Professor Deon Geldenhuys and Dr Hennie Kotze, both of the Rand Afrikaans University, have said that the ssc has 'probably' reduced the full cabinet's decision-making role: 'Apart from the fact that the full cabinet is only brought into the picture—at the prime minister's discretion [now the state president's]—on an *ex post facto* basis, cabinet discussion of ssc decisions is bound to be further inhibited by virtue of the decisions carrying the prime minister's stamp of authority.'²⁸ The ssc is the only cabinet committee created by law, the only one chaired by the Prime Minister/State President and its task of advising the government on the formulation and implementation of policy and strategy in relation to national security is 'broad enough to embrace virtually every area of government activity at home and abroad'.²⁹

The ssc has under it the National Security Management System (NSMS) which composes at local level about 500 Joint Management Centres. Its members include police, military, government and municipal officials who are supposed to identify and solve local grievances. The strategy behind it, according to James Selfe, a Progressive Federal Party researcher, includes removing local 'pinpricks' such as poor living conditions which could lead to unrest. If the military or police recommend a political solution to counter a security threat, this is referred upwards to the ssc and cabinet.³⁰

The ssc and the NSMS can be expected to be abolished under a post-apartheid government. Most of their members are unlikely to be very sympathetic to the new government and this in itself will be a danger, given the experience they have had and the network of communications built up. The new government probably will have to build from scratch a whole new local government structure. A further problem could well be the 'tradition' of a compliant parliament and a

²⁷ *Apartheid* . . . p 154.

²⁸ *Ibid.*

²⁹ *Ibid.*

³⁰ *Star* (Johannesburg) 12 October 1986.

strong executive presidency, given the disorder that is likely to accompany the transfer of power.

It is not only the central South African government that is highly authoritarian. The 'independent' and 'self-governing' black homelands or bantustans have been ably taught, or learned well, the habits of Dr Worrall's 'limited democracy'. The four 'independent' homelands are, to all intents and purposes, one-party states with power concentrated largely in the hands of the Prime Minister or President. Most have relied on chiefs nominated to the legislatures to gain and maintain power: in Transkei, for example, Kaiser Matanzima, despite having won a minority of elected seats, became Chief Minister in 1963 through the support of government-paid chiefs.³¹ Potential or actual rivals within the ruling Transkei National Independence Party or in the opposition have been ruthlessly dealt with: detained without trial, less often charged, and sometimes forced into exile.

Similar events have occurred in the other 'independent' states: Ciskei, Bophuthatswana (although to a lesser extent) and Venda. In the 'self-governing' homelands, democracy is also, at best, a frail plant. In all these 'states', as in South Africa itself, the system has, at least in part, maintained itself through 'security' legislation, the power of patronage and bloated civil services which provide secure and relatively well-paid employment. The cost to Transkei of its public service in 1983-84 was R226.58 million—36 per cent of its total budget.³² In the same year there were 44,127 Transkei civil servants, one for every 59 persons.³³ All the homelands are heavily dependent on South Africa: Pretoria's contribution towards their total budget varies from between 42.9 per cent (Bophuthatswana) and 77 per cent (Transkei).³⁴

The homelands will pose problems for any post-apartheid government. Their existence as administrative and political units will be difficult to ignore although the ANC wants to abolish the bantustans as symbols of apartheid. But they provide, as the Transkei example above shows, an important source of employment for thousands of people in areas where unemployment is high—the by-product of government policy in pushing 'superfluous appendages' of black labour back to the homelands. And whatever the faults of the homeland system, they will

³¹ Barry Streek and Richard Wicksteed, *Render Unto Kaiser: A Transkei Dossier*, Johannesburg: Ravan Press, p 110.

³² *Apartheid* . . . p 114.

³³ *Ibid.*

³⁴ *Ibid.*, p 113.

almost by necessity provide the post-apartheid government with a source of administrative experience and ability.

The position of the largely-white civil service controlled by Pretoria will be even more problematical. They provide the administrative tentacles that administer apartheid and, on the basis both of experience in South Africa and other newly-independent African countries, will be less than whole-heartedly in favour of *any* post-apartheid government. The limited 'reforms' introduced by P W Botha in the early and mid-1980s were often hindered by the conservatism of the civil service. One of the 'reforming' ministers, Piet Koornhof, at the head of the vast bureaucracy controlling African affairs, likened it to a tortoise. Koornhof is said to have lost his job as a cabinet minister precisely because the bureaucracy's obstructionism hindered the desired 'reforms'. Although there may have been a desire for 'reform' at the top, this did not necessarily reflect at the lower levels—the people actually dealing on a daily basis with Africans.

The Westminster convention that the civil service is neutral and that it will serve any government with willingness and competence is a very questionable assumption, particularly in the South African context. It will be even more so in any post-apartheid state. National Party policy, from its coming to power in 1948, was to Afrikanerise the civil service, both because it felt this would better serve its political aims and to provide employment for many relatively-impooverished Afrikaners. Over the years this was ruthlessly implemented and expanded to the extent that an English-speaking white civil servant at any degree of seniority is a rarity today. Although by no means all English-speakers favour getting rid of apartheid, this shortage of senior white civil servants less wedded to apartheid than many Afrikaners will be an additional problem.

Almost by necessity, perhaps, and reflecting the divisions in the country, the post-apartheid government probably will have to move in the direction of having senior officials appointed from outside the ranks of the civil service, more on the American model, reflecting the views of the elected politicians.

The size of the civil service is and will be another problem. By early 1986, 22 per cent of all urban white adults worked for the government—more than one million people.³⁵ In the black community, 29 per cent of blacks in the metropolitan areas of South Africa worked for the

³⁵ *Business Day* (Johannesburg) 7 February 1986.

government. They were said, in July 1986, to form an elite: 35 per cent of black adults with household incomes of more than R900 a month were government employees; among those earning R600 to R899, a total of 34 per cent worked for large government concerns. Only in the lower-income group—those earning between R200 and R599—were there more private enterprise employees: 38 per cent against 18 per cent working for the government.³⁶ This relatively large number of civil servants will have to be accommodated somehow by a government that will face economic problems on many fronts.

But one thing a post-apartheid government will not have to worry about is the actual cost of administering apartheid: in 1986 Professor Michael Savage of the University of Cape Town estimated that 12 cents of every Rand in the previous year's budget went on maintaining apartheid. He said that apartheid cost the country R8,000 million in lost economic growth because of racial restraints on human resources, loss of potential skills and lost investment. The immediate costs of running the country's legislative network—three houses of parliament and ten legislative assemblies with 1,270 members, and 121 ministers—was nearly R50 million a year. There will be few savings better earned in the post-apartheid state than those of maintaining apartheid. Duplicated facilities of 151 government departments, Professor Savage said, cost more than R130 million a year.³⁷ But some duplication of facilities will be inevitable in a post-apartheid government, at least initially.

Just what form the post-apartheid constitution will take is not clear. The ANC, regarded by many observers as the natural heir to power, has not publicly committed itself to any future constitutional settlement. Its director of information, Govan Mbeki, told the British House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee in mid-1986 that:

The only thing we have said is that we want to see a united democratic and non-racial South Africa; we want a South Africa in which the population is not defined by race or ethnicity; that this group concept is totally done away with, and that the question of what kind of constitutions we have (because a constitution requires legitimacy, acceptance) is exactly one of the issues that would need to be addressed fundamentally in a negotiating process . . . in specific terms, as of now, we certainly do not have any blueprint.³⁸

Earlier, in October 1985, Mr Mbeki said that 'the ANC would be very much in favour of an entrenched bill of rights in a new constitution for

³⁶ *Evening Post* (Port Elizabeth) 4 July 1986.

³⁷ *Star*, 30 August 1986.

³⁸ *FAC* . . . p 112.

South Africa, but entrenching the rights of individuals, not the rights of groups, because those groups would get defined in the same way that the apartheid structure is defined today.³⁹ Curiously, after years during which it resisted any bill of rights, ministers now appear more ready to accept one. In today's climate, a bill of rights would be little more than a legalistic joke; post apartheid a bill of rights could and should be an essential part of the constitution. How it will be guaranteed is another problem: the South African experience to date has shown, government propaganda to the contrary, that the judiciary has not been a shining beacon of freedom. Ironically, perhaps, the very history of oppression could be the best guarantee that the post-apartheid judiciary will be better than the present and past generations: among the advocates and attorneys are a number who have distinguished themselves defending political prisoners and who are far better qualified to sit on the bench than many of the present incumbents.

Mr Mbeki said that the ANC does not favour a federal constitution. He said: 'We would not want to federate these constitutional units that the apartheid system has created. We cannot say we need a federal structure which must recognise the reality of the bantustans . . . we are saying a united, democratic and non-racial South Africa.'⁴⁰

Others, however, have different ideas. Chief Gatsha Buthelezi agreed with a member of the Foreign Affairs Committee in January 1986 that a federal arrangement, based principally on geography rather than race, could be a possible solution to South Africa's problems.⁴¹ This approach motivated Chief Buthelezi to set up the Buthelezi Commission in 1980 to inquire into possible constitutional arrangements between the KwaZulu homeland and the Natal provincial authorities. Optimistically, this inquiry was viewed as a potential model for future, country-wide negotiations. It proposed a legislature for all race groups in the region.⁴² This led to the Natal/KwaZulu Indaba, which brought together representatives of a number of different strands of opinion in the area. It reported in November 1986 recommending:

- A two-chamber legislature, one of 100 members elected by universal suffrage through proportional representation, and the second of fifty members with equal representation for African, Afrikaans, Asian and English 'background groups'.

³⁹ *FAC* . . . pp 8-9.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, p 95.

⁴² *Ibid.*, p 84.

- A provincial governor appointed by the State President on the advice of the provincial legislature;
- A prime minister and ten-man cabinet;
- A Bill of Rights entrenched constitutionally and an independent judiciary.
- 'Cultural councils' to protect cultural rights.
- A council of chiefs of Africans and 'traditional authorities' to be treated as part of local government.⁴³

As in all South African political life, the proposals exposed some code language that can mean different things to different people. The least subtle is the protection of 'cultural rights'; the black converse in this case is the respect for 'traditional authorities'. 'Cultural rights' translated means 'group rights'—the insistence, usually by whites, that the group must be regarded as more important than the individual. In the parlance of the National Party this has come to mean continued white domination. In the Natal/KwaZulu Indaba it appears to have meant, at least on the part of some conservatives, power-sharing on an 'equal' basis with Zulus—as long as the white minority enjoyed an overriding veto.⁴⁴

Even this did not commend itself to the ruling National Party. The Natal National Party leader and Minister of Home Affairs and Communications, Stoffel Botha, who represented the party at the Indaba, effectively rejected the proposals. In London, however, the then South African Ambassador, Denis Worrall, denied that this was government policy. Yet the Minister of Constitutional Development and Planning, Chris Heunis, distanced the government from the Indaba, denying that he had promised a referendum would be held among whites, Coloureds and Indians to vote on the Indaba. Significant bodies of Afrikaner opinion also rejected the Indaba proposals, including the Durban Afrikaanse Sakekamer and the Handelsinstituut (two commercial organisations) and the Federasie van Afrikaner Kultuurvereniging (an important cultural coordinating group).⁴⁵ Although the Indaba proposals were presented at a time when the government appeared preoccupied with the forthcoming election and was therefore keen not to be seen to be agreeing to political 'integration', the initial response to this mild set of proposals hardly augurs well for any productive talks in the immediate future.

⁴³ *Weekend Post* (Port Elizabeth) 29 November 1986.

⁴⁴ *Financial Mail* (Johannesburg) 7 November 1986.

⁴⁵ *Eastern Province Herald* (Port Elizabeth) 3 December 1986.

Group rights are seen as important in a future post-apartheid South Africa even by the official opposition Progressive Federal Party. In November 1986 a move to drop from the party's constitutional policy the right of a minority to veto legislation was defeated. This was despite the support of Mrs Helen Suzman, widely respected in the party, and the urging of Dr Ntatho Motlane, former chairman of the Soweto Committee of Ten and an influential black politician, for the party to align itself with the ANC's Freedom Charter.⁴⁶

As these sections of the white establishment were making their attitudes clear, a public opinion survey revealed the attitudes of some urban blacks towards ending apartheid. The survey needs to be treated with some caution, however, as more than half those approached were unwilling to answer questions on political affairs. Of those who did reply, 74 per cent said they would prefer a multi-racial rather than an all-black form of government. Seventy-four per cent were also said to have preferred to seek an end to apartheid by negotiation rather than violence. Only 13 per cent said they advocated violence as a solution to the impasse on the total elimination of apartheid. In the 18-24 age bracket, this rose to 17 per cent. Thirty-six per cent said they would be happy to support any blacks willing to work with P W Botha on a national statutory council; 16 per cent said that they would regard blacks on the council as sell-outs, while 9 per cent wanted black leaders to boycott the council.⁴⁷

This survey appears to show that there is less rigidity among blacks than is sometimes thought. Another survey, conducted by the Community Agency for Social Enquiry with the Institute for Black Research (CASE/IBR) found in September 1985 that 20 per cent of urban Africans questioned would accept a federal compromise in post-apartheid South Africa while 80 per cent wanted a unitary non-racial democracy—as favoured by the ANC, PAC, UDF and AZAPO.⁴⁸ Another authoritative poll, conducted by the Institute of Black Research in December 1985 to January 1986, asking about preferred parties and leaders, concluded 'that black people are not as monolithic as white fear conceives them to be; that a significant, though small, proportion of blacks favour existing white political parties and leaders, this being particularly marked among Indians and Coloureds; that black people

⁴⁶ *Natal Mercury* (Durban) 24 November 1986.

⁴⁷ *Argus* (Cape Town) 1 December 1986.

⁴⁸ Mark Orkin, *The Struggle and the Future: What Black South Africans Really Think*, Johannesburg: Ravan Press, p 50.

perceive a considerable choice of leaders, both black and white; that there are marked regional variations in political choices.⁴⁹

From the other side of the political fence, the 'differences' have long been emphasised for white political motives. Dr Worrall, for example, told the House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee in June 1986 that 'it is particularly difficult to find the right constitutional formula for South Africa because the fact is that there is a tremendous incompatibility of interests in South Africa. . . . We are not really one nation and do not have a single perceived history or one single set of shared heroes. . . . there are no models on the continent of Africa and no real precedents one can look at if one is not interested in substituting black rule for white rule and if one is interested in creating, in place of the limited democracy we have at the moment, a fully-fledged democracy. . . . one-person, one-vote in a unitary state is unacceptable to the white South African, in particular to the Afrikaner. The best possible deal he can hope for in terms of this would be like the Basques of Spain, and the worst possible deal he can have is to become a Palestinian in South Africa. . . . blacks are going to have to realise that the final constitutional form should take into account the group and community character in South Africa. . . . white South Africans will have to accept that numbers in the final analysis will be decisive, but it is extremely important that the right of self-determination of the Afrikaner people in particular can somehow be recognised.'⁵⁰

Various other whites have tried to make provision for Afrikaner self-determination. Extreme right-wingers in organisations like the Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging (AWB), the Conservative Party and the Herstigte Nasionale Party have played around with maps and constitutions that, in one form or another, would give Afrikaners control over the Boer 'heartland', usually defined as the Transvaal, Free State and part of Natal. The rest of the country, the assumption goes, could be parcelled out to the various other contenders. But this is the stuff of dreams and myths, an attempt to return to a simpler age when Bible, musket and laager were all that the Afrikaners needed. The desire to maintain Afrikaner 'self-determination', however, is still strong in most ranks—whatever the constitutional framework.

That is perhaps the major obstacle for any peaceful, or relatively

⁴⁹ Institute for Black Research, *Political and Economic Choices of Disenfranchised South Africans*, Durban: Institute for Black Research, 1986, p 8.

⁵⁰ *FAC* . . . pp 123-4.

peaceful, transition. Publicly, at least, the ANC is opposed to any kind of guarantees for group 'rights' and will not accept any constitution that provides for Afrikaner 'self-determination'. It is also debatable whether the English-speaking community would wish to be lumped together with the Afrikaners in a constitution providing for Afrikaner 'self-determination'. On the other hand, they would probably be keen for reserved white seats on the Zimbabwe model—but again this is something that the ANC would not countenance publicly at this stage. Some kind of federal constitution, allowing for 'local autonomy including the right to what cabinet minister Gerrit Viljoen termed 'own residential areas, own schools, own education departments and own separate political representation'⁵¹ would probably emerge as the whites' favoured compromise. But that would be unacceptable to anybody else, perpetuating as it would large elements of the apartheid system. It would also go against the grain of the ANC's commitment that the equality it seeks is 'formal, guaranteed by law, and providing equal rights to all people . . . an essential element of a democracy'.⁵² Any framework as envisaged by Viljoen would leave some people—today's oppressors—more equal than others.

And that, in whatever guise it is presented—apartheid, separate development, parallel development, or the latest euphemism, 'cooperative co-existence'—is what the majority of whites still want. On 31 December 1986, P W Botha announced that the long-awaited white election would be held in early 1987 and that the electorate would be asked to vote on more 'reform' measures. There was no indication then that it would involve any significant degree of real power-sharing. Negotiations leading to any kind of qualitative change of South African society still look a long way off.

⁵¹ *Apartheid* . . . p 53.

⁵² *Sechaba*, June 1985.

South Africa's media: the commercial press and the seedlings of the future

'The *Financial Mail* has been edited to comply with the emergency regulations,' reads a warning buried on page fifty-three of a recent issue of South Africa's leading business magazine. 'Information may therefore be distorted, incomplete and misleading.' Never before in the history of South Africa's beleaguered media have those three adjectives been more fitting than in the period since the imposition of a State of Emergency—the second in less than two years—in June 1986. The Emergency regulations specifically bar representatives of the media from entering areas of unrest without the permission of the police; reporting any statement which incites people to take part in unlawful strikes, boycotts, demonstrations, protest meetings, any acts of civil disobedience, or any actions which undermine military service; promoting disinvestment or the application of sanctions; inciting any member of the public to resist or oppose the government; and—the most restrictive clause, so wide as to bar almost anything—reporting or disseminating a 'subversive statement'. Perhaps even more shocking than this list of media shackles is the fact that they represent no temporary aberration (as the reference to 'Emergency' would seem to indicate) but rather a logical extension of a long-term state plan, aimed at cowing and controlling South Africa's media, which dates back more than a decade.

A series of exposés in the English-language newspapers in 1978 revealed the secret and illegal influence-buying campaigns of the government's Information Department. These began with the establishment of a \$74 million slush fund in 1972 and created the so-called 'Muldergate Scandal' which ultimately led to the fall of Prime Minister John Vorster and his Information Minister, Connie Mulder. While the liberal press hailed its revelations as evidence that freedom of the press still thrived, the scandal actually served only to replace one section of the ruling National Party with another. The subsequent ascendancy of the former Defence Minister, P W Botha, has since been

coupled with unprecedented state efforts towards media manipulation. Botha's government commissioned a study on press coverage of security matters in 1980 which urged a tightening of constraints on press freedom. A second 'Steyn Commission of Inquiry into the Mass Media' in 1982 exhorted the South African media to inform the public of the 'total onslaught' to which the country was being subjected by the Soviet Union, the Third World, and even certain circles in the West, concluding that 'government credibility must at all times be maintained and strengthened'. The specific recommendations of these government commissions, ranging from the implementation of a 'National Communication Strategy' to the establishment of a statutory register of journalists from which any could be struck off and banned from the profession for life, raised such a public outcry that the government backed down. The long-range strategy, it now appears, was not to force such clear abrogations of the cherished ideal of South Africa's 'free press', with all the attendant negative publicity, but rather to win for the government bargaining chips, for use in future negotiations with the media.

Anyone doubting the advantage of behind-the-scenes government pressure, as opposed to public regulation of the media, need only glance at a confidential memo issued by the Chief of the South African Defence Force, entitled 'Guidelines on Statements in Respect of Sabotage and Terrorism: The Need for Security Consciousness and Responsible Reporting'.¹ 'While the need exists for the general public to be informed and reassured concerning acts of terrorism,' the memo counsels, 'keeping the public informed must be weighed against providing the enemy with intelligence.' The succinct conclusion: 'As a general rule, "the least said, the better" applies.' The memo goes on to warn spokesmen for the South African Police and Defence Force, victims of attacks, as well as media representatives, that they should not mention in public statements any of the following information: how the guerrillas entered or left the premises to launch an attack, details of 'enemy casualties (especially if anybody is captured)', or which access routes were followed.

Although the professed goal of this memo was 'to deny the enemy the intelligence that would assist him to replan his strategies and methods in

¹ Reproduced in Julie Frederikse, *South Africa: A Different Kind of War*, London: James Currey, 1986; New York: Beacon Press, 1987; Harare: Mambo Press, 1986; Johannesburg: Ravan Press 1986.

an effort to attack the RSA more effectively', this directive also seems geared to operate on an ideological level. Since the rise in popular and armed resistance to apartheid following the uprising in the black township of Soweto in 1976, the South African government has, in particular, tried to suppress all information about the political demands of its opponents. The rationale of the Minister of Law and Order, Louis le Grange, is simple: 'Terrorists want publicity for their demands in order to inspire their followers.'

Any outside observer, unencumbered by the fear and ignorance of all the resistance politics so assiduously cultivated by the ruling white minority, would recognise the short-sightedness of such an approach. Banning all reporting of the strategies and motivations of the major anti-apartheid movement, the underground ANC, is a transparent attempt to discredit the organisation as a reasonable political movement and to portray its members and leaders as mindless, bloodthirsty anarchists, bent on violence purely as a means of instilling terror in the white population and intimidating the black majority. The only sure success of such a policy will be in fanning the fear and ignorance of whites, while obscuring any understanding of the grievances of blacks and of the real nature of the conflict that is at the root of the current political upheavals.

The decline of the liberal press

Although more than 60 per cent of South Africa's white and most of the 'Coloured' population group are Afrikaans-speaking, the English-language press dominates the scene, accounting for more than three-quarters of total daily circulation and two-thirds of Sunday circulation.² While the Afrikaans press is in effect the media arm of the ruling National Party and the mainly Afrikaner-owned business interests that support it, the English press reflects the views attached to the English-owned, mainly mining-oriented capital that controls the small opposition party in the white section of Parliament (the House of Assembly), the Progressive Federal Party (PFP). The majority of anti-apartheid activists define the terrain of resistance politics as extra-parliamentary, and see both the PFP and the liberal press as a token opposition, inextricably and unacceptably bound to the state,

² William A Hachten and C Anthony Giffard, *The Press and Apartheid*, New York: Macmillan, 1984.

though the information to be gleaned from the English-language press is certainly appreciated.

If there was one living symbol of the positive contribution of the white-run opposition press in South Africa, it was Johannesburg's *Rand Daily Mail*, whose editors and reporters were prosecuted for their exposés of prison conditions in the 1960s and the information scandal in the 1970s. Although the 1980s were seeing the *Mail's* image beginning to tarnish, especially after the political sacking of its outspoken editor, Allister Sparks, the decision of the Anglo American Corporation-owned newspaper monopoly to close the *Mail* and its sister Sunday paper, the *Express*, in April 1985, still sent shock waves through media circles all over the world. Many observers saw cynical political motives on the part of English capital, which has, in this season of 'reform', closed ranks with Afrikaner big business and thus no longer needs such a strident anti-government mouthpiece. As the leader of the ultra-right-wing Herstigte Nasionale Party (HNP) observed, 'Big business interests had clearly decided the two papers could be sacrificed for the sake of encouraging co-operation between the government and the PFP.' Other analysts believe that it was, ironically, the *Mail's* success in championing black causes that ultimately brought it down, for the paper had sought the bulk of its advertising revenues from white-owned and oriented businesses.

Two other English dailies and a black Sunday paper were also closed in the wake of the *Mail's* demise, and three of the country's five biggest black publications passed from white liberal control to one of the two government-supporting Afrikaans press monopolies. Media critics have begun to worry that 'South Africa's already battered commercial press could end up resembling the Rhodesian press during the last years of Ian Smith's rule, reflecting only the views of a tiny minority'.³ On the brighter side, the ever-narrowing job options for liberal journalists prompted several former editors and reporters to pool their severance pay and launch the independent *Weekly Mail* in June 1985. Its influence is greater than its 20,000 readers would indicate, as the paper has become essential reading for foreign journalists, diplomats and anti-apartheid activists and it is freely available abroad by subscription. If the new *Mail's* price—more than a rand per copy—puts it out of the reach of most blacks, another new national weekly is aiming to fill that

³ 'Behind closed doors', *Work in Progress* (36) 1985, and *None But Ourselves: Masses vs Media in the Making of Zimbabwe*, London: Heinemann, 1983; New York: Penguin, 1984; Harare: Zimbabwe Publishing House, 1983; Johannesburg: Ravan Press, 1982.

vacuum. Edited by a veteran black journalist, Zwelakhe Sisulu (son of Walter Sisulu, an ANC leader imprisoned with Nelson Mandela), the *New Nation* is sponsored by the South African Catholic Bishops Conference. The weekly non-racial but black-oriented paper was inspired by the South African bishops' call for a publication 'designed to enter into the life, struggles, needs and burning aspirations of the majority of South Africa's people', and by the findings of a feasibility study that South Africa's 'large, relatively compact urban population' is now approximately 40 per cent black, with literacy levels as high as 80 per cent in many areas. Both the *New Nation* and the *Weekly Mail* are small and struggling, but the fact that they represent the only significant media voices not controlled by either the government or big capital makes them more free and independent than any other commercial media ventures in South Africa today.

The consensus carrot and the press-bashing stick

This is Pretoria's self-proclaimed era of reform, and the government has no desire to be seen to be further expanding its legislative arsenal against the media. On the contrary, the credibility of the government's reforms depends on the image of a healthy opposition from within the system—expressed in the context of what Pretoria has dubbed 'consensus journalism'. In mid-1984, on the eve of the first sitting of the tricameral parliament, and the burgeoning mass protests that finally forced President P W Botha to declare the first State of Emergency a year later, the Minister of Constitutional Development announced that 'the new deal' would require a 'media style' that would highlight 'consensus opportunities' rather than concentrating on 'problems causing conflict'. The Minister, Chris Heunis, went on to explain that, while the government agreed that it was necessary for the media to point out problems, such observations should always be balanced against the 'potential for consensus'.

As it happened, the events of the eighteen months that followed presented a challenge even for pro-government journalists to emphasise any positive 'potential for consensus', with well over 1,000 people killed in township violence, mainly by the police and army. As a result, the government suddenly dropped the consensus carrot and once again grabbed the press-bashing stick. A telling recent instalment in the recurring clash between government and the media centred not on the newspapers but rather on television. South Africa entered the era of 'ungovernability' with enough laws to constrain the words used to

describe the mass protests engulfing the country. Pictures emanating from the townships have, however, been harder to control. Pretoria's first response was to 'blame the messengers' who were bringing to the rest of the world the bad tidings of intensifying civil war in South Africa. During President Botha's much-derided 'Rubicon speech' of August 1985 (in which he bitterly disappointed even his staunchest Western supporters with a total lack of new initiatives), Botha accused the electronic media, asking: 'How do they explain the fact that they are always present, with cameras, at places where violence takes place?' A resident of one of Cape Town's troubled townships wrote to the *Financial Mail* with an apt repartee: 'To continually maintain that sympathetic journalists are acting as catalysts and making actors out of protesters is another example of the unceasing attempts to pass the buck—and the buck stops in Pretoria.'

The escalation of the government's 'blame the messengers' media policy into a more determinedly anti-press freedom policy of 'kill the messenger' came with the graphic worldwide television coverage during the first State of Emergency (declared in July 1985 and lifted in March 1986, only to be reimposed on a wider scale three months later). The state-run, monopolistic South African Broadcasting Corporation was instructed by P W Botha as far back as 1980 'not to feature reports of the onslaughts on South Africa by revolutionary elements as main news items'; thus the footage from the townships that South Africans watch in their living rooms is routinely sanitised. It was not the local tv fare, but rather the tales of what is seen in the living-rooms of the rest of the world, that began to worry Pretoria in 1985. 'Overseas one is confronted with footage we don't see here at all,' reported a PFP leader after a trip to New York. 'What comes over very clearly is that it's not just a handful of agitators causing unrest in South Africa—it's a whole community in protest.'

It is precisely the spectre of mass protest, motivated by frustration and commitment rather than by 'a handful of agitators', that the government vainly hopes to excise from the public consciousness. The wave of media coverage outside South Africa after the declaration of the State of Emergency was followed, inside South Africa, by a concerted campaign against the foreign media that was disturbing even by South African standards. After a brief abortive attempt to cajole the media into 'toning down' reporting on the townships, a security force committee was appointed to monitor news coverage, and the battle lines were drawn. A month after the declaration of the State of

Emergency, nine media representatives were arrested in Cape Town and charged with obstructing the police in the execution of their duties while covering an attempted march on the prison where Nelson Mandela and the bulk of the ANC leadership is being held. The next month, *Newsweek* magazine, which had featured an article on South Africa that was, by all accounts, accurate and fair, had that issue banned from distribution, and its correspondent summarily deported. The following month saw journalists barred from entering Soweto. Countless other journalists have been turned back from townships at police roadblocks and had their film and videotapes confiscated and sabotaged. Many have even been physically attacked and fired at by soldiers and police with tear-gas, bird-shot and rubber bullets.

Then the smear campaign against the foreign press began, with a suspicious build-up of unbelievable stories, said to emanate from unnamed informants among the foreign press corps and anonymous outraged witnesses. They alleged that tv crews were stage-managing phoney unrest scenes by paying black youngsters to riot. (It was later disclosed in the British press that amongst the government's evidence of these alleged media stunts was a letter that proved to be a crude forgery.) The climax of this press-bashing campaign came with an extraordinary *Government Gazette* announcement in November 1985 banning the use of audio-visual equipment for recording disturbances or unrest situations in the designated emergency areas, except with official permission, and then only with a police escort. The restrictions, which effectively keep all tv crews and still photographers well away from 'hot' areas, were immediately denounced by the Johannesburg-based Foreign Correspondents Association as a thinly-veiled attempt at a news black-out. The black anti-apartheid activist, the Reverend Allan Boesak, went even further. In his first speech since his release from detention (for attempting to organise the peaceful 'Free Mandela' march), Boesak issued this challenge: 'Botha must answer whether the purpose of keeping reporters out of the townships is so that our children can be murdered in circumstances where there will be no witnesses and no record.' Even Britain's Prime Minister, Margaret Thatcher, whose exhortations to the world to 'cut the oxygen supply of terrorism' from the media were quoted (out of context) in defence of the media ban, saw to it that a member of the South African Embassy in London was summoned to the Foreign Office for the Foreign Secretary to convey the British government's displeasure at the latest violation of press freedom.

Psychological warfare

Why, in fact, did Pretoria invite such controversy by imposing the tv gag? One answer is dictated by 'the bottom line'; that South Africa's economy, in the throes of the worst recession in fifty years, could no longer afford to allow the documentation of what appeared to be an inexorable downward spiral into civil war. In the view of sympathetic foreign analysts, 'With the continued negotiations for foreign loans, the growing disinvestment lobby, and the increasing isolation of Pretoria, it was necessary to get those sjamboks (hide whips) off the screens.'⁴ A group of media academics at the University of the Witwatersrand read a more ominous message into the media ban: that it signalled a watershed in state repression, representing a new police and army strategy in the townships 'which would be even more unacceptable to foreign television audiences'.⁵ These academics cited an incident in which Cape Town police hidden in boxes on the back of a government transport vehicle drove through a township street and then leapt out, 'like macabre jack-in-the-boxes', when stones were thrown, ambushing unarmed demonstrators (including children) with shotgun fire. The fact that the so-called 'Trojan Horse incident' was broadcast on international television is believed to have prompted the media ban. The Witwatersrand academics say that the preconceived nature of such a tactic shows that the authorities have reached the end of an *ad hoc* response to South Africa's conflict and seem to be embarking on a more open 'occupation force' strategy which will deploy a combination of military manoeuvres and psychological warfare techniques that can only be carried out in a sealed-off 'operational area' over which policemen and soldiers have total control. This strategy represents a desperate response to the heightened level of mass resistance. From the vacuum created by the collapse of state control, a new phenomenon is emerging, known in the townships as 'people's power', and evidenced by the development of street committee cells which unite in civic associations to implement (in coordination with union structures) consumer boycotts and work stay-aways.

⁴ Harriet Gavshon, Eric Louw and Ray Williams, 'Shut your eyes and think of nothing', *Weekly Mail* (Johannesburg) 8-14 November 1986. Sjamboks are rawhide whips used by the South African police in crowd control.

⁵ *Ibid.*

Black-on-black violence

Although people's power is still in its incipient stages, its potential threat to the state is chilling. Thus the government, the police and the military have launched an hysterical media campaign to discredit anything to do with those denigrated as 'the comrades' or—another new word suddenly discovered by Pretoria—'the necklace'. For township residents, anyone who supports 'the struggle' is a comrade. For the white-controlled South African media, the term conjures up imagery that is not just violent, but 'savage'. Comrades are those who dispense 'medieval justice' in 'kangaroo courts', who, in the words of a typical editorial in the liberal press, 'give no thought to the wanton damage they are doing to people's—their *own people's*—property and possessions'. 'The necklace', a township term for a petrol-filled tyre which is placed around a victim's neck and ignited, is a weapon used only by those who are unarmed and have no recourse to authority. The fear and loathing with which it is treated in the media—as 'the other side of the story of police brutality'—smacks of hypocrisy for township residents whose daily experience includes police and army harassment, beatings, shootings, detention and torture.

The government's declaration of the first emergency, as broadcast over SABC-TV, was a prime example of how the state can manipulate media imagery toward its own ends. President Botha's announcement was followed by extensive footage of two incidents filmed in the townships: the mass funeral of four black activists who disappeared and were then found with their bodies grotesquely mutilated, and the 'sell-out killing' of a woman believed to be a police informer. At the Cradock funeral, the head of the South African Council of Churches, the Reverend Beyers Naudé, and the Reverend Allan Boesak, were both filmed so that they appeared to be speaking under the banner of the banned South African Communist Party, although in fact they were on a podium draped with scores of anti-government banners. There was, curiously, no sound as the ministers spoke; the impression left was that they were being inexplicably inflammatory. The SABC then juxtaposed the totally unrelated attack on an informer in Duduza, a township more than 500 kilometres north of Cradock. At six on a Saturday evening, prime viewing time for young children, the camera lingered on the gruesome spectacle of a young woman being burned to death by a frenzied mob. The SABC told viewers nothing of the situation that had sparked the 'mindless violence': the suspected spy had been

linked to an apparent police 'dirty trick' in which seven township youths had been supplied with booby-trapped grenades which exploded in the young men's faces and killed them. One TV critic summed up the widespread response to that piece of agitprop: 'You don't have to be a psychologist to realise that the average viewer will perceive a simple causal link—the emergency announcement is justified by the rhetorical behaviour of two ministers of religion and the actions of murderers.'

The next month the SABC featured the necklace killing of a soldier of the despised Ciskeian homeland army by a crowd at the funeral of Victoria Mxenge, a respected political lawyer who had been hacked and shot to death by assailants believed to have been either right-wing vigilantes or police. If a Second World War film had depicted a Nazi sympathiser—let alone an SS soldier—being brutalised by members of the French resistance, there would have been no condemnation of their vengeance, yet this African scene (at Mxenge's funeral) was denounced as a 'macabre orgy of barbarism'. Documented cases of the use of the necklace in reprisals represent a tiny fraction of the more than 2,000 deaths during the past two-and-a-half years of unrest. The majority of these deaths are attributable to the security forces, most of whose unarmed victims (according to a recent study) have been shot in the back. White revulsion at the misunderstood dynamics of political violence is such that evidence of the use of the necklace is actually sought out by the state. When thirty-two decomposed black bodies were uncovered in the homeland of Lebowa in early 1986, police immediately issued reports to the media that they 'suspected the infamous necklace method'. Only after a blaze of publicity did it emerge that gangs of rebellious youths, and not comrades, were responsible for the death, and that, according to interviews with residents, members of the Sekukuneland Youth Congress had tried to prevent the attacks on alleged witches. In fact, villagers said that police had warned them not to talk to the media unless it was to tell them that the victims had been killed by comrades.

The necklace has also been linked by the media to street committees and their 'people's courts' and 'disciplinary' committees', although none of the many sensationalised articles on these structures of people's power has ever turned up a shred of evidence of the use of capital punishment in the execution of township justice. Countless black leaders have appealed against intimidation and violence, and several civic associations have expressly banned necklacing. Moreover, the media descriptions of the leaders and members of street committees as

'faceless people' and 'shadowy groups' is not so sinister once one understands that any anti-apartheid activist who becomes known to the police is routinely detained and harassed.

The most straightforward articulation of the government's efforts to make propaganda capital out of the 'black-on-black violence' issue came in an April 1986 speech to Parliament by President Botha. Citing an unsubstantiated figure of more than 500 'brutal murders by radical blacks, mostly by the necklace method', he charged that 'the ANC and its cohorts use these most callous and gruesome methods of terror and extreme violence to intimidate people in order to gain control of the various black population groups.' Botha went on to claim that it was the alarming rise in black-on-black violence that had left the government with no choice but to extend drastically the powers of the police via the Public Safety Amendment Bill, which in effect obviates the need for future States of Emergency by allowing the Minister of Law and Order to take extraordinary measures to curb unrest without even having to give his reasons. In the words of the civil rights lawyer, Nicholas Haysom, 'The use of the "black-on-black violence" label has served to obscure the emergence of a pattern of extra-legal violence by right-wing vigilantes.'⁶ In his study on vigilante groups, Haysom maintains that their purpose is to alter the balance of power in areas where restoring political control is beyond the scope of the security forces, who are 'limited by potential publicity and hindered by legal restrictions in their ability to perpetrate the deliberate terror and violence to combat popular organisations'.

The most devastating single incident of vigilante violence—and the one most widely, though inaccurately, reported in the media—occurred in May and June of 1986, when vigilantes, police and army forces jointly launched an armed assault on the largest and longest-surviving squatter community in South Africa. According to affidavits filed in the Cape Supreme Court, white men carrying weapons were also seen among the conservative black vigilantes who flattened Crossroads, leaving at least fifty dead and 70,000 homeless. Yet, in the face of abundant evidence of state collusion with the vigilantes, and even after an international television cameraman was brutally hacked to death by vigilantes, most of the media clung to the government line that the carnage was a

⁶ Nicholas Haysom, *Mabangalala: The Rise of Right-Wing Vigilantes in South Africa*. Johannesburg: Centre for Applied Legal Studies, University of Witwatersrand.

manifestation of the kind of black-on-black violence that is endemic to black politics.⁷

Objectivity and context

Curiously, the same media commentators who recoil at the necklace murders which they blame on comrades display a great tolerance for the excesses of vigilantes. The ostensibly liberal *Sunday Times* (Johannesburg) compared 'the white right wing's lack of faith in the ability of the police to maintain order' with 'black vigilantes' lack of faith in police efforts to ensure justice', arguing further that 'the vigilantes are merely responding to the undeniable provocation of the township militants'. Even more disturbing is the labelling of vigilantes as 'moderate', in obvious juxtaposition to the 'radical' comrades and 'communist terrorists'. The State has now begun laying the groundwork for channelling these supposed moderates into the ranks of the newly-established black municipal police forces, thus setting the scene for private armies of vigilantes who owe allegiance to councillors, homeland officials and other state collaborators. In many ways, the state's vigilante strategy can be seen as a domestic counterpart to its regional destabilisation policy. Pretoria's attitude toward the atrocities committed by vigilantes—professed renunciation coupled with a reluctance to prosecute which is ultimately tantamount to arming them—is comparable to its apparent relationship with the armed gangs now terrorising Mozambique. The analogy is even more striking in the light of reports from the eastern Transvaal that vigilantes loyal to the Lebowa homeland government have been supported by soldiers from Phalaborwa, the South African Defence Force military training centre for Frontline State 'dissidents' and mercenaries.

As far as South Africa's commercial media is concerned, however, both the regional and domestic destabilisation campaigns are so under-reported that they remain, for most of the population, Pretoria's secret wars.⁸ While some details and events do find their way into the newspapers, readers are given no framework in which to analyse developments. The same lack of context is evident in reporting on the police and military presence in the townships. For example, several townships in the eastern Cape have actually been ringed with barbed-

⁷ See 'Crossroads is not for burning', Press Trust of South Africa, 3 June 1986.

⁸ See Joseph Hanlon, *Beggar Your Neighbour: Apartheid Power in Southern Africa*, London: Catholic Institute for International Relations/James Currey, 1986.

wire fencing, allowing residents to enter and exit only through road-blocks heavily guarded by armed soldiers. Clearly, this is an urban application of the familiar counter-insurgency warfare technique of forcing villagers into 'protected villages' or 'strategic hamlets', in an effort to deny access to guerrillas. Yet this alarming trend, if reported at all, has been presented as an isolated incident rather than as an integral facet of State strategy to crush the opposition.

The constraints on the media that have been promulgated under the latest State of Emergency can best be understood as forming a key component of such a counter-insurgency campaign. Initially, the international reaction to the emergency regulations was fixated on the ludicrous nature of the decrees issued by the new, all-powerful Bureau of Information: actually forbidding journalists from using certain words, so that the government's legislation could not be described as 'draconian', the state itself was not to be called a 'white minority regime', and the hundreds of men, women and children missing from the townships (but whose presence in police cells could not be confirmed) could not be said to have 'disappeared'. At one stage, the Bureau even went so far as to announce that the white spaces that newspapers had left in place of censored copy had been declared 'subversive'.⁹ But ultimately, the tragedy of the latest assault on South Africa's media lies not in the words and pictures that the censors have taken out, but in the vital context and analysis that reporters, editors and camera crews no longer even attempt to include. To be sure, there are the odd analytical interventions, but as one critic has noted about the media that have 'substituted fads, fashion, food and Fergie for what remains reportable', there is 'no point in complaining about censorship in the leaders or opposite editorial pages if other pages are undermining this critical position'.¹⁰

The commercial media's self-perception as an unwilling victim of state repression finds little sympathy among the majority of the population. The General-Secretary of the National Union of Mineworkers, Cyril Ramaphosa, argues that 'repression alone cannot produce the relations of domination and subordination in our society, for legitimacy and consent have to be generated', and he blames the

⁹ Anti-apartheid groups and newspapers have successfully challenged the 'unduly excessive' range of the emergency regulations in court, but the government responded with amendments to the legislation that have in effect nullified most of the court rulings.

¹⁰ Ruth Tomaselli and Keyan Tomaselli, 'The Bureau of Information before the Emergency: from news management to control', Contemporary Studies Unit, University of Natal, Durban.

media for playing a crucial role in this process. Most anti-apartheid campaigners vehemently reject the media's characterisation of itself as objective, for, as Ramaphosa puts it, 'under the guise of objectivity, they have been perpetrators of disinformation and blatant propaganda for the minority regime and the capitalist class in our country'. The conventional Western notions of media objectivity seem grossly distorted to the leaders and members of mass-based anti-government organisations. These groups have to struggle for exposure of their views in the commercial media, while the pronouncements and opinions of the government, of government-created 'leaders' such as homeland chiefs and community councillors, and of individuals who represent no mass base are all disproportionately represented. Many anti-apartheid activists are not only disgusted with the pretensions of South Africa's commercial media to espouse a policy of objectivity; they go on to reject the Western concept of objectivity itself. This attitude is most common among the alternative media which describe their politics as 'progressive'.

This more sophisticated understanding of the economic and political base of the commercial press has in turn led to a more sophisticated critique. Authors, journalists and alternative publishers have formed an Anti-Censorship Action Group to monitor and challenge the unprecedented level of media censorship under the State of Emergency. In years past such a group might have tried to meet the editors of the liberal press or perhaps appeal to the Publications Control Board, but in the current climate the group has concluded that it is self-censorship that not only poses the greatest threat, but is also perhaps open to being successfully challenged. Thus, when the country's largest chain of booksellers began to refuse to sell books that they feared might be regarded as 'subversive' under the wide-ranging emergency regulations, the Anti-Censorship Action Group went straight to the chairman of the conglomerate that controls the shops. It appealed to Tony Bloom, the chairman of the Premier Milling Group that owns the Central News Agency, to put an end to CNA's effective collaboration with the government's censorship campaign. Bloom, who was one of the prominent businessmen who travelled to Lusaka in September 1985 to meet with the ANC at a time when big capital in South Africa first began to voice its growing lack of confidence in the National Party's ability to solve the country's problems, responded positively. Similarly, when evidence emerged indicating that a top international courier service (DHL) had cooperated with security police efforts to intercept

informational material being shipped out of the country, the Anti-Censorship Action Group went directly to DHL management to argue against this invasion of privacy.

Commercial vs community media

It is now clear that anyone who seeks a representative sample of popular opinion in South Africa must make a concerted effort to monitor media other than the conventional commercial print and broadcast outlets. One could make a start by buying the 'Extra' or 'Africa' editions of the commercial newspapers (for even the liberal press practises a form of media apartheid and produces different editions aimed at black and white readers) as well as the various magazines aimed specifically at the black market (although it should be noted that virtually all 'black' publications are published by white-owned concerns). Reading what the white press prints for blacks at least gives one an idea of what most blacks are reading—though not necessarily endorsing. Blacks in the eastern Cape staged a ten-week boycott of all editions of the East London *Daily Dispatch* after an editorial called Nelson Mandela and other jailed political leaders 'criminals'. Many blacks said the boycott represented a more general dissatisfaction with the paper's political reporting. 'There was a lack of coverage of events in our areas,' explained the local publicity secretary of the United Democratic Front (UDF, an umbrella group of more than 800 affiliated anti-apartheid organisations, 'and when they did cover anything concerning us it was always one-sided.' When losses to the newspaper's management topped R40,000 with sales down more than 30 per cent, the *Dispatch* printed a front-page apology, acknowledging that its editorial policy was seen in some quarters as pro-apartheid. The spirit of non-racialism in anti-apartheid circles is such that the Alexandra township consumer boycott committee circulated a pamphlet urging residents to boycott the black-run *Sowetan*, in a bid to protest at its 'reactionary' politics.

Unfortunately, blacks and other government opponents cannot usually influence editorial policies through consumer boycotts. Increasing numbers of anti-apartheid activists have given up on the commercial press completely. 'I no longer have any confidence at all in the commercial media,' complained one UDF activist, who says she cancelled her subscription to the Johannesburg *Star* the day it featured a billboard that read, 'ANC Killers to Hang'. 'I'm sick of reading condemnations of "terrorists" and "marauding mobs" or "angry

youths"; so now I get all my news and information from word of mouth and from the community newspapers.'

Like the community organisations and trade unions which they promote, community-based and worker newspapers, magazines and newsletters define local, grassroots fights in the townships, schools or the workplace, as part of a broader national struggle against apartheid. Community and worker media is rooted in a context—resistance—that is alien to the commercial press. While the commercial papers aim to inform and entertain, community media works to raise critical awareness. 'All over South Africa, people are hearing the words of the bosses, and the government tv, the radio, the newspapers and films control what we know and think,' stated Cape Town's *Grassroots*, a community newspaper that has achieved a circulation of 20,000. 'We need to answer back; we need to speak for ourselves, to find ways of reaching people and passing on our own message. The state uses media to control the people; we must use it to liberate ourselves.' Another key difference between the commercial and the progressive press lies, of course, in the fact that profit is the underlying motive for any commercial paper to publish, while the community media aim only to break even, financially, and often rely more on grant funding and donations than selling advertising.

The rise of community media dates back to 1980, and parallels the mushrooming of the civic associations, the independent trade union movement, student organisations, women's groups and religious bodies, culminating in the launch of the UDF in 1983 and the most powerful non-racial labour movement in South African history, the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU), in 1985. The state's response to the growing influence of community media has mirrored its reaction to the increasing power of the mass-based organisations: media workers, like community activists and trade unionists, are harassed, detained, physically attacked and forced into hiding or exile. The most common form of state repression of the mass-based media has been through relentless bannings by the Publications Directorate; one community newspaper even had its offices, along with those of a range of community and union organisations, blown up.

Community media workers have coped, in turn, by expanding their scope. Some groups, like COSATU and other unions, do not try to produce full-fledged newspapers, but rather a combination of a broadsheet and a pamphlet, which often includes pull-out posters. *Learn and Teach*, part of a national adult literacy campaign, now prints

25,000 attractive, highly illustrated magazines a month, and though the language level is necessarily low, the contents range from English lessons set in the workplace to overtly political articles to educative comic strips.

State harassment may handicap the production of an issue of a newspaper, but there are always enough people around to print some leaflets. When production of the monthly *UDF News* proved impossible at the height of the State of Emergency, those members not in jail or on the run poured their energies into the printing of several thousand handbills that proclaimed, 'Leaders detained, but UDF fights on!' This siege mentality has spurred the development and sophistication of new media forms. Johannesburg's Silkscreen Training Project found itself fighting a constant battle against time, in an effort to get its posters and T-shirts out to meetings and funerals before the authorities declared them 'banned for distribution' (or sometimes even for mere possession). The organisation was ultimately hounded out of existence, after equipment was vandalised (by assailants with axes!) and members were detained and banned. The quest for unbannable media has led to a proliferation of freedom songs, T-shirts, hats, bumper stickers, political graffiti, and, the latest innovation, the placing of placard-bearing dummies on lamp-posts and park benches, where they are seen by hundreds of passers-by before they are confiscated by police. Each new political development brings its media counterpart, as the very definition of community media expands daily. Boycotting students hold alternative education workshops and teach 'People's history' in place of the old Bantu Education (now re-named the Department of Education and Training) syllabus. Protesting township residents stage candle-lit vigils, and when the police baton-charge them in the streets, the people retreat into their homes and send a message via a single candle in the front window of every family's home. When even the community newspapers are banned or confiscated, activists duplicate handwritten letters detailing the latest black-out news from the townships.

Although any section of the media that 'furthers the aims of a banned organisation' is considered 'subversive' under South African law, supporters of the banned African National Congress have in effect unbanned much of what can be seen as the ANC's media. While the police are able to arrest anyone found in possession of any ANC publications, it has become impossible for the State to exert much control over the singing of freedom songs, many of which explicitly praise gaoled and exiled ANC leaders. In addition to the clenched fist

'power' salute that is *de rigueur* at any anti-apartheid function, an increasing number of activists now signal their express support for the ANC with the thumbs-up sign of the movement. Similarly, ANC flags, and even ANC uniforms, are routinely seen at rallies and funerals. The South African government devotes much effort toward attempts at jamming the transmissions of the ANC's Radio Freedom, broadcast from Angola, Zambia, Tanzania, Ethiopia and Madagascar, yet large numbers of South Africans persevere in their efforts to tune in to the programme. One anecdote that indicates the authority that Radio Freedom commands in the townships came from a white activist who had been anxious about the perception of the nation-wide anti-conscription campaign among young blacks. 'You people are doing good work,' the white activist was told by a black friend. 'That's what we hear on Radio Freedom.'

In conclusion, those who wish truly to comprehend the dynamics of the current South African political scene must travel beyond the familiar and predictable terrain of the commercial media and begin to traverse the unexplored terrain of the media that is being shaped by the forces of the evolving conflict. It is worthwhile to recall that the publications once banned by the white minority government of Rhodesia, such as the Catholic publication, *Moto*, and the Zimbabwe African National Union's monthly, *Zimbabwe News*, are now sold on the streets of Harare alongside *Time* and the *Financial Gazette*. *Time*, controlled by multi-national capital, and the *Financial Gazette*, the voice of Zimbabwean business, still thrive in independent Zimbabwe, while *Zimbabwe News* continues from the war years as the journal of the country's ruling political party. The national broadcasting corporation, state-run by the former minority regime, is now run by the government of majority-ruled Zimbabwe, which formed the Zimbabwe Mass Media Trust in order to buy out all the previously South African-controlled shares in the country's major commercial newspapers. And *Moto*, still run by the Catholic Church, remains Zimbabwe's most independent media organ.

Comparisons between Zimbabwe's post-independence media policies and the situation in a post-apartheid South Africa are fraught with complications, for reasons ranging from the levels of organisation to the ideologies of the liberation movements in the two countries. Certainly, any new government that is truly representative of the majority of South Africa's population would move to transform the media so that it would no longer represent the view of a tiny minority.

Thus, one would expect to see totally new management at the national broadcasting network. By the same token, there has been much speculation that, as in Zimbabwe, a new government in Pretoria would acquire an interest in the existing newspaper chains, and that newspapers and magazines that are now banned and produced underground would be published freely under an ANC government.

The ANC has, understandably, not divulged any specific blueprint of its vision of the post-apartheid media, arguing that its Freedom Charter provides a broad outline of the non-racial democracy of the future, with the concrete details to be determined democratically by the people of South Africa once they have the power to realise their aspirations. However, some clues as to the ANC's approach are contained in an assessment of 'Monopoly Capitalism, Racism and Mass Media in South Africa' by the ANC National Executive Committee member, Pallo Jordan, who singles out the 'democratic press' inside the country and the ANC's underground media as the 'seedlings of a future, non-monopoly press, dedicated to serving the cause of the people, social progress and peace'.¹¹ Jordan maintains that, 'For these seedlings to grow into maturity requires the overthrow of the apartheid regime, the uprooting of the colonial structures on which it rests and the re-ordering of the economy so that it serves the people rather than a handful of monopolists.'

¹¹ *Sechaba* (official organ of the ANC) London, May 1986.

Literature and popular culture in South Africa

'People's education', 'people's history': a decade ago these were little more than radical slogans, declarations of intent. Today they represent well-defined transformative practices which the apartheid state seeks, simultaneously, to repress and to co-opt.¹ They are practices in which highly original research and methodology are tested against the experience of a generation who are, as one sixteen-year-old veteran put it recently, 'fighting for the world'.² Looking both ways, to the past and to the future, they are the two faces of a Janus who guards the doorways of many a 'liberated' classroom in which lessons are held under the noses of the patrolling security forces.³ Likewise, they are the two main aspects of a new cultural vista within which the works of literature to be dealt with in this article need to be situated. In all these works we find evidence of a dual process: on the one hand, a decisive break with the hegemonic culture of South Africa's colonial past; on the other, the forging of new continuities with past epochs of cultural resistance.

¹ For an overview of the prospects for 'people's education' in South Africa and the emergence of a transformative practice, see Pam Christie (ed), *The Right To Learn. The Struggle for Education in South Africa*, Johannesburg: SACHED/Ravan, 1985; Peter Kallaway (ed), *Apartheid and Education. The Education of Black South Africans*, Johannesburg: Ravan Press, 1984; Zwelakhe Sisulu, 'People's education for people's power', keynote address to the National Education Crisis Committee Conference, March 1986, *Transformation* 1 (1986), pp 96-117; Jon Campbell, Eric Molobi, *et al.*, 'National education crisis', *Work In Progress* 45 (November/December 1986), pp 15-28.

For an overview of 'people's history', see Shula Marks, 'Towards a people's history in South Africa? Recent developments in the historiography of South Africa' in Raphael Samuel (ed), *People's History and Socialist Theory*, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1981; Luli Callinicos, 'The "people's past": towards transforming the present' in Belinda Bozzoli (ed), *Class, Community and Conflict*, Johannesburg: Ravan Press, 1987, pp 44-64.

² Author's interview with Willie M (fifteen years old), 1986. After he and other scholars had been engaged in a battle with police at a school near Middelburg, during which the school burned down, Willie was brought to Johannesburg by his father, a migrant worker employed as a cleaner in a block of flats. Now sharing his father's room in a 'location in the sky' (as these roof-top compounds are popularly known), Willie is attending a privately-run 'crammer' in the city. He reflected that if his Middelburg comrades were to find out about this they would probably see him as a traitor, and ask him why he was furthering his education when they were 'fighting for the world'.

³ See, for example, Sefako Nyaka, 'The afternoon class flip', *The Weekly Mail* (Johannesburg) 18-24 April 1986, and 'No school, but quietly classes go on', *The Weekly Mail* 17-23 October 1986.

The recovery and utilisation of cultural resources buried by the past—uprooted by conquest and dispossession, alienated by educational *fiat* or diluted by appropriation, silenced by ban, premature death, or life-long exile—is a task for the cultural activist as much as the scholar. It is being pursued under the same range of penalties as before, but contextualised and strengthened by the maturing of the political struggle which marks off the 1980s from the 1970s. Another development which is thus placed on the agenda is the unification of the national culture, long sundered by the phenomenon of exile—a topic which cannot be dealt with here, though its urgency has been poignantly signalled by the deaths within a year of Alex La Guma, Bloke Modisane, and Bessie Head.

That is, as it were, the strategic view within which to range the works to be discussed. They also, however, engage South African audiences and readerships at the level of cultural tactics: drawing on the past, and projecting a liberated future, they also locate the pulse of the present. Here we might discern two related effects. In the first place, the works offer *counsel*: that is to say, they invite the practical test of the audience-reader's own experience in a relatively unmediated way. They envisage a world in which one can intervene rather than, as in the hegemonic culture with which they have broken, a world which can only be questioned for the fugitive, ever-problematic 'meaning of life'.⁴ In the second place, in the process of opening up to the audience-reader's experience, these works recognise, jostle and interact with a whole range of cultural acts to which that experience is simultaneously exposed.

Attention has recently been drawn—within South Africa, anyway—to some of the more salient and public cultural forms which have been evolved in the acute phase of struggle which has turned many townships and rural areas into only nominally undeclared war zones.⁵ Political funerals, the site around which many of these forms are clustered, are themselves harbingers of a secular future (in terms of the content of

⁴ 'The "meaning of life" is really the centre about which the novel moves. But the quest for it is no more than the initial expression of perplexity with which its reader sees himself living this written life. Here "meaning of life"—there "moral of the story": with these slogans novel and story confront each other, and from them the totally different historical coordinates of these art forms may be discerned.' Walter Benjamin, 'The storyteller: reflections on the works of Nikolai Leskov' in Gregory T Polletta (ed) *Issues in Contemporary Literary Criticism*, Boston: Little, Brown and Co, 1973.

⁵ See, for example, Charlotte Bauer and Ivor Powell, 'Culture as you don't see it at the city hall'. *The Weekly Mail* 21–27 November 1986, and a letter criticising this article by Kelwyn Sole, *The Weekly Mail* 28 November–4 December 1986.

funeral oratory, funeral poetry, icons, photographic images, etc), at the same time as 'looking back' to the centrality of funeral arrangements, wakes, processions, memorialising and grave-tending in the cultural past. Militant dance forms—such as the Eastern Cape's *toyitoyi* with its ritualised 'hand-grenade', 'bazooka' and other movements—and the reworking of traditional resistance songs to render the sharpened context of today's struggle are among the other obvious examples.

These extremely visible expressions—part of their value is that they will adhere even to the most perfunctory media coverage—are only the surface layer of a cultural groundswell which is sweeping South Africa. Something of the momentum of this process was captured by an incident on 23 September 1986 at the Kinross mine in the Orange Free State when management attempted to hold a memorial service for 177 miners killed in an underground fire. The service had barely begun when thousands of miners marched into the arena and began to circle around it. One by one, the black miners who had elected to attend the official ceremony left their seats and joined the procession, which toppled the 'management' pulpit before moving off to another venue where the miners held their own service.⁶

It is the infrastructure of this cultural momentum that needs to be understood. We need to look at political venues such as shop steward local committees and the 'cultural locals' which have now emerged in some areas, or at the house/yard/block/street/area committee tiers in some townships. It is here, as the slogan of 'grass roots democracy' turns into actual democratic practice, that we shall discover some of the most significant cultural innovations—together with the simultaneous recovery and re-evaluation of older cultural resources. What happens here, for instance, in the new patterns of relationship between children and parents, and between men and women, is of crucial cultural importance. So is the resurfacing, in a new context, of older cultural forms such as story-telling as a means of transferring personal experience and enriching the collective bond of community. The works of literature discussed below open on to this space.

A few years ago Mi Hlatshwayo's name was known only to a small circle of family, friends, and workers at the Dunlop factory where he worked as a driver. He was a union member but not a shop steward. In the Black Consciousness period he had attended political meetings at which poems were read. Hlatshwayo listened, stirred by the power of

⁶ The Kinross mine disaster occurred on 23 September 1986.

the poetry but discouraged, too: these poets wrote in English, a language in which his own proficiency was limited. Then one day at a union meeting he heard Alfred Qabula *bonga*⁷ in Zulu.

Qabula had submitted the traditional form of the *izibongo*, or praise poem, to the energy of a new content. Traditional *izibongo* varied from the short praises developed by youths to identify themselves within the community to the much longer praises composed, collected, and performed by professional *izimbongi*⁸ to honour chiefs: these less ephemeral praises drew attention to the history, achievements, and heroic qualities of the clan as reflected in the person of its leader and his ancestors. In Qabula's version the chief was replaced by the black trade union movement. What he praised was its struggle and the strength it offered through solidarity: it was 'the black forest that the employers saw and ran for safety'.

Hlatshwayo had no formal training in this traditional poetic style. However the *Chilibini* (St John's Apostolic) separatist church, of which he was a member, had transmuted the praise poem into a distinctive pulpit oratory with which he was familiar. Hearing Qabula brought Hlatshwayo to one of those creative conjunctures with which we are becoming familiar in South Africa today. A cultural resource carried forward from the precolonial period, and utilised *inter alia* to resist the hegemony of colonial Christianity,⁹ was now becoming available to the organised working class: a new cultural front of the liberation struggle was opening up. After hearing Qabula, Hlatshwayo found his voice as a poet and his role as an activist.

A poem like *The Black Mamba Rises Again In Victory* aims, as is evident from the title, at a more specific narrative content than the traditional praise poem, which embodies fragments of narrative—usually very disparate, evoking rather than recording the past—only as an aspect of eulogy.¹⁰ Hlatshwayo's poem celebrates the victory of the Dunlop workers after an uphill fight with management and records the main events of this chapter in the recent history of the trade union movement. Yet this centralisation of narrative is not effected without a

⁷ To compose or recite praises (Zulu).

⁸ Bards or praise poets (Zulu). The singular form is *imbongi*.

⁹ For a background to the impact of separatist Christianity on forms of performance culture, see David B Coplan, *In Township Tonight! South Africa's Black City Music and Theatre*. Johannesburg: Ravan Press, 1985, pp 80–81.

¹⁰ The use of the word 'eulogy' here draws attention to a formal characteristic and is not meant to imply that the traditional *izibongo* were never a vehicle for criticism of chiefs and their policies. See Coplan, *op. cit.*, pp 17–18.

strong tussle with the eulogistic tendency of the form he is using. We might summarise the poet's skill as a matter of imposing this conflict on the traditional form and then wrenching the strong resistance which the form offers into a new rhetorical strategy. The narrative is thus repeatedly subjected to 'eulogising' sequences which actually question it and draw out its significance within the broader context of the struggle for worker power and liberation.

Epic stasis and permanence in the traditional form become dynamism and process in the new, while the epic tenses (present and continuous past) are interwoven with the historic past of direct narrative to lift a current event on to an epic plane. The totemic animal symbols which figure in many praise poems are freed from the specific weight of clan histories, and now carry associative bonds which have been created in the popular memory of national oppression and struggle: black mamba, black buffalo, black ants. Qabula's image of worker solidarity as a forest also recurs. Aspects of traditional culture are often brilliantly transvalued, as when the workers (collectively) become

Ngudungudu, the woman who married without any *lobolo*.

Busy boiling foreigners' pots,

Yet yours are lying cold.¹¹

The unpaid *lobolo*—or bride price—here captures both the illegitimacy of exploitation and the alienation of the working-class 'bride' from the value of her labour. Imagery of this kind, as well as references to 'our heroes on the Island',¹² evokes both the historic national struggle of black South Africans and its contemporary socialist content.

Worker *izibongo*, while they need to be located in a wider cultural context than a purely literary one, do not claim attention in a literary vacuum. The poems of a Qabula or a Hlatshwayo need to be assessed, for instance, in relation to the transformation of the Zulu epic tradition by Mazisi Kunene in his *Emperor Shaka the Great*¹³ and *Anthem of the Decades*,¹⁴ Mongane Serote's choice of the long poem as the vehicle of his more recent work,¹⁵ Ingoapele Madingoane's *Africa My Beginning*

¹¹ Mi Hlatshwayo, 'The Black Mamba Rises Again in Victory', *Staffrider* 6(3) 1986, II. 8-10.

¹² *Ibid.*, I. 80.

¹³ Mazisi Kunene, *Emperor Shaka the Great*, London: Heinemann Educational Books, 1979.

¹⁴ Mazisi Kunene, *Anthem of the Decades*, London: Heinemann Educational Books, 1981.

¹⁵ Mongane Serote, *Behold Mama, Flowers*, Johannesburg: Ad Donker, 1978; 'Time Has Run Out', *Staffrider* 2 (4) 1979, pp 4-5; *A Tough Tale*, Johannesburg: Ravan Press, forthcoming 1987.

and *Black Trial*,¹⁶ and Modikwe Dikobe's *Dispossessed*.¹⁷ The reader who considers all these works together will not need to be persuaded that the poetic language of South Africa is in the process of being remoulded on the other side of a cultural watershed. Among the few critics who have begun to measure the dimensions of this refashioning, the former political prisoner, poet, and activist Jeremy Cronin, has so far made the most decisive contribution.¹⁸

His own verse,¹⁹ while flexible and wide-ranging, has established the prison experience of South Africa's numerous political captives as a focal point in the national consciousness. In these poems, prison is both a microcosm of South African society and a meditative space in which the 'deep history' of individual and national life can be registered, pulsing below the seeming stasis of repression. A light lyrical grace surprisingly informs a book which is analytical, technically experimental, and political to the core:

Overhead is mesh,
To one side the morgue,
To one side the gallows wing, this
Is our yard

Into which a raggedy
By happenstance
Butterfly has flown,

Fluttering
Half way to panic
Half way to give a damn

Springtime has come.
The years flow into each other.
The struggle goes on.

Poems like 'Walking On Air', a biographical celebration of fellow prisoner John Matthews, trace the human lineaments of a revolutionary culture in South Africa, delighting in the ordinary in a way which takes us beyond stock depictions of political figures. We meet Matthews the inheritor of a fragment of the radical past:

¹⁶ Ingoapele Madingoane, *Africa My Beginning*, Johannesburg: Ravan Press, 1978.

¹⁷ Modikwe Dikobe, *Dispossessed*, Johannesburg: Ravan Press, 1983.

¹⁸ Jeremy Cronin, "'The law that says/Constricts the breath-line (. . .)': South African English language poetry written by Africans in the 1970s', *The English Academy Review* (3) 1985, pp 25-49.

¹⁹ Jeremy Cronin, *Inside*, Johannesburg: Ravan Press, 1983.

LITERATURE AND POPULAR CULTURE

He was nine
when his father came
blacklisted home

From the 1922
Rand Revolt,
and there with a makeshift

Forge in their backyard
a never again to be employed
father passed on to his son

A lifelong love
for the making
and fixing of things.

Matthews the period dancer:

And later, deedle-deedle
—Dulcie, heel-toe,
his future wife

Whom he courted with
(he can still do it)
diddle-diddle: the cake-walk . . .

Interspersed with cameos of Matthews the gaol-bird grandfather, the story is told of how in the 1960s he turned to the 'making and fixing' of igniters for the armed struggle and was arrested. The poem's climax is the prisoner's moral victory over the security police who try to use the non-political Dulcie as blackmail to persuade him to give evidence for the state:

—Do you know why they've brought you?
And she said
—I do.
And he said
—Dulcie, I will never betray my comrades.
And with a frog in her throat she replied
—I'm behind you. One hundred percent.

So back they hauled John Matthews then and there,
back to the cells,
that was that, then, but

all the way down the passage
toe-heel, heel-toe, diddle-diddle
ONE HUNDRED PERCENT
I mean, he was high
off the ground, man.

He was walking on air.

At the heart of the poems is a linguistic project, an attempt to identify a new South African language by attending closely to the voice notes of a great range of interlocutors, from a bird outside the prison walls to three comrades on Death Row

. . . singing slow
Antiphonal phrases,
Three tongues floating over
That audible
Drop which gathers . . .

An archaeology of South African language-as-history is what one sequence of poems searches towards, offering the reader evidence of the richness which a new language may subsume:

A swift stream in the high mountains, dropping dental, lateral,
Clicking in its palate like the flaking of stone tools;
And a wide river that grazes the plains,
Lows like the wind in summer maize.
And a waterfall that hums like a turbine
And is whirled into light.

A river that carries many tongues in its mouth.

Hlatshwayo's emergence as a worker *imbongi* took place against the background of a broader engagement by worker organisations in the cultural sphere: educational programmes, choirs, and plays were among the more visible results of this development. Worker plays can draw, to some extent, on the experience of long-standing attempts to initiate an alternative theatre, based on the workshop method. These date back to the early plays of Athol Fugard and to the pioneering Workshop '71 group of the pre-1976 period, which produced plays such as *Crossroads*, *Uhlanga (The Reed)*, *uNosilemela*, and *Survival*.²⁰ More recently the momentum has been carried forward by the Junction

²⁰ The last two plays have been published. R Kavanagh (ed), *South African People's Plays*, London: Heinemann Educational Books, 1981.

Avenue Theatre Company²¹ and by playwrights such as Zakes Mda,²² Fatima Dike,²³ Julius Mtsaka,²⁴ Matsemela Manaka,²⁵ Maishe Maponya,²⁶ Percy Mtwa,²⁷ Mbongeni Ngema,²⁸ and Barney Simon.²⁹ To varying degrees, all these initiatives have had to wrestle with a central problem: the creation of an audience base in the black community. In the townships politically challenging plays have continued to be eclipsed by the success enjoyed since the 1960s by Gibson Kente,³⁰ a playwright-producer whose 'art did little to raise the political or class consciousness of his audiences' but 'did achieve the important goal of developing a theatre faithful to African daily experience that for the first time reached thousands of township residents.'³¹ Johannesburg's non-racial Market Theatre has provided alternative plays with a focal point since the late 1970s, and has acted as a stepping-stone to international exposure for aspirant playwrights, but it has never succeeded in drawing black audiences out of the townships in great numbers.

²¹ Junction Avenue Theatre Company, *The Fantastical History of a Useless Man*, Johannesburg: Ravan Press, 1978; 'Randlords and Rotgut' in Stephen Gray (ed), *Theatre Two*, Johannesburg: Ad Donker, 1981. Unpublished plays include 'Security', 'Will of a Rebel', 'Dikitshineng', 'Marabi', and the recent 'Sophiatown!'

²² Zakes Mda, *We Shall Sing For the Fatherland*, Johannesburg: Ravan Press, 1980. This collection contains the title play, 'Dead End', and 'Dark Voices Ring'. These plays, together with 'The Hill' and 'The Road', will be available in Andrew Horn (ed), *The Collected Plays of Zakes Mda*, Johannesburg: Ravan Press, forthcoming 1987.

²³ Fatima Dike, *The First South African*, Johannesburg: Ravan Press, 1979; 'The Sacrifice of Kreli' in Stephen Gray (ed), *Theatre One*, Johannesburg: Ad Donker, 1978.

²⁴ Julius Makwedini Mtsaka, *Not His Pride*, Johannesburg: Ravan Press, 1978. Unpublished plays include 'The Last Man'.

²⁵ Matsemela Manaka, *Egoli*, Johannesburg: Soyikwa/Ravan, 1980; 'Pula' in Stephen Gray (ed), *Market Plays*, Johannesburg: Ad Donker, 1986. Unpublished plays include 'Imbumba', 'Vuka', and 'Children of Asazi'.

²⁶ Maishe Maponya, 'The Hungry Earth' in P Hauptfleisch and I Steadman (ed), *South African Theatre: Four Plays and an Introduction*, Pretoria: HAUM, 1984. Unpublished plays include 'Gangsters', 'Dirty Work', 'Return of the Drum', and 'Umongikaza'.

²⁷ Percy Mtwa's plays include 'Bopha' and, with Mbongeni Ngema and Barney Simon, 'Woza Albert'.

²⁸ Mbongeni Ngema's plays include 'Asinamali' and, with Percy Mtwa and Barney Simon, 'Woza Albert'.

²⁹ Barney Simon's workshop plays—usually created with the participation of the entire cast—include 'Cincinnati' in Hauptfleisch and Steadman (eds), *op. cit.*, 'Born in the RSA', and with Percy Mtwa and Mbongeni Ngema, 'Woza Albert'. Simon's considerable flair for the successful theatre 'package', in terms which include what will 'work' for audiences outside the country, have made his influence on indigenous theatre a topic of debate in recent years. What is undeniable is the energy and originality of his input over a long period and the impossibility of describing South African theatre without taking his contribution into account.

³⁰ Gibson Kente's plays include 'Manana, the Jazz Prophet' (1963), 'Sikalo' (1966), 'Lifa' (1968), 'Zwi' (1970), 'How Long' (1974), 'I Believe' (1975), 'Too Late' (1976), 'Can You Take It' (1977), 'La Duma' (1978), and 'Mama and the Load' (1980). See Coplan, *op. cit.*

³¹ Coplan, *op. cit.*, p 208.

A play like *The Long March*, created by the Sarmcol-BTR workers in the course of their protracted struggle with this multinational, is in part a development of this workshop tradition. What makes it different is the depth of the workshop process and the working-class audience base which it has enjoyed from the start. The 'father' of the play is one Zondi, a remarkable man who has seen service in many political and worker organisations down the years and is also a direct descendant of Bambatha, the chieftain who led a famous rebellion against colonial rule and tax-enforced proletarianisation in 1906. The 'home' of the play is Mpophomeni, a resettlement area where many of the Sarmcol workers live. In its first version, under Zondi's guidance, a large part of the play dealt with the history of dispossession and forced removal to which the workers had been subjected. Subsequently it was used in workshops by many different groups, with input from Hlatshwayo, Qabula, and others, including a former member of the Junction Avenue group. Its rich performance dynamics—mime, dance, story-telling, an abbreviated version of the historical material Zondi had stressed—include a *papiermâché* 'Maggie Thatcher' mask used to highlight the 'imperial factor' in the struggle with management. Most instructively, the language of the play was Zulu in its initial, regional phase. When it played to worker audiences in parts of the country where other indigenous languages predominated, English was introduced by virtue of its role as *lingua franca*. This process will be extended when the play—finding its own route to an international future—is performed abroad in support of the workers' case against BTR (for infringement of the EEC's Code of Conduct) to be heard at the International Court of Justice at The Hague.

'There is an obstinate correlation between pride, dignity, and time in the worker performances,' writes Ari Sitas, the former Junction Avenue member mentioned above, in an intriguing discussion of the dynamics of workshop theatre in a working-class setting.³² 'Here especially the older workers insist that the time must take its course; they take more than an hour to recount one event with all its correct nuances. They insist on being in control of a time that takes on an epic quality in its unfolding layers.' It is not only on workshop plays that story-telling has had its impact. 'I have listened to countless storytellers on the buses and trains carrying people to and from work in South

³² Ari Sitas, 'Culture and production. The contradictions of working class theatre in South Africa', *Africa Perspective* New Series 1 (1-2) 1986, p 100.

Africa. The majority of them have woven masterpieces of entertainment and instruction. Others were so popular that commuters made sure they did not miss the storytellers' trains.³³ The speaker now is Njabulo S Ndebele, winner of the Noma Award for African writing in 1984 for *Fools*, a collection of stories.³⁴ He singles out Bheki Maseko³⁵ and Joel Matlou³⁶ as writers whose works are the closest parallel to the performance art of these oral storytellers.

Maseko's first published stories were brief workplace anecdotes. 'Mximbithi', for example, is a wry, laconic report from the factory floor. It records the rise of an informer who, worming his way into the favour of the firm's white supervisors, obtains (marginally) better-paid positions for himself and a side-kick at the expense of his fellow workers. 'Of course there are limits to the progress leadership maniacs can make. Mximbithi is still a mechanic and a car-washer, though he boasts that he is earning more than everybody else. But rumour has it that he is not recognised either as a driver or as a mechanic by head office.' What takes even this slight piece clear of the protest genre is Maseko's rendering of worker consciousness—rather than, simply, worker misfortune. The end-line, quoted above, is perceptive and ironic about the broader exploitative context within which the informer's paltry victory must be situated, but this wider vision remains rooted in the experience and the idiom of the factory worker. The authorial voice which we hear at the end of the tale is the same as that which earlier remarked that 'the old gossips were beginning to lose ground with Mr Lawrence. They envied Mximbithi who was gaining strength every day; he was coming closer to the 'Baas', every time'; or recalled that, when the workers began to see what Mximbithi was up to, 'Very few went on fine with him.'

Maseko's longer stories move away from the factory milieu, but remain within the ambit and the idiom of those who travel 'people's class' on the story-telling trains. Both 'Mamlambo' and 'The Night of the Long Knives' are receptive to the predominance of sensational stories of sorcery and ritual murder in popular lore. While Maseko

³³ Njabulo S Ndebele, 'Turkish tales and some thoughts on South African fiction', *Staffrider* 6(1) 1984, p 47.

³⁴ Njabulo S Ndebele, *Fools and Other Stories*, Johannesburg: Ravan Press, 1983.

³⁵ Bheki Maseko's stories include 'Mximbithi' and 'The Digger's Closing Day', *Staffrider* (4) 2, 1981, pp 4-5; 'Mamlambo', *Staffrider* 5 (1) 1981, pp 22-27; and 'The Night of the Long Knives', *Staffrider* 5 (3) 1983, pp 2-6; and 'Those Were The Days', *Staffrider* 6 (2) 1985, pp 2-4.

³⁶ Joel Matlou's stories include 'Man Against Himself', *Staffrider* 2(4) 1979, pp 26-8; 'My Lifestyle', *Staffrider* 3(2) 1980, pp 16-17; 'Life at Home', *Staffrider* 6 (4) 1986.

artfully positions a critique of superstition within the second of these texts, it is voiced by a neutral and minor character. The reader's susceptibility to a tale replete with supernatural horror and blood-curdling scenes is thus utilised by the storyteller, though this is by no means the only effect Maseko is aiming at.

'Mamlambo', for instance, deals with the plight of Sophie, a domestic worker who is trying to escape from a cycle of brief love affairs. She is haunted by the memory of her first lover, Elias, who stayed longer than the others but deserted her after a quarrel. When another man turns up who looks likely to last, she calls in the help of a 'traditional doctor'. But the main effect of the potion he gives her is to introduce the 'Mamlambo' or 'fortune snake' into the bed she shares with Jonas that night. While, as its name implies, this snake may bring good fortune, its 'maintenance' requires so many bizarre and cruel sacrifices that it is a curse rather than a blessing. Sophie's problem is how to get rid of it. Another traditional doctor supplies a charm and a suitcase into which Mamlambo is lured. Sophie, after several adventures, manages to 'give' the snake to an old woman by leaving the suitcase in her care on a busy station platform. The old woman is waiting for her son. Leaving her, Sophie narrowly avoids a face-to-face encounter with Elias. This near miss has a cathartic effect. For the first time she feels beyond the power of his memory, and free to commit herself fully to her new love. Her happiness seems assured when Jonas, returning to help his father on the land, offers to share this future with her. The reader, meanwhile, discovers that the son for whom the old woman—and Mamlambo—were waiting at the station was no other than Elias.

It is readily apparent that the story outlined above will yield to a symbolic interpretation which confers on the snake a predominantly sexual value. However, Maseko has not reduced the evocative power of the supernatural to a symbolic schema primarily encoding the interiority of personal relationships—as a 'Western' reading might expect. Instead, the snake's 'meaning' at this level is fully integrated with its broader function as a real social phenomenon, rather than a symbolic literary device. The sense of poetic justice we feel at Mamlambo's transfer from Sophie to Elias and his family, for instance, depends on our acceptance of the supernatural as an aspect of social reality. Maseko emphasises this non-symbolic treatment by introducing his tale with a summary of the lore connected with Mamlambo. The 'fortune snake' is clearly a phenomenon collectively experienced: we may learn from others how to deal with it. 'Someone will come along, pick up a shiny object, and

Mamlambo is his. There are many things said about this monster. Here is an account of how Sophie acquired Mamlambo and what happened to her.'

One might argue that the difficulties confronting Sophie (exploitation, loneliness, sexism, lack of education, etc) could be set out in a more concrete fashion. In utilising the supernatural, doesn't Maseko obscure the underlying reasons for her plight? Yet the significance of this writer would seem to lie in the manner in which he has taken hold of a genre—the oral story—which has not been hegemonised by the dominant culture, and which can thus engage his audience/readership in a resilient, oppositional cultural discourse. The habit of taking counsel from a story is not discarded—as might be the case in a different prose treatment which addressed the 'real' causes of Sophie's plight, but did not allow the reader to bring experience to bear in a direct and practical fashion. It may be that such a phenomenon as Mamlambo gathers into its serpentine coils a host of social issues and problems, but this does not necessarily mean that those who occupy Sophie's particular 'site of struggle' lose sight of these in the process. On the contrary, it might be argued that it is through Mamlambo that these issues become 'real' to social agents like Sophie, who are then able to use available social networks, and their own wits, to overcome misfortune—sharing experience through cultural forms such as storytelling in the process. Perhaps when domestic workers organise as a group—a process which is currently taking place—and are included in wider democratic processes, we shall see stories such as Maseko's taking on a new content. Whether this happens or not, and whether the resulting stories will be as richly entertaining as 'Mamlambo', will be one test of the human depth of trade union and democratic political practices.

Ndebele has utilised elements of the oral storyteller's repertoire in his own writing, perhaps most notably in 'Uncle',³⁷ a story which celebrates the gift of one generation to another. For the boy through whose eyes this narrative unfolds his uncle is a source of rare wonder: a master musician whose impromptu playing can cause mayhem in the streets. He is also a source of knowledge: in particular, knowledge of the mystery and delight that can be had from drawing out the potential that lies in one's own life, in one's specific, historically embattled milieu, and in the dream of Africa.

³⁷ Ndebele, *Fools*, *op. cit.*, pp 53–123.

One episode is the stuff of which stories in the buses and trains are made. His uncle has a showdown in the township streets with the local bully-hero, Nzule, whose woman has transferred her affections to the musician. It is one of those Brer Rabitt encounters that go back to Aesop. His uncle is fleet of foot, and during the first part of the encounter the well-armed and impressively accoutred Nzule pursues him relentlessly around the streets on a circuit of shame, deeply felt by the watching boy. His uncle, however, has a plan. He leads the tiring Nzule towards a pile of stones that he has prepared in advance, and picks his opponent off with well-aimed stones as he attempts to close the gap. The victory of cunning over brute force transfers the sympathy of the watching community to his uncle's side, and small boys join him in pelting the hapless and humiliated Nzule. It is an index of Ndebele's art, and the complex counsel he has to offer, that the boy's reactions to this victory are mixed. His uncle's triumph, in which he shares, is also a source of pain to him: Nzule, a childhood hero and the township's champion, stands revealed in all his limitation. Gaining knowledge means, often, the painful loss of comforting illusions.

Stories coming out of South Africa's townships today are full of variations on the theme of how the cunning strategists of the streets defeat the brute force of the Casspirs. Under cover of darkness, children throw stones at a patrolling vehicle and then run off in a massed group which hides the road ahead from the might and rage of their pursuers. Suddenly the children veer off to either side. The road has been excavated across half its narrow width; the Casspir topples; petrol bombs are lobbed by the 'artillery section'. While Ndebele has criticised 'an art that is grounded in the negation of social debasement, where scenes of social violence and a host of examples of general social oppression become ends in themselves'³⁸ the story when it remains faithful to 'correct nuances' has shown that it can carry a political content. Its capacity to do so, exemplified in Ndebele's own work but also in many anthologies,³⁹ turns on two main aspects which distinguish the presence of the storyteller from that of the novelist.

One is the matter of counsel referred to earlier; the other is the presence of the community to which the storyteller explicitly or implicitly refers, providing for 'counsel' a concrete field of social

³⁸ Ndebele, 'Turkish tales', *op. cit.*, p 45.

³⁹ See for example Mthobeni Mutloatsi (ed), *Forced Landing*, Johannesburg: Ravan Press, 1980; Norman Hodge (ed), *To Kill a Man's Pride*, Johannesburg: Ravan Press, 1984; Mbulelo Mzamane (ed), *Hungry Flames*, Johannesburg: Ravan Press, 1987.

reference. The often-noted 'failure' of black South African writers to produce a major novel (the publication recently of Lewis Nkosi's *Mating Birds*⁴⁰ may force a reassessment of this verdict) while offering such a wealth of stories, might well be reconstructed. Could it be that Western critics, in searching for excellence in what is pre-eminently the literary genre of the 'homeless', atomised bourgeois ego,⁴¹ have overlooked the stronger claim of the story to being the authentic prose genre of the Third World?

⁴⁰ Lewis Nkosi, *Mating Birds*, New York: St Martin's Press, 1986.

⁴¹ Walter Benjamin, *op. cit.*, p 806.

THE FREEDOM CHARTER

We, the People of South Africa, declare for all our country and the world to know:

that South Africa belongs to all who live in it, black and white, and that no government can justly claim authority unless it is based on the will of all the people;

that our people have been robbed of their birthright to land, liberty and peace by a form of government founded on injustice and inequality;

that our country will never be prosperous or free until all our people live in brotherhood, enjoying equal rights and opportunities;

that only a democratic state, based on the will of all the people, can secure to all their birthright without distinction of colour, race, sex or belief;

And therefore, we, the people of South Africa, black and white together—equals, countrymen and brothers—adopt this Freedom Charter. And we pledge ourselves to strive together, sparing neither strength nor courage, until the democratic changes here set out have been won.

THE PEOPLE SHALL GOVERN!

Every man and woman shall have the right to vote for and to stand as a candidate for all bodies which make laws;

All people shall be entitled to take part in the administration of the country;

The rights of the people shall be the same, regardless of race, colour or sex;

All bodies of minority rule, advisory boards, councils and authorities shall be replaced by democratic organs of self-government.

ALL NATIONAL GROUPS SHALL HAVE EQUAL RIGHTS!

There shall be equal status in the bodies of state, in the courts and in the schools for all national groups and races;

THE FREEDOM CHARTER

All people shall have equal right to use their own languages, and to develop their own folk culture and customs;

All national groups shall be protected by law against insults to their race and national pride;

The preaching and practice of national, race or colour discrimination and contempt shall be a punishable crime;

All apartheid laws and practices shall be set aside.

THE PEOPLE SHALL SHARE IN THE COUNTRY'S WEALTH!

The national wealth of our country, the heritage of all South Africans, shall be restored to the people;

The mineral wealth beneath the soil, the banks and monopoly industry shall be transferred to the ownership of the people as a whole;

All other industry and trade shall be controlled to assist the well-being of the people;

All people shall have equal rights to trade where they choose, to manufacture and to enter all trades, crafts and professions.

THE LAND SHALL BE SHARED AMONG THOSE WHO WORK IT!

Restrictions of land ownership on a racial basis shall be ended, and all the land redivided amongst those who work it, to banish famine and land hunger;

The state shall help the peasants with implements, seed, tractors and dams to save the soil and assist the tillers;

Freedom of movement shall be guaranteed to all who work on the land;

All shall have the right to occupy land wherever they choose;

People shall not be robbed of their cattle, and forced labour and farm prisons shall be abolished.

ALL SHALL BE EQUAL BEFORE THE LAW!

No one shall be imprisoned, deported or restricted without a fair trial;

No one shall be condemned by the order of any Government official;

The courts shall be representative of all the people;

Imprisonment shall be only for serious crimes against the people, and shall aim at re-education, not vengeance;

The police force and army shall be open to all on an equal basis and shall be the helpers and protectors of the people;

All laws which discriminate on grounds of race, colour or belief shall be repealed.

ALL SHALL ENJOY EQUAL HUMAN RIGHTS!

The law shall guarantee to all their right to speak, to organise, to meet together, to publish, to preach, to worship and to educate their children;

The privacy of the house from police raids shall be protected by law;

All shall be free to travel without restriction from countryside to town, from province to province, and from South Africa abroad;

Pass Laws, permits and all other laws restricting these freedoms shall be abolished.

THERE SHALL BE WORK AND SECURITY!

All who work shall be free to form trade unions, to elect their officers and to make wage agreements with their employers;

The state shall recognise the right and duty of all to work, and to draw full unemployment benefits;

Men and women of all races shall receive equal pay for equal work;

There shall be a forty-hour working week, a national minimum wage, paid annual leave, and sick leave for all workers, and maternity leave on full pay for all working mothers;

Miners, domestic workers, farm workers and civil servants shall have the same rights as all others who work;

Child labour, compound labour, the tot system and contract labour shall be abolished.

THE DOORS OF LEARNING AND OF CULTURE SHALL BE OPENED!

The government shall discover, develop and encourage national talent for the enhancement of our cultural life;

THE FREEDOM CHARTER

All the cultural treasures of mankind shall be open to all, by free exchange of books, ideas and contact with other lands;

The aim of education shall be to teach the youth to love their people and their culture, to honour human brotherhood, liberty and peace;

Education shall be free, compulsory, universal and equal for all children;

Higher education and technical training shall be opened to all by means of state allowances and scholarships awarded on the basis of merit;

Adult illiteracy shall be ended by a mass state education plan;

Teachers shall have all the rights of other citizens;

The colour bar in cultural life, in sport and in education shall be abolished.

THERE SHALL BE HOUSES, SECURITY AND COMFORT!

All people shall have the right to live where they choose, to be decently housed, and to bring up their families in comfort and security;

Unused housing space to be made available to the people;

Rent and prices shall be lowered, food plentiful and no one shall go hungry;

A preventive health scheme shall be run by the state;

Free medical care and hospitalisation shall be provided for all, with special care for mothers and young children;

Slums shall be demolished, and new suburbs built where all have transport, roads, lighting, playing fields, creches and social centres;

The aged, the orphans, the disabled and the sick shall be cared for by the state;

Rest, leisure and recreation shall be the right of all;

Fenced locations and ghettos shall be abolished, and laws which break up families shall be repealed.

THERE SHALL BE PEACE AND FRIENDSHIP!

South Africa shall be a fully independent state, which respects the rights and sovereignty of all nations;

South Africa shall strive to maintain world peace and the settlement of all international disputes by negotiation—not war;

Peace and friendship amongst all our people shall be secured by upholding the equal rights, opportunities and status of all;

The people of the protectorates—Basutoland, Bechuanaland and Swaziland—shall be free to decide for themselves their own future;

The right of all the peoples of Africa to independence and self-government shall be recognised and shall be the basis of close co-operation.

Let all who love their people and their country now say, as we say here:

'THESE FREEDOMS WE WILL FIGHT FOR, SIDE BY SIDE, THROUGHOUT OUR LIVES, UNTIL WE HAVE WON OUR LIBERTY.'

Adopted at the Congress of the People, Kliptown, South Africa, on 26 June 1955.

* * * * *

How the Freedom Charter came into being

When the Campaign for the Defiance of Unjust Laws was brought to an end in 1953 by new, harsher legislation, a meeting was convened by the African National Congress to discuss what action could be taken next.

At this meeting (of the Executive Committees of the ANC, the South African Indian Congress, the Congress of Democrats and the South African Coloured Peoples' Organisation) Professor Z K Matthews proposed the convening of a national assembly, in effect a general election throughout the country, on the basis of a universal voters' roll. This was considered to be beyond the capabilities of the Congress Alliance, but it was out of this proposal that the idea of the Congress of the People developed.

It was decided to get the widest possible representation from the whole country to draw up a charter of freedom, embodying the peoples' demands. This charter would be put before a mass assembly of delegates from all over the country, elected on the basis that they represented an organisation (trade unions, political parties, sports, etc) or a

THE FREEDOM CHARTER

locality, a street, a region, a factory, a church organisation. The Working Committee that was set up was the first Action Committee of the Congress Alliance. (Previously there had been discussions between the organisations, but no actual alliance.) The Assembly would be open to all. A call went out to existing political parties to participate; they did not respond.

The call for the Congress of the People that went out indicated headings for different groups of demands: land, industry, human rights, education, the law, but did not draft direct proposals. This was left to the people up and down the country. And the proposals came flooding in, from simple local demands to theoretical concepts of a new constitution, from carefully worded documents to scraps of paper. A sub-committee put them into a manageable form for submission to the Congress. It was the intention to have a lead speaker for each section, then general discussion. But with the mass intervention of the police, this was not possible. Each section was carried by acclaim rather than by discussion and debate.

So the Freedom Charter was adopted. But by the end of the year 156 leading activists were on trial for treason, and the Charter was cited as a treasonable document. When this first treason trial came to an end after four-and-a-half years, the ANC was banned and the Charter declared illegal. Yet 25 years later it has become the basis for mass opposition to apartheid, acclaimed, published, quoted from, its opening words: *South Africa belongs to all who live in it, black and white*, as familiar as a popular poem.

When it was first adopted, the whole concept was entirely new. It took many years for its ideas to become generally known, to be accepted, and eventually, through the courage and militancy of a new generation, to be 'unbanned' and distributed openly throughout the country.

Criticisms of the Freedom Charter, particularly from radical organisations in the West, miss its significance. It gave the liberation movement a single programme for the first time, and this unity was cemented by the subsequent treason trial. This unity is the outstanding feature of the South African movement. The Charter is a broad statement of aims, not a policy document or blueprint for a future democratic government. How these general aims will be put into practice is the task that faces the victors. Until then, the Freedom Charter remains the basis for a united struggle to free our land.

HILDA BERNSTEIN

THE NATIONAL ANTHEM

Nkosi Sikelel' i-Afrika*

Nkosi sikelel' i-Afrika
Maluphakanyisw' uphondo lwayo
Yizwa imithandazo yethu
Nkosi sikelela—Nkosi sikelela

Nkosi sikelel' i-Afrika
Maluphakanyisw' uphondo lwayo
Yizwa imithandazo yethu
Nkosi sikelela—Thina Lusapho lwayo

Woza Moya
Woza Moya, oyingcwele
Nkosi sikelela
Thina Lusapho lwayo

Morena boloka
Sechaba sa heso
O fedise dintwa le Matswenyeho

Morena boloka
Sechaba se heso
O fedise dintwa le Matswenyeho
O se boloke—o se boloke
O se boloke—o se boloke

Sechaba sa heso
Sechaba sa Afrika

O se boloke Morena—o se boloke
O se boloke Sechaba—o se boloke
Sechaba se heso
Sechaba sa Afrika

Translation of Nkosi Sikelel' i-Afrika

Lord Bless Africa
Let its Horn be Raised
Listen also to our Prayers
Lord Bless
Lord Bless
Come Spirit
Come Spirit
Holy Spirit
Lord Bless Us
We, thy Children

* Nkosi Sikelel' i-Afrika, the National Anthem of the people of South Africa, has its roots deeply embedded in our history and cultural traditions.

Its composer, Enoch Mankayi Sontonga, was born in Lovedale, Cape Province, in 1860. He left school at an early age and went to Johannesburg, where he was employed in various occupations. A Christian, Sontonga was endowed with a wonderful voice, and he wrote both music and lyrics. His songs, sung in churches and concerts, were popular throughout the country. Composed in 1897, Nkosi Sikelela was commonly sung by choirs, churches and in African schools and by the turn of the century was known throughout the country. Mankayi Sontonga died in Johannesburg in 1904—his grave is in the now all-white Brixton Cemetery.

It was SEK Mqhayi (1875–1945), *imbongi yesizwe jikelele* (the national poet), who added seven stanzas to the national anthem. The Xhosa lyrics, with the exception of the first stanza which was Sontonga's, was thus Mqhayi's version, and was first published in 1927.

Nkosi Sikelela, originally intended as a hymn, was sung in all provinces and steadily gained recognition as the people's national anthem. The first verse (Sontonga's) has survived as the basis of the popular national anthem of today.

The ANC adopted Nkosi Sikelel' i-Afrika as its national anthem in 1925, and all organisations and churches followed suit. It was also at this time that the ANC adopted black, green and gold as our national colours. Today the song has become the national anthem of many countries in Africa north of the Limpopo River, including Tanzania, Zambia, Zimbabwe and the liberation movement of Namibia, SWAPO. Within South Africa the song is sung in many languages, although an English translation can only be literal and loses the poetic and melancholy rhythm of the song—a prayer for the people of Africa.

Today Sontonga's Nkosi Sikelela is closely associated with and symbolises the struggle of our people for a democratic South Africa. It is heard at protest and solidarity meetings, conferences and funerals. It is sung by workers, women, youth and students, who stand with fists raised while singing—a sign of respect for our traditions, culture and fight for freedom.

Corrections

In Yezid Sayigh's article, 'The Politics of Palestinian Exile' in the January 1987 issue of *Third World Quarterly*, the last sentence in paragraph 2, page 34, containing the phrase 'had not made it a political force' should read: 'The PRM's overall military capability remained modest, but the swell of Arab popular support had made it a political force to be reckoned with.'

On page 66 of the same article, the interview with A Saif cited in footnote 91, was not conducted by the author, as stated.

Third World Quarterly regrets these errors.

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INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND (IMF)/WORLD BANK

▲ International Development Association (IDA)

Meeting of Deputies

Washington DC, 23–25 September 1986

■ IDA deputies from the association's thirty-four donor countries met for their fourth round of negotiations on the eighth IDA replenishment (IDA VIII). The negotiations had begun in Paris in January 1986,¹ continued in April² and June 1986, and were due to be concluded before the annual meeting of the IMF and World Bank (see below).

According to Moeen Qureshi, Chairman of the negotiations, agreement was reached on a minimum replenishment of \$11.5bn over the three years 1988–1990, with a commitment to a higher level through extra donations by Japan, Italy and The Netherlands. These countries, particularly Japan, were making their contributions over and above their existing percentage shares, conditional on receiving larger shares in the World Bank, with a consequent increase in voting power. The USA, the largest share-holder in the Bank, had agreed in principle to reduce its shares, thus making more available for Japan. There was also apparently general support for amending the Bank's fundamental Articles of Association to allow the USA to maintain its veto over amendments to the Articles, despite a fall in its shareholding from 20 per cent to 15 per cent. The hope was that the additional contributions would result in an IDA VIII of \$12bn, compared to \$10.5bn, for the current three-year period.

IDA lending terms were to be tightened under the new agreement, with repayment periods being reduced from fifty to forty years for the least developed countries, and to thirty-five years for others. The ten-year period of grace before capital repayments began would, however, be maintained, as would the existing service charge of 0.75 per cent.³

▲ Group of Twenty-Four (G24)

Ministerial Meeting

27 September 1986

Group of Ten (G10)

Ministerial Meeting

28 September 1986

IMF Interim Committee

28 September 1986

IMF/World Bank Development Committee

29 September 1986

Forty-First Annual Joint Meeting of the Boards of Governors

30 September–3 October 1986

Washington DC

■ The Annual Meetings of the IMF and World Bank were dominated by the issues
The North-South Monitor was written and researched for Third World Quarterly by Maya Jaggi.

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of the record trading imbalances among some major industrialised economies, and Third World external debt.

The Group of Twenty-Four (G24) developing countries made a strong protest against the failure of the industrialised countries to tackle the four-year debt crisis, emphasising the 'intolerable burden' which debt servicing placed on developing countries. The ministers pointed out that advocacy of growth-oriented programmes of adjustment in debtor countries would remain mere rhetoric unless the net flow of resources from developing to industrialised countries was reversed. To this end, they advocated reduced real interest rates; an IMF or World Bank interest relief facility; eased terms of debt repayment; increased assistance from multilateral institutions and governmental agencies; and a resumption of voluntary loans from private sources. They also proposed that decisions on financing and performance be linked to changes in the prices of primary commodities, as had been achieved in Mexico's recent debt renegotiation, just prior to the Washington meetings. The G24 recommended the creation of an ad hoc committee of ministers from both developing and developed countries, to re-examine the debt problem in view of these recommendations. The ministers also expressed disappointment over the slow rate of growth in the global economy, and stressed the need for surveillance of the industrialised countries' economies, using economic indicators, with a view to ensuring the compatibility of their policies with global growth and stability. This call for increased surveillance, particularly by the IMF, was reiterated in the subsequent meeting of the Group of Ten industrialised countries (G10).

The Interim Committee identified two priorities: the strengthening of growth in the major industrialised economies, and the implementation of the 'Baker Plan' on Third World debt.⁴ Echoing the statement of the Group of Seven industrialised countries (G7) in their related meeting in Washington DC (see below), the Interim Committee's communiqué advocated the reduction of the US fiscal deficit and the sustaining of growth through adequate domestic demand, particularly in those countries with surpluses. It also recommended greater use of economic indicators in surveillance of the industrialised countries' economies. While reaffirming the continued importance of implementing the Baker Plan, a year after its inception, the communiqué noted the disappointing response of the commercial banks, whose lending to developing countries had declined. The committee noted, however, that lending from multilateral development banks (MDBs) and officially-supported export credits had grown, and it welcomed the renegotiation of Mexico's debt under the Baker Plan. This rescheduling, concluded on 30 September 1986, offered Mexico a further \$6bn in commercial bank loans, and the same amount from multilateral and official sources, with an extra \$500m in guarantees from the World Bank. An important feature of Mexico's new package, apart from the linking of performance criteria to the price of oil, was the linkage with growth. If the country failed to meet certain growth targets, it would, under strict conditions, be able to borrow more, rather than having to modify its development targets.

The Interim Committee went on to reject G24 demands for enlarged access to IMF resources and to the Compensatory Financing Facility (CFF) in 1987. It also decided that there was insufficient support for a new allocation of Special Drawing Rights (SDRs), another long-standing request of the G24. It urged the IMF Executive Board, however, to review the matter and report to the committee's next session in the

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spring of 1987. The committee also welcomed Japan's offer to provide the IMF with SDR 3bn to assist its support for adjustment programmes in developing countries.

The Development Committee affirmed the need for higher levels of sustained growth in the industrialised countries, as a prerequisite for the success of developing countries' adjustment efforts. Like the Interim Committee, it emphasised the need for increased commercial lending to debtor countries, in support of growth-oriented policies. The committee also urged support for the implementation of the UN Programme of Action for African Economic Recovery and Development 1986-90,⁵ and appealed to the industrialised countries to provide the extra annual \$2.5bn in concessional flows needed by low-income sub-Saharan countries over the next five years. The Bank was asked to report within a year on progress in meeting this resource gap, and in improving the coordination of aid flows to increase their effectiveness. Expressing concern about the inadequacy of Overseas Development Assistance (ODA) to low-income countries, the committee also asked the Bank to prepare a study on the external resource needs of poor countries outside Africa. Repeating its frequent assertion that lack of capital should not be a constraint on increasing the Bank's lending, the committee agreed that a substantial increase in its General Capital would be needed to fulfil projected lending for the period to 1990. The G24 estimated a lending level of \$21.5bn for 1990 as the minimum consistent with the developmental role of the Bank, against the level supported by existing capital of \$14.5-15bn per year.

The Development Committee reaffirmed the central role of the World Bank as a global development agency, charged primarily with accelerating world growth and alleviating poverty. This role was stressed by the new President of the World Bank, Barber Conable. In his first speech since succeeding A W Clausen on 1 July 1986, Conable specified a five-point programme by which the Bank could fulfil its role as a leading force in world development:

- the Bank should be a force for development, rather than primarily an agency for debt management;
- it should combine investment with adjustment lending on a country-by-country basis;
- it should accord priority to agricultural development in the poorest countries, as a means to alleviating poverty;
- it should take account of long-term developmental issues, such as population and environmental concerns, as well as the full integration of women in the development process;
- it should maintain flexibility in its programmes and management.⁶

● It is not enough to endorse the proposals US Treasury Secretary Baker made this time last year in Seoul. With regard to middle-income nations, the private financial community must move from approval in principle to action in practice'. Barber Conable, President of the World Bank, advocating increased commercial bank lending under the Baker Plan in his opening speech. *Financial Times* (London) 1 October 1986.

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COMMODITIES

▲ UN Conference on Natural Rubber, 1985

Third Session

Geneva, 6-17 October 1986

■ The third round of talks between some fifty rubber producer and consumer countries collapsed without agreement on a successor to the present pact. The International Natural Rubber Agreement (INRA) was signed in 1979 and twice extended, but is precluded by its terms from further renewal.

Consumer countries, led by the USA and the EEC, tabled a series of demands for a new agreement:

- a regular price review every twelve months, as opposed to the present period of eighteen months;
- an automatic price change of 5 per cent if the International Natural Rubber Organisation (INRO) Council failed to agree on a change;
- indicative prices (the outer levels of the pricing mechanism) to become operational if the buffer stock reached a level of 450,000 tons.

The seven producer countries meanwhile made a substantial concession by dropping their demand for a 30 per cent rise in the reference price of rubber, accepting the current price of 201.66c per kilogram, provided that it was enshrined in the new agreement rather than being worded in a more vague format. Their concession was also made conditional on the reference price being expressed in Malaysian dollars, rather than in Singapore's currency.

In the face of a consequent deadlock, the Chairman of the conference, Manaspas Xuto, presented an eight-point proposal, which was rejected by consumers as biased towards the producers' interests. The final stumbling block to agreement proved to be the consumers' insistence on larger and more rapid automatic adjustments in price, to reflect changing market circumstances. While the producers were willing to compromise on the currency issue, they were unwilling to limit the discretion of the INRO Council in determining price changes.

The talks ended with no definite plans for a resumption of negotiations. Producers, bitterly sceptical of the consumers countries' willingness to conclude a new agreement, suggested that a return to free market forces might be less of an evil than conceding to the consumers' demands.⁷

▲ International Tin Council (ITC)

Eighteenth Ordinary session

London, 2-3 October 1986

Association of Tin Producing Countries (ATPC)

Ministerial Meeting

Jakarta, 27-28 October 1986

■ Ministers from the ATP's seven member-countries (Australia, Bolivia, Indonesia, Malaysia, Nigeria, Thailand and Zaire) met to consider means of

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supporting the price of tin in the wake of the suspension of the Sixth International Tin Agreement (ITA). On 24 October 1985 the buffer stock had ceased its operations, having exhausted its funds and incurred vast debts.⁸ Since that time, the ITC had confirmed the suspension of the buffer stock at successive meetings, including the latest in October 1986,⁹ and the price of tin had fallen by half. The seven ATPC members, accounting for 70 per cent of world tin production, were joined by observers from Brazil and China, accounting for a further 20 per cent of production.

The ministers considered the possibility of imposing a production ceiling on tin as a means of raising prices. They agreed on two possible scenarios for the following year: One suggested that the price would attain a level of US\$5,000–5,800 per ton, provided that Brazil and China cooperated with the ATPC in limiting production. Alternatively, they judged that a price of US\$5,800–6,900 could be achieved only if the two countries joined the ATPC. Member-countries were unlikely to wish to limit their own production in an effort to raise prices, without assurances that their market shares would not simply be replaced by extra sales from non-members. Neither Brazil nor China would, however, commit themselves to joining the association, and action on production and prices was deferred.

The ministers did agree on the disposal of stockpiled tin, requesting their Executive Committee to make an inventory of all tin stocks and report on the possible options for their depletion. Once the committee's recommendations were forwarded to member-governments, the decision to act on them would be a political one. The meeting also expressed concern over continued sales from the USA's General Services Administration (GSA) stockpile. It made a renewed plea for the USA to abide by its agreement of 1983 with producer countries of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) which obliged the USA to limit sales to 3,000 tons per year.

Participants also agreed to urge their respective governments to participate in UNCTAD's discussion on the formation of an International Tin Study Group, whose functions would be chiefly in the field of research and development.¹⁰

● 'Now that the ITC has been virtually inoperative, the tin industry has been left with the ATPC to turn to for international intervention aimed at restoring normality in the market.' Dr Subroto, Indonesia's Minister for Mines and Energy and current Chairman of the ATPC. *Financial Times* (London) 28 October 1986.

THE NORTH

▲ Group of Five (G5)

Ministerial Meeting

Washington DC, 26 September 1986

Group of Seven (G7)

Ministerial Meeting

Washington DC, 27 September 1986

■ Major disagreements were reported within the Group of Five industrialised countries (Britain, France, Japan, West Germany and the USA) when their finance

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ministers and central bank governors met in closed session, in the margins of the annual meetings of the World Bank and IMF (see above).

The G5 members differed over their immediate prescriptions for interest and exchange rates. In a well-publicised dispute before the meeting, the USA had urged West Germany and Japan to cut interest rates as a stimulus to global growth. The US Treasury Secretary, James Baker, maintained that the fall in the value of the US dollar, presaged by the 'Plaza Pact' of September 1985,¹¹ would be insufficient to reduce the USA's record current account deficit, and the West German and Japanese surpluses, to sustainable levels. Only a further depreciation of the dollar (which the USA opposed) or accelerated growth outside the USA would, he maintained, remedy these trade imbalances. The European countries and Japan, however, while anxious for agreement to stabilise the value of the dollar, were unconvinced of the need to lower interest rates.

In a subsequent communiqué,¹² finance ministers of the Group of Seven (G5, joined by Canada and Italy) concentrated on medium-term prospects, rather than immediate action. Created at the Tokyo Summit of the seven countries in May 1986,¹³ the G7 had been charged with reviewing developments in the major economies, using a range of economic indicators, in an attempt to promote greater policy coordination. In their first exercise of multilateral surveillance, the ministers noted generally favourable prospects for growth in their countries, observing that interest rates had fallen, with corresponding benefits for indebted developing countries, though while inflation was likely to remain low, unemployment would probably remain high.

The ministers agreed that existing trade imbalances could not be sustained at their present levels, citing the need for increased cooperation to reduce them. They recommended that countries with surpluses sustain or accelerate their economic growth, with the US committing itself to cutting its budget deficit. Such actions, they said in their statement, were necessary to reduce imbalances in the world economy without further exchange rate intervention. The G7 statement contained furthermore a recognition of the fact that the Group's member-countries had a special responsibility to 'foster an open, growing world economy' as a means of alleviating the international debt problem.¹⁴

NORTH-SOUTH

▲ Commonwealth

Annual Meeting of Finance Ministers

Castries, St Lucia, 14-15 September 1986

■ Finance ministers from forty-seven Commonwealth member-countries met in their annual effort to reach a concerted position on economic issues before the imminent meetings of the World Bank and IMF.

In a final communiqué,¹⁵ the ministers expressed their concern on a number of issues. These issues notably included the net transfer of financial resources from developing countries to industrialised countries, and the prolonged depression in

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commodity prices. The ministers welcomed recognition by the major industrialised countries at their Tokyo summit of 1986¹⁶ of the need for increased IMF surveillance of their economies. They also expressed approval of developments in the past year aimed at improving policy coordination between these major economies. They went on, however, to express great dissatisfaction with persisting financial imbalances between some of those countries, calling for enhanced coordination as a means of remedying those imbalances.

Developing countries were concerned at the consequences for them of disputes between the US on the one hand and Japan and West Germany on the other, over the US trade deficit and the value of the dollar. In particular, they feared that such imbalances would encourage protectionism, while the US threat to devalue the dollar still further, if realised, could jeopardise developing country exports. The absence from the meeting of the British Finance Minister, Nigel Lawson, was, however, taken by some countries to be symptomatic of the industrialised countries' preoccupation with their own economic woes, including trade imbalances and currency alignments, to the neglect of developing countries' problems with trade and debt.

In a final communiqué, the ministers expressed relief over the agreement, reached at Punta del Este in September 1986,¹⁷ to launch a new round of multilateral trade talks. In particular, they noted the inclusion of agriculture on the agenda of the talks, stressing the link between agricultural protectionism in the major industrialised countries and the persistent weakness of commodity markets.

The communiqué also expressed solidarity with the states of the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC), echoing a dominant concern of the opening session. Economic cooperation to assist the Frontline states facing South African attempts at regional destabilisation was seen as a necessary corollary of the political accord on sanctions reached at the Commonwealth 'mini-summit' in London in August 1986.¹⁸

● 'Net transfers to developing countries were minus \$30bn in 1985. Resources now move from the poor countries to the rich in steady and significant amounts. This is a perversion which is as offensive to commonsense as it is to morality.' Sir Shridath Ramphal, Secretary-General of the Commonwealth Secretariat. *The Guardian* (London) 25 September 1986.

▲ Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)—European Economic Community (EEC)

Joint Ministerial Meeting
Jakarta, 20–21 October 1986

■ Foreign ministers from ASEAN's six member-countries (Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore and Thailand) met those of the EEC's twelve countries, together with the EEC Commissioner for Relations with Asia.

The meeting was dominated by economic issues, and in particular, discussion of a joint EEC-ASEAN report identifying the major obstacles to increased European investment in Southeast Asia. The report described Europe's investment as lagging behind that of Japan and the USA, and the concentration of its investments in

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banking and finance rather than manufacturing. One of the report's proposals was for a Southeast Asian Common Market, with the removal of tariff and non-tariff barriers between ASEAN countries. The fact that ASEAN is composed of six separate national markets, rather than a common regional one, was identified by the report as the single most important disincentive to European investment there. The common market proposal was, however, known to be opposed by Indonesia, despite President Suharto's call for increased foreign investment and economic cooperation to help to maintain political stability in the region. Indonesia was known to fear that the removal of regional trade restrictions would swamp its vast domestic markets with goods from more competitive industries in neighbouring countries. The report also recommended an end to investment restrictions in ASEAN countries and more effective copyright protection against pirating and counterfeiting. The participants agreed to establish joint committees in each ASEAN capital, to promote European trade and investment. They also resolved to encourage European financial institutions, such as the European Investment Bank, to offer their expertise.

Though the focus of the meeting was undoubtedly economic, there was also discussion of political issues. Sir Geoffrey Howe, the British Foreign Minister, speaking in his capacity as President of the EEC Council of Ministers, challenged the Soviet Union to implement the new and flexible Asian policy which its leader, Mikhail Gorbachev, had espoused in a speech at Vladivostok in July 1986.¹⁹ Recognising that the Vietnamese occupation of Kampuchea remained the greatest obstacle to improving relations between Southeast Asia and Moscow, Sir Geoffrey Howe urged a settlement of both the issues of Kampuchea and Afghanistan. In a final joint communiqué, the ministers appealed to Vietnam to begin serious negotiations for the withdrawal of troops from neighbouring Kampuchea, and agreed that no assistance should be given to Vietnam to maintain its occupation. The EEC agreed, at ASEAN's request, to raise the subject of Kampuchea with the Soviet Union at every available opportunity.

Other subjects discussed included the fight against drug trafficking and terrorism, the need to find a negotiated settlement to the Gulf War and the need for international pressure to end apartheid.²⁰

● 'Recently we have heard much of a new and more flexible Soviet approach to Asia. We have yet to see this take shape as far as Kampuchea and Afghanistan are concerned. The time has come for Moscow to match words with deeds.' Sir Geoffrey Howe, British Foreign Minister and President of the EEC Council of Ministers. *The Guardian* (London) 21 October 1986.

'The Soviet Union should not underestimate the importance of a withdrawal from Kampuchea as a prerequisite of having better relations with ASEAN members.' Dr Mochtar Kusumaatmadja, Indonesia's Foreign Minister. *Financial Times* (London) 22 October 1986.

▲ Conference of France and African States
Thirteenth Annual Summit
Lomé, Togo, 13-15 November 1986

■ The annual summit of France and its former francophone colonies in Africa was attended by thirty-nine delegations, twenty-five of which were from full member-countries. Among those present were nineteen African Heads of State, and

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representatives of anglophone and lusophone countries including Liberia, Mozambique, Sierra Leone and Sudan. The French delegation was led jointly by President François Mitterrand and Prime Minister Jacques Chirac, in accordance with the prevailing political system in France of 'cohabitation'. Observers seeking signs of conflict between the two leaders were, however, disappointed by the level of unity presented in their expressions of French foreign policy.

Some leaders such as President Felix Houphouët-Boigny of Ivory Coast and President Denis Sassou Nguesso of Congo, had threatened to stay away from the summit, in the former case owing to personal attacks against him in the socialist press in France in July 1986 and in the latter case of the OAU Chairman, in protest at France's recent reception of South African President P W Botha, while on a private visit, and of the UNITA leader, Jonas Savimbi. The threats were, however, averted by preliminary French diplomatic activity. President Thomas Sankara of Burkina Faso, however, maintained his boycott of the conference.

The opening speeches of President Gnassingbe Eyadema of Togo and President Mitterrand emphasised issues of international terrorism and Africa's economic problems. The leaders called for an international economic recovery programme for Africa similar to the US-financed Marshall Plan for post-Second World War Europe.

Economic discussions were, however, partially eclipsed by further developments in Chad. Accusing Libya of genocide in northern Chad, President Hissène Habré declared that the Transitional Government of National Unity (GUNT), formerly allied to Libya, was now united with the national government in opposition to the Libyan occupation of the north. Following a rapprochement with President Habré, the former GUNT leader, Goukouni Oueddei had, however, reportedly been shot while Libyan officials were attempting to arrest him in Tripoli, and he was now in hospital in the Libyan capital. Seven of the nine GUNT factions had subsequently, however, chosen as Oueddei's successor Acheikh Ibn Oumar, who was still receiving Libyan support. Notwithstanding this continued rebel opposition, President Habré advocated taking advantage of rebel disunity to recapture the north of Chad. While President Mitterrand responded at the summit with an offer of additional logistical support for President Habré, he adamantly refused to support the government in any attempt to regain territory north of the sixteenth parallel, the line of partition determined in 1983. France, it transpired, was unwilling to become embroiled in a war with Libya over Chad.

Southern Africa featured strongly at the conference, with the OAU Chairman, President Sassou Nguesso, urging France to press the EEC for comprehensive sanctions against South Africa, similar to those imposed by the USA. Despite private talks with President Mitterrand, however, the leaders of the Frontline States were reported to have been disappointed by the lack of formal decisions on the region's problems. Other issues discussed included the attempted coup in Togo in September 1986 and France's new immigration laws, together with its recent expulsion of 101 Malis from France, on the grounds of their being illegal immigrants.²¹

● 'We now have a common front with GUNT which has turned its back on Libya,' President Hissène Habré of Chad, *The Independent* (London) 17 November 1986.

'France has no intention of intervening militarily north of the sixteenth parallel.' President François Mitterrand of France, disappointing President Habré's hopes for French assistance in ending the Libyan presence in northern Chad.

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▲ South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC)

Ministerial Meeting; Second Annual Summit

Bangalore, India, 13 November 1986; 16-17 November 1986

■ Drug abuse and trafficking and terrorism were among the main subjects of multilateral discussion by leaders of the seven SAARC member-countries (Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka) at their second summit since the association's inception in Dhaka in December 1985.²² At the meeting, Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi of India assumed the chairmanship of SAARC from President Ershad of Bangladesh. Though 'bilateral and contentious issues' are explicitly excluded from SAARC's purview, the summit was effectively dominated by the peripheral exchanges between India and Pakistan and between India and Sri Lanka. General Zia ul-Haq of Pakistan was absent from the summit, but was represented by Pakistan's Prime Minister, Mohammad Khan Junejo.

Perhaps the main achievement of the summit's multilateral discussions was the creation of a technical committee to follow up a ten-point programme endorsed by the leaders, to restrict the production and distribution of illicit drugs. Pakistan, a major source for the distribution of such drugs from both sides of the border with Afghanistan, and with an estimated 500,000 addicts of its own, was to chair the new committee. Other countries embroiled in the illicit drugs trade were India, Nepal and Bangladesh, which together with Pakistan have replaced the 'Golden Triangle' of Southeast Asia as the main source of world supply. The ten-point programme included: confiscation of the assets of drug traffickers; effective measures to curb production, distribution and consumption, and to limit use to medical and scientific purposes; international exchange of intelligence and close cooperation with Interpol; cooperation with the UN and other international organisations; establishing regional anti-drug associations; harmonising legislation.

On terrorism, the leaders instructed a committee of experts to draw up a list of extraditable offences, for which the defence of their being 'political' would not be available. The previous efforts of the SAARC foreign ministers to evolve a united strategy on terrorism had been hampered by their failure to agree on a definition of 'terrorism'.²³ The summit leaders, however, resolved to abide by UN Resolution 2625, committing them neither to aid nor condone terrorists, and they decided that the committee's draft list would be considered by the SAARC foreign ministers at their Council meeting in mid-1987.

A major development toward the eventual settlement of the ethnic crisis in Sri Lanka was reported to have taken place in the margins of the summit. In a series of bilateral talks, Rajiv Gandhi apparently endorsed a Sri Lankan proposal for a measure of political autonomy for the Tamils. Tamil guerrilla leaders who arrived in Bangalore to consider the proposal, rejected it, however, on the basis that it offered the Tamils a mere enclave in Sri Lanka's eastern province, not contiguous to the northern province also claimed by separatists. President Junius Jayewardene of Sri Lanka had persistently refused to concede to Tamil demands for a Tamil homeland

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('Eelam') consisting of the entire northern and eastern provinces of the island, on the basis that there was no Tamil majority over the Sinhalese Buddhists and Muslim populations in the east. The significance of India's support for the Sri Lankan proposal, however, derived from the fact that its southern territory, the state of Tamil Nadu, was host to large numbers of Tamil guerrillas, whose vulnerability had been proved by recent Indian raids on Tamil guerrilla bases around Madras, on 8 November 1986. There was speculation that in his anxiousness to procure a political settlement in Sri Lanka, Rajiv Gandhi would exert pressure on the Tamil leaders in India to accept President Jayewardene's offer.

Indo-Pakistan relations remained strained during the summit, which saw them at an already low ebb. Just before the meeting, Indian troops were reported massing on the border with Pakistan, and Mohammad Junejo voiced his scepticism of Indian assurances that the movements were routine military exercises. Rajiv Gandhi, in turn, refused to accept Junejo's assertion that the nuclear 'trigger' test recently alleged to have been conducted by Pakistan had no basis in truth. Relations had further been strained by the hijacking of a PanAm airliner at Karachi airport in September 1986, in which twenty-two people, mostly Indians, had been killed. Rajiv Gandhi had then accused the Pakistan authorities of bungling. India was also angered at the US's avowed intention to supply Pakistan with a sophisticated air-borne early warning system (AWACS). Rajiv Gandhi insisted that Indo-Pakistan relations would not improve until Pakistan had abandoned its nuclear weapons programme, ceased to arm and train Sikh terrorists in the Punjab and curbed drug smuggling into India.

In their closing declaration, the leaders included a number of pledges in relation to the care and rights of children. They endorsed the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, and set targets of four years for universal immunisation, and until the year 2000 for the provision of universal primary education, better standards of maternal and child nutrition, safe drinking water and adequate shelter. The leaders also agreed to establish a SAARC meteorological information centre in India and an agricultural information centre in Bangladesh.

It was decided that the permanent SAARC secretariat would be set up in Kathmandu in January 1987, and its first Secretary-General was named as Abul Ahsan, a Bangladeshi diplomat. A funding arrangement was approved whereby India would pay the largest sum, followed by Pakistan. The next SAARC summits were scheduled for Kathmandu in 1987 and Colombo in 1988.²⁴

● 'Violence breeds hatred. Hatred cannot be cured by violence. Every time a bullet, whether it be from a terrorist or from the security forces, kills a civilian, it goes deep into my heart. I don't know how to stop this.' President Junius Jayewardene of Sri Lanka, in his address to the summit. *The Independent* (London) 17 November 1986.

'We do not believe that there should be an Eelam in Sri Lanka. With the package that President Jayewardene has given now, we believe that the Tamils can live in peace and security.' Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi of India, during the summit. *The Times* (London) 18 November 1986.

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▲ Arab League

Ministerial Meeting

Tunis, 18-19 October 1986

■ Foreign ministers from the Arab League's twenty-two member-countries agreed unanimously on the need to convene a summit as soon as possible. Observers remained sceptical, however, of the likelihood of a summit's being held in the near future, particularly given the continuing antagonism between Syria and Iraq. No Arab League summit has been held since the extraordinary summit in Casablanca in August 1985,²⁵ owing to deep-seated differences in the Arab world. Chief among the issues which would be discussed at any future summit was the controversial meeting between King Hassan II of Morocco and the Israeli leader, Shimon Peres. Despite appeals by the Arab League Secretary-General, Chedli Klibi, to avoid divisive issues at the ministerial meeting, several countries, including Syria and Algeria, condemned King Hassan's action.

A total of twenty-two draft resolutions were tabled at the Tunis meeting, covering issues such as the Gulf War; the Palestinian problem and refugee camps in Lebanon; Euro-Arab dialogue; and the state of the Arab League's finances. The foreign ministers strongly condemned the recent decision of the Ivory Coast to open an embassy in Jerusalem, following its resumption of diplomatic relations with Israel in 1985. They reaffirmed the 1980 Arab League resolution calling on member-countries to sever links with any countries recognising Jerusalem as Israel's capital, or transferring an embassy there.²⁶

▲ Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC)

Seventy-Ninth Extraordinary Ministerial Conference

Geneva, 6-22 October 1986

■ Oil ministers from OPEC's thirteen member-countries, meeting to determine their permanent production quotas, decided instead to extend with some modifications a temporary agreement reached at their last conference in August 1986.²⁷

The original interim agreement for the period 1 September 1986 to the end of October 1986, had determined an overall production ceiling for twelve OPEC members of 14.8m barrels per day (b/d), allowing Iraq unrestrained production, estimated to add 2m b/d to overall output. Meeting in October 1986, however, two ministerial committees on quota distribution (including the oil ministers of Nigeria, Indonesia and the UAE) and on pricing (Kuwait, Ecuador and Libya) were unable to reach long-term conclusions on future strategy. A statement by the government of Saudi Arabia on 17 October 1986 broke the apparent deadlock, by conceding to a further extension of the interim agreement, despite Saudi Arabia's initial insistence on the fixing of permanent quotas.²⁸ The statement countenanced the temporary measure, however, on condition that it did not extend beyond December 1986, and that certain countries would have slightly increased quotas. These countries were understood to be Ecuador, Gabon, Kuwait and Qatar. The announcement indicated Saudi support for Kuwait's insistent demands for a substantially increased quota, on

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the basis that its current allocation was based on the entrenchment of concessions it has made on its output in 1983 and 1984.

The Saudi Arabian concession formed the basis for the eventual OPEC agreement, though all countries other than Saudi Arabia and the UAE, which voluntarily maintained their present outputs, were granted some increases in their official quotas. Kuwait's current volume of 900,000 b/d was to be increased by 21,000 b/d in November 1986 and by a further 79,000 b/d in December 1986. Ecuador, Gabon and Qatar also received significant increases in terms of their small basic outputs. Saudi Arabia's quota remained static at 4.353m b/d and the UAE's at 950,000 b/d. Iraq, meanwhile, continued to produce without official restraints, hence raising OPEC's production level from the official ceiling of 14.961m b/d in November 1986 and 15.093m b/d in December 1986 by about 2m b/d.

A final communiqué reflected Saudi Arabia's concern that the agreement, enshrined in an OPEC resolution on 22 October 1986, would be a temporary one.²⁹ It also referred to a Saudi proposal (backed by Iran, Algeria and Libya) for a return to a fixed price structure for OPEC. The communiqué reiterated OPEC pleas for the participation of non-OPEC oil producers in the effort to defend global market stability.

The next OPEC ministerial meeting was scheduled to begin on 11 December 1986.³⁰

▲ Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)

Meeting of Foreign Ministers; Seventh Annual Summit
Abu Dhabi, 27 October 1986; 2-5 November 1986

■ The annual summit of the six GCC member-countries (Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates) was dominated by discussion of the Gulf War, and in particular, of the 'tanker war'. Roughly seventy merchant vessels were reported to have been attacked by Iran and Iraq in 1986, against a figure of forty-six for the whole of 1985, an escalation which proved of extreme concern to the Gulf states.

Following their series of closed meetings, the leaders issued a communiqué in which they vowed to protect freedom of navigation in the Gulf. They appealed to Iran to accept mediation towards a negotiated settlement of the six-year war, but the communiqué nevertheless indicated an unwillingness on the part of the member-countries to antagonise Iran. There was speculation that this softening of attitude reflected support for Saudi Arabia's efforts to mediate in the Gulf War.³¹ The leaders also approved undisclosed measures towards enhancing collective security and commended the 'peninsular shield', a collective rapid deployment force based in Saudi Arabia.

A closed meeting of oil ministers from the six states, all but two of which (Bahrain and Oman) are OPEC members, was apparently requested by King Fahd of Saudi Arabia. It was reported that the meeting, called by the new Saudi Oil Minister, Nisham Nazer, was intended to gather support for Saudi oil policy following the dismissal of the previous oil minister, Sheikh Ahmed Zaki Yamani. There was, however, no mention of GCC oil strategy in the final communiqué.³²

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▲ Southern African Frontline States (FLS)

Emergency Summit

Maputo, 2 October 1986

Zambia-Zimbabwe

Summit

Victoria Falls, Zimbabwe, 15 October 1986

Angola-Mozambique-Zaire-Zambia

Summit

Kasaba, Zambia, 19 October 1986

■ Leaders of the six FLS (Angola, Botswana, Mozambique, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe) held emergency talks in Maputo amidst Mozambique's fears of an imminent military strike by South Africa.

Following a landmine explosion near the Mozambican border in South Africa on 6 October 1986, in which six South African soldiers had been injured, Pretoria had renewed its accusations that Mozambique was breaching the Nkomati Accord of 1984, by allowing the African National Congress (ANC) to operate from its territory. South Africa threatened military reprisals against alleged ANC bases in the Maputo area, and in what was seen as a form of economic reprisal, decided to repatriate all Mozambican workers at the end of their contracts in South Africa, and to cease recruiting labour from Mozambique. The loss of earnings from the 60,000 Mozambican workers involved was estimated to represent an annual loss of \$50m, or one third of Mozambique's entire foreign exchange earnings.

Mozambique had responded with an announcement on 11 October 1986 placing all citizens and the armed forces on a state of 'permanent alert'. It had imputed to Pretoria the intention to overthrow the government of President Machel and replace it with its own puppet regime. Mozambique suggested that South Africa's threats reflected annoyance at the pressure imposed by the FLS on Malawi, notably at a meeting between some of their leaders and Malawi's President Kamuzu Banda in Blantyre in September 1986.³³ The FLS accused Malawi of allowing the South African-backed rebel Mozambique National Resistance, (MNR) to operate from its territory. Since the Blantyre meeting, John Tembo, a contender for succession to President Banda, had visited Maputo and agreed to a Mozambican proposal to establish a high-level joint security commission between the two countries. This agreement was followed, however, by a renewed MNR offensive in northern Mozambique, with rebels pouring across the border from Malawi.

In a final communiqué at Maputo, the FLS appealed to 'all peoples and governments of the world to block South Africa's race towards generalised war'. Condemning South Africa's 'insistent and hysterical campaign of accusations and threats against Mozambique', it warned that South Africa's forces were concentrated on the borders of Mozambique and Zimbabwe, and its commando units had already infiltrated into Mozambique, to promote acts of terrorism. Malawi's 'complicity in the terrorist campaign against Mozambique' was equally condemned.

The Maputo meeting was attended, unusually, by the Prime Minister of Zaire, Kengo Wa Dondo. In a situation analogous to that of Malawi and the MNR, Zaire had been criticised by the FLS for affording bases to the Angolan rebel movement, UNITA. In preliminary talks with Zaire's Prime Minister in Maputo, and later with Zaire's President Mobutu Sese Seko in Zambia, the Leaders of Angola, Mozambique and

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Zambia apparently discussed regional security and communications. They were reported to have considered ways of lessening their dependence on South Africa's transport system.

At bilateral talks at Victoria Falls, President Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia, the FLS Chairman, and Prime Minister Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe condemned President Banda, while saying that they would not instigate punitive action against either Malawi or Zaire. While their refusal to retaliate was in part a recognition of their vulnerability to South African reprisals, they specified a desire to maintain Southern African solidarity against Pretoria and not to harm the peoples of Malawi or Zaire as their chief motivations.³⁴

●Malawi has become 'a destabilising agent of the whole of Southern Africa. . . . We will have to decide what to do with a country that has decided to be a force of destabilisation.' President Samora Machel of Mozambique. *Financial Times* (London) 14 October 1986.

'We only hope there will be no need to take any action against our neighbours because if we did, that will weaken our position against the common enemy, apartheid. We are all in one boat and only one action can be taken to steer us off the rock of apartheid—sanctions.' President Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia, Chairman of the FLS. *The Guardian* (London) 16 October 1986.

▲FLS

Summit

Maputo, 29 October 1986

■Leaders of the six FLS met in the wake of the funeral of President Samora Machel of Mozambique, following his death in an air crash in South Africa on 19 October 1986. The Mozambican delegation to the meeting was led by Marcelino dos Santos and Joaquim Chissano, chief contenders for succession to the Mozambican presidency.

Though awaiting the results of an inquiry into the crash, the leaders suggested that South Africa was implicated in President Machel's death and that 'he fell victim to apartheid'. Prime Minister Mugabe of Zimbabwe meanwhile dismissed the MNR's recent declaration of war against Zimbabwe as constituting nothing new. The FLS Chairman, President Kaunda of Zambia, accused South Africa of making the challenge through the MNR in response to Robert Mugabe's pledge to defend the crucial Beira corridor to the Mozambican port at all costs.

The leaders pledged increased support for the Mozambican government against South Africa and the MNR, and appealed for international sanctions to be applied, and for increased support for the banned South African movements. Attacking South African and US support for UNITA, they condemned France and other European countries which had permitted recent visits by Jonas Savimbi.³⁵

●'There is sufficient circumstantial evidence for us to hold South Africa directly responsible for the plane crash which killed Machel and thirty-three other people.' President Kaunda of Zambia, speaking after the meeting. *The Independent* (London) 30 October 1986.

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NOTES

In these notes the following abbreviations are used for newspapers and periodicals: *Econ* = The Economist (London); *FT* = Financial Times (London); *FEER* = Far Eastern Economic Review (Hong Kong); *Gma* = Granma (Havana); *G* = The Guardian (London); *I* = The Independent (London); *IHT* = International Herald Tribune (Paris); *MEED* = Middle East Economic Digest (London); *MEER* = Middle East Economic Review (Washington, DC); *MEES* = Middle East Economic Survey (Nicosia); *Obs* = The Observer (London); *S* = South (London); *SN* = Soviet News (London); *SW* = Soviet Weekly (London); *ST* = Sunday Times (London); *SWB* = Summary of World Broadcasts (London); *T* = The Times (London); *TWQ* = Third World Quarterly (London); *UNPR* = UN Press Release; *USIS* = US Information Service; *WA* = West Africa (London); *XNA* = Xinhua News Agency.


- ¹ On the first round of the IDA VIII negotiations, see *TWQ* 8(3) July 1986, pp 1033-4.
- ² On the April 1986 round, see *TWQ* 8(4) October 1986, pp 1389-90.
- ³ *FT* 26 September 1986; *IHT* 27-8 September 1986; *IMF Survey* (Washington DC) 20 October 1986, p 334; *WA* 6 October 1986, p 2121.
- ⁴ For the Baker Plan on debt, see *TWQ* 8(2) April 1986, pp 691-5.
- ⁵ For the UN Programme of African Economic Recovery, see *TWQ* 8(4) October 1986, pp 1372-4.
- ⁶ Barber Conable's speech is in *World Bank Press Release* (Paris) 30 September 1986.
The Washington communiqués are in *IMF Survey* (Washington DC) 20 October 1986. See also *FT* 25, 29, 30 September 1986, 1, 2 October 1986; *IHT* 29, 30 September 1986; *G* 29, 30 September 1986, 1, 3 October 1986; *T* 29 September 1986, 3, 4 October 1986; *Obs* 5 October 1986; *FEER* 16 October 1986, pp 81-5; *WA* 6 October 1986, p 2094-6; *Commonwealth Secretariat International Development Policies* (London) No 23, July-September 1986; *World Bank News* (Paris) 2, 9 October 1986; *IMF Survey* (Washington DC) 20 October 1986, 3 November 1986.
- ⁷ *G* 6 October 1986; *FT* 7, 9, 15, 17, 20, 21 October 1986; *I* 16 October 1986; *FEER* 30 October 1986, pp 50-51.
- ⁸ On the tin débâcle, see *TWQ* 8(2) April 1986, pp 696-9 and 8(3) April 1986, pp 1039-41.
- ⁹ See *ITC Press Release* 3 October 1986.
- ¹⁰ *G* 25, 27 October 1986; *FT* 28, 29 October 1986; *FEER* 13 November 1986, pp 112-25; *WA* November 1986, p 2371.
- ¹¹ For the 'Plaza Pact' on exchange rate intervention, see *TWQ* 8(1) January 1986, pp 293-4.
- ¹² The G7 communiqué is in *IMF Survey* (Washington DC) 20 October 1986, p 314 and *T* 29 September 1986.
- ¹³ On the Tokyo Summit, see *TWQ* 8(4) October 1986, pp 1392-5.
- ¹⁴ *FT* 26, 27 September 1986, 1 October 1986; *G* 27, 29 September 1986, 3 October 1986; *T* 27 September 1986; *Econ* 4 October 1986.
- ¹⁵ For the Commonwealth ministers' final communiqué, see *Commonwealth News Release* 25 September 1986.
- ¹⁶ For the Tokyo summit, see *TWQ* 8(4) October 1986, pp 1392-5.
- ¹⁷ For the Punta del Este decision to launch a new GATT round, see *TWQ* 9(1) January 1987, pp 311-14.
- ¹⁸ For the Commonwealth mini-summit, see *TWQ* 9(1) January 1986, pp 306-8. *FT* 24 September 1986; *G* 24, 25 September 1986; *Commonwealth Currents* (London) October 1986.
- ¹⁹ The text of Mikhail Gorbachev's Vladivostok speech is in *SN* 30 July 1986, pp 337-343.
- ²⁰ *T* 10, 21, 22 October 1986; *FT* 20, 22 October 1986; *G* 21 October 1986; *I* 21 October 1986, *Obs* 19 October 1986; *Econ* 25 October 1986; *S* December 1986, p 85.
- ²¹ *I* 14, 15, 17, 19 November 1986; *FT* 14, 17 November 1986; *G* 15, 17 November 1986; *Econ* 22 November 1986; *WA* 11 November 1986, p 2343 and 24 November 1986, pp 2440-2.
- ²² For the first SAARC summit in Dhaka, see *TWQ* 8(2) April 1986, pp 724-7.
- ²³ For the first SAARC ministerial Council meeting in August 1986 see *TWQ* 9(1) January 1987, p 317.

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- ²⁴ *T* 12, 15, 17, 18 November 1986; *G* 14, 17, 18, 19 November 1986; *I* 14, 17, 18, 20 November 1986; *FT* 15, 17, 18 November 1986; *IHT* 17, 18 November 1986; *Econ* 15 November 1986; *FEER* 27 November 1986, p 30 and 4 December 1986, pp 26-8.
- ²⁵ For the Casablanca Summit of the Arab League, see *TWQ* 8(1) January 1986, pp 304-6.
- ²⁶ Ivory Coast is one of the four black African countries to have re-established diplomatic relations with Israel. The other countries are Zaire (1982), Liberia (1983) and Cameroon (1986). *G* 20 October 1986; *IHT* 21 October 1986; *MEED* 25 October 1986; *MEES* 27 October 1986, p C2.
- ²⁷ For OPEC's Geneva meeting in August 1986, see *TWQ* 9(1) January 1987, pp 314-16.
- ²⁸ The Saudi statement is in *MEES* 27 October 1986, p A10.
- ²⁹ The text of the resolution and OPEC press communiqué are in *MEES* 27 October 1986, pp A7-10.
- ³⁰ *IHT* 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11-12, 13, 14, 20, 21, 22, 23 October 1986; *FT* 6, 9, 10, 11, 13, 15, 16, 17, 18, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24 October 1986; *T* 7, 10, 13, 14, 15, 17, 20, 22, 24 October 1986; *G* 8, 9, 10, 15, 17, 18, 20, 21, 23, 25 1986; *I* 13, 14, 20, 21, 22, 23 October 1986; *Econ* 25 October 1986; *MEES* 13, 20, 27 October 1986; *MEED* 1 November 1986, p 18; *WA* 27 October 1986, p 2274.
- ³¹ See *G* 20 October 1986.
- ³² *IHT* 28 October 1986; *T* 28 October 1986; *FT* 3, 6 November 1986; *G* 3, 4, 6 November 1986; *I* 4 November 1986; *MEED* 8 November 1986, p 2; *S* December 1986, p 36.
- ³³ See *TWQ* 9(1) January 1987, pp 326-7.
- ³⁴ *FT* 9, 13, 14, 16 October 1986; *I* 11, 14, 16 October 1986; *G* 13, 14, 16, 20 October 1986; *IHT* 13, 14 October 1986, *T* 13 October 1986; *WA* 20 October 1986, pp 2202-3.
- ³⁵ *FT* 30 October 1986, 8 November 1986; *I* 30 October 1986, 8 November 1986.

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Third World Foundation News

1986 Third World Prize

At the Third World Prize Committee's meeting in London on 10 November 1986, it was decided that Bob Geldof should be awarded the 1986 Prize, worth \$100,000, in recognition of his 'mammoth personal crusade against human suffering and human indifference, with which millions the world over identified', according to the citation.

Stunned by television pictures of famine in Ethiopia, Geldof pledged in November 1984: 'I would send some money, I would send more money. But that was not enough. To expiate yourself truly of any complicity in this evil meant you had to give something of yourself.'

As the Committee pointed out: 'That irresistible motivation fired an individual whose creativity and flair had hitherto been confined to the world of rock music, whose idealism lay largely dormant and qualities of leadership undiscovered.' After millions of pounds were raised by Geldof's song 'Do They Know It's Christmas', the sixteen-hour Live Aid concert at Wembley Stadium, London, was watched by over a billion and a half people worldwide in July 1985. The Sport Aid 'Race Against Time', held last May, galvanised the efforts of thirty million runners in over 270 cities and in seventy-eight countries. The event was sponsored jointly by Sport Aid and UNICEF, and was timed to have the maximum impact on the UN's debate on Africa.

Together the three spectacles raised over \$130 million, and their success helped swell donations to British charities by 25 per cent; donations to international charities rose by 163 per cent over the period. Most of the money has been invested in long-term, small-scale development and rehabilitation projects in Ethiopia, Sudan, Chad, Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso.

'The driving force—initiator, organiser and leader—was Bob Geldof, who linked three separate if massive individual efforts and gave them continuity and substance,' said the Committee. 'The plight of the Third World has been brought home to people around the globe with an immediacy and a clarity which was compelling.'

The Committee was impressed by Geldof's ability to convince people that they could help remove inequalities and injustices by cutting through bureaucracy and acting effectively. 'His overriding contribution has been to bring into life a dynamic relationship across the North-South divide, moving aid from the realm of charity into the world of popular politics. Internationalism has thereby been given a new content in bringing relief to people in Africa afflicted by famine; in changing perceptions beyond Africa of

a grossly unequal world; in mobilising millions to give millions; in altering the dynamics of aid and development as a political issue. Bob Geldof has rendered a service of immense proportions to all humanity.'

Second Manzur Qadir Memorial Lecture

Michael Manley, the former Prime Minister of Jamaica, delivered the 1986 Manzur Qadir Memorial Lecture, entitled 'Dominance or Equity: The Multilateral Institutions', on 16 December in Lahore, Pakistan.

In a critique of the existing international system, Manley condemned 'the financial enforcers of the world economy', and claimed that transnational corporations 'act in chronic disregard of the interests of host countries sacrificing these on the altar of the analyses of cost effectiveness.'

Calling for radical reforms to international bodies such as the IMF, UN and World Bank, Manley argued that only through collective action exerted through some form of international cooperation will the developing countries ensure redress and achieve equity. His key recommendations were for changes in the management of world trade to provide market access for producers, the introduction of an international code of conduct for multinational corporations, and IMF loans based on Third World needs.

Manley also pointed the way forward to a new global political programme, based on consensus to make international institutions: universal in membership, with the inclusion of socialist countries; democratic in decisionmaking, with one country one vote; adequate in financial resources to finance their operations and member-country needs, and powerful enough to enforce recommendations, with the power to impose sanctions.

1986 Faiz Memorial Lecture

The Third World Foundation has instituted an annual lecture, to be delivered in London, in the memory of Faiz Ahmad Faiz, a leading twentieth-century Urdu Poet.

Faiz Ahmad Faiz (1911-84) was a teacher, army officer, journalist, political leader, trade unionist and broadcaster. His poems have been translated from Urdu into several languages, including English, and almost every popular singer has sung his *ghazals*. He was imprisoned several times by the Pakistani government for his political stance, and spent a period of exile with the Palestinians in Beirut before returning to Lahore in 1984.

The 1986 Lecture, entitled 'Poetry and Man Today', was given by Mrs Rimma Kazakova, a Russian poetess, on 3 December. Mrs Kazakova is a member of the Presidium of the Soviet Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee in Moscow, and she has translated Faiz Ahmad Faiz's poems into Russian.



Bob Geldof, recipient of the 1986 Third World Prize, speaking at the presentation ceremony in London, on 23rd January.



Michael Manley delivering the 1986 Manzur Qadir Memorial Lecture in Lahore, Pakistan.



Rimma Kazakova (on the left) delivering the 1986 Faiz Memorial Lecture in London. Left to right: Rimma Kazakova, Altaf Gauhar, Zahra Nigah.

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Book Reviews

The titles reviewed are listed below with names of authors and editors

Cohen, R: **Endgame in South Africa: The Changing Structures and Ideology of Apartheid**

Fatton, Jr, R: **Black Consciousness in South Africa: The Dialectics of Ideological Resistance to Apartheid**

Hanlon, J: **Beggar Your Neighbours: Apartheid Power in Southern Africa**

Johnson, P and Martin, D: **Destructive Engagement: Southern Africa at War**

Soggot, D: **Namibia: The Violent Heritage**

United Nations Institute for Namibia: **Namibia: Perspectives for National Reconstruction and Development**

CIIR and British Council of Churches: **Namibia in the 1980s**

Moorsom, R: **Transforming a Wasted Land**

CIIR: **Mines and Independence**

Ellis, J: **Education, Repression and Liberation: Namibia**

Moorsom, R: **Exploiting the Sea**

Lobstein, T and Namibia Support Committee Health Collective (eds): **Namibia: Reclaiming the People's Health**

Smith, S: **Namibia: A Violation of Trust**

Aluko, O and Shaw, T (eds): **Southern Africa in the 1980s**

Seidman, A: **The Roots of Crisis in Southern Africa**

Catholic Institute of International Relations: **South Africa in the 1980s: State of Emergency**

MacShane, D, Plaut, M and Ward, D: **Power! Black Workers, Their Unions and the Struggle for Freedom in South Africa**

Mbeki, G: **South Africa: The Peasants' Revolt**

Frankel, P H: **Pretoria's Praetorians—Civil—Military Relations in South Africa**

Grundy, K W: **The Militarization of South African Politics**

Cawthra, G: **Brutal Force—The Apartheid War Machine**

International Defence and Aid Fund for Southern Africa (ed): **Nelson Mandela: The Struggle is My Life**

Benson, M: **Nelson Mandela**

Tutu, D: **Hope and Suffering: Sermons and Speeches**

Boesak, A: **Walking on Thorns: The Call to Christian Obedience**

Kuzwayo, E: **Call Me Woman**

Joseph, H: **Side by Side: The Autobiography of Helen Joseph**

de Beer, C: **The South African Disease: Apartheid, Health and Health Services**

Baker, C and Turshen, M (eds): **Africa: The Health Issue**

Neuhaus, J R: **Dispensations: The Future of South Africa as South Africans See It**

Crapanzano, V: Waiting: The Whites of South Africa

Uhlig, M: Apartheid in Crisis

Twenty South African Photographers: South Africa: The Cordoned Heart

Lawson, L: Working Women in South Africa

**992 Women Workers and the Institute for Black Research: Factory and
Family: The Divided Lives of South Africa's Women Workers/Impilo
Yabasebenzi Emzansi Afrika**

Journal of Communist Studies: Military Marxist Regimes in Africa

Schwab, P: Angola: Politics, Economics and Society

Ray, D I: Ghana: Politics, Economics and Society

**Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis: Third World Marxist-Leninist Regimes:
Strengths, Vulnerabilities, and US Policy**

**Chinweizu, Jemie, O and Madubuike, I: Towards the Decolonization of African
Literature. Volume 1: African Fiction and Poetry and their Critics**

**Ngara, E: Art and Ideology in the African Novel: A Study of the Influence of
Marxism on African Writing**

Bame, K N: Come to Laugh: African Traditional Theatre in Ghana

Dathorne, O R (ed): The Afro World: Adventures in Ideas

BOOK REVIEWS

FEATURE REVIEWS

Southern Africa at war

Richard Moorsom

Endgame in South Africa? The Changing Structures and Ideology of Apartheid

Robert Cohen

London: James Currey; Paris: UNESCO Press. 1986. 108pp. £4.95pb

Black consciousness in South Africa: the Dialectics of Ideological Resistance to White Supremacy

Robert Fatton, Jr

Albany New York: State University of New York Press. 1986. 189pp.
\$42.50hb/\$14.00

Beggar your Neighbours: Apartheid Power in Southern Africa

Joseph Hanlon

London: Catholic Institute for International Relations in association with
James Currey; Bloomington: Indiana University Press. 1986. 352pp. £8.95pb

Destructive Engagement: Southern Africa at War

Edited by Phyllis Johnson and David Martin

Harare: Zimbabwe Publishing House for the Southern African Research and
Documentation Centre. 1986. 378pp. £7.50pb

For those committed to radical political change in South Africa, these are indeed difficult times. There seems to be no limit to the degree of personal sacrifice which many black South Africans are prepared to sustain in confronting the armed might of the apartheid regime, no end to popular mobilisation against the symbols, agents and instruments of racial tyranny. Yet in most manifestations the formidable apparatus of state power appears scarcely damaged in its capacity for ruthless violent repression, the political resolve of the leaders of white supremacy confused but unshaken.

Is the system cracking? Afrikaner political morale disintegrating, the economy in a terminal tailspin? Or are we on the verge of another counter-revolution, as after Sharpeville, the success of brute force reviving investor confidence? In the first of the books under review, Robin Cohen takes a more sophisticated view, that 'when future historians periodise our time, I believe they will fix on the Soweto riots as a "break event", after which and despite many reversals and setbacks over a prolonged period, direct political

representation and participation by the black majority in the central organs of the South African state became inevitable' (p ix). A sudden dramatic transfer of power—the 'revolutionary overthrow' or 'bloodbath' paradigm so popular in political and media rhetoric—is therefore a less likely model of political change than a complex transition in which the political economy of a restabilised post-apartheid settlement will be largely determined in the course of the struggle itself.

As might be expected from one of the leading figures in his field, Cohen's short book is ably written, refreshingly free of conceptual clutter, authoritative in its deployment of comparative insights, and lucid in exposition. It forms at the same time a short textbook case-study in applied social theory and an analysis of the potential for radical change in the central ideological and political structures of the apartheid order.

The author's focus is on 'apartheid as an ideology and its relationship to the fundamental structures which it both underpins and reflects' (p 8). This is an unusual line of attack: 'apartheid' is conventionally treated either as a political system of racial domination or as a political economy of racial exploitation of labour under capitalism; and if as a system of beliefs, then so absurdly false as to dismiss all need of serious consideration. Cohen points out that apartheid has not achieved conspicuous success in any of the standard functions of an ideology—as religion, as social science, as a universal message, even as a mask for ruling class interests. He argues nonetheless that there are three forms in which apartheid does so function: reifying the present state of affairs as 'natural' while rationalising the past, deadening white anxieties about the risks of change; generalising special interests, of whites in society as a whole, of segments with the white community, and of foreign capital in the South African state; and, finally, the 'transmutation of contradictions' (p 13), not so much by denying their existence as by displacing their locus to a demonology of abstract hate-symbols.

Cohen proceeds to analyse three of what he identifies as 'the four pillars of apartheid' (p 8) (Afrikaner political control of state power is to be the subject of a parallel monograph by Harold Wolpe): spatial segregation by race; coercive segmentation of the labour market; and urban social control. Some of the terrain covered is fairly familiar, the evidence occasionally anecdotal, the relationships between system and ideology not always clearly drawn. This is nevertheless an illuminating analysis. It assesses the far-reaching changes in influx control and trade union policy over the last decade, the state straining to set its ideological image above race and class as the technocratic harmoniser of social relations. It also covers strategies of urban social control: the repressive state apparatus; the bureaucratic formations of the state and corporate capital, especially in welfare co-option; and processes of socialisation, both informal processes constructing racial identities and the direct and indirect impact of state action.

Finally, Cohen risks a brief assessment of the likelihood of radical change. Criticising conservative 'top-down' analyses which marginalise the oppressed as agents of historical change, he was (December 1985) 'convinced that white minority rule cannot survive' (p 94), describing the current phase of struggle as a possibly prolonged period of 'unstable equilibrium' (p 88). On the dismantling of the 'pillars of apartheid' under majority rule, however, his prognostications are perhaps too conservative: the persistence of racial geography, dependence on white farmers, state direction of labour to farms and mines, a government caught between diehard white resistance and urban black deprivation and disillusionment. Such brief analysis is of necessity simplified: unfortunately the sketchy and partial characterisation of the forces of black resistance renders it also somewhat simplistic.

One of those forces, black consciousness (which Cohen dismisses in three sentences as coincident with the ideological programme of apartheid), is the subject of a full-scale study by American political scientist Robert Fatton. This is a sophisticated, thoughtful and carefully constructed analysis of the origins of the Black Consciousness Movement (BCM) and the formation and theoretical basis of its political ideology. Fatton's stated purpose is 'to analyze the ideology of [the] forms of [African] resistance to white supremacy and specifically to trace the development and radicalisation of the Black Consciousness Movement' (p 2).

What he achieves is somewhat more limited, for there is little actual political history in the book, nor anything more than fragmentary treatment after the early 1960s of the other main components of the black political resistance, especially the ANC. It is nonetheless substantial: a critical assessment of the body of political theory represented or implied in the speeches, resolutions and writings of the BCM between the late 1960s and the banning of its organisations in 1977. One might anticipate that an explicitly Marxist approach would not be at ease with a race-defined cultural politics, but Fatton's interpretation is both strongly sympathetic and rich in insight. His major contention is that the BCM was far more than a limited, race-bound reaction to the impact of apartheid ideology, and that it linked cultural liberation with elements of class analysis to develop an alternative, revolutionary challenge to the apartheid state.

The political significance of the BCM is located in the aftermath of the shattering defeat of the black nationalist resistance in the early 1960s. Fatton places, I think correctly, rather more weight than Cohen on the ideological impact on blacks of apartheid's degrading social engineering and political indoctrination, and of the limited co-option pursued under what he terms the strategy of 'passive revolution' (pp 33ff). The BCM's role in challenging white ideological ascendancy was therefore crucial in building a new self-reliant black cultural hegemony and in liberating the potential for a class-based politics. Drawing heavily on Gramsci, Fatton rejects the mechanistic determinism he sees as dominant in much neo-Marxist writing on South Africa to assert the

relative autonomy of ideology, a theoretical framework which enables him to develop a sophisticated analysis of the significance of cultural self-assertion for revolutionary insight and praxis.

In Fatton's view, the BCM's central concept of 'blackness' can be sharply distinguished from the Africanism of the 1950s: it included 'coloureds' and 'Indians'; it excluded political and ideological collaborators with apartheid (labelled 'non-whites'); it recognised, particularly in its later stages, the material conditions of exploitation and not simply racial exclusion from elites. The barring of radical whites was determined by the structural conditions of cultural and political struggle, not a racially exclusive conception of post-apartheid society. At this stage of struggle, in other words, mobilisation on the primary basis of class rather than 'black' solidarity would be more divisive of blacks than of whites; but black liberation could only be finally achieved with the resolution of the class struggle.

Fatton is still some distance from regarding black consciousness as a complete theory of revolutionary change in South Africa. As a 'situational philosophy of praxis' (p 60), it was vague in specifying the new social order towards which it aspired and failed to formulate a sustained revolutionary analysis or programme. The BCM's links with black trade unionism and high school student activists were weak, its translation into political organisation unfulfilled. Yet it did have a central role in creating a 'new ideological terrain' (p 125) on which revolutionary strategies and initiatives could be rooted. Fatton himself fails to trace adequately and therefore underestimates the full political impact of black consciousness after 1977, which has reached far beyond the organisational regrouping under AZAPO and the National Forum into the major battlegrounds of struggle for which other tendencies have taken the credit. But his criticism of the 'programmatically escapism' (p 146) of both the BCM and the ANC—the predilection for substituting rhetorical slogans for critical thinking on revolutionary transformation—carries weight.

Perhaps inevitably in what is principally a work of theory, there remains an air of artificiality about much of the analysis of black consciousness as a political philosophy. 'BCM' positions are frequently presented as a presumed synthesis—'the Movement recognised'—unsituated in time, political context, process of formulation, or extent of support. The author has performed an invaluable service all the same in rehabilitating a major strand in the theory and practice of radical political change in apartheid South Africa.

The two remaining books under review both deal with the destructive external impact on the Southern African sub-continent of the apartheid regime's fight for survival. Both were funded by the Swedish International Development Agency; both reflect a growing concern amongst the more progressive development agencies and intellectuals involved in the SADC region that South Africa's increasingly aggressive drive for regional domination has gained success and credibility under the tacit—sometimes

BOOK REVIEWS

explicit—protection of right-wing governments in key Western countries. The principal objective has therefore been to politicise Western perceptions of South Africa's destabilisation strategy.

For that purpose these books are excellent vehicles. Both embody major efforts of research and scholarship over a period of two to three years and are impressive additions to an already strong contemporary literature on South Africa's political economy, foreign relations, and dynamics of change. Both supply a welcome corrective in viewing South Africa mainly from the perspective of its neighbouring states. Both draw not only on standard secondary sources but on a wide range of media reports, political ephemera, unpublished documents and interviews with politicians and officials.

The two books are differently constructed: *Destructive Engagement* is a collection of ten essays, *Beggar your Neighbours* a single-authored monograph, albeit assisted by four 'contributors'. In the latter there is accordingly a greater consistency in the deployment of evidence, mode of analysis, and style of presentation; but the former has also clearly benefited from a strong editorial hand. *Beggar your Neighbours* exhibits a welcome avoidance of self-righteous rhetoric and political jargon in favour of a commitment to communicate effectively to non-specialists, the uninformed, and the undecided. Such restraint is, however, not always so evident in *Destructive Engagement*, where the frequent use of a pejorative term such as 'bandit' (for 'insurgent', but also 'armed criminal') clouds the analysis.

The central concern of both books is South African destabilisation of its neighbouring states. *Destructive Engagement* opens with an eloquent and moving foreword by ex-President Julius Nyerere which could equally set the one for both books. It should be made required reading for all Western policy-makers on Southern Africa, from desk officer to Prime Minister and President. Three of the ten chapters in *Destructive Engagement* are, however, focused on South Africa itself and give hardly any consideration to the regional context at all. Why they should be included in a book about regional destabilisation is far from clear. Two chapters (6 and 7) by Abdul Minty, provide a thorough but pedestrian overview of South Africa's military and nuclear capabilities. It is difficult to take seriously the author's apparent acceptance of fancifully alarmist SADF warnings of a deteriorating military balance with the Frontline States (p 200). The third (chapter 8), by Vella Pillay, develops a technically skilled but somewhat forced case that 'there exists no hope for the apartheid economy' (p 222), arguing that the current economic crisis should be seen as structural and organic rather than cyclical and transient.

The other two general chapters are centrally concerned with the politics and economics of destabilisation. William Minter's fine review of US policy towards South Africa under Reagan (chapter 10) is a sophisticated attempt to integrate US, South African and regional factors into a narrative assessment of the evolution of 'constructive engagement', stressing the broad continuities of

US policy on southern Africa, notably the Cold War consensus on confronting 'communism' worldwide. The success of the Free South Africa Movement and President Reagan in politicising respectively the anti-apartheid campaign and aid to right-wing 'contras' has contributed largely to the extraordinary contradiction in Congress between overriding the President on sanctions and endorsing his military aid for South African regional destabilisation.

Green and Thompson's study of the struggle between South Africa for regional hegemony and SADCC for economic liberation (chapter 9) is perhaps the core essay in this collection. It is a dense, complex, sophisticated analysis of the range of economic, political and military factors at play, not always fully integrated but rich in insights, authoritatively founded on the authors' accumulated research and policy-making experience in the region, and fired by their active commitment to the fundamental goals of SADCC, whose very existence, let alone success, they see as a prime target of the South African onslaught. Perhaps a greater political unity of purpose is attributed to SADCC members than is always justified by the diversity of national interests and policies. Nor do the assessments of particular costs and benefits always add up to the marginally upbeat general conclusions. But the impact of destabilisation, the risks of sanctions, and the unrealised potential of SADCC are on the whole evaluated with perceptive realism. As the authors argue, the destructive effects of South African destabilisation, both economic and military, are so horrendous that the extra penalties of more radical disengagement from South Africa's clutches are likely to be compensated in the long run by the gains of economic liberation.

With this interpretation and commitment, Joseph Hanlon is in broad agreement. Partly because they are specifically geared to the regional context, his opening sections (chapters 1-9), provide the most comprehensive integrated account to date of the origins and evolution of South Africa's drive for regional hegemony: from the conception of the 'total strategy', through the initial phase of destabilisation (1982-83) to the high water mark of Nkomati and the subsequent collapse, confusion and escalating militarism. This is contemporary political history of high quality, the narrative approach orchestrating a vast array of evidence into an illuminating and often compelling explanation of complex sequences of events and policies that are all too frequently befogged by the news management of the apartheid regime and its protectors. Economic factors are fully integrated into the analysis and the assessment of the South African Customs Union is particularly useful.

Although ostensibly covering much of the same ground, there are sufficient differences in emphasis, theme, and, to a certain extent interpretation as to establish a useful complementarity between the two sets of country chapters. *Beggar your Neighbours* is far stronger and more detailed on economic aspects, and largely for this reason presents a more satisfactory analytical synthesis of structural and contingent factors. *Destructive Engagement*, on the other hand,

is concerned primarily with the political and military dimensions of destabilisation, especially the South African use of surrogates, on which its level of detailed information and use of inside information from privileged intelligence and political sources is in several instances (notably the MNR and Super-ZAPU) more comprehensive.

There is nonetheless a certain variability in the quality of the country sections. Hanlon's chapter on Mozambique is disappointingly thin on the post-Nkomati period, especially in view of the author's intimate knowledge of the country. In *Destructive Engagement*, the chapter on Namibia is depressingly superficial and in places simplistically polemical in its political analysis, although it provides a useful summary of the sequence of international diplomacy and a timely warning of the extent of South Africa's preparations for post-independence domination and destabilisation. Regional and ethnic factors are studiously ignored; so too is some of the best recent literature, including—in a text co-authored by an official of its Department of Information and Publicity—SWAPO's own published history of the liberation struggle. In *Beggar your Neighbours*, too, literature on Namibia and proper consideration on Namibia as an independent factor in South African regional strategy are noticeably absent and seriously weaken the chapter on Angola.

Strongest in both books are the chapters on Zimbabwe, on which Hanlon/Stoneman's economic analysis is a major contribution in its own right. Here the competition between the two in political explanation is at its most intense and much can be learnt from a detailed comparison of the two accounts, which often address the same issues and episodes with much the same source material. A slight edge in clarity goes to *Beggar your Neighbours*, in part because an implicit but noticeable hostility towards ZAPU on the part of Johnson and Martin tends to obscure the necessary differentiation of indigenous from South African-inspired dissidence.

A more serious deficiency is the failure in both books to relate political action systematically to the domestic social structure, elite economic interests, and modes of political mobilisation and control. On occasion the narrative of political events has the appearance of surface froth, leaving the deeper historical roots and structural forces, although not entirely ignored, somewhat obscure. This weakness is most evident in treatment of South African manipulation of internal political divisions in the Frontline States and of the cultural and political bases of South African-sponsored dissidence.

Typographical errors are relatively few, as are editorial slips—Harold Macmillan, he of 'wind of change' fame, was most definitely the British Prime Minister in 1960 and not 'foreign secretary' (*Destructive Engagement* p xv). There are occasional misjudgements too: Hanlon's description of P W Botha's 1984 tour of Europe as 'triumphal' (p 148) would be disputed both by the tens of thousands of anti-apartheid activists who mobilised to harry him all the way and by the Mozambican government following its diplomatic offensive during

1983 (p 143). A technical irritation in so long and factually dense book as *Destructive Engagement* is the complete absence of an index. Although there is useful cross-referencing within the text of *Beggar your Neighbours* and an index, the latter is inadequate—a thorough upgrade would considerably enhance the book's accessibility for reference.

Although the flood of publications on Southern Africa has been criticised for opportunism and superficiality, analyses of high quality, acute perception and political commitment to the cause of liberation from the destructive evil of apartheid are mixed in the tide. All four of the books reviewed here are worthy contributions to the genre.

The Namibian cause

Randolph Vigne

Namibia: the Violent Heritage

David Soggot

London: Rex Collings. 1986. 333pp. £17.50

Namibia: Perspectives for National Reconstruction and Development

United Nations Institute for Namibia

Lusaka: United Nations Institute for Namibia. 1986. 1008pp. np

A Future for Namibia: 1 Namibia in the 1980s [1981, 2nd edition 1986. 83pp. £3.50pb], **2 Agriculture: Transforming a Wasted Land.** Richard Moorsom [1982. 114pp. £2.95pb], **3 Mines and Independence** [1983. 155pp. £2.95pb], **4 Education, Repression and Liberation: Namibia.** Justin Ellis [1984. 94pp. £2.95pb], **5 Exploiting the Sea.** Richard Moorsom.

London: Catholic Institute for International Relations. 1984. 123pp. £2.95pb

Namibia: Reclaiming the People's Health

Edited by Tim Lobstein and Namibia Support Committee Health Collective

London: AON Publications. 1984. 151pp. £12.95, £3.95pb

Namibia: A Violation of Trust

Susanna Smith

London: Oxfam. 1986. 96pp. £3.00pb

Since 1984 and the beginning of a new phase in the South African revolution

BOOK REVIEWS

Namibia has disappeared from the headlines. The world media follow the national State of Emergency in South Africa in detail, despite tight censorship. Reports tell of mass detention—8,000? 12,000? An occasional priest or professional man manages to tell his story of torture and brutality in detention. The Botha regime fails to keep secret the existence of camps where detainees are held for 're-indoctrination'. Western politicians—at least since the total failure of the mission of the British Foreign Secretary, Sir Geoffrey Howe, in July 1986—have realised the futility of trying to talk the Afrikaner nationalist Government in South Africa into moving towards a new democracy based on 'one person—one vote—one value'.

Now substitute 'Namibia' for 'South Africa', change figures *pro rata* for Namibia's 1.5 million compared to South Africa's 28 million, omit the reference to the world media interest and you have the Namibian scenario of the past ten years. With the world's eyes on South Africa, and its independent neighbours understandably concerned more about their own security than Namibian freedom, the politicians can leave Namibia to the UN Council for Namibia and to the UN General Assembly, where lost causes never die. In this twenty-first year of SWAPO's armed struggle against South African occupation, the once burning issue of Germany's last pre-1914 colony and South Africa's refusal to free its people, wards of the international community, is scarcely an ember in the world's cabinet rooms.

If this is the time to prepare for the revival of the Namibian cause, we are well placed as never before to learn what is at stake. A neophyte could do little better than read his way through the books listed above to acquire, if not expertise, at least a working knowledge of South Africa's rule of violence (from Soggot), views of social and economic conditions today and in the future (the CIIR series) and a comprehensive study of the future and its needs (the UNIN *Perspectives*) with a view of the physical effects of their treatment on Namibians (the health study) and an apportionment of current responsibility for the whole grim tragedy of Namibia (the Oxfam report).

David Soggot explains his connection with the 'political and insurgent battles in Namibia (which) have in recent years come to be fought with increasing ferocity':

Since the early seventies my work as a defence lawyer has brought me into close collaboration with many of the main actors in the conflict. This contact together with political trials which were often focal points of political and social confrontation were for me a discovery.

His narration of these events from the early 1970s onwards forms the great bulk of a very substantial book. It is brought to life by the noticeable effect of this 'discovery' on him. We learn that he taught political science at the University of the Witwatersrand before being called to the Johannesburg bar. Yet, though a South African radical, he had to 'discover' the political and social situation in the neighbouring territory his country had ruled since long before

his birth and had, in his boyhood, tried to annex as a fifth province. Such is the obscurity of the great landmass of Namibia and its people, which has for more than a hundred years permitted foreign invaders—the Germans and then the South Africans—to oppress its people and plunder their natural wealth. And it is this obscurity which his book so forcefully seeks to dispel, if its publishers and the Namibia 'lobby' in New York and London will only let it.

He begins with a concise account of the German invasion with its horrific consequences of genocide and brutalisation, followed by the years of the League of Nations mandate so cynically misapplied by South Africa. In 1935, fifteen years after His Britannic Majesty had had the mandate conferred upon him (to be administered by South Africa on his behalf) the total sum spent by South Africa on the education of the bulk of the black population, living in Ovamboland, was £200! And yet in 1946, we learn, it was their anxiety to hold on to the protection of the British Crown, however remote, that persuaded the chiefs on Ovamboland to vote in favour of the continuance of South African rule. The irrecoverable loss of this protection when South Africa became a Republic in 1961 was but one of the acts of betrayal which have led to the present abdication from any responsibility at all for Namibia's continuing tragedy by the present British Government.

The early growth of an independence movement, in reaction to the hated contract labour system in the main, is well described. But the book pays tribute to the vital role of the churches too, particularly in confronting the apartheid regime of Prime Minister Vorster and in the leadership of its black Lutheran and white Anglican bishops, followed by the ordinary clergy, many of them, if black, cruelly victimised by South African police and military gaolers and torturers. Again there is a paradox, for we are given an unsparing account of the shameful role of many Lutheran missionaries in support of colonial rule at its harshest and most unjust. It is right that the work of such churchmen as Auala, Gowaseb, Dumeni, Mize, Winter, Wood, Witbooi and Karuaera should be acknowledged as well as the sins of their predecessors.

That work is interwoven with the author's own labours in the many legal actions which led him from that first discovery to a deep knowledge and understanding of the Namibian freedom struggle. He describes with clarity, modesty and restraint these dozen or so cases (and refers to many more in which he played no direct part). He intersperses these chapters with his account of the interminable negotiations that have led to and followed UN Security Council Resolution 435 of 1977, the 'UN plan' for South African withdrawal, and this takes up most of his concluding chapters. His analysis of the 'political machinations' which have so far brought forth two 'internal settlement' regimes is more illuminating as he was closer to the events described. The lesson is equally clear: SWAPO will always, though often publicly unseen and unheard, triumph over South Africa's synthetic constitution-making and the creation of governments with no conceivable base in the people (except for the right-wing

Afrikaner Nationalist elements, which bedevil Pretoria's plans almost as much as would SWAPO's participation, from the opposite angle).

The capacity of SWAPO to endure was the discovery that seems most to have impressed Soggot. We see its revival after the exile of its early leaders, and again in the great days of the SWAPO Youth League in the early 1970s (and, it seems from recent reports, during the present rule of the Interim Government of National Unity, the current synthetic constitutional apparatus). Waves of police activity would remove political leaders from the scene and:

The newspapers would announce the death of SWAPO only to witness—with unpublished disappointment—its miraculous resuscitation. What the papers and editors did not realise was that the strength of SWAPO lay not in any bureaucratic cohesion nor in the charisma of prevailing leaders; it was rather that the grievances and grief, and a nation's aspiration, were mirrored in the language and action of SWAPO's leadership.

The grievances and grief are the fabric of all the cases Soggot fought in the Namibian courts. A rough count would suggest that of twelve legal actions two were withdrawn for lack of funds, ten were lost (three of them later won in the Appeal Court in South Africa), one dropped by the prosecution and only the Nkandi case won outright in the Namibian courts. There can be no question but that these results show up not the weakness of the plea nor certainly the abilities of the defence team. In virtually every case it is the judges' inhumanity, prejudice and moral bankruptcy that are exposed for all to see.

It can be accepted that there is still some residue of jurisprudential rectitude in the South African courts, though they are not, after thirty-eight years of Afrikaner Nationalist rule, the unchallengeable fortresses of the law that South Africa's apologists still claim them to be. Good men are passed over and men who can be relied upon to do the Government's dirty work are appointed to the bench. Even good men on the bench are silent in the face of the most glaring evidence of police brutality and malpractice, and pass draconian sentences because they are mandatory, without comment on the legislation that has made them so. But in the South African courts right occasionally still triumphs, as has recently been seen in relation to the State of Emergency now in force.

Namibia is like a grotesque distorting mirror set against the already ugly face of South Africa. On all sides there are aspects of apartheid which mar the lives of black South Africans. For black Namibians these aspects are the same ones—social status, labour conditions, health, education, living conditions, political life—but infinitely worse. The legal system as revealed here is another of these aspects. With commendable moderation and no trace of *animus* Soggot repeats to us the comments of judges or reflects on their verdicts and the reader cannot but be horrified. The discovery here is that the Namibian distorting mirror reflects not some disfigurement scarring a subject people through a hundred years of colonialism, but the disease of colonialism itself. Apartheid in South Africa is evil enough but there is opposition to it from among the white community, expressed by their newspapers, and many of its

worst excesses are checked or well hidden. In Namibia the only comparably privileged opposition comes from white churchmen who are treated as political confederates of the black Namibians and, as is the one newspaper, *The Namibian*, which exposes the wickedness of South African rule, the victims of firebombs, death threats and constant vilification.

The Court was not always an elevated forum in which white prosecutors and white defence performed before white judges and assessors while bewildered black men and women humbly awaited their fate. Among many other key processes of the 1970s recorded here was the rise of the SWAPO Youth League, followed inevitably by the merciless attacks of the Security Police. In 1973 the chairman, Jeremiah Ekandjo, his vice-chairman and a third member were put on trial under the Sabotage Act, charged with inciting Namibians to take up arms. Their attitude to the Court is best exemplified by Ekandjo's characterisation of it, when addressing the judge *in mitigation* of sentence at the end of the trial, as the 'temple of devils where Namibians are being crucified'. At an earlier stage he asked the judge: 'Has this court perhaps obtained permission from the UN to try us?' and another time lectured Judge President Badenhorst on the illegality of South Africa's presence in Namibia, as decided by the World Court the previous year: the UN alone was responsible for them. Vice-Chairman Ngidina summed up:

We have sabotaged nothing, We are oppressed. The people in Namibia who do sabotage are the whites of South Africa. This Court is here illegally and terrorises us in our own land. Only the United Nations may hear us. We do not recognise the court and we will be back.

They were sentenced to eight years imprisonment. Six months later their comrades Taaipopi, the new SYL chairman, and Kashea were found guilty of having a hand in a letter calling for help from the SWAPO President in exile, Sam Nujoma—a letter of marked sobriety and sense. For incitement to murder, public violence and arson, they were sent to Robben Island prison for two years, with three further years suspended. Leaving the Court, Taaipopi called out: 'I am off to college. There I will meet our head boy, Ja Toivo.'

The great value of *Namibia: the Violent Heritage* is that it exposes from the inside not only the violence and wickedness of the foreign invaders of Namibia but also the unquenchable spirit of so many of its people who have fought on for their freedom against a cruel enemy. Measured against such as these, the functionaries South Africa has recruited to masquerade as an 'internal government of national unity' seem poor stuff indeed. And it records with spirit and accuracy the weary processes of the UN and the self-appointed 'Contact Group' in their work towards South African withdrawal. If only the spirit of the SWAPO heroes Soggot defended could infuse the politicians of many nations to whom the country's fate has been entrusted.

The reprinting of *Namibia in the 1980s*, the first of the series of six studies called 'A Future for Namibia', is to be welcomed. From 1981 to date the

Catholic Institute for International Relations in London has produced expertly written and researched surveys of agriculture, mining, education and the fishing industry in Namibia, present and future. They have a common pattern: human and material resources have been exploited and squandered: what can be done to conserve the residue and enrich the lives of the Namibians who have been thus plundered? The papers presented to the International Seminar on Health in Namibia, convened by the Namibia Support Committee and the SWAPO Department of Health and Social Welfare in 1983, *Namibia: Reclaiming the People's Health*, constitutes a sixth such survey. Their usefulness is to offer the wide range of non-governmental organisations, international agencies, government aid bodies around the world and, above all, to the Namibians themselves, an expert series of simply written texts which can help them to judge where their own services might best be applied.

Independent writers and researchers on Namibia are few and some of the best of them are to be found here—Richard Moorsom on agriculture and fishing, and a participant in most of the others, Professor R H Green *passim*, Justin Ellis on education. The health writers are less known outside their own fields, with the exception of David Werner, whose *Where There is No Doctor* has found its way wherever two or three volunteers are gathered together in health, education and development centres round the world. For ten years or more responsibility for the independence of Namibia has been arrogated to themselves by South Africa's five Western trading partners: the rapid success of agreement of UN Security Council Resolution 435 was won ten years ago. It is some small recompense for the unpreparedness of those governments to coerce South Africa into withdrawing its oppressive rule that such books as these are produced. It is significant, however, that the 'Future for Namibia' series come from that same defender of human rights and decency as in Namibia itself, the Christian churches.

The new edition of No. 1 in the series is published jointly by the CIRR and the British Council of Churches. It provides a helpful analysis of the events that have led to the paradoxical situation of 1986. At the same time, no vestige of official support remains for South Africa's continued illegal occupation, and no remaining credence, official or otherwise, in South Africa's good faith as a negotiator either in its withdrawal or in the ending of white supremacy in South Africa—yet no willingness has been shown by the powers whose investment underwrites South Africa's continued occupation to consider any form of coercion that will at last expel South Africa from Namibia. Is it the Christian message of hope that inspired the concluding view that 'in the vacuum caused by the US loss of interest, there is room for a new, European initiative'? In Brussels in September 1986 when the EEC finally agreed to impose some form of sanctions on South Africa, it was also agreed that Namibia was to be excluded from these measures. It will take something more than hope, however pious and well-intentioned, to restore to the West, and, in particular, to the

Government of Her Britannic Majesty, the sense of duty and responsibility required for resolute action against South Africa.

These ten years of deadlock have seen also the build-up of research, training and basic education organised by the United Nations. The centre of the best work is the UN Institute for Namibia in Lusaka, established in 1976 as a training and applied research institute, which has sought, with success, 'to make available the necessary documentation required by the Liberation Movement and the future government of independent Namibia'. Their splendidly produced 1008-page summary of 'perspectives for national reconstruction and development' addresses itself on an academic and professional level to the subjects of the CIIR series, and many more: water, forestry, wildlife and tourism, energy, transport, housing, commerce, the monetary system, science and technology, the role of women in development and the legal and constitutional framework among the more specific.

In his foreword President Kaunda finds it 'gratifying that Namibians themselves under the leadership of SWAPO have determined their goals, policy objectives and priorities which have so far guided all the support activities and actions of the international community'. With independence the new government will have to 'shape a new environment and define new goals and priorities for the young nation'. The international community, however, must demonstrate its solidarity with the Namibian people in the 'reconstruction and development of a united and independent Namibia'. UNIN's *Perspectives* has fulfilled its task, as a first stage: the definition of those goals and priorities, as set for it by the UN General Assembly. If the Namibians of tomorrow are to enjoy a heritage different from that which David Soggot so memorably and harrowingly reveals, it will indeed be the Namibians of today who must create it. To expel the foreign power despoiling the sources of that heritage they must surely be helped by the world community. The CIIR hope for a new initiative must somehow be translated into practical action.

Susanna Smith, for the Oxfam Public Affairs Unit, subtitles her book 'an Oxfam report on international responsibility for poverty in Namibia'. Some distracting material—'basic facts', a four-page chronology, summaries of Oxfam aid to Namibians and of the terms of Resolution 435—interrupt her introduction, which climaxes thus:

The challenge facing Britain is clear. There is now an urgent need to consider new measures to secure Namibia's unconditional independence, *to relieve the poverty, distress and suffering of the Namibian people* [my italics].

These trenchant words should have been presented as the main thrust of the book. Would not a commercial publisher have discerned in them its main point and appeal—rather than her title, dully echoing the standard UN publication: *Namibia: a Trust Betrayed*, or her subtitle above, which spreads the blame thinly over the world community? Once into her main text, the theme stands out. We examine the shocking equation of abundant natural wealth with

grinding human poverty. For the black 94.5 per cent that is. They take 22 per cent of the gross domestic profit—compared to 40 per cent to foreign corporations and colonial businesses (20 per cent goes in tax to South Africa and 18 per cent in salaries and allowances to the white, 5.5 per cent of the population). It is not the figures alone that shock but the author's first-hand and well illustrated account of the poverty of the victims, the inhuman price paid for dividend cheques around the world and revenue for South Africa's military machine.

Her verdict is that only by transforming the structures can the Namibians be saved from the fate she has seen them suffer. And only genuine independence can make possible that transformation. She highlights three spheres—education, health and (counterpointing Soggot) the effect of the South African military response to SWAPO's guerrillas—for which emergency development aid is needed. Her final chapter completes the theme: Susanna Smith's analysis of Britain's interlocking diplomatic and economic roles leads her to demand, speaking for Oxfam, that the British Government (1) should initiate a fresh initiative for unconditional independence, (2) should recognise 'UN Decree No. 1 for the protection of the natural resources of Namibia' (usefully reproduced in an appendix), (3) 'give consideration to . . . economic sanctions against South Africa', and (4) offer generous aid on independence.

Miss Smith's and Oxfam's ascription of responsibility to Britain is well argued. There may be less agreement over her identification of the curative measures to absolve British guilt. But neither she nor, alas, the others who have begotten this fine set of Namibian studies have set their minds to the first essential task. How do you make the citizens of a democracy such as Britain so conscious of their responsibility and guilt that the politicians (and, even more insulated from such consciousness, the bureaucrats) have to impose their will on their own businessmen and EEC partners so as to force through, wielding the powerful economic weapons they hold, that unconditional independence? Though lacking a dimension of education for political change, books like these make it none the less impossible for the British and other Western powers engaged in the exploitation revealed here, ever to ask: 'Why were we not told?'

South African publishing: more or less

Terrence Ranger

Southern Africa in the 1980s

Edited by Olajide Aluko and Timothy Shaw

London: Unwin and Hyman. 1985. 327pp. £20.00

The Roots of Crisis in Southern Africa

Ann Seidman

Trenton, New Jersey: Africa World Press for Oxfam America. 1985. 209pp.
\$19.95. \$8.95pb

South Africa in the 1980s: State of Emergency

Catholic Institute of International Relations

London: CIIR (3rd revised edition). 1986. 94pp. £3.25pb

Power! Black Workers, their Unions and the Struggle for Freedom in South Africa

Denis MacShane, Martin Plaut and David Ward

Nottingham, England: Spokesman. 1984. 195pp. £4.95pb

South Africa: The Peasants' Revolt

Govan Mbeki

London: International Defence and Aid Fund for Southern Africa. 1984.
160pp. £3.00pb

There are too many books about South Africa. Literally dozens have appeared in the last two years as publishers strove to command territory in the latest 'Scramble' or 'Gold Rush'. Most of these books have been shallow or repetitive or self-indulgent. Readers badly need a Consumer Guide to the literature on South Africa which would test for obsolescence, economy, reliability and so on. There are also too few books about South Africa. Some crucial topics have hardly been treated at all. Readers who want to obtain a coherent, overall picture need to know what the literature largely leaves out. The five books under review here sustain both of these generalisations.

To begin with the Consumer Guide. Books on South Africa can be classified according to their producers. There are four main production groups—academics, journalists, anti-apartheid organisations and participants in the South African struggle. The books reviewed here fit into three of these categories though they do not include an example of the journalist's wanderings with camera and tape recorder through wildest South Africa. Aluko and Shaw's collection is an example of academic production; Ann Seidman's book and the Catholic Institute for International Relations' booklet are examples of support-group briefing; Govan Mbeki, whose book on peasant revolt in the Transkei has been republished by International Defence and Aid, has served more than twenty years on Robben Island. Taken together these books offer examples of the worst of some of these styles of production and the best of others.

At their best, academic writers on South Africa can offer the results of long and careful research, tested by the scrutiny of exacting colleagues. At their worst, they offer the results of hastily assembled gatherings, cobbled together as edited collections and published with excruciating slowness. Alas, Olajide Aluko and Timothy Shaw's *Southern Africa in the 1980s* is an example of the worst rather than the best of academic production. Issued only last year its rust is already showing and one cannot be optimistic about its resale value. The book emerges from a conference held as long ago as 1980 and its Preface is dated March 1983. The Preface claims that despite the passage of time 'the long-term analyses proposed here remain valid.' The trouble is that long-term analyses are hard to find in a book which is very much the product of the optimistic moment at which its contributors gathered together, and which begins with a classic example of academic lack of proportion:

This collection marks another stage in the further development of (1) the liberation of the peoples of Southern Africa, and (2) the maturation of the Department of International Relations at Ife; both of which have progressed markedly in the 1980s.

The 'African perspective' proposed by this book might indeed have been very welcome when the Defence Ministers of the Organisation of African Unity have been meeting in Harare to coordinate Africa's military response to South African aggression and when African heads of state have been working out their position on sanctions. Its major argument—that South Africa has to be seen above all as part of Africa and that African developments will in the end determine what happens there—is persuasive. But in 1980, or in 1983, it was possible to take a much more optimistic African perspective than now seems sensible. In their Introduction, the editors point to the 'series of successes which the liberation movements have scored against the remaining racist regimes'; remark that 'Africa's attentions and resources are now concentrated on Namibia'; and assume that 'Namibia is free under an internationally acceptable and recognised formula before 1985.' Thereafter, they say, Africa 'will be ready for the final assault on the white-ruled redoubt—South Africa itself.' It all looks very different now, with no prospect of Namibian independence in sight and with South Africa's neighbours in turmoil as a result of her destructive interventions. The books of the moment in 1986—books like Joseph Hanlon's *Beggar Your Neighbours* (Catholic Institute for International Relations and James Currey, 1986) or Phyllis Johnson and David Martin's *Destructive Engagement: Southern Africa at War* (Zimbabwe Publishing House, 1986)—do indeed take a Southern African regional perspective, but one for which nothing in the Aluko and Shaw collection prepares us.

It is, of course, easy and often unfair sport to shoot down failed academic prognostications. But most of the contributors to this book took much too superficial and immediate a view to be able to risk longer term prediction.

Boniface Obichere, writing on Zimbabwe, tells us, for example, that the 'militant' faction of ZANU/PF, led by Edgar Tekere; the followers of Ndabingi Sithole and those of Abel Muzorewa; the 'unpredictable guerrillas of ZANLA' are 'all live political forces that must be reckoned with in the 1980s'. This is a comment so much based on a visitor's-eye view of Zimbabwe in 1980 rather than on any long-term analysis that Obichere really deserves the total collapse of his assertion, since by 1985 none of these political forces had to be reckoned with at all. Some contributors to the book—notably Kenneth Grundy and Sam Nolutshungu, whose subtle analysis runs counter to the overall thesis—show what can be achieved by digging deeper and thinking harder. But overall a Consumer Guide would have to caution against buying this expensive book, though it might be made mandatory for the bookshelves of academic Southern Africanists as a warning. (What could also be made mandatory as a model for really long-term and searching academic analysis is Robin Cohen's much cheaper and infinitely better *Endgame in South Africa?* published in 1986 by James Currey for UNESCO, which is being reviewed elsewhere in this journal but which I cannot resist recommending so as to restore academic morale.)

Anti-apartheid support groups have rather different audiences and objectives in mind. They publish to their particular constituency and as well as seeking to inform it about South African realities they seek to direct it towards immediate and effective action. At their best, support group publications combine forceful and perceptive analysis with committed concern. At their worst, they can be merely rhetorical or sentimental or skewed by too exclusive and partisan support for one South African movement. Ann Seidman's *The Roots of Crisis in Southern Africa* and the Catholic Institute's *South Africa in the 1980s* are admirable examples of this sort of publishing at its best. This means that both are very properly directed towards their own constituencies—in Seidman's case that of Oxfam America and in CIIR's case that of radical British Christianity. A Consumer Guide would report that each is ideally designed for its particular market.

But each has a wider interest. One of the most remarkable developments of the last two or three years has been the emergence of a really vigorous and successful anti-apartheid movement in the United States, a movement which has made South Africa an issue in American politics, has forced university and church disinvestment and produced sanctions resolutions in Congress. It is thus very well worth listening in to Oxfam America talking to its constituency. Ann Seidman's book is commended on its back cover by one Congressman and recommended to other 'policymakers and legislators'. Its very useful appendices list the main US companies and banks involved in South Africa and Namibia, give the addresses of the many American organisations concerned with Southern Africa and of the representatives of South African liberation movement offices in the United States, and offer a guide to periodicals, audio-visuals and further reading. It argues that 'analysis of the interests of US

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citizens should lead to an alternative policy of support for the efforts of the majority of southern Africans to achieve self-reliant development.' This argument is presented with all the lucidity that one might expect from its able and experienced author.

As for the Catholic Institute's booklet I am tempted to describe it as the best buy not only of the five books under review here but of all the current crop. No doubt this is because I am a part of its constituency, being particularly interested by the role of religion in contemporary South Africa. But there are other more objective reasons. The booklet is astonishingly up to date, being a third and very comprehensively revised edition of the original 1980 publication. The most important of its sources 'have been South African Christians who, through the network of the universal Church, are able to present their perceptions of their society to a wide audience.' These Christians are committed to an incarnational theology and to the total repudiation of the legitimacy of the South African state. Very many of them have been detained under the recent emergency. They speak from the heart of the South African crisis in a way unparalleled anywhere in the world. This booklet also has its appendices, some of which give the extraordinarily radical flavour of this South African liberation theology. The booklet is not restricted to an account of radical Christianity—indeed it is a brisk, authoritative and marvellously well-informed account of the whole South African crisis. But it is informed throughout by a genuine radicalism which overturns conventional assumptions whether of right, left or centre.

When we turn to the two books by participants, we come to the question of what the literature on South Africa has largely left out. The answer is 'people', not people in the sense of individuals, many of whom feature in journalistic accounts, but people in the sense of actors and agents. Of course, an incarnational theology speaks about people as actors but there is not really space for them in the *CIR* booklet. Nor can necessary academic analyses of the mega-structures of exploitation and under-development find much room for workers and peasants. Social historians of South Africa are now producing fascinating work on people as actors in the past. What we need is similar work for the present. Three Labour Party or Trade Union activists, Denis MacShane, Martin Plaut and David Ward have combined to produce *Power! Black Workers, Their Unions and the Struggle for Freedom in South Africa*. Their book was published in 1984 but it is still the best introduction to 'the immense growth in trade unions organising black workers' in South Africa. In its way it is directed to a particular constituency just as much as is Seidman's book or the *CIR* pamphlet since it argues that 'workers and unions in countries outside South Africa can now play crucial roles in building solidarity with their brothers and sisters in South Africa.' It also has a long section of appendices which allow black Trade Unions and Trade Unionists to speak for themselves, together with a list of the addresses of black Unions with whom readers can get

in contact. Plainly, this is a book that every Trade Union activist should buy.

But it is also a book for everyone who wants to catch the voices of black people as actors. The authors draw heavily, and with full acknowledgements from the *South African Labour Bulletin*, that remarkable collaboration of academics and activists. They also quote frequently from their own interviews in 'South African workplaces and townships'. The result is a book which does not lose sight of the workers while describing their organisations.

And what, finally, of Africans in the rural areas of South Africa? MacShane, Plaut and Ward tell us that 'a great deal of material is available in South Africa' about workers and unions although, until their book, little had been published outside. But all too little is known about black peasants as actors and agents even inside South Africa. There is no rural equivalent of the *Labour Bulletin*. We sometimes get the impression that the struggle in South Africa is carried on exclusively in 'workplaces and townships'; that it is indeed, to use the title of Julie Frederikse's new book (James Currey, 1986), *A Different Kind of War*—different, that is, from the rural guerrilla wars of Mozambique and Zimbabwe. Yet the recent newspaper stories on events on KwaNdebele—garbled though most of them were—were enough in themselves to show that crucial contestations are taking place outside the cities.

Govan Mbeki's *South Africa. The Peasants' Revolt* has been for over twenty years the classic exception to the silence and ignorance. First published in 1964, the book was nevertheless prophetic, foreseeing that the bantustans would become crucial battlefields for the struggle against apartheid. It is a marvellous demonstration of the peasant capacity for action and resistance and a humane discussion of how the limitations of peasant action might be transcended. It is good to have it re-published, though I hope that not every copy of the IDAF edition contains the frustrating blank pages of my review copy which have sent me back to the original Penguin. And yet the need to republish the book in order that the peasants should be heard is an indication in itself of the most lamentable of all the gaps in the literature on South Africa.

We need fewer books about South Africa—fewer books like *Southern Africa in the 1980s*. We need more books about South Africa—more books like Mbeki's, about other rural areas and brought up to date.

Militaristic apartheid

Elling Njaal Tjoenneland

Pretoria's Praetorians—Civil-Military Relations in South Africa

Philip H. Frankel

Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 1984. 215pp. £22.50hb

The Militarization of South African Politics

Kenneth W Grundy

London: I B Tauris. 1986. 133pp. £16.50hb

Brutal Force—The Apartheid War Machine

Gavin Cawthra

London: International Defence and Aid Fund for Southern Africa. 1986. 319pp. £6.00pb

The coercive instruments of the apartheid state have always played a crucial role in defending and upholding segregation and white supremacy. Traditionally, however, the maintenance of law and order and the control of the non-white population have been left to the police. The South African Defence Force (SADF) has historically been a loose and creaky organisation and has only recently—beginning in the 1960s—been transformed into a highly rationalised device for the preservation of white supremacy and the apartheid state. The 1970s witnessed a rapid and accelerating militarisation. This is evident from statistical evidence showing both a quantitative expansion and growth, and—of even greater significance—a qualitative shift in the role of the military in apartheid politics, a shift which has given SADF increased power in almost every sphere of South African life. With P W Botha as Head of Government, the military gradually became more and more involved in political decision-making and civil law enforcement. Today, the armed forces and the security establishment are at the centre of formulation, coordination and implementation of public policy. Military considerations and the aim of the defending the security of the state seems to be the guiding spirit behind the regime's tactics and strategy of countering what Pretoria perceive as a 'total onslaught'. Increasingly the development of the apartheid state has become identified with the emergence of an authoritarian military-bureaucratic regime.

Despite the crucial role of force and coercion in apartheid society, the amount of research on the South African armed forces (and other instruments of physical repression and control) has been very limited. *Pretoria's Praetorians* by Philip H Frankel—a political scientist at Johannesburg's Witwatersrand University—is the first critical book-length inquiry into SADF. He succeeds well in his treatment of the Praetorian march on Pretoria. The strength of Frankel's study lies in his analysis of the dynamics behind the process of militarisation. He identifies the rise of a 'garrison state' and an unfolding 'siege culture' as the product of growing international isolation since 1960, the strengthening of black nationalism, regional liberation and majority rule in the neighbouring states. Demonstrating a deep knowledge of South African social and political matters, he shows how National Party rule and apartheid have led to

increasingly authoritarian state structures and to political changes which have brought forward leaders more receptive to positions favoured by the military, willing to allocate increased funds to the armed forces and to support systems providing increased political influence to SADF.

Frankel also argues that the increased political role of the military is deeply grounded in South Africa's historic experience—in particular in the 'Kommando ethic' inherited from the Anglo-Boer War with its blurred distinction between civil and military roles. This aspect, however, needs to be further explored and studied. (eg: how is the concept of a *volksleer*—peoples' army—to be reconciled with a professionalised, armed force?). Beyond his focus on the process of militarisation and the notion of 'total strategy' underlying the tactics and strategy of the Botha regime, Frankel also explores a number of other issues such as the links between SADF and the business community and the expanding military-industrial complex. (Unfortunately, he has very little to say about South Africa's regional policy of destabilisation where the military impact has been particularly strong.)

Kenneth W Grundy—an American political scientist and author of a major study on the non-whites in the South African armed forces—also analyses the rise of SADF, the political role of the military and the whole security establishment centred on SADF. In addition he examines some issues politically influenced by the armed forces, such as the policy towards the 'Homelands' and the neighbouring states.

The strength of this brief but admirable study lies in Grundy's analysis of changes in decision-making processes and structures since the fall of Vorster. He documents how SADF has strengthened its position and gained influence at the expense of other bodies in each of the shifts that have taken place under P W Botha. But he also points out that the military does not always get its own way, and that its influence is not uniformly powerful on all issues. There are, according to Grundy, still forces within the Cabinet and the National Party who challenge Botha's reliance on the security establishment and who to some extent manage to become a check on SADF.

While the books by Frankel and Grundy are traditional academic studies, Gavin Cawthra's contribution is a more popular introduction intended for a wider audience. The book lives up to the tradition of the International Defence and Aid Fund (IDAF) research division of publishing books packed with factual information and instructive overviews. The data brought together on SADF and the coercive instruments of the apartheid state, the various dimensions of militarisation, the pattern of military aggression and the immense implications for the societies of Southern Africa are not easily available elsewhere. Cawthra's discussion on the dynamics of militarisation and the role of SADF in public policy formulation, however, is largely derived from the works by Frankel and Grundy and does not add much new information. The reader hunting for information on arms production, names of

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navy vessels in operation and listing of police and military headquarters throughout the country is likely to find it in Cawthra's book.

Perhaps because it does cover such a wide canvas, Cawthra's study contains several minor factual errors. It would also have benefited from a sharper analytical perspective, eg his discussion of the growth of military expenditures would have been considerably strengthened if he also had included a systematic analysis of SADF spending compared to total public expenditures and GNP. Despite this criticism the book provides a comprehensive treatment, it is the most detailed introduction available to date and it constitutes an indispensable tool for anyone seeking more information about the armed forces and the repressive apparatuses of the apartheid state.

Chester Crocker—the architect of the US policy of 'constructive engagement'—has argued that the rise of the military-bureaucratic Botha regime was a change towards a more modernising regime; one prepared to lay the foundation for peaceful and evolutionary change and elimination of apartheid. These three books make it evidently clear that the increasing power and influence of the military, and the centralisation and concentration of power over the past few years, are far from removing apartheid, and are likely to lead to increased authoritarianism, repression and intensified conflict. The analysis of these studies and additional evidence from South Africa over the last year leads one to the unavoidable conclusion that the rapid militarisation and increased influence of the SADF on state policy is likely to accelerate in the future.

These three books have opened up a previously neglected area of social and political inquiry, one of critical importance in understanding contemporary developments in Southern Africa. They deserve to be widely read by all students of the region. However, it should also be added that, despite these studies, the need for further research on the South African armed forces is still obvious. Compared to research on the military in politics elsewhere (eg Latin America and Israel) the state of our knowledge of SADF is still limited; something which is also evident in the attempts by Grundy and, particularly, Frankel to evaluate the South African military by using the expanding literature on military sociology and civil-military relations as a comparative backdrop. For instance, we know far too little about the internal dynamics of SADF and the inner springs of the security establishment. What are the implications of the fact that SADF is still largely a citizen army with only a small number of professional soldiers? To what extent does continued military build-up and the 'creeping coup' generate new cleavages and conflicts within the white community?

Biographies of the struggle

Lionel Cliffe

Nelson Mandela: The Struggle is My Life

Edited by International Defence and Aid Fund for Southern Africa

London: IDAF. 1986. 249pp. £4.50pb

Nelson Mandela

Mary Benson

London: Penguin. 1986. 268pp. £2.50pb

Hope and Suffering: Sermons and Speeches

Desmond Tutu

Glasgow: Collins. 1984. 189pp. £1.75

Walking on Thorns: The Call to Christian Obedience

Allan Boesak

Geneva: WCC Publications. 1985. 65pp. £2.25pb

Call me Woman

Ellen Kuzwayo

London: Women's Press. 1986. 266pp. £5.95pb

Side by Side: The Autobiography of Helen Joseph

Helen Joseph

London: Zed Books. 1986. 249pp. £18.95, £6.95pb

These recent books by and about prominent South Africans can be read from three different standpoints. At one level they offer absorbing and often inspiring examples of 'lives of struggle'—not only of the author or subject but of others involved in opposition to apartheid—and offer further evidence of the forms of political and social oppression in that society. They are also documents of social and political history. They offer perspectives on the nature of the apartheid system: what life has been and is like for those who reside in its shadow. They all contain descriptions of particular, inhuman aspects of apartheid society and its practices—although any originality in this regard lies not so much in any new insights into horrors that are now on the whole

well-documented but in the vehemence of the denouncements and the courage needed to voice them. They have uses (some greater than others) in documenting aspects of the long history of struggle against apartheid.

A third 'reading' is suggested, however, by recent events, when the widespread resistance inside South Africa and its own contradictions have generated a deep crisis in the structure itself. It may take years before apartheid finally disappears but it is no longer premature to talk about what might replace it. If apartheid, as most of our cast of characters would to varying extents agree, is a system of exploitation as well as oppression, then it follows that the range of alternatives to this 'racial capitalism' begins with a politically and socially deracialised version of the same economic system, but extends to the possibility of a more democratic move towards socialism. The paradox of the present moment of heightened struggle is that while it calls for the widest possible unity of action to really put apartheid on the skids, the issue of the character of post-apartheid society will reveal conflicts among blacks—leaders and supporters. In this context it is tempting to glean what one can from texts like these about some of the influential activists and to divine how they see that future.

From this latter standpoint, Nelson Mandela is of course by far the most crucial figure to study. This is so because of the unparalleled position he has come to occupy in the opposition to apartheid. He is now more than just the leader of the ANC. The events of his long life in prison, his refusal to consider any conditions that would secure his release after so many years, swelled by the international campaign for his unconditional release, have made him the supreme symbol of all his colleagues imprisoned, of the thousands detained, and of the whole struggle of a people. Moreover, the ANC itself—outlawed twenty-five years ago, and somewhat marginal to events inside South Africa in the 1970s—has emerged as clearly the most vibrant and widely-backed element in the broad stream of the anti-apartheid movement. Indeed, the present political conjuncture in that country is one where the next round in the struggle hinges on the issue of his release: there is no possibility of further reform from above or of political dialogue or negotiation with *any* black political figures including even some bantustan leaders without his release as a prerequisite; and no end to the escalation of resistance and repression without such further steps; at the same time his release would vastly galvanise and hopefully focus that resistance.

Given that he is the most significant political figure in South Africa, curiosity about him is intense—and is heightened by the occasional glimpses into the character of the man and his political ideas that are occasioned by some visitors he is at times now permitted. The continued availability of the IDAF collection of his writings and speeches, originally published to commemorate his sixtieth birthday, is therefore very handy. The new biography is equally very timely. It sets out the main events of his political life against a background of the history

of the ANC, which Mary Benson has also chronicled, and against the unfolding struggle in South Africa. This latter task has been neatly done for the last decade or so to show that Mandela's views and his circumstances have not been completely isolated from the dramatic happenings of these years.

Hers is also an intensely personal book, befitting someone who has been in close touch with the family, which brings out some of the stature of the man himself rather than the symbol he has come to represent and to which role his incarceration could confine him. The book—through force of circumstances more than any omission—is less revealing about our third level of interest. It is not surprisingly, given the present global interest in someone who is arguably the world's most famous political prisoner, first and foremost a celebration of the man and his cause, his (shared) suffering and unflinching commitment to the national struggle. Most of his own statements of the last twenty-five years have either been submissions in court cases to answer political charges against him, like the famous statement from the dock in 1964, or have been filtered through the heavy restrictions imposed on what he can communicate to the outside world. And yet there are tantalising issues that are raised by Mary Benson's account and by Mandela's own words whose further implications it would be tempting to explore. The Western visitors he has been allowed all seem to have asked him whether he is a communist. He seems to have replied essentially as he did in the 1950s and 1960s: that he is an African nationalist. But more significant than any labels would be the kind of programme for change in post-apartheid he might back. In 1964 he described the Freedom Charter as the ANC's 'most important political document', characterising it as 'by no means a blueprint for a socialist state', and distinguishing the ANC's position from that of the Communist Party as the latter saw the Charter, 'as the beginning, not the end, of its programme', and the Communist Party 'sought to emphasise class distinctions whilst the ANC seeks to harmonise them'. One itches to know what Mandela's thoughts might be today on this kind of issue, now being hotly debated within the movement. It is intriguing to speculate what his years of daily reading and studying have encompassed and how he might concretise not only the struggle for liberation and its methods (about which his views are known), but the struggle to build an alternative society.

Bishop Tutu and the Reverend Boesak are also both important symbols, but are arguably predominantly religious figures who have had a political significance. In that their views and their roles are sometimes compared to other similar figures. Such evidence that comes over from books that are more theological than socio-political in style suggests that they are more in the Martin Luther King mould than that of Bishop Muzorewa. Apart from the fact that political circumstances and alignments in South Africa would preclude anyway playing a role as embodiment of an 'internal settlement', and that Buthelezi is a more likely candidate, both men seem more honest and smarter than Muzorewa. Tutu in particular invites comparison with Luther King in his

position about non-violence and in his emphasis on black liberation in terms of freedom and political rights. He does talk about the poverty of black people and declares his backing for trades unions; he is aware of the co-optation of a black middle class by recent reforms; but does not yet fully acknowledge the socio-economic structures which maintain poverty even when legal political rights are removed, which Luther King only began to recognise at the very end of his life. In a perceptive Introduction, the editor of the volume a (Catholic) father, Mothobi Mutloatse, sums up what Tutu stands for: concern about the 'broken existence of black people'; an end to the pass laws, common South African citizenship, common education system; opposition to tribalism. Many of these demands are not too far off, are urged by big business in South Africa and even some in ruling circles. But what beyond this will bring full liberation? The editor's first selection, an earlier (1976) open letter to Vorster, shows Tutu at his most piously ingratiating—reminiscent of Kaunda's nauseating, oily letters to Vorster of the early 1970s—and shows the Bishop's readiness 'even to talk to Pharoah himself', but adds the editorial comment that 'surely the Bishop (now) knows that the latter-day Pharaohs . . . will not relent until they are overtaken by the merciless hand of violence.'

Ellen Kuzwayo's and Helen Joseph's are in fact the best reads of the selection, both covering less well-chartered terrain in the story of institutionalising racism and unfolding political struggle that has characterised South Africa this century. Ellen Kuzwayo's tale is most original in what she describes of her origins in a black family of what could only be described as 'landed gentry' on a large farm, a family heritage that was lost when it was declared a 'black spot' within a white area. She is also interesting in her descriptions of her role in ANC women's work in the 1940s. Helen Joseph had been actively involved in ANC politics since that time, was a defendant in the Treason Trial in the 1950s, and from long periods as a 'banned' person has continued to make her political voice heard into her 80s. Her account is full of revealing incidents in the political story of African nationalism in South Africa.

Health issues

G U Westcott

The South African Disease: Apartheid, Health and Health Services

Cedric de Beer

Trenton, New Jersey: Africa World Press. 1986. 87pp. \$19.95hb \$7.95pb

Africa: the Health Issue

Carol Barker and Meredith Turshen (eds)

Sheffield, England: Review of African Political Economy. 1986. 119pp.
£2.95pb

The South African Disease is a clearly written and single-minded book showing for the non-specialist reader how the appalling burden of ill health for the majority of the South African population is rooted in social and economic conditions and ultimately in political powerlessness.

Cedric de Beer approaches this task with case studies which also contrive to tell much about South African economic history. In the first chapter, the social history of tuberculosis, he shows how a disease previously unknown among Africans became, through the conditions of mine labour and increasing levels of malnutrition in the general population, the epidemic among black people that it is today. In the second he describes the proposals for a National Health Service for South Africa in the early 1940s, highly progressive for their time; and explains their failure. A later chapter pin-points the commodity form as the convenient way in which health is depoliticised under capitalism, bereft of social or political context. He debunks recent state rhetoric in the 1977 Health Act, locating it in the current political strategy of attempting to woo and co-opt the urban black population (now perhaps morbid if not quite buried), and shows the references to 'community participation' and 'self-care' to be the cover for continuing an impoverished system of health care for blacks while whites get their needs met in the private market. The chapter on the bantustans takes as its focus the allegation of 'genocide' made by the Black Sash organisation, and a picture of the unimaginable suffering of millions of families after forced removals to overcrowded desert areas is clear focused.

The book will be accessible to a large audience among health workers who want to see major changes in the health system. Not all may respond to the didactic tone, particularly in the last chapter, and the reference to 'workers' and 'the working class' and not to 'black people' or to racism, however strong theoretical justification for this usage may be, and however well put the basic message that ill health results from oppression of whatever kind, whether race, class or gender.

In the last chapter de Beer gives his views about the development of a democratic health system in South Africa. It is extremely condensed and reflects much thought; an expanded version with examples might well be useful though one might imagine greater risks to be attached to its publication. He argues that health professionals (but sometimes 'doctors') should put their expertise at the disposal of growing democratic groupings (unions, community and womens organisations) so that they can understand their health problems better and use health issues to improve their bargaining power with the

authorities; but that there is also a need for 'sympathetic' health workers within the health services, for although what they can achieve now by way of change is limited, when the revolution comes they will be indispensable. One wonders if the extraction of concessions from the state is as viable a strategy now that communities are facing survival issues more strongly under renewed emergencies. I think also that de Beer underplays the need to fantasise about a future health service for South Africa. True, ideas will be clarified in struggle, but it should be noted how much the Vietnamese learnt from previous experiments in other countries that was of value in their struggle to meet health needs during and after the war. As South Africa moves towards escalating violence on all fronts this may well be the kind of example which progressive health workers will need. Nevertheless, de Beer is to be congratulated on a clear and enlarging view of South Africa's health problems.

The Special Issue of *ROAPE* on health is a more specialised publication. It contains extremely worthwhile contributions, for example on health policy in Mozambique, the effect of aid and aid donors on health in Africa, on the 'Selective Primary Health Care' debate, AIDS in Africa and other topics. Although the geographical range is not as great as it might be in the main articles (Mozambique and Tanzania are favourites) one gains a perspective on the way health is affected in a time of economic crisis, drought, falling real incomes in many countries and increased pressure on social policies from international agencies.

Annie Thébaud points out in 'Aid Games' that little if any of the health improvement which occurred in many African countries between 1960 and 1982 can be attributed to health aid (often of minute proportions compared to interest on the foreign debt). Indeed Caroline Baylies, in 'The Meaning of Health in Africa' shows how limited the implementation of primary health care strategies has often been and doubts whether health services have contributed much to this improvement. She notes that improved availability of water supplies may have done. Thébaud appears to take the statistics on life expectancy at face value (Baylies does not). However she makes the interesting point that international health aid can allow discontented physicians from industrialised countries to project elsewhere an ideal of transforming medicine that cannot be put into practice in their own community.

The group of British-based socialist health workers who worked in Mozambique in the early years of independence seem to have achieved somewhat more than this, besides writing a good part of this issue of *ROAPE* (in which their book about that period is also reviewed). In the article 'Mozambique Health Holding the Line' we are brought up to date. Julie Cliff, Najmi Kanji and Mike Muller show how, in an economy devastated by war and a health system under severe pressure, the multiplicity of aid agencies threaten the successful national pharmaceuticals policy, enforce priorities of their own without reference to local realities and needs and require inordinate

administration and hosting of visitors and consultants where skilled personnel are already scarce; and yet how priority is still being given to the Primary Health Care network.

Meredeth Turshen's and Peter Kumuzora's articles in different ways both re-emphasise the shortcomings of present approaches to promoting occupational health in an African setting. The needs of peasant producers, workers in the informal sector and rural women and child labourers are generally neglected. (A note on child labour emphasises the devastating effects premature employment can have on children.) Amandina Lihamba contrasts models of health presented in African theatre. Contemporary plays (such as those of Soyinka), like traditional performances, refer to the balance of forces in a cosmology whose disturbance brings illness. Health education plays tend to situate causation in material forces alone and isolate individual responsibility. Theatre in development brings people to an awareness of the socio-economic causes of their health problems and, says Lihamba, could play a much greater role in establishing community expression and action. It is impossible to do justice to other worthwhile contributions, but some deserve mention: Jennie Linsay's report on South Africa's population control in Namibia; Carol Barker and Meredith Turshen's exposé of the politics of Selective Primary Health Care; and their argument that the pattern of AIDS in Africa gives the lie to Western stereotypes about the disease—stereotypes which still prevent the problem being acknowledged by African governments.

South African voices

David Moore

Dispensations: The Future of South Africa as South Africans See It

Richard John Neuhaus

Grand Rapids, Michigan: Eerdmans. 1986. 317pp. n/p

Waiting: The Whites of South Africa

Vincent Crapanzano

London: Paladin. 1986. 377pp. £4.95pb

Apartheid in Crisis

Mark Uhlig

London: Penguin. 1986. 334pp. £3.95pb

BOOK REVIEWS

'Dispensation' is another one of those unique Afrikaner words, or at least its meaning has been peculiarly appropriated by South African semanticists. It combines the divine and the political to mean 'a system of revealed commands and promises regulating human affairs'¹ and thus the politicians in South Africa dispense their milestones of reform: those who are divinely ordained 'grant dispensation' to their subjects.

The vast majority of South Africans are hoping to dispense with apartheid, but in much more fundamental ways than their temporary masters. One would hope that of the scores of books being produced about the crisis in South Africa many would lay the groundwork for a 'dispensation' allowing most South Africans a future transcending the now clearly formed bounds of neo-apartheid. Unfortunately, of all the words and pages in the three books under review, only a few come close to the heart of this matter. That is, there is no analysis that assiduously calculates the balance of forces creating the present interregnum in South Africa. Thus, if one relied on the material at hand, one would be hard put to imagine a way out of the crisis that would go beyond the pitfalls that have plagued the rest of Africa—that would overcome neo-colonialism.

It is, of course, something akin to a neo-colonial solution that is desired by the most 'progressive' elements of international and South African capital. These books include only a few of these dispensations, too. Of those few, however, one stands out with startling clarity. It is encapsulated in the words of Pretoria's Denis Worrall, in response to Neuhaus's persistent questioning about the true nature of 'reform'. 'Listen . . . there are some things we cannot say. You've read Huntington. That's it. That's the Scripture.' (Neuhaus, p 296).

It is revealing that Huntington is a guiding light behind what John Saul has called the 'formative action'² of the South African State's attempts at a new dispensation. Most students of Third World politics are familiar with Huntington's work, and hopefully a majority reject his conservative—nay, reactionary—stance.³ Huntington, who believes that the untutored masses—be they hungry in the South or well-fed in the West—deserve very little say in the

¹ That this definition comes from an American dictionary, *Webster's Seventh New Collegiate Dictionary*, certainly indicates that dispensation is not an Afrikaans word. However, none other than that Calvinist state would use it in such a way.

² John S Saul, 'South Africa: the crisis deepens', *Monthly Review*, 37(1) April 1986, p 7. See also John S Saul and Stephen Gelb, *The Crisis in South Africa: Class Defense, Class Revolution*, second edition, New York and London: Monthly Review Press and Zed Books, 1986. See also Saul's 'South Africa: the question of strategy', *New Left Review* (160) November–December 1986, pp 3–23, for a precise posing of the questions needed to be asked if the future of South Africa is going to be substantially beyond apartheid.

³ Colin Leys, 'Samuel Huntington and the end of classical modernization theory,' *Introduction to the Sociology of Developing Societies*, Hamza Alavi and Teodor Shanin (ed), New York and London: Monthly Review Press, 1982, pp 332–49. Also see the classic, Donald Cruise O'Brien, 'Modernization, order, and the erosion of a democratic ideal', *Journal of Development Studies* (7) 1971, pp 141–60.

affairs governing their lives,⁴ has turned his attention to advising the governors of South Africa on how best to construct a 'consociational oligarchy'. It should not be surprising that a man who thinks democracy makes the world ungovernable has donated his skills to a regime most compatible with his views. It is a bit more shocking to see an apparently religious and seemingly progressive man spend nearly ten pages replicating Huntington's advice,⁵ judging it as 'approximating our democratic ideal of justice', (Neuhaus, p 306) and giving qualified assurances that this is indeed the path being followed by Botha's 'modernisers'.

Neuhaus's remarkable affinity with the views of those he apparently started out criticising seems less of a *volte-face* on second glance. Caution signs are sprinkled throughout. How could he claim that South Africa's military leaders are 'thought to be a liberalising influence?' (Neuhaus, p 281). Has he not heard of their role in a 'total strategy' which has probably led to the murder of Samora Machel?⁶ Can a truly objective analyst state that the ANC is the 'vehicle' for those persuaded by quotes in Marx (p 268), go on to précis its history solely in terms of its dominance by the South African Communist Party, and proceed to pose 'severe problems' for Western liberals who would like to support change in South Africa, but 'who cannot endorse Marxism-Leninism and who have learned from past experience the dangers of viewing incipient totalitarians as gentle agrarian reformers'? (p 275). How can anyone the least bit informed about the sub-continent ignore Inkatha's many terrors⁷ and portray Gatsha Buthelezi as 'thoughtful and humane'? (p 258). The list goes on: it is implied that Beyers Naude has been 'used by the communists' (pp 106-22), divestment and sanctions are denigrated, and the views of trade unionist David Lewis are subtly distorted so that the working class can be presented as an ally of multinational capital.⁸

All in all, Neuhaus's attempt appears too much a product of 'constructive engagement'—albeit in its *verligte* form—to be taken seriously, although the various conversations he records do reveal quite a bit about some important South Africans, and his excursions into religion provide some food for theological thought.

⁴ Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, *Hegemony and Socialist Strategy*, London: Verso, 1985, p 165.

⁵ The original is S P Huntington, 'Reform and stability in a modernizing multi-ethnic society,' *Politikon* 8(2) December 1981, pp 8-26.

⁶ Victoria Brittain and Paul Fauvet, 'Beacon of death', *The Guardian* (London) 13 November, 1986, p 21.

⁷ Kwazulu residents, 'Terror in the townships', *The Guardian*, 19 September 1986, p 21. John Brewer, 'The modern Janus: Inkatha's role in black liberation', *The Societies of Southern Africa in the 19th and 20th Centuries*, Volume 12, Collected Seminar Papers, No 28, London: Institute of Commonwealth Studies, 1981.

⁸ See David Lewis, 'Capital, the trade unions and the national liberation struggle', *Monthly Review* 37(11) April 1986, pp 39-50.

It would be impossible to label all the disparate parts of the Uhlig collection as proponents of an enlightened constructive engagement—a sample of Andries Treurnicht's *verkrampte* ideology burst any unity there, while Mothobi Mutloatse and Cyril Ramaphosa indicate promising departures from the many instant orthodoxies ushered in by talk of reform—but the vast majority could just about fit in under a liberalised Huntingtonian umbrella, by default. Their pulling apart of what should be the integrated realms of economics, politics and ideology, combined with a general lack of historical perspective, leads to a paucity of analysis that could help us start thinking of a way forward. Thus one is left with a vacuum in the calculation of change, and Huntington's isolated elite is again let in by the back door. Too many of the articles end up putting the ball in the white's court, no doubt actually believing they can do something with it.

Perhaps the majority of the works Uhlig has put between his covers reflect the most forward thinking elements of American, or in a broader sense Western, liberalism. Certainly, when over two hundred and fifty of the 334 pages are written by white liberals, the book can hardly be claimed to be representative of 'voices in South Africa today', as the cover states. (The cover also says that Chester Crocker will make his views known inside, but alas he does not appear. Maybe he is in a spot of trouble for admitting, backhandedly, that the ANC could be called 'freedom fighters'.) One reads Nadine Gordimer's anguished letter, quite consciously crafted to reach the *New York Times Magazine* readers (she is also featured in Neuhaus (p 122) and Crapanzano (p 29)). It is also notable that Uhlig's own pieces were written for the ultimate medium of the North Atlantic left-liberal intelligentsia, the *New York Review of Books*, and that many of the substantial pieces are taken from *Foreign Affairs*—perhaps a liberal journal, certainly not a leftist one—held in high esteem by many Washington power brokers. Archbishop Desmond Tutu sounds just like John Dewey when he claims that 'we have reached this sad state of affairs because of our appalling education system' (Uhlig, p 18)—not because of its gross inequalities, but because of its production of acquiescence: it is remarkable how the peculiarly American notion that liberal education can cure all social ills has made its way around the world. The Archbishop later condemns apartheid for altering the 'free market system' (Uhlig, p 21): Neuhaus notices this economic critique and asks if he is calling for South Africa to practise the free enterprise system he has at other times said he loathes (Neuhaus, p 133). The response was first a chuckle, then 'maybe . . . maybe not'.

Friedman's piece on labour is fraught with the pitfalls of workers' struggles being eclipsed by the political one, but his analysis seems compromised by an either/or dichotomy that splits the unity of economics and politics. Thus it is endangered with being placed in the canons of a certain liberalism, too. With the majority of the unions joining the United Democratic Front (UDF) or the

Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU), he says that 'the goal of independent worker politics appeared to have receded' (Uhlig, p 187), rather than allowing for the possibility that such a move could further expand a 'consciousness' that is already, as he notes, well beyond economism, and thus significantly alter the path of nationalist politics. The dialectic that is missing here can lead to a sterile 'workerism' which asserts that class politics should not be compromised by the petty bourgeois traps of nationalism.⁹ It can also end up with a benign sort of corporatism which would allow the unions to join in a version of tripartite consociationism. Friedman does not come down clearly on either of these sides, but he implies that it is easier for unions to deal with capital—and maybe even with South African whites—than with black nationalists. Thus he finishes with a very contradictory sentence: 'The unions' growth . . . provides the white establishment with the prospect of a relatively peaceful transition to an egalitarian society' (Uhlig, p 189). One rather doubts if the whites want egalitarianism; the chances would seem better to go with a 'few high profile leaders' in the 'black elite' (pp 184–5) rather than with a white elite allied with international capital.¹⁰ Happily, Karis's comprehensive analysis of black politics suggests that the COSATU and UDF unions will not forget their base: rather, the debate on 'race and class' is developing further as a result of this historic coming together.

The other major contributions in *Apartheid in Crisis*—interspersed by the abbreviated but still very revealing voices of P W Botha, Frederick van Zyl Slabbert, Nelson Mandela, Gatsha Buthelezi and a terror-stricken seventeen year-old township woman—are good examples of the netherworld between journalism and academia that inevitably has to catalogue the ever-changing currents of contemporary South Africa: they are strong on detail and middle-range analysis, weaker on the deeper structures behind the scenes. They are all informative, critical, and most are unequivocally progressive. Uhlig's two pieces and Karis's make good cases for the ANC. Martin and Johnson unravel many of the mysteries of destabilisation as only those excellent front-line based writers-cum-publishers can. Vale and Unger lay out a prescription for American 'constructive confrontation' which shows just how illiberal the present regime is—and perhaps indicates a bit of wishful thinking, even though there is nothing in their suggestive list of pressure measures that would challenge the interests of capital. Its optimism is contrasted not only by Martin and Johnson's chronicle of destruction, but Michael Gavin's sober economic survey. South Africa is not going to fall with sanctions, nor of its own economic accord. It takes this essentially conservative economist to quell a host of liberal hopes and say, point-blank, that real change will only come about

⁹ For more on this debate see Robert Davies and Dan O'Meara, 'The workers' struggle in South Africa—a comment', *Review of African Political Economy* (30) September 1984, pp 109–16.

¹⁰ David Lewis, *op. cit.*, pp 44, 48. Also see 'Focus on labour', *Southern Africa Report* (Toronto) 2(1) June 1986, on the issue of foreign solidarity and the labour movement(s) in South Africa.

after 'civil unrest . . . intensifies' (p 248). Incidentally, that is no doubt why sanctions should be supported—they will not of their own accord bring down the regime, but they will weaken it and thus shorten what Gavin has called the period of civil unrest.

Vincent Crapanzano's whites are waiting for that day of revolution, even though they cannot quite bring themselves to say it. His records of the discourse in a small village near Cape Town are intriguing, if irritating. At first, one feels like hammering some sense into the heads of the people who utter such vapid and repetitive clichés. Eventually the circularity draws in, and—as with Crapanzano, perhaps—one gets lulled into a sinking mesmerisation. Chapter headings and the odd bits of Sartrean analysis—sometimes penetrating, other times maudlin—snap the reader out of the wasteland.

Perhaps Crapanzano's schemata are too grandiose for his subjects: his theories about the dead weight of 'waiting' for an end that cannot be named could just as well apply to all of us, living as we do under the nuclear dispensation. And even the 'decent' and nearly liberals—and English or Jewish—rural-dwellers in this social anthropologist's case-study cannot fail to display the peculiarly South African affliction that dominates their consciousness as much as they exploit black—or 'coloured'—labour: *Waiting* certainly does demonstrate the all-embracing hold that a deeply entrenched racist ideology has on its perpetrator/victims. And it is interesting to note that the dominance of this ideology extends to perceptions of and about the various white ethnic groups in South Africa: indeed Afrikaners and English seem to denigrate each other much more than their more obvious protagonists. This indicates the deeply structured mental walls these people have erected around the real problems of the country. They will have a real shock when the day of reckoning—and reconciliation—comes.

When Professor Crapanzano does make his various phenomenological explanations of these distorted articulations, one is a little disappointed that his lack of a material grounding forces him to rely on the Afrikaner's own interpretations of history, or idealist liberal variations of it, to score his own subtle critique. Thus the circularity of their discourse is reflected in his. It is never deconstructed. Recent work on ideology, hegemony and discourse could have been used to break out of this problem. Some of it has been applied in Dan O'Meara's *Volkskapitalism*,¹¹ countering the ethnic mobilisation theories of Adams and Moodie. But in general the book is an enlightening, albeit saddening, one.

All three books are sobering—even the optimistic liberal ones, because they lack grounding—illustrating as they do Gramsci's by now oft repeated observation that in the long interregnum between the dying of the old and the

¹¹ Dan O'Meara, *Volkskapitalism: Class, Capital and Ideology in the Development of Afrikaner Nationalism 1934–1948*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983.

birth of the new, the symptoms are morbid. But Gramsci also wrote about pessimism of the intelligence and optimism of the will. There are other works, based on a materialist understanding of South Africa, which leave room for an intelligent optimism.¹²

¹² For an example of a work relying on talks with a lot more than whites in a small village, and using the analytical techniques of the 'new school' of materialist South African historiography, see James North, *Freedom Rising: War and Peace in Southern Africa*, New York and London: Macmillan, 1985.

Images of apartheid

Tsehai Berhani-Selassie

South Africa: The Cordoned Heart

20 South African Photographers

Cape Town: The Gallery Press. 1986. 186pp. £14.95pb

Working Women in South Africa

Lesley Lawson

London: Pluto Press, 1986. 144pp. £5.95pb

Factory and Family: The Divided Lives of South Africa's Women Workers/ Impilo Yabasebenzi Emzansi Afrika

992 Women Workers and the Institute for Black Research

Durban: Institute for Black Research. 1984. 105pp. n/p

These three photo journals are powerful documentations of the brutal realities of life in South Africa for the poor, the migrant labour force and the women factory workers. Their compilation is certainly no mean achievement under current press restrictions.

South Africa: The Cordoned Heart is made possible by the Second Carnegie Inquiry into Poverty and Development. In the foreword, Desmond Tutu outlines and condemns the poverty-generating system of apartheid in South Africa. He points out the internal contradictions: in the land which pioneered heart transplants inhabitants cannot be protected from cholera; in the land where Family Day is a public holiday, it is a crime for a woman to be found in bed with her husband; looking for work is illegal if you are the 'wrong' colour;

forced removals to make room for the white minority are the order of the day.

First class photographs, selected from the thousands submitted by twenty South African photographers, illustrate these contradictions. The book's professed aim is to show how the gap between ordinary people and artists, photographers, and writers can be narrowed. Unlike an enquiry into poverty sixty years previously which looked only at whites, the current Carnegie inquiry has deliberately looked at every section of the population affected by the South African system including those in the neighbouring states such as Lesotho. The photographers are taking risks in doing that. In the words of the editor: 'None of us knows who will survive the coming days, who will succumb and leave the country, who will disappear mysteriously into the night, or who will lose heart in the face of the government's onslaught against its opponents. But I am sure that no amount of repression will stifle the voice of ordinary people for peace and democracy.'

The pictures translate the words into manifest realities. People have to fetch water three times a day from about four miles away, or seven in a drought year in the Transkei, or queue from two in the morning to ensure they get water. Pictures of women carrying water bring this home. Old women carrying firewood from distances which are increasing with the depletion of the countryside, illustrate another aspect of the poverty being forced on people.

About 50 per cent of the population live below the poverty line. Pictures of a growing number of elderly people who are dying of hunger because they have had no pension schemes while they were day labourers are quite distressing. More malnourished children and infants are queueing for 'injection' at clinics. Displaced people housed in a TB clinic or pensioners either waiting at a collecting point or being carried in a stretcher because they are too weak to walk are among the common scenes that are included with the pictures.

The whole economy of South Africa is based on migrant labour coming from as far afield as Lesotho, Mozambique and Zambia. A scene of a recruitment centre in Lesotho depicts the desperation to which Africans are pushed. As migrant workers, they also have to suffer living in single sex compounds that look like barns, and sleep on bunk beds made of concrete. Quite an inhuman picture captured by the shrewd cameras.

The apartheid system is designed to keep local Africans away from the prospering areas of the country. Bulldozers are shown removing migrant labourers' shanty towns or other homes; sometimes owners dismantle their own dwelling because the government forces them to move. As such pictures show there is no end to the misery of Africans in the land.

The book depicts the protest meetings, demonstrations, strikes and funeral marches which have become familiar in the South African struggle. These pictures are however interspersed so that the theme of struggle is considerably played down. Instead a remark is made about the rising crime rates attributed to overcrowding and lack of employment. Unfortunately this trivialises the

armed struggle against colonialism; at best it gives it a criminal context. The intense discontent of the Africans is nevertheless demonstrated by the theme of the struggle of women for their rights. Pictures of women working in cleaning and other menial jobs, while at the same time struggling for their rights in the unions and elsewhere, bring this home to the reader.

Working Women in South Africa by Leslie Lawson is like a companion to the *South Africa: the Cordoned Heart* although they came out of different projects. It focuses on women, mostly in the service sector of domestic work, nursing, teaching, machinist work and agricultural labour. Unlike the previous book which relies on commentary, the photographs in this one are accompanied by interesting reported speeches. Time and again women describe their lives with a thorough assessment of the political situation in which they find themselves.

A historical outline contrasts the current position of women with the independence women formerly enjoyed when they owned their own fertile lands and travelled about as they pleased. The discovery of gold in 1886 led to urbanisation and prosperity, first allowing urbanites to employ rural men and women as domestics, then as factory workers and finally in other services such as office cleaning, cooking fast food, hairdressing, waitressing and tea-making. The pictures put faces to the names and stories recounted.

Low value is placed on the work done by black women. There is no legal minimum wage for example for domestic employees, although the South African Domestic Employees Association (SADWA) is now fighting for one. We are given glimpses of some of those involved in the movement.

The 'minimum' factory wage is very low and African women have been trapped within it. In the 1960s, when factory owners brought machinery which required only semi-skilled workers, a large number of African women were employed from the rural areas and given very low wages. The government's introduction of the pass laws, however, has created a division between those who qualify for employment and those who do not. Even those who qualify can work only in the so-called 'home-like' industries of food, clothing, textiles and leather under very bad conditions. There is discrepancy in the pay of men and women doing the same work; maternity rights are almost non-existent and the health hazards are such that a woman was cut in half by a machine, and a heavy pressing machine causes miscarriages. Women are also subjected to sexual harassment in the process of getting jobs or of keeping them. Newspaper cuttings and women in meetings illustrate the development of that history.

The government's influx control laws have separated women from their husbands and other family members so that they are the household heads and bread winners. Some women become self-employed working in precarious jobs such as running shebeens or brothels, or selling vegetables and clothes. For a change pictures of shebeen queens are there to make a point rather than to attract customers.

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Wherever they work they have to send remittances to their families in the rural areas too. In the rural areas, employment is available only for seasonal farm labourers. The scarcity of factory work in the bantustans makes women very vulnerable as employers ignore minimum wage limits and mistreat their employees in more ways than one. Individual women's daily routines are recorded to put across that side of their lives.

Women have a double shift because even in the case of those who have remained married, men are little inclined to work in the house looking after the children or even themselves. Women have very little time to rest, visit friends or sleep. Pictorial examples are given of how children die because mothers have neither the time nor the money for them; or how they feel like domestics within their own homes.

The main issues women workers address through the trade unions are equal pay, the pass system, the shift system, maternity rights and the rights of domestic workers to organise. Developing leadership skills within the unions and asserting them are some of the in-house fighting they have to do. Examples are given of women taking the fight into their homes as well.

Factory and Family: The Divided Lives of South Africa's Women Workers is introduced by a short paragraph summing up the demands, aspirations and expectations of '992 women' who speak on behalf of 'thousands' of Black—African, Indian and Coloured—women of all ages and educational background, working in the factories in the big city and in on the edges of the 'homelands'.

The book is presented first as a conversation between six women, one of whom is a researcher at the Institute for Black Research (IBR), and then between three other women. Pictures of jobless men, idle children and heavily loaded, hard working men and women, emphasise the points they make. Taking full account of women's work at home and in the factory, a sharp contrast is drawn between the lives of men and women. Pictures of men idling at home or supervising at work are interspersed with pictures of women at work, or snatching a nap on their desks, that being the only free time they have. These factory workers are obviously of a different class than the migrant workers we saw in the other books. Their priorities are luxury consumer goods: 'If we did not work we wouldn't be able to buy clothes; we would not be able to pay our hire purchase instalments.'

A heavy emphasis is also put on the conditions of the work place. Two clothes factories, one of them in a border area, are discussed in detail. Very poor health facilities and poor amenities, such as lack of sick pay are accompanied by pressures such as controlling the time women spend in the toilet. Promotional chances are very limited. For example only men are the pattern makers, and women cut and serve as machinists. At lunch time the racial and sexual segregation is maintained heavily (evidenced by the pictures) although they work together at other times. The pressure is made worse as

women are unable to belong to unions. Most cannot afford the time as they have to travel long distances to work from the ramshackle accommodation the government has removed them to. Others cannot afford to be seen devoting time to union activities since most husbands are not supportive at home. They all need whatever money they can earn as husbands spend earnings on drinks and other personal requirements.

The report ends with an appeal for help for women who are threatened by the loss of jobs for themselves and their husbands, the loss of their homes and the loss of money with which they could pay for their hire purchase furniture. Like the other two titles this book unfortunately categorises people and situations to blame. The idling men, held responsible for the demise of the women, and the women themselves, are now engaged in an armed struggle, a fact which none of these books has made an effort to highlight.

Interestingly, the last book is both in English and in Zulu. This obviously has the advantage of recording the vocabulary of the period of struggle in South Africa; it also has its potential readership in the local African population. This bilingualism helps the spirit of defiance to the white minority rule in South Africa.

While the three books suffer from their failure to address the nature of the struggle in South Africa, each has its particular merits. Apart from the political and social points they make the photographers have captured each situation with the most striking and powerful images. The pictures alone are quite captivating for any reader.

Marxist states in Africa

Ben Turok

Military Marxist Regimes in Africa

Journal of Communist Studies

London: Frank Cass. Special Issue 1 (3-4) September-December 1985.

Ethiopia: Politics, Economics and Society

Peter Schwab

London: Frances Pinter. 1985. 134pp. £17.50hb/£6.95pb

Angola: Politics, Economics and Society

Keith Somerville

London: Frances Pinter. 1985. 207pp. £17.50hb/£6.95pb

Ghana: Politics, Economics and Society

Donald I Ray

London: Frances Pinter. 1986. 192pp. £17.50hb/£6.95pb

Third World Marxist-Leninist Regimes: Strengths, Vulnerabilities, and US Policy

Special Report.

Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis

New York: Pergammon Press for IFPA. 1985. 130pp. n/p

These are hard times for leftists in Africa mainly because regimes which cannot deliver on promises are prone to suppress their critics. There is scant scope for socialist opponents of colonialism and neo-colonialism to develop substantial movements. It is rather paradoxical therefore that there are so many Marxist states scattered across the continent and that many commentators expect more to follow. The fascination for the Marxist phenomenon in Africa is spawning a growing literature, of which the *Marxist Regimes Series* published by Frances Pinter in London, with no less than nine books on Africa, is but the latest manifestation.

Given the absence of a visible and strong Marxist pan-African movement or political culture, analysts have puzzled over the origins of these Marxist regimes. Two categories are identified, those regimes which originate in a struggle for national liberation and where the source of Marxism is in a political movement, eg Angola and Mozambique, and those where a military group seize power by *coup d'état* and then adopt Marxism as the state ideology, sometimes after a considerable period. In neither case is the working class the main vehicle nor are there classical communist parties leading the way to a socialist revolution. In short, Marxism is being put on the agenda in Africa in unexpected and unorthodox ways. This phenomenon, perhaps without equal elsewhere in the world, naturally produces a wide range of differing explanations, with even those authors who are grounded in the Marxist-Leninist classics seemingly unable to establish agreed positions.

The *Journal of Communist Studies* has devoted a special double issue to 'Military Marxist regimes in Africa' attempting to arrive at some definitional clarity of this process. In a somewhat contradictory editorial John Markakis argues that there is an attempt by 'soldier rulers to shore up the foundations of the post-colonial state by constructing a new political consensus based on Marxism'. At first sight this seems a strange thing for soldiers to do. In Latin America and elsewhere in the world soldiers are more likely to adopt fascist ideology to shore up reactionary states. So why Marxism in Africa? He then goes on to admit that there is an element of idealism among these soldiers, that 'radical soldiers were attracted by this (socialist) promise'. They see themselves

carrying out a 'revolution from above' using the state as the principal means. He nevertheless concludes that socialism is unlikely to be realised under this type of regime.

The co-author of the editorial, Michael Waller, raises a more interesting point. He asks whether, in the conditions of Africa, armies can do the party's work in creating the conditions for a socialist revolution? Can the army serve as the vanguard of the party? Given that political power is seized by *coup d'état* and not through struggle by political parties, how can their actions be consolidated into a new social system? Waller seems to have no doubt that in certain cases the military did set out to 'overturn existing social relationships' and establish a 'strong collectivist state'.

Waller argues that once the new regime is established, nationalism loses its appeal and Marxism-Leninism takes its place, performing three functions: it legitimates the regime, it facilitates mobilisation behind an austere development programme, and it gives the regime a historically progressive flavour at home and abroad. All this would seem to indicate that in some subtle way the peoples of Africa are seen by the military as having a substantial sympathy for genuine socialist ideas which mesh in with their own concern for social change.

Other articles in the *Journal* are more negative about the military's resort to Marxism. An excellent essay on the Horn of Africa by Markakis nevertheless concludes that these are but 'garrison states' with invocations of socialism being used to defend the state against its critics. Writing about Benin, Congo, Burkina-Faso, Somalia, Libya, Ethiopia and Madagascar, Decalo portrays the coups of the soldiers who later adopt Marxism as a non-ideological revulsion against the corrupt ruling groups in Africa. The turn by middle and lower rank soldiers to Marxism is ascribed to pragmatism. They only started reading their Marx after the coup had succeeded, according to one commentator. Even then, though these regimes resort to some important measures such as nationalisation, centralisation of power and the use of cultural nationalism, their actions are ineffective and of 'little import'. Yet, even Decalo concedes that these regimes 'have a certain aura of permanence', that 'military Marxism could well be the wave of the future in much of the continent', and that the 'appeal of Marxism cannot but grow'.

Peter Schwab's study of Ethiopia, *Ethiopia: Powers, Economics and Society*, has none of these reservations. He believes that Ethiopia has moved 'light years' in a decade in not only destroying the feudal autocracy but in socialist construction, and all this under a military vanguard. Acknowledging that there are massive economic problems and that many plans have gone awry, Schwab argues that the political import of the Dergue revolution remains substantial. There has been a move from feudalism to state socialism in a short space of time without going through intervening stages, though this demanded a massive upheaval in which many suffered but from which the great majority have

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benefited. The most important instance is that of land reform where the political dimensions of social change far outweigh the economic weaknesses.

Schwab's book provides the historical backdrop necessary for understanding the process of radicalisation of the military in Africa. He describes the growth of political consciousness of the military and the students after the failed coup in Ethiopia in 1960, leading to the militant upheavals in 1974. By 1975 Marxists were in command in the Dergue and a socialist path was laid down. Apart from the land reform based on the slogan 'land to the tiller', banks, insurance and manufacturing and commercial firms were nationalised.

But many on the left were opposed to the military assuming the role of political vanguard and Schwab describes how various movements composed of intellectuals and students rose against the Mengistu regime, implementing a 'campaign of terror' which, according to Schwab, led the regime to unleash a 'red terror' in response. Hundreds of people were killed and the streets were dripping with blood, but 'It was not the Dergue that initiated the violence against the civilian population.'

Be that as it may, Schwab does not understate the centrality of one man, Mengistu, in the whole political process, and the role of the military. Four mass organisations were created, for the peasantry, the urban dwellers' associations (kebelles), the Trade Union movement, and the women's association, but all were ultimately under the direct control of Mengistu and his political/military structures.

Thus, this book brings us back to an important theme of current analysis of radical military regimes in Africa, namely what is the relationship of the military to the political and whose interests do the military represent. Schwab is unequivocal on both points. The civilian left were adventurous and irresponsible while the military were performing a political role and soon came to represent the interests of the peasants and the working class as a whole. (Markakis concedes that in Ethiopia the military did not carry out 'a revolution from above' but were themselves infected by the general radical fervour, whence they came to lead the revolutionary current. Schwab holds that the seizure of political control by the military in Ethiopia was the crucial element in the start of real social transformation. Although the actions of the urban masses are given due recognition, it was the military who established themselves in power and then moved to install socialist policies.

However, missing from the book is a thorough discussion of the problems of socialist transformation in military-led Marxist regimes. Focusing on the political process, many other issues are by-passed, leaving us with the essential question posed in all these studies. Having seized power, how does a Marxist military also bring about a socialist transformation?

A similar weakness informs Keith Somerville's book on Angola. While he refers to the context within which Angola's Marxist leaders are attempting to create the conditions for socialism (namely, a struggle for party unity, national

integrity, economic survival, and internal and external security) we are not given enough of a feel from inside of what the problems really are. We have a list of socialist objectives—nationalisation of vital industries, state control of foreign trade and greater control of foreign companies, among others, but it is not clear how implementation is attempted. No doubt Somerville's difficulty arises from the war situation in Angola. Everything is distorted by the war effort, economic measures to develop the economy, social measures to redress the legacy of colonialism, and political processes to create the necessary social forces are all bogged down by the war crisis, holding up the difficult march to socialism.

So Somerville focuses on the political, and it is a fascinating account. How the MPLA was transformed from a liberation mass movement into a vanguard party embracing Marxism-Leninism is quite different to the process in the military regimes. It is quite evident that key personnel in the MPLA's leadership were already Marxist before the seizure of power, and believed that the problems of post-independence development could only be tackled on the basis of class analysis and by rooting the party in the working class and peasantry. Here classical Marxism-Leninism emerges in familiar form as does a move to identify with the world movement for socialism, according a special role to the Soviet Union and Cuba.

Evidence of leanings towards classical Marxism-Leninism is found in the emphasis on the leading role of the party in the state and society as a whole. However, we are also introduced to the difficulty of creating democratic structures among the people, especially under the conditions of constant military threat from within and without. But efforts to establish the vanguard role of the party has also been persistently undermined by internal dissension. Indeed, it is a matter for wonder that the present leadership and the state itself has survived the terrible haemorrhaging brought about by factional battles, which became at several points actual coup attempts.

Although Angola has special links with the Soviet Union and Cuba, Western speculation about the personal commitment of individual leaders to a Soviet link is shown to be groundless, particularly when this is the basis for explanations of internal changes in leadership. The MPLA has gone through many such crises, but the evidence of this book is that the explanations must be sought in the problems arising within the system itself rather than aspirations by some faction for closer ties with the Soviet Union, or worse still, to satisfy Soviet rather than Angolan objectives.

Indeed, it is the merit of the books being reviewed here that, with one exception, scholars give responsible accounts of the work of Marxist regimes in the context of their own problems rather than that of a conspiracy of world communism.

While the authors dealt with thus far exhibit a substantial understanding of Marxism as a theory, the same cannot be said of Donald Ray whose book on

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Ghana is wholly misplaced in a series on Marxist regimes. While it is the case that Rawlings was associated with Marxists during the process of seizing state power, and some Marxist influence remains even now, he himself has never declared himself for Marxism and has actually opposed the incorporation of socialism as a goal in his political manifestos.

This book must therefore be read outside a Marxist typology and its value lies largely in its account of how a lower rank coup took place and how it rapidly abandoned its early promise of social reform even accepting that the early objectives were limited to such matters as clearing away corruption and abuse of power and not to social transformation. This is confirmed in Ray's last sentence; 'The PNDC has decided that until economic recovery has taken hold, social and political programmes will be put in abeyance. Rawlings, the IMF and the World Bank all see Ghana as the test case for West Africa.' This conclusion belongs to Ray, not Rawlings, but it is nevertheless rooted in the regime's policies.

Should Rawlings' Ghana be considered at all in an examination of radical regimes in Africa? The answer must be affirmative, because the actions of Rawlings inspired a great social ferment among the masses and gave considerable scope, quite unexpectedly it seems, for the left. While the Rawlings regime articulated only the vaguest of revolutionary ideologies, there rapidly grew a socialist literature and even an organisation which was both anti-capitalist and anti-imperialist. Most importantly, followers of Nkrumah who had lain low for almost two decades joined in the popular upsurge and sought to give concrete organisational form to the rhetoric emanating from on high.

The questions posed by the Rawlings experience are not those of Ray who struggles to locate the regime in an inappropriate Marxist framework. What is more relevant is the question whether Rawlings has advanced the cause of socialism or not. Many hold a negative view, and the decimation of the left and its lack of opportunity to express itself tends to confirm this. At the same time, it cannot be denied that at least for a brief period, the slogan and practice of 'power to the people' flourished in Ghana, providing the people of Ghana and Africa with a reminder that the rule of the bourgeoisie is not necessarily permanent.

If the author of the book on Ghana revealed a certain naive ignorance about Marxism, the authors of *Third World Marxist-Leninist Regimes* exhibit qualities of a different kind. Produced by the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis at Tufts University, USA, it violates its claim of being an 'independent, non-partisan research organisation' for scholars, students, and the general public. Being 'non-partisan' it recommends as follows:

History shows that no Marxist-Leninist regime has ever been overthrown except by foreign invasion, and since opportunities such as that in Grenada are not likely to come

very often, it would be better to prevent the consolidation of such regimes than to hold out a military expedition as a policy tool as a last resort.

The means for doing so are also set out. A 'special group' needs to be established divided into three branches focused on 'countering insurgency, assisting insurgency, and devising anti-terrorist initiatives'. In case the meaning is still unclear, the report proposes 'the United States must develop strategy and capabilities which permit it to strike pre-emptively, to carry out reprisal raids, to deal with more than one terrorist action simultaneously, and to use intelligence in timely fashion.' But the most chilling proposal is non-military. It is for a 'counter-insurgency strategy that focuses on civic action'. That is it must focus equally on 'the socio-economic, political and psychological dimensions of civic action. This will require greater involvement by civilian specialists from other parts of the national security community.' Such 'civic action' would not elicit 'the damning charge of "military intervention"'.

Are African Marxist regimes being subjected to these attentions and can this account for some of their problems? How can we know? But the warning has been given, in a non-partisan manner.

Radical interpretations of African literature

Alastair Niven

Towards the Decolonization of African Literature. Volume 1: African Fiction and Poetry and their Critics

Chinweizu, Onwuchekwa Jemie and Ihechukwu Madubuike

Washington DC: Howard University Press. 1983. 318pp. \$7.95pb

Art Ideology in the African Novel: A Study of the Influence of Marxism on African Writing

Emmanuel Ngara

London: Heinemann. 1985. 126pp. £6.95pb

Come to Laugh: African Traditional Theatre in Ghana

Kwabena N Bame

New York: Lilian Barber Press. 1985. 192pp. \$19.95hb/\$9.95pb

The Afro World: Adventures in Ideas

Edited by O R Dathorne

Coral Gables, Florida: Association of Caribbean Studies and the University of Wisconsin. 1984. 174pp. n/p

It is not hard, from their titles alone, to see what links these books and makes them appropriate candidates for a collective review. They are all concerned with radical definitions of literature and with shifting the spotlight from the high ground of 'elite' culture to the grassroots of popular tradition. The four books are works of criticism, united by their belief that elevated aesthetic doctrines or Eurocentric liberal humanism are inadequate guides to the interpretation of African literature.

It is hard to overestimate the impact which *Towards the Decolonization of African Literature* made when it first came out in 1980. The publisher was Fourth Dimension of Enugu, eastern Nigeria. This in itself was important. No major book of literary criticism had previously been published indigenously in Africa: conference proceedings and essay collections, yes, but no work which could instantly be regarded as seminal in its probable influence. Though Chinweizu, who of the three authors is the one most known outside Nigeria (he is the author of *The West and the Rest of Us*), describes himself in the descriptive biodata as 'an occidentalist' the central thread in this book is a conviction that Africa must draw from its own traditions and not live in awe of Europe's. It follows, therefore, that the central fact of commitment which every author has to make—ie to the publisher—is a particularly sensitive matter among contemporary African writers, far more ideologically indicative than the choices made by most of their Western counterparts. The uncomprehending outsider may think it does not much matter where a book makes its first appearance but that is not how it will appear in African literary circles where issues of publisher and language choice are pivotal. The fact that Ngara's *Art and Ideology in the African Novel*, which in its way is every bit as challenging a work as that by Chinweizu *et al.*, has been published first by a multi-national in London will have affected the way it is perceived, whether that is fair or not, and neither Ngara's book, nor any of those with which this review is concerned, has made an impact.

Towards the Decolonization, full of lapses and polemic though it is, dropped into the centre of African literary debate and set up ripples which are still being felt.

What is it about the book which caused that effect? When I first reviewed it, for *The Times Literary Supplement*, I praised it for its energy, its refusal to be confined within the constraints of academic *politesse*, its conviction politics and its recognition of the antiquity of the African literary tradition. These still seem to me to be sterling qualities, though I am glad of the opportunity to re-assess

the book in the light of the offence it has given and the reputations it has assailed. It is surely precisely because it lacks the scholarly knowledge, the scrupulousness and the mandarin objectivity of routine criticism that it has caused so much discussion. In saying that, one risks the accusation that one is losing sight of the values that make academic debate worth having. I am not, however, saying that this book is inaccurate in its details or irrational in its arguments: only that it does not aim at respectable neutrality. It is not impressed by anyone's name for its own sake. Perhaps most of all it has broken out of the predictable ideologies and '-isms' which have been at war with each other in European criticism or among the commentators on African literature in the 1960s and 1970s. It establishes its own doxology, not yet fully worked out, sometimes tending to overstatement rather than authority, but fresh with the spirit of people saying something genuinely new and captivating.

Towards the Decolonization of African Literature examines the African novel and its critics, 1950-75 (a chapter which accounts for nearly half the book), tendencies in recent criticism of both fiction and poetry, and tasks facing the African critic in the process of decolonising assumptions. The arguments are not, in fact, all that revolutionary. There is little in the first chapter which Ayi Kwei Armah was not saying in his famous attacks on Larsony and Eurocentrism some years earlier. Ngugi wa Thiong'o has been asserting some of the same points since at least the early 1970s, and it is a weakness of the Chinweizu approach that it does not put Ngugi more centrally into the picture. As for Ngara, he is not mentioned. In reprinting the book there was surely an opportunity to widen the examples. After all, the preface opens 'We are three Nigerian writers and critics who are intensely concerned for the health of African culture.' They may dislike Eurocentrism, but not a concept of Africanness, in which case more recognition of what East, Southern and North Africa—no Fanon, one mention of Nkosi—have given to the re-definition of African aesthetics was surely necessary. But within its partiality and its larger claims to radicalism than can be justified this remains the key statement of Afrocentric literary values.

I can recall when European critics first started writing about African literature in the early 1960s. Almost invariably they praised the writers for being reminiscent of European masters. The late Anne Tibble was a particular offender. In *African/English Literature* she managed to compare Amos Tutuola to Dante, Hans Christian Andersen, R L Stevenson, Bunyan and several others within a few sentences, but she did not see the link with D O Fagunwa, now authenticated as an obvious Yoruba model. Gerald Moore at least saw that link but he also, though an admired and innovative critic, tended to validate African authors by European comparisons. As early as 1965 the Nigerian critic Obiajunwa Wali lashed out at these paternalistic claims and uttered a famous refutation of the notion that an African writer can be

legitimately African if he writes in a European language. That debate rumbles on, dominating virtually all colloquia on Africa literature, though one has to say, a little sardonically, that the debate is necessarily argued in English. The ultimate put-down to the notion that there is no valid reason for an African writer these days to write creatively in English was expressed by Lewis Nkosi at the 'New Directions in African Writing' conference held in London in 1984 when he posed a lengthy question to the arch-advocate of that view, Ngũgĩ, and did so in his native Zulu. Answer came there none. But the Chinweizu resentment of European cultural domination is based less on a distrust of the use of the basic language *per se*, than on a surely justifiable belief that 'It is therefore pernicious, and a manifestation of cultural imperialism, to try to constrain fresh developments by demanding strict and exclusive adherence to the characteristics of one of the parent strains.' Looked at closely this is a moderate proposition.

Another central premise of the 'Decolonisation' thesis is that the great tradition of African literature is oral. The word 'orature' has since the publication of this book become as current a term in African literary criticism as 'structuralism' is in the West. It is likely to prove less faddish. Perhaps there is no continent left with as active an oral tradition in its cultural self-expression as Africa. It impinges upon almost everyone's life. Despite a tendency among some of the younger urban Nigerian novelists to show otherwise, there is a sense in which every African is still a villager, gravitating back to his birthplace whenever possible—if, that is, he has ever left it. There can be no African writer who is unaware of village story-telling, praise poems, traditional rites and festivals incorporating oral performance. Indeed, the element of performance in African literature is something which even Chinua Achebe and Ngũgĩ—take *Arrow of God* or *Devil on the Cross*, for example—have tried to render on the flatness of the page: there is a sense in which these novels require, at least in part, to be read aloud. So the emphasis which 'Decolonisation' places on retention of the oral mode results from a practical recognition that it is the life-blood of the literature, without which modern African writing would be a synthetic alien. Hence the high praise accorded to Okot p'Bitek's *Song of Lawino* and the disdain for Wole Soyinka's *Idanre*.

Soyinka so obviously bestrides modern African writing that the attacks upon him in this book must seem like the baying of hounds at midnight. He is accused of turgidity and obscurantism. Readers of *Madmen and Specialists* or *Season of Anomy* may sympathise with this view, but these works are not the object of the 'decolonisers' critique so much as the earlier, to many of us much clearer, Soyinka. Since Chinweizu *et al.* first published their book Soyinka has brought out *Aké*, his autobiography of childhood, which seems to me one of the masterpieces of this difficult genre. The charge of intellectualism for its own sake disintegrates beside such a precise and affectionate recollection, and must

inevitably make the alert reader return to the 'difficult' works feeling that when Soyinka writes elliptically, mythically or in a symbolist manner he is doing so for a sharply focused purpose.

Soyinka does not engage much of Ngara's attention. Indeed, his choice of examples in some ways counterbalances that of the 'decolonisers'. Ngugi is prominent, Armah, Maillu, the late Alex La Guma, Nadine Gordimer. (But women writers are shamefully neglected in both these books.) Much of *Art and Ideology in the African Novel* is discursive, but it is a no less assertive work than Chinweizu's: 'the dynamics of political struggles and social change affect the content and form of works of art, so that if we are to understand fully and appreciate the rise, development, concerns and styles of the literature of a nation we must see that literature in relation to the history and struggles of its people, and in relation to the various ideologies that issue from socio-economic conditions.' Ngara's hostility to Eurocentric evaluations of African writing is strongly presented and his faith in a Marxist perspective is explicit, but this does not lead him into intransigence. He admires Achebe, I sense, because by any criterion the author of *Things Fall Apart* and *Arrow of God* is a superb artist, even when he does not confirm to some of the tenets which are central to Ngara's position. The teacher of African literature will find Ngara's book well informed, positive and signposted—in pedagogical terms probably a more useful, and certainly a more researched, work than *Towards the Decolonization of African Literature*. But in the end it is the difference between the ideologist with a grounding in old-fashioned practical literary criticism, now modified to fit his present aims, and the campaigner advocating a creed. Though they do not match in all respects, Ngara and the 'decolonisers' should be read side by side. By doing this the reader will have laid out before him the ground-plan for the most positive, and in my estimation, despite the rhetorical flourishes, the most reasonable aesthetic for talking about contemporary African writing.

The Afro World assembles, under the experienced editorship of O R Dathorne, nine pieces, plus introductions and postscript, on aspects of black literature. Two of them are about women, including a fascinating account of group activities among female slaves. Deborah G White has to admit that 'slave women wrote few of the sources that are now used to examine their lives', but she nevertheless conveys a sense of thorough documentation. There is some creative writing in this miscellany, including a short story by Jan Carew, a worthy study by Marian M McLeod of a missionary called Thomas P Callender, who was influential in the development of the Jamaican church, and an introduction by Lloyd W Brown to the predicament of West Indians settled in Canada which will particularly interest people engaged with their counterpart community in Britain. *The Afro World* has all the signs of a journal special issue, but it is a lively contribution to the growing number of studies of the black diaspora.

BOOK REVIEWS

Come to Laugh bears out much of what is explicit in Chinweizu and Ngara, implicit among the contributors to *The Afro World*. I do not claim to know a lot about the Ghanaian concert party tradition, though I lived in Ghana for three years in the 1960s and attended some performances. I cannot imagine, however, a more readable and accessible introduction than this by Kwabena N Bame. This history of concert parties, along with audience responses to them, actors' approaches, production methods and social values ascribed to them are all examined. Bame does not make the mistake of analysing humour over-earnestly. He includes transcripts of two concert parties. This is an essential book for anyone interested in African popular theatre.

Not all of these books will be easy to find, even in London and New York bookshops. Indeed, *Towards the Decolonization of African Literature* was, when only published in its Fourth Dimension edition (admirably produced though that was), like gold dust. So I end on a small campaigning note of my own. Why should such excellent publications as these be so difficult to buy? If it is hard to find publications from or about Africa and Central America in Western bookshops then how much more difficult it is in those continents themselves. Book distribution in the Third World is in crisis. Deliberations about how writers should write are valueless if what they publish can be read only by a favoured few, eg reviewers and their like. Impoverished distribution of printed matter perpetuates elitism. None of the authors I have discussed here would dissent from that fact or be happy with it.

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Panama: the roots of current political instability

In mid-1981 Panamanians, even those bitterly opposed to the rule of General Omar Torrijos Herrera, would have felt it incumbent upon themselves to give the devil his due. There had been thirteen years of political stability—a duration unprecedented since the separation from Colombia in 1903—and, while virtually all other economies in the hemisphere (including that of the USA) were in recession or catastrophic depression, Panama's national income continued to register moderate if not impressive increases. Social unrest which festered and flared repeatedly had been quelled by highly visible programmes of social reform, and the most volatile issue in Panamanian history—sovereignty over the national territory—apparently had been resolved in the country's favour through the Carter-Torrijos Canal Treaty. Six years later it is a different Panama that one perceives: a country racked by social strife, governed by alleged drug dealers and assassins, in economic decline, and, some would say, in danger of losing the limited gains in sovereignty promised in the 1977 treaty.

The present political instability ought not to come as a surprise. The relative tranquillity of the Torrijos years represented an atypical interlude rather than a break with the past; indeed, in important respects the Torrijos dictatorship intensified the country's plight and laid the basis for the current social strife.¹ Panama is a country characterised by three fundamental economic, political, and socio-historical distortions, and each is almost without parallel in the hemisphere. The fundamental aspect of these distortions is that they serve to alienate and disarticulate the Panamanian people (of all classes) from the country in which Panamanians live. Perhaps the key to understanding the Panamanian dilemma is to understand that the Panamanian nation, although it has a clear and distinct cultural and

¹ In the category of forecasts that go unrealised is the following, written about six months after the death of Torrijos in an air crash, 'Contrary to the predictions shortly after the death of General Omar Torrijos Herrera, his disappearance [from the political scene] on 31 July 1981 did not provoke a political crisis . . .' *Inforpress Centroamerica, Centro America* 1982. Guatemala: *Inforpress*, Junio de 1982, *Panama*, p 36 (author's translation from the Spanish). Between 1982 and 1986 Panama had five presidents, prompting the opposition press to nickname the last 'Su Turno' ('Your Turn').

historical identity, lacks a country except in the most formal sense;² and that the present upheavals are the most recent manifestation of that nation seeking to construct a country.

In the first section which follows, the socio-historical distortion is discussed, which is the particular way in which Panama became a formally independent country. Second, and closely related to this, is the political distortion, the overwhelming influence of the US government over the day-to-day political life of Panamanians, so overwhelming that it is possible that the term 'domestic politics' is a misuse of words. Third, the economic distortion, the fact that there is not a 'Panamanian economy' as such, is examined and its implications discussed. With these distortions as a background, the rest of the paper seeks to understand political events and social tension in Panama since the death of Torrijos.

Panama: a society distorted

The socio-historical distortion

It is the curse of the collective consciousness of the Panamanian nation that it can take no pride in its formal creation, and that its founding fathers are justifiably branded as agents of a foreign power. Yet, the Panamanian independence movement is not without its heroes and proud moments, reaching back into the nineteenth century. Cut off from Colombia by tropical swamps and rain forest which have yet to be crossed by road,³ the province of Panama developed independently from the rest of the country of which it was a part, and the population emerged with its own particular cultural identity. In the nineteenth century there was for a brief period (1840-41) an independent Panama, though the government came and went before formal diplomatic recognition had been gained.

Whether Panamanians (largely by their own efforts) would have succeeded in creating an independent country or whether, in absence of foreign intervention, the northern border of Colombia would today abut upon Costa Rica are moot points, for external events decided the future of the Panamanian nation. In the early 1850s, a railroad, financed

² This distinction will be used throughout. 'Nation' will refer to cohesion of a people in terms of culture and history, and is appropriate independent of the geographical and legal entity in which those people live. 'Country' refers to a geographic area with a state whose formal sovereignty over its territory is internationally recognised.

³ The Pan-American Highway has yet to be completed and ends one hundred miles south of the Canal Zone.

by US capital, was constructed across Colombian territory at the Isthmus of Panama. This railroad soon became inadequate to the task of transporting a growing volume of trade, and, at the end of the nineteenth century, the government of the United States committed itself to the construction of a trans-oceanic canal. Opinion differed as to whether the optimal route would be through Panama or Nicaragua. While the transit distance in the former case was much less, the position of San Juan River and Lake Nicaragua appeared to indicate that the engineering work would be less formidable if Nicaragua were chosen.

At the turn of the century, negotiations began between the governments in Washington and Managua for the rights to a canal route through Nicaragua. At the time Nicaragua was ruled by the last great Central American leader who attempted to dominate the region, Jose Santos Zelaya.⁴ Since independence and the creation of the Central American Federation (which collapsed in the midst of civil war in 1838), the region had been dominated by local despots with foreign powers playing a substantial but secondary role.⁵ It was Zelaya's goal to maintain this situation and resist the imposition of protectorate status which Washington clearly intended as the future for the region. The conflict between the US government's ambitions for hegemony and the Nicaraguan dictator's nationalism came to a crisis over the canal issue.

As would later be the case with the puppet government of Panama, the Theodore Roosevelt Administration demanded that Zelaya surrender sovereignty over the proposed Canal Zone, and accept that the USA had an unlimited right of military intervention. Zelaya refused to concede this and negotiated for an agreement accepting limited sovereignty. In practice, this proved unacceptable to Washington, and the US government treated the agreement as doing no more than preclude competition from other countries (e.g. Britain and France) for a Nicaraguan canal. They sought a more favourable treaty elsewhere. The Isthmus of Panama provided the most attractive alternative, and there the US government had been active politically and economically since construction of the railroad in the 1850s. Indeed, US troops had

⁴ Despite the despotic nature of Zelaya's rule, he is recognised as a nationalist hero in Nicaragua for expelling the British from the Atlantic Coast of the country and thereby bringing the entire national territory under his rule. No thorough analysis of his role has yet been done, but a useful description of events is found in Ralph Lee Woodward Jr., *Central America: A Nation Divided*, New York: Oxford University Press, 1973.

⁵ Britain was the most influential power in the region in the mid-nineteenth century, and some historians, particularly those from Central America, credit British agents with undermining the Central American Federation. See Mario Rodriguez, *Central America*, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1965, pp 80ff.

been dispatched to the province in the 1880s to meet an alleged threat to the railway line. Troops were sent again in 1902; perhaps to set the tone for negotiations with the Colombian government. A year later, in 1903, the two governments reached agreement on a Canal Treaty. The Colombian Congress, however, rejected the surrender of sovereignty embodied in the Treaty and refused to ratify it. This show of Colombian nationalism led to the loss of the province of Panama in 1903.

Having been rebuffed twice in its diplomatic attempts to annex a canal route across the Isthmus, the US adopted more direct means. Through a mining engineer and Panamanian agents, Washington provoked a show of insurrection in the province. The complicity of Panama's 'founding fathers' with the territorial designs of the US government is a matter of historical record. In September 1903, Manuel Amador Guerrero, soon to become President of the new Panamanian state, wrote to a colleague telling him that US support for independence had been secured through an American agent.⁶ In November 1903, as agreed, US warships moved into the coastal waters of Panama, preventing the intervention of Colombian troops to quell the Panamanian revolt, and on 3 November 1903 Panamanian independence was declared, if 'independence' it could be called. That the purpose of the exercise was a Canal Treaty there is no doubt.⁷ Two weeks later the new Panamanian government signed an agreement that granted the US government a strip of territory which it could administer indefinitely 'as if it were sovereign'.

It is doubtful that any other nominally independent country in times of peace has ever granted a foreign power such power over its territory and population as was surrendered by the Treaty of 1903. *De jure* and *de facto*, the Canal Zone became US territory, administered by an American governor. The government of Panama had no rights within the Zone, and American employees of the Zone were not subject to Panamanian courts. Not until 1962 could the Panamanian flag be flown in the Zone. Within the Zone fourteen US military bases were

⁶ Amador Guerrero wrote to Jose Agustin Arango on September 5, 1903, reporting that he had received affirmative answers to the following questions posed to William Nelson Cronwell: 'What conditions are required for United States recognition of our independence with protectorate [status]? Will the warships arrive at our ports when independence is declared? What resources will be given us to help the movement?' Cited in *Revista Epocas* No. 27, Ano 2 (Enero 25 de 1948), p. 13 (author's translation).

⁷ At six o'clock in the evening of the day of declaration of independence, Amador Guerrero sent a telegraph to John Hay, US Secretary of State, 'Proclaimed independence of Isthmus without bloodshed. The Canal Treaty saved.' Cited in '3 de Noviembre de 1903', *Dialogo Social* Ano XVI (Nov-Dic de 1983), p. 20 (author's translation).

eventually constructed, and in 1971 military facilities were estimated to be worth almost \$5,000 million, accommodating 14,000 soldiers. The only other country in the hemisphere that has permitted the presence of a US military base was another *de facto* protectorate, Cuba.⁸

The legal power of the US government was not limited to the Zone. The Treaty of 1903 granted an unlimited right of military intervention throughout the country should Canal security require it. While Washington softened its position on this issue in 1939, the option to intervene unilaterally was not in principle changed and was re-affirmed in the Carter-Torrijos Treaty of 1977. In terms of domestic governance, Panamanian presidents ruled at the pleasure of Washington and, until the 1950s, the US government discouraged the development of an effective national army, fearing it might pose a threat to US control of the Canal. Perhaps the most grotesque symbol of Panama's protectorate status is the fact that Panama has never had a central bank and does not print its own currency—US dollars circulate as the medium of exchange.⁹

There are strong elements of both farce and tragedy in the manner by which Panama became nominally independent. The farce lies in the pretence of the initial rulers of the country that they embodied national aspirations for independence, when in fact their rule was based upon US military and geo-political interests and their primary function was to serve those interests. Tragic is the fact that there was at the turn of the century a coherent Panamanian national identity and an aspiration for independence. The consequence of this contradiction is to rob the Panamanian people of pride in the creation of their country. Certainly, Panama is not the only country in the hemisphere in which foreign powers played a significant role in gaining independence—Uruguay and Cuba come to mind. However, in the case of Uruguay, it could reasonably be argued that the role of British sea power was no greater than the presence of French warships off the coast of Virginia at the time of the decisive battle of Yorktown in 1781. And while the USA granted independence to a puppet government in Cuba, this had been preceded by a long and fierce national struggle against both Spanish colonialism and US occupation.

In the case of Panama, 3 November 1903 marks a bogus event, a declaration of independence of no substance and little form, for it did

⁸ After the defeat of Spain in the Spanish-American War, Cuba was granted independence by the USA subject to the Platt Amendment, which established protectorate status for Cuba.

⁹ The non-existent Panamanian currency has a name—the *balboa*—but its only form is in coin.

not even establish the minimal conditions of sovereign status; that is, formal sovereignty over the national territory and a nominally independent foreign policy. While one must be cautious in attributing too much importance to intangible factors such as perception of national heritage, the collective consciousness of a farcical birth of the nation is a burden upon Panamanian nationalism which it is difficult for outsiders to appreciate.

The political distortion

From 1903 until 1968, Panama provided a stereotype of political instability—thirty-eight governments each with four presidents between 1918 and 1949. It is defensible to assert that no President of Panama has ever come to power as an expression of popular will; or, if he did, he did not rule for long.¹⁰ This apparently chronic political instability has relatively little to do with the character of the body politic or with an abstract category called 'domestic politics'. Rather, it reflects a distortion of the relationship between the rulers and the ruled resulting from the subservience of Panamanian governments to successive US governments.

The geo-political importance assigned to Panama by Washington and a US military presence in the Canal Zone larger and vastly better equipped than the Panamanian National Guard (later called the 'Defence Force') has had a profound effect on the governance of the country. First, no government could pursue policies which significantly deviated from what US officials conceived to be the national interests of their government in Panama and the region as a whole. To a significant degree the hegemonic influence of the US government has been exercised by the military commanders in the Canal Zone, where the headquarters for all US military operations in Latin America and the Caribbean is located. The direct intervention of US military commanders in local political affairs—a task usually monopolised by the civilians in the State Department and Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)—is virtually unique in the hemisphere. In El Salvador there are US military 'advisers' and in Honduras there is the US-funded 'contra'

¹⁰ Arnulfo Arias was declared the winner of the 1967 presidential election and most certainly won a majority of votes cast. He was overthrown by a coup the next year. The dubious character of Panamanian elections has been conceded even by government officials. In December 1986, Rolando Murgas, Vice-President of the national Election Tribunal (which had certified the results of the extremely controversial election of 1984, discussed below) observed that 'our political history, lamentably, is full of blemishes and electoral corruption.' See *Central American Report*, Guatemala: Inforpress, 30 January 1987.

army. The relatively 'high-profile' role in Panama gives the US generals the appearance of commanders of an army of occupation rather than as protectors of the Canal.¹¹

As a result of this overt and dominant role of the US government, the governments of Panama have usually found—if they wish to remain in office—that it is considerably more important to keep Washington content than to keep content their own population. Accommodating Washington was certainly the deciding factor in the continued health of Panamanian governments from 1903 until the 1950s. During this period the country was ruled by the principal oligarchic families—the Arias, the Arosemena and the Chiari being the most prominent. These families competed among themselves for political office, with little attempt to accommodate or co-opt the emerging middle class, much less the mass of the population. With their power guaranteed by the presence of thousands of US troops, their rule was even more narrowly based than that of other oligarchies in Central and South America.¹²

The overwhelming dominance of American governments over Panama distorted political life both between the rulers and the ruled and within the elite itself. Relieved of the burden of consolidating its rule over the population, the Panamanian elite failed to develop effective, long-term institutions of political accommodation and co-optation. Indeed, beginning in the 1940s, the most serious manifestations of popular unrest were directed primarily at the US presence in the Canal Zone and secondarily at the government of the day as accomplices.

The most obvious manifestations of political instability, (governments and presidents coming and going with alarming frequency) were the result of a second distortion. With a foreign power playing such a dominant role in the affairs of the country, it was a small and obvious additional step for the US Embassy and the military to

¹¹ Roberto Eisenmann, editor of the independent newspaper *La Prensa*, has commented upon the role in 1986 of the US military in Panama, referring specifically to General John Galvin, head of the Southern Command, and General Manuel A Noriega, the *de facto* dictator of Panama. '... [T]he US ambassador has a lot of competition, when it comes to stating the US position, with the General [John Galvin] who commands the US Southern Command ... We [at *La Prensa*] got hold of a memorandum from Noriega to Galvin ... which had the tone of an underling reporting to his boss.' Council on Hemispheric Affairs, *News and Analysis*, Washington DC, 12 June 1986, p 2. See reference to Eisenmann in note 44.

¹² The role of US governments differed in kind in South America and Mexico, but only in degree in Central America. In Central America the extremely narrow political base of the oligarchy was also the result of forced labour systems considerably more rigid than in Panama. See John Weeks, 'An interpretation of the Central American crisis', *Latin American Research Review* 21(3) Fall 1986.

serve from time to time as arbitrators in intra-elite conflicts. Therefore, it was extremely tempting for Panamanian factions out of immediate power to petition to the American patrons to intervene and shift the balance of political power. Even when US agents chose not to exercise this informal viceroy role, the realisation that it might be exercised created an inherent instability in intra-elite struggles for power.

The rise in importance of the Panamanian military, beginning in the 1950s, magnified the political distortion. Since the primary policy-orientation of the US government in Panama had always been military—the defence of the Canal and the geo-political focus of the Southern Command—preservation of the influence and prestige of the Defence Forces became a goal in and of itself for US national security planners. This development—namely, the US government assigning increasing importance to the Panamanian military as a source of stability in Panama—was not without its irony.

The most important consequence of the distortion of political conflict by the role of the USA was for the issue of nationalism and national self-esteem to dominate all others. Despite the relatively rapid growth of a working class in the urban centres of Colon and Panama City and the substantial proletarianisation of the agricultural labour force, political conflict and political parties did not develop along class lines. Even the distinction between Left and Right is of questionable relevance for analysing the political scene. The first mass political movement began in the 1940s; it was built around a single personality, Arnulfo Arias, whose political career was constructed on one issue—the Canal.

Unquestionably the most popular political figure in Panama from the 1940s until Torrijos, Arias has been compared to another populist demagogue, Haya de la Torre of Peru. Like de la Torre, Arias contested presidential elections for four decades, running last in 1984 at the age of 82; an election he most certainly won, but was denied by fraud. While there are similarities between the two men—a gripping oratorical style and a wordy populism aimed at the petty bourgeoisie and workers with little explicit class content—the similarities are superficial. Despite the dominance of his personality over his followers, Haya's political party APRA won an overwhelming victory in the presidential elections that followed his death in the early 1980s. While the Aprista Party proved to be considerably more than just the inspiration of one long-lived leader, the Panamanista Party is little more than the extension of Arias' personality. Further, while the Aprista Party is

social democratic in its outlook, Arias' politics (beyond the nationalist issue of the Canal) is decidedly right-wing, leading him to be described as 'corporatist' and 'fascist'.

The emergence in Panama of a right-wing populist seizing on nationalism is a symptom of the political distortion. The emergence of an urban middle class in the 1940s created the opportunity for a nationalist leader. During the war the political Left, particularly the Communist Party, had compromised itself with regard to nationalism by uncritically supporting the Allied Powers in World War II; in the Panamanian context, this meant supporting the oligarchy closely tied to the US government. Into this vacuum of nationalism stepped Arias, seizing upon the single issue that could unite Panamanians against the rule of the traditional elite. Arias' political fortunes waxed and waned with popular outrage over the Canal, and his success in cornering the market on nationalism left the parties of the Left and the centre continuously without an effective electoral strategy.¹³

While nationalism is a powerful political force in all countries of Latin America, in no country but Panama (and possibly Cuba) has it played such an overwhelming role. Furthermore, because the nationalist issue was monopolised for so long by a right-wing populist, the explosive issue of the Canal was effectively divorced from issues of social reform. This separation of issues is in stark contrast to the nationalist struggle in Nicaragua, where the overthrow of the Somoza dynasty was inseparable from a call for a general and radical reorganisation of society. In Nicaragua an initially narrow nationalist struggle brought social and political issues to the fore; in Panama, national outrage against US domination has been narrowly focused upon the status of the Canal, with the result that until recently other issues have been eclipsed. Fundamentally, the political distortion created by US dominance has denied Panamanians a national political consciousness, just as the historical distortion robbed it of a national history.

The economic distortion

Mainstream Western economic theory ('neoclassical' theory) makes great use of the term 'distortions' when referring to economies.¹⁴ In the

¹³ Arias won the presidency in 1948, following major and violent demonstrations the previous year against the American presence; he won again in 1967 after violent riots in 1964 and his successor's failure to negotiate a new Canal treaty.

¹⁴ See discussion in *World Development Report 1983*, where it is claimed that 'price distortion' accounts for a third of measured growth performance in selected developing countries. World Bank, *World Development Report 1983*, London: Oxford University Press, p 3.

framework of this theory these alleged distortions are always the result of state interventions which prevent an economy from approximating to an ideal result implied by a model of perfect competition ('the invisible hand'). Thus, for example, minimum wages, subsidies on commodities and tariffs divert the economy from an optimally efficient use of resources. The economy of Panama, which has evolved under policy attitudes of relatively little state intervention and regulation compared to most underdeveloped countries, is by any reasonable measure one of the most distorted in the world and has become more so in the last two decades.

The economy of Panama has a structure which makes it *sui generis* in the hemisphere, an economy in which relatively rapid measured growth of national income has been associated with a declining importance of production in the normal sense of that word. Until the 1960s, Panama's economic life, like its political life, was dominated by the Canal. This narrow strip of waterway divides the country in two parts, with virtually all economic activity taking place along its borders or in the north of the country. Only a small portion of the tonnage carried by ships passing through the Canal either comes from or lands on Panamanian soil. The Canal is thus a singularly appropriate symbol of the economic life of Panama, for the country has no national economy as such.

'National economy' is an elusive concept, but one that plays a central role in economic theory.¹⁵ It is useful to ask what are the characteristics of a national economy; for example, to ask what characteristics make it appropriate to refer to the economic relations between Canada and the USA as 'international', and those between Wisconsin and Minnesota (on the Canadian border) as 'internal' or 'domestic'. First and most obviously, Canada and the USA have separate currencies and provinces of a country do not. The absence of a national currency has a number of quite important consequences for economic policy. Without a national currency, a government cannot borrow from itself (that is, print money or buy national currency bonds from itself). Since the Panamanian government must borrow in dollars, there is no internal (non-

¹⁵ In neo-classical economic theory internal trade and foreign trade are governed by two different principles. In the first case, competition results in specialisation according to which producer has the lowest absolute cost ('absolute advantage'). Between countries, competition results in specialisation according to relative cost differentials ('comparative advantage'). The least-cost producer drives the others out of business within a country but not among countries. In this analysis, a 'country' is an entity with its own money supply and for which the in-migration of labour is limited.

convertible) debt;¹⁶ indeed, any borrowing by the private sector or the state adds to the foreign debt.

Second, the absence of a national currency precludes certain basic policy instruments at the heart of national economic policy. With no separate currency, the government of Panama cannot devalue in an attempt to redress a balance-of-payments deficit, nor can it restrict foreign exchange flows by limiting the conditions of currency convertibility. While one can question the effectiveness of such policy measures, they are commonly used throughout the developed and developing world. Further, and even more fundamental, the government of Panama has virtually no control of its domestic rate of inflation, no more, say than the local governments of Bavaria or California. This is for two reasons: first, there is no money supply to attempt to regulate; and, second, the value of the medium of circulation, the dollar, is determined in the money and commodity markets of the industrial capitalist countries.

To appreciate the full implications of this situation, consider the options open to the Panamanian government if faced with a severe balance-of-payments crisis. No relief could be sought through devaluation, nor could the government seek to increase the competitiveness of its exports (and domestic import-substitutes) by restrictive monetary policy aimed at lowering the Panamanian price level relatively to the price level of its trading partners. The only viable option would be to attempt to depress money wages, thereby reducing production costs. This is not a policy that is likely to enhance political and social stability.

In practice, government policy in Panama over the last two decades has been not to promote exports, though foreign exchange earnings have increased at an extremely rapid rate. The distorted character of the Panamanian economy is demonstrated by two distinctions it held in the hemisphere in the 1980s—it is not only the country with the largest ratio of foreign exchange inflow to national income but also the country that exports the smallest proportion of its national production. This unlikely combination is the consequence of the increasing denationalisation of the Panamanian economy—inherent in the role of the Canal—which was greatly intensified during the Torrijos years. Much is written about

¹⁶ Even were the Panamanian government to borrow from its citizens, the debt held by these Panamanians would still be 'foreign' in that it must be repaid in a foreign currency, the US dollar. These dollars cannot be created by the Panamanian government, but must be obtained through exports of commodities and services or capital inflows.

the phenomenon of 'denationalisation' of Latin American economies, this term referring to the buying-up of private national capital by foreign capital, particularly during the 1950s and 1960s. In Panama a much more profound form of 'denationalisation' has occurred: the structure of the economy has shifted from the production of commodities to the servicing of other countries' economic activities; and, within the commodity producing sectors, from using Panamanian resources to assembling and processing intermediate products supplied from abroad.

The prime vehicle for the shift away from commodity production is the International Financial Centre (IFC) a major economic legacy of the Torrijos government. Established in the early 1970s, the IFC quickly became one of the world's largest 'off-shore' banking centres, a refuge for financial capital safe from taxation and regulation and enjoying a guarantee of total secrecy in dealings and movement. By its peak of success in 1982, the IFC accommodated the operations of over 120 international banks, with capital on deposit of \$48,000 million dollars. Foreign exchange inflow from the operation of the IFC reached 6,000 million in 1983, over three times the value of commodity exports.¹⁷ As a consequence of this ratio, commodities represented only about 15 per cent of the current account of the balance of payments compared to 85 per cent for the five Central American countries.¹⁸

The operations of the IFC can hardly be considered a part of a national Panamanian economy. Whatever other effect the financial capital resting in the IFC may have, it has no impact upon the Panamanian economy except as a source of foreign exchange earnings. Along with the other service activities which provide over 80 per cent of Panama's foreign exchange, international banking activities have few linkage effects and generate little employment—only 8,000 jobs for a sector whose measured share of national income is 6 per cent.¹⁹ Perhaps more serious than the limited level of employment is its inherent nature. Virtually all the employees in the banking sector are 'white-collar workers', so that expansion of the sector has little if any impact on the unskilled, who account for most of Panama's urban unemployed. To compound matters, the level of prosperity of the banking sector has

¹⁷ Inforpress, *Central American Report*, 23 February 1985. Earnings from services other than banking were \$742 million, while commodity exports were \$1,778 million.

¹⁸ For a comparison of the structure of the Panamanian external sector to that of the Central American countries, see John Weeks, *The Economies of Central America*, New York: Holmes and Meier, 1985, pp 96-7.

¹⁹ Inforpress, *Central American Report*, 23 February 1985.

little influence on the level of employment. Once the buildings were constructed and the office equipment put in place, a given number of employees can move a virtually limitless amount of money, for little more than ledger entries are then involved. More difficult to measure than the employment effect of banking are the negative consequences of the IFC on the Panamanian government's economic and political autonomy. An economic strategy based upon attracting foreign direct investment has major political implications, for governments must maintain what is called a 'favourable investment climate'. Even more restrictive of political and social policy is the need to provide a favourable environment for short-run financial capital. As a rule, productive investors cannot afford to be as fickle as financial depositors. A factory or plantation is an illiquid asset, not easily converted to money and expatriated. By contrast, the slightest hint of regulation or restrictions upon the privileges of depositors could prompt a massive flight of short-term capital from Panama to more compliant locations such as the Cayman Islands.²⁰ While Torrijos is viewed by many as a great Panamanian nationalist,²¹ it may be that the international banking sector which he fostered has created constraints on political sovereignty as limiting as those in force when the country was a virtual protectorate of the USA.

A second major innovation of the Torrijos years further contributed to the denationalisation of the Panamanian economy, the Colon Free Trade Zone. This industrial estate, in the country's second largest city, grew from nothing to a total export value of \$1500 million in less than two decades, with its production based largely on imported inputs. As in the case of the IFC, there are few linkages to the rest of the economy, although in this case increased production does require increased employment. The employment generated is not great considering that the Colon FTZ's international cost advantage is cheap labour. Together the FTZ and the IFC account for less than 5 per cent of the country's labour force, while generating over 80 per cent of foreign exchange earnings.

The economic strategy based on international banking and the FTZ cannot be judged a great success. During the 1970s, Panama had a

²⁰ The difficulty of maintaining a favourable amount for financial capitalisation is discussed further in John Weeks, *The Economics of Central America*, New York: Holmes and Meier, 1985, Chapter 4. Specifically on the concern by a Panamanian official about the consequences of easing banking secrecy laws, see *Central American Report*, 10 August 1984.

²¹ The case for Torrijos as a Panamanian nationalist is presented in *Inforpress, Centroamerica, Centro America* 1982.

slower rate of aggregate economic growth than any Central American country, considerably below its own rate for the 1950s and less than half its rate during the 1960s.²² After 1980 the Central American countries suffered a severe economic depression and Panama's growth performance was considerably better by comparison. However, close inspection of the statistics raises doubt as to what 'growth' implied in the Panamanian context. To take an extreme example indicative of the contradictions in the Panamanian economy, in 1981 measured national income rose by 4 per cent in constant prices. This was despite declines in all commodity-producing sectors: a negative 2.5 per cent in agriculture and manufacturing, and a negative 7 per cent in construction. A statistical recording of positive aggregate growth was achieved by an 8 per cent increase in transport and communications, and an 11 per cent increase in commerce and banking.²³ One's usual expectation is that these tertiary sectors grow because there are more commodities to be transported, exchanged, and financed; that is, that these economic activities are means to an end. In fact, one discovers that in 1981 Panamanians enjoyed a lower domestic supply of commodities; that production in agriculture, manufacturing and construction was down, and that the volume of commodity imports was also down. The profound 'denationalisation' of economic activity in Panama is dramatically demonstrated by the fact that the measured rate of growth of the economy could be positive in a year in which, on average, material well-being declined. One concludes that much of the growth of the Panamanian economy in the last decade has been a statistical illusion.²⁴ Alienated from its own history and politics, the Panamanian nation is also alienated from its own economic life, living in a society so constructed that expansion and contraction of the dynamic sectors of the economy have little direct impact on the livelihoods of the mass of the population.

Under Torrijos, some steps were taken to revitalise the productive sector of the economy. From 1969 to 1977 the government implemented a highly-publicised land reform, involving the expropriation or purchase of 500,000 hectares of land. However, this land reform

²² Rates of growth of gross domestic product by decade were: 1950s, 4.7 per cent; 1960s, 9.0 per cent; and 1970s, 3.5 per cent. The average for the five Central American countries by decade was 4.6, 6.5, and 5.9 per cent, respectively. See Weeks, *The Economies of Central America*, pp 61-3.

²³ Weeks, *The Economies of Central America*, pp 195-6.

²⁴ Steve Ropp, in a review of recent economic trends, refers to 'two economies' in Panama: The dynamic service and financial centre and the stagnant productive sector. 'General Noriega's Panama', *Current History*, 85(550) December 1986, p 423.

affected only 10 per cent of rural families and has not arrested the decline of the peasant sector. In 1960, 16 per cent of peasant families derived their incomes from agricultural wage employment, and in 1979 this had risen to 27 per cent,²⁵ an increase indicating growing landlessness despite the agrarian reform.²⁶ For rural families retaining land, conditions have worsened for the smallholder. Despite a rise in the average size of all farms (due to out-migration to urban areas), the average size of farms less than ten hectares (60 per cent of all farms) declined in the 1970s.²⁷ Even more indicative of the plight of the small peasant is data on yields per unit of land. In most of the developing world there is an inverse relationship between output per unit of land and farm size, since smallholders tend to work land more intensively than is the case on large estates.²⁸ Apparently, this is not the case of Panama. For the most important food crop, rice, the yield per hectare in 1960 was virtually the same on small and large farms, but over the next twenty years land productivity declined absolutely on small holdings.²⁹ In the early 1980s, a hectare of land on large farms yielded almost three times as much rice as a hectare on small farms.³⁰

Decline of peasant agriculture during the 1970s stimulated an exodus from the countryside. Evidence indicates that rising per capita income in Panama during that decade, at about 1 per cent per annum, had little impact on the level of poverty. In 1975, 173,000 families were estimated to be in poverty, 68 per cent of which were in rural areas. In 1980, the total number of households in poverty had risen to 213,000, only 56 per

²⁵ Much of the increase in wage employment in agriculture has been the result of the growth of sugar production. With the world price of sugar extremely low and a reduction in Panama's quota to the United States by the Reagan Administration, the future of this sector is in doubt.

²⁶ One study shows an increase in landlessness from 34,000 families in 1970 to 55,000 at the end of the decade. The total number of rural families at the middle of the decade was about 150,000. See Weeks, *The Economies of Central America*, p 123 and Roberto Pinnock and Charlotte Elton, 'Rural poverty in Panama: trends and structural cases', *World Employment Programme Research Working Paper 10-6/WP 60*, Geneva: ILO, September 1983, pp 10-15.

²⁷ Pinnock and Elton, *Rural Poverty in Panama* . . . and Marco A Gandasegui, *Hijo, La Fuerza de Trabajo en el Agro: Experiencia del desarrollo capitalista en Panama*, Panama: CELA, 1985, pp 102ff.

²⁸ See, for example, FAO, 'The Effects of Land Tenure and Fragmentation of Farm Holdings on Agricultural Development', Rome: FAO, December 1986, Document No. COAG/87/8, pp 34-46.

²⁹ The yield estimates come from studies in which the definition of 'small' and 'large' varies according to quality of land. Average size of small farms was approximately 11 hectares. See Pinnock and Elton, *Rural Poverty in Panama* . . . , p 17.

³⁰ For the 1959-60 crop year, rice output per hectare on small farms was 27 quintals and 25 quintals on large farms. In 1971-72 the averages were 20 quintals and 51 quintals, the gap increasing subsequently. See Republica de Panama, Contraloria General del la Republica, *Boletines de produccion agropecuaria*, Panama, various years.

cent of which were rural.³¹ A relative reduction in rural poverty has come about in Panama by the poor moving to urban areas. This demographic shift together with other causes has increased the rate of urban unemployment. In the early 1970s, the urban unemployment rate averaged about 7 per cent per annum, rising to an average of 11 per cent for 1981-83.³² While unemployment has been growing, those urban Panamanians with blue-collar jobs have enjoyed no improvement in their real wages in two decades. Real wages rose from 1965 to 1970 and remained virtually constant until 1980, when they slipped back to the level of the mid-1960s. Furthermore, the purchasing power of the minimum wage for Colon and Panama City fell by 30 per cent from 1971 to 1982.³³ While the IFC has prospered from the inflow of short-term capital and the FTZ has bustled with activity, the economic plight of most Panamanians has deteriorated. It is not unknown for per capita income in a country to rise with no benefit accruing to the mass of the population; this was the case with the distribution of gains from growth in the countries of Central America during the 1960s and 1970s (except for Costa Rica). However, the failure of most Panamanians to benefit from the growth of measured national income over the last fifteen years has not been a distributional phenomenon as such, but rather a phenomenon of disarticulation. The vast majority of Panamanian peasants, wage-workers, and white-collar employees have no link, however tenuous, to the dynamic sectors of the economy, no mechanism by which the income generated in those sectors would reach them except through government expenditure of state revenues generated by those sectors. The fence around the Colon FTZ and the guards restricting entry to the IFC are singularly appropriate symbols of the relationship of these economic entities to the Panamanian nation.

Political instability in Panama in the 1980s

The success of Torrijos

Omar Torrijos is commonly perceived as a great Panamanian nationalist, notwithstanding the fact that he pursued an economic

³¹ Pinnock and Elton, *Rural Poverty in Panama* . . . , pp 32-3 and A Cordero et al, *Distribucion del ingreso en Panama*, Panama, 1980.

³² Commission Economica para America Latina (CEPAL), *Balance Preliminar del la Economia Latinoamericana en 1984*, Santiago: CEPAL, 1985.

³³ Programa del Empleo para America Latina y el Caribe (PREALC), *Empleo y Salarios*. Santiago: PREALC, 1983, and PREALC, *Panama: Evolucion y Estructura de los Salarios*. Santiago: PREALC, Junio de 1985.

strategy which 'denationalised' Panamanian economic life beyond anything achieved by US economic and political domination. One indicator of this perception is the fact that the Moscow-line People's Party of Panama gave Torrijos virtually unqualified support throughout his rule (and then transferred its support to his successor as Head of the Defence Forces, General Noriega). This contradiction between Torrijos the nationalist in rhetoric and Torrijos the facilitator of international banking and Free Zone manufacturing is explained in terms of historical and political distortions.

Domestically, Torrijos initiated two highly visible social reforms; land reform and the reform of labour relations. Land reform did little if anything to improve the plight of the peasantry or agricultural workers, though it probably had a major effect on temporarily defusing rural unrest. Labour reform apparently had great potential to alter the bargaining relationship between capital and labour. From 1969 to 1977 the government legally recognised 131 new unions (over 60 per cent of all workers' organisations), and approved over 500 collective agreements, compared to only thirty for the period 1965-69.³⁴ As shown in the previous section, these measures had no obvious effect upon the trend in real wages: average urban real wages rose 12 per cent from 1965 to 1970, then were virtually constant throughout the 1970s, declining in the 1980s. Perhaps one reason that Torrijos is perceived as significantly shifting the balance of power from capital to labour is the obsession shown by the World Bank over revisions in the country's labour code, discussed below.

The real basis of Torrijos' popularity lies in his adroit appropriation of the Canal issue from Arias and the subsequent use of that issue as a nationalist rallying cry. As Torrijos' critics have stressed, no elected government of Panama would have dared to conclude an agreement with the USA embodying so many fundamental compromises of national sovereignty as the Carter-Torrijos Treaty of 1977. Although the Treaty provided for the formal transfer of Canal ownership to Panama in the year 2000, it did not amend the fundamental compromise of Panamanian sovereignty—for the USA was granted the unilateral right to intervene militarily in Panama should there be any perceived threat to the 'neutrality' of the Canal. That Torrijos could achieve such a nationalist reputation in face of evidence to the contrary is graphic

³⁴ Inforpress Centroamerica, *Centro America 1982, Panama*, p 38.

evidence of the distortion of Panamanian politics and national consciousness resulting from seventy-five years of US domination.

What Torrijos did undeniably achieve was the establishment of temporary political and social stability in the country, based on an unlikely coalition of segments of the peasantry, the urban working class, the middle class and the capitalists. Briefly, the peasantry saw the land reform as partial fulfilment of its aspirations; the labour reforms seemed to create the possibility for gains for the working class; the short-term boom created by the construction of the IFC and the FTZ brought prosperity to the middle class and the business community also anticipated substantial gains from this prosperity. The anti-imperialist rhetoric associated with the new Canal Treaty touched the nationalism of all these groups. Briefly, Torrijos had a project that probably united a majority of Panamanians and obscured the fundamental distortions of society. By the time of his death the project was already floundering, and it was left to his successors to reap the fruits of disillusionment.

Disillusionment sets in

In 1978 Torrijos organised an indirect election of a new President of Panama which optimists interpreted as a step towards democratisation. This election had two major consequences. First, it demonstrated the weakness of the government in terms of popular support; the official Revolutionary Democratic Party (PRD) secured only about 40 per cent of the vote, achieving a majority only in coalition with the People's Party (a Moscow-line Communist Party) and a second partner, the Frente Amplio Popular (FRAMPO). If considered as a referendum on ten years of military rule, the election result was ambiguous at best. Second, it established the essentially powerless role of Panama's Head of State, a situation which continued for subsequent Presidents however chosen. In 1982 Torrijos' hand-picked President, Aristides Rojas, was replaced by Ricardo de la Espriella, an indication that the real power struggle was going on behind the scenes within the Defence Forces. From the death of Torrijos until early 1984, the most important factor determining the immediate political future of Panama was who would emerge as the dominant figure in the Defence Forces: General Ruben Dario Parades (the commander who succeeded after Torrijos), or perhaps one of two of his subordinates, Colonel Manuel Antonio Noriega (Head of Military Intelligence) or Roberto Diaz Herrera (a cousin of Torrijos).

This struggle for control of the Defence Forces (and thereby of political power) became complicated by the intervention of two external factors, the IMF and the World Bank. In 1979 Torrijos had reached an accord with the IMF, receiving a credit line of \$80 million conditional upon a reform of the tax system and a reduction of state subsidies, particularly on agriculture. These IMF-fostered measures proved unpopular, both as an affront to nationalism and because of their direct economic effects. By 1983 another approach to the IMF was necessary, and it was clear that this time 'conditionality' would be considerably more stringent. The urgency for an agreement arose from the necessity to renegotiate Panama's foreign debt. Most of this debt had been contracted with private international banks, which made a prior accord with the IMF and/or the World Bank a condition for serious negotiations.

Given the urgent need to restructure the debt and the IMF-World Bank austerity measures that would be necessary to facilitate renegotiation, it was clear in the early 1980s that whoever was President of Panama for the foreseeable future would present an unpopular agenda for the country. Torrijos' vehicle of a figure-head President offered the military leadership an escape from this dilemma, for they could rule without appearing to govern. The strategy would have to be a subtle one, for a President of the stature of Rojas or de la Espriella would fool no one as to where real power lay. As the May 1984 elections approached, a singularly unlikely candidate emerged as the choice of the official PRD—Nicolas Ardito Barletta, a Vice-President of the World Bank.

In some respects Barletta was the ideal candidate to follow in the footsteps of Rojas and de la Espriella, for he had no political constituency of his own in Panama, was untainted by corruption or nepotism and, given his position at the World Bank and training as an economist, he could be trusted to carry out competently the negotiations with the multilateral agencies and private banks. On the negative side, he might prove too independently-minded and his University of Chicago view of economics would offend the left-wing of the Torrijos coalition. When, in early 1984, a five party coalition was formed to support Barletta (the National Democratic Union, UNADE), the Peoples Party denounced the leadership of the PRD for abandoning *torrijismo* and put its own candidate into the race.

Seven presidential candidates contested the election of 1984, but only Barletta and 82-year-old Arnulfo Arias had serious prospects of

winning. There is some evidence that early in the campaign the Reagan Administration favoured Arias, but as election day approached its preference had changed to Barletta.³⁵ An opinion poll in March 1984 indicated Barletta and Arias to have roughly equal shares of public support, promising a close election. Close the election was and rife with fraud, according to neutral observers. The military intervened to seize the ballot-boxes, and after a delay of two weeks, Barletta was officially announced the winner by a majority of 1713 votes out of 600,000 votes cast. The incidence of fraud was so great that few doubted that Arias had actually won, prompting the opposition press to nickname Ardito Barletta, 'Fraudito'. Two years later Seymour Hersh of the *New York Times* would write a series of articles with overwhelming evidence that Arias had won by a margin of 25,000–30,000 votes; evidence that was available to the US government immediately after the election.³⁶ Undeterred by intelligence from the US Embassy in Panama that the new President had been elected as the result of an electoral fraud carried out by the military, the US Secretary of State, George Shultz, attended Barletta's Investiture and expressed words of praise for the new President and 'Panamanian democracy'.

While the election campaign had diverted attention, the struggle for power within the military resolved itself with Colonel (now General) Noriega becoming Head of the Defence Forces. Barletta, with no political base and holding office on the basis of a fraudulent election, served at the behest of the new military chief. The military found it convenient that Barletta appeared to rule in order that a civilian President would assume the responsibility for yielding to World Bank and IMF pressure and reversing the reforms of the Torrijos period. Throughout Barletta's eleven months as President, opposition increased from both the Panamanian business sector and the trade union movement. So effective was the military in hiding its political role that some groups on the left, such as the People's Party, supported it as the progressive and anti-imperialist alternative to a President judged to be pro-American and economically reactionary.³⁷

There seems to have been little difference between the policies of the

³⁵ See *Central American Report*, 16 March 1984; and Seymour M Hersh, 'Panama General reported to rig election in 1984', *New York Times*, 22 June 1986.

³⁶ Hersh, *New York Times*, 22 June 1986.

³⁷ After the forced resignation of Barletta, the People's Party openly supported the military and Noriega in particular, referring to him as part of the Panamanian 'national liberation struggle'. See the summary of a *Miami Herald* article of 2 August 1986, in *Latin American Monitor* 3(6) August 1986, p 325.

civilian President and the military leadership during 1985 with regard to either domestic or foreign policy, only a division of labour. If Barletta stood accused of compromising Panama sovereignty in economic matters, then the military stood equally suspect in its own field. In January 1985, joint Panamanian-US military exercises were held, involving about 10,000 American troops. These exercises, lasting four months, occurred whilst Panama was nominally an active member of the Contadora group. For several years the Contadora countries had sought a peaceful solution to conflicts in Central America, in the face of clear US opposition. Indeed, Barletta's Administration hosted a meeting of the Contadora ministers while the military exercises were in progress.³⁸ Further joint exercises were held in 1986 and early 1987, indicating a growing and overt cooperation between the Southern Command and the Defence Forces.

As 1985 proceeded, less and less was left of the limited substance and extensive rhetoric of the Torrijos period. In foreign policy Panama moved into closer accord to US goals in the region, with joint military exercises and only formal participation in Contadora. On the economic front, Barletta sought to implement the conservative austerity package urged upon him by the World Bank and the IMF. Strong opposition from the business sector (who were opposed to increased taxation) and from organised labour (who objected to reform of the Labour Code) delayed matters, even forcing Barletta to reverse several decisions.³⁹ These vacillations increased the impression that Barletta's capacity to implement policy was extremely limited. There is some evidence that Noriega was planning to remove the civilian President as early as December 1984,⁴⁰ and an overt demonstration that the military effectively governed came in May 1985. For the first eight months of his short presidency, Barletta directed a multi-party cabinet in which the

³⁸ Perhaps even more in contradiction with alleged nationalist tendencies in the military leadership, the exercises were in progress on 9 January 1985, the 'Day of National Dignity'. On this date in 1964, the Panamanian military had refused to disperse people demonstrating against the US presence in the Canal Zone. US troops opened fire upon the demonstrators, killing twenty-one and injuring about 500; see *Central American Report*, 25 January 1985.

³⁹ Soon after assuming the presidency, Barletta announced an austerity programme, then withdrew it in the face of strong opposition in November 1984; see *Central American Report*, 22 February 1985. In June and July 1985 opposition from organised labour (including a two-day general strike, 1-2 July) forced a retraction of proposed changes in the Labour Code; see *Central American Report*, 28 June 1985 and 5 July 1985.

⁴⁰ In August 1985, *La Prensa* reported that a New York Public relations firm had supplied to Noriega in December 1984 a plan 'to transform General M A Noriega into the protector of Panamanians and their civil liberties'. The report allegedly involved a campaign to present the general as a Gaullist figure; see *Central American Report*, 23 August 1985.

party of the military (PRD) held a minority of positions. In early May 1985, the leadership of the PRD gave Barletta an ultimatum to restructure his cabinet by the end of the month, with rumours of an intended coup providing the implicit sanction for non-compliance. Within a few days of the demand a new Cabinet had been formed which was overwhelmingly dominated by the PRD. Those who interpreted the military pressure for a Cabinet change as an expression of disapproval with Barletta's conservative economic policies were disappointed: in late June a new agreement was reached with the IMF whose secret provisions were rumoured to involve further and severe austerity measures.

Thus in mid-1985 Panama was swept by social unrest, headed by a President with no power or authority, and, perhaps most serious of all, who had lost the rhetoric of nationalism which had been so crucial to national stability during the Torrijos years.

Things fall apart

In October 1985 Nicolas Ardito Barletta resigned as President of Panama in favour of his Vice-President, Eric Arturo Delvalle, a millionaire businessman. That Barletta resigned following pressure from Noriega is beyond doubt, but considerable controversy surrounds Noriega's motives.⁴¹ After the fall of Barletta, political life in Panama began to change significantly. For more than two decades Panama had been a country whose democratic credentials were dubious, but in which there was considerable individual and political freedom, particularly freedom of expression. Major abuses of human rights had been rare, and during the 1970s the country had become a haven for political refugees from the rest of Latin America, particularly the Southern Cone. However, a year and a half after the blatant demonstration of military control over government by the forced resignation of Barletta, Panama had acquired a number of the characteristics of a police state.⁴²

One of the most ominous of recent events occurred in September

⁴¹ 'Ardito's fall a mystery'. *Central American Report*, 18 October 1985.

⁴² '... [I]t appears that Panama, once proudly distinguishing itself from the dirty human-rights records of some of its Central American neighbors, may be slipping into the abyss as well, with the Defense Forces playing the role of final arbiter in any and all social conflicts.' See *Central American Report*, 31 January 1986, p 29. A prominent Panamanian opponent of the Noriega regime summed up the situation in January 1987 with the observation, 'Today it is a humiliation to be Panamanian.' In the present political context in Panama it is unwise to identify hostile commentators.

1985, just before the fall of Barletta, when the decapitated body of Hugo Spadafora was discovered just across the border with Costa Rica. A colourful and extremely popular politician of left-wing populist tendencies, Spadafora had been an outspoken critic of the military. Shortly before his death he had accused high-ranking officers of drug trafficking, saying that he had evidence to substantiate this. Allegations of drug trafficking on the part of the military were not new. In subsequent months it emerged that if Spadafora did have evidence of such criminal activity, he had not been alone in that regard.

For several years US officials had believed that banks in Panama served as conduits for money obtained from drug trafficking. Following Spadafora's allegations, the US entered into negotiations with Delvalle to seek an amendment of the strict secrecy laws of the IFC.⁴³ The Panamanian government was hardly enthusiastic about changing the banking regulations in order to facilitate investigation of a relatively small sum of money.⁴⁴ Any change could dampen the enthusiasm of depositors in general and lead to massive capital flight. However, in June 1986 unnamed American officials dropped an undiplomatic bombshell by leaking to the Press that Noriega himself was suspected to be the major drug trafficker in Panama, and that he was involved in a number of other criminal activities.

The most serious of the accusations were: 1) that Noriega was a major intermediary in the smuggling of drugs to the USA; 2) that for fifteen years he had passed on sensitive intelligence information to the government of Cuba; 3) that he was implicated in the murder of Hugo Spadafora;⁴⁵ 4) that he was personally responsible for the electoral fraud of 1984; 5) that he facilitated the supply of arms to the M-19 guerrilla movement in Colombia and, 6) that he was a major investor in a Panamanian firm which sold to Cuba and Eastern Europe items of US technology whose export to those countries was restricted for reasons of

⁴³ In August 1984, the US District Attorney in Miami was quoted as saying, 'Evidence developed . . . shows that substantial sums of money derived from narcotics sources have been funneled through some Panamanian banks.' At this time a Panamanian military officer, Lieutenant-Colonel Julian Melo, was arrested for drug trafficking. See *Central American Report*, 10 August 1984, p 246.

⁴⁴ The sum alleged by US officials to be from drug sources was \$600 million, compared to \$40,000 million in total deposits in the IFC. The head of the Panamanian Banking Commission pointed out that total drug sales in the United States were commonly estimated to be \$100,000 million, so even if allegations against Panama were true, the IFC comprised less than one per cent of the US drug problem. See *Central American Report*, 11 July 1986.

⁴⁵ At the time of Spadafora's death his family had contended that military intelligence agents had arrested him at the orders of Noriega. See *Central American Report*, 31 January 1986.

national security.⁴⁶ Even at the height of its anti-Sandinista polemics, the Reagan Administration had not accused a Nicaraguan leader of such an array of crimes. Coming on the heels of negative comments by the new US Ambassador to Panama and criticisms of Panama by the US Under-Secretary of State for Latin America,⁴⁷ the allegations against Noriega seemed a part of an orchestrated destabilisation campaign. The most astounding accusation against Noriega came in October 1986 at a semi-public academic conference in Washington on recent political events in Panama. Norman Bailey, a former adviser to the US President, took an opportunity to allege that a few months earlier Noriega had attended a meeting of major Latin American drug dealers in Cuzco, Peru. According to Bailey's account, the participants in the meeting had discussed the elimination of Spadafora before damaging evidence was revealed.⁴⁸

The most surprising aspect of this series of extraordinary charges is that having accused Noriega of being a drug-pusher, murderer, and an agent for the Communist bloc, the USA in no significant way changed its behaviour towards Panama. The new ambassador duly arrived in Panama City, Panama's special trade concessions within the Caribbean Basin Initiative continued, and joint US-Panamanian war games went on as planned in January 1987. No less surprising is the fact that little response came from the Panamanian government, other than a resolution in the National Assembly against the United States and a pro-Noriega street demonstration. The only groups to take up the allegations of criminal activity were those of the domestic Panamanian opposition. Both the right and the left (with the exception of the People's Party) denounced Noriega and called for his resignation. This provoked a series of repressive measures by the military, including Press repression that sent two of Panama's most prominent journalists into exile in the United States.⁴⁹

⁴⁶ These allegations appeared in articles by Seymour Hersh in the *New York Times* and in several other newspapers in June 1986 when Noriega was visiting the USA.

⁴⁷ At his confirmation hearing before the US Senate, Ambassador-designate Arthur H Davis said that the Panamanian government should be warned about human rights investigations and pressed to investigate the murder of Spadafora. Two months later, Elliot Abrams, Under-Secretary of State, listed a number of criticisms of the Panamanian government in a press interview. See *Central American Report*, 7 March 1986 and 23 May 1986.

⁴⁸ The author was present at this conference, which was organised by the School of Advanced International Studies of Johns Hopkins University. Bailey's comments were widely reported. See *Central American Report*, 17 October 1986.

⁴⁹ Roberto Eisenmann left Panama to take up a fellowship in the USA, then chose not to return due to death threats. The associate editor of Eisenmann's paper, *La Prensa*, took refuge in the Venezuelan Embassy in July 1986 after death threats and also being charged by the government with various offences. He eventually made his way to the USA.

A number of explanations have been ventured for this total contradiction between words and action by the government of the United States. One hypothesis postulates a split in the Reagan Administration and the US Congress between foreign policy pragmatists who viewed Noriega as a source of stability in Panama and a bulwark against 'Sandinista expansionism', and a group of right-wing ideologues hoping for a compliant pro-US government which would agree to cancel the planned transfer of the Canal to Panamanian control in the year 2000.⁵⁰

That such a split existed there is no doubt, but the entire episode reflects a much more profound phenomenon—the grotesque distortion of US–Panamanian relations resulting from seventy-five years of domination and clientage. The charges against Noriega represented but one further example of direct manipulation of Panamanian politics which has characterised US policy since American warships had intervened to create the country in 1903. While the Reagan Administration is more heavy-handed than its predecessors, its treatment of Panamanian internal affairs as a proper arena for direct action is consistent with the history of US governmental policies. In effect, the USA treats Panama as a military protectorate and its politicians, be they civilian or military, as clients to be manipulated.⁵¹ The political genius of Torrijos lay in his ability to obscure this client status of Panama while doing nothing of importance to alter it. The patron–client relationship remains, perhaps stronger than ever, and it is this distortion which robs Panama of 'domestic politics' as such and leaves the Panamanian nation, after seventy-five years of existence, still struggling to establish itself as a sovereign country.

⁵⁰ Extreme right-wing Senator Jesse Helms of North Carolina is usually identified as the leading spirit in the campaign to prevent transfer of the Canal.

⁵¹ If this statement seems too strong and polemical, refer to the US Department of Defense document obtained by the Council on Hemispheric Affairs, a Washington human rights and lobbying group. In the discussion of US policy toward Panama, one reads a passage that goes beyond the allegations of the most paranoid Panamanian nationalist: 'A policy of systemic change [in Panama] is a deliberate effort by a component of the US government to modify or remove one of more elements or characteristics . . . which along with other elements comprise [a country's] basic internal "system". Such elements or characteristics may include a particular law, a prevalent pattern of behavior, rules and regulations . . . a system of values, the nation's governmental structure, or its ideology.' United States Southern Command, Department of Defense, *Memorandum for Director, Planning and Strategy: Preliminary Assessment of the Applicability and Utility of a US Policy of Systemic Change for Panama*, Quarry Heights, Panama, 1 November 1985, p 1.

Mexico's challenges: sovereignty and national autonomy under interdependence *

As Mexico struggles to emerge from an economic crisis already half a decade old, the terms of the debate on development strategy are changing. From the late 1940s until the late 1970s, it would have been accurate to characterise the development debate as one centred on how best to insulate the domestic political economy from the vagaries of the international political economy. There were disagreements about the specific policy options, but the advocates of each strategy shared an emphasis on insulation as the best means of defending national sovereignty. While such insulation meant foregoing some of the opportunities afforded by closer integration into world markets, the decreased risks and potential benefits resulting from internally-oriented growth and industrialisation promised to offset such potential losses.

Today, after some dramatic gains, that inward-orientation seems to offer Mexico little hope for future advances in growth or welfare. Dissatisfaction with the old strategy arises from the political and economic problems attendant on both its successes and failures. Among the most important results are the near completion of the easy stages of import substitution, its demonstrated inability to create sufficient employment opportunities, and the need to generate foreign exchange to service a large foreign debt, contracted in part to sustain the old development strategy. Consequently, the terms of the development debate in Mexico now increasingly revolve around the means by which closer integration into the liberal international economic order could be used to defend national sovereignty.

These political and economic debates over the often contradictory pulls of interdependence and national autonomy have both international and domestic implications. In the 1980s, the international

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division of labour seems to offer an opportunity for some developing countries to better their position within it. Brazil and South Korea appear poised to move up; the question is whether Mexico can join them. There are also important domestic concerns. How will the gains and losses of whatever development strategy chosen be distributed among social groups within, as well as outside, Mexico?

This article reflects this complexity of issues and alternatives. First, it examines the concepts of sovereignty, autonomy and interdependence, as well as the relationships between them. Then it analyses the political economy of Mexico's international and domestic response to the new international opportunities and constraints. Its conclusions fall short of the dramatic, because the relevant choices have not yet been made and, perhaps more importantly, neither of the present contenders seem to offer any answers.

Sovereignty, autonomy and interdependence

These three concepts play fundamental roles in the literature of political economy. *Sovereignty* is intimately linked with the legitimacy of central state authority *vis-à-vis* competing claimants in both the domestic and international arenas.¹ However, political leaders are not only concerned with recognition of their *right* to make decisions affecting their country's political economy, but are also interested in safeguarding their *ability* to do so. The question of this ability brings in the concept of *autonomy*. In the context of development policy, autonomy can be defined as the ability to manage the domestic economy in accordance with a pattern of growth and welfare which corresponds to policymakers' perceived requisites for remaining in power. This ability is tempered by the need to make domestic economic decisions in response to the demands of the external trade and capital accounts, which represent the constraints on national policy deriving from the international political economy.²

Defining sovereignty and autonomy in this manner enables us to see that there is no necessary one-to-one relationship between the two. From this perspective one can certainly argue that Mexico's current debt crisis represents not so much a challenge to its absolute right to

¹ John Gerard Ruggie, 'Continuity and transformation in the world polity: toward a neorealist synthesis', *World Politics* 35(1) 1982-3, p 276.

² Thomas L Ilgen, *Autonomy and Interdependence: US-Western European Monetary and Trade Relations, 1958-1984*, Totowa, New Jersey: Rowman and Allanheld, 1985, p 8.

make choices (sovereignty intact) as to development strategies, as a narrowing of those choices to take account only of external rather than internal needs (a decrease in autonomy).

Interdependence is the result of the increased integration of national markets into one international market. National economic policy can be seriously constrained by such integration because the behaviour of buyers and sellers in one country tends quickly and easily to equilibrate the prices of the same goods in the interdependent countries.³ This economic sensitivity leads to the key political issue: the vulnerability of states. The degree of vulnerability is best understood as reflecting the opportunity cost to an actor of foregoing the relationship,⁴ and thus can pose a threat to national autonomy. Interdependence can be asymmetric, with one country finding it easier to take advantage of the opportunities and manage the costs, of interdependence. North-South relations are conducted in such asymmetric terms, although many Northern analysts often attempt to mask the power relations in interdependence by portraying a certain equality of vulnerability.⁵

The concern with sovereignty, autonomy and interdependence is not peculiar to Third World countries. The difference between the general manner in which Southern and Northern countries attempt to develop a balance among the three which suits the domestic political economy, derives mainly from differences in the internal and external resources of each.⁶ Countries deal with the challenges of interdependence in three general fashions. Actual policy may combine the three, but with a clear bias towards one. Policy can be oriented towards submission to interdependence; insulation of key sectors of the domestic political economy from interdependence; or, acceptance of interdependence but with an effort to negotiate increased benefits and decreased costs.⁷

³ Richard N Cooper, *Economic Policy in an Interdependent World: Essays in World Economics*, Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1986, *passim*.

⁴ The interdependence literature, including its dependency variant, is examined in David A Baldwin, 'Interdependence and power: a conceptual analysis', *International Organization* (34) Autumn 1980, pp 471-506.

⁵ For an examination of this political use of interdependence in USA-Mexico relations, see Carlos Rico, 'Las relaciones mexicano-norteamericanas y los significados de la interdependencia', *Foro Internacional* (74) October-December 1978, pp 256-91.

⁶ This is the general argument presented in Stephen D Krasner, *Structural Conflict*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985. Krasner, however, plays down the tension between autonomy and interdependence in the North. For a better understanding of the complexity of, and concern over, this issue in the North, see Ilgen, *Autonomy and Interdependence*.

⁷ Some will argue that there is a fourth possibility, namely, rejection of the capitalist system and alliance with the socialist world led by the Soviet Union. In the case of Latin America, economics and politics both make such a route impractical, as Fidel Castro noted very early to the Sandinistas in Nicaragua.

A submissive response allows the international market to set the incentives which will determine the allocation of resources in the national economy and, consequently, how that national economy will be integrated into the international political economy. The greatest exponents of this development strategy have been the so-called 'Chicago boys', whose ideas dominated policymaking in Chile, Argentina and Uruguay in the 1970s, and Bela Belassa's World Bank group.⁸ Under this kind of response, sovereignty in the economic realm is given up, with perhaps a weakening of sovereignty in the politico-military realm. The effect on autonomy depends on yet another choice. If the international market is allowed to distribute the costs and benefits of interdependence, autonomy would be lost. But if political leaders intervene to alter such distribution, autonomy would survive, perhaps in an even stronger form than the autonomy preserved under failed programmes of insulation or negotiation.

Allowing the market free rein has three major problems for Southern countries. First, even if the international market itself were free of distortions, the cost to an individual country of change in response to international signals could be extremely high.⁹ Second, if they had followed international market signals, even the Newly Industrialising Countries (NICs such as Taiwan, South Korea, Brazil and Mexico) would probably have been prevented from attaining their present levels of industrialisation.¹⁰ Third, both international and national markets suffer from distortions. At the international level, Northern countries attempt to use their political and economic power to structure incentives to support Northern dominance. At the national level, markets in even the most developed countries of the Third World tend

⁸ On the 'Chicago Boys' and their experiments see, Rene Villarreal, *La contrarevolucion monetaria*, Mexico, DF: Oceana, 1983; Alejandro Foxley, *Latin American Experiments in Neo-Conservative Economics*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983; and Joseph Ramos, *Neoconservative Economics in the Southern Cone of Latin America, 1973-1983*, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986. For a collection of Belassa's writings see, Bela Belassa, *The Newly Industrializing Countries in the World Economy*, New York: Permamon Press, 1981.

⁹ Even an ideological free-marketer such as President Ronald Reagan of the USA has sanctioned intervention into foreign currency markets because he perceives that his administration and the American position in the international political economy are extremely vulnerable to continued record trade deficits.

¹⁰ For an argument about the role of the state in export-led growth, with examples from South Korea, see Stephen Haggard and Chung-in Moon, 'The South Korean state in the international economy: liberal, dependent, or mercantile?' in John Gerard Ruggie (ed), *The Antinomies of Interdependence*, New York: Columbia University Press, 1983, pp 131-89.

to be fragmented, and thus 'getting prices right' may not lead to the expected outcome.¹¹

Another means of addressing the challenge of interdependence is to seek to insulate those sectors of the national economy which are fundamental both to national standing in the international political economy and to the legitimacy of policymakers at home, from current international signals. This is not a policy of autarky. In its most popular Latin American variant it emphasises import-substitution industrialisation (ISI), financed by external links via primary sector exports, foreign loans and direct foreign investment. This response protects economic sovereignty, but its impact on national autonomy depends upon the success of the insulated sectors. If these sectors develop efficiently, autonomy is enhanced. But if protected sectors increasingly use resources inefficiently, a foreign exchange bottleneck and balance-of-payments crisis could undermine national autonomy.

The insulation strategy was fundamental to the industrialisation which allowed the NICs to exploit the workings of the product cycle in labour-intensive manufactures.¹² But the economic and political limits of ISI are well established,¹³ and the NICs may have moved beyond the point at which insulation's benefits outweigh its costs. South Korea and Taiwan abandoned that strategy in the early 1960s, before reaching its limits, although South Korea flirted briefly with import substitution in heavy industry during the 1970s. Brazil took steps in the late 1960s to diversify its strategy. In the 1970s Mexico vacillated between prolonging the life of ISI and following the diversification strategy. The recession in the early 1970s, the balance-of-payments crisis in 1976 and the debt crisis of 1982 were each followed by liberalisation and restructuring efforts, each more drastic than its predecessor.

A final, general orientation towards interdependence falls between the poles of submission and insulation. It accepts interdependence but stresses the need to negotiate with the major participants in the international political economy for a better deal than that offered by a

¹¹ Richard Cooper, 'Economic mobility and national economic policy', in his *Economic Policy in an Interdependent World*, p 74; see the Villarreal, Foxley and Ramos citations in footnote 6 for examples.

¹² On the product cycle and the NICs see the collection of essays in Louis Turner and Neil McMullen, *The Newly Industrializing Countries: Trade and Adjustment*, London: George Allen & Unwin for the Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1982.

¹³ On the economic limits, see Ian Little, *et al*, *Industry and Trade in Some Developing Countries*. London: Oxford University Press, 1970. Albert O Hirschman, 'The political economy of import-substituting industrialization in Latin America', *Quarterly Journal of Economics* (82) February 1968 pp 2-32, emphasises the socio-political obstacles to the continued success of ISI.

MEXICO'S CHALLENGES

static view of comparative advantage. For those countries with the resources with which to bargain,¹⁴ the goal is to find a niche for their products in the international market, with the highest possible value added, while structuring incentives at the domestic level to induce the allocation of resources by the private and public sectors in support of the production of those goods and/or services. At the same time, such countries should negotiate mutual adjustment with external agents who control both national consumer markets, and the flow of capital and technology. In short, the strategy entails creating comparative advantage in products attracting higher levels of value added.¹⁵ This response defends both sovereignty and autonomy, although at the expense of a degree of autonomy. The degree of autonomy lost will depend upon the negotiating resources and skill of the country.

Each of these responses to interdependence has implications for the resultant distribution of costs and benefits, at both the international and national levels. Internationally, none of the strategies will bring fundamental changes in the general relationship between North and South, but they may make a difference for individual Third World countries. By the same token, adherence to a strategy after it has become dysfunctional may threaten the progress made and call for a shift in orientation. For example, if large numbers of Third World countries were to choose the negotiated path, Northern markets might prove politically incapable of adjusting, thereby increasing the attractiveness of the insulation route.

The different responses may also influence the distribution of costs and benefits within the national political economy. But here the causal path is more complex because it is conditional upon the political arrangements adopted to implement the strategy nationally. Despite attempts to tie the political and economic repression of labour in Latin America to export production, evidence suggests no causal link.¹⁶ Analysis of the politics of adjustment among small Northern countries demonstrates that social democratic forms of governing, distributing benefits and cushioning the costs of international competitiveness are

¹⁴ For a study which emphasises the possibilities of this strategy see, David B Yoffie, *Power and Protection*, New York: Columbia University Press, 1983; for a stress on its limits see, L N Rangarajan, *Commodity Conflict*, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1978.

¹⁵ Theoretical justification for this strategy and a model of how the components interact can be found in David R Mares, *Penetrating International Markets: Theoretical Considerations and a Mexican Agriculture Case*, New York: Columbia University Press, 1987.

¹⁶ David Collier (ed), *The New Authoritarianism in Latin America*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979.

both politically and economically feasible.¹⁷ The failure in theoretical or empirical terms to make the link between production for export and repression suggests the importance of domestic politics in understanding how development strategies affect social classes.

In sum, Mexico faces two challenges at the moment. One is to review its strategy for dealing with the dilemmas of sovereignty and autonomy in an interdependent world. While interdependence among the capitalist nations has a logic of its own, policy choices can have a significant impact on its international distribution of benefits and costs. A second challenge lies in devising domestic political strategies to bring about structural change in the economy, at social and political costs which are at a level that will not undermine the chosen development strategy. How is Mexico addressing these twin challenges?

Mexico's political economy under transition

Brief historical overview

The modern Mexican state emerged after almost two decades of revolution, civil war, and military revolts (1910–29). Out of this turmoil was constructed an elite-centred consensus that allowed regional strongmen to dominate their areas in return for peace in national politics. Under the presidency of Lázaro Cárdenas (1934–40) this elite coalition was broadened to include labour and peasants. In addition, the representation of business and industry was formalised through mandatory membership in peak associations. These corporatist organisations not only serve as channels by which societal forces gain access to decision makers, they also permit representatives of the government to influence the content and presentation of societal demands.¹⁸

These broader alliances were constructed on the basis of material and ideological interests. Peasants were given land reform, and the urban industrial labour force the support of organisation and strikes. Entrepreneurs gained state subsidies for their enterprises in the form of import protection and below-cost sales of inputs produced by state-

¹⁷ Peter J Katzenstein, *Small States in World Markets*, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1985.

¹⁸ The English-language literature on Mexico's political economy is vast. Standard introductions include Raymond Vernon, *The Dilemma of Mexico's Development*, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1963; Clark Reynolds, *The Mexican Economy*, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1970; Roger D Hansen, *The Politics of Mexican Development*, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1971; Susan Kaufman Purcell and John F H Purcell, 'State and society: must a stable polity be institutionalized?' *World Politics* (32) January 1980; and *Latin American Perspectives*, Summer 1975, special issue.

owned enterprises. They also benefited from control over labour and peasant demands for a more equitable distribution of the benefits of economic growth. Among the ideological factors supporting the coalition have been social justice and national sovereignty.

Although the ruling coalition includes all important social groups, the distribution of influence and benefits within the coalition varies. This variation is determined by the need for the coalition to respond to the pressures that accumulate under the pattern of economic growth as well as the authoritarian nature of the political system. For example, when the reality of Mexico's skewed distribution of income (the top 10 per cent of the population receives 40.6 per cent of total national income while the bottom 20 per cent gets only 2.9 per cent¹⁹) threatened to diminish political support from the poor, extensive social welfare programmes were introduced.

The state-led ISI development strategy implemented after 1940 and defended until the late 1970s was used to meet the demands of the political coalition. Protection and subsidies were distributed to the private sector while labour was fragmented into two factions, one privileged and granted social welfare programmes in return for disciplined support to the political coalition and the other, disorganised, defenceless, and generally marginal to the welfare state. ISI itself promised to insulate the domestic economy from much of the international fluctuation to which developing countries were especially vulnerable. Its initial successes led policymakers to perceive autonomous national development as a goal which was not only desirable but, with the correct state policies, attainable.

To safeguard the states' ability to influence investment patterns, group mobilisation and inter-group conflicts, over time political institutions developed significant insulation from societal forces. For example, although the single-term limit on elected public office was a demand of the Mexican Revolution in response to electoral manipulation by the Porfirian dictatorship, it has also served to marginalise the electorate's ability to sanction individual office holders.

In addition, social forces have given great autonomy to the political system through two political bargains. These deals help to ensure that the leaders of each group will continue to identify their own interests in remaining within the coalition. The first bargain involves continued

¹⁹ 1977 figures cited from the World Bank, *World Development Report 1986* by Jorge G Castaneda in 'Mexico's coming challenges' *Foreign Policy* (64) Fall 1986, p 127. The economic crisis beginning in 1982 most certainly increased inequality in Mexico.

support for the system even in the face of short-run losses, because of the existence of a guarantee of compensation in the long run. The second bargain involves joining an alliance for economic growth to allow the peaceful distribution of an ever-expanding pie.²⁰

Partly as a result of these factors, presidential dominance over the political apparatus is virtually complete for a period of five years (once his successor is chosen, a year before taking office, the President becomes a 'lame duck'). Congress does the President's bidding (the rejection of presidential proposals is unheard of and even modification is rare); the judiciary generally follows the President's lead; and most major political posts (governorships and party offices) are selected by the President. The dominant party (PRI) uses the finances and other resources of the government. All major office holders are members of the party, and the electoral machinery is controlled from the centre. The result is that the President has many tools that increase his leeway to formulate and implement policy. His freedom of action is not absolute, but the constraints on his policymaking ability are severely limited.

The system was not perfect. There were major political clashes with labour in the late 1940s and 1950s, with landless peasants in 1958, and with the middle class in the 1952 presidential elections. There were also economic anxieties in the early 1950s and 1960s. But the overall level of political stability and economic growth was sufficient to lead many to marvel at Mexico's peaceful economic 'miracle', known as 'Stabilising Development'.

After 1968, however, serious challenges arose. The children of the middle class were massacred in the streets in 1968, the traditional high population growth rates and the capital intensive nature of the country's industrialisation led to significant underemployment in the urban areas and millions of landless peasants in the countryside. Sources of domestic capital became concerned about the slowdown in economic growth. In addition, the current account deficit now threatened to constrain domestic economic policy: its 1970 level of more than one billion US dollars represented a 50 per cent increase over 1969 and tripled that of 1966.²¹ The legitimacy of both the authoritarian

²⁰ Jorge I Domínguez, 'Introduction' in Domínguez (ed), *Mexico's Political Economy: Challenges at Home and Abroad*, Beverly Hills, California: Sage, 1982, pp 10-11; and Purcell and Purcell, 'State and Society'.

²¹ René Villarreal, *El desequilibrio externo en la industrialización de México (1929-1975)*, México: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1976, p 110.

corporatist political system and the ISI development strategy was under great stress.²²

Luis Echeverría (1970–76) sought to address these problems with a modification of the ISI strategy, dubbed 'Shared Development'. It had four pillars: the use of public expenditure to stimulate demand and broaden the domestic market; the fuller use of existing productive capacity; the deepening of import substitution; and the expansion and diversification of exports to help to confront the foreign exchange bottleneck. On the political side, electoral reform was offered. These moves represented an effort to revitalise a strategy of insulation and to introduce a different domestic distribution of gains and losses.

Domestic capital, labour, peasants and opposition political parties threatened, however, non-participation in 'official' reform and Echeverría had to find other means to support 'Shared Development'. The choice fell on an expansion of the public sector deficit (from an average annual rate of 2.5 per cent of GDP in 1965–70 to 9.5 per cent in 1976²³) and an increase in the external debt; by 1976 Mexico's public foreign debt was US\$20 billion.²⁴ These alternative means of supporting 'Shared Development' proved unsustainable, however, and in 1976 the development strategy collapsed in the midst of domestic political and foreign debt crises. Ironically, this failure to revitalise ISI created domestic challenges to the state's sovereignty and foreign constraints on its autonomy.

Jose Lopez Portillo (1976–82) began his administration with an International Monetary Fund (IMF) stabilisation programme, calls for structural change, an emphasis on anti-corruption and electoral reform. From 1977–79 some progress was achieved in stabilisation and structural change because there appeared to be no alternative but to accept interdependence. Once petroleum revenues finally began coming in (its export value was less than US\$1 billion in 1977²⁵) and transnational banks returned to offer new money, Mexican leaders' calculations changed.

It was now believed that the foreign exchange bottleneck which had

²² I have dealt with the political economy of the period 1970–82 elsewhere, so here I present only a quick description of events. For a detailed analysis, see David R Mares, 'Explaining choice of development strategies: suggestions from Mexico 1970–1982', *International Organization* 39(4) Autumn 1985, pp 667–97 and the sources cited therein.

²³ Sidney Weintraub, 'Case study of economic stabilization: Mexico', in William R Cline and Sidney Weintraub, (eds), *Economic Stabilization in Developing Countries*, Washington DC: Brookings Institution, 1981, p 19.

²⁴ Figures taken from lecture by Jesus Silva Herzog, Stanford University, 15 January 1987.

²⁵ *ibid.*

caused ISI so many problems, was solved. Insulation of domestic industry could proceed (reflected in the decision not to join the GATT) and domestic distributional questions would be settled by giving everyone something. Foreign consumers of energy, in both the North and South, would finance this dramatic increase in Mexican autonomy. The currency was allowed to become overvalued, structural change became something to be achieved by tying non-petroleum exports to petroleum exports, corruption reached new heights, and electoral reform seemed less pressing in a booming economy. Mexican sovereignty and autonomy seemed assured and the country attained a status of respected spokesperson for the South in the eyes of the North.

But this second attempt in the 1970s to safeguard national autonomy created a dangerous contradiction. For the first time in half a century, economic growth came to depend upon two international markets over which Mexico had no control: energy and finance. When the USA decided in 1979 to assert its national autonomy and provoke a domestic recession, the world economy plunged into crisis and the energy and financial markets collapsed within three years. Mexico's increased vulnerability became evident as the interest payments on its foreign debt increased and the value of its petroleum exports decreased.

Lopez Portillo chose to respond to the developing economic crisis by contracting more international loans (public sector foreign debt increased by US\$19.2 billion in 1981²⁶). Priority was placed on sustaining the economic largesse that would, it was hoped, increase voter turnout and the PRI's margin of victory. Those results would demonstrate that the political system had finally overcome the legitimacy crisis which had haunted it since 1968.

Mexico's political elite probably did not appreciate the magnitude of the risks of such a strategy. They now increased the vulnerability of the state's autonomy to an internal group, in addition to the two international markets and US fiscal policy. Holders of wealth in Mexico, large and small, could see the end in sight and fled from pesos into dollars, thus aggravating (not causing) the development of the crisis.

Choosing a new strategy 1982-86

With the presidential election of 1982 over, policymakers turned to confront the economic crisis. Three economic tasks presented

²⁶ Rosario Green, 'Mexico: crisis financiera y deuda externa', *Comercio Exterior*, February 1983, p 105.

themselves: finding a solution to the foreign debt; stabilising the crashing economy; and undertaking structural change to permit a growth free from addiction to foreign debt. On the political front, the state sought to regain its leadership through an anti-corruption campaign and a massive publicity effort (the *Consulta Popular*) in support of its economic recovery programme.

For almost two years Mexico followed a fairly typical stabilisation path, overseen by the IMF. It did so at a time when the IMF, the US government and the transnational banks were having difficulty persuading Argentina, Colombia, Venezuela and Peru to accept similar strategies. The results were fairly predictable: severe contraction in economic activity, decreases in the public sector deficit, an increase in the trade surplus, devaluations, and a plan to liberalise trade.

Mexico's choice of this route resulted from the conjunction of three major factors. First, the US government intervened quickly and with enough money to give Mexico time to reach an agreement with the IMF and its creditors and to demonstrate the benefits of playing by the rules. Second, domestic opposition to stabilisation was muted. Most people's attention was diverted elsewhere: the bank nationalisation of 1982 evoked a nationalistic euphoria, the exposure of corruption under Lopez Portillo diverted anger from the system to individuals, and individuals found direct ways to minimise the costs of stabilisation as an informal economic sector mushroomed, illegal migration to the USA increased, and capital flight continued. Finally, President de la Madrid surrounded himself with a cabinet which was largely united on economic policy. Not only did they agree that stabilisation was necessary but they also believed that it forced the kinds of structural changes that were difficult to make in normal times. It was a group which believed acceptance of interdependence was the only viable route. Consequently, Mexico would need to negotiate advantages in the international political economy and, for this, a more efficient economy was a necessary precondition.

However, structural change demands long-term policies and political decisions on the accommodation of winners and losers (including direct foreign investment and transnational banks) in the change. The political calendar in Mexico took precedence once again as important elections approached in 1985. Economic policy increasingly emphasised spurring growth and avoiding the hard political choices involved in structural change. The economy recovered in 1984 (GDP growth of 4 per cent²⁷) but

²⁷ Latin America Regional Reports, *Mexico and Central America Report*, 21 March 1986, p. 7.

at significant cost to both short-run stabilisation and structural change. The public sector deficit increased, the trade surplus deteriorated, inflation resumed and liberalisation of trade was significantly slowed.²⁸

If Mexico had abandoned the stabilisation route because it believed it had found another which could provide sustainable growth, it would have been following Brazil's path. But the changes were undertaken without a long-run vision, and responded to changes in the domestic political situation which looked threatening to the PRI and beneficial to the opposition parties. Mexicans had reluctantly accepted recession because they expected things to improve. The corruption scandal threatened to go beyond individuals to an indictment of the system. The USA was also not being very helpful: advocates of immigration reform were stimulated by the increased flow of Mexicans to the USA and the Congress, the Press and Ambassador John Gavin became open advocates of cleaner elections in Mexico. Moreover, the transnational banks were not anxious to finance recovery beyond mere debt payments.

The Mexican government paid a high political and economic price for the PRI's electoral victories in 1985 and 1986. In political terms, the US Press was on hand to record electoral fraud, supporters of the rightist party, PAN, rioted, and parties of the right and left formed an anti-PRI publicity campaign.²⁹ Economic costs were also high. The economy began slipping back into recession once the government addressed the economic consequences of promoting renewed growth without changing the structural elements which made growth dependent upon fiscal deficits or foreign debt. In July 1985 austerity was renewed, the peso's rate of devaluation accelerated (in June 1985 it had reached its highest real value in two decades), trade liberalisation was speeded up (partly in response to acceptance of GATT membership), the public payroll was reduced by 30,000, and promises to sell more state firms were repeated.³⁰

Before the new stabilisation effort could make much of an impact Mexico was hit by two events over which it had no control. One was a devastating earthquake which killed and injured thousands and left many more homeless and without employment. The other was the

²⁸ *ibid.*, 12 July 1985, p 2; the Government's description and explanation, which leaves out politics, can be founded in Secretaria de Hacienda y Credito Publico, 'Carta de Intencion al FMI', *Comercio Exterior* 36(8) p 730.

²⁹ Latin America Regional Reports, *Mexico and Central America Report*, 25 September 1986, p 2.

³⁰ *ibid.*, 16 July 1985, p 2 and 25 September 1986, p 2; Gobierno de Mexico, 'La politica de comercio exterior', *Comercio Exterior*, 36(8) pp 735-41.

renewal of the dramatic decline in oil prices, which began in 1985 and cost Mexico US\$6–7 billion in 1986.³¹ The government was forced to make major borrowings from domestic savings, including 100 per cent of bank deposits in December 1985, in order to finance its own budget deficits. The private sector responded to the renewed squeeze on credit with sporadic and unorganised repayment strikes on their government loans, stimulation of a parallel private financial market, and threats to support the PAN opposition.³²

The government seemed at a loss for a response to the worsening situation in early 1986. A fissure began to appear in the strong consensus on taking the orthodox route to recovery, when Finance Minister, Jesus Silva Herzog, who had negotiated the previous packages with the IMF and transnational banks, began to advocate a harder line toward international creditors. The likelihood that the only Latin American showcase for orthodox stabilisation was on the verge of defecting (Argentina, Brazil, Venezuela, Colombia and Peru had all rejected IMF guidance while Chile's military government was an embarrassment to the USA) probably forced the US government's hand. The Federal Reserve Board chairman, Paul Volker, paid a secret visit to Mexico and promised to help Mexico to obtain a better deal from the international banks.³³

De la Madrid was now faced with a new choice. The decision had to be based not only on support for long-run change, but also on growth in 1987, when the presidential succession campaign would begin. He dismissed Silva Herzog and joined forces with Volker. In the process, he may also have gained politically, for Silva Herzog was believed to be such a strong candidate for the presidency that he would soon be threatening the President's prerogative to nominate his successor.³⁴

After months of strenuous negotiations, Mexico formed a new agreement with the IMF and the transnational banks. It is a remarkable agreement and clearly demonstrates that Mexico's negotiating power was made significant by its threatened collapse and defection. Nearly one-half of the public external debt was rescheduled, with a seven-year grace period and a twenty-year maturity. The spread of 0.8125 per cent Libor given to Mexico was the lowest of any debtor. The package of US\$12 billion is to be increased by \$1.7 billion if the price of oil falls

³¹ *Examen de las situacion economica de Mexico*, 62(729) August 1986, pp 362–3.

³² Latin America Regional Reports, *Mexico and Central America Report*, 14 February 1986, p 1; 21 March 1986, p 7; and 2 May pp 2–3.

³³ *ibid.*, 17 July 1986, p 8.

³⁴ *ibid.*

below US\$9 per barrel or if the economy fails to grow by 3–4 per cent in 1987! The World Bank agreed to co-finance and guarantee part of these contingency funds. Finally, the IMF agreed to remove the impact of inflation on interest payments on internal debt in its calculations of Mexico's budget deficit. This accounting could shave 2 per cent of GDP off the figures.³⁵

This package is the envy of debtors; Brazil is already demanding similar terms.³⁶ But the question is, what can Mexico do with it? Mexico had problems before the current decline in petroleum revenues; its problems are structural and require structural answers. Those answers require difficult political choices, whether they are attempted under the auspices of the liberal international financial system or on its margins.

In 1987 there are two groups within the PRI vying for the right to make the necessary choices. Some observers see this split as an indication of the seriousness of the Mexican situation.³⁷ But that is a misreading of Mexican politics. In an election year, this is the time for different currents within the PRI, especially those which felt excluded from the outgoing administration, to surface, to mobilise their constituents and to try to have an impact on the policies of the successor, whoever it may be. This was true in 1958, 1964 and 1970, and while the severity of the political crises in 1976 muted disagreements, they surfaced again in 1982. This is democracy *à la mexicana*.

The 'Movimiento de Renovacion Democratica' represents the national populist coalition and is thus heir to the 'Shared Development' strategy which failed in the early 1970s. Its public leader, Porfirio Munoz Ledo, was Minister of Labour during that period. (Echeverria himself is rumoured to be behind this group.) Other prominent leaders include Carlos Tello, best known for leading the nationalisation of the banks in 1982, and Cuauhtemoc Cardenas, the son of the most radical of Mexican presidents, Lazaro Cardenas. For this group, national autonomy is achieved by seizing it and forcing outsiders to adjust. Its economic strategy consists in insulating industry and agriculture until it can compete on favourable terms in the international market. Its political programme is one of distribution in favour of labour, peasants and those national capitalists who follow the lead of the state; foreign capital is to be residual and tightly regulated. Its solution for the foreign debt problem consists in tying it to the country's capacity to pay

³⁵ *Wall Street Journal*, 9 January 1987, p 24.

³⁶ *ibid.*

³⁷ For example, Latin American Research Reports, *Mexico and Central America Report*, 30 October 1986, p 2.

without recession.³⁸ But its programme still faces the constraints encountered by Echeverría before Mexico had a debt crisis: how can Mexico finance import substitution in the capital goods sector and distribute wealth to those at the bottom of society? The answer is to have foreigners pay (by lending at unprofitable rates, investing in unprofitable enterprises, and importing high-cost, low-quality goods) while refusing them a say in how the funds are spent. This strategy, while defending national autonomy, does not appear very viable.

However, the plans of the other group do not seem to offer a way out of the recurrent cycle of stabilisation, unstable growth, stabilisation. The de la Madrid faction in PRI (in fact, in the state bureaucracy), believes that autonomy is achieved by adjusting to outside forces. This demands restructuring and making the economy efficient in intermediate level manufactures (e.g. motor vehicle and electrical parts) and using direct foreign investment to gain technology and international markets. The state will attempt to do less in the economy, but still guide it. By maintaining this management role the state will be able to negotiate for better terms in its acceptance of interdependence. Labour, peasants and national capital have to make sacrifices now in order to gain later. This strategy also faces serious problems. The foreign sector does not appear to be committed to financing growth during a long period of adjustment, and this group will be incapable of making labour, peasants and national capital pay during election years.

Conclusion

The Mexican political system has demonstrated a capacity to survive, although it increasingly appears dependent for its success on *ad hoc* infusions of foreign funds. Ironically, however, this path to national sovereignty undermines national autonomy in the short run and threatens to question sovereignty itself. At this point, sovereignty and autonomy require taking the hard political decisions to alienate some domestic and international supporters, in order to embark on a path of sustained economic recovery and distribution of wealth. If this strategy is successful, the alienation of those supporters will prove to be temporary as they return to participate in the wealth. If unsuccessful, because the path chosen was the wrong one, or the political elite shied away from alienating its supporters, the support gained will be short-lived, as those who extended it seek answers elsewhere.

³⁸ *ibid.*, and extrapolation from other pronouncements by members of this tendency.

The consolidation of Alan García's Government in Peru

When Alan García Pérez received the presidential sash from Fernando Belaúnde on 28 July 1985, most observers thought that the 'honeymoon' period of the new government would not last for long. Despite the size of the Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana (APRA) victory in the 1985 elections, the problems faced by the new president were formidable. There were problems with debt repayments to foreign creditors, many of whom had not received interest let alone principal during the last year of the Belaúnde government. There were also problems in fulfilling election promises to reactivate the economy and to reverse the sharp fall in living standards experienced over the previous ten years. García also faced a growing guerrilla presence in the highlands, a movement which appeared to be spreading to the cities. In addition, there was the problem of how to handle the military, which historically had shown strong anti-Aprista sentiments.

A year and a half after his inauguration, García had not only shown the capacity to survive and to deal with some of these problems, but had also done much to build up a powerful political machine with himself firmly in control. The opinion polls continued to show García enjoying strong popularity, *more* so than his political rivals to the left or to the right of APRA. The November 1986 municipal elections saw APRA gaining control of nearly all the municipalities in the country. The election was a further endorsement of the President and his Administration. Indeed, such was García's public profile that his opposition critics declared that his ambition was to turn Peru from a republic into a kingdom. The jibe was given added force when in November 1986, just after the elections, a proposal was floated in Congress which, if passed, would have changed the Constitution to permit García a second consecutive term in office, assuming that APRA won the 1990 elections.

Rather than reviewing individual policies and their success or failure, the central purpose of this article is to identify the ways in which García and his associates have attempted to build on this popularity so as to strengthen the position of the ruling party within the framework of Peruvian politics. In particular it examines the ways in which the party

leadership has set about expanding the party's political base (largely at the expense of the Left) into areas where it had previously enjoyed little support. The article then looks at how García has been able to forge links with Peru's business community, again an area where APRA had traditionally enjoyed little support. Finally we observe how APRA under García has sought to achieve a *modus vivendi* with the military.

King of the castle

An important element of García's popularity is the charismatic figure of the President himself. Young, tall, good-looking with a flair for oratory and communication with the public, García has adopted a strident populist style. From the outset, he sought to project his image through direct contact with the people. Typical were his *balconazos*, fiery speeches from the palace balcony, relayed throughout the country by the largely supportive press and television. The image he conveyed was one of drive and authority. He made it clear that he, not his ministers or fellow party leaders, was the man in charge. Like Víctor Raúl Haya de la Torre, APRA's founding father and García's political mentor, he is fully aware of the political value of personalism.

But the secret of García's public profile goes beyond charisma and the cult of personality. During its first eighteen months his government, through various aspects of policy, successfully articulated nationalist sentiment. Nowhere was this more clear than in regard to APRA's policy on debt. In saying that Peru would limit debt payments to '10 per cent of exports', and would no longer accept International Monetary Fund (IMF) control over economic policy-making, he was responding to the popular mood of a country which had striven since 1977 to comply with stabilisation policies irrespective of their inflationary and recessionary impact. Indeed, in doing so, he upstaged the Marxist United Left (Izquierda Unida—IU) coalition, which had emerged as the country's second largest political force in the 1985 elections. The nationalist stance was further developed in 1986 when the government's refusal to pay its arrears to the IMF led to Peru being declared 'ineligible' for further Fund support. Similarly García mobilised nationalist sentiments by ousting one of the foreign oil companies (Belco) for tax avoidance. He also made a big issue of 'forcing' Peru's biggest foreign oil contractor (Occidental) to sign a new contract, though many believe the new contract to be less favourable to Peru than the old. Oil contracts have traditionally been a highly sensitive issue in Peruvian politics. Also in its

foreign policy, Peru's support for the Non-Aligned Movement and its criticism of US policy in Central America have reinforced its nationalist credentials.

García's popularity was further enhanced by his ability to claim major successes in his government's handling of the economy. In 1986 the Peruvian economy grew by 9 per cent, the fastest single year's growth for twenty-five years. Manufacturing industry, undermined by domestic recession since 1982, chalked up a spectacular 16.9 per cent growth rate. Peru's average rate of growth in 1986 was the fastest in Latin America, outpacing even Brazil, which like Peru had refused to accept orthodox IMF stabilisation policies. At the same time, the García government had not only managed to bring inflation down from 11 per cent a month in the last period of the Belaúnde government to around 4 per cent, but to keep it around 4 per cent a month for over a year. The official inflation rate of 63 per cent in 1986 compared with 158 per cent in 1985 and 111 per cent in 1984. Not only did Peru under García 'cock a snook' at the international banking community, and remain relatively unscathed, it actually appeared to benefit from doing so.

But before beginning an analysis of how García has tried to build on his popularity and gain support from business and the military, it is important briefly to outline some of the main features which characterise the party, which had waited since the 1930s to win office.

Reviving APRA's fortunes: García's leadership, 1982-85

In 1982 at the age of thirty-four, Alan García became General Secretary of what is formally known as the Peruvian Aprista Party (PAP). He inherited a party which was dispirited and demoralised. From 1978, when APRA had won the largest number of seats in the Constituent Assembly and Haya de la Torre had become the Assembly's president, the party's fortunes had declined. First, Haya de la Torre died of cancer in 1979. Then APRA, which had been widely tipped to win the 1980 general elections, did badly. Fernando Belaúnde won 46 per cent of valid votes (see Table of election results) while APRA's Armando Villanueva picked up only 27 per cent. In the wake of this rebuff APRA suffered a significant split, resulting in a prominent leader from the right of the party, Andrés Townsend, setting up his own political grouping and claiming to represent the true legacy of Haya de la Torre. It was therefore up to García, a relatively inexperienced political figure, to impose his authority over the different factions within the party, and to

ALAN GARCÍA'S GOVERNMENT

Peru: election results 1980-86

	<i>As % of all votes cast (including null & void)¹</i>				
	1980 (presid)	1980 (munic)	1983 (munic)	1985 (presid)	1986 (munic)
APRA	21.3	19.3	27.2	45.7	40.7
Acción Popular	35.2	30.7	14.4	6.8	NP
Izquierda Unida	11.0 ²	19.3	23.8	21.1	26.4
Partido Popular Cristiano	7.4	9.6	11.4	10.2 ³	12.6
Others/Independents	2.7	6.3	5.6	2.6	5.6

¹ Until 1985 it was most usual for election percentages to be expressed as a proportion of valid votes cast, thus excluding votes that were null or void.

² Combined votes of PRT, FOCEP, UNIR, UI and UDP.

³ In alliance with Aprista splinter group (MBH) under the name of Convergencia Democrática.

Note: Non-participant. As in the 1978 Constituent Assembly elections Acción Popular did not participate in the 1986 municipal elections.

Source: Jurado Nacional de Elecciones (JNE).

attempt to widen its geographical and social appeal in time for the 1985 elections. He proved to be extremely successful.

One of his priorities during this period was to consolidate the party's links with the armed forces.¹ Back in 1932, Haya de la Torre and other Aprista *dirigentes*, angered by what they considered to be the electoral fraud perpetrated against the party in the 1931 election, became involved in an armed insurrection in the city of Trujillo, the centre of APRA's power base. The military of the day brutally quelled the uprising, responding in a similar way to other revolts in the early 1930s. In 1933 APRA was outlawed. From Trujillo onwards, the military imposed a veto on APRA's coming to power. The party suffered lengthy periods of repression, clandestinity and exile. The only exception was the partial lifting of the veto in the period 1945 to 1948 when the party did participate in government, holding several important ministries. It also supported the conservative Prado Administration during the period from 1956 to 1962. It is not clear exactly when this veto was finally lifted. According to APRA's elder statesman and first Vice-President under

¹ Interview with the author, June 1983.

García, Luis Alberto Sánchez,² the *rapprochement* took place in 1976, a year after a more conservative military government had replaced the reformist Revolutionary Government of the Armed Forces of General Juan Velasco. Between the years 1975 and 1980, under the government of General Francisco Morales Bermúdez, the relationship between the Apristas and the military authorities improved significantly, to the extent that many observers believed that the military would use its weight to tip the political balance in APRA's favour. By the time García became General Secretary in 1982, APRA had gone some way towards establishing a more secure relationship with the military.

One of the immediate difficulties faced by García was how to assert the authority of his leadership over the party. His rise to pre-eminence had been at the expense of many of the previous generation of leading party members, Haya's putative successors. García held two important cards. The first was that he had been shown particular favour by Haya himself, who apparently recognised his political talents at an early age. He became almost a political protégé. Secondly, García was careful to maintain close relations with Luis Alberto Sánchez, a key member of the party's old guard. Though on the conservative wing, Sánchez did not follow the Townsend faction, and remained within the party after the split. García's ability to consolidate personal control and to make himself unassailable to his rivals owes much to his energy and political flair. However, he was aided by his inheritance of the leadership of a party with a long history of vertical, authoritarian control and a strong sense of hierarchy.

During his long political life, Haya de la Torre exercised almost absolute control over the party apparatus. He stood head and shoulders above his fellow party leaders, and would not tolerate the questioning of his authority. Indeed, APRA was a highly authoritarian structure in which the chain of command descended from the leader through a hierarchy of national, departmental, provincial and local committees. It was not a party structure which favoured internal pluralism. Many Apristas who disagreed with Haya or his group had little alternative but to leave the party. However, for those who offered unswerving loyalty, it was a system which could provide quick and rapid preferment, and a way of mobility out of provincial life.

The party's vertical structure owed much to the legacy of repression

² Sanchez cites the occasion when APRA and the military each agreed to forego the ritualised demonstration in Trujillo in commemoration of the uprising of 1932. Interview with author. January 1986.

which lasted intermittently until the mid-1950s. Closely linked to authoritarian control was the cult of leadership fostered by Haya de la Torre, who in party literature was made out to be a man of prophetic, almost God-like stature.³ It was partly for this reason that Haya's death was such a blow to the party which he had created and fostered. This was a lesson which was not lost on García.

García realised, though, that the party needed to be brought up to date and to be made more attractive to a broader spectrum of Peruvian voters. The party's initial ideological stand was radical and reformist, involving both nationalisation of foreign companies and land reform. By the 1950s the party's ideology had become more conservative and stridently anti-communist. In fact, the Velasco government pushed through many of the reforms first put forward by APRA. But this time APRA's links with popular organisations were being rapidly whittled away with the growth of mass-based political parties on the Left. Nowhere was this encroachment clearer than among the trade unions where the once powerful Aprista Confederación de Trabajadores del Perú (CTP) was almost totally eclipsed by the growth of the communist-led Confederación General de Trabajadores del Perú (CGTP) and independent union federations further to the Left. The loss of links with popular organisations and of prominent members of the party was due to APRA's alliances with conservatives, in particular with Prado (1956-62) and the former dictator, Manuel Odría (1963-67).

APRA has always styled itself as a multi-class party, appealing to a spectrum of class interests which could rally around a nationalistic anti-oligarchic ideology. This aspiration has in turn reflected an ideological and programmatic vagueness. APRA has always tended to shy away from a narrowly class-based interpretation which would preclude alliances with certain classes. Indeed, it has tended to stress how all Peruvians, rich or poor, are ultimately brothers. The accent on redistribution of wealth which influenced its early thinking was gradually superseded by an insistence on the part of Haya de la Torre that it was not for the party to take wealth from those who have it, but to generate wealth for those who do not.

Finally, García saw the need to create a party presence and organisation among sectors where Aprismo was weak, and to widen the party's geographical ambit. Traditionally, the focus of Aprista support had been in the coastal area in the northern half of the country. APRA

³ See Imelda Vega Centeno's recent book *Aprismo Popular: Mito, Cultura e Historia*, Lima: Tarea, 1984. Also her *Ideología y Cultura en el Aprismo Popular*, Lima, 1986.

had grown up as an alliance between urban middle-class groups and organised labour in the departments of La Libertad and Lambayeque. APRA's performance since the 1930s in those elections in which it has been free to participate demonstrates this regional bias. As a consequence the party has found it difficult to build up a substantial vote in Lima and in the south, where the last fifteen years have seen a notable growth in Left-wing parties. In order to extend the party base, García, like Haya de la Torre and Belaúnde in his younger days, has spent considerable time and effort since 1982 on the road, from community to community, making himself known.

Building the party: the pyramid and the trapezium

Alan García's notable election victory in 1985 with 52 per cent of the vote (excluding null and void votes) was not attributable to any well-oiled national political machine working for APRA. The only part of Peru where APRA's organisational strength was solid was on the northern coast, in La Libertad and surrounding departments. As we have seen, APRA's election victory had much more to do with the way in which García's image and the promise of change was perceived by people tired of seeing their government conniving in the erosion of their living standards.

The attainment of office gave the party new opportunities to create and organise support in areas and among social sectors where APRA's popularity had traditionally been weak. García went out of his way in the election campaign to present himself as the candidate 'for all Peruvians', in order to appeal to as wide an audience as possible. Given García's upfront populist style, the presidency has become the crucial vehicle for extending the radius of APRA support. As this fact has become increasingly evident within the party, García's own position has become increasingly impregnable.

Taking advantage of government to help build party structures is nothing new in Peruvian politics, nor for that matter elsewhere in Latin America. President Belaúnde's creation and promotion of Cooperación Popular in the 1960s went hand in hand with mobilising support for his party, Acción Popular. Through rural development schemes, usually community-based, Acción Popular built an important part of its constituency, in the highland and the jungle rim, or *ceja de selva*, areas. The same occurred during the Velasco years when the military government set up Sinamos to help build and strengthen popular

support for the regime. When Belaúnde returned in 1980, so did Cooperación Popular.

Whereas Belaúnde's long-held obsession for developing the jungle and the *ceja de selva* led Cooperación Popular to concentrate much of its energies in this part of Peru, the accent shifted notably under García. APRA's targetted priority groups include the urban shanty-town (or *pueblo joven*) population, and the highland peasantry in what has become known as the 'Andean trapezium', encompassing the southern departments of Puno, Cuzco, Apurímac, Ayacucho and Huancavelica.

In many of his speeches, García has been at pains to stress his party's commitment to the poorest sectors of Peruvian society. In doing so he has typified Peruvian society as a pyramid divided into sectors: a relatively small 'formal', 'modern', 'privileged' Peru which includes the urban elite, the middle class and (significantly) unionised workers in relatively stable employment; and a numerically large 'informal', 'traditional' and 'underprivileged' Peru composed of the unemployed and underemployed of the *pueblos jóvenes* and the majority of rural peasant workers concentrated in the Andes.⁴

During his first eighteen months in office, García has taken a number of steps to demonstrate his interest in addressing himself to the latter part of the pyramid. In doing so, his government has been spurred on by the challenge posed by Sendero Luminoso, the Maoist-inspired rural guerrilla movement which has spread since 1980 over a wide swathe of southern Peru.⁵ Despite a massive counter-insurgency operation spearheaded by the military since 1982, Sendero has succeeded in spreading the radius of its support and operations both in the highlands and among the *pueblos jóvenes* of Lima. Belaúnde's response to insurgency in the highlands had been to turn the problem over to the military, his government making little attempt to win back support by pumping new resources into the area. García, however, has moved some way to recognising the long-term imperative of economic and political approaches to insurgency problems, if Sendero or other movements like it are ever to be quelled.

Mobilisation in these sectors was also seen to be important not only in building an APRA presence but in undermining the popularity of the

⁴ First developed in his inaugural speech on 28 July 1985. For an English translation, see *The Andean Report* (Lima) August 1985.

⁵ See Lewis Taylor's pamphlet, *Maoism in the Andes*, University of Liverpool Working Paper, 1983, for the development of Sendero Luminoso. Sendero has also built up a notable presence in La Libertad and the Huallaga Valley in the north, in parts of Junín and Pasco in the centre, as well as in Lima.

left-wing parties of the Izquierda Unida. Since the days of Velasco and Sinamos, the Left has had few rivals in its ability to organise the peasant communities and the urban *pueblos jóvenes*. The vote for the Izquierda Unida in the November 1983 municipal elections (when the IU won control of Lima as well as other provincial cities) was an indication of the Left's popularity. In rural areas too, the Left has had a strong foothold among peasant communities and in agricultural cooperatives, through its control of the two main confederations: the Confederación Nacional Agraria (CNA) and the Confederación Campesina del Perú (CCP). Despite the ideological difference between them, both confederations are closely linked to the Izquierda Unida.

The main instrument for mobilisation in the *pueblos jóvenes* has been the Programa de Apoya al Ingreso Temporal (PAIT), a scheme under which the central government gives unemployed workers temporary, short-term contracts to participate in community improvement projects. The scheme is administered by Cooperación Popular, which—despite the change in government—retains the old name given it by Acción Popular.

First announced in October 1985, the PAIT scheme has been expanded rapidly in the *pueblos jóvenes* around Lima, and in the *pueblos jóvenes* in other provincial cities. Within the first three months of operation alone, it was providing employment for 45,000 workers. Not surprisingly PAIT has been much criticised by the Left, which perceives it as a direct threat to its political hegemony in many of the *pueblos jóvenes*. There is a strong evidence to suggest that PAIT programmes, usually run by APRA militants, became a key tool in APRA's strategy to build local organisation in poor urban areas. Little attempt was made to hide PAIT's partisan nature during the municipal election campaign when the numbers involved virtually doubled before polling day. At the time of the election, for instance, PAIT workers in Chimbote and Huaraz complained bitterly about their being cursorily and prematurely laid off within a week after polling day.⁶ Indeed, the whole programme was suspended a month later, in December 1986. In providing work in areas of high unemployment and under-employment (especially among women), PAIT naturally responded to a pressing social need.

Mayors belonging to the Izquierda Unida pointed out the way in which the PAIT scheme had undermined the municipalities and their role.⁷ Municipalities in the *pueblos jóvenes* are chronically under-

⁶ *La Voz* (Lima) 2 December and 3 December 1986.

⁷ Interview with Michel Azcueta, mayor of Villa El Salvador, January 1986.

funded due to the lack of local resources and the lack of help from central government. Unable to finance the sort of projects undertaken by PAIT which would normally fall within their jurisdiction, the municipalities found that PAIT further erodes their credibility, while creating new patronage structures. PAIT also helped to undermine Left-wing and Church-based neighbourhood projects which had hitherto relied on non-paid labour.

A second but less important scheme is the Programa de Apoyo Directo (PAD), which also helps to boost APRA's presence in the *pueblos jóvenes*. First set up under Belaúnde but expanded under APRA, PAD works through community organisations such as mothers' clubs, and provides direct assistance such as distributing cookers and sewing machines. Additionally, the government has set up the Instituto de Desarrollo del Sector Informal (IDESI) which channels credit to, and finances, businesses in the 'informal' sector—so-called '*créditos chicha*'.

In rural areas the APRA government has given new priority to the development of links with peasant communities, and has established a variety of new aid programmes including Direct Assistance to Communities, the Microregional Development Fund, new subsidies to agricultural producers and a greatly increased volume of loans at concessional rates through the Banco Agrario. At a national level, the office coordinating the rural strategy is the Instituto Nacional de Planificación (INP),⁸ while at regional level the mechanism for disbursing funds is usually through the regional development corporations (CORDES), normally closely controlled by Apristas or APRA sympathisers. In the distribution of funds for capital investment, the 'Andean trapezium' has been earmarked for a much bigger proportion of spending than was the case previously. Though the annual budget is not necessarily an accurate guide as to how much is spent and where, the 1987 budget assigned 20 per cent of agricultural capital spending to the 'Andean trapezium', with over half of that going to Ayacucho and Puno.⁹ The government has, however, encountered considerable difficulty in locating projects in the 'trapezium' through which to channel the funds.

Also working through the INP and its head, Javier Tantaleán, García organised a series of 'mass dialogues' (known as '*rimanacuy*') with the leaders of peasant communities in different parts of the country. Five

⁸ See *Que Hacer* (Lima) (39) February–March 1986, an article by the head of INP, Javier Tantaleán.

⁹ *Caretas* (Lima) 15 December 1986.

rimanacuys took place during 1986; at Piura in the north; at Huancayo in the central highlands; at Puno in the south; at Cuzco also in the south; and finally at Pucallpa in the jungle.¹⁰ In theory, these were meetings at which presidents of communities discussed rural problems with the President of the Republic, with other ministers in attendance. In fact, García tended to arrive for the concluding speech. Significantly, in appealing directly to community presidents, the *rimanacuys* by-passed the peasant federations and confederations run by the Left. Indeed the *rimanacuys* were intended to be the basis of an organisational drive competing with that of the Left in rural areas. At the first of these events in Piura, leaders of the ccp were deliberately excluded, even though one of the ccp's leading personalities, the Leftist senator Andrés Luna Vargas, is himself from Piura. Only by remonstrating personally with García were ccp leaders admitted to this and the Huancayo *rimanacuy*.

The *rimanacuys* were not so much designed as APRA rallies, but more as events to relay the image of Alan García among rural communities. In terms of the numbers of communities represented at each rally, they were very successful. But only in the Puno *rimanacuy* was the local federation of peasants (affiliated to the ccp) officially present. They were carefully stage-managed by the INP to promote García, who would typically make a dramatic arrival by helicopter, and then skilfully appeal to an often sceptical audience through humour, strident oratory and promises of what his government would do.

These attempts to mobilise opinion in both the urban and rural settings were of course assisted by the government's success in reactivating the economy in 1986. An increase in real incomes in all sectors, especially in the *pueblos jóvenes*, generated strong demand for agricultural produce, so growth in the urban sector had a spill-over effect into the rural sector, especially those parts of it producing most for the market.¹¹ A detailed evaluation of the political effects of all these developments in both the *pueblos jóvenes* and rural areas awaits proper study at the local level. However, in comparison with the 1983 municipal elections, the 1986 poll saw the consolidation of the APRA vote in the south and in Lima where Aprista loyalties had never been traditionally strong, though in comparison with the 1985 presidential elections, the APRA vote was lower in percentage terms and the Izquierda Unida vote higher. (See Table.) As well as winning control of

¹⁰ On the Huancayo *Rimanacuy*, see *Que Hacer* (41) June-July 1986; and on the Pucallpa *Rimanacuy*, see *Que Hacer* (43) October-November 1986.

¹¹ *The Andean Report*, January 1987.

many districts of Lima previously run by the Left, APRA won control of departments with a strongly Left-wing tradition, such as Puno and Cuzco.¹² While in 1983, the Izquierda Unida won in eight departmental capitals, in 1986 it won in only two. Aprista local organisation in traditionally non-APRA areas is only incipient. In many areas, it seems that APRA victories have had most to do with the image of García. Votes have also stemmed from disillusionment with the often unexceptional record of Izquierda Unida in those municipalities which it previously controlled, and from financial and other stimuli to voters provided by PAIT and IDESI (in urban areas) and cheap credit and cash handouts (in rural communities). This suggests that APRA support in such places stemmed more from pragmatic than ideological considerations.

Relations with the private sector

The *rimanacuys* became both the means of making contact with a range of social groups and a vehicle for projecting García's personality. The government also looked for ways of building links, albeit in a slightly different style, with the business community. As a party APRA has never enjoyed a close relationship with the Peruvian business community, even though its early ideology was based on an alliance encompassing the middle classes and local business interests. The party was for a long time the *bête noire* of the Peruvian oligarchy, and this tended to taint its relations with the private sector. In more recent years it has been the Partido Popular Cristiano (PPC)—an offshoot from Christian Democracy in the 1960s—that has been the political mouthpiece of the local business elite. Politicians from the PPC have enjoyed a particularly close working relationship with the businessmen's pressure group, the Sociedad de Industrias (SI).

Since taking office, García has been able to create a close working relationship with the private sector, even though this is far from being one of the disadvantaged sectors of the social pyramid. In part he was able to take advantage of dissatisfaction among businessmen, especially manufacturers, with the PPC's close association with the experiment in economic liberalism under the Belaúnde government. Peruvian factory owners were particularly hard hit by the lowering of protective tariffs in 1981, and the PPC, which held the Industry Ministry from 1980–84, was seen to be guilty by association. APRA, by contrast, along with the

¹² For an electoral map of Lima, see *Caretas*, 12 January 1987.

United Left, had opposed this liberalism, arguing in favour of the maintenance of tariffs as a guard against an influx of cheap foreign imported goods.

The business community soon came to realise that, rhetoric apart, García needed their support. The tone of his inauguration speech extolled the importance of the state in economic management and planning, but did not appear to seek confrontation with private interests. The logic of García's strong nationalist stand against international banks and multinational lending agencies was that Peruvian private enterprise would have an important role to play in domestic capital accumulation if the desired 'reactivation' of the economy was to be attained. From the businessmen's point of view, the disastrous results of the Right in the 1985 elections (19 per cent of the vote including both the PPC and Accion Popular, giving them 14 per cent of the seats in Congress) left little alternative but to deal politically with the new APRA government. The first major public encounter between the government and private representatives was the annual conference of executives (CADE), held at Ica in November 1985. Though they went with a view to debating the new rules of the game with the new APRA government and obtaining concessions on such long-standing issues as job security, most businessmen were impressed by García's performance—even when he criticised them for wanting more guarantees and protection 'than a bank in Miami'.¹³

The role to be played by the private sector in the government's reactivation strategy was made clearer by a package of economic measures decreed in February 1986. The mixture of tax and financial incentives which were aimed to boost production included a reduction of sales tax (not to be passed on to the consumers), a cut in interest rates, a reduction in the industrial tariffs charged for electricity, and a series of measures to restrict imports which competed with locally produced products. These measures coincided with a strong surge in domestic demand. The motor for recovery was the increase in purchasing power that followed the drastic reduction in inflation, combined with periodic wage rises. The effects of reactivation in the manufacturing sector became increasingly clear in the second quarter. Shortages of certain manufactured goods began to appear as factories experienced expansion bottlenecks, though for many, it was mainly a question of utilising excess capacity which had been idle since the onset

¹³ See *Que Hacer* (38) December 1985–January 1986.

of recession in 1982-83. In the case of manufacturers, sales of basic consumer goods, such as shoes and clothing, increased significantly. Though companies found themselves paying their workers higher real wages, their profitability tended to increase by a greater margin.

It was therefore with a new sense of confidence that the government approached industrialists, anxious to find ways in which profits would be reinvested in what García called 'socially profitable' ventures, and not simply converted into dollars and transferred to bank accounts abroad. The strategy was to talk directly to the major economic groups first, not to the sectoral pressure groups. The hope was that smaller companies would be swept along by the response of the larger ones. In July and early August 1986, top government and APRA party officials set in motion a series of meetings with Peru's leading private sector groups.¹⁴ Heading the list was the Romero-Raffo group which had been supportive towards the APRA government from the beginning. As well as owning the country's biggest bank, the Banco de Crédito del Perú, the group has interests in textiles, agribusiness, real estate, insurance and construction. Then came the Brescia group (textiles, property, mining, hotels and insurance); the Nicolinis (milling, animal feeds); La Fabril (milling, textiles, distribution), the Bentins (brewing), the Lanattas (brewing, milling), the Wiese group (banking and financial services), the Cogorno and Isola groups (commercial and industrial) and, subsequently, the Hochschild and Benavides groups (mining). The general idea was to persuade these industrialists that if they failed to invest in the government's growth strategy (from which they were all benefiting) it would have little hope of success. The main items for negotiation were subsidies, the availability of cheap credit, fiscal incentives and exchange rate policy.

With the 'captains of industry' supporting the government's strategy to varying degrees, it was hardly surprising that the atmosphere which prevailed at the November 1986 CADE meeting held in Huaraz was of a positive nature. Gone was the scepticism of Ica concerning the government's promises and intentions. The tone was decidedly bullish.¹⁵ Juan Francisco Raffo, for the Romero group, argued forcefully that the self-interest of business coincided with an interest in supporting the government. To consolidate the gains achieved at the November 1986 CADE meeting, the Finance Ministry proceeded to set up a National Investment Board. In February 1987, the Finance Ministry issued a list

¹⁴ See *The Andean Report*, October 1986.

¹⁵ *Que Hacer* (44) December 1986-January 1987.

of the names of people invited to participate in the establishment of the board. The list included key representatives from mining, food, textile, construction, banking and exporting interest groups. The purpose was to take the main investors beyond the 'letter of intent' stage.¹⁶ It remains to be seen however, to what extent industrial optimism, spurred on by increasing growth in sectors such as manufacturing and construction, can be translated into sustained investment.

The corollary, however, of a government rapprochement with industrialists in the private-sector, was the government's increasingly unsympathetic attitude towards organised labour, which in García's social pyramid was relegated unequivocally to the 'privileged' modern sector. During the first year and a half of office, government policy aimed at increasing real wages. This tended to calm labour unrest. Indeed, partly as a result of five years of increasing unemployment and falling real wages during the Belaúnde administration, the militancy of Peru's highly politicised labour unions had diminished. However, at the beginning of 1987, there were signs that this was changing. First, the relationship between government and unions was soured by moves to diminish job security. There was the further threat that the Ministry of Labour would try to curb demand by encouraging firms not to succumb to union pressure for wage increases. The scene appeared set for increased union conflict, with little doubt as to which side the government was most committed to.

APRA and the military

Peru's generals returned to the barracks in 1980 after twelve years of power, having extracted certain conditions from their civilian successors under Belaúnde. They were anxious that reprisals would not be taken against those who had held office, and that military budgets and appointments would not become subject to civilian control. The military's position was that they should retain a say in matters which they considered to be of 'strategic' importance (ie development in the jungle) and that they would not be constrained by the civil authorities when it came to dealing with internal 'subversion'. Thrown out of the palace in 1968 none too decorously, Belaúnde was not the man to question such conditions. Though government policy clashed with that of the military on specific issues, (for example, the liberal oil code

¹⁶ *The Peru Report* (Lima) No. 2, February 1987.

affecting concessions in the jungle of the Minister of Mines and Energy, Pedro Pablo Kuczynski), Belaúnde avoided trouble. The main area of difficulty in civilian-military relations turned out to be the role played by the army and the marines in the struggle against Sendero from 1982 onwards. Though instances of human rights violation (murders, 'disappearances', torture) became frequent, Belaúnde was careful not to criticise the military too openly, irrespective of the image of his government at home and abroad. Indeed, Belaúnde underlined his disdain for human rights violation charges when he commented on how Amnesty International reports he received were invariably thrown into the waste paper basket.

Many of APRA's leaders (including the party's unsuccessful candidate in 1980, Armando Villanueva) had spoken out on the human rights issue. The party's human rights spokesman, Javier Valle Riestra, stood out as a particularly vociferous critic both in parliament and outside. In his inaugural speech, Alan García reasserted his commitment to the observance of human rights and to ensuring that the military recognised its responsibilities to a civilian president. He promised that 'the law will be applied with severity on those who violate human rights through killings', extra-judicial executions, torture and the abuse of power: 'To struggle against barbarity, [it was] not right to fall oneself into barbarity'. He also promised to investigate cases of those who were detained who were not members of Sendero Luminoso, and to establish a Peace Commission to 'seek dialogue to persuade those who are mistaken to return to democracy'. He went on to say that 'when the conditions are right', it might be possible to consider an amnesty for terrorists so as to promote 'understanding between Peruvians'. In saying this García appeared to be responding to the climate of international opinion against Belaúnde's handling of the problem.

It is difficult to judge the true tenor of relations between military and government, since only on rare occasions are differences aired in public. It is a relationship which gives rise to a plethora of sometimes knowledgeable, sometimes less-informed political speculation. But the tone of García's speech was not likely to have kindled enthusiasm among the military hierarchy. It was García's concern with his image abroad, especially within the Socialist International and in the Non-Aligned Movement, which partly explains his initial emphasis on conciliation rather than repression.

The first major crisis arose in September 1985, when news filtered out of a massacre perpetrated by troops at the Ayacuchan village of

Accomarca. Sixty-nine villagers were killed. The outcry in Lima, especially in parliament, stung García into responding. As well as making a strongly-worded speech in which he accused his predecessor of deliberately covering up atrocities committed by the military, he demanded the resignation of three key generals: the military commander in Ayacucho, the commander of the second military region based in Lima, and the President of the Armed Forces Joint Command.

Though the details are obscure, García's stand appears to have caused a strong response among the military. Indicative of this was the fact that the killings which took place shortly afterwards at two other villages (Bellavista and Umaru) were dealt with in a very different manner. No attempts were made to identify those responsible or to punish them.¹⁷ Attempts in parliament to investigate the issue further were blocked by the APRA majority. At the same time, members of the Peace Commission (formed in early September 1986), found that their attempts to get the Commission moving were frustrated by a lack of finance and by obstruction from the government and the military establishment. The newspapers which had dealt with the Accomarca massacre in detail, suddenly reduced their coverage of Ayacucho to a minimum. According to one government aide at the time, this was on orders from the palace. The obvious implication of this abrupt change in policy was that García had been given a stern warning by the military hierarchy.

A new crisis broke in June 1986. Following a mutiny by Sendero prisoners in three Lima jails, troops stormed them along with Republican Guard police, killing more than 300 people. Many of the victims at one jail, Lurigancho, were executed one by one after they had surrendered. No one knows for sure how many were killed when marines attacked another, the island jail of El Frontón, with bombs and bazookas, completely destroying the prison buildings. The embarrassment of the government was heightened by the way these events coincided with García's hosting a meeting of the Socialist International. Many of the delegates were horrified by what they saw taking place at such close quarters. Amid widespread rumours of an imminent *coup d'état*, García admitted that he had issued the order for military involvement to quell the mutinies. He blamed the military and police for excessive violence, promising that those responsible would be punished. Members of the Republican Guard who are normally

¹⁷ *Human Rights in Peru: Special Update* (London) PSG, July 1986.

responsible for guarding the jails, were temporarily interned. However, the army and marine troops involved, including General Jorge Rabanal who led the attack on Lurigancho, were not disciplined. There has been no serious investigation into what happened at El Frontón.¹⁸ According to one security official the events in the jails produced 'the elimination of a major focus of tension and subversive conspiracy'.¹⁹

Another sensitive moment followed in December 1986. This time, news emerged of another indiscriminate killing in Ayacucho, at the village of Parcco. The incident was announced in a routinely worded communiqué which talked of a 'clash with subversive delinquents'. Witnesses spoke of how among the victims was an eighty-two-year-old man, and his seventy-year-old wife and their grandchildren of ten and eleven. The revelation sparked a new outcry in parliament, and resulted in the decision to send another delegation to investigate what had happened. Following talks between García and military leaders, a new statement was released which announced that 'unfortunately acts had been committed which were contrary to the regulations which guide operations by the forces of order'. The statement said that those responsible would be tried in military courts, pre-empting demands from human rights organisations that trials be conducted in open civilian courts. The Aprista leader of the House of Deputies, León de Rivero, did his best to stop the investigating commission going to Ayacucho;²⁰ and when it finally did, it was stopped by the military from visiting the village concerned.²¹

While acutely conscious of promoting its democratic reputation abroad, the García government has resisted pressures from the Left and from human rights organisations to allow for more public monitoring of counter-insurgency strategies or for military personnel to be held criminally responsible for their actions in civilian courts. Meanwhile, at the beginning of 1987, state of emergency regulations were in force in the capital, while twenty provinces in four departments in south-central Peru were still under tight military control. In this so-called Emergency Zone, the peering eye of congressional commissions, human rights delegations and members of the press were still no more welcome than they had been under the Belaúnde regime.

In March 1987 a conflict between the Government and the military of

Amnesty International Report (London) February 1987.

The Peru Report, No. 2, February 1987.

Caretas, 9 December 1986.

Caretas, 19 January 1987.

a slightly different nature developed. Taking up an old idea, shelved at various points in the past, García announced his intention to unify the three military ministries—War, Navy and Aviation (each with a minister in the cabinet)—into a single defence ministry. Arguing that a single command would, amongst other things help end counter-insurgency, García's initiative ran into a barrage of protest. Those against the idea were those most likely to lose political weight, particularly in the Navy and the Air Force. Some senior members of the Army were also opposed, though military protest was largely articulated through retired generals and admirals. Irrespective of these protests, an extraordinary session of Congress approved the President's legislative proposals, leaving considerable leeway for the executive to regulate the law as it saw fit.

The Government's objective, it seems, was to take advantage of its popularity to take a step towards greater political control over the military. Its intention, at least, was that the new minister should be a civilian, if not an Aprista. The government was keen to have more direct control over promotions, control over military expenditure and an increased capacity to punish corruption within the armed forces. The reaction of the majority of the military establishment was muted, at least in public. The only senior officer to go beyond verbal opposition was Airforce General Luis Abram Cavallerino who ordered pilots to buzz the presidential palace. Abram Cavallerino was summarily dismissed immediately afterwards. Following closely on the disputes over human rights, the Ministry of Defence row created new levels of tension. The central issue in all these disputes was the question of institutional autonomy of the armed forces, one of the key conditions accepted by Belaúnde in 1980. In military circles there was the fear that the government would push ahead with the 'Apristización' of the military establishment. At the same time, however, García's trump card—his political standing—made it difficult for adversaries of the Ministry of Defence proposal at this point to take further steps to pursue their case.

Conclusion

Important advances were made by the APRA government during its first eighteen months in office to consolidate its political hold. In line with APRA's traditional polyclassist approach, the party attempted to draw new sectors into a pro-government political alliance, varying from the

business élite to the poor in the urban slums and rural communities, cemented by a strong nationalist ideology.

Such was the government's apparent success that opposition leaders, both on the Right and on the Left, became increasingly concerned at the extent to which their own political spheres of influence were being eroded. Some saw APRA preparing the ground for a term of office, extending well beyond 1990 when García's five-year term expires. They saw APRA successfully dominating the middle ground of politics, adopting an increasingly authoritarian and presidentialist style of government, and moving towards the establishment of a Peruvian version of the Mexican Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI). These fears, however, tend to exaggerate the degree of Aprista hegemony. Though the results of the local elections of November 1986 confirmed the party's electoral popularity, it remains to be seen how 'committed' or 'loyal' this vote will be, given that the party's presence in many areas of the country is at most thin on the ground.

The main 'joker in the pack' for the government as it entered 1987 was whether the impressive economic results for 1986 could be sustained. There can be little doubt that economic growth, coupled with an increase in employment and in real incomes is an important element in sustaining the government's popularity. But while nothing breeds success like success, the reverse may also turn out to be true if things begin to go badly.

In early 1987, there were ominous warning signs beginning to appear. On the external front, Peru's trade balance turned negative in the second half of 1986, as growth attracted more imports and as exports stagnated both in terms of volume and value. With international reserves falling by over a third between October 1986 and January 1987, many observers predicted a severe balance-of-payments crisis, even though debt payments were being kept to a minimum. At the same time, on the domestic front the renewal of devaluation, the progressive unfreezing of prices, and a surge in government spending (notably in its credit to the public sector) all heralded the revival of new inflationary pressures. Also, it was by no means clear that industrialists would honour their word and invest in expanding capacity. Without investment, growth would peter out and supply shortages would further fuel inflation.

In these circumstances, the government's commitment to increase real incomes in 1987 by between 6 and 7 per cent seemed extremely optimistic. But if the 1986 heady boom turns into stagnation (or worse)

in 1987, then the government's popularity may prove hard to sustain, while opposition groups may begin to take advantage of the opportunity to regain the political initiative.

A further danger lay in the resentment in the armed forces at the way in which the García government threatened the cherished institutional autonomy of the military. The social base for a successful coup was hard to detect, at least in the first part of 1987. But a deteriorating economy would mean that it would be harder to maintain García's 'populist' alliance. In this context, then, military resentment could still spell trouble for García, and put to the test the degree of political consolidation achieved since 1985 by APRA.

The Status: a day in the life of a contemporary Iranian writer*

In the Bejewelled Land¹ of (traditionally Shahanshahi) Persia, a good writer is a dead writer. So, being a contemporary novelist, alive and kicking on the literary scene of the (Ayatollahi) Islamic Republic of Iran, in the grip of a seven-year, holy, throttling, life-shrinking war, is not all that it's cracked up to be. Thomas Wolfe once wrote of *his* land as 'a place where miracles not only happen, but they happen every day, on the sidewalks'.² He must have spent a light-year weekend in Kermanshah.

Here, however, the myth miracle is the amalgamation of organised confusion *vs* confused organisation, which not only happens, but happens every second in the gutters of Six Thousand Years of Glorious History.

Here is a second:

I

The Contemporary Iranian Writer on the Literary Scene wakes up at 4.30am and jogs in the Avenue of the Oppressed Martyr Ayatollah Doktor Seyed Mohammad Beheshti, for fifteen minutes. A lonely runner, a dark avenue.

After a quiet bath (in the candle-light, due to the energy-rationing power-cuts) the Contemporary Writer puts the kettle on, and sharpens all six of his pencils. He has to go over the thirty-seven miscellaneous pages of his type-set, but not yet published, novel. It has been delayed for seven months pending approval by the Ministry of Irshad-e-Islami (the Islamic Guidance). He has had to rephrase, or omit, or *think about* certain passages, sentences, or words that may contain 'ambiguous remarks' or 'conflict' with the Islamic Republic.

Before sitting down, he takes a look into the boy's room. The boy is resting, seemingly comfortably, under the intravenous medication of

* This study was written in response to an invitation by the *Third World Quarterly* to 'contribute an article on the status of the writer in contemporary Iran . . .' The writer illustrated is of course fictitious.

his two-hour, twice-a-day injective medicine for leukopaenia. (They can't get the imported medicine easily now in Tehran, due to wartime budget regulations. So they have to decrease the dose—when they can get the stuff.) His thinning, harried wife is resting on some bedding on the floor, with the battery-operated flashlight at hand in case of a midnight air-raid blackout, when they would have to shelter in the basement. The apartment is still quiet, and it is the hour of the wolf as the Contemporary Writer sits with his coffee at a corner of the dining table to work.

The Contemporary Writer is affected, among other factors, by American culture and literature, like a generation of writers before him in the early Pahlavi era, some of whom were influenced by French and other European cultures and literature. When the Contemporary Writer was eighteen and just finishing high school there came the *coup d'état* of 28th of Mordad 1332 (17 August 1952), the fall of Dr Mossadeq's nationalist government, the return of the Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi from a brief escape to Italy, and the entrance of the Eisenhower Administration, leading America into the history of the Bejewelled Land for the first time, to influence it for the next quarter of a century, until the Islamic Revolution. He was charmed with the adventures and voices of the New World and he went to America for his higher education, got degrees and learned how to write and how to appreciate Shakespeare and Faulkner, and he learned looking back with pain, and he learned loving and experienced tragedy.

The Contemporary Iranian Writer now has a lump on his vocal cords, clogging his voice. It is benign and he is scheduled to have it removed in eleven months and eight days' time, 8 o'clock sharp. Otherwise, he is fine, at forty-nine with an athletic body and an athletic heart. He is thin but not gaunt, with only slightly undernourished-looking, shallow wrinkles on his lower cheeks and his neck. His hair and his razor-shaven cheeks are the colour of ashes. His hands are fine and soft and unlined, perhaps because he has never worked with them except with pencils and chalk and dusters.

He sweats over the alterations for an hour and a half on the first leg of the day. The objective: keep the tone and the theme of the novel intact, while removing and/or changing the blatantly offensive words, phrases and images—to allow it to pass through the censorship Brothers, and get the book out. Words such as 'dissatisfaction', 'torture' and 'execution' must be rephrased. Phrases like 'a martyr-breeding nation' must be deleted. Images of a 'destroyed land', or visions of 'a

holy, green-robed mullah on a white horse galloping across the war-fronts' must come out. Men and women must not touch. He swears, deep in his cerebral cortex. The Contemporary Writer is very good at swearing in his cerebral cortex. This is not revising or rewriting; this is metamorphosing and whoring. He adds a slug of C_2H_5OH 96 per cent to his coffee and takes his first Cordarone and two aspirins with it.

II

At 6.30am the Contemporary Writer goes for the milk because it's Wednesday. It's the alternative day for their neighbourhood's milk. He takes the two empty bottles and the *Baseej* (Mobilisation of the Meek) Ration Booklet. His wife could buy the milk on the 'free bazaar', but that's not pasteurised. You never know what you're getting even if you boil. Once, the boy broke out in an infectious rash. It's also their day to receive the monthly ration of meat. Next week, the monthly cheese, *inshallah*, God willing. There won't be any monthly butter, because in the Islamic Republic at War, butter has been declared a luxury. When he comes up the alley, it is still so early that the garbage thieves are still at their work, rummaging selectively among the plastic trash bags outside the doors: paper scraps to be made into confectionery boxes, plastic containers for refilling, dry bread to be re-made into flour, and other garbage to feed sheep in south Tehran.

The Contemporary Writer contemplates the long queue in front of the butcher's, which won't be opening until after nine. It is no easy task, to reserve a place in the mid-morning meat-queue for your wife and get the early milk yourself. But a Contemporary Writer in the Islamic Republic is a Trained Artist on the Hard Ration Trapeze.

He manages a little arrangement with an elderly, gentle Armenian lady in Islamic *hejab*, and a haggard, retired army officer in worn-out jeans. No one knows his name. No one knows anybody's name in the queues. The Contemporary Writer and his family have recently moved into their rented apartment in this upper-Tehran neighbourhood, in order to be close to the hospital. He could have taken the boy abroad for a cure, were it not for the 'Catch 15-19'. They won't give you an exit permit now because you are fifteen and male and have to wait until you are nineteen and conscripted, and you can't be officially medically exempted from service until you are nineteen.

Coming back down the alley, he arranges his day's work in his mind: his university class, Nasser Khan's shop, Irshad, lunch with Fereydoon,

see Hamid, on to see Aqa-Reza, and his evening English class at the National Iranian Oil Company. He recalls the bad dream he had (again) just before he awoke. He was in that room again. It was pitch black. Or he was blind. Or both. He was carrying a load of paper on his back and was looking for the door. There was no door. Within the walls, there was a fight, there was mockery, there was pushing, there was thieving, and there was hunger. Without, was sweet life blowing at the walls. The confusion, the uncertainty and the agony of the pressure was so much that his brain had thrust him awake almost screaming, and certainly with another onset of Premature Ventricular Contractions.

III

He takes a rented *agence* taxi to the College of Persian Literature and Foreign Languages, where he has just finished two advanced English writing courses, (supposedly on an hourly-based contract). Driving up the Parkway Autobahn, now Martyr Chamran, in the cold but sunny Tehran morning, he observes people sitting along the hard shoulder with empty gas cylinders waiting hopefully for the gas truck, or Godot, to come. The place is about ten miles away, in Sa'adatabad (Fortuneville) on the north-western outskirts of Tehran, at the foot of the Alborz mountains. He likes the place, and the classes, and especially the students. They are part of his life-long contact with the roots of the land. And he could use the money (if it came!). It has not come so far, due to, ahem, 'Budget problems'. He does not rebel against the petty things. What he does not like at all is Brother Dr Birjandian, in charge of the department.

Holding the envelopes containing the final exams and final grades, he cuts across the long footpaths of the Persian-style garden in front of the rather pleasant, sprawling, five-storeyed building. The garden, like everything else, is unkempt. The school used to be one of the private colleges, in the Shahanshahi regime—the old College of Translation, set up by the late Dr Abbas Aryanpour, the distinguished linguist. After the Islamic so-called Cultural Revolution take-over, the School was brought with umpteen other private colleges of that era under a single administrative umbrella. The new complex (very complex) was named the University of Allameh Tabataba'ii, after the late Ayatollah Seyyed Mohammad Tabataba'ii, a reclusive and learned mullah.

He stops to catch a breath by the white-and-turquoise modernistic pond, with its under-water lighting systems and the central pedestal

with the huge white bird. It is almost empty save for an inch of muddy slime at the bottom, with bits of paper and plastic bags and other trash, including the fallen leaves of the past few seasons, embedded in it. The Contemporary Writer can hear the bones of both the distinguished linguist and the poor Ayatollah rattling in their graves.

He passes the Lower Hall, the University *Jihad* rooms, the *namaz* hall with a half-dozen soiled slippers on its threshold, and climbs the five flights of stairs up to the Language Department. He passes the deserted Persian Literature floor along the way. None of the (mostly contracted) teachers know him—they have full-time jobs elsewhere—and then again, he knows none of them either. It's mostly a come-and-zap-and-go joint. He's alone there and he's been in a dog-day mood since he had that hassle with Brother Dr Birjanidian. The Contemporary Writer has not been used to being lied to and swindled by Heads of College Departments.

He collects an end-of-term record sheet from the Administration Room and, since he has no private cubby-hole, he goes and sits in an empty classroom to fill in the grades. He will hand in the grades and clear off. The classroom is well-lit and airy, with a peaceful view of the Alborz mountains, the only jarring note being the *Jang jang, ta Piroozi* (War, War, Until Victory) slogan on the wall next to the green blackboard. Above the board are the ever-present portraits of Ayatollah Khomeini and Ayatollah Montazeri flanking a framed motif bearing the inscription '*Kalamatollah*' ('the Word of Allah'). There are other notices too. A graphic illustration shows how and where the boys and girls should sit in the classroom, on opposite sides. Also on the wall, there are two prayers inscribed; one for 'starting the lesson' and one for 'ending the lesson'. He remembers the day he was almost kicked out because he had given his essay-writing class an essay on the poetess Forough Farrokhzad. Birjandian had come in search of him like a mad dog and caught him in the corridor, practically dragging him to his office, and scolding him for discussing a woman, a *poetess*, in class. Some stool-pigeon *Hezbollahi Khahar*³ (Sister) student (an *âbji-ôllahi*,⁴ he called them) had reported the incident! Oh, Glorious Days in the Corridors of Contemporary Persian Literature!

The Contemporary Writers fills the grade sheets in with meticulous care, rapidly, to get out as fast as possible. One part of his mind is at home, where the boy is alone while his mother goes to the meat queue. The other part is in the Financial Affairs Room, wondering if there is a pay cheque ready for him at last. He recalls the first time he had come to

see Brother Dr Birjandian. They had discussed his classes and the assistance he could give. ('We shall be proud and honoured to have a tiger like you in our faculty.') They had discussed the terms. Since the official rate of pay was terribly low and since he had to come a long way by *agence* taxi every time, Dr Birjandian would arrange a 60 per cent bonus in the contract, to compensate. ('Just between you and me! I'll cheat the Republic for you.') The contract would be written out and signed later. . . There had been no reason to misunderstand or to disbelieve what he said, for was he not the Head of the Language Department, with an American PhD, and had been introduced by a gentleman friend, a trustworthy person. The Contemporary Writer had started the classes but the second time they met to sign the contract, three weeks into the course, Dr Birjandian did not remember any such conversation.

The good doctor had just come out of the toilet and was wiping his wet hands with a couple of precious sheets of writing paper from his desk. He had no time. In fact, he had nothing but nerves, today. He was cross, too, and kept fidgeting and fussing under the portraits of Khomeini and Montazari flanking the *Kalamatollah*. Even his fuzzy beard, shaven around the edges, *Cazanova* style, seemed bristling and annoyed. His pants, which he had perpetual difficulty in maintaining in a stationary position on the dome of his pot-belly, and zipped up, seemed even more recalcitrant and mobile. He had raised his voice at his associate professor (because his secretary was listening) and had scolded him. 'You think of taking money from the Treasury of the Moslem Ummat?' ('I'll cheat anybody for the Republic.') The Contemporary Writer had got up, shaken the man's hand in farewell, and left, never to set foot in that office again. He had, however, stayed on to finish the classes he had undertaken. The students did not have to suffer. No *Fortunevillë* for the Contemporary Writer, though; not around the College of Literature and Languages, of the University of Ayatollah Allameh Tabatabaïi.

Just before leaving the campus, he checks at the dingy room labelled 'Financial Affairs Manager'. 'No cheques ready yet,' a little Sister tells him. That only means, perhaps, some Brother has not pulled up his pants to manage to process the payments. Or to allocate the budget. 'Keep in touch.' Yes, all right. 'They'll be ready tomorrow, *inshallah*.' Or TOMORROW! But this is not nearly half as bad as it could have been. A few months back, he had taught an intensive report-writing course for a group of specialists in the Ministry of Planning and Budget's Training Department. When he received his pay-cheque, payable from

the Central Bank of the Islamic Republic, it *bounced*! Somebody in the Master Accounts Division had not even bothered to check whether there was any *money* in that Job Account Number.

IV

The Contemporary Writer walks alone, down into the windy, open highway to take a town taxi eastwards on the Martyr Chamran Autobahn, another south on the Ayatollah Modares Autobahn and then another one east on Jomhoori Avenue, because Tehran taxis now go in a *straight path*, taking five passengers at a time. The taxis are still designed after the old British Hillman cars and the two passengers squeezing up front next to the driver have to sit on each other's laps. The fifteen-odd miles from Sa'adatabad to Baharestan Square, deep in central-south Tehran, takes him about an hour and a half to cover, on to the Ministry of Irshad. This is *not* the most pleasant of his daily chores.

The southern and central sections of Tehran's alleys are sprinkled with *hejlehs*,⁵ here and there, mourning a soldier, or a volunteer *Baseeji*, 'martyred' at the fronts in the 'War of Righteousness against Blasphemy'. An alley or a street is named (renamed) after each, because in miraculous Persia, for the good of society, we must re-write, wipe out and toss into the 'garbage-can of History', any remaining effects of the previous regime(s) not conforming to our own ideology. Today, we are even more magnificently miraculous—we are re-writing our geography. The day before, there was an air-raid massacre of the city of Bakhtaran (previously Kermanshah for centuries) 'martyring' hundreds of men, women and children in their houses.

Coming down the long way to Irshad, the Contemporary Writer's thoughts wander ahead, painfully, vexatiously. He does not, however, ask why the hell do it at all? He simply tries to recount how many times he has already made this trip to the Ministry: seven months for this novel (so far), twenty-three months for the collection of short stories (so far), and eight months for the other novel which (miraculously) came out. How many trips, how many days, how many hours, ~~how~~ many minutes—waiting? Time here means waiting. A day is a day is a month is a year is a century is a minute. So what is thirty-eight months? What one could do with thirty-six million minutes of time and energy! How many minutes does it take you to kill a man by keeping him waiting in a dark room? Does he *want* this? But for the Contemporary Writer, writing is not an act of will, or a need, or a pleasure. It's a painful instinct, an

obsession, a response to visions of a beaten, bruised and broken angel—an ache, a deep-rooted stimulus. He stops for a rest and a *stekan* of tea and a chat at the bookshop belonging to his friend Nasser Khan. There will be no tea for him at the Irshad.

The smile on Nasser Khan's lean face, and the fine tea, brighten up the Contemporary Writer's day a little and open up his mitral valves a touch. Good old, stone-faced Nasser Khan, always smiling, even now that the establishment has practically come to a dead stop, and he is trying to sell the large place and move into a smaller office. He pours the tea from a teapot on the little *Aladdin* kerosene heater. 'How's the paper situation?' the Contemporary Writer asks. 'Still in the throes of agony', Nasser Khan answers. 'How much is it today?' '2,400 tomans a (500-sheet) ream!'

Like almost every other vital commodity, paper has been slipping further and further away from the printers and the publishers—ever since the government took over the production and distribution. Three years ago, paper was sold to printers for around 280 tomans a ream. After it, too, was rationed out meagrely to the printshops and publishers, not necessarily owing to war time regulations, paper quickly moved into the 'free bazaar', and the price gradually rose by over 900 per cent—if you could get it. And since the book prices were fixed and controlled by the Ministry of Guidance, there ensued the 'Catch 280–2400': you could not get government paper for 280 a ream because it was sold for 2,400 a ream in the 'free bazaar', and you could not sell your book at a price based on 2,400 a ream because the government fixed the prices on the basis of a 280 rate. Some considered it a ploy to dry up the independent publishers of books 'they' didn't like, even if they had no pretext for stopping them. Nasser Khan once said that taking away paper from a publisher was like pulling out the Dextrose 6 per cent intravenous from a comatose patient. The remark had touched deep, reminding the Contemporary Writer of his boy.

But the remark was only partly true. Fortunately, not *all* publishers were drained of their life-line; many had, in fact been fattened by the paper extravaganza. The publishers belonging to Anjoman Islami Nasherin (Islamic Society of Publishers) had all the paper they needed to bulk-print the fundamentalist and/or propaganda genre. Hòzeh-e-Andisheh va Honar Islami (the Domain of Islamic Thoughts and Arts) had wider and richer resources, and covered books, TV programmes and feature films to appraise, advertise, promulgate and publish 'Islamic Ideas'. Sazeman Tabliqat Islami (Islamic Propaganda

Organisation) had a more penetrating and world-reaching policy: at one time, during the past three or four years, they had published over three thousand titles in the Arabic, Urdu, and English languages to be distributed throughout the world. These were the major *newly-founded* organisations. Among the largest of the old organisations confiscated and taken over by the Government were the huge Entesharat Amir Kabir (Amir Kabir Publications) with its seven bookshops and the huge Sepehr printshop. Amir Kabir was not used exclusively for Islamic propaganda now; it published selected titles in history and science, as well as dictionaries, and works of fiction, but its main objective was the production of basic Islamic books; the Holy Qoran, the *Nahj ol Baleqeh*, the *Word of Imam* (in twenty-seven volumes) etc. etc. . . The novel *Fajr (Dawn) of Islam*, by MA Fajr, starting a century before the birth of the prophet Mohammad, had had an 11,000 print-run. Another old organisation among those confiscated was the Kanun Parvaresh-e-Fekri Kudakan (Centre of Children's Mind Development), which brought out tens of thousands of copies of children's books, in accordance with its own thematic objectives. They had paper to print *and* to sell for profit at the 'free bazaar'. One manager from the Entesharat Ba'that (Ba'that Publishers) had been put in prison for, among other charges, mis-using rationed government paper.

Today, Nasser Khan is only apologetic that he cannot do anything for the Contemporary Writer. For months now, Nasser Khan has not been able even to reprint any of their best-selling titles—including a novel by the Contemporary Writer, the first edition of which had sold out within the space of a few months. The establishment had just been selling, without any replenishment of stocks. They had sold many of their good rare books in bulk to make ends meet. The four Hamedani brothers were among the most reputable of scholar/publisher/printers of the past fifty years. One brother is now suffering from cardiac ailments. Another brother has been breaking down with mental illness and kidney disease, tinged with bad bouts of insomnia. Their production had fallen even lower than the 80 per cent decrease, cited as a national figure by *Ettela'at* daily. This is not one of their best years.

Theirs is not, however, the only such case. Nor the worst. They still exist, whereas 21 per cent of Tehran's publishers have gone out of business altogether, with only a few government foundations, such as *Bonyad Shaheed* (Martyrs' Foundation) surviving. The largest publishing house to have disappeared was, of course, *Amir Kabir* Publications, with its founder and owner put into prison. After eleven

months, he was, fortunately, acquitted of any charges against the country or Islam. He was set free—but he was 'asked' to sign a compromise to the effect that his establishment was to be canonically confiscated.

After the tea and sympathy, the Contemporary Writer now has the energy to face the Brothers at Irshad. When he has said good-bye and is on the threshold of the shop entrance, the 'Red Alert' comes on Nasser Khan's little transistor radio. 'Red Alert' at 10am in Tehran now means the Iraqis are either bombarding the Tehran Refinery, or the industrial sites in not-too-far-away Arak, or the residential areas in Kermanshah, Isfahan, Tabriz, massacring children in schools, workers in factories, and women at home—a daily, blessed chore in a bloody war of mad drunken dogs. Like most Tehrani citizens, the Contemporary Writer is only pathetically alarmed by the 'Red Alert'. He turns and looks at Nasser Khan. He is also grinning pathetically and shaking his head. Another economic, 'industrial and military' site cast into flames. And another 10 per cent on the price of paper. 'Farewell.' 'When you come out, let me know what happens in there.' 'And if I don't come out?' 'I'll come to Evin prison and bring you some cigarettes.'

When he is outside, he catches sight of the snapshot affixed in one corner of Nasser Khan's shop window—one glaring sight depicting the predicament of the book business in Tehran: it is a front view of the spacious Rastegar Bookshop on the old Shah Abbas Avenue—now renamed Qaem Maqam Farahani. The establishment still bears the big, neon-lit sign on top, in both Farsi and English. But inside, behind the huge glass windows, they are selling fruits and vegetables.

V

There is a narrow half-door entrance for men, and the Contemporary Writer goes through, or tries to. He gets a visitor's slip and a body check, and goes on to the end of the long, cage-like path that leads to the courtyard and its surrounding buildings. What's missing is the trainer with the chain and the whip. But the body check consists of nothing more than a little bearded boy in paramilitary uniform and the everlasting brown slippers putting his hands on your breast and your hips and then saying '*befarmaid*' ('You may enter'). To the Contemporary Writer, he says '*Befarmaid, Haj Aqa.*' Not because the visitor is a mullah, or even bearded, but because he is wearing an elegant

suit and has gentle eyes, and they have seen him many times before—without a bomb.

He knows how to find the publications section on the first floor only too well, and soon climbs to the corner where they have their three rooms for Book Investigations.

One room is marked 'No Entry'. Visitors are instructed by means of arrows, to go to the room on the right. There is usually nobody in the room on the right. There is nothing but four or five hard chairs and two humble desks, with a picture portrait of Khomeini on one. The little portrait is pasted on a simple piece of cardboard, folded to stand upright. At the side of the picture, it says, in an elegant *Nasta'liq* script: 'Without the Love of Khomeini, One Can Not be in Love with *Mahdi*.'⁶

The Contemporary Writer sits waiting on a hard chair. He knows the Brothers don't like to be called and disturbed in the forbidden room; once he had caught them unawares having a mid-morning breakfast of bread and roasted liver. But the Contemporary Writer likes them because they're boys of the lower sections and back-alleys of the little towns. All but one—an older and grimmer fellow, who looks and interrogates like a SAVAK⁷ torturer, and probably *was* one, once. The rest are naive, dusty, earthy, and hungry—like the land itself. During the Shah's rule, when the Contemporary Writer was called in for an 11 o'clock interview, he would be led in by a mini-skirted secretary to a spacious office (in the then Ministry of Culture and Arts) to face clean-shaven, cologned, tailored, flannel-suited *Jenab Aqâye* Zandpur in his Christian Dior silk tie. They would discuss words or phrases that would sound 'offensive' or 'in conflict with' the monarchy. The official would be corrupt or perhaps a SAVAKI, or both, and just back from a snoop around his private second-hand automobile salesroom. The Brothers here have perhaps never heard of Christian Dior. They are humble, religious, Qoran-quoting nobodies, having barely qualified for high school diplomas, who are commissioned (among other things) to investigate novels, and to *irshad* the novelist. But they are and were doing the same thing in the same ministry: shutting up or scaring off their fighting enemies, and haggling, red-taping, and slowly punishing and torturing their non-aggressive critics.

One of the boys slips in. He takes a half-look at the Contemporary Writer, as if he already *knew* he was in here. He goes on to busy himself behind the desk bearing the 'Love of Khomeini' charm. They all know him. He is the only major one who keeps drifting back in. A silent

drifter, a stubborn drifter. But he does not know whether they like him, hate him, fear him, admire him, or just keep piling evidence on him. He likes one of them, though, the Bahmanzad boy. He has a boyish smile, and talks with him, and treats him with respect, and his *salaam* and smile make the place slightly more tolerable. The Brother behind the desk is quiet. He raises his head, and looks at the Contemporary Writer. 'You want to see who? Brother Foroughi?' 'Yes, *Aqaye* Foroughi,' says the Contemporary Writer answering the superfluous question. The Brother leaves the room, though he can call anyone on his phone. The Contemporary Writer is left alone, waiting, again. Another visitor drifts silently in and perches on a hard chair. He holds a copy of *Key To Solving Physics and Algebra Problems* for high school graduate students who study to take the National University Entrance Exams—and wants a print permit. Another visitor wanders in and perches on a hard chair. He has a new design for the packing cases for his confectioner's shop. Boy, is he in the wrong section!

Foroughi edges slowly in past the half-open door. He is in his perpetual black slippers, his long black rosary dangling from his right hand, signifying that he can't shake hands with you. They get down to business quickly. The Contemporary Writer submits the alterations. 'All right, yes.' 'Will that be all?' 'We will examine them.' 'When will you have the final answer?' '*Inshallah*, God willing, soon.' 'When?' All the official work is done. '*When*,' the Contemporary Writer wants to know. 'Call us, later.' 'Next Saturday?' 'Yes, next Saturday, *inshallah* . . . ' The Contemporary Writer feels he is dangling from a thin thread, in a vacuum. Next Saturday will not be *the* next Saturday. Nor will it necessarily be the following one. In a land blessed with the prospects of *inshallah*, time is a loosely buoyant and slightly dormant commodity. A Saturday is a Thursday is a Shmursday. And even if one blooming Saturday or Thursday he is allowed to come in, there will be a few more 'just minor' problems again, for him to consider. Then, even if, with the Blessed Powers of Allah, they do say okay, where in Allah's name is the *paper* to print it? The okay, incidentally, will be an *oral* one. There won't be any official permit. Nothing on paper. Nobody is censoring anybody to give a permit. Go ahead and print it in n-thousand copies and then bring in five copies for price-setting and the final authorisation for distribution. Heh, heh. Go ahead.

VI

Under the bright late-morning Tehran skies—the Iraqi air-raid ‘Red Alert’ is over—the Contemporary Writer takes another taxi to Lower Shah Abbas Avenue and the Ararat Restaurant. He has a lunch date with Fereydoon, his high school pal, life-long friend, and *favourite poet*—and this is his favourite joint. The Armenian place is clean, but cold and dead and empty. Outside, on the corner of the sidewalk, the weather-beaten street-cleaner and the raw-skinned fruit pedlar, are warming their hands at a large tin-can in which bits of wood from broken boxes are burning.

While waiting, the Contemporary Writer takes his noon medicine, with a glass of water, and calls home, where his wife’s sister (a university graduate accountant, now laid off) is looking after the boy while the boy’s mother is out in the queues. He then sits back in the lonely corner, sighs, and begins to read a fan’s letter sent c/o Nasser Khan’s bookshop. A reader of his latest novel, herself an unpublished poetess, writes: ‘. . . My depth-finding friend, I want to congratulate you for this, and I hope, and I see how Iranian writers (today) with their restricted possibilities, spread blissful, blissful life.’ That’s good for two Cordarones and one Nitrolingual, and opens the mitral valves a little more.

He lights a cigarette, crosses his legs, and sits back, facing the door, waiting. His lonely eyes are not *blissful* eyes; in fact they are now painful eyes—a lonely front, a silent anger, a hurt, wound-licking bobcat, crept into a cosy hole. Except for a friend or two, all these years, he has really been able to associate himself with few of the intellectuals and literary clan. *His* people are the real people, with real pains. He is not a political writer or even a revolutionary writer. He is a natural back-alley story-monger with a pain in his heart and a lump in his throat. It has never entered his wildest dreams (or nightmares) to send in an application for membership of the Society of Iranian Artists and Writers. He likes the Gospel according to Fereydoon, that says the Artists and Intellectuals of Iran are the Rare Birds of Iran. They can sing only at a certain fixed temperature, given certain fixed foods and drinks. Otherwise they fly west. The Contemporary Writer of Iran is the Lonely Wild Bird of Iran and the lonely wild bird flies within the storm for evermore.

Fereydoon should be coming through the half-door soon, his tall, lean body wobbling, and his weather-beaten face—*ouch!* For the last few years, he has always looked as though he has just banged his head

hard against the frame, coming through the narrow door. He has been a poet, a university teacher and an essayist, and he wrote two good books immediately after the Revolution. He is also a socialist. That's why he looks mostly *ouch!* He's got other personal pains, too. A year ago his daughter was ranked sixth in her University Entrance Exams (the Councours!). This was in the *academic* test results, out of 700,000 participants, nationwide. Her field was language and literature. She was rejected because some Brother in the Selective Investigation Unit marked her 'unfit' to enter the University of the Islamic Republic. Once the academic aptitude tests are over, the Selection Brothers go literally spying on the 'character or moral fitness' of the top students. (They actually snoop around the neighbourhood asking questions here and there. Does she go to Friday Prayers? Does she observe *hejab*? Do they play music, out loud?) The girl is now mentally ill and has been hospitalised several times, with symptoms of acute schizophrenia.

Fereydoon comes in right on time, that is almost half an hour late. They shake hands, sit down, order food and ask each other the usual life-line questions: the family, the ailing boy, the suffering girl. Which is less horrific?—to bleed-dry with leukaemia or to agonise sapless with schizophrenia? Fereydoon extends his small box with its meagre stock of Benzedrine-cocaine balls which his neurosurgeon nephew brings regularly from Frankfurt as cerebrilia-tranquillisers. This is some tonic! Before the fish-kebab comes, they down a wee bit. The Contemporary Writer and the Contemporary Poet of Iran have a ball, each.

They don't stop to ask one another, or themselves why the hell they bother at all because they know. You don't stop to ask and determine your next cardiac catheterisation. When you're a death-baby freak of personal expression and Iran is your womb and your grave, you've had it. Like Iran itself, the Contemporary Writer, or Poet, ~~woos~~ *woos* and loves, and pains, and hurts himself and people drawn to him, ~~to be~~ recognised as a source; to understand and be understood, to love and be loved—no matter what world he is in, and even if it takes Six Bloody Thousand Years of stumbling and falling and rising again and breaking down again, and not thinking, and moaning, and being torn and raped and robbed. Like Iran itself, he does not want a new world, or a thinking world; he wants a world of imagination and tradition where he can return to a for-ever-more womb. Fereydoon's eyes are sadder than his.

They can now get down to talk about the enterprising subjects of their social lives, such as the War, paper, and censorship. They both have two or three books in the Irshad, but on skewers. They both have two or

three books ready for reprint, but no paper. They both have one or two books in the hands of a small chiselling publisher who sneak-prints the material and lies in their faces. They have both lost heavily in the abominable war—the Imposed War. Fereydoon has lost more: he taught in a college in the southern city of Ahvaz for twenty years before he was 'retired'. His house and his household in Kian-Pars were destroyed during the early Iraqi bombing and shelling. During the process of his retirement, when they calculated his pension, it was something in the vicinity of 14,000 a month, based on his own salary savings, and his own monthly payments to the Retirement Pension Fund. A few days after his retirement, however, the Islamic Republic at War had quickly passed a Bill through the Islamic Council (Majles) which put a ceiling on the retirement pension of 8.6 thousand, and hence chopped some 40 per cent of his life's earnings per month. He vows that he will sue the Islamic Republic Majles on the Resurrection Day, if there is one.

They both had at times considered leaving Iran to live quietly somewhere, but they could not, even if they definitely decided to. Both had 'Exit forbidden' problems, handicapped children and moral obligations to their teaching jobs. To live in a Kensington High Street flat in London, or in a Passy pièce in Paris, or a stucco mansion in Beverly Hills, Los Angeles, was less strain—and you didn't have to commute to any Irshad. Many had left. Mohammad Ali-Jamalzadeh lived in Geneva. Bozorg Alavi lived in Germany. Sadegh Chubak lived in California. Ebrahim Golestan lived in England. Mahshid Amirshahi lived in Paris. Nader Naderpur lived in Paris. Even Dr Gholam Hossein Sa'edi had fled to and died in Paris. But they were the older and the wiser ones. Those who had stayed with the storm, or could not go, or would not want to go, were the hard-skins—even Khanom Simin Daneshvar who had the tenderest touch and loveliest, hushed voice. Some the Irshad Ministry had branded as socialist, and hushed. Ahmad Mahmood's novel, *Hamsâyeha* (*The Neighbours*) was banned and even his *Zamin-e-sukhteh* (*The Burned Land*) which came out after the War, was being withheld for re-checking, before reprint permission was granted. Mahmood Dowlatbady's 900-page reprint of his *Majmu-e-Dastanha* (*Collected Works*), which came out before the revolution, was to be pulped. So was Esmail Fassih's *Sharab-e-Kham* (*Raw Wine*). So also was the new edition of Ali Mohammad Afgani's *Shohar Ahu Khanom* (*Ahu Khanum's Husband*). Some who were downright hard-boiled *Cherique-e-Fadaii* (*Self-Sacrifice Fighters*), like Poet

Sa'eed Soltanpur, were labelled as *Munafeqin-e-* (Seditious Hypocrites of) *Khalq*, and were arrested on their wedding day ceremonies, and shot. Many with other sensitivities had given up with the Irshad boys. Reza Barahani refused to submit his 1,200 page saga, *The Secrets Of My Land* for 'investigation', although it is already type-set and ready for print. Others still, had stopped altogether, gone home, slammed the door, pulled the curtain and stoned themselves into oblivion, waiting for the storm to pass, waiting for the sun to rise, waiting for the fanfare to sound—or the Comrade Chairman to enter.

The late Dr Gholam Hossein Sa'edi once told a personal joke in Paris that has ramifications. A peculiar thing had happened when he was fleeing Iran across the Turkish border, north of Bazargan. A smuggler, dressing and acting as an Azarbayejani shepherd, had given him a sheep-skin to wear and told him to crawl among a herd of a thousand sheep. The man had warned: 'When we are on Turkish soil, I'll yell: "Get up, and run!", and you just get up and run.' After some hours of crawling and baa-ing, when the man had yelled 'Get up and run,' there was a miracle: a thousand-and-one sheep were on their two feet—running.

VII

After lunch, the Contemporary Writer takes another taxi to the office of his friend and lawyer, Hamid, and their 3 o'clock appointment. A fine, moving and subtle poet, known for his *manzoomehs* before the Revolution, Hamid is now making a living as an attorney at law, working (and also teaching all morning) and running his office in the afternoons, until 8pm. The Collected Volume of his *manzoomehs*, revised and ready for reprinting, is now gathering dust on the shelves of Nashr-e-Now Publications—no paper. (For him, that is.)

The Contemporary Writer is out of breath when he reaches Hamid's office, having climbed four storeys up the narrow, zig-zagging, airless staircase. They exchange greetings and shake hands. 'Did you run all the way up?' 'I've been running, period.' 'Sit down and take a breath, runner.' 'Merci.' Good runners are the course runners. I'd just as soon sit and stretch my bloody legs. And then the course runners are the eternal runners.

The combination of his fine language, his soft, fine eyes, bushy, frosted moustache, and his soothing, throaty voice are a relief post in the course of the dog-day marathon. He is a poet of subtle imageries and

symbols, admired everywhere. The Contemporary Writer likes his famous *manzoomeh* of love and social unrest where he says: 'If you sit still/If I sit still/Who, then, will rise?' So did thousands and thousands, before the Revolution. But this kind of 'ambiguous remark' is now, of course, taboo.

After the greeting and the small talk, Hamid tells him of his latest strategy for their impending hearing. He has been helping the Contemporary Writer, in a formal law suit, to salvage the rights to a book of his which has been exploited for years by a small publisher. The publishers, *Raz* the Vine (or *Razl*, the Vile, as Hamid calls him), has been filching reprint jobs of the Contemporary Writer's first novel, in the shady, slimy print-shops in south Tehran, for sixteen years, still claiming that the first edition has not completely sold out yet, and that he has the copyright reserved, permanently. When, as an unknown youth, the Contemporary Writer was looking for a publisher for his novel, the Vile owner had taken some money from him *and* the rights for any possible future reprints, in exchange for publishing the work, in an obscure but shrewdly phrased little 'agreement'. He did not remember now how many copies were printed, or where, although at least four or five different reprints had crept out, according to experts. The book is now selling at five times above its original price sixteen years ago. All the law suit is aimed at, however, is clarifying the printing history of the novel. He and Hamid have not been successful so far. The Vile owner ignored the first subpoena, and then dodged the elementary hearing by feigning kidney illness because of the beatings he had been given by SAVAK torturers in prison, seventeen years ago. Another hearing had gone by fruitlessly, with the judge giving the sides six months to settle the issue out of court. The Vile owner had disappeared again. He had been a fruit dealer from Gilan, and he knew the market tricks. He had switched to the book business during the oppression of SAVAK, when the underground publication of books on the communist movement and religious doctrine were the thing. But then, that was in the Shah's time. Public courts in Iran have not exactly been the soul of speed and meticulousness in the annals of human justice. (Once, the judge had interrupted the hearing four times to answer long personal phone calls, while picking his nose.) In this case, the court has re-scheduled a re-hearing for another date, on the 17th of Doomsday, 10 o'clock sharp.

The afternoon sky is growing gloomier and gloomier as their talk deteriorates into the 'that's-how-it-is' status. Hamid's face, behind the

piles of files on his desk is sad and apathetic. He could be doing another *manzoomeh* right now, were it not for abominable files to catch the swindlers. But then, on the other hand, if you *did* write the *manzoomeh*, who would get it past the Irshad boys? And then on the other hand, if it weren't for the abominable files, who could pay for the rent and the water and the electricity and the cheese, etc, etc, on the 'free bazaar'? A sick society can swindle, just as a sick fruit dealer can swindle, just as a sick Sultan can swindle. There is pain in the poet's eyes, and 'though in the seawine' of those eyes, 'nothing is dead and nothing dies', the Contemporary Writer can see, in the agony within them, Ferdowsi running from Toos to Qaznein, to present the manuscript of his *Shahnameh* (*Book of Kings*), in 60,000 verses, to Sultan Mahmoud in the tenth century. The Sultan swindles Ferdowsi by offering a drachma, and not the promised dinar, for every verse. So the legend says.

VIII

Seeing his editor at the *Nashr-e-Emrooz* (Today Publications) House, is next on the Contemporary Writer's agenda. The place is actually a rented apartment on the second floor of a small house in one of the alleys near Zardosht Avenue. So, after checking at two more pharmacies for the hard-to-find medicines, he will take another taxi down the crossroad of Vali-e-Asr (the Imam of Time) Street, formerly Pahlavi Street, and Zardosht Avenue. He has five books with *Nashr-e-Emrooz*; two novels ready for reprinting (one a best-seller), no paper; two held up in Irshad, the fifth a best-selling translation, ready for reprint; again, no paper. All very clear-cut. The last royalty cheque was eight months ago and even that was less than a monthly payment for his part-time English teaching classes.

He likes Aqa Reza, though, the chief editor and production manager at the house. He's rather young, but then they don't come that gifted and masterful by the dozen. At thirty-seven, with a degree in Literature and Language, he has had only thirty years of experience in the book business. What else can you do when you are the only son of a man who thinks, eats, lives, prints, makes an Empire out of, is toppled by, and imprisoned on account of books?

The street door is ajar, and the Contemporary Writer slips in quietly, with no one in sight. He crosses the tiny, shabby yard and climbs up to the three-room establishment on top of a basement stockroom. He squeezes through the very narrow hallway, made even more cramped

by piles of hundreds of dusty, defective books. Nobody knows what to do with them. You don't dare throw away anything that contains *paper*; even unsold and unwanted newspaper is sold to pulp-makers (at 25 toman per kilo) to make grocery bags, etc. (This is the blessed land where the gross annual consumption per capita of paper for books and stationery is all of nine grammes per day; 150 million kg for a population of a meagre 48 millions.)

The room belonging (supposedly) to the Managing Director, Ali Aqa, is deserted save for piles of unfinished proofs, untouched printshop packages and unedited manuscripts, all dusty and forlorn. Little Ali Aqa himself is perhaps out there in the swamps of Tehran bazaar, negotiating with the Paper Sharks Brothers, Inc. For the past year or so, in *Nashr-e-Emrooz*, as in most other independent publishing houses, little and large, paper has been the paralysing, cancerous tumour. During its five-year history, *Nashr-e-Emrooz* has published nearly ninety titles of the best standard quality covering social, scientific and political studies, in addition to languages, history, and fiction—of course from both Persian and world literature. In the first year of business, *Nashr-e-Emrooz* published ten books, and its profit was more than in its *second* year with twenty new titles, because this was (miracles, miracles) the year of the glorious appearance of Irshad, to exercise 'Guidance' over publications. A number of the already printed books were marked 'unfit' for distribution, which was, of course, a formal go-ahead for the book to be turned into pulp. In the third year, the House published forty titles, with several reprints marked 'unfit' and made even less profit than in the first year, due to the prevailing atmosphere and pressures. In the current year, with only five titles out, miracles continued to multiply. Irshad Brothers had decided to deliver the Printed Treasures of Iran, by taking charge of importing paper (no thanks to Saddam for repeatedly bombing the defenceless Pars Paper Factories, among other industrial plants) and distributing it (ie selling it at a profit) among printshops, publishers and authors. This was also done through the Islamic Economic Organisation—a non-profit body. So far, there were a 'number of consignments placed on order *and* shipped', but none had as yet been delivered. Who knows how long those funny Merchant Cargo Sea-Turtles were going to continue their strike against poor Lloyds of London?

The Contemporary Writer enters his editor-publisher's room to find Aqa Reza busy at a large table which is slightly bigger than a dining table for six. (Some of the furniture came with the house when it was rented.)

On the table, not in the tidiest of arrangements, there is just about everything connected with books, including material unavailable in the Ketabkhaneh Melli (National Library). One wall is covered with cover samples of all *Nashr-e-Emrooz* publications from its very inception, grinding to a halt with its last publications some time ago, signifying the death of enthusiasm. The wall does not exactly depict disaster; only seized progress.

Aqa Reza rises to greet him, his lean, fragile body bending slightly, his delicate, graceful mannerisms lighting up the shabby, chaotic room. He never looks tired, he does not look tired today, only beaten. At twenty-nine, in the last year that he was running the production department of Amir Kabir, that house put out 480 new titles with 8 million copies in print.

They sit wearily down, to discuss things—knowing all too well the answer to almost every question: 'Nothing yet.' The Contemporary Writer confirms that nothing definite has come from the Irshad boys. The Contemporary Editor-Publisher assures him that all is dead quiet on the paper front. Today, paper in the 'free bazaar' is over ninety times its official value—if you can find it. None whatsoever is allocated to independent publishers or authors. Down-payments *have* been taken as a deposit, but so far nothing delivered (Damn Sea-Turtles again). There was some good news, though. The Government was seriously considering selling its scrap paper (from its printshops) to honourable independent publishers and authors at thirty toman a kilo, only a fraction higher than the official market value of the waste paper which pulp-makers buy for grocery-bags.

As the afternoon turns to dusk, their futile meeting falls into long moments of silence . . . a painful experience for both of them, especially for Aqa Reza who is younger, and has a more energetic and productive mind. He is not a dreamer, but a doer, an intuitive, constructive, edificatory, establisher. So he is shrivelling more, if not as consciously. The Contemporary Writer can visualise *his* late last night's dream. He had been smoking his last *TIR* (Bullet) cigarette when the door-bell rang. There was a beat-up little Mazda pick-up delivery truck by a gate, bringing, allelujah, their ration of seventy-three reams of straw papyrus from Biafra. From down the alley, too, came a little beggar girl of about ten, in loose *hejab*, holding her baby to her stomach, chanting '*Marg bar Amrika. Marg bar Amrika . . .*' (Death to America). It was the National Night of Very Funny Things.

IX

Coming out of the *Nashr-e-Emrooz* House, with the twilight falling, the Contemporary Writer stops at the corner of the placid Zardosht Avenue and sooty, muggy Vali-e-Asr Street, to catch his breath, and a taxi. He now has to go to the National Iranian Oil Company Training Centre, where he has been teaching English classes for the Company's on-the-job trainees. It isn't exactly his idea of the perfect end to so creative a day. At this hour, it's back-breaking. But *they* pay. Standing under the Zardosht Avenue sign, he watches the dough-maker of the nearby bakery quitting at the end of a long day's work, and getting on his bike to go home. Lucky. The Contemporary Writer will be going home too, but not before two English commercial correspondence classes have been sat through. At the Oil Company's Training Centre, the electricity will probably be cut off during his classes on the Seventh Floor (the emergency generator has no gasoline) and he will have to correct individual papers in the dim light of the leaky, portable cellular gas burner. He will have to climb down the dark staircase, hanging on to the railing, occasionally striking a match, if he can find one. By the time he'll be going Home, Sweet Home, after buying rice, butter, Bizacodine, and Acetaminophens, it will be around eight. After a quiet supper, he hopes, in the candle-light, he will be writing some letters and jotting down notes on things as they are. It will all be really simple.

EPILOGUE

If he could have made this day into a Persianic scroll, it would have had the whole story. At 4.30am, a few centuries before the Achaemenian era, Zoroaster would be taking his brisk walk from Khorasmia into the land of Vishtaspa only to find no rest there because he is born to be the prophet of Ahura in the Ancient Persia. He would be in that hall to tell the Parsees to *think* and to distinguish between the *Asha* (Truth) and the *Druq* (Lies), to read the *Gathas*, and love, because Love is Light, and to cease hostile action and live in peace and pastoral calm, but no one will be listening to him because the men would be in the streets *baseejing*, yelling and chanting in Arabic and chest-beating, and the women would be in the meat queue in the cold drizzle of Tehran, with their Mobilisation of the Meek *Baseej* Booklets in their hands, worried to death because there is a Red Alert on, with Iraqi Tupolovs above. Zoroaster would not be asking himself why in all *Duzakh* does he have

to do this, because he knows he is the Prophet of the Wise Lord Ahura Mazda.

Ferdowsi, a Toos poet, would be in the garden, later, to jot down the *Shahnameh* in a thirty-five year blink of an eye, to be rebuked by the Sultan, and Sa'adi would soon be coming back from his wanderings in Baghdad, via Cairo and Hejaz to Shiraz to write the *Boustan* and *Golestan*, and Mir-Zadeh Eshqi would be commuting back and forth between Istanbul and Tehran to write revolutionary and nationalistic poems and plays and finally to be assassinated by the secret police, and Sadeq Hedayat would be translating Pahlavi scripts on location in Bombay and Tehran before he turns the gas on in his Paris rooms to stop his impulsive, creative ache, because this is the way things are in the Bejewelled Land.

On line, in lower and more basic cosmic altitudes, the Contemporary Iranian Writer in the Islamic Republic will get up again tomorrow in the wee small hours of the morning to jog in the Avenue of the Oppressed Martyr, Ayatollah Dr Beheshti. He will sharpen all six of his pencils to have his novel slip past the Brothers in the Irshad room. *Salaam-o-Alaikum*, *Aqaye* Foroughi. Next week, *inshallah*. He will make a last depressing trip to the College of Persian Literature and Foreign Languages to hand in the grades. With the Blessed Powers of Allah, *Aqaye* Dr Birjandian, if you want tigers, you must throw meat. If you throw peanuts, you'll get monkeys. He will lunch with sad socialist poet, Fereydoon, whose genius daughter should be proud *she's* getting schizophrenia and not a BA-mania from the University *Jihad*. Who will jot down *her* story? Nasser Khan will be having his *last stekan* before closing the fifty-eight-year bookshop. Fine poet Hamid, turned thief-catcher, will desperately try to rescue a book on which he has been swindled for sixteen years. There will be an exasperating session with a young genius of a born publisher whose talents and struggles are going down the drain for lack of paper and Irshad disapproval of him, because his father was once a great publisher. Who will tell *their* story? He will teach commercial English classes in the late hours of the evening because there is no such phenomenon as a Professional Writer in the Bejewelled Land with illiteracy figures as high as 43 per cent in the late Twentieth Century AD.

His eye falls upon the shop-sign of a haberdashery named 'Zardosht'. The long sign has a small likeness of Zoroaster in one corner. *Ashu Zardosht* himself, the Lord and the Soul of Persian Mythology: the stone face, the *Far-va-har* lower body, the works. He is not looking at

the Contemporary Writer, though, only vaguely in his direction. It could be the gloomy twilight, or the malignant traffic, or the throttling gasoil fumes, or the blast of *azan* from the nearby mosque, or it could be the late kick from Fereydoon's Benzedrine-cocaine balls, or a crazy amalgamation of them all. The Contemporary Writer's lips are trembling. He could swear now that it is the real Him and he could swear he saw Him this morning in the Irshad corridors. The face, too, seems to be turning this way a little, as if sick of the status of things.

'Oh, God. Why do I have to go through this now?' Then it *is* the responding voice of Zoroaster all right: 'Because you are the Contemporary Writer, stupid. That's why.'

Notes

¹ A reference to the Iranian National Anthem of the mid-Pahlavi era: 'Oh, Iran, oh the Bejewelled Land/Thy Soil (is) the Fountainhead of Arts. Away from you the Contemplation of Evil/Stay Lasting and be Eternal . . .' The song expresses thoughts and language of the Zoroastrian Faith.

² Thomas Wolfe (1900-1938), American novelist.

³ *Hezbollah*: Party of God; *Hezbollahi*: one who belongs to this clan.

⁴ *abji*: colloquial word for 'sister'.

⁵ *hejleh*: a booth made up with crystals and lights in commemoration of a Martyr, with his picture framed inside.

⁶ *Mahdi*: The last Shi'ite Imam, believed to have disappeared in the 3rd century, Hijri.

⁷ SAVAK: Secret State Police during the last twenty-five years of Shah Mohamad Reza Pahlavi's reign.

Women in South Asian politics*

Two contradictory images come to mind whenever one thinks of women in politics in South Asia. One image is that of powerful women leaders (Indira Gandhi, Sirimavo Bandaranaike, Benazir Bhutto, Hasina Wazed, Khaleda Zia), swathed in beautiful traditional dresses, surrounded by party leaders who are mostly male, addressing huge public rallies, enthusiastically attended—again, mainly by men. Another image is that of female masses, poor, illiterate, often veiled, huddled in groups in separate ‘women only’ polling booths or ration lines, or in labour lines seeking casual jobs.

To an outsider, the two images are seen as indicative of the contradictions of South Asian society; some Western observers even argue that sharp class or caste differences make it easier for South Asian women of a certain class and family background to achieve positions of political leadership. Whether or not it is easier for women in South Asia to attain the highest political offices is debatable; nonetheless, the frequent emergence of powerful women leaders, both in government and in opposition, in all the major South Asian countries, gives rise to a number of questions: how and why have these women succeeded in assuming political leadership, particularly in societies still dominated by the values of gender segregation and *purdah*? Is family connection the crucial factor? How representative are these women? What impact does their emergence have on women’s participation in mainstream politics? Finally, does so-called mainstream politics hold any future for women or does an alternative exist?

While women’s participation in politics may be analysed in many ways, this article will concentrate on three major issues: women in leadership, women in mainstream politics, and the new women’s movement as an alternative to the mainstream. Data and examples are drawn primarily from the four South Asian countries where women have achieved leadership positions in the last few decades: India, Bangladesh, Pakistan and Sri Lanka.

* The opinions expressed in this article are those of the author, and do not represent the views of any organisation.

Data on women's participation in politics is sparse. Most political studies, particularly those on voting behaviour, legislative bodies, and political institutions, do not disaggregate data by gender. No systematic study or data set exists that makes it possible to evaluate the development of women's participation in politics over time in any single South Asian country. While the UN Decade for Women (1975-85) has generated some studies and data on women's economic contributions, comparable data on women's political contributions is lacking. This article is, therefore, based on the limited information available in studies and reports.¹ It raises many more questions than can be answered, in part in the hope of provoking analysis and research on a number of issues that have not yet been adequately addressed; in part because the lack of information precludes giving definitive answers. Some of the leaders—Benazir Bhutto, Hasina Wazed and Khaleda Zia—have appeared only in the last few years on the main political stage; it would be premature to compare them with leaders such as Indira Gandhi or Sirimavo Bandaranaike who held the reins of governmental power for decades. The new women's movement is also in the process of evolution. This article, therefore, notes some trends and identifies some possibilities for the future, without attempting to draw firm conclusions. It is hoped that some of the hypotheses advanced in this article may lead to debate and lay foundations for further research on the topic of women's participation in politics. Nonetheless, analysis and understanding of women's role in the polity must precede a realistic assessment of the potential for future action to improve women's status in society.

Women in leadership

In South Asia there are two types of women leaders: those who are

¹ Surveys of women's political status are to be found in the Government of India report, *Towards Equality*, Committee on the Status of Women in India, 1975; *Status of Women in Sri Lanka*, University of Colombo, 1979; *Status of Women in Bangladesh*, Women for Women, 1979; 'Women's participation in politics', Centre for Women and Development Studies, India, *mimeo*, 1985; Ruth L. Sivard, *Women: A World Survey*, 1985; UN, *Selected indicators on the situation of women*, 1985. Other specific studies include: Robert N. Kearney, 'Women in politics in Sri Lanka', *Asian Survey* 21(7) July 1981; Rounaq Jahan, 'Purdah and participation: women in the politics of Bangladesh', in H. Papanek and G. Minault (eds) *Separate Worlds*, Delhi: Chanakya Publications, 1982; Vina Mazumdar, 'Women's participation in political life in India', paper presented at the meeting of Experts on the Participation of Women in Political Life and the Means for Increasing the Participation, *mimeo*, Lisbon 1983; Gail Omvedt, *Women in Popular Movements: India and Thailand during the Decade of Women*, UNRISD, 1986; ISIS, *Women's struggle and strategies: Third World Perspective*, 1986; *On the Women's Movement*, special issue *Lokayan Bulletin*, India, 1987.

recognised as women's leaders (eg leaders of women's organisations or heads of the women's sections of mass political organisations) and those who are recognised as populist leaders (eg heads of government or of mass political organisations). This section is devoted to the latter category, the few women who have achieved the highest leadership roles, either in government (Mrs Gandhi, Mrs Bandaranaike) or in political opposition (Miss Bhutto, Mrs Wazed, Mrs Zia).

These women are remarkable not only for their rare achievement in gaining the highest political office, but more importantly for their tenacity in remaining in power. Other regions of the world, notably the Scandinavian countries, have also witnessed the recent emergence of a large number of women political leaders, but only in South Asia have individual women succeeded in dominating national politics for decades. Indira Gandhi governed India for nearly twenty years. With the exception of two years as leader of the opposition, she was Prime Minister of the country from 1966 to 1984. Similarly in Sri Lanka, Sirimavo Bandaranaike was Prime Minister from 1960 to 1965, and from 1970 to 1977, while remaining leader of the opposition from 1965 to 1970. The emerging leaders of the 1980s—Benazir Bhutto, Hasina Wazed, and Khaleda Zia—have headed the political opposition in Pakistan and Bangladesh for more than five years.

It is difficult to compare these five women leaders. The political careers of three of them—Miss Bhutto, Mrs Wazed and Mrs Zia—are only beginning and it is too early to make an assessment. There are both similarities and differences in their backgrounds. While Indira Gandhi, Sirimavo Bandaranaike and Benazir Bhutto were born into rich, aristocratic families and were educated in the West, the two leaders of Bangladesh, Hasina Wazed and Khaleda Zia, have more middle-class, less Westernised family backgrounds. However, there is a common factor: they were all politicised within their family environment, and gained entry into leadership through family connections. They all fall into the category of leaders whose assumption of power was 'mediated' by a male relative, as opposed to those whose careers were shaped from the beginning by their own choices, attributes and efforts, grounded in a strong sense of their own political efficacy.²

The fact that all the women leaders of South Asia were related to powerful heads of government, either as daughters (Mrs Gandhi, Miss

² For an elaboration of these two categories of 'mediated' vs 'political efficacy' see Rita Mae Kelly and Mary Boutilier, *The Making of Political Women: A Study of Socialisation and Role Conflict*. Chicago: Nelson Hall, 1978.

Bhutto, Mrs Wazed) or as wives (Mrs Bandaranaike, Mrs Zia), naturally raises two related questions: first, why were they chosen to inherit the political mantle of their fathers and husbands? Second, why is it difficult for women to gain entry into political leadership without the support of family connections?

In considering the choice of these women to succeed their male relatives, it is worth remembering that they were initially chosen by male party leaders to fill the vacuum created when a charismatic leader was suddenly removed before having had time to groom a well-defined political successor. In all cases, the inability of the party bosses to reconcile their own differences and select a leader from amongst their number, made it politically expedient for a member of the dead leader's family to be persuaded to take up the political inheritance. It is also interesting to note that these women were chosen because of their relative political inexperience. Before succeeding their husbands, Mrs Bandaranaike and Mrs Zia had held no political positions within the party. Miss Bhutto and Mrs Wazed had only limited experience in student politics. Though Mrs Gandhi was the President of the Congress Party for one term, she spent more time before 1964 as her father's political hostess than as a participant in party politics. However, the absence of a well-known political past became an advantage for these women. Party bosses thought that on the one hand they would be easier to control, and that on the other hand they would have no adverse political record to defend. As wives and daughters of fallen leaders they would, moreover, be able to draw the people's sympathy and support.

But why choose a woman and not a man in the family? In the cases of Indira Gandhi and Hasina Wazed, of course, there was no choice; but why Benazir Bhutto and not her brothers? Why Khaleda Zia or Sirimavo Bandaranaike and not male relatives of the assassinated leaders? One possible explanation could be that these women proved more willing than other male relatives to take the risks of assuming the political mantle. Leading political opposition against military regimes, as in Pakistan and Bangladesh, is a dangerous proposition.

But why did the masses in these countries accept these leaders? How did these women become the guardians of the dead leaders' political legacies? Perhaps to the ordinary citizens, they appeared credible because their loyalties to the memories of the dead leaders were unquestionable. They were able to project themselves as being personally honest, above petty squabbles in the party, and uncompromising in the pursuit of certain fundamental objectives. As

political newcomers, they brought a fresh clean image which was in sharp contrast to other established leaders whose political images were often tainted with broken promises and corruption. In an environment of amoral politics, these women seemed to be standing for certain principles; people could trust them personally and believed that they would not willingly or easily sell out the goals they propounded. (This element of personal trust and popularity can be found in the cases of other women leaders, most notably, President Corazon Aquino of the Philippines.) The point that needs to be underscored, when one talks about women leaders, is not so much how they were chosen, but how they succeeded in establishing themselves as people's leaders. The changes they underwent from the status of relative political novices to mature politicians were truly remarkable, and form a process which has not yet been fully analysed.

The question of the difficulty experienced by women in gaining access to leadership without the support of family connections also needs further exploration. The obstacles women generally face in participating and advancing to higher political and decisionmaking levels have been identified.³ To participate, and more importantly to succeed in politics one needs money, time, skill, experience, patronage, contacts and information. Politics, particularly electoral politics, is expensive. It involves exposure to a wide network of information. The patronage of senior leaders is often crucial in pushing young aspirants into leadership roles, particularly within organisations. However, women are at a disadvantage with regard to all the above-mentioned factors promoting success in politics, and it is only through their family connections that women can sometimes counteract these obstacles.

Women generally lack the money to run for public offices. It is true that many women (like men) belong to wealthy families, but the wealth is usually that of the family, rather than individual wealth. Few women have control over family wealth, and few are permitted to use family wealth for political purposes. Women may be isolated at home, cut off from networks of information, and lacking in the confidence to seek elective or appointive positions. Even women who work outside the home, both middle-class and poor, often remain isolated from workplace organisations such as trade unions, which are dominated by their male colleagues. When women do join such organisations, more

³ See ILO, 'Obstacles to poor women's participation through organisation', draft ILO paper, *mimeo*, 1982.

frequently than not they are kept out of the informal network of power and decisionmaking.

The dichotomy between the domestic and public spheres is present in most cultures, and assigning women the domestic sphere has limited women's participation in the public sphere of politics.⁴ However, in South Asia, *purdah*, which is an extreme manifestation of the domestic/public dichotomy, creates particular problems for women. Though *purdah* in its strictest form is practised more amongst Muslims than Hindus, and more by the middle class than the working class, the norms of *purdah*—gender separation and limiting women's physical mobility—are widely prevalent amongst all communities and classes in South Asia, making it difficult for women to seek two critical routes to leadership.

For example, one route—entering into a protégé/patron relationship with a successful politician—is more difficult for a woman than a man. While a young man can easily establish a protégé/patron relationship with a senior leader and be pushed up the organisational hierarchy, for a young woman the choice is much more complicated; there are not many senior women leaders who can be influential patrons; and entering into a protégé/patron relationship with a senior male leader can be misconstrued as a sexual relationship which may hinder rather than promote a woman's upward mobility, and jeopardise her support. There is, therefore, more of a compulsion on women to seek patrons from within the family circle. While Nehru, Mujib, and Bhutto could seek patrons (Gandhi, Suhrawardy and Ayub) from outside the family, for Indira Gandhi, Hasina Wazed and Benazir Bhutto the choices were limited to fathers and close political associates of fathers. Similarly, women tended to depend more on kinship networks for advice and support. It is debatable whether Nehru, Bandaranaike, Mujib, Bhutto and Zia ever seriously considered Indira, Sirimavo, Hasina, Benazir and Khaleda as their respective political successors, or gave any recognition to these women as their political advisers and confidantes. They recruited close associates from a wider circle and background. In contrast, Indira Gandhi projected her sons and Sirimavo Bandaranaike, her nephew, as close political advisers and successors.

The second route to leadership—that of courting imprisonment and

⁴ Michelle Z Rosaldo, 'Women, culture and society: a theoretical overview', in Michelle Z Rosaldo and Louise Lamphere (eds), *Women, Culture and Society*, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1974.

accumulating political 'sacrifices'—is also more difficult for a woman. A young male politician can achieve charisma and leadership by facing police brutalities and undergoing imprisonment for a political cause; for a young woman, however, courting arrest and facing police brutalities is more problematic. If a woman is imprisoned and beaten up by the police she could count these as political 'sacrifices' to promote her political career; but if a woman political activist is raped in the process of courting imprisonment she cannot use this fact as an asset. If a woman is raped and killed by the police she might achieve martyrdom and a political movement might be launched in her memory, but for a woman who is raped and living it is nearly impossible to attain the halo of martyrdom. Again, for a woman, a well-known family background works as a relative safeguard against sexual harassment during imprisonment. It is worth remembering that the vast majority of women political activists who achieved national fame, from Sarojini Naidu, Kamala Devi Chattopadhyay, Aruna Asaf Ali to Moshina Kidwai, came from rich, established families. It is also worth noting that many of the well-publicised police and landlord rape cases in India involve women from working-class backgrounds.⁵

The family is, of course, important in politics all over the world, both for men and women. Political dynasties are not uncommon in the West. In other parts of the world, too, women have succeeded their dead husbands, eg Corazon Aquino in the Philippines and Eva Peron in Argentina. But South Asia stands out because of the greater number of women in top political positions, all of whom gained entry into politics through their families. The absence of a single instance where a woman has gained the highest political office on her merits alone naturally underscores this point.

A frequent explanation is that weak institutionalisation facilitates the frequent rise of political dynasties in South Asia. Though all four South Asian countries discussed in this article inherited modern institutions such as political parties, bureaucracies and armed forces from their colonial masters, all the charismatic leaders (with the notable exception of Jawaharlal Nehru) operated their systems more as forms of personal rule bypassing institutional relationships. This trend towards 'privatisation' of government weakened the institutional process of

⁵ For detailed discussion and analysis of these rape cases, see Omvedt, *Women in Popular Movements* . . . *op. cit.* and Lokayan Bulletin, *op. cit.*

political succession and facilitated the inheritance of leadership by members of the former leaders' families.⁶

In addition to the question of family connections, two other issues have repeatedly been raised in relation to these women: their leadership style and their attitude towards the women's cause in their countries.

The women proved themselves to be tough and uncompromising in their pursuit of power. Though initially selected by party elders, they soon emerged as leaders in their own right, outmanoeuvring the old party leadership and recruiting their own group of supporters. Mrs Gandhi, Miss Bhutto and Mrs Wazed all replaced their fathers' friends and advisers and created their own small circle of confidantes. They also proved to be politically shrewd, often without any well-defined ideological stance. Unlike the martyred leaders who propagated a certain ideology, they were more concerned about retrieving or maintaining political power. The absence of ideological goals gave them flexibility and a certain room to manoeuvre, but on the other hand it also left them (with the exception of Mrs Gandhi and Mrs Bandaranaike) without a well-defined political platform. While Mujib, Bhutto and Zia anticipated certain emerging political issues and successfully built a majority coalition around them, Hasina Wazed, Benazir Bhutto, and Khaleda Zia have not yet demonstrated this capacity to create a new political platform to match the people's mood and their needs, and sustain a popular movement. With her *Gharibi Hatao* (Eliminate Poverty) programme, Mrs Gandhi did succeed in creating a platform and a majority coalition that lasted for a number of years, but the other women leaders have not yet been able to provide a credible political programme of social transformation.

Why did these leaders choose to ignore women's liberation as a major plank of their political programme? Why has it been far easier for a Rajiv Gandhi or a Ziaur Rahman to talk about women's subordination than for Indira Gandhi or Khaleda Zia? It is difficult to judge as to why these women did not single out women's issues or identify themselves with the women's movement. Did they deliberately try to set themselves apart from others who were perceived as women's leaders addressing only women's issues (and hence not on a par with top leadership)? Or did they find it politically expedient not to raise an issue that would challenge deep-seated religious, cultural values which could

⁶ For an elaboration of this point see Rounaq Jahan, 'Political dimensions of independence: Asian leaders and the liberal democratic model of government and politics', in Rounaq Jahan, *Bangladesh Politics: Problems and Issues*, Dacca: University Press Ltd, 1980.

backfire and undermine even their own political status? It is particularly intriguing that when feminist groups in Pakistan and Bangladesh are now actively protesting against the effects of the backlash or resurgent Islamic fundamentalism on women's status, Benazir Bhutto, Hasina Wazed and Khaleda Zia are silent about it. It is also interesting to note that the women leaders in Bangladesh and Pakistan take precautions in their public appearance so as not to offend the religious/cultural sentiments of the majority Muslim masses. For example, while addressing public meetings, they invariably cover their head, though in private life they would not necessarily follow this custom of veiling. In the last forty years urban educated women in Pakistan and Bangladesh have progressively been able to shed *burquah* and veiling of the head in educational institutions and workplaces, but women political leaders from the 1950s to the 1980s have not dared to appear unveiled in mass public rallies.

Not only have women leaders failed to champion feminist issues or challenge the existing religious cultural norms about the place of women in society, but they have also found it difficult to promote younger women actively into leadership. For example, in Sri Lanka, during her two terms as Prime Minister (1960-65 and 1970-77), Mrs Bandaranaike appointed only one woman (Siva Obeyesekere) as Minister of Health in 1976. But to be fair to Mrs Bandaranaike, it must also be pointed out that during 1947-56, 1959-60, and 1965-70, no woman served in the Sri Lankan Cabinet.⁷

In some situations more than one woman in leadership positions became one woman too many. A case in point is the recent election of the Party Presidium of the Awami League in Bangladesh, where the fact that both the President and the General Secretary of the party were women became an issue. That for so many decades only men held the positions of party President and General Secretary was apparently a non-issue. However, it is worth noting that in spite of the surrounding debate, both incumbent women succeeded in retaining their positions; in addition, women were elected as Secretaries of Agriculture and Labour, apart from the usual position of Secretary of Women's Affairs.

To summarise the major arguments of this section: since the 1960s. South Asia has witnessed an unusually large number of women leading either government or political opposition. All of them, however, achieved entry into politics through their family connections. It was this

⁷ For details, see Kearney, 'Women in politics . . .'

factor that enabled them to overcome the obstacles women generally face in politics all over the world (eg lack of money, time, skill, experience, patronage, contacts, and information) and more particularly in South Asia (eg *purdah* constraints on women's mobility and gender segregation). Yet the point that needs to be emphasised is that after achieving leadership, these women emerged in their own right, and demonstrated considerable skill and resources in staying in power. They were tough and quick in decisionmaking and handled power with ease. They did not consciously make women's liberation an issue, nor did they in any way project themselves as facing any particular obstacle, or having a special perspective on issues, because of their gender. However, in spite of their success in breaking down gender-stereotyping and certain barriers against women in leadership, these women had only a marginal impact on the political roles and opportunities of women in general in their countries.

Women in mainstream politics

This section will look at women's participation in what is often called 'mainstream' politics. Here, 'mainstream' will refer to the various forms of political participation significant in the context of South Asia, ranging from voting in elections to attendance at public meetings and rallies, membership of elective bodies and political and mass organisations, and participation in political struggles and movements. Since macro-level data is often not disaggregated by gender, this section will depend on a few micro-studies.

As voters, women's rate of participation is high, almost equalling that of men. In Sri Lanka it reaches nearly 80 per cent.⁸ In India and Bangladesh the voting rate is lower than in Sri Lanka (approximately 50 per cent) but compares favourably with that in many Western democracies. The differences between male and female rates of voting has steadily declined over the years.⁹ However, the mere act of voting cannot be regarded as a measure of political consciousness or participation. In many instances poor rural and urban women are mobilised to vote by the political parties. In such situations women vote in high numbers but do not participate in any other political activity. Studies of electoral participation indicate that women tend to be less informed and less interested in campaign issues, feeling politically less

⁸ *ibid.*

⁹ Centre for Women and Development Studies, India, 'Women's participation . . .'

efficacious, and participating less in public rallies, meetings, and organisations.

For example, survey data from Bangladesh shows that rates of women's participation in different types of activities (eg attendance of public rallies, membership of social and political organisations, campaign work for the election of candidates, donation of funds to parties) are significantly lower than those of men.¹⁰ Only a minuscule number of women are members of organisations: 35 per cent of men and only 3 per cent of women from the sample were members of social organisations, and 10 per cent of men and 2 per cent of women were members of political organisations. Similarly, campaign rallies drew 39 per cent of men and only 4 per cent of women, and 13 per cent of men and 3 per cent of women were active political workers in the election campaign. A study on Sri Lanka finds similar differences in the rates of male-female participation.¹¹

Data from Bangladesh also indicates that not only are the rates of women's participation lower, but more significantly, the patterns of women's participation are different from those of men.¹² The standard socio-economic model that explains differences in participatory behaviour in the Western democracies is also applicable in the case of men in Bangladesh—higher socio-economic status does lead to greater political interest and knowledge which in turn leads to a greater sense of political efficacy and higher political participation.¹³ But the socio-economic model is only partially applicable for women: with higher socio-economic status, women's political interest and knowledge increases and they do feel a greater sense of political efficacy, but unlike men these factors do not lead women to greater participation in public rallies or membership of social and political organisations. Cultural factors such as the *purdah* norms limiting women's physical mobility obviously counter the socio-economic model, and set a different pattern for women's participation.

Available data on women's participation in elective bodies also suggests only marginal changes over the last few decades. In the two countries which held regular, free elections—India and Sri Lanka—women always constituted less than 10 per cent of members in the

¹⁰ Jahan, 'Purdah and participation . . .'

¹¹ Kearny, 'Women in politics . . .'

¹² Jahan, 'Purdah and participation . . .'

¹³ For an elaboration of the socio-economic model explaining participatory behaviour, see Sidney Verba and Norman H Nie, *Participation in America: Political Democracy and Social Equality*. New York: Harper and Row, 1972.

parliament. For example, during 1980–84 in India there were 514 male and 28 female members of parliament. The corresponding figures for Sri Lanka are 147 male and 7 female.¹⁴ Though small, this figure is comparable to the world average. A global survey in 1984 showed that women held 10 per cent of seats in national legislatures and 7 per cent in executive cabinets.¹⁵ The survey also indicated that the exception is the Nordic area. Four countries—Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden—have 25–30 per cent women in their national legislatures and 18–25 per cent in their cabinets. Major communist countries have good records on the number of women in their assemblies but give them relatively little or no representation in the executive branch.

In Pakistan and Bangladesh, countries with a history of irregular elections and political movements, women have a separate quota in parliament which ensures at least some female presence. However, the mechanism of their selection also raises several critical questions about the women parliamentarians' constituency and representativeness: what is the constituency of these women parliamentarians—the members of parliament (mostly men) who 'select' them or the female masses in whose name they are allotted their special seats? Whose political views do they represent—those of the party or regime in power or those of the divergent women's groups and organisations in the country? What kinds of women are selected by male politicians to be their colleagues in parliament? Do they select women who share similar political experiences of organisational and grassroots politics, or do they prefer educated middle-class women who excel more in volunteer social work than in organisational activities in the party?

Comparative data on male/female parliamentarians is limited; but at least one study in Bangladesh indicates significant differences in the class background and political socialisation of male and female parliamentarians.¹⁶ When compared with their male counterparts, female parliamentarians were younger in age and better educated; their socialisation process and political background were also different. The majority of male parliamentarians were born in villages in illiterate or near-illiterate peasant families, and went to school in rural areas, coming to the city only when they were in college. They settled down in middle-sized towns either as lawyers or businessmen but maintained close contact with their village land, kinship network, and local party

¹⁴ UN, *Selected Indicators on the Situation of Women*, 1985.

¹⁵ Ruth M Sivard, *Women: A World Survey*.

¹⁶ Rounaq Jahan, 'Members of Parliament in Bangladesh', *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 1(3) 1976.

factions. They were recruited into national politics through their involvement in student politics or small town bar association politics. In contrast, the majority of women politicians were born into urban, middle-class families whose fathers were graduates and in salaried employment. They went to urban schools and colleges, married, and settled down in cities. They were generally a generation removed from their rural base and had little contact with their constituency. They were recruited into politics through their involvement in social work and women's organisations. Data from Sri Lanka also indicates that as compared to men, women parliamentarians come from more affluent, educated and urban family backgrounds.¹⁷ They have little experience in grassroots politics.

Data from Sri Lanka as well as from other countries of the region also suggests 'that prospects for service in local government bodies, particularly in rural areas, are limited for women almost to the point of non-existence'.¹⁸ Few women serve in village or town councils or are elected as presiding officers of these bodies. In Bangladesh, to ensure women's presence, two women are nominated to these bodies, but those nominated are generally politically uninformed and inactive. In Council meetings their role is often limited to making *paan* (betel leaf) for their male colleagues! In Sri Lanka, women constitute only 1-2 per cent of members in local bodies. For example, only one woman served in the chair of the village council in 1966 (total number of chairmen 208) and in 1970 (total number of chairmen 203). Not a single woman was vice-chairman. In urban councils women constituted 2 per cent of members in 1966 and 1970. Only in municipal councils did women's membership increase from 1 per cent of members in 1966 to 3 per cent in 1970.¹⁹

The paucity of women in local government bodies, particularly in rural areas, implies significant differences between women and men in the path of recruitment to national political office. Chairmanships of village and town councils are common springboards for parliamentary candidacy by male politicians. In the parliamentary election of 1973 in Bangladesh, 60 per cent of elected men (but not one woman) had previous experience of membership in such councils.²⁰ In Sri Lanka 40 per cent of men elected to parliament in 1965, 1970 and 1977 had been

¹⁷ Kearney, 'Women in politics . . .'

¹⁸ *ibid.*, p 743.

¹⁹ *ibid.*

²⁰ Jahan, 'Members of Parliament . . .'

members of a local body, whereas only one woman parliamentarian had ever served on a local council.²¹

The differences in the backgrounds of male and female political leaders indicate that while it is possible for a man born and brought up in a village, and with little education, to move up to the stature of a national leader through his involvement in local bodies and party organisation, it is nearly impossible for a woman with a similar background to achieve this in one generation. It is much more difficult for a woman with a working-class background to achieve the status of a national leader. In a society where a man is valued for what he achieves and a woman for what she is born with, it is an uphill task for a woman to counter-balance the disadvantages of her class background with her work record.

In national legislative bodies, women members generally concern themselves with the so-called 'women's issues', such as education, health, child care, population, women's welfare, food and prices. They participate less vigorously in debates related to such issues as defence, foreign policy and macro-economic policy. Their participation in public affairs is thus perceived as an extension of women's domestic roles.

If women's presence in elective bodies is insignificant, what of other institutions: political parties, trade unions, and mass organisations that dominate mainstream politics? Again, available information indicates that women participate more as ordinary members than at the centre of power or at the highest decisionmaking levels. For example, the report of the National Committee of the Status of Women in India shows that only one-seventh of the members of the Congress Party's Working Committee were women; the Communist Party of India (CPI) had only four women out of a total membership of 110 in the National Council, though it claimed that 5 per cent of its ordinary members were women. The CPI(M) had only one woman out of thirty-one members in the Central Committee.²²

In the South Asian countries political parties were formed to spearhead popular mobilisation against colonial rule or against particular regimes. In such situations, the mobilisation of women was an integral and necessary strategy and women's sections of political parties were formed specifically to mobilise women. However, once such parties came to governmental power, women's mass movements were

²¹ Kearney, 'Women in politics' . . .

²² ICSSR, *Status of Women in India: A Synopsis of the Report of the National Committee on the Status of Women*, 1975.

often allotted only non-political functions or supportive roles. Very few women achieved positions of leadership in the overall party or trade union structure.

In addition to the obstacles discussed earlier, women face a particular disadvantage in organisational politics. Building support in South Asia often requires not only mobilisation but also muscle-power; *goondas* (armed henchmen) are a necessary element of organisation politics. Again, it is much more difficult for women to keep retinues of *goondas* to help in factional fights with their rivals.

Women are also notably absent from the civil bureaucracy and the armed forces, the two key decisionmaking institutions in South Asia. In India, despite recent increases in women's numbers, the vast majority of senior administrators are men. In Pakistan during 1947-71, women were allowed to serve only in the audits and accounts and taxation services. They were barred from the civil, police and foreign services, which fact again implies the virtual absence of women from the ranks of senior officials in both Pakistan and Bangladesh. In the armed forces women are even scarcer, yet in Bangladesh and Pakistan they are the main political activists. Women are also not represented in the major power groups, amongst rich farmers, industrialists and businessmen.

Their absence from leadership roles in political organisations and major power groups, however, does not mean that women do not participate in politics. Indeed, women do participate and in great numbers but their pattern of participation is different from that of men, and has generally been intermittent. They participate in great numbers and often assume leadership during crisis periods (Bangladesh and Pakistan) but the rate and level of their participation often falls during normal times. For example, in Pakistan during the 1964 election campaign against Ayub Khan, political opposition parties selected a woman (Miss Jinnah, sister of Pakistan's father of the nation, Mohammed Ali Jinnah) as the opposition's candidate for the presidency, who provided courageous leadership at a critical period. In 1966, when all the leaders of the Awami League party were arrested after the launching of the party's radical autonomy demand, or the 'Six Points Movement', Mrs Amena Begum led and held the party together at a crisis period. In more recent times in Pakistan and Bangladesh, Nusrat Bhutto, Benazir Bhutto, Hasina Wazed, and Khaleda Zia have led the Pakistan People's Party, Awami League, and Bangladesh National Party during periods of crisis.

What is generally noticeable, not only in South Asia but all over the

world, is that women are often in the front ranks when a political struggle is in its ideological phase but they become invisible when the struggle enters the phase of distributing the fruits of power. Women are mobilised on an *ad hoc* basis to support specific causes and issues, but once the cause is achieved and the movement turns into a routine power game, women tend to lose out, either being pushed back by men to their 'normal' duties at home, or themselves losing interest in overt power struggles. Women participate more in informal than in formal structures, and more in what is known as supportive roles; they vote, they help in campaigning, and in mobilising electoral support—especially women's support—but they rarely stand for election themselves. They are active in peasant struggles and trade union movements but more as unrecognised foot-soldiers than as leaders.

The differential pattern of women's participation has raised another critical issue: can women's participation improve without a change in the nature of mainstream politics? Conversely, can mainstream politics change without women's participation? The goals, objectives, and methods of current politics in South Asia ignore the problems, hopes and aspirations of the vast majority of the population who are poor—and women constitute the majority of the poor. The ruling elites of the region, politicians as well as civil and military bureaucrats, always promise the alleviation of poverty, social transformation, and the creation of a just social order in their public speeches and election manifestos, but the sad reality is that the conditions of large sections of the masses have actually worsened in the last few decades. As one study points out

In the two decades of the sixties and seventies, in no country has there been a dramatic breakthrough in the reduction of poverty . . . Agrarian structures remain highly unequal, and movements in real wages and changes in rural employment opportunities give little indication that there has been any widespread improvement in the condition of the rural poor in spite of the rapid spread of new technology and significant improvement in agricultural productivity in some countries . . . Inequality in rural incomes and land distribution have accentuated poverty.²³

Instead of mobilising the poor, and heightening their consciousness, the political institutions and leaders have largely depended on major power groups—rich and middle farmers, industrialists, businessmen, organised labour—for support. Party leaders often co-opted 'local influentials' without socialising them into the ideology of the party.

²³ ILO, ARTEP, *Fighting Poverty: Asia's Major Challenge*, 1986, pp 3–4.

Since women rarely fall into the category of local influentials, that is, local council chairmen, Bar Association presidents, leaders of student unions, trade unions, or peasant associations, they are left out of the mainstream process of organisation building. Women tend to be active in social reform movements, in community organisations and non-governmental organisations (NGOs), but in political organisations and social reform movements have generally kept apart. Only in periods when the two are linked (eg the Indian nationalist movement under Mahatma Gandhi's leadership) do women participate in large numbers in the mainstream.

To summarise this section, women generally participate in high numbers in one single political activity, that is, voting, but in other activities such as attendance at public rallies and membership of social and political organisations, their participation is very low. Women's representation in national and local legislative bodies is marginal. The few women who succeed in being elected generally come from affluent, urban, educated family backgrounds and have very little contact with rural and small-town politics. Women's presence at decisionmaking levels in mass organisations such as political parties and trade unions, is also nominal. But the absence of women in positions of leadership in the established political structures and institutions does not mean that women do not participate in politics. They participate in large numbers in political struggles and in crisis periods, they are more involved when social reform is an integrated part of a political movement. Women seem to lose interest or be excluded however, when politics becomes a simple game of distributing power.

New women's movement as an alternative to mainstream politics

The differential pattern of women's participation has led to the hypothesis that women's visions, priorities, and modes of organisation are different from those of men. The new women's movement demonstrates the potential for changing mainstream politics by bringing in new issues and groups which have been marginalised by the processes of mainstream politics, yet which concern the majority of the population.

The Women's Decade witnessed the emergence of a powerful new women's movement in South Asia. Though initial doubts were raised that the movement would be a pale replica of Western 'women's liberation', by the end of the Decade, the movement had found its

roots, identified indigenous feminist issues, and brought forward new leadership, new organisations and new modes of organisational behaviour. The movement demonstrated the potential for mobilising and organising women in an alternative and more effective way.

The issues emphasised by the new women's movement were more consciously feminist in trend, posing a fundamental challenge to many of the basic ideological and cultural values regarding the family and society. The new women's movement linked, at both theoretical and practical levels, the issues of production/reproduction and economy/kinship. It mobilised women around issues that could for the first time establish a coalition between a section of young, educated, middle-class women and the poor urban and rural working-class women. Issues of physical violence (rape, assault, dowry deaths), cultural violence (traffic in women, negative images of women in the media), economic exploitation (discriminatory wages, retrenchment, lay-offs, bans on unionisation), economic rights (land rights, rights to forest, access to credit) and political rights (democratic participation, rights to organise) were emphasised.

In India, large-scale mobilisation took place around a number of notorious rape cases.²⁴ The police and landlord rape cases on the one hand raised women's consciousness about the link between economic exploitation and sexual violence and oppression, and on the other demonstrated to women activists the weakness of their own movement. While sympathy was aroused about rape victims, there were no grassroots-level organisations to assist these women. Mobilisation also took place in India and Bangladesh around dowry deaths and bride-burning,²⁵ but again, effective action on dowries could be taken only in situations where, as in the case of Grameen Bank in Bangladesh, women were organised at the neighbourhood and village levels in a cooperative and supportive way.

Women's access to means of production (land, forest, credit) became a major issue during the Decade. In India, land struggles by both tribal and non-tribal women attracted public attention. Women have joined earlier land struggles in Bengal and Telengana;²⁶ but what was remarkable about the new land struggles in Bodh Gaya in Bihar and Dhule district in Maharashtra, was the women's demands to have land

²⁴ Omvedt, *Women in Popular Movements* . . .

²⁵ *ibid.*

²⁶ See S Sunil Sen, 'The working women in West Bengal: a study in popular movement and women's organisations' in S Muntamba (ed), *Rural Development and Women: Lessons from the Field*, Geneva: ILO, 1985, Vol. II.

rights in their own names.²⁷ Simultaneously with these land struggles, several NGOs, both in India (Centre for Women's Development Studies) and Bangladesh (Grameen Bank, Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee), initiated employment programmes for women which gave women's groups rights and access to land for production. Access to forests and forest produce was established as a major women's issue by the Chipko movement in India,²⁸ and women's need for credit to promote employment and income was demonstrated by both government-sponsored programmes and development-oriented NGOs.

In India, Sri Lanka and Bangladesh the new women's movement emphasised economic rights. In Pakistan, the introduction of *sharia* laws and the consequent limitations on women's legal rights, necessarily made legal and political rights the focus of the new women's movement. The legal changes carried out under the recent Islamisation policy in Pakistan include changes in the law of evidence which states that in financial matters a woman's witness is worth half that of a man's, and the Haddood Ordinance which does not differentiate between adultery and rape.²⁹ The Decade witnessed the large-scale mobilisation of women in Pakistan for the restoration of democratic rights, as well as in protest against the imposition of *sharia* laws and courts.³⁰

The Decade also saw the emergence of non-partisan, grassroots women's organisations. By adopting a strategy of combining developmental work with consciousness-raising and organisation-building, these organisations achieved remarkable successes. Thousands of previously unorganised (and reputedly unorganisable) women—hawkers, street vendors, fisherwomen, piece-rate workers, agricultural labourers—were effectively organised by new types of grassroots organisations, such as the Self-Employed Women's Association (SEWA) and the Working Women's Forum (WWF) in India, and Nijera Kori and BRAC in Bangladesh. The formation of these grassroots organisations, particularly women's organisations in rural areas, marked a qualitative step forward in the women's movement. These organisations stressed the autonomy of the women's movement and organisation, and questioned some of the traditional

²⁷ Omvedt, *Women in Popular Movements* . . .

²⁸ Kumud Sharma, Balaji Panday and Kusum Nantiyal, 'The Chipko Movement in the Uttar Khand Region, Uttar Pradesh, India' in Muntemba (ed) *Rural Development and Women* . . .

²⁹ J. Henry Korson and Michelle Maskiell, 'Islamisation and social policy in Pakistan', *Asian Survey* 25(6) June 1985, and Nighat Said Khan and Simorgh Women's Resource and Publication Centre, 'Women in Pakistan', in ISIS, *Women, Struggles and Strategies* . . .

³⁰ Khan *et al.*, 'Women in Pakistan'.

bureaucratised modes of organisation. They emphasised more democratic practices and more egalitarian male/female roles within organisations.

The emergence of these new rural women's grassroots organisations rekindled the old debate about separate vs integrated methods: whether women should be organised separately, or whether such separate organisations would threaten working-class solidarity. The debate centred mostly on New Left groups. Some within these groups argued that their movement was all-encompassing and espoused women's issues sufficiently to dispel the need for separate organisations. On the other hand, the feminists championing the autonomy of the women's movement argued that women could more easily be made self-conscious and more self-reliant and confident in separate women's organisations; that in most mixed organisations the existence of the specific oppression of women within as well as across classes is disputed or submerged without much debate.³¹

The new women's movement also gave rise to a new breed of women leaders. Though they themselves came from urban middle-class backgrounds, these women spent time organising poor peasant and agricultural women labourers or working-class women in urban slums. The experience of working with militant working-class women transformed the consciousness of many of them, leading them to identify closely with issues that are of primary importance to working-class women. For example, leaders such as Ela Bhatt (SEWA), Jaya Arunachalam (WWF) or Chetna (Chatra Yuva Sangharsh Vahini) in India, and Khushi Kabir (Nijera Kori) in Bangladesh, are themselves from middle-class family backgrounds, but have highlighted the problems of employment, working conditions, and the organisation of rural and urban poor women, making these problems part of a national debate. Yet in spite of close interaction and the formation of effective coalitions, no woman from a poor, rural, working-class background has yet effectively assumed a position of leadership on a par with the urban middle-class women in these organisations.

What is the future of the new women's movement in South Asia? Will it be able to undertake the large-scale mobilisation of women at the grassroots level, make women's issues more central to people's consciousness and train a new cadre of women leaders who can play a more effective role in mainstream politics? Will it create a new coalition

³¹ Omvedt, *Women in Popular Movements . . .* and Lokayan *Bulletin*, *op. cit.*

of marginals—landless farmers, informal sector workers, untouchables, tribals—who can some day aspire to be a majority political coalition?

It is too early to discern the ultimate direction of the new women's movement. There have, however, been some encouraging trends in recent years. As a result of the women's movement, political parties have become more aware of women's issues. In India, joint alliances of women's organisations—both political and non-political—have demanded more effective government action in the suppression of crimes against women and in promoting employment and educational opportunities. Recognising women as a potential source of political support, political parties and leaders throughout South Asia are now ready to adopt pro-women stands in public statements and election manifestos. The growing women's movement has also had an impact on legislation and on a section of the judiciary. In Bangladesh and India some legislative reforms have taken place in family law, labour laws and in criminal laws for the protection of women.

In future, the women's movement needs to pay more attention to major trends in the economy, society and polity. A significant trend in the economy is one of increasing poverty and growing differences between the rich and the poor. More and more women are pushed into the labour market, and the number of female-headed households is increasing. The norms of secluding women, of keeping them in the private domain, are bound to break down under strong economic pressures, as has already happened in Bangladesh. On the other hand, in all countries of the region there is a resurgent fundamentalism that is seeking to revalidate the traditional norms of the sexual division of labour, female seclusion and gender segregation. For example, in Pakistan and Bangladesh, Islamic fundamentalists are pressing for the veiling of women (to different degrees) in public places, or in public appearances (eg television), and prohibiting women from participating in games or marches in public arenas. Violence against women is also increasing.³² There is also more violence in the country as a whole, and women are the special victims of the rising ethnic, communal violence in the region.

While violence limits women's physical mobility in general, it inhibits middle-class women much more than working-class women. For the latter, violence may be said to be part of their daily lives and struggles. The middle-class women, who are leading the new women's movement,

³² Khan *et al.*, 'Women in Pakistan'.

will have to come to terms with this increasing violence and work out a strategy to consolidate the movement, rather than dividing it along ethnic/communal/sectarian lines.

Finally, the movement will have to identify and work with external allies. The support from groups outside the movement is particularly necessary in the women's struggle against resurgent fundamentalism. The initial decision by the grassroots women's organisations to remain autonomous and non-partisan, and concentrate on raising the consciousness and organisational level of women around women's issues was a step forward in the right direction. With increasing strength and visibility, however, they need to establish their stand *vis-à-vis* other issues, and their relationships with other grassroots organisations and popular movements. This, however, should be carefully debated and negotiated to ensure that women's issues and groups do not get relegated to a secondary position in a general coalition.

In summary, the new women's movement in South Asia has succeeded in making a number of new issues that concern women (ie physical violence, cultural violence, economic exploitation, economic rights, social and political rights) part of a national debate and agenda. The movement has highlighted the problems of poor working-class women—urban as well as rural—brought forward a new leadership which has forged close links between middle-class and poor working-class women, and has given rise to new types of autonomous grassroots women's organisations that emphasise democratic participatory organisational behaviour. The movement is, however, still evolving its objectives and strategies, and its future potential and impact will depend on its capacity to make alliances with other popular movements without submerging the visions and priorities of women.

Conclusion

In South Asia, as in most other parts of the world, the agenda and priorities of women have hitherto been set by others. Increased political participation should involve not only greater numbers of women in politics but, more importantly, a qualitative change in political goals and processes; the goals should be set by women's perspectives and priorities, and processes should be such that women will feel more at ease in participating.

The developments of the last decade in South Asia indicate some small steps forward in this direction. The grassroots organisation of

rural women, emphasis on working-women's concerns, and the coalition of middle-class and working-class rural women are all positive developments; however, the movement is still small and scattered. It has

evolved from 'specific' women's issues (such as rape, dowry, maintenance, wife-beating) to an overall approach of tackling 'general' issues (such as drought, housing, social forestry, energy policies, health, right to work, redistribution of land) from a woman's perspective. This indicates the need to develop an overall political perspective in cooperation with other forces such as unions, parties, people's movement on ecology, people's science, human rights groups and the voluntary sector.³³

Apart from dealing with social, economic and political issues, the movement will also have to understand and come to terms with people's spiritual and psychological needs. For an overwhelming number of human beings, these needs are partly or largely met by religion. But religious scriptures and teachings are open to many interpretations; the fundamentalists and obscurantists are interpreting them to spread communalism or restrict women's opportunities. The women's movement cannot respond to them by ignoring or under-estimating the role of religion in society. It has to respond creatively to fundamentalists on their own ground. In Pakistan and Bangladesh women's movements need to work out their own interpretation of Islam that will ensure women's equality, opportunities, and physical mobility, and to build mass support around that interpretation. In India, raising the emotional appeal of non-communist forces provides the movement with a challenging opportunity to build a mass base for action founded on the perspective of women.

³³ Gabriele Dietrich, 'Can the Women's Movement become an anti-communist force', in *Lokayan Bulletin*, *op. cit.*, p 55.

Somalia impasse: state power and dissent politics*

... Wandering between two worlds, one [seems] dead, the other [seems] powerless to be born.
Matthew Arnold

Like a great many African countries, Somalia has now reached an impasse: the prevailing order which came into place in 1969, with the coming to power of Siyaad Barre, is infirm and has lost meaning, and no credible alternatives are discernible on the horizon.¹

In addition to the constrictions of the legendary vagaries of the Somali climate and the enveloping global market, I propose that some of the most immediate and primary reasons for this impasse are: a total failure of the process of national accumulation—ie, the development of productive forces—and a decay of the system of governance on the part of the state; and the lack of a theoretically informed and grass roots-based challenge from oppositionist forces. Both the current state structure and the dissident groups are divorced from the popular masses, fatally undermining their respective claims to hegemony and thwarting national development.

To sustain this thesis, I shall first summarise some of the literature on Somalia in the crucial decade of the 1970s; secondly, review the political economy of the country in the 1980s; thirdly, examine the appearance of dissent and insurgent politics; and finally, I shall offer a few personal and concluding remarks on the state and its relationship to the imperative of development in Africa.

* This paper has benefited from the editorial assistance of Marlene Guzman and Patricia Alden.

¹ For a sample of the numerous writings on this African condition, see René Dumont and Marie-France Mottin, *Stranglehold on Africa*, London: André Deutsch, 1983; Richard Sandbrook with Judith Barker, *The Politics of Africa's Economic Stagnation*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985; Timothy M Shaw, *Towards a Political Economy for Africa*, New York: St Martin's Press, 1985. In the historical specificity of the Somali case, see A I Samatar, 'Underdevelopment in Somalia: dictatorship without hegemony', *Africa Today* 32(3) 1985, pp 23–40 and A I Samatar and Abdi Samatar, 'The state, agrarian change and crisis of hegemony in Somalia', paper presented at the Third International Congress of Somali Studies, University of Rome, 26–31 May 1986.

The legacy of the 1970s

Previous studies have not fully examined the consequences of military-cum-revolutionary rule in Somalia in the 1970s. However, there is a small cluster of research undertaken during the first half of the decade, almost all of it by non-Somalis. While this literature is positive and confirmatory in the first four to five years, most observers fall into two broad categories when the entire decade is taken into account.² First, there is a line of investigation which has clung to those momentous early years and continues, therefore, to defend the endeavours: and second, a less enthusiastic and more sceptical trend. Charles Gesheker's brief study typifies the first type of analysis.³ He concludes that the Somali 'Revolution', until the time of his writing (early 1979), could claim the following notable achievements:⁴

- 1) The discordance and 'cleavage' between the countryside and the city had been diffused;
- 2) Relations between the managers of the bureaucracy and the rest of society had been improved;
- 3) A sense of professionalism had returned to the civil service as official responsibilities began to be respected;
- 4) Significant strides had been taken to create opportunities for women;
- 5) On the whole, 'Somalia's socio-economic priorities [were] sound, its developmental strategies rooted in local realities . . .'

While Gesheker's conclusions are approving, other analysts are not as sanguine. David Laitin, in a judicious article, suggests five criteria for assessing the Somali experience:⁵ public control of the means of production; equity and promotion of egalitarianism; development of the productive forces; loosening of world capitalist linkages; and 'ideological refinement'. Laitin feels that some progress has been made in forestalling oppressive social stratification and in promoting sexual equality. He also acknowledges the value of establishing an

² I M Lewis, 'Somalia's leaders go forward with confidence', *New Middle East* (51) December 1972, p 9; Basil Davidson, 'Somalia's lessons for Africa', *New Statesman*, 16 May 1975, pp 648-98. 'Somalia: towards socialism', *Race and Class* 17(1) July 1975, pp 19-38; also, Luigi Pestalozza, *The Somalian Revolution*, translated by Peter Glendening, Bari: Dedalo Libri, 1974.

³ Charles Gesheker, 'Socio-economic developments in Somalia', *Horn of Africa* 2(2) April-June 1979, pp 24-36.

⁴ *ibid.*, pp 35-6.

⁵ David D Laitin, 'Somalia's military government and scientific socialism', in *Socialism in Sub-Saharan Africa: A New Assessment*, edited by Carl G Rosberg Jr and Thomas M Callaghy, Institute of International Studies Research Series, No 38, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1979, p 177.

orthography for the Somali language, and of other hesitant steps taken towards 'creating a social base for democracy'.⁶ On the negative side, he observes that the regime's economic guidelines were neither anchored in 'scientific analysis', nor informed by socialist thinking. Further, he argues that the economy had stagnated, military dependence on the Soviet Union had been created, and persecution of critical 'socialist thinkers' was a feature of the state's domestic policy.⁷ In short, according to Laitin, 'The record suggests that a non-socialist but vigorous, development-conscious military in control of the Somali government would have acted much the same way as the present socialist regime.'⁸

I M Lewis is also, at best, ironic about the outcome.⁹ He points to the success of the establishment of the Somali language, the subsequent literacy projects, the competent handling of the great 1974-5 drought, various crash development programmes, and an enhancement of Somalia's international and regional reputation. On the debit side, he lists glorification of Siyaad Barre's personality, 'monolithic militarism', corruption, a continuation of clanism, and economic stagnation.¹⁰

My assessment of the regime's performance for the first couple of years corroborates the positive notes expressed by all these writers. However, by the end of the 1970s the evidence pointed in a different direction. The regime's record proved to be very poor and fell short of the goals enunciated in the beginning.¹¹ On crucial issues affecting economic transformation, the performance was most disappointing. The rural sector, the largest part of the economy, was utterly neglected, with the pastoral sub-sector left to the whims of small but dominant trading families and the *dilaals* (middle men) who linked them to the pastoral producers. In his evaluation, Lewis suggests that it was only this segment of the economy which prospered, ostensibly because of the absence of state ownership. I disagree. First, the positive growth of

⁶ *idem*, 'The political economy of military rule in Somalia', *Journal of Modern African Studies* 17(1) March 1979, pp 95-116.

⁷ *idem*, 'Somalia's Military . . . ' p 197.

⁸ *ibid.*, p 198.

⁹ I M Lewis, 'Kim-Il-Sung in Somalia: the end of tribalism', in *Politics and Leadership in Eastern Africa*, edited by William A Shack and Percy S Cohen, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979, pp 14-43.

¹⁰ *ibid.*, pp 39-42.

¹¹ For an intriguing theoretical proposition for why this is so among 'radical' regimes in Africa, see Kenneth Jowitt, 'Scientific socialist regimes in Africa: political differentiation, avoidance, and unawareness', in *Socialism in Sub-Saharan Africa: A New Assessment*, edited by Carl G Rosberg Jr and Thomas M Callaghy, Institute of International Studies Research Series, No 38, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1979 pp 133-74.

livestock production (2.5 per cent) hardly kept up with population growth. Moreover, Lewis does not pay attention to the contentious fact that, despite the high return for pastoral products, that windfall could have been harvested primarily by the export traders and, to a lesser extent, by the state.¹² Finally, conspicuous ecological deterioration underlined the extent to which this sub-sector was disregarded. Agriculture fared even worse. I have documented elsewhere how the production of almost all the major food crops declined, culminating in the need to beg for food aid and to borrow large sums of money to pay for food imports.¹³ In addition, state allocation or credit extension for both sub-sectors was meagre. Finally, fisheries, the third largest component of the rural economy, remained very peripheral to the Somali economy and state planning.


In the modern sector, state enterprises expanded but production was negative. While it is true that employment in those public establishments engaged in manufacturing increased from 4,482 to 9,735 (an average growth of 17 per cent per year), growth in terms of value added per employee declined at an average of 12.5 per cent per year. Further, these industries were shackled by a lack of skilled personnel, low capacity utilisation, a high tax burden (over 80 per cent at net profit), and rising prices of imported inputs. In contrast to these areas of production, however, the government services sector grew by 8.5 per cent per annum.

In politics and human rights, the overall results were not encouraging and were at variance with the imperatives of the regime's goal of self-reliance (*Hantiwadaag*). For example, despite the nationalisation of some important segments of the Somali economy—especially the modern sector—there was very little evidence of genuine democratisation of the work-place. One of the first edicts of the military government was the abolition of strikes and the use of the death penalty against offenders. Participation in politics and the encouragement of local initiatives were also inhibited. For the first seven years, despite speeches enjoining democracy, free political activity was the least conspicuous characteristic of Somali life. From the beginning, there was

¹² While researchers on the Somali political economy have not yet undertaken a thorough accounting of this, many writers suggest the dominance of traders. For example, see Dan Aronson, 'Kinsmen and comrades: towards a class analysis of the pastoral sector', *Nomadic Peoples* (7) November 1980, pp 14–23. See also, John Holtzman, 'The economics of improving animal health and livestock marketing in Somalia', USAID paper, Mogadishu, 1982; and Vali Jamal, 'Nomads and farmers: income and poverty in rural Somalia', in D Chai and S Radwan (eds), *Agrarian Policies and Rural Poverty in Africa*, Geneva: ILO, 1983.

¹³ A I Samatar, 'Underdevelopment in Somalia . . .' p 35.

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a clear centralisation of power at the district, regional, and national levels. All the decisionmakers in local and regional areas were directly appointed by the centre.

I found only superficial and discontinuous steps in the devolution of authority and the encouragement of local participation. Moreover, there were no constitutional limitations on the powers of the central government and, in particular, on President Siyaad Barre. Even after the Somali Revolutionary Socialist Party (SRSP) was established in 1976, General Barre monopolised the five most powerful offices in the country: Head of State, Chairman of the Defence Committee, Chairman of the High Judicial Council, Chairman of the Council of Ministers, and the newly-created Secretary-General of the SRSP—effectively making him responsible for making, carrying out and adjudicating on all laws.

In light of all this, I disagree with Laitin's conclusion that 'a social base was created for democracy'. On the contrary, the above evidence underlines one inescapable and fundamental reality: the withering away of 'traditional' democracy and the failure to create a viable replacement.¹⁴ Obviously, such an ambience is not only detrimental to authentic self-reliance, but is also a breeding ground for deformed politics and malignant rule. In Montesquieu's instructive warning,

When the legislative and executive powers are united in the same person or body, there can be no liberty, because apprehensions may arise lest the same monarch or senate should act tyrannically . . . Where the power of judging is joined with the legislature, the life and liberty of the subject would be exposed to the arbitrary control, for the judge would then be the legislator. Were it joined to the executive power, the judge might behave with all the violence of an oppressor.¹⁵

An enduring bequest of the decade was the Somali–Ethiopian war of 1977–78. This catastrophic conflagration which pulled in the two superpowers cost the Somalis, and the region, dearly. It is estimated that more than 25,000 Somalis were killed.¹⁶ Over half a million

¹⁴ David D Laitin, 'Political crisis in Somalia', *Horn of Africa* 5(2) April–June 1982, pp 60–4. I M Lewis, 'Somalia: nationalism turned inside out', *Middle East Research Information Project Reports*, No 106, June 1982, pp 6–21. For a masterly exposition of traditional Somali democracy, see I M Lewis's classic, *A Pastoral Democracy: A Study of Pastoralism and Politics Among the Northern Somali of the Horn of Africa*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1961.

¹⁵ Charles Louis de Secondat, Baron Montesquieu, *De L'esprit des Loix* (1748) Book XI, Chapter 6, quoted in Harold J Laski, *A Grammar of Politics*, London: Allen & Unwin, 1928, p 297.

¹⁶ Ruth Leger Sivard, *World Military and Social Expenditures, 1979*, Leesburg: World Priorities, 1982, p 15.

destitute refugees crossed the border from the disputed Ogaden into Somalia, putting more pressure on an already precarious ecology and economy.¹⁷ The process of extending military control over society and the bureaucracy was accelerated. With the war lost and the economy in dire straits, the 1970s came to a close with the state's legitimacy at perhaps its lowest point since the heady days of national independence in 1960.

The political economy in the 1980s

The economy

Perhaps the best way to enter a discussion of this topic is to survey briefly the main points of the National Five Year Development Plan, 1982-86.¹⁸ Three fundamental objectives can be culled, which seem to be the logical focus for any actions in the economy:¹⁹

- 1) To raise the wealth of Somalia and the standard of living of the general population;
- 2) To create a society based on social justice, individual freedom, and popular participation in development—ie, self-reliance;
- 3) To protect the environment.

In themselves, these general principles are laudable; nonetheless, their application to the realities of Somali life should be examined. By looking at two of the main sectors of the economy: the rural and the modern sectors.

Most of the evidence in the pastoral sub-sector illustrates that not only has the stagnation of the 1970s continued, but the condition of the supporting rangeland has also deteriorated.²⁰ Obviously, the development of the productive forces—including livestock—depends, to a great extent, on what happens to the surplus a society generates. In Somalia, of all the loans and advances made by the Somali banking system in 1985, only a meagre 12.8 per cent went to livestock, while a pitiful 1.1 per cent and 2.8 per cent went to agriculture and industry respectively. In contrast, trade was allocated 70 per cent.²¹ Moreover,

¹⁷ Kevin M Cahill, 'Somalia: a tragedy beyond Cambodia', *Horn of Africa* 2(4) October-December 1979 pp 8-9; and 'Somalia: one in three is a refugee', *Horn of Africa* 4(1) January-March 1981, pp 46-51.

¹⁸ Somalia, Ministry of National Planning, *Five Year Development Plan, 1982-1986* (1982). Over 85 per cent of the total Plan investment was expected to come from outside sources.

¹⁹ *ibid.*, pp 1-19.

²⁰ World Bank, *Somalia: Towards Economic Recovery and Growth*, Report No 5584-SO. Restricted Document, 20 August 1986, p 42.

²¹ Somalia, Central Bank of Somalia, *Bulletin*, No 56, Mogadishu, 1986, p 8.

given the domination of pastoralism by merchant capital, with the connivance of the state, very little of the wealth which pastoral producers had generated, whether in terms of fair prices to producers or windfalls by traders, had returned to the sub-sector.²² The consequences have been lower off-takes of livestock, with crippling repercussions for exports. For instance, the total livestock unit of exports in 1983 had declined by 30 per cent from those of 1971–72. No improvements in the marketing of pastoral produce have been introduced and the vulnerability that comes with concentration on a single market was rudely brought home when, for health reasons, the Saudis banned the import of Somali cattle in 1983.²³ In short, both at the level of production and export, livestock—the most important sub-sector in the economy—is still unable, droughts notwithstanding, to make its proper contribution.

A high priority of the Development Plan has been agriculture, the other sub-sector of the rural economy. Allocated about 30 per cent of total investments, the central objective of the Plan was to work towards self-sufficiency in food grains; and secondarily, to increase the production of export crops. With the exception of 1981–82, when agricultural production increased (partly as a result of more attractive prices for farmers and exceptional rains) the crop output of Somalia has remained largely stagnant, with one of the lowest yields in Africa.²⁴ While complete data is not available, a measure of this condition can be gleaned from the huge food imports and aid that were delivered to Somalia in the years 1984–85. In 1984, 70,000 tons of food were bought, and 230,000 tons were given as aid; in 1985, the import figure was 92,000 tons with another 270,000 tons in aid.²⁵ Table 1 throws some light on both the inertness of domestic production, and the continuing dependence on imports of food grains, especially in the face of an alarming population growth rate of almost 3.1 per cent per year.

To add insult to injury, most of the emergency food delivered to Somalia—primarily from the USA—is reported to have failed to reach the most needy of the population. A recent investigation by the General Accounting Office of the US government found that 58 per cent of US

²² The Development Plan allocated a mere 15 per cent to this sub-sector.

²³ *Africa Economic Digest* 6(9) 1–7 March 1985, p 4. Despite Somalia's appeal to Arab brotherhood, and the swift implementation of an intensive Arabic language programme as a means of gaining favour, the Saudis refused to lift the ban.

²⁴ Somalia's average index of food production per capita has dropped from a bench-mark of 100 in 1969–71 to only about 60 in the mid 1980s. World Bank, *World Development Report 1984*, New York: Oxford University Press for the World Bank, 1984, p 228.

²⁵ Anthony Shaw, 'Barre's balancing act', *Africa Report*, November–December 1985, p 29.

THIRD WORLD QUARTERLY

Table 1: Somalia: domestic production and imports as a percentage of total grain availability (1979-83)

Year	Domestic Production (000 tons)	Imports (000 tons)	Imports as % of marketed grain supply
1979	262	150	37
1980	268	241	47
1981	383	271	41
1982	405	155	28
1983	358	168	32

Source: World Bank, *Somalia: Towards Economic Recovery and Growth*, Report No 5584-SO, Restricted Document (20 August 1985), p 43.

food aid has not been distributed at all, while about 30 per cent has been diverted to other groups (the army, government bureaucrats, and cronies).²⁶

How does one explain this chronic weakness in Somali agriculture? Evidence both from micro-studies and macro-analyses strongly suggests the absence of any significant peasant participation in rural development schemes;²⁷ further, there is a paucity of some of the most crucial technical ingredients for any successful campaign: inputs, extension and support services, adaptive research, and irrigation and water management.²⁸

Yet, if rural production has remained disappointing, Somali industrial performance in the mid-1980s has been even more regrettable. For example, despite about 15 per cent of the resources of the Plan allocated for investment by the 1982-86 Plan, real output per capita has been unchanged since the late 1970s. Moreover, most industrial enterprises—almost all of them owned by the state—have failed to cover even depreciation costs, let alone to generate healthy accumulation. These serious problems are illustrated by the deplorably low capacity of utilisation that prevails in most major plants, as illustrated in Table 2. There are many reasons for this gloomy picture, but the most critical is the failure in rural development, especially in agriculture and fisheries. This failure means that the most basic sector

²⁶ 'GAO raps Somalia program', *African News* 26(12) 16 June 1986, pp 1-4.

²⁷ For a clear exposition of one such case study where the state has become a catastrophic liability, see Abdi Samatar, 'The state, peasants, and pastoralists', (PhD dissertation, University of California, Berkeley, 1985), especially Chapter Five.

²⁸ Both the Somali Ministry of Agriculture and the World Bank acknowledge all of these technical problems and much more. For example, irrigation efficiency is estimated to be around only 20 per cent.

SOMALIA: IMPASSE

Table 2: Somalia: capacity utilisation in a sample of major industries
(actual utilisation as a percentage of capacity)

Enterprise	1978	1982	1983
Somaltex (Textiles, Balcad)	75	51	33
SNAI Sugar Mills (Jowhar)	...	30	7
Milk Plant (Mogadishu)	46	14	6
Meat Factory (Kismayo)	0	3	2
Edible Oil Mill (Mogadishu)	...	2	1
Cigarette and Match Factory (Mogadishu)	...	57	33
Aluminium Utensils (Mogadishu)	...	45	21
Foundry and Machinery Workshop	...	60	22

Source: Somalia, Ministry of Industry, quoted in World Bank, *Somalia: Towards Economic Recovery and Growth*, Report No 5584-SO, Restricted Document (20 August 1985), p 55.

of the economy is unable to produce the necessary raw material inputs; hence Somali industrial activity is sorely handicapped. In addition, shortfalls in rural export production and growth hamper the capacity of the state to import technology inputs and spare parts. But this is not the whole story. Technical and managerial difficulties also bedevil industry. These factors range from a scarcity of management expertise and technical cadres, to an erosion in public sector salaries and wages that has depressed morale—particularly when managers and workers cannot draw on genuine non-material incentives.²⁹

Despite these lean, almost bankrupt times, the regime continues to pour a large part of the meagre national resources into the most unproductive spheres of defence and general administration. For instance, as the latest World Bank confidential study shows, Somalia is spending only 20 per cent of its recurrent expenditure on economic and social activities as compared to the 40 per cent allocated by all other

²⁹ The regime has taken some hesitant initiatives ostensibly to address this issue, in the form of a new Employment Law (1984). This act stipulates that wages will be tied to productivity rather than fixed by the state.

THIRD WORLD QUARTERLY

Table 3: Somalia: selected items as a percentage of ordinary state expenditures (1981-84)

Item	1981-2	1983	1984
General Public Services	51.2	47.3	45.2
Defence and Security ^a	30.5	32.6	36.3
Social Services	11.7	11.7	10.5
Economic Services	6.7	8.3	8.0

Source: World Bank, *Somalia: Towards Economic Recovery and Growth*, Report No 5584-SO, Restricted Document (20 August 1985), p 85.

^a These expenditures do not include military aid.

low-income African countries.³⁰ Table 3 captures this misuse and impoverishment of economic and social resources.

The contraction of production has combined with excessive—sometimes extremely unwise—spending, and acute deficiencies in implementation and management, to create a harrowing economic bind for the Somali people.³¹ For example, in 1985 alone, the Somali shilling has been devalued by more than 70 per cent through IMF intervention, and inflation is hovering around 100 per cent. In addition, as the cost of imports has reached seven times the revenue from exports, Somalia's balance of payments has been worsening, as shown by Table 4.

Table 4: Somalia: balance of payments in the 1980s
(millions of US dollars)

Item	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984
Exports	133	144	137	100	58
Imports	-461	-422	-484	-450	-408
Trade Balance	-328	-308	-347	-350	-350

Source: World Bank, *Somalia: Towards Economic Recovery and Growth*, Report No 5584-SO, Restricted Document (20 August 1985), p 17.

With these severe structural problems and economic imbalances, the Somali regime continues to borrow more from the international system,

³⁰ World Bank, *Somalia: Towards Economy Recovery*, p 28. This figure is lower than the mid 1970s allocations.

³¹ *Africa Economic Digest* 6(2) 11-17 January 1985, p 7. Some observers report that the prices of essential commodities in rural areas such as the Northwest have doubled or trebled in less than four years. For more details on this, see Samatar, 'The state, peasants, and pastoralists', p 220.

consequently sinking deeper into debt.³² Despite the government's continuing success in attracting one of the highest per capita aid flows in Africa—estimated at over 30 per cent of the Gross National Product—Somalia's outstanding debt stood at an estimated \$1.4 billion in early 1985. The service alone, on this debilitating financial burden, is already claiming over 80 per cent of export earnings; and service arrears jumped from \$28 million in 1980 to well over \$120 million at the end of 1985.³³ Compounding this unenviable situation, is the absence of any sign of relief in the near future. Most observers believe that even if the economy improves—and that will take some doing, especially given the projected doubling of the population (to about 11 million) in the next twenty years—Somalia will have to face still heavier debt obligations during the remainder of this century.

Politics

The nature of power in Somalia in the mid 1980s, and the conduct of its international affairs, can perhaps best be characterised as a further descent into internal imperiousness and militarism, and external dependency.

Domestically, this decade began with increasing military domination and the lack of effective popular participation. For example, in January 1981, eighty-five new district and regional Party secretaries were appointed, all but seven of them from the military.³⁴ Moreover, when the regime's unilateral and, in the eyes of many Somalis, unwise extension of Somali port and land facilities to the US armed forces triggered disapproval and unease, the leadership responded by declaring a state of national emergency. The same act revived the old Supreme Revolutionary Council (SRC), the original military body that took power in 1969. In the process, the Somali Revolutionary Socialist Party was superseded, exposing the lack of constitutional guarantees of existence. These imperious tactics and the critical situation of the economy did not sit well with everyone in the ruling faction of the

³² On the culprits and consequences of this uniform trend in Africa, see the blunt and penetrating insights of Dumont and Mottin, *Stranglehold on Africa*; also, Henry Jackson, 'The African crisis: drought and debt', *Foreign Affairs* (63) Summer 1985, pp 1081–94. These Somali economic traits also fit into what the Executive Secretary of the Economic Commission for Africa has lamented as 'tendencies towards regression rather than progress'. For more on this, see Adebayo Adedeji, *The Evolution of the Monrovia Strategy and the Lagos Plan of Action: A Regional Approach to Economic Decolonization*, Addis Ababa: Economic Commission for Africa, 1983; and Shaw, *Towards a Political Economy for Africa*.

³³ World Bank, *Somalia: Towards Economic Recovery*, p 11.

³⁴ 'The Horn: rumblings in every camp', *Africa Confidential* 22(6) 11 March 1981, p 6.

Somali petite bourgeoisie. In fact, those who had believed in the general virtue and efficacy of Siyaad Barre's leadership, and in the original direction of the Somali development strategy, began to raise uncomfortable and downright heretical questions. These doubts clustered around the widening gulf between the unrelenting rhetoric of the regime and the increasingly contradictory reality. The showdown came in June 1982, when seven members of the Central Committee of the SRSP, who were challenging the unbridled growth of personal rule and the tendency towards socio-economic retrogression, were summarily arrested. The most prominent of this new band of dissidents were: General Ismail C Abokor, Third Vice-President of the Republic and President of the National Assembly; Cumer Carteh Qalib, a distinguished former Foreign Minister; Colonel Usman M Jelle, a senior member of the original SRC; General Umar Xaji Moxammad, a close relative of Siyaad Barre and one-time Minister of Defence; and Dr Moxammad Aden, one of the two ideologues of the regime and, on different occasions, Minister of Information and National Guidance, and Minister of Higher Education.³⁵ All seven were accused of treason and placed in detention without prospect of an early trial.

President Barre took to the road, in order to muster support and for the first time in a number of years, he travelled to the northern towns of Hargeysa and Boroma. Accompanied by three senior colonels from the North, where government forces were coming under serious attacks by insurgents, the President tried to explain his case and thus diffuse the growing hostility of Northerners to his regime. According to most commentators and witnesses to the occasion, few Northerners were won over. Consequently, Siyaad Barre cut short his visit and returned to Mogadishu. In the few years since then, new 'elections' for the National Assembly and the Presidency were held in December 1984 and November 1986, respectively. As many expected, and in line with the perversion of democratic participation already mentioned, all candidates of the ruling SRSP, including Siyaad Barre as the sole Presidential contender, received more than 99.8 per cent of the total vote. State repression has become more pronounced in most regions and many religious and many religious leaders in different parts of the country have been arrested, ostensibly for seditious preaching. For example, Amnesty International has listed the names of eighteen sheiks, particularly from Hargeysa and Mogadishu, who were detained

³⁵ *Africa Economic Digest* 3(21) 23 June-1 July 1982, p 11; and 'Somalia: Barre hangs on', *Africa Confidential* 24(5) 2 March 1983 p 5.

between April and May of 1986, with the possibility that some were killed as a result of torture. Amnesty International also acknowledges the imprisonment of many other belonging to different 'Islamic organisations'.³⁶ The state of health of the septuagenarian President is doubtful after the severe injuries he sustained from a car accident on 23 May 1986.³⁷ According to *Africa Confidential* and a number of reliable local sources, this accident has exposed the precariousness of state leadership. Logically, the First Vice-President, Lieutenant-General Ali Samatar, is in line to succeed President Barre, but in practice the President's relatives and clan (Mareexan) are reported to have had an emergency meeting in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, where Barre was being treated.³⁸ Apparently, this ethnic convocation was an attempt to keep leadership in the family, a testimony to the weakness of state constitutionality and its juridical basis. In the end, General Samatar, partly as a result of brave and crucial military moves, prevailed; and it is now reported that President Barre, who is officially back as head of government, has appointed General Samatar as the First Minister of a 'new' Council of Ministers.³⁹

On regional and international policy, two things stand out: first, hostilities in the Horn—with Ethiopia in particular—have not improved, despite recent presidential and other high-level meetings.⁴⁰ Somalia's status as an appendage and an outpost of superpower dominance has also been enhanced. By mid-1982, the USA began airlifting military equipment and advisers and has since taken hold of the major, strategic port of Berbera, where new installations are about to be completed:⁴¹ radar systems, a new quay, and a doubling of other facilities necessary for roll-on, roll-off ships used by the US Rapid Deployment Forces, a modern imperial gendarmerie. Somali integration into the American

³⁶ Amnesty International Index: AFR 52/15/86 (30 June 1986), p 1.

³⁷ 'Somalia: after Barre', *Africa Confidential* 27(12) 4 June 1986, pp 1-2.

³⁸ *ibid.*, p 1. This is also corroborated by conversations with some senior state and military officials who are privy to the intentions and activities of Colonel (now General) Masleh Siyaad Barre, one of two sons of the President. These sources have asked not to be identified. (Field notes, June-July 1986).

³⁹ 'Injured Somali president resumes duties', *Africa News* 27(1) 21 July 1986, p 7; 'Shirkii Aan Caadiga Ahayn . . .', *Xiddiga Oktoobar*, Monday, 2 February 1987, p 1.

⁴⁰ For the first time since the war of 1977-8, General Siyaad Barre and Colonel Mengistu H Miriam met in Djibouti in January 1986, primarily as participants in a conference convened to address regional ecological problems. There is very little evidence, to date, that this event has had any positive impact on lessening the tension between the two countries. A major and continuing consequence of the hostilities is the plight of refugees from the Ogaden, nearly 500,000 camped in various settlements in Somalia. 'Somalia, Ethiopia seek accord', *Africa News* 26(11) 2 June 1986, p 12; and for a more enthusiastic interpretation, see *Heegan*, No 466, 29 August 1986, p 1.

⁴¹ *Africa Research Bulletin: Political, Social, and Cultural Series* 20(6) 15 November 1983, p 6695.

global military network was consummated in 1985 by joint military exercises in 'Operation Bright Star'.⁴² The rewards for Somali collaboration with the American state and its allies have not been very great, but they have been enough to keep the regime compliant. In fact, US security assistance to Somalia was \$50 million in 1985, and \$75 million in 1986, mostly used to purchase US-made military equipment.⁴³ These disbursements make Somalia a member of the small group of exclusively pro-American sub-Saharan African states.⁴⁴

Other states have also contributed to the effort to realign Somalia towards the West. Italy, for example, has given around 500 million lira in economic aid and is the single largest donor of the \$600 million that has been earmarked for the 'grand' Bardhere dam on the Juba river, the biggest development scheme in Somali history.⁴⁵ Even if all these foreign policy activities are still within the boundaries of traditional diplomacy, the regime's alleged connection with the pariah state of South Africa will, if it is proved, dispose of any lingering claim to a progressive ideology.⁴⁶ Undoubtedly, these mounting economic problems, a highly circumscribed and arid political life, and unsavoury external relations, are bound to deepen and entrench Somali underdevelopment. As Guy Arnold writes, no other region of the African continent has so clearly suffered such a total return to neo-colonialism and big power competition as the Horn of Africa since 1977.⁴⁷

In summary, Somalia of the 1980s seems far from the 'socialist' and 'non-aligned' society that is still so much a part of the rhetoric of President Siyaad Barre and his military cohorts. On the contrary, the country has become a permanent member of the economic 'basket-cases' and political autocracies in Africa, with debilitating social consequences.

⁴² James Kanu, 'US-Somali military exercises', *South* (London) September 1985, p. 35.

⁴³ Shaw, 'Barre's balancing act', p. 28.

⁴⁴ 'Bits and pieces', *Africa News* 25(9) 4 November 1985, p. 16.

⁴⁵ Shaw, 'Barre' balancing act', p. 28.

⁴⁶ Shaw writes that the regime has agreed to allow South African Airways to use Somali airspace, and has given landing rights to Air Comores—piloted by South Africans—for a small fee. This report adds, however, that there is little basis, thus far, for the allegation by Somali National Movement spokesmen that the regime has been negotiating a \$20 million loan for the purchase of arms from South Africa. Also, there is no evidence known to this author that the USA '... will pay Somalia some \$600 million in aid programs in exchange for a 50-year lease on about 500 square miles of land to be used to bury highly radioactive nuclear waste'. See, 'Key dates 1985—East Africa, the Horn, and the Indian Ocean', *Africa News* 26(1-2) 27 January 1986, p. 3.

⁴⁷ *Africa Research Bulletin: Political, Social and Cultural Series* 20(10) 15 November 1983, p. 7031

Dissidence and insurgency

Despite the aforementioned crises of economy and polity, there is little evidence to suggest any discernible, active dissidence inside Somalia. This can be explained by the success of President Barre's regime in nipping in the bud any political discontent and, more importantly, by the lack of any consciousness of the power of organised struggle among the broad spectrum of the Somali people. Opposition and resistance to the current order has continued to come from two externally based groups—the Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF) and the Somali National Movement (SNM).⁴⁸

The first major military foray by the SSDF, with strong Ethiopian support, was undertaken in early 1982. This particular operation resulted in the capture of Balambale and Goldogob, eighteen miles inside Somalia proper.⁴⁹ While the SSDF has claimed credit for the incursion, and the occupation of the area, the Somali government has argued vociferously that the operation was purely an Ethiopian invasion, with the aid of a few Somali traitors.⁵⁰ More attacks and engagements by both the SSDF and the SNM forces, sometimes collaboratively, were mounted in 1983, some of them rather spectacular raids on government strongholds.⁵¹ Despite these bold but sporadic actions, both movements have experienced serious internal squabbles and relapses, and are far from advancing towards amalgamation of unity.

The SSDF is reported to have convened its long awaited Congress in January 1983. However, members of the two smaller partners in the coalition (the Somali Workers Party and the Somali Democratic Liberation Front) boycotted the meetings. They argued that the agenda had already been surreptitiously decided and that the Chairman, Colonel Cabdillahi Yusuf, originally Chief of the Somali Salvation Front (SSF), had assured his position against those who wanted a new leadership. Colonel Yusuf, manifesting similar undemocratic proclivities and poor stewardship to those which characterise President

⁴⁸ For the origins and beginnings of these organisations, see A I Samatar, 'Self-reliance in theory and practice: a critique of Somali praxis', (PhD dissertation, University of Denver, 1984), especially Chapters Seven and Eight.

⁴⁹ 'Somalia: of Barre's making', *Africa Confidential* 23(18) 8 September 1982, pp 1-4.

⁵⁰ For the Somali Government's official line of this, see Somalia, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *Ethiopia's Invasion of Somalia, 1982-83* Mogadishu, (1984).

⁵¹ 'Somalia: Barre hangs on', p 5. It is significant to note that, thus far, both of these two organisations have focused their activities on areas that are primarily inhabited by their respective lineage segments.

Barre, ordered the immediate arrest of thirty leading adversaries, including senior members of the executive. With most of the 'disagreeable' elements out of the way, the Congress proceeded to re-appoint Yusuf as chairman and he subsequently filled the new executive with his loyal clansmen, the Majerteen.⁵² Not surprisingly, the frustration and fury of the general membership was so great that, soon after, as many as two hundred members are reported to have returned to Somalia to take advantage of an amnesty offered by President Barre. Yet this did not end SSDF internal strife. In May 1984, new mutinies broke out and bloody fighting is said to have taken place in many camps, causing more guerrillas to cross the border to Somalia.⁵³ Moreover, during these divisive times, two prominent members of the SSDF's Central Committee, who had represented the most progressive faction, were assassinated at SSDF offices in Dire Dawa.⁵⁴ Despite recent reports of the forceful removal of Colonel Yusuf from the chairmanship, reorganisation under a new leadership, and even some guerrilla activity in 1985, the SSDF is badly damaged and at the nadir of any popularity it enjoyed earlier. Its resurrection as a credible organisation, even among dissident Somalis, will be difficult.

The Somali National Movement has also run into domestic quarrels and discord. On 10 November 1983, in a crucial Central Committee meeting held in Jigjiga, the entire civilian component of the leadership was ousted, leaving the military solely in charge.⁵⁵ The reasons expressed to justify this 'coup' were many and diverse: organisational weakness; a leadership coming mostly from the Habar Awal clan, while the guerrillas were mostly from the Habar Yunis clan; a civilian leadership resistant to unification with the SSDF; and the close ties of the civilian executives with Saudi Arabia and the USA.

But the dominance of the military faction did not endure, and without any great acrimony or bloodshed, SNM again changed its leadership. A new civilian group was installed in the 1984 Congress.⁵⁶ The Chairman is Axmed Moxammad 'Silanyo', a senior minister in the Barre government until his defection in 1982. More recently, the SNM has

⁵² It is estimated that 16 of the 20 members of the executive body were from Colonel Yusuf's own clan. 'Somalia: towards Samatar's sword', *Africa Confidential* 24(15) 20 July 1983, p 5.

⁵³ *Africa Confidential* 25(24) 28 November 1984, pp 7-8.

⁵⁴ These two members were: Cabduraxman Cydeed, one of the more theoretically informed members of the dissident community and Ikar Haji Moxammad Xusein. Both Cydeed and Xusein are reported to have been shot, on the order of Colonel Yusuf, for their unyielding commitment to authentic democratic practices and progressive ideology.

⁵⁵ 'Somalia: dissidents decline', *Africa Confidential* 24(24) 30 November 1983, pp 6-7.

⁵⁶ *ibid.*

announced the opening of a second front of military activity in the Bakol and Hiran regions of southern Somalia.⁵⁷ It has also stated that representative offices have been opened in over eleven countries in Africa, Asia, Europe, and North America, all evidence for its claim to the mantle of leadership in this incipient struggle for change in Somalia.⁵⁸

While the inception of any organised and change-oriented dissent politics is certainly very welcome and is more valuable than acquiescence or vacuity, both movements possess severe handicaps which have constrained their viability and impact. Foremost among these are widely differing and contradictory ideas among their respective memberships about the nature of the problems and their solutions. In both the SSDF and the SNM camps, a number of elements coexist: individualistic and petty capitalist ideology, Islamic fundamentalism, clanism, and impulses of social democracy. Secondly, both movements have yet to pass any convincing test of credibility regarding their adherence to democratic practices and their competence to lead an effort of reconstruction. Thirdly, and most significantly, the SSDF and the SNM are still limited to urban petite bourgeoisie followers, and no significant steps have been taken to involve the masses of the Somali people. These serious weaknesses are due partly to the naive belief that the demise of President Siyaad Barre's rule will automatically usher in a buoyant and productive economy, and democratic politics; and partly to an inability to see beyond the most immediate fragmentation and alienating circumstances, that is, the lack of a coherent theory of mobilisation and reconstruction. Unquestionably, as the historical record amply suggests, a successful effort to break out of apathy and mobilise national participation in the making of a different history will demand more creative thinking from those who have chosen to lead. In the words of Christopher Hampton:

[One] cannot hope to bring into being any of the unrealized conditions for a free and full life for [anyone] unless [one is] first of all capable of imagining them, and communicating [one's] vision . . . with sufficient intensity to prevail upon others to conceive them as potentialities and to believe that the prospects

⁵⁷ Somali National Movement, *Political Program* (1985), p. 2.

⁵⁸ *ibid.*, p. 3. Late 1984, the appearance of two other new organisations was reported: 'Somali First', and 'Somali Patriotic Front'. The former, made up of 'loosely connected groups of intellectuals', is said to have started in London, while the latter is said to be based in Aden. Very little else is known about either except that they share this: an abhorrence of the present Somali regime and disapproval of the 'clanist' tactics of the SSDF and the SNM. Shaw, 'Barre's balancing act', p. 27.

it offers will be worth the effort and determination and courage required to bring [it] into existence.⁵⁹

Hampton's admonition points to the vital necessity of winning the respect and active consent of the masses in civil society long before the final assault is made on the state, and before the creation of a set of ideas and organisations that organically bind together a new historic bloc.

Conclusion

In another article, I theorised that a main reason for state and societal crisis in Somalia, and much of Africa, was the inability of the ruling state classes to chisel out of the admittedly rough, but available, economic, political and cultural material a genuine 'national-popular will'.⁶⁰ This overwhelming failure to include the real interests of the African masses in the narrow agenda of the elite has led to anaemic and feeble states incapable of becoming motive forces for national accumulation, the development of productive forces, and the initiation of popular participation.

Somali and African progressives (ie, those who are minimally melioristic, maximally revolutionary) and future leaders will do well to think seriously upon the role of the state and its place in any agenda for development. While the contradictions between a less conspicuous 'world-system' and the working masses of Africa remain as deadly as ever, the immediate danger to African self-reliance and empowerment is from the regressive petite bourgeoisie social forces which, with the tacit support of their imperialist patrons, have barricaded themselves in the most nodal point of national power, that is, the state.

Does this mean that the state, *per se*, is inimical to development, as the current 'state-bashing' carnival suggests, and that the time for hollowing it out and returning to the 'free market' has come? Of course not. For we now know that, contrary to *laissez-faire* ideology, there never was such a thing as a totally 'free market'. In fact, the opposite is historically more accurate—the private and public sectors have always played their respective roles in concert. The central theoretical question, then, is not the absence or the presence of the state in development, but rather its proper role. Our response is that, as a

⁵⁹ Christopher Hampton, *Socialism in a Crippled World*, Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1981, p 314. This is a splendid, learned and evocative book. While it is primarily written for the citizens of industrial societies (both East and West), the images and messages are equally relevant to Third World situations.

⁶⁰ A I Samatar, 'Underdevelopment in Somalia . . .' especially pp 23–6.

historical rule, undeveloped societies have invariably assigned the state a prominent place in the making of a modern political economy. As Malcolm Caldwell writes,

... the more backward a nation, the greater the role the state has had to play in order to mobilize and make effective its human, technical, political, and diplomatic resources and potential. In the absence of active state initiatives and intervention, opportunities are pre-empted by nationals and agents of powers already more developed, or simply lie dormant.⁶¹

Caldwell's proposition becomes even more resonant and instructive in contemporary Africa (and Third World) societies in which lack of development is not only highly pronounced, but in which an effective collective shield against the worst abuses of imperialism (for example underdevelopment) is desperately needed.

We conclude, then, by postulating that a progressive Somali/African state will, at least, have the following main characteristics. It must represent the vast majority, with power and coercive apparatuses that have unbreachable constitutional limits and popular accountability. In other words, a clear distinction must be made here between a predatory, Leviathan state and collective authority structures assigned to manage macro-economic and political activities. An uncompromising corollary to such a central authority is genuine local autonomy. National development policy must focus on the rehabilitation of the ecosystem, and the creation of a food system designed to maintain concern for the environment while at the same time ending hunger. This will require the immediate shifting of priorities from militarism to food production, making food available to the entire population, particularly the poorest. Moreover, a real commitment must be made to ensure national food self-sufficiency, to avoid 'outside manipulation through food aid or exports'.⁶² The progressive state must seek to join Third World nations in demanding a serious moratorium on debt payments, while setting aside no more than 10 to 15 per cent of export earnings to pay off the national debt. Delinking any military relations from imperial powers and superpowers is indispensable. There is little doubt now that accepting a role in an imperial power's or superpower's global security design is a sure road to neocolonialism and a new serfdom. For all of the above to have any chance of success, collective self-reliance must become the

⁶¹ Malcolm Caldwell, *The Wealth of Some Nations*, London: Zed Books, 1977, pp 76-7.

⁶² On this, see the writings of Susan George, especially *Ill Fares the Land: Essays on Food, Hunger, and Power*, Washington DC: Institute for Policy Studies, 1984.

alpha and omega of regional politics, particularly among progressive states. Such a strategy helps to facilitate not only economic and cultural cooperation, but could induce new conceptions of security which will gradually enable Africans to become masters of their own lives and continent.

Post-Numeiri Sudan: one year on

The parliamentary elections held in April 1986 heralded the return of formal democracy to the Sudan after the sixteen-year hiatus of Jafaar Numeiri's rule. One year later, it is becoming increasingly clear that democracy has not proved a panacea for the multitude of problems afflicting the country. In fact, democracy may ironically have added problems of its own producing a weak government, torn between the conflicting demands of disparate constituencies.

One year after the fall of Numeiri, the Sudan is sunk into the morass of a stagnating economy, staggering external debt, civil war, and a serious conflict concerning the place of Islam in the country's legal system. The government of Sadiq al-Mahdi is indecisive to the point of paralysis because of the enormity of the problems it faces, the fragility of the coalition which supports it, and the conflicting international pressures to which the Sudan is exposed. The paralysis cannot be attributed primarily to Sadiq's personal shortcomings, but to the nature of the government coalition and the fact that the solutions to the various problems may well be inherently contradictory and mutually exclusive. The steps needed to move toward a negotiated solution of the civil war would undermine the government coalition. Attempts to revive the economy would hinge on finding a new source of external support, while any external support is bound to have political overtones which would threaten the delicate balance of power achieved after the elections.

The April 1986 elections were formally a success, at least in the areas where they could be held. Although they were stretched over a long period of time (1-12 April 1986) there were few allegations of cheating. However, the war made it impossible to hold elections in thirty-seven out of sixty-eight districts in the south, in effect disenfranchising much of that region. Thus, democracy did nothing to change the existing character of the central government as, in reality, a northern one with token southern representation. It did even less to dispel southern fears of northern domination.

The election results showed the continuing strength of the Umma

Party and the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP), the two organisations with Islamic affiliations which have dominated the political scene in the Sudan in all periods of democratic rule since independence.¹ The Umma Party won ninety-nine of the 264 seats for which elections were held and the DUP sixty-four.² A third party, the National Islamic Front (NIF), formerly known as the Muslim Brotherhood, made a very strong showing with fifty-one seats. The rest of the vote was dispersed among the smaller parties of the north and the southern parties, leaving an assembly where four-fifths of the seats were controlled by organisations with an unmistakable Islamic character.

The Umma Party is affiliated to the Ansar, the religious organisation formed by the followers of Mohammed Ahmed al-Mahdi, whose Islamic fundamentalist movement temporarily defeated British rule at the end of the nineteenth century. Sadiq al-Mahdi, the leader of the Umma Party and now Prime Minister of the Sudan, is the Mahdi's great-grandson and the effective political and spiritual leader of the Ansar. As Prime Minister from July 1966 to May 1967, furthermore, Sadiq was personally at the forefront of an effort to adopt a permanent Constitution with an Islamic orientation.

The DUP has historically been affiliated to the Khatmiyyah, the major Sufi order in the Sudan. The party leader belongs to the Mirghani family, which is as closely tied to the Khatmiyyah as the Mahdi family is to the Ansar. The National Islamic Front, led by Hassan El Turabi, is the most militantly Islamic of the three parties. Its membership is somewhat different from that of the other two parties. While many Sudanese are simply born into the Khatmiyyah or the Ansar, and thus are automatically associated with the DUP or the Umma Party, the members of the National Islamic Front have chosen their affiliation. The NIF has achieved its success through a major organisational and recruiting effort. The Muslim Brotherhood has been particularly active for a long time among university and even high school students, thus gaining an urban and highly visible following. In the months preceding the election the NIF mounted a major campaign to reach potential voters, canvassing actively in urban areas.

Their common Islamic orientation does not unite the three organisations. While the DUP has joined the Umma Party in the

¹ The Democratic Unionist Party is a coalition of two organisations, the National Union Party and the People's Democratic Party. The two have cyclically united and split again ever since independence. Most recently, they merged in January 1986 in preparation for the elections.

² The Assembly has, formally, 301 seats. However, elections were not held in 37 districts, all of them in the south, and consequently the present assembly has only 264 members.

government coalition, the relationship between the two is tense. They disagree on a number of issues, including policy towards Egypt—the DUP had historically advocated very close relations while the Umma has been more suspicious of Egyptian intentions. Open conflict between the two parties has been avoided only because the government has made no major decisions. Finally, the two parties are separated by personality conflicts and a historical rivalry. The NIF has refused to join the government coalition, accusing the other two parties of being lukewarm towards Islam, and has called unequivocally for the application of the religious laws to the entire country—during the electoral campaign it even threatened to launch a *jihad* if an attempt was made to repeal the Islamic laws of 1983.³

The three parties which dominate the Sudanese assembly thus do not speak with the same voice, but all three speak with an Islamic voice. In fact, the competition among them makes it virtually impossible for any of the leaders to risk taking a position implying support for a secular state, because such a move would provide a clear advantage to his rivals. This is a major problem since the place of Islam in the political system and of Islamic law (*sharia*) in the country's codes play a major part in the conflict between north and south. John Garang, the leader of the main southern opposition movement, the Sudanese People's Liberation Movement (SPLM), has stated repeatedly that there will be no negotiations, and no participation of the SPLM in a constitutional conference, until *sharia* is repealed.⁴ This statement puts Sadiq al-Mahdi and the Umma–DUP coalition which supports him in an untenable position. They are being asked to take a step which would decrease the importance of Islam in the political system, while Sadiq is the leader of the Ansar, and the Umma and DUP are affiliated with religious movements. Meanwhile, making matters worse, the NIF stands on the sidelines ready to transform any attempt to repeal or modify the Islamic laws into its own political capital.

Paradoxically, Numeiri's September 1983 laws, based on *sharia*, are not particularly popular and were not welcomed by any of the religious organisations when they were enacted.⁵ In the south, where the

³ For details on the laws, see Jean François Rycx, 'L'Islamisation du Droit Comme Enjeu Politique au Sudan', in Peter Woodward (ed), *The Sudan Since Numeiri*, University of London: Centre of Near and Middle Eastern Studies, 1986.

⁴ See letter addressed by John Garang to the leaders of the transitional government, published in *Sudanow*, January 1986.

⁵ The so-called 'September laws' included a number of reforms of the judiciary systems, enacted between August 1983 and February 1984. The most controversial part of the legislation was the adoption of an Islamic penal code. See Rycx, *op. cit.*, p 2.

overwhelming majority of the population is not Muslim but Christian, or follows a traditional religion, the imposition of Islamic laws was greeted with dismay, and contributed to heightening the feeling that the government in Khartoum represented not the entire country but only the Arab and Muslim population, and that it ruled the south as a colony without rights. In the north, too, *sharia* provoked a great deal of resentment. The most controversial aspect of the laws was the imposition of mandatory amputations of hands or feet as punishment for certain crimes. The banning of alcohol angered the drinkers, but more seriously created real economic hardship for the women who made a living brewing and selling beer in the slums. More insidiously, the religious movements did not like the September laws because by enacting them Numeiri had stolen their thunder, instead, they all advocated their replacement with the real *sharia*. Prime Minister al-Mahdi, too, has talked of abolishing the September laws and replacing them with the 'real *sharia*'.

It is not clear what the difference between the 'real *sharia*' and the present laws would be, above all in view of the fact that some of the most unpopular aspects of the September laws, such as sentencing to amputation, are beyond any doubt an integral part of the Islamic penal law. In an absolute sense, the statement is thus meaningless. Politically, it is revelatory of the quandary in which all northern movements find themselves; that in a country as saturated with religious movements as the Sudan nobody can afford to appear lukewarm towards Islam or, worse still, opposed to it. Repealing *sharia* is a very dangerous political move, but maintaining it, in any form, ensures the continuation of war in the south.

The war is raging on without a military solution in sight. The Sudan is a huge, under-populated African country where no government can possibly defeat an organised opposition movement and establish effective control by military means alone, because the resources required to do so are immense. The war in the south can only come to an end through a political compromise, but the prospects for such a compromise are dimmer now than at any time since Numeiri was deposed.

The problem of the relation between north and south is an old one, predating the independence of the Sudan. The differences between the largely Arab Muslim north and the largely African non-Muslim south are accentuated by the imbalance in the level of development of the two regions. It is not that the north is highly developed, but that whatever

little development exists is concentrated there, and above all in the capital.⁶ The attempt to run the country in a centralised fashion following independence floundered, a fact recognised by Numeiri after sixteen years of civil war, when he signed the 1972 Addis Ababa agreement which gave the south its own regional government. The agreement did not create a federal system, in that only the south, rather than all parts of the country, had a regional government. Furthermore, the central government remained dominated by northern politicians. As time went by, southern politicians became increasingly convinced that their region was still a neglected area, and that the Addis Ababa agreements did not provide a long-term answer to the problem. Chevron's discovery of oil at Bentiu in the southern region in the late 1970s made the problem worse. A proposal to establish a refinery at Kosti in the north, rather than at Bentiu, angered southern politicians who saw this as another example of how the central government syphoned all wealth from the area for the benefit of the north. Chevron's contention that it was economically unfeasible to set up a refinery at Bentiu, far from the main market, failed to convince anybody in the south, and the solution finally adopted—to build a pipeline to the coast rather than a refinery—did nothing to assuage resentment. The construction of the Jonglei Canal, a waterway designed to speed up the flow of the Nile water through the marshes of the Sudd, reducing evaporation and thus making more water available to Egypt and northern Sudan, also reinforced the conviction that the central government saw the south as an area expected to feed resources to the north, rather than to be developed in itself.

The final straw in the tense relations between north and south was a decision taken by Numeiri in 1981 to disband the southern region as a whole and to replace it with three separate smaller regions, each with its own government. The ethnic diversity of the population in the south, and the tension which existed between Dinka and non-Dinka politicians, provided the basis for this policy. For this reason, Numeiri initially had some support from southern politicians, above all Vice-President Joseph Lagu. But the move was also seen by many as abrogation of the Addis Ababa agreement by the central government, and as a sign that it was bent on dividing the southern region in order to weaken it.

⁶ The western part of the country, too, has been neglected in terms of economic development. However, while there have been periodical rumblings of discontent, the problem has not acquired the same dimensions as in the south, in part because of the absence of a sharp ethnic and cultural cleavage.

By early 1983, armed opposition had resumed in the south, and the Anya Nya movement, which had spearheaded the first civil war, was rumoured to have been revived as Anya Nya II. Fearing that the southern troops stationed in the south would join the opposition, Numeiri ordered them out of the area and their replacement by northern troops.⁷ Some garrisons, including the one at Bor, refused to obey the orders. John Garang, an officer of southern origin who had fought in the Anya Nya movement and later had pursued a successful career in the Sudanese army, was sent to Bor to negotiate with the mutineers, but defected instead and helped to found a new organisation, the Sudanese People's Liberation Movement (SPLM), and its military wing, the Sudanese People's Liberation Army (SPLA).⁸

A manifesto issued by the SPLM in July 1983 established a vaguely socialist orientation for the movement and also made it very clear that its goal was not secession, but equal rights for north and south in a united Sudan.⁹ The promulgation of Numeiri's September laws, which were to be applied to all parts of the country and to Muslims and non-Muslims alike, added a new, central goal for the SPLM: the abrogation of *sharia*.

The birth of the SPLM greatly complicated the political dynamics of the Sudan. Anya Nya II, with a predominantly Nuer constituency, found itself competing with the predominantly Dinka new movement. Anya Nya II had been formed earlier, but the SPLM was soon much better organised. Cooperation between the two movements proved impossible, and by 1984 fear of Dinka domination led Anya Nya II to accept military equipment from the government, becoming a pro-government force fighting against the SPLM.

While Numeiri was in power, there was no possibility of negotiations between the government and SPLM. However, Garang was in touch with opposition groups in the north and was considered by all of them as one of the individuals with a major part to play in devising a solution to the problems of a post-Numeiri Sudan. Immediately after the coup, Garang

⁷ Under the terms of the Addis Ababa agreement, Anya Nya guerrillas were integrated into the army, if they chose to pursue a military career. As a result, there were many former Anya Nya members in the Sudanese army.

⁸ In 1983, when the movement was formed, the SPLM and the SPLA were distinct organisations with separate leadership. The SPLA was under the command of John Garang and was considered strictly military in scope. The SPLM, under the leadership of Joseph Oduho, was considered the political arm of the movement and it issued its early political manifesto. The distinction between the two wings of the movement has become increasingly less significant as Garang has emerged as both the political and the military leader.

⁹ See 'Statement by the Sudan People's Liberation Movement', in *Africa Contemporary Record* (17) 1984-85, pp C32-C38.

clarified his negotiating position to the new government. First, he issued an ultimatum to the military committee, threatening to resume war unless there was an immediate return to civilian rule. On 11 April 1985, the SPLM issued a ten-point memorandum, further specifying its position. It reaffirmed its commitment to national unity and set forth a list of demands for the transition period. These included the application of the 1956 Constitution; the reunification of the south into a single region as provided by the Addis Ababa agreement and the formation of a transitional southern government; the immediate repeal of the September laws; adequate representation for southerners in all government institutions; careful screening of army officers to serve in the south, selecting only those animated by a spirit of reconciliation; the release of political prisoners and the restoration of civil rights and liberties; and finally, direct contacts between the government and the SPLM to reach a peaceful settlement.¹⁰

By this time, the SPLM had become a well-established movement. Militarily, it operated over a wide area, and it had succeeded in halting work on the oil pipeline from Bentiu to Kosti and on the Jonglei Canal. Politically, it had established itself as one of the parties that had to be consulted in the reconstruction of the Sudan after the Numeiri era. At this time the SPLM also enjoyed the support of Ethiopia, Libya and less importantly, South Yemen. Libya could provide military aid, but Ethiopia played a crucial part, because it gave the SPLM safe rear bases outside the Sudan. Neither Ethiopia nor Libya, however, could be counted upon to remain firm allies of the SPLM, since it was ultimately a matter of indifference to them as to who ruled the southern Sudan. For Qaddafi, support for the SPLM was simply a means of getting even with Numeiri, who had angered him by spurning early Libyan attempts at unification with the Sudan and by establishing instead a close relationship with Egypt. For Ethiopia, support for the SPLM was above all a bargaining asset, to be traded, as Emperor Haile Selassie had done in 1972, against Sudanese support for the Eritrean liberation movements.

The *coup d'état* against Numeiri led to a sudden change in the position of Libya. Qaddafi saw the crisis as a chance to decrease the influence of Egypt in the Sudan and magnify his own. He thus terminated support for the SPLM and made overtures to Khartoum. The transitional government was receptive, in part because Libya could

¹⁰ *ibid.*, p B75.

provide both oil and weapons, commodities the bankrupt and besieged Sudanese government badly needed, and partly because Libya was seen as a possible counter-balance to Egypt, whose influence had grown considerably under Numeiri, creating a fear of domination among many Sudanese. Qaddafi personally visited the Sudan on 18 May 1985, the first foreign leader to go there since the coup.

This initial visit was followed by several concrete measures, such as some free oil shipments, the signing in July 1985 of a military aid pact involving logistical support and training, and the issuing of visas to Sudanese seeking jobs in Libya at a time workers of other nationalities were being expelled.¹¹ There was also a significant increase in the number of Libyans stationed in the Sudan, including a number of what the US Embassy defined as 'known terrorists'.¹² Less threatening to American personnel in Khartoum, but politically more significant, was the fact that Libyan troops started entering western Sudan, and even remaining there for long periods, ostensibly as part of their operations in Chad.

In March 1986, Libya further helped the Sudan by loaning two Tupolev-22 bombers for an attack on the SPLM-held town of Rumbeck, and by providing 2.2 million barrels of oil in time to alleviate the shortages around the time of the election.¹³ In a very short time, Libya thus established itself as a very useful ally for the transitional government and later for Sadiq.

Libya's turnaround from backing the SPLM to backing the government did not lead to any change in the war situation. The SPLM was well entrenched, did not appear short of supplies to continue fighting, and still received the backing of Ethiopia. And while Libyan help could secure the government's victory on specific occasions, such as the battle over Rumbeck, it did not even remotely make it possible for the Sudanese army to defeat the SPLM completely.

The transitional government thus initiated the search for a political solution, but it met with no success, because it was paralysed by its own

¹¹ The military pact with Libya was signed in Tripoli on 8 July 1985, with Libya pledging to provide logistical support and training. See *Africa News*, 15 July 1985. In the same period, Libya also started issuing more work permits for Sudanese workers, despite the fact that the overall number of foreign workers was being cut back drastically. See *Los Angeles Times*, 19 March 1986.

¹² Since the overthrow of Numeiri, Libyan troops have undoubtedly been stationed in the Sudan, although their number is not clear. The SPLM has accused Libya of stationing as many as 13,000 troops in the southern Sudan. This is almost certainly not correct. Libyan troops are stationed along the Chadian border to serve Libyan policy there, rather than the policies of the central Sudanese government in the southern Sudan. See *Christian Science Monitor*, 14 August 1986, and 19 August 1986; *Africa Confidential*, 4 June 1986.

¹³ *Africa News*, 21 April 1986.

temporary nature, the delicate political balance which existed in the country and the lack of a clear policy. While it recognised the importance of opening a dialogue with the SPLM and in theory accepted the idea that the southern movement had a legitimate role to play in post-Numeiri Sudan, the transitional government never acted. However, it allowed an unofficial, non-government group, the National Alliance for the Salvation of the Country, to hold talks with the SPLM.

A meeting between the SPLM and the National Alliance was held at the Koka Dam resort in Ethiopia on 19–24 March 1986 (just before the elections) to explore the conditions under which official talks might be held. The Alliance was a coalition of labour leaders, politicians and professionals which had been formed at the time of the coup against Numeiri. The Koka Dam meeting did not obtain any decisive result, but it was considered encouraging by the participants. The major points discussed were the repeal of the *sharia*, the abrogation of all foreign military pacts—the SPLM feared the mutual defence pact with Egypt might be used to justify Egyptian intervention—and the holding of a constitutional conference. Many details were left unanswered, including who should participate in the constitutional conference, but an agreement was reached to hold a further meeting on 7 May 1986.

The elections halted this process. The new government, anxious to take charge, refused to give a role to an unofficial organisation, but it was too disorganised and uncertain of its policies to take the initiative itself. On 31 July 1986, however, John Garang and Sadiq al-Mahdi had a meeting in Addis Ababa, where the Prime Minister had been attending a summit conference of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU). The two met again on 11 August 1986 but at this point the dialogue broke down over Garang's request that the government repeal the September laws immediately and without replacing them with any other kind of Islamic legislation. As we have already shown, Sadiq could not comply with such a request without undermining his own position. By this time, the majority of parties in the assembly had already demonstrated clearly that they opposed the repeal of the September laws: when the so-called 'African bloc' of southern members repeatedly threatened to resign during July 1986 and even staged a walk-out over the issue, other parties refused to make concessions.

The already slim hope of reaching an agreement between the government and the SPLM was definitively dashed by the downing of a Sudan Air plane near Malakal on 17 August 1986. The incident occurred shortly after the SPLM announced that it would shoot down all

planes flying over 'its' territory, including those carrying food aid. Since the incident, the government and the SPLM have not held any direct talks, and even contacts between the SPLM and the National Alliance have produced no results. Garang remains adamant about the repeal of the *sharia*. For his part, Sadiq al-Mahdi no longer accords any legitimacy to the SPLM. In an interview with a Jordanian newspaper in late November 1986, he argued that under Numeiri the opposition by the SPLM had internal causes and in addition received the support of Libya, South Yemen and Ethiopia. After the coup, the internal causes had ceased to exist, while Libya and South Yemen had withdrawn their aid. 'Therefore,' he concluded, 'the present rebel movement is a foreign Ethiopian aggression against the Sudan . . . This movement has now become exposed as a subservient foreign movement.'¹⁴ In the same vein, Radio Omdurman launched a campaign to discredit the SPLM, portraying Garang as a Soviet stooge and a 'tribalist'. 'The Russians promised him that he would be a great member of the Kremlin . . . As for Garang's attitude toward the other tribes of the-South, he declares a tribal *jihad* against the other tribes.'¹⁵ The government also tried to spread rumours of Garang's death in November 1986, apparently hoping to cause a division within the movement.

The third major problem area the government has to confront is the economy, and there, too, the prospects are dim. The country is saddled with a very large foreign debt, estimated at \$13 billion in late 1986.¹⁶ It is \$300 million in arrear on its debt to the IMF, and \$100 million in arrear on repayments to the Arab Monetary Fund. Total debt servicing obligations amount to \$930 million a year, but total government revenue was estimated at only \$538.2 million in 1985-86 and was expected to rise to \$1.1 billion in 1986.¹⁷

The inflation rate was estimated at 40-50 per cent, and industrial production had dwindled to about 20 per cent of capacity.¹⁸ Total revenue from agriculture decreased 33 per cent between 1984 and 1985, while sugar production was down 28 per cent. While lack of rain was largely responsible for the sharp drop in 1985, and agriculture was beginning to recover in 1986, the market for cotton, a major export,

¹⁴ *Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS)* 5(227) 25 November 1986.

¹⁵ *FBIS* 5(220) 14 November 1986.

¹⁶ *FBIS* 5(227) 25 November 1986. Figures were provided by Sadiq al-Mahdi in an interview. Most sources put the Sudanese debt at \$10 billion.

¹⁷ *Middle East Economic Digest (MEED)* 30 August-3 September 1986 and 27 September-3 October 1986.

¹⁸ *MEED* 25-31 October 1986.

remained sluggish. The Sudan was forced to sell at a discount, or to barter, much of the cotton produced in 1985, and the situation appeared similar in 1986, with only 10 per cent of the new crop sold by the middle of the year.¹⁹

The new government's response to the collapse of the economy was inaction. The budget was not announced until September 1986, with a three month delay. A recovery programme had not yet been put in place at the end of 1986, despite numerous contacts with, and much pressure from, the IMF, the World Bank and various Arab funds. The major problem did not appear to be any disagreements about policy between these organisations and the Sudanese government. Rather, the government of Sadiq al-Mahdi appeared unable to tackle the economic problems in any guise.

Inaction sums up the condition of the Sudan under its first democratic government in seventeen years. The government has not acted on the *sharia*, it has not made any progress towards negotiating with the SPLM or otherwise devising a solution to the problem of the south, and it has not taken any effective steps concerning the economy.

The only area where Sadiq al-Mahdi has been very active since becoming Prime Minister has been diplomacy. This may partly be an attempt on his part to escape the difficult problems of the country by pursuing the easier path of a high visibility foreign policy. However, it is also a recognition of the fact that the Sudan cannot solve its problems alone, either because their cause is not purely domestic or because the solutions require outside intervention or have foreign policy implications.

The economic problems of the Sudan, for example, are to a large extent the result of mismanagement by the Numeiri regime, particularly in its final years. It launched grandiose development schemes, squandered money, and allowed private individuals to influence economic policies for private gain.²⁰ But this is not the entire story. The oil-producing Arab states of the Gulf also contributed to the economic collapse by promoting, and then abandoning, an ambitious development programme for the Sudan in the mid-1980s. The 'breadbasket' scheme called for a \$6,000 million investment in massive agricultural development projects expected to provide food for the entire Arab world. The discovery that such investments were not

¹⁹ MEED 5-11 July 1986.

²⁰ The extent of economic mismanagement under Numeiri is documented in Mansour Khalid, *Numeiri and the Revolution of Dis-May*, London: Kegan Paul International, 1985.

particularly profitable in the short run, coupled with political disagreement over Numeiri's decision to accept the signing of the peace treaty between Egypt and Israel, led the sponsors of the projects to lose interest. This left the Sudan deeply in debt over half-finished projects. Furthermore, whatever its causes, the present economic crisis cannot be overcome without an infusion of aid.

The other problems have a foreign component, too. While the war in the south was not provoked by Ethiopia and Libya, but by the continuing imbalance between the northern and southern regions, its outcome has become entangled in the Sudan's relations with its neighbours. Ethiopia in particular can make it easier or more difficult for the SPLM to operate. The loss of Ethiopian support would create serious difficulties for the SPLM, just as the loss of Sudanese support would create problems for the Eritrean movements. The 1972 Addis Ababa agreement which put an end to the first civil war was underpinned by an understanding between Emperor Haile Selassie and President Numeiri that they would cease to help each other's opposition movements. The issue of the repeal of the *sharia* also has foreign policy implications. Islamic laws were not introduced by Numeiri because of foreign pressure. Rather, he responded to the increased militancy of the Muslim Brotherhood and very probably to his own psychological need, as a sick and ageing man, to turn to religion. But the *sharia* is now part of the Sudan's image held by its neighbours and its repeal would be interpreted as a political statement by other countries in the region.

Complicating the situation, the three issues are interrelated. Thus, if the Sudan turned to the oil-producing Arab countries for economic aid, such a move would be perceived by the SPLM as an affirmation of the country's Arab and Islamic identity, and this would become a further obstacle to negotiations. An attempt to obtain more aid from the West, on the other hand, would be perceived by the most extremist Islamic groups as a return to Numeiri's policies, and it would heighten their opposition. Repealing the *sharia* and negotiating peace with the SPLM, on the other hand, could easily lead to accusations that the government is becoming more radical and opening the door, wittingly or unwittingly, to the Soviet Union, which is deemed to support the SPLM through Ethiopia.

The foreign policy of Sadiq al-Mahdi reflects the dilemmas involved in finding acceptable sources of support. He has tried to diversify the country's relations, moving away from the USA and Egypt, which had bolstered Numeiri's position. Increasingly, however, the absence of

real alternatives seems to be pushing him back in the same direction as his predecessor.

Under the Numeiri regime, the Sudan attracted considerable amounts of aid from Egypt, the USA and, somewhat less reliably, the oil-producing countries. Egypt provided aid because of its eternal fear that a hostile government in the Sudan might some day reduce the flow of Nile water to Egypt, strangling it economically. Having found Numeiri to be a cooperative neighbour, Anwar Sadat and later, Hosni Mubarak, were interested in keeping him in power. Egyptian aid was thus mostly military, with economic cooperation limited to projects, such as the Jonglei Canal, of great importance to Egypt itself. The signing of a mutual defence pact in 1976 and of an Integration Charter in 1982 formalised the relations between the two countries.

The USA, too, found Numeiri reliable in his foreign policy. From the American point of view, the Sudan was on the right side of three different issues. In the general Middle East conflict, it accepted the peace treaty between Israel and Egypt. In the East-West global confrontation, it was the only consistently pro-Western government in the Horn of Africa, and thus a bulwark against the possibility of an expansion of Soviet influence from neighbouring Ethiopia. Finally, the Sudan was firmly anti-Libyan, particularly after Qaddafi supported an almost successful Ansar attempt to overthrow Numeiri in July 1976. American aid to the Sudan thus increased steadily, reaching about \$200 million a year by 1985. This aid was suspended at the beginning of that year, shortly after the Sudan also lost its IMF drawing rights, in an attempt to force the country to carry out some economic reforms. While \$67 million was released as a gesture of goodwill during Numeiri's visit to the USA a short time later, the rest remained frozen following the coup.

The transitional government changed the foreign policy of the country enough to differentiate itself from Numeiri but not sufficiently to create a clear new pattern. It accepted aid from Libya, and became cooler towards Egypt, but it abrogated neither the mutual defence treaty of 1976 nor the Integration Charter of 1982. Similarly, it tried to establish some distance from the USA, while continuing to seek its economic and even military aid. In reality, in 1985-86 emergency food aid to drought victims brought American assistance to the Sudan to the unprecedented level of over \$400 million.

Sadiq's foreign policy has been very active, but no clearer in its orientation. He has travelled widely, announced a policy of maintaining

good relations with all countries, and cast a wide net in trying to gain supporters, even attempting to establish close relations with Iran, a country that has never played any role in the Sudan. While he has become somewhat more cautious towards Qaddafi, he has signed new trade agreements with Libya, including one in August 1986 providing for the bartering of \$30 million worth of Sudanese camels and meat for oil, chemicals and cement. At the same time he has accepted renewed shipments of Egyptian military aid, though relations between the two countries are still not cordial. He talks of non-alignment and has invited Soviet technicians back to rehabilitate pre-1971 projects, but he is not seeking a close alliance with the Soviet Union. In the meantime, he is discussing with the World Bank and the IMF measures to relaunch the economy and he is trying to attract more US aid.

None of these steps has brought the Sudan closer to solving its problems. Egypt can provide some military aid, but it is economically bankrupt itself. The Gulf countries can provide some funds, but they are no longer as cash-rich and free-spending as they were in the mid-1970s. They no longer dream of \$6 billion investments in the Sudan. American aid is decreasing sharply and is likely to continue doing so, even if relations improve, because of US domestic budget constraints. Of an aid request by the US administration of \$223 million for the fiscal year 1987, already well below previous levels, only \$69 million was allocated. Food aid accounts for \$40 million of this total and development aid for only \$22 million. The IMF and the World Bank have been involved in protracted discussions with the Sudan, but there has been no agreement on debt rescheduling or new loans. Sadiq's active foreign policy, in other words, has produced few concrete results.

It is not easy to find reasons for optimism about the Sudan a year after the return to democracy. The major domestic problems cannot be solved without external help, but there is no sign that sufficient external help is available from any source. And no matter where the Sudan turns to for aid, this is going to lead to domestic complications. It is not necessarily that the problems of the Sudan cannot be solved in an absolute sense. It is conceivable that negotiations could put an end to the war in the south, and that a compromise could be reached on the *sharia*, perhaps not by repealing it but by applying it only to certain regions or exclusively to the Muslim population. The debt can be, and is bound to be, rescheduled, because there is no possible way the government can make the payments expected of it now. The economy can revive, for the potential resources of the Sudan have not vanished.

It has become increasingly clear since the April 1986 elections that the government of Sadiq al-Mahdi is unlikely to accomplish any of this. It is handicapped by the clearly Islamic nature of the groups that support it, which is likely to prevent it from tackling the issue of the *sharia* and thus from negotiating with Garang. Furthermore, it is inhibited in all its actions by the fragility of the government coalition, making decisions of any type dangerous. There is an air of *déjà vu* about the present situation. The very real desire for democracy by the country's intelligentsia, and the determination to make it work, have been defeated before by the hard reality of the socio-political make-up of the Sudan. Democratic elections tend to ensure a central role for the religious organisations while risking the creation of governments too weak and divided to tackle the country's problems.

The politics of AIDS in Kenya*

AIDS in the African context

Let us at once state the necessary and the dramatic. There may at present be 10 million people in the world who have been infected by the AIDS (Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome) virus. By 1990, according to the World Health Organisation (WHO), there may be as many as 100 million. Over 100 countries have reported AIDS victims, including thirty African nations. But half of those estimated to be infected world-wide live in the eleven countries that comprise Central Africa, and it is there that 50,000 to several hundred thousand lives may already have been lost.¹

The African AIDS connection was first recognised in 1983 by physicians in Europe who reported AIDS-like illnesses among their African patients.² These incidences prompted clinical studies by Western researchers in Rwanda and Zaire where people with similar illnesses and immunological problems were found.³ With the subsequent isolation of the human T-lymphotropic virus type III (HTLV-III/LAV), now referred to as the human immuno-deficiency virus (HIV), and the development of screening procedures to detect antibodies against HIV (the ELISA and the Western blot technique), further studies confirmed that African patients were suffering from the ill-effects caused by the same virus.⁴

Estimates of the extent of those infected abound in the scientific and popular press even if they are at times difficult to prove with certainty. Yet despite the latitude that we may give to a sensationalist press and its exaggerations, the message is appallingly clear: if what is predicted does happen, then countries in the hardest-hit region, those touching the

* The author wishes to thank the American Council of Learned Societies, the Social Science Research Council, and the University of Hawaii for their support.

¹ *Newsweek*, 11 November 1986; *Time*, 16 February 1987.

² N Clumeck *et al.*, 'Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome in black Africans', *The Lancet* (I) 1983, p 642; N Clumeck *et al.*, 'Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome in African patients', *New England Journal of Medicine* (310) 1984, pp 492-7.

³ P Perre *et al.*, 'Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome in Rwanda', *The Lancet* (II) 1984, pp 62-5; P Piot *et al.*, 'Acquired Immunodeficiency syndrome in a heterosexual population in Zaire', *The Lancet* (II) 1984, pp 65-9.

⁴ J Biggar, 'The AIDS Problem in Africa', *The Lancet* 1 1986, pp 79-82.

Great Rift Valley—Zambia, Uganda, Rwanda, Zaire, Burundi, Tanzania—face a serious challenge that may, in some cases, threaten their already fragile political and economic stability. In Lusaka, for example, 15 per cent of the adult population, and 30 per cent of all its men may be infected.⁵ Serological testing of healthy adults in Kigali, Rwanda has shown 18 per cent are positive to HIV.⁶ In Bujumbura, the capital of Burundi, it is estimated that one out of every ten adults carries the AIDS virus; and in the Rakai area of southwest Uganda, one of the most heavily AIDS-stricken areas in the world, an incredible 30 per cent of the population are estimated to be infected.⁷ For Central and East Africa, deadly AIDS statistics seem all too easily available and they seem to be getting worse all the time.

Kenya, while not untouched by the virus, has, according to most accounts, been relatively spared. Although high rates of infection among prostitutes have been reported, the overall prevalence of the disease in Kenya has been considerably lower than in neighbouring countries.⁸ But AIDS is in Kenya. And although Kenya is the country in the region best equipped to mount an effective prevention programme, it has failed in many respects to do so. Despite its comparatively well-developed medical infrastructure and working coterie of Western scientists, its efforts have fallen short of even the minimum requirements suggested by its statistics.

Reporting AIDS in Kenya

In January 1985, under the headlines 'Killer disease in Kenya' and 'Horror sex disease in Kakamenga', the Kenyan press made public its first serious interest in the AIDS problem.⁹ In these stories, the press reported that in the Kakamenga District of Kenya four cases of AIDS had been diagnosed and that the patients had subsequently died. Later accounts contradicted the story, quoting a hostile district medical officer who claimed that the deaths were not due to AIDS but were simply extreme cases of skin cancer. Despite the confusion and the obvious need for clarification, relative silence followed until the Autumn of 1985

⁵ *Time*, 16 February 1987.

⁶ P Van de Perre *et al.*, 'HTLV-III/LAV infection in central Africa'. Presented at the International Symposium on African AIDS, Brussels 1985.

⁷ *Newsweek*, 24 November 1986.

⁸ For study on transmission, see J K Kreiss *et al.*, 'AIDS virus infection in Nairobi prostitutes, Spread of the epidemic to East Africa', *New England Journal of Medicine* (314) 1985, pp 414-18.

⁹ *Standard* (Nairobi) 15 and 18 January 1985.

when Western press accounts began to focus sharply on the somewhat frightening implications of AIDS research in Central Africa. Realising the importance of these studies, the respected Kenyan magazine, *The Weekly Review* (Nairobi), took up the cause of informing the public. It issued a carefully worded summary of some of the material printed in the West, citing the numbers of AIDS victims reported in Zaire, Rwanda, Uganda and Kenya. In September 1985, under the growing public pressure caused by these reports, the Kenyan Ministry of Health unofficially let it be known that only twenty victims with AIDS had actually been diagnosed in Kenya since May 1985.¹⁰ Officially, however, the government continued to deny to foreign reporters the presence of AIDS within its borders, until the now famous study of Kenyan prostitutes broke in the international press. In this study of ninety prostitutes in Nairobi, over half were reportedly infected with the HIV virus and three-quarters of these women showed signs of significant illness.¹¹ Kenyan leaders who had up to this point steadfastly avoided the health care implications of AIDS in the country, now became incensed by these disclosures and by others, which they conceived to be part of a Western racist campaign to exaggerate the prevalence of AIDS in Africa. Yet the immediate effect of this unwanted publicity was to wake up a somewhat lethargic Kenyan health officialdom, which until then (and still now) had tended to play down the AIDS threat.

In October 1985, Kenyan government leaders, concerned about jeopardising the local tourist industry (which generated 600,000 visitors in 1986) protested through the national press that the reports about AIDS in Kenya were alarmist and untrue. Americans and others in the West were being given the impression that AIDS was sweeping across Africa even though the virus had been documented in only 'a handful of countries: Zaire, Rwanda, Burundi, and Uganda'. Even the President of Kenya, Daniel arap Moi, was prompted to remark that the foreign press was conducting a 'hate campaign' and urged *wananchi* (Kenyan citizens) to 'turn a deaf ear to our enemies'.¹² This kind of reaction gained support in Kenya as Central Africa came increasingly under the scrutiny of an inquisitive Western scientific community, eager to answer critical epidemiological and clinical questions about the HIV virus. The international media, heady with the potential importance of the AIDS story, also began invading Central Africa in search of answers

¹⁰ *Weekly Review* (Nairobi) 13 September 1985.

¹¹ *International Herald Tribune* (IHT), 9/10 November 1985.

¹² *Weekly Review*, 11 October 1985.

to questions of its own, questions that would invariably embarrass and call to account African health officials.

In November 1985, the *New York Times* quoted leading American scientists, Robert Gallo of the National Cancer Institute and William Haseltine of Harvard University, as arguing strongly, on the basis of early epidemiological studies, that the AIDS epidemic probably began in Africa. Kenyan officials were outraged and reacted swiftly to minimise the impact of these reports by confiscating the entire shipment of the 9 November 1985 issue of the *International Herald Tribune* in which reports began of Lawrence Altman's *New York Times* series on African AIDS research and its implications.¹³ The African offensive in Kenya to combat the Western 'African origin' theory of AIDS then began in earnest. An editorial in *Medicus*, the official publication of the Kenya Medical Association, suggested the possibility that tourists from around the world had introduced AIDS into Africa, and complained of the West's apparent need for an African connection for every disease.¹⁴ One columnist of a major Kenyan daily went so far as to claim that infected foreigners were deliberately being sent to Africa as part of a global conspiracy of multinational drug companies to produce African 'guinea pigs' for Western AIDS research.¹⁵

The hostility of African governments including that of Kenya was also witnessed in the low attendance of African scientists and physicians at a major European conference, ostensibly about AIDS in Africa, which was held at about the same time. At this conference where 700 AIDS experts gathered from around the world to discuss the issues involved, only fifty delegates from African countries were present. These delegates, however, made the African position very clear in a joint statement challenging the contention that AIDS originated in Africa. They feared that 'a blanket identification of Africans with AIDS could lead to large-scale discrimination against nationals of the continent elsewhere in the world'. Indeed, later press accounts cited the case of two Zairean brothers who were expelled from a school in Brussels when it was reported to the authorities by their family doctor that they were carrying the AIDS virus. The tests were subsequently found to be incorrect.¹⁶ More recent reports of discussions over possible restrictions on world travel for citizens of infected areas have given a prophetic ring to these

¹³ *IHT*, 24/25 December 1985.

¹⁴ *Weekly Review*, 29 November 1985.

¹⁵ See Robin McKie's 'Panic: the story of AIDS', New York: Thorsons Publishing Group, 1986, p. 84.

¹⁶ *Weekly Review*, 29 November 1985.

original fears.¹⁷ Yet, in addition to these legitimate concerns, it later became obvious that African governments were exerting significant pressure on both African and Western scholars and researchers not to participate in the sharing of AIDS information on Africa. These pressures included a number of increasingly restrictive government conditions concerning the conduct and publication of research on AIDS in African countries.¹⁸

The image of AIDS held by the West was not easily digestible by Africans. Yet, the African defence against the 'African origin' theory, and the consequent hostility to the West, went deeper than the fear of being stigmatised. It questioned the scientific and methodological grounds of the studies being undertaken, as well as the projections of AIDS casualties highlighted by the media. Gheorghiu Grigorieff argued against the theory in his book, *No to AIDS (Non au SIDA)*, saying in part that non-African researchers did not take into consideration physiological differences between black Africans and their non-African counterparts, and that carrying the AIDS virus may possibly be part of Africans' normal haematological make-up.¹⁹ Furthermore, later scientific reviews of the early AIDS epidemiological surveys also confirmed African suspicions that the extent of seropositivity among the population may have been greatly overestimated.²⁰

More importantly, however, the African response was in defence of an Africa that, as the local press was wont to say, was an easy target to shoot at. Countries such as Kenya which have little money to conduct their own studies, are consequently dependent on the West for information and research. Health budgets are stretched to their limits in fighting malaria, diarrhoea, cholera, malnutrition and other maladies more frequent in Africa. African politicians are also shrewd enough to know that Western science itself often comes to Africa with dirty hands. According to one Kenyan journalist,

The competition between research institutions for a share of research financing may also lead unscrupulous scientists to put forward half-baked theories in hopes of attracting funds. Quacks can easily thrive in Africa where they are far from more respectable researchers likely to cross-check their findings and methodology.²¹

¹⁷ See A J Zuckerman, 'Would screening prevent the international spread of AIDS?', *The Lancet* (II) 1986, pp 1208-9; and *Associated Press* account of WHO meeting on international travel, 'Experts against check of travelers for AIDS', 5 March 1987.

¹⁸ McKie, 'Panic . . .', p 79.

¹⁹ *New African* (London) September 1986, p 32.

²⁰ Biggar, 'The AIDS Problem . . .', p 80.

²¹ *Weekly Review*, 29 November 1985.

Yet, in spite of these initial denials, Kenya started to 'open up' officially. In November 1985, in response to a question from a member of the Kenyan Parliament, the Minister of Health, Peter Nyakiano revealed that there had been eight persons conclusively diagnosed as suffering from AIDS in Kenya and fourteen others suspected as having the disease. Of the twenty-two patients only ten were Kenyan. Seven of the eight diagnosed patients had already died. The local press hailed this frankness as a welcome sign that the government had finally admitted that AIDS existed in Kenya and was possibly preparing to doing something about it. But the admission also drew some criticism. While Western newspaper articles may have been exaggerated or even racist in their implications, one Kenyan journalist complained that 'African governments are to blame for creating an information vacuum by placing a lid on the AIDS problem.'²²

Since the public explosion in the Autumn of 1985, the government has pursued a deliberate, although not necessarily vigorous, AIDS reporting and prevention policy. It agreed in late 1985 to report the incidences of AIDS to the World Health Organisation and has since held regular press conferences to up-date the information being given to the Kenyan public. An authoritative statement given when I was in Kenya came from the Director of Medical Services, Dr Karuga Koinange, on 12 August 1986. He reported that a total of 109 persons with AIDS had so far been diagnosed in Kenya. He explained that Kenya was diagnosing about four AIDS victims each month. Of the victims, 65 per cent were in the western part of Kenya (Nyanza and western provinces), 30 per cent were in central Kenya, and 5 per cent were spread among the Rift Valley, and eastern and coastal provinces. Victims were equally distributed according to sex, about 30 per cent were non-Kenyans, and only two were homosexuals.²³

But these numbers, it must be remembered, must be approached in the full knowledge of our ignorance of the hidden battles that have taken place, the silences imposed, and the sectional interest reflected in their construction and eventual public consumption. The problem with numbers is not just a technical one, exacerbated by the conditions of the African context. Numbers also reflect ideological, and political problems as well. In Africa, the numbers that constitute an important part of the 'language of AIDS' are severely compromised by massive problems of appropriate diagnosis and diagnostic protocol, of basic and

²² *Weekly Review*, 29 November 1985.

²³ *Kenya Times* (Nairobi) 12 August 1986.

accurate record-keeping, of local cultural and political sensitivities, of the manipulations that are part of Western 'grantsmanship', and, finally, of irresponsible and deliberate manipulation by official power-brokers.

Certainly the government in Kenya can be criticised for being slow to take the AIDS epidemic seriously enough. The Ministry of Health still does not see AIDS prevention efforts as a national priority, although it claims to be monitoring the situation closely.²⁴ But an important question remains in this AIDS numbers game beyond the problems inherent in diagnosis, record-keeping, and interpretation: Is the government, even given these limitations, reporting the incidence of AIDS and other relevant information honestly and thoroughly? Or to put it another way: Is the Kenyan Ministry of Health deliberately *under-reporting* the incidence of AIDS in Kenya?

There is some cause to suspect that this may be the case. In the announcement of August 1986 by the Ministry of Health referred to above, Dr Koinange reported that there had been a total of 109 diagnosed persons with AIDS since 1985 averaging about four cases per month for the last twelve months. The reporting in all three national newspapers, *The Nation* (Nairobi) *The Standard* (Nairobi), and the *Kenya Times* (Nairobi) was essentially the same, all carrying the statement without seriously questioning how those figures were formulated. No attempt was made to estimate the numbers of people who may be infected with the virus, although a central province dermatologist, Dr Irungu Mwangi, announced that there were '300 confirmed carriers' of AIDS in Kenya.²⁵ In my own direct conversations with researchers of the Kenya Medical Research institute (KMRI) in Nairobi over 340 patients with clinical symptoms common to AIDS had tested as positive for AIDS antibodies in the first six months of 1986 alone. Add to this fact, probable government tampering with AIDS statistics and major gaps in the AIDS reporting system itself, and any numbers officially deriving from Kenya become highly suspect.²⁶ In fairness to Kenyan officials, they are not alone in their hesitation to report on the incidence of AIDS. Jonathan Mann, head of the WHO's AIDS prevention efforts, suspects a 'huge' under-reporting of AIDS by countries in general.²⁷

²⁴ *Weekly Review*, 14 February 1986 and *Kenya Times*, 12 August 1986.

²⁵ *New African*, p 31.

²⁶ Author's visit to Kenya, August 1986.

²⁷ *United Press International*, 15 February 1987.

AIDS IN KENYA

The lack of local press interest in problems of AIDS detection and prevention is remarkable, given the fairly open access of reporters to KMRI. When it comes to AIDS, however, the truth seems to be that the Kenyan press has all but abdicated its role as public watchdog, and is under the control of government censors. There is no critical press in Kenya and any serious political opposition is clandestine or a mere product of the extensive rumour mill that forms part of any expression of discontent with the government. The press simply records and reports official statements. Typically, it does not analyse or evaluate the government's performance. This is not the case with the foreign press, however, who continue to keep the AIDS issue alive much to the consternation of public officials. Following President Moi's uncomfortable trip to the USA last March where he was haunted by press questions on human rights abuses in his suppression of the Mwakenya movement as well as on AIDS in Kenya, KANU National Secretary, Laban Kitele, threatened to censor all Nairobi-based foreign correspondents. He criticised all of these reports as an 'orchestrated move by certain foreign powers and self-exiled Kenyan dissidents'.²⁸

Some of the problems in press and government reporting are related to the absence of what may be called a politically active AIDS constituency. Unlike the USA with its highly organised, efficient and widespread 'Gay Movement', there is no comparable group with the potential to galvanise, articulate and document AIDS activities in Kenya and other African states. These countries, to their detriment, have no similar catalyst to stimulate and keep objective their AIDS efforts. This gap is partly due to the contrasting constellation of AIDS victims in Africa as compared with the West. AIDS in the West primarily affects the homosexual population (70 per cent of victims) unlike Africa, where the virus takes an equal toll of men and women. These factors to some extent explain the acceptance of the rather impoverished official response and corresponding lack of commitment in the face of this serious medical problem. This criticism does not necessarily entail a lack of sympathy for the massive problems that these agencies already face. The health issues they are confronting are enormous; cholera, malaria, accidents, poor medical care and facilities, and chronic shortages of essential supplies are all too frequent and demanding. Certainly, in the face of these problems, the difficulties in the way of obtaining the resources needed for an adequate AIDS campaign must seem overwhelming.

²⁸ *New York Times*, 31 March 1987.

AIDS prevention efforts in Kenya

The Autumn of 1985 also witnessed the formation of the Kenya National AIDS Committee to assist the Ministry of Health in its prevention campaign. This committee which only meets every two months is made up of physicians and researchers. They began working in January 1986 on AIDS guidelines for health care professionals and the public. The announcement of the formation of this committee came in the wake of a report that medical staff in a leading private hospital in Nairobi had refused to handle a diagnosed AIDS patient. Doctors from KMRI were called in to take the patient to Kenyatta National Hospital where most AIDS patients receive treatment. These guidelines were issued at the end of January 1986 to senior doctors in Nairobi and to those in provincial hospitals. A series of workshops for those physicians was also conducted by KMRI staff on the management of AIDS patients. A central unit for blood testing and patient profile make-up was established, and a cost analysis of screening the nation's blood supply was begun. In these guidelines, confidentiality was stressed. However, keeping information confidential is jeopardised by an over-elaborate and loose system of reporting. Information on a confirmed AIDS diagnosis goes first to the director of the hospital involved, then the doctor, then presumably the patient. The guidelines also called for hospitals to set up AIDS registers as well as to establish hospital committees to oversee discharges of AIDS patients.²⁹

The government's public education campaign consists of periodic statements placed in the national media (both in Swahili and English) offering information about the conditions of transmission, and prevention measures. The Ministry has also distributed pamphlets and posters. They are not, however, easily accessible or available, and their distribution is often more discussed than seen. Posters have been reported to have been widely distributed in those areas reporting the highest incidence of AIDS victims, although I did not see any in Nairobi or Mombasa. The nature of the information has ranged between the over-technical and clinical to the vague and misleading, such as those by the Director of Medical Services, to refrain from 'grazing in other pastures'. The material bounces between confusing explanations of medical terminology to blatantly sexist references as to the unfortunate implications of AIDS for manly sexual practices. Yet, there is important information being distributed also. However, it was only in August 1986

²⁹ *Weekly Review*, 31 January 1986.

that any serious attempt was made to mention condoms in the prevention literature. That delay is somewhat understandable given their high cost and low availability, and the problem of their acceptance by men. These are major problems that still receive little attention in Kenya.

It is clear that there is much public concern about AIDS in Kenya. Letters to daily newspapers frequently request educational materials on AIDS. A public lecture on sexually transmitted diseases, held at Kerugoya Catholic Church in the central province attracted thousands of eager listeners. And the readiness of the press to report any 'approved' detail of the epidemic reflects the commodity value of AIDS talk. But expressions of public sentiment in interviews and public comments have also included the negative, such as calls for the government to screen all foreigners for AIDS or to round up AIDS victims and put them in a 'secret place'. Then there is also the charge by Kenya's rising right-wing evangelicals that AIDS is 'a clear sign of divine judgement in connection with homosexuality and drug abuse'.³⁰ The fact that these divine assessments fail to fit the reality of the African AIDS predicament appears to be of little consequence.

One troubling silence in the public discourse on AIDS in Kenya involves the pressing problem of blood supply for transfusion. Not surprisingly, the blood supply in Kenya is not adequately protected. Infections through contaminated blood may account for as many as 10 per cent of all AIDS victims in Africa.³¹ It has been reported that screening the blood supply for AIDS patients is occurring in Nairobi and Mombasa, and that by March 1987 Kenya will, according to Dr Koinange, become the first African nation to screen all blood for the AIDS virus.³² There are, however, many good reasons to be sceptical of this proclamation. There is, for example, a widespread lack of testing kits, complicated by a fast-moving blood supply, chronic blood shortages, and the absence of adequate blood reserves and storage facilities. These problems also prevent the storage of blood by those who themselves need to use it for forthcoming elective surgery.³³ In addition, the tendency in African medical practice to transfuse blood more frequently, raises even higher the risk of the spread of infection. All of these problems plus the cost of such active screening are certainly

³⁰ *Weekly Review*, 22 August 1986.

³¹ J M Mann, 'Epidemiology of LAV/HTLV-III in Africa'. Paper presented at the Second International Conference on AIDS, Paris 1986.

³² *New York Times*, 24 February 1987.

³³ Personal discussions with various Nairobi physicians.

demoralising, and have contributed to a feeble government response to this aspect of the AIDS crisis.

An additional problem is the transmission of the virus by the use of contaminated needles. Studies have already linked seropositivity with the number of injections received by patients.³⁴ Infection via this route is a major problem both in legitimate medical facilities in Kenya and on the street. Sterilisation or re-usable (and even what are meant to be disposable) needles and syringes is poor, owing to shortages of supplies and equipment, inadequate staff education, non-existent monitoring procedures, and the high number of patients. Even more troublesome is the danger of infection due to injections given by a wide variety of local healers (and charlatans) living in the shanties and in the bush. The cultural preference given to the injection as a mode of treatment has spawned a host of profiteers at the grass-root level. If one considers that an estimated 75 per cent of the population use folk-healers as the first line of health defence, the possible magnitude of the problem becomes apparent.³⁵

But while the problems of AIDS prevention may receive little attention in the press, those of regulation are reported in great detail. It is now common knowledge that Kenyans who fail to report to the authorities that they may have AIDS are liable for arrest. Recently a man at the provincial hospital in Nyeri who was suspected of having AIDS, and transferred to Kenyatta National Hospital in Nairobi, left the hospital on his own before his diagnosis was completed. The police and medical officers arrested the man in his home and took him back to the hospital where he was eventually given a 'conditional discharge'. Another man in Nairobi was suspected of having AIDS and admitted to Kenyatta National Hospital. His relatives were not allowed to enter his room and after his subsequent death his coffin was sealed and police and medical officers prohibited the public viewing of his body.³⁶ In a similar incident, public health officials in Mombasa refused permission to transport the body of a man who had died and was suspected of having AIDS. The man had to be buried in Mombasa and not his home town. His family was instructed to have no more than eight people at his funeral.³⁷

In a more recent display of medical policing, 275 women were picked up by the police in two separate sweeps in Eldama and in Kisumu

³⁴ Mann, 'Epidemiology . . .'; D A Feldman, 'Anthropology, AIDS and Africa', *Medical Anthropological Quarterly* (17) 1986, pp 38-40.

³⁵ *Standard*, 10 August 1986.

³⁶ *New African*, p 32-3.

³⁷ *Weekly Review*, 11 July 1986.

Kenya. They were all tested for sexually-transmitted diseases including AIDS.³⁸ These women faced criminal charges if they were tested positive on any STD. One should note that no similar sweeps were done on the men that frequented the bars where these women were picked up. The authorities claim the right to authorise these police hunts under the Kenyan Public Health Act, Section 17.

Observations

Recent press accounts have noted an increasing openness by African officials in discussions of the AIDS epidemic in their countries, and the WHO has become more aggressive in its efforts to engage African governments in AIDS reporting and prevention efforts.³⁹ But Kenya's political leaders have continued to react fiercely to any direct or implied criticism of their dealing with AIDS. When it was reported in the London press that Prince Charles would be carrying his own blood supply during his visits to Kenya, Malawi, and Swaziland, the President and several of his ministers condemned the 'malicious propaganda emanating from outside the country'.⁴⁰ This defensiveness has practical consequences for AIDS efforts in Kenya. The language governing these AIDS efforts is characterised by a number of major absences and silences. These gaps in the AIDS discourse in Kenya are conditioned by the environment of struggle found throughout Africa, which exerts a strong negative impact on attempts to combat AIDS on the continent. Contagion and prevention are cultural, social and political phenomena. Since AIDS preventive efforts fall mostly within the area of behavioural education, these gaps are all the more important since they blind us to a more thorough understanding of the social meaning of AIDS in Africa and the complex set of human processes which contribute to its spread.

I think it is safe to say that the language of AIDS in Kenya and in many other parts of Africa suffers from a lack of critical reflection and dialogue. At the local level, as I have indicated, frank, open, and honest discussion is smothered by the absence of a free press, the economic pressures exerted by tourism, and the politics of the Western scientific invasion of the area. These forces also operate at the regional and international levels but are further complicated by the politics of neo-colonialism and the struggles of the Third World against the

³⁸ *Standard*, 25 August 1985.

³⁹ *New York Times*, 17 November 1986.

⁴⁰ *New York Times*, 24 February 1987.

cultural and political penetration of the West. AIDS talk in this atmosphere becomes very complicated indeed, and is infused with political agendas which have little to do with the immediate goals of AIDS prevention.

But there are other silences that must be addressed, in the voices that make up the AIDS language itself. Sacrificed in the African discourse on AIDS, for example, is the voice of the victim. There is no literature, no popular media, no major group articulating this voice. There is, in other words, no visible response from those who suffer from this malady, no dialogue with those who can most directly communicate the meaning of this pain. What is the social and cultural experience of the illness for Africans? How can preventive measures reflect and adapt to this experience? Where is the communication and learning between the fields of medicine, culture and AIDS? How will compassion and understanding be created in the absence of this voice? There are indications that most Africans know very little about AIDS and its prevention.⁴¹ This is not just the result of the lack of AIDS brochures. It is the product of the historical, cultural and political gap between the First and Third Worlds. One can gain a small measure of appreciation of the issues here by considering the difficulties experienced even by AIDS activists in the USA in finding an effective bridge between the language of AIDS prevention and that of homosexuality and intimacy. With this silence is lost the potentially positive impact on preventive efforts that comes when AIDS victims speak out.

There are, in addition, other victims silenced or ignored in the AIDS language of Kenya. Current AIDS talk reinforces heavy discrimination against women in Kenya and in other African countries. Given the male-oriented bias of the medical community, as well as the lack of an active AIDS constituency, AIDS talk becomes part of an arsenal of reasons to harass, abuse, and exploit the victims of the booming sex trade, namely, poor and disadvantaged women. The medical policing of these women proceeds with almost total disregard for due legal process and basic civil liberties. The weight of science and medicine now contributes to an already poor human rights record for women, and the AIDS language does nothing to reflect the suffering of these victims.

Finally, the African AIDS situation is further complicated not only by the political struggles but by the cultural ones as well. The language of AIDS in Africa is one derived from the West. It is a transplanted language

⁴¹ D A Feldman *et al.*, 'Public Awareness of AIDS in Rwanda', *Social Science and Medicine* 24(2) 1987, pp 97-100.

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that is dependent on the West for its meaning and continued development. It speaks in Western symbols and with a voice that was born from that cultural cosmology. It is not indigenous to Africa and thus is blind to the African world of meaning. For example, there are cultural practices, traditional rituals including a host of communal eating and drinking practices, that seem to be coming under what may be called the negative influence of AIDS preventive efforts. These practices are coming increasingly under review by anthropologists and social scientists who are moved by their concern over the potential for transmission of HIV.⁴² Where these practices are intact, they are fundamental to community bonding and the meaning of social life. Yet, they are all falling victim, justifiably or not, to both the negative impact of Western inspection, and the public's fear of contracting the AIDS virus. This fear is in part generated by the media, and other sources of information which rely on Western reports. A prevention language insensitive to this potential runs the real risk of contributing significantly to the deterioration of the everyday symbols of communality specific to those areas of Africa involved.

Given the richness of the cultural diversity of the African continent, the language of AIDS should be a polyphony of voices aware of the many dimensions and problems that this epidemic presents. Yet, at root, the basic preventive strategy should be one that addresses the voices from below, that is, from those who suffer. This singularly important hermeneutic point cannot be neglected. It alone poses the critical question, namely, what would an AIDS prevention programme look like from the social, political and cultural world-view of those most directly affected? This kind of strategy cannot be adequately represented in the current monopoly of AIDS research by Western medicine. While certainly indispensable for efforts to stop the spread of AIDS, this monopoly precludes an analysis sympathetic to different cultural symbols of meaning, and often fails to recognise its own conventional origins and limited perspectives. It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the silence of voices from below, for whatever reasons, presents a major obstacle to the effectiveness of AIDS prevention efforts in Africa.

⁴² See Feldman 1986 above for example; A Moore and R LeBaron, 'The Case for a Haitian Origin of the AIDS epidemic' in *The Social Dimensions of AIDS: Method and Theory*, A Feldman and T Johnson (ed), New York: Praeger 1986, pp 77-94.

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
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BIBLIOGRAPHY

Selected themes in West Indian literature: an annotated bibliography

David Dabydeen and Nana Wilson-Tagoe

Despite the divisions created by geographic distances and the existence of independent West Indian states, it is still possible to talk in general terms of a West Indian literature of English expression. A common history of colonisation, displacement, slavery, indenture, emancipation and nationalism has shaped most West Indian environments, creating a unity of experience that can be identified as particularly West Indian. West Indian literature is, in the main, a product of this experience. Its beginnings in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, its explosion in the 1930s and 1950s and its assumption of new dimensions in the late twentieth century reflect the progress of a West Indian engagement with history, with political and social adjustments and with problems of definition, identity and aesthetics.

Such an engagement has evolved through more than a century of West Indian literary activity in poetry, prose fiction and drama. The movement from the derivative and imitative poetry of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, from the often unconscious rejection of the West Indian experience in the early prose fiction, towards the social awareness and cultural consciousness of the mid-twentieth century is an indication of a literary trend steeped in the historical development of the West Indies itself. In the early stages of the region's literature, the people in the forefront of literary activity were the white creoles, a minority group with the training and economic power to create a 'creole' literary tradition but often weakened by their cultural allegiance to the metropolis and by an ambivalence towards the islands. An example of the paucity of their literary output and the narrowness of its perspective can be traced in the deteriorating vision of a fine writer like De Lisser who moved from the social vision of a novel such as *Jane's Career* to the exotic romance of *The White Witch of Rosehall*.

The poetry of the period fared even worse in terms of its social awareness and responsibility towards a tradition. The problem was not just of an imitative and derivative poetry drawing its inspiration and forms from a metropolitan tradition; it was one of an absence of vision and direction. Poets such as James Grainger (1723-65)¹ and M J Chapman (1833)² wrote with little of a West Indian context, perspective or tradition. Only the black poet, Francis Williams,³ perhaps moved by his own inner tensions, seems to have seen poetry

¹ James Grainger, *Sugar Cane*, London: Whittingham, 1764.

² M J Chapman, *Barbados*, London, 1833.

³ Francis Williams, 'Ode to George Haldane' in Edward Long, *History of Jamaica*, London: Lowndes, 1774.

as a means of voicing personal conflicts and social dilemmas. The emergence of a politically aware and socially conscious literary tradition had, it seemed, to await improvements in West Indian popular education and the rise of nationalism. Accordingly, the years between 1937, when widespread rioting and strikes broke out on the islands leading to labour unrests and demands for self-determination, and 1962, when the West Indies Federation broke up, constitute the most active and vigorous in the literary history of the islands. They were years of activity and debate marking the rise of political consciousness in the West Indies and popular anti-colonial agitation which heralded demands for social and political change. The emergence of the 'Beacon Group',⁴ a political, radical and creative set active in the labour movement and identified with the independence struggle, gave a new perspective and urgency to literary activity in the West Indies. For these activists were also novelists, poets, short story writers and historians who saw their writing as part of the anti-colonial struggle and of the new sensitivity to economic and social relations. Alfred Mendes's *Pitch Lake* (1934) and *Black Fauns* (1935), and C L R James's *Minty Alley* (1936) widened West Indian perspectives by raising questions about colonial society and giving new depths to the social realism which had informed earlier novels such as De Lisser's *Jane's Career*. *Pitch Lake*, for instance, flayed the hollow, spiritually impoverished world of the middle-class Portuguese in Trinidad, and *Minty Alley* confronted its educated hero with the lowly, pinched world of the yard.

In poetry, increased self-consciousness and social awareness were reflected in new dimensions, especially in the poetry of Una Marson⁵ and A J Seymour,⁶ where for the first time the clichés of the pastoral tradition were giving way to personal exploration and political statement. This vigorous literary activity took place in the atmosphere of a new critical interest in canons and standards. The nature and character of the emerging literature were being debated and defined in the new literary journals of the time, and continuing interest in the creole language, the traditions of the folk and West Indian historiography,⁷ was helping to widen the scope of the debate.

It was from this political and literary context that V S Reid's *New Day* (1949) emerged, and it is not surprising that it should have recreated the historical past

⁴ These were mostly literary people and political activists associated with the Jamaican monthly publication, *The Beacon*, namely, Albert Gomes, Alfred Mendes and C L R James. The literary output of *The Beacon*, was complemented by other publications: *Focus* edited by Edna Manley, *Kyk-ove-a!* (1945-61) edited in Guyana by A J Seymour and *BIM* edited in Barbados by Frank A Collymore.

⁵ Una Marson, *Tropic Reveries*, Kingston, Jamaica: Gleaner, 1930.

⁶ A J Seymour, *Verse*, Georgetown, Guyana: Author, 1937.

⁷ See, J J Thomas, *The Theory and Practice of Creole Grammar* (1869).

(b) Martha Bekwith, *Jamaica Anansi Stories; Jamaica Proverbs*.

(c) C L R James, *The Black Jacobins* (1938), London: Allison & Busby 1980.

(d) Eric Williams, *Capitalism And Slavery* (1944), London: André Deutsch, 1964; *The Negro In The Caribbean* (1942); *Education In The British West Indies*.

(e) Elna Goveia, *A Study On The Historiography of The British West Indies*.

in order to present a continuity in West Indian experience. This historical perspective was part of the mood of the times, part of the growing sense of a separate West Indian entity and experience. The sense of separateness was not really new in West Indian thought. Jamaican settlers and planters had persistently asserted the distinctiveness of their society and its institutions as far back as the eighteenth century. They had often jealously guarded the autonomy and integrity of their Legislative Assembly and even conceived of an internal autonomous Jamaica within the wider framework of Empire. But this sense of 'identity' was frequently obscured by ambiguities and dichotomies. Often, their natural wish for autonomy conflicted with their contempt for the vulgarities of a slave and colonial society. The impact of colonisation complicated the situation by generating a divisive loyalty to the metropolitan culture, and slavery further inhibited their attitudes to the whole idea of freedom, creating a neurotic fear of an enfranchised slave population, and ultimately stifling their aspirations for national independence. Freedom for 'settlers' could not include freedom for slaves. For the slave was not seen then as a historical force, being neither a maker nor a creator of history. Reid's perspective thus formed both the continuation of a trend and a widening of its implications. For the first time an imaginative writer had placed West Indian blacks in the context of West Indian 'history'. He had rescued them from anonymity and made their experience and inner reality part of the West Indian aspiration for national freedom. Admittedly, the West Indian scholar, J J Thomas, had argued the validity of 'negro' history in the West Indies long before in *Fraudacity* (1889), and Mittelholzer had dramatised in almost epic proportions the evolution of Guyanese colonial and slave society in the *Kaywana* trilogy.⁸ But Reid's novel was a development on these works, especially in the way it created a particular West Indian sensibility shaped by the peasant environment and the way of life of the emancipated slave. Yet, in a sense, Reid's novel was also ironically a reflection of the ambivalence of the nationalist thinking of the time, of its self-consciousness and self-assertion on one hand and, on the other, its dependence upon the guidance and goodwill of the metropolis.

The literature of the 1950s and 1960s constituted a more rigorous examination of the colonial experience, combining an anti-colonial perspective with a search for new definitions and values. In Guyana, Martin Carter's *Poems of Resistance* (1954) established a strident anti-colonial voice as part of political statement and protest while his later poetry⁹ examined the nature of colonial society and the colonial psyche. This was the general direction towards which the literature was moving. The past was again being recreated but in fictional, more imaginative terms that gave writers the leeway to explore the

⁸ See Edgar Mittelholzer, *Children of Kaywana* (1952); *The Harrowing of Hubertus* (1954); *Kaywana Blood* (1958), London: Secker & Warburg.

⁹ See Martin Carter, *Poems Of Succession*, London: New Beacon Books, 1977; *Poems Of Affinity*, Bridgetown: Guyana Release Publishers, 1980.

complex consequences of the region's history. For the creative writer of this period the apprehension of history was particularly problematic, since the past as manifested in the present seemed both negative and uncreative. West Indian history conceived in terms of progress and development seemed short, uncreative, fragmentary and dependent on values implicit in the language and culture of a colonial power. The imaginative writer's engagement with such a past demanded new and radical approaches to history and for a writer such as Lamming, 'history' came to signify more than the history books' definition; it came to mean not a succession of episodes with causal connections but something more active: 'the creation of a situation offering antagonistic opposition and a challenge of survival that had to be met by all involved'.¹⁰ The past, in other words, was to be confronted and explored, but with an eye to the future, and for Lamming the future was that of the Community of people: their self-knowledge, their identity and the re-integration of their personalities. The imaginative medium, rather than conventional history or anthropology, could grapple with such an exploration, and Lamming's novels became ways of investigating and projecting the inner experience of West Indian people, ways of charting the West Indian memory as far as it could go. From *In The Castle Of My Skin* through *The Emigrants*, *Of Age And Innocence*, *Season of Adventure* and *Water With Berries* to *The Pleasures of Exile*, Lamming explored colonial relations and probed the nature of colonial dependence and rebellion. In somewhat similar terms other novelists revealed the reality of the West Indian in ways that no conventional history could have managed. V S Reid, who had earlier charted the progress of the West Indian experience and sensibility by exploring real history, now examined the emotional and spiritual tensions of colonial relations through a less restricting and inhibiting medium in *The Leopard*. In Jamaica, John Hearne reacted in a similar way to the consequences of history, exposing the precariousness and vulnerability of middle-class values in novels such as *Strangers At The Gate*, *The Faces of Love* and *Voices Under The Window*, while in Trinidad, V S Naipaul and Samuel Selvon assessed the costs and gains of the 'creolisation' of the East Indian in *A House For Mr Biswas* and *A Brighter Sun* respectively. In both novels, explorations centred on the nature and quality of the East Indian's adjustment in the colonial society. Indian characters moved from enclosed peasant worlds into the wider colonial world, and the movement was in both novels one of exploring and growing in awareness and sensibility, though (for Naipaul more than for Selvon) possibilities for wholeness, fulfilment and achievement were lessened by the very circumstances of the colonial experience.

The concern with transition and social evolution was not just directed towards progress and growth; it was also an attempt to capture the very meaning and significance of a West Indian world, and this attempt was part of the inspiration behind the proliferation of novels of childhood during this time.

¹⁰ George Lamming, *The Pleasures of Exile* (1960), London: Allison & Busby, 1984.

Lamming's *In The Castle of My Skin*, Michael Anthony's *The Year in San Fernando*, Drayton's *Christopher*, Ian McDonald's *The Humming Bird Tree*, Merle Hodge's *Crick Crack Monkey* and Jean Rhys's *Wide Sargasso Sea* were all, in part, attempts at capturing and savouring something of the essence of West Indian life through the developing consciousness of the child. Somehow the identity of this world, and its discovery, seemed more truthful when revealed through the impressions of the growing child.

In the 1960s a similar pre-occupation with meaning and significance underlay Wilson Harris's intense explorations of the impact of history on the West Indian personality. His novels, particularly *The Guiana Quarter*¹¹ recreated the various aberrations of history in the consciousness of both the oppressor and his victim, enacting not just the linear drama of conquest and defeat but also the dualities and paradoxes of the confrontation, as well as the possibilities for re-birth, reconciliation and the creation of a new community.

During this vigorous period of West Indian literary activity, the social world—even in its negative manifestation in the slum—was an object of exploration. Roger Mais's *The Hills Were Joyful Together* (1953) and *Brother Man* (1954) limited themselves to the conditions of the slum, evoking its deprivations, poverty, frustration and waste as evidence of rural dispossession and urbanisation. These worlds were not the changing and developing worlds of Naipaul, Selvon and Lamming; they were the static enclaves of the urban castaways, those whom industrialisation had flushed out and abandoned. Mais sought to highlight the social neglect of the slums while at the same time revealing the indomitable will of the people and the healing, unifying power of the communal spirit. In the early 1960s Orlando Patterson was to evoke the same background in the *Children of Sisyphus* (1964), demonstrating the same social concern but revealing frustration and escapism as the ultimate absurdity of the West Indian condition.

The concern with the consequences of history, with the social world and its impact on West Indian sensibility, led almost naturally to another major theme in the 1950s and 1960s: that of emigration. The concern was a response both to a historical phenomenon and a psychological colonial problem. In the 1950s and 1960s West Indians were actually emigrating from the islands to the metropolis, in search of what they called a 'better break', though in some sense they were also manifesting a colonial syndrome, a belief in a shared heritage with the mother country and the Western world. Novel after novel, poem after poem explored the pleasures and perils of exile and their effects on the sensibilities of West Indians. Lamming's *The Emigrants*, *Water With Berries* and *The Pleasures of Exile*; Selvon's *Ways of Sunlight*, *The Lonely Londoners*, *Moses Migrating* *Moses Ascending*, Brathwaite's *Rights of Passage* and

¹¹ See Wilson Harris, *Palace of The Peacock* (1960); *The Far Journey of Oudin* (1962); *The Whole Armour* (1962); *The Secret Ladder* (1963), London: Faber & Faber.

recently the novels of Austin Clarke¹² have all revealed the enlarged consciousness of the emigrant side by side with his peculiar disorientation in an alien world. Increasingly, however, the idea of migration has become almost a global phenomenon and a new extension of West Indian consciousness and vision has already begun to emerge in England and North America:

This exciting progress of theme, vision and form in the West Indian novel has not always been matched in the region's poetry. In the 1940s and 1950s West Indian poets and dramatists clearly lagged behind the novelists. Still groping for distinctive voices, they had not acquired the depth of theme or authority of vision that the novelists had achieved. Claude McKay's¹³ experiments with dialect and folk forms in the 1920s and his articulation of the divided Afro-Caribbean consciousness in poems such as 'Outcast' had offered significant pointers, but it was not until the 1960s and the poetry of Louise Bennett, Eric Roach, Derek Walcott and Edward Brathwaite, that these forms and themes began to be handled with maturity and complexity. The Calypsonian Sparrow¹⁴ and the poet Louise Bennett¹⁵ explored various dimensions of the tradition of folk poetry, including the orality of the form, and enhanced the performance quality of poetry and song. In the written medium Walcott was grappling with themes of displacement and spiritual impoverishment in *The Castaway* and looking for ways in which the artist could transcend these themes in his effort to be creative. For all his cynicism and despair, however, he did manage to retain a sense of the possibilities of the poetic experience and to progress through *The Gulf* and *Another Life* towards a view of the artist as capable of freeing his people by returning them to themselves through the very act of naming them, capturing their lives, their landscape and their language. Accordingly, his experiments in the Trinidad workshop with dialect, folk forms and folk mythologies in plays such as *The Sea At Dauphin*, *Ti-Jean And His Brothers* and *Dream On Monkey Mountain* helped to establish a most vibrant tradition in West Indian drama, realising his hopes of making 'heraldic men' out of 'foresters and fishermen'.¹⁶

Brathwaite, the other major poet of the 1960s, responded to the apparent void in the region by exploring the creolising process itself and seeing in the adjustments and adaptations to slavery and colonisation, creative possibilities that could provide a context of history and a source for a tradition of poetry. His trilogy: *Rights of Passage*, *Masks* and *Islands* recreated and appraised the New World experience, revealing its manifestations in the variety of Caribbean

¹² See Austin Clarke, *The Meeting Point*, London: Heinemann, 1967; *The Bigger Light*, Boston and Toronto: Little Brown, 1975.

¹³ Claude McKay, *Songs of Jamaica*, Kingston, Jamaica: Gardner 1912; *Constab Ballads*, London: Watts, 1912; *Selected Poems*, New York: Bookman Associates, 1953.

¹⁴ The Mighty Sparrow (Slinger Francisco), acknowledged champion of Calypso.

¹⁵ Louise Bennett, *Dialect Verse*, Kingston, Jamaica: Herald, 1942; *Jamaican Dialect Poems*, (1948); *Jamaica Labrish* (1966).

¹⁶ First known as The Basement Theatre Workshop, it was founded by Derek Walcott in 1959.

musical structures and in the very language of the creolised folk with its distinctive core of perception and sensibility. These explorations of the 1960s, the personal dialogues, the experiments with song, dialect, sermon and ritual, established a tradition of orality in written poetry, creating an authority to which poets of the 1970s and 1980s could refer in their search for forms based on indigenous models. Thus, far from striving to establish a tradition which would rely, for instance, on external (often metropolitan) models, West Indian poets of the 1970s wrote with a sense of an already existing tradition. Wayne Brown's *On The Coast*, though principally an appraisal of the new national order, assumed some of the perceptual models of the older Walcott in the 'Castaway' poems, and several of the younger poets of the 1970s saw in Brathwaite's oral models a fresh and exhilarating medium for their own use.

In general, the poetry of the early 1970s wavered between appreciation of the revolutionary and radical imagination forged by the Black Power movement, and an awareness of its level of rhetoric and self-delusion. The spirit and sensibility of the age were often captured by the ambivalence of the works of poets such as Roger McTear, Victor Questel, Wayne Browne, Anthony McNeill and Dennis Scott. Their poetry relates to the poetry of the younger generation in the way in which the West Indian experience continues to be recreated and appraised in the 1980s.

In the 1980s the metropolitan experience has for historical reasons become a notable influence on West Indian poetry and literature. British West Indians have either provided dimensions of their experiences or re-appraised the colonial experience with imaginations nurtured by wider perceptions of colonial relations. But the greatest single influence on contemporary West Indian poetry has been, without doubt, the complementary relationship between oral and written traditions. It is really the recognition and exploitation of the ordinary speaking voice as an expression of feeling and perception that has given West Indian poetry a distinctiveness and authority capable of preserving the uniqueness of the West Indian experience.

Anti-imperialism and nationalism

In West Indian literature the themes of anti-imperialism and nationalism reflected the political movement for independence and formed part of the cultural nationalism which was its manifestation. The consciousness of a West Indian people with a character, history and aspirations separate from those of the metropolis was an underlying ideology of the nationalist movement and found many reflections in the literature of the mid-twentieth century. There was on one hand, the overtly anti-colonial literature, mostly poetry, which reflected a single-minded belief in the socio-political function of poetry, where the poem was less an imaginative evocation than an expression of outrage at

colonial repression. This tradition of anti-colonial protest poetry, begun by McKay, continued by George Campbell and exploited to the full by Martin Carter in *Poems of Resistance*, was the most straightforward form of early anti-imperialist literature. Anti-imperialist and nationalist aspirations were expressed in subtler, less direct ways on other literary levels; in the novel a new interest in history, in the historical process and in the continuity of historical experience, marked a new West Indian awareness which challenged nineteenth-century assumptions about the region's absence of history. Victor Reid's *New Day*, Samuel Selvon's *A Brighter Sun* and Roger Mais's *The Hills Were Joyful Together* attempted to recreate the distinctive experience and character of the region's history. In the late 1950s and early 1960s, however, anti-imperialist themes acquired greater variation and depth. Novelists and poets set themselves the more rigorous task of analysing colonial society, assessing the rebellion of the colonial and exploring his psyche. Although these were not straightforwardly nationalistic themes, pitting coloniser against colonised as in some of the earlier protest poetry, their nationalist affirmations derived from the ways in which they sought to clarify and define the West Indian experience. Each novelist seems to have sought to understand his relationship to the colonial experience and to have found his vision from this exploration and analysis. Lamming's concern with the nature of true freedom in *Of Age And Innocence* and *Season of Adventure* was in part an attempt to come to terms with a colonial status and to transcend the conditions it imposed. For him, true freedom was dependent on the quality of protest and rebellion, which were in turn related to the people's sense of history and their link with the rural organic world of the peasant. For Naipaul, true freedom—the link with landscape and the sense of community as envisaged by Lamming—seemed an impossibility. The very wrongness, he felt, of the colonial adventure, the irrevocable disability it engendered, created barriers between the colonial and true freedom. In both *A House For Mr Biswas* and *The Mimic Men*, his characters struggled against these barriers, achieving either limited and fragile personal niches in the general chaos or a more cathartic and personal understanding of their situation.

The concern with the colonial experience and the colonial psyche led inevitably to other variations in the anti-colonial theme: the Prospero-Caliban relationship. It was an interesting and revolutionary variation, notably in the way it challenged the usual historical assumptions about the colonised as an object rather than a subject of history. A great deal of Walcott's concern in *The Castaway* was, for instance, directed towards subverting and challenging these very assumptions. His skilful manipulation of symbolism and language, especially in the 'Crusoe' poems, revealed dimensions of colonial relations that challenged the dominant myth of Crusoe as the heroic European settler struggling against odds to maintain supremacy and provide light and guidance in a colonial society. His explorations transcended the usual images of

master/slave/servant and highlighted ways in which the colonial sometimes manipulated the relationship to his advantage and often achieved a unique personal development in the process. In these poems the colonised became not merely the converted cannibal moulded to the coloniser's faith, but the very human 'Friday' whose personal and separate development actively highlighted contradictions and failures in the new faith itself. This rounded view of 'Friday' as human, self-aware and perceptive, not only endowed him with a subjectivity and an identity but also revealed an added level of subtlety in his relationship with Crusoe.

Lamming undertook similar explorations in *The Pleasures of Exile*, *Water With Berries* and *Natives Of My Person*, projecting the colonial 'Caliban' as possessing a unique insight into the coloniser's consciousness and motivation. His reading of Shakespeare's *The Tempest* in *The Pleasure of Exile* was in a major sense a metaphorical view of West Indian colonisation and of the psychology of colonial relations. Ultimately, it was also an attempt to create a future from the past, a way of pushing colonial relations beyond that legacy of domination and subordination which 'history' ordinarily imposes. For Lamming this future involved a transformation of past relations and this was possible only when the past, endowed with different meanings, generated new soils for new beginnings: 'The mystery of the colonial is this: where he remains alive, his instinct, always and forever creative, must choose a way to change the meaning and perspective of this ancient tyranny.' The entire range of Lamming's work as a novelist springs from this perspective. His novels concern themselves with analysis and exploration on both personal and public levels, their drama comprising a struggle to escape the cage of personal (and public) history. In *Water With Berries*, Lamming's most complex and intense drama of colonial relations, the colonial does finally survive and is able to choose and act. Like a crab among rocks, Lamming's Teeton emerges slowly from the furnace of the coloniser's (the Dowager's) grave to answer the political call of 'the Gathering', representing his messianic future. The experience is altogether a spiritual and hugely symbolic one, and the catharsis merges into an apocalyptic vision of revolution and promise. In most of Lamming's anti-colonial novels the burden of re-orientation and change is normally the burden of the colonised. But choice and change usher in a future which also involves a dialogue and an understanding with the coloniser, and the changed relationship between coloniser and colonised, between Prospero and Caliban, becomes Lamming's major emphasis in *Natives of My Person*. The personal drama is principally the coloniser's drama and is necessitated by Caliban's assertion of freedom, by his new vision of himself as a 'possibility of spirit which might fertilise and extend the resources of any human vision'. To accept this vision of Caliban in a new relationship, Prospero has to evaluate his own place in a changed world and re-examine those values which once sanctioned his acts as a coloniser. *Natives Of My*

Person is the drama of this revaluation and is Lamming's attempt at transcending the 'history book' story of colonisation.

Interestingly, the themes of anti-imperialism and nationalism have continued to engage West Indian writers since their genesis in the 1950s and 1960s. Each generation seems to be engaged by particular dimensions of the same fundamental ideas. Wayne Brown's *On The Coast*, a product of the 1980s, might for instance appear to be treading the old ground of Walcott and Brathwaite in the 1960s, but the poet's bitter attack on the continuing colonial syndrome of dependence and self-rejection has an edge of anger and bitterness which lends it a special emphasis. On the other hand, Dabydeen's *Slave Song*, published in the 1980s, explores the colonial experience through the imaginative reconstruction of the private world of slave and indentured labourer: an inner world of anger, pain, frustration, brutality and fantasy; an imaginative fusion of present and 'past' which, as Lamming has argued, neither 'history' nor 'anthropology' could evoke.

These variations of the anti-imperialist and nationalist themes indicate the extent to which, from the very beginning, the act of writing in the West Indies had been part of the new national consciousness and self-awareness. The very proliferation of these themes and their continual re-appraisal reveal the colonial experience as the single most important determinant in the making of the West Indian people.

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V S Reid, *New Day*, New York: Knopf, 1949; London: Heinemann Caribbean Writers Series, 1973.

The novel sees Jamaica's constitutional freedom of 1944 as an inevitable sequel to the Morant Bay rebellion of 1865. Reid uses the Campbells, a fictional family of mixed African and European ancestry as the cultural and political link in this historical progress, and his novel charts the movement from a fiery but ineffectual radicalism towards a responsible political leadership in which a combined force of workers and the educated class achieves political realisation through reasoned argument.

George Lamming, *Of Age And Innocence*, London: Michael Joseph, 1958; Allison and Busby, 1981.

Lamming's third novel explores the pitfalls and failures of nationalist aspirations in the West Indies. Carefully plotted to reflect the multi-racial complexity of the region, it dramatises the historical disabilities which West Indians must overcome in order to achieve true unity and freedom.

George Lamming, *Natives of My Person*, New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1972.

Lamming describes this novel as a way of going forward by making a complete return to the beginnings. In it, he attempts to understand the colonial experience and colonial relations by examining the very roots of West Indian colonisation, concentrating on the

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drama of the coloniser's voyage (from Europe to the slave coast and to the West Indies), his motivation, his psyche and the eventual brutalisation of his personality.

Samuel Selvon, Turn Again Tiger, London: MacGibbon and Kee, 1958; Longman, 1972.

Written six years after *A Brighter Sun* and featuring the same creolised Indian peasant, this novel recreates the environment and social context of the colonial plantation, complete with its hierarchy of white supervisor, overseer, timekeeper and labourers. The protagonist's confrontation with this situation and its moral and psychological reflections becomes an examination of his own relationship to the colonial experience. The mere process of creolisation, Selvon implies, is finally not the whole answer to the quest for freedom and realisation.

V S Naipaul, The Mimic Men, London: André Deutsch, 1967.

Naipaul's novel examines the relationship between the colonial experience and nationalist assertion in the West Indies, showing how freedom itself is limited and impaired by the permanent disabilities of the colonial experience. Its world is a grim one in which the dismantling of the external colonial order leaves only chaos because the fragmented ex-slave society of displaced people has no centre to hold the society together. Nationalism in such a context, Naipaul implies, is ultimately ineffective, appealing only to race and colour and offering only drama and violence.

Martin Carter, Poems of Resistance, London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1954; Poems of Succession, London: New Beacon Books, 1977.

Carter's poems, written in the ferment of political resistance to colonialism, are perhaps the most vocal and tormented anti-imperialist assertions of the period. Composed almost as dialogues between the poet and the conditions of his existence, between the poet and the Caribbean Man, and between the poet and the coloniser, they argue the historical necessity for revolution and transformation, projecting a vision of freedom and liberation in a future that is also (ironically) apprehended as vulnerable.

Derek Walcott, The Castaway And Other Poems, London: Jonathan Cape, 1965.

In this collection of poems Walcott's persona, the artist figure, responds to the colonial experience as revealed in the physical and human landscape of the Caribbean. Here, the historical experience of people and landscape is as relevant as the artist's isolation and estrangement, and the poet assumes the burden of creating meaning and drawing out significances.

Wayne Brown, On The Coast, London: André Deutsch, 1972.

Brown's collection is essentially an evaluation of the colonial experience almost in the tradition of Walcott's early poetry. The evocations span three phases of the historical experience, manifesting the harshly anti-colonial moods of Walcott's early poetry. In 'Conquistador', 'Red Hill' and 'Drought', he recreates the wasteland of Empire, the self-contempt generated by racial inferiority and the persisting colonial psychology.

David Dabydeen, Slave Song, Copenhagen and London: Dangaroo Press, 1984.

The poems in *Slave Song* bring to life the ordinary humdrum existence of slave and

Indian colonial peasant, depicting it as shaped both by the rigour and brutality of plantation life and by those rare moments of order, compassion and tenderness which are also, ironically, part of his sensibility. Those instances in which his sexual fantasies about the white woman become conscious acts of subversion and liberation manifest a human presence in spite of a colonial self-abasement.

Edward Brathwaite, Islands, London: Oxford University Press, 1969; The Arrivants: A New World Trilogy, London: Oxford University Press, 1973.

Brathwaite's poetry in *Islands* challenges the usual colonial view of the Caribbean as an uncreative product of the imperial order. His sensitivity to the creative areas of West Indian experience in the Caribbean and his recognition of a spiritual, numinous quality in the peasant's sensibility inspire his hopes of redemption and restoration. The poems reflect this, alternating between visions of sterility in which all memory is lost, and visions of hope in which the poet himself becomes a priest, attempting a recovery of the word.

The treatment of race

Race has always been a crucial issue in colonial relations, and has surfaced as a fundamental aspect of the colonial experience in various dimensions of the literature of the West Indies. The simplicity of colonial society, Naipaul observed in *The Loss of Eldorado*, was the very simplicity of its values of money and race. In the colour-structured society, unified only by its general acceptance of the inferiority of 'negro-ness', race was an appalling arbiter of value. It surfaced not only in relations between European white master and black slave, but also between the various gradations of the colour hierarchy. Such consistent debasement of 'negro-ness' had two major psychological repercussions: it instilled in the black slave an overwhelming awe of everything white and at the same time bred a sense of inferiority and self-abasement in his innermost consciousness. The emancipation of slaves and the exhilaration of freedom which accompanied it hardly changed the general thinking on race; rather, the importation of indentured labour from India into a number of West Indian islands introduced a new racial element, complicating the white/black dichotomy. White, coloured, African, East Indian affected fundamentally separate racial identities, fearful, suspicious and often contemptuous of each other. Colonial society, reflecting most of these tensions, remained fragmented and unsettled, a prey to racially-inspired conflict and violence. In West Indian literature, the racial theme has generally been associated with the theme of history. The best of West Indian writing on the subject has seen the ramifications of race as a historical legacy, and has explored possibilities of transcending its negative effects. As part of the new nationalist self-awareness and re-definition, writers explored the psychology of race and colour in the consciousness of black West Indians almost as an exorcism of a deep-seated racial inferiority. V S Reid provided an interesting exploration of the theme in

The Leopard (1958), an imaginative evocation against the background of the 'Mau Mau' rebellion in Kenya, of relations between white and black and between 'mulatto' and black; aspects which he had suggested but left unexplored in *New Day*. Like Reid, Walcott and Lamming explored similar confrontations in *Dream on Monkey Mountain*, *Ti-Jean And His Brothers* and *Water With Berries*, and in all these works the underlying idea was the decapitation of the dominant 'white master' image, whether it was manifested in the white goddess as in *Dream*, the Devil as in *Ti-Jean*, or the benevolent Dowager as in *Water With Berries*. In all three situations the black colonial had to annihilate the dominant racial image in order to be free, for as Walcott has said, getting rid of his overwhelming awe of everything white is the first step every colonial must take.

On another level, the racial theme explored the West Indian's confrontation with Africa as a racial and cultural symbol. It was in a sense a confrontation with self, a coming to terms with origin and a purging of fear and shame. The black West Indian had grown to accept the racial and cultural inferiority of Africa, and for him this was a crucial confrontation. In Reid's *The Leopard* it took the form of the tortuous relationship between the 'mulatto' Toto and his black father Nebu; in Lamming's *Season of Adventure* it was dramatised in the relationship between the middle-class Fola and the voodoo ceremony of souls; in *Other Leopards* it formed the entire drama of Lionel Froad's ambivalent response to the African past; in Brathwaite's *Masks* it consisted in a positive evocation of an African world and culture which the poet could not possess but to which he felt related. These levels of confrontation were in a sense acts of purgation that led to black West Indians' revaluation of themselves and of their place in the world. Other aspects of the theme were explored in a different sense by Wilson Harris in novels such as *Palace of The Peacock*, *the Secret Ladder* and *Heartland*. Here the confrontation was not so much between ancestor and a particular racial group as between Amerindian/African ancestor and the entire Caribbean consciousness. For Harris not only believed in the unity of all peoples but also in the possibility of capturing the subtle discontinuities in the region's history as a means of illuminating the Caribbean psyche and extending its sensibility.

Among writers of East Indian descent the need to exorcise fear and shame, was, for obvious historical reasons, not so urgent a theme. Thus, in the works of writers such as Naipaul racial themes surfaced mostly as an awareness of the loss of racial and cultural homogeneity or as a recognition of the barriers which ethnicity and the plural society placed on the political and social prospects of West Indian societies. *A House For Mr Biswas* is, in one sense, a re-definition of 'Indian-ness' in the context of a disordered colonial and multi-racial society, while *The Mimic Men* is a drama of the historical and racial barriers against true freedom and nationhood. Naipaul saw these barriers and disabilities as generated by history, by the very wrongness of the artificial societies of the

West Indies. For him, these were permanent disabilities over which there could be no transcendence; but for writers such as Selvon, Mittelholzer and Lamming who also explored the racial theme, possibilities for transcendence existed in people's understanding, in their capacity to re-order their societies.

MAJOR TEXTS

V S Reid, The Leopard, London: Heinemann, 1958; Heinemann Caribbean Writers Series, 1980.

Set against the background of the racial conflicts and hatreds of Kenya's 'Mau Mau' struggle, the novel explores the consciousness of race and racial identity as part of the process of resistance against white oppression. On another level, it is a drama of the tortuous relationship between the 'mulatto' (Western black) and his African origins. A greater part of the action in the forest concentrates on the 'mulatto' and the dying African. The drama is projected as the 'mulatto's' inward journey towards knowledge, understanding and acceptance of his origins.

George Lamming, Season of Adventure, London: Michael Joseph, 1960.

The novel which enacts what Lamming has called 'the backward glance', is the drama of his middle-class heroine's dialogue with her forgotten racial self and of the political and social repercussions of this adventure. The tonelle, the ceremony of souls and the forest reserve represent areas of African/folk experience which the heroine has always rejected out of fear and shame. Her confrontation with the ceremony begins a process that leads her to self awareness, understanding and consequently to a major political action on behalf of her society.

Edward Brathwaite, Masks, London: Oxford University Press, 1968; published as part of The Arrivants by Oxford University Press, 1973.

Brathwaite's long poem is an enactment of the modern West Indian's return to Africa, an experience which Brathwaite broadens with a simultaneous evocation of the circumstances of the Middle Passage and of Africa's own historical progress and development until that time. These three areas of experience to which the poet *persona* responds through his borrowed masks present a comprehensive Affcan world which the poet cannot possess but to which he feels himself related. This awareness and acknowledgement of kinship not only purges his fear and shame about the past but also leads to an understanding of the sources of his West Indian identity.

Denis Williams, Other Leopards, London: Hutchinson, 1963; Heinemann Caribbean Writers Series, 1983.

Williams's novel charts the difficulties and dilemmas of the West Indian's quest for origins. The novel's central character, Lionel Froad, is caught between two visions of himself, the cultivated European image which he possesses and the ancestral image which he thinks he ought to acquire. His divided consciousness is a disability that leaves him feeling empty and insubstantial, and determined to find himself in Africa. But identity is not something we merely pick up and wear, and Williams's hero, caught between a genuine desire for a racial identity and an honest alienation from tradition and politics in Africa, ends up defeated and disoriented.

Derek Walcott, Dream On Monkey Mountain, New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1977.

Walcott's play identifies fantasies about whiteness and ancestral connections with Africa as the major fantasies which preoccupy, confuse and shape the psyche of West Indian man. His central character is caught between the two fantasies. His vision of himself as a descendant of African kings and as a revolutionary saviour of his African tribe is ironically inspired by a white blonde goddess, symbol of the antithesis of his ordinary perception of himself as black, ugly and undesirable. Are the fantasies about African origins inspired by fantasies about whiteness? The acting out of such fantasies is a process of understanding and self-knowledge, but the ultimate self-knowledge, Walcott implies, is the eventual ability to liberate oneself from them, acknowledging only the green beginnings of the West Indies as one's true origin.

Wilson Harris, The Secret Ladder, London: Faber and Faber, 1963.

The novel explores racial identity and the quest for origins in terms of a need to understand and transform Caribbean beginnings. Its action involves a confrontation between the middle-class cultivated surveyor, his racially-mixed crew and the community of Africans, descendants of runaway slaves. The confrontation explores what Harris feels should be the Caribbean relationship with the ancestor.

Edgar Mittleholzer, A Morning At The Office, London: Hogarth Press, 1950; Heinemann Caribbean Writers Series, 1974.

The action of Mittleholzer's novel about Trinidad is compressed into the duration of one particular morning but it succeeds in dramatising the workings of a stratified, colour-based, colonial society. The characters reflect the class and racial situations of Trinidad society, and their relationships are conditioned by their various historical experiences. The author's delineation points to the need for compassion between people and for the integration of the different peoples and cultures of Trinidad.

V S Naipaul, The Suffrage of Elvira, London: André Deutsch, 1958.

The novel is a comic evocation of the racial, religious and cultural confusion which is the historical legacy of Trinidadian society. Although the campaign for the elections demonstrates an easy interaction between racial and religious groups, the novel's action points to the failure of true unity and democracy. Under pressure, Trinidadians cluster into their respective racial groups. The election, for all its underlying comedy, proves a serious point about the simplicity of colonial society and the simple value it attaches to race and money.

George Lamming, Of Age And Innocence, London: Michael Joseph, 1958; Allison and Busby, 1980.

The racial theme in Lamming's novel resides in the prospects and fortunes of the political alliance between the three racial groups, and on the progress of the friendship between four young boys, representatives of the four racial groups in San Cristóbal. The novel balances and contrasts the two sets of relationships, measuring the forces at work in each situation. Among the older politicians the ideals of freedom and unity struggle against the prejudices and attitudes engendered by history, ultimately crumbling in the face of colonial opposition and intrigue. In contrast, the young boys appear free from

fixed perceptions and prejudices. Their vision represents an entirely new way of seeing, and it is in their strengths that Lamming locates the racial ideal and the future.

Samuel Selvon, A Brighter Sun, London: Allan Wingate, 1958.

The novel is essentially a novel about growth, and part of this growth consists in the East Indian hero's perception of himself as part of a multi-racial creole society. The very idea of a new cosmopolitan town as the location for the action and the complementary presence of an Afro-Trinidadian couple not only suggests Selvon's special pleading but also a movement forward from enclosed racial entities.

The theme of childhood

The theme of childhood and the accompanying idea of growth from innocence to maturity has been a recurrent theme in West Indian literature. Its popularity seems to stem from the very notion of development which it entails. The idea of capturing environment and experience from childhood right through to maturity is for the West Indian writer almost like a re-living of a West Indian experience, a savouring of its essential character. In most of the novels about childhood the child protagonists are engaged in recording their impressions of a particular environment or experience. Michael Anthony's two novels, *The Year In San Fernando* (1965) and *Green Days By The River* both concern a child's progress through a particular world. *The Year In San Fernando* records the consciousness of a rural boy as he responds and adjusts to the city and its peculiar ethos. As readers we are drawn into the fresh, unbiased responses of the child as he reacts to landscape and people, and as he develops in knowledge, understanding and judgment. Sometimes, as in *Green Days*, we witness in the child's growth the loss of childhood spontaneity and the beginnings of adult choice with its necessary calculation and compromise. Anthony's novels are in the main entirely steeped in the child's experience. The reader is led to view the world as the child views it and is thus limited to his uncomplicated perceptions and awarenesses.

In other novels about childhood the child's experiences become part of the novel's social and political vision and are often controlled and shaped by the overall point of view of the writer. In Merle Hodge's *Crick Crack Monkey* the young heroine's experiences are crucial both for her personal development and as an illustration of the novel's theme of cultural confusion and insecurity. Thus, while the overall point of view is the heroine's (as in Anthony's novels), Hodge controls and manipulates it to suggest crucial ironies of which she is unaware, ironies which are part of the novelist's deliberate control of viewpoint in the interests of a social vision. In Drayton's *Christopher* the situation is made a little easier by the novelist's omniscient standpoint. The boy hero, like Jean Rhys's white creole heroine, grows up in the era of the decline of white influence in Barbados, and his personality and perceptions are influenced by class tensions between the white creoles themselves and by racial tensions

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between whites and blacks on the island. Unlike Rhys's heroine, who is crushed by her feelings of alienation and disconnection, the boy Christopher grows up turning inwards, developing his relations with the land, nurturing his artistic sensibilities and also, through his warm relations with his nurse, developing an understanding of the black world around him.

In Lamming, the world of childhood becomes part of the colonial ethos and of the general disintegration evoked and dramatised in *In The Castle of My Skin*. The children's responses to their environment, their interpretations of adult standards and their confusions about history and race reflect both the confusions and fantasies of childhood and the sensibilities of a colonial upbringing. The very tensions between them, the eventual separations that send each child on a distinct course, are all part of the social forces that divide colonial society. Although Lamming uses the children's lives to suggest a typical West Indian childhood, his emphasis is eventually on the maturing consciousness of his child narrator and hero. Thus boy 'G', whose personal and political growth are finally charted and linked to the frustrations and the disintegration of the old order, becomes Lamming's portrait of the sensitive and alienated artist.

The theme of childhood is not always explored as a progress towards physical and emotional maturity. Sometimes entire areas of a child's perception are illuminated simply through the increasing quality of his impressions of people around him. The boy narrator in Naipaul's *Miguel Street* presents such a vision of childhood. His evocation and presentation of the dramas around him reveal both the environment that has shaped him and the way in which his perceptions of it mature.

MAJOR TEXTS

Michael Anthony, *The Year In San Fernando*, London: André Deutsch, 1967; Heinemann Caribbean Writers Series, 1970.

The novel deals principally with a crucial year of adjustment in the life of a child. A young rural boy is constrained by his own family's poor circumstances to move in with a better-off family in the city. The novel charts his responses, perceptions and personal growth in the course of a year.

Michael Anthony, *Green Days By The River*, London: André Deutsch, 1967; Heinemann Caribbean Writers Series, 1973.

An evocation of a Trinidad childhood, concentrating on a young boy's responses to the landscape and the world around him. It is also the story of a boy's gradual social and sexual awakening.

Geoffrey Drayton, *Christopher*, London: Collins, 1959.

Drayton's novel depicts the childhood of a young white creole boy, growing up in the West Indies at a time when the economic power of the old planter class had been usurped by the new merchant class of white upstarts. The tensions and resentments

between the two classes of white people dramatise themselves in the estrangement between the boy's parents and in the boy's own brooding loneliness throughout the novel. His growth into maturity is, however, presented as a complex and interesting process of self-discovery and social awareness.

Jean Rhys, Wide Sargasso Sea, London: Hutchinson, 1966; Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1968.

The novel recreates the changed circumstances and the psychological terror of Jamaican white creoles on finding themselves swamped after emancipation by a free and hostile black population. Rhys's heroine lives under the psychological strain of these times, and the novel dramatises her sense of menace and insecurity and the gradual alienation which contribute to the disorientation and madness in her adult life.

Ian McDonald, The Humming Bird Tree, London: Heinemann, 1969; Heinemann Caribbean Writers Series, 1974.

McDonald evokes with regret and nostalgia the spontaneity and romance of a Trinidadian childhood. The romance between his white creole hero and the East Indian girl cuts across the racial and class barriers solidly built by the island's historical legacy. But this illusion of possibility is shown as part of the innocence of childhood itself. In his maturity, the hero confronts the reality of his situation as a member of the white oligarchy and is unable to break out of the prison of history.

George Lamming, In The Castle of My Skin, London: Michael Joseph, 1953; Longman, 1970.

Lamming recreates a typical Barbadian childhood as part of the social world he presents in this novel. The group of young boys whose feelings, responses and fantasies occupy several chapters, present a picture of what it was like to be a growing child in the 1930s.

Merle Hodge, Crick Crack Monkey, London: André Deutsch, 1970; Heinemann Caribbean Writers Series, 1981.

Hodge's heroine grows up amidst the class and cultural confusions of Trinidad in the mid-twentieth century. Intelligent and sensitive, she nevertheless suffers from insecurity and self-rejection when moved from a raw but humane lower-class world into a pretentious and artificial one. Although the novel's ironies show up the confusions of the social world, the heroine's own personal trauma and her dilemmas about race and culture are never really resolved.

V S Naipaul, Miguel Street, London: André Deutsch, 1959; Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1971.

The stories in *Miguel Street* present us with a child's view of the world around him. Though not necessarily primarily concerned with the child's progress towards physical and emotional maturity, the stories reveal this progress in the changing quality of perception with which the boy presents, comments upon and judges the various experiences he recounts.

Derek Walcott, Another Life, London: Jonathan Cape, 1973.

In this autobiographical poem, Walcott charts the landmarks in the childhood and growth of a young St Lucian boy. It is in a sense Walcott's portrait of the artist as a

growing child and it recreates the various social, cultural and spiritual influences that shaped his personality and his artistic sensibilities.

The treatment of women/women characters

While West Indian women were historically considered to be the repositories of folk wisdom and the oral tradition, they have only recently attempted or been able to project themselves in the written language of the region. Thus, the images of women which appeared in the early literature were mainly images created by men, preoccupied with the appraisal and definition of the West Indian man. The images of women tended, therefore, to be focused on their historical role in the evolution of West Indian man. Historically, woman was central to the continuation of the slave system as an essential part of the plantation system, her essential value resting on her ability to produce the labour force. This utilitarian and commercial view was only the planter's view, however. In reality the slave woman was a mother in an almost spiritual sense. For her, the bond between mother and child was as sacred as the bond between the earth and creativity; and it was generally in her role as creator, protector and matriarch that early West Indian writers saw their spiritual survival. In the existing political ferment and self-assessments of the 1940s, George Campbell portrayed Caribbean women in poetry as 'history makers', as 'women stone-breakers', as 'hammers and rocks' and as builders whose strength had provided not just the sustenance for survival but also the power to create a way of life and a sensibility.

The projection of the West Indian woman in literature has progressed from this image to various others, mostly in accordance with historical and social changes in the region. It is possible for instance, to trace in Lamming's work alone an interesting, complex and historical progression of woman through West Indian history. There is first the image of the rural woman as appears in *In The Castle*, the poor, hardy, often abandoned, mother, lovingly committed to her child and to the land, uncritically optimistic and unquestioning of the *status quo*, but possessing a strength and a meaning derived from her sense of community and from the shared confidences and bonds between her and the people around her. This image is later concretised and broadened in the image of Ma Shephard (in *Of Age And Innocence*) who becomes both a symbol of the earth and tradition and a conservative stumbling block in the way of radical transformation. Lamming's young boys in their commitment to freedom and resistance must ultimately reject her vision, and in *Season of Adventure* her spirit as embodied in the heroine has to be combined with her radical political vision. It is perhaps with a similar sense of the value and inadequacy of the rural woman's vision that Brathwaite evokes her consciousness in *Rights* only as part of a general progress towards a revolutionary will in *Islands*.

In other West Indian writers and even in Lamming himself, the image of the

woman extends beyond the image of the earth mother. The very disintegration of rural life and the separations brought about by migrations and urban settlements created new priorities and ambitions and therefore new images of woman. The picture of the rural woman in the urban world, bewildered and confused but doggedly set on making her way either as worker or prostitute, is a common image in West Indian urban novels. In De Lisser, Roger Mais and Orlando Patterson, the image is deepened by a vision of her as doubly deprived and oppressed by society and by her menfolk. In Patterson, the aggressively ambitious urban prostitute, determined to move out of the dreary dunghill into a better life, is part of the novelist's general expression of the cycle of futility in which all slum-dwellers are trapped. In Mais, however, the degraded woman of the slum, for all her poverty and constriction, often possesses a generosity of spirit which is part of that communal spirit explored as a positive aspect of the slum world.

Ironically, very few West Indian women have specifically explored the social and psychological problems of women. In the 1940s the Jamaican poet, Louise Bennett, saw herself mainly as an oral performer and social commentator. Her commentary, on women's view of marriage, women's racial attitudes and women's strength and vulnerability in Jamaican society, was presented through the consciousness of her rural women, but mostly as part of a general social commentary, not exclusively concerned with the situation of women. It is really only in writers such as Merle Hodge, Jean Rhys, Erna Brodber and, recently Grace Nichols, that a particularised consciousness of the West Indian woman begins to emerge. For in all these writers the social world is evoked mostly through the consciousness of the women characters. In Hodge, the process of a child's growth from childhood to maturity may well reflect a generalised preoccupation with West Indian problems of cultural confusion and identity but the heroine's dilemmas about colour, prettiness and self-worth are also part of the tensions and confusions of a maturing female sensibility. In a similar sense, Jean Rhys's *Wide Sargasso Sea* dramatises the 'ravaged status and emotional alienation of the white creole woman from her West Indian background, at the same time revealing the dependence and vulnerability characteristic of all Rhys's female characters.

In Brodber and Nichols the emphasis is more directly on the female experience. Nichols's evocation of the West Indian woman's evolution from slave to person is a celebration of the woman's struggles, fears, weaknesses and triumphs. *I Is A Long Memored Woman* evokes for the first time a total vision of woman's progress, a vision which is removed from the 'earth mother' image, particularly in its very ambivalence towards the role of motherhood and its radical revolutionary tone. In Brodber, the contemporary woman's search for a personality and individuality, amidst the various imprisoning roles imposed by small cramped societies, is chiefly highlighted. But, on the whole, the voice of the contemporary West Indian woman is yet to be established in the

literature of the region. Very few women indeed write for a living in the West Indies, and the paucity of professional writers is perhaps a good explanation for the absence of a tradition of women's writing in the sense in which it exists, for instance, in Black American literature.

MAJOR TEXTS

H G De Lisser, Jane's Career, London: Methuen, 1914; Heinemann Caribbean Writers Series, 1972.

The novel contrasts the life of women in rural and urban environments in Jamaica, concentrating on the young woman's vulnerability in the new grasping and exploitative environment of Kingston. The heroine finds a form of success in the city, acquiring a husband, a house and, ironically, a servant.

George Lamming, In The Castle of My Skin, London: Michael Joseph, 1953; Longman, 1970.

The women of Creighton Village, Barbados, are part of a pattern of existence and a vision of life which Lamming associates with an old order, with adjustments and sensibilities created in response to slavery, the colonial experience, and peasant life.

Edward Brathwaite, 'The Dust' in Rights of Passage, London: Oxford University Press, 1967.

In the voices of the folk women in 'The Dust', Brathwaite evokes the minds and sensibilities of the rural women showing their apprehension of their environment and society, demonstrating their stoicism and resilience and identifying their cosmic understanding of time.

Merle Hodge, Crick Crack Monkey, London: André Deutsch, 1970; Heinemann Caribbean Writers Series, 1981.

The heroine's divided consciousness and its accompanying insecurities are shown as a reflection of the racial and cultural conflicts in a young girl's upbringing.

Jean Rhys, Wide Sargasso Sea, London: Hutchinson, 1966; Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1968.

The gradual dissociation between the heroine and the landscape, between her and the people she had always known, provokes a crisis of identity. Her inability to cope with this crisis, as well as with enstrangement from her husband, demonstrates her vulnerability, a trait which always marks out Rhys's heroines as victims.

Grace Nichols, I Is A Long Memored Woman, London: Caribbean Cultural International, 1983.

These poems celebrate the black woman's progress and evolution in the new world. They are the poet's imaginative rendering of the consciousness of the black woman as she has responded and adjusted to life in the West Indies.

Erna Brodber, Jane And Louisa Will Soon Come Home, London: New Beacon, 1980.

The novel deals with the contemporary woman's search for personality and self amidst the various imprisoning roles imposed on women in small societies.

Olive Senior, Summer Lightning and Other Stories, London: Longman, 1986.

In this compelling collection of short stories, Olive Senior vividly depicts the aspirations, hardships and fears of a rural Jamaican community in which family life is splintered by the constant barriers of class and colour. Her sensitive perceptions of childhood convey a private world of confusion and alienation, but also reveal a universal humanity observed with affection, poignancy and wit.

Zee Edgell, Beka Lamb, London: Heinemann, 1982.

The action of the novel only spans a short period in the life of the heroine, but Edgell manages to suggest all those influences of church, home, school and the wider political world which help to shape the mind and outlook of a growing girl in Belize in the mid-twentieth century.

The Theme of Migration

The treatment of migration in West Indian literature has been a response both to an actual historical phenomenon and to a psychological problem created by colonial relations. At the turn of the century the decline of the sugar industry and of the importance of the West Indies heightened the constriction, poverty and isolation of the islands. Most West Indians felt genuinely hemmed in by the poverty and deprivations of their worlds and looked elsewhere for greener pastures—the 'better break' envisaged by most emigrants. In the early stages West Indians drifted into Panama where the building of the canal afforded opportunities for work and enrichment. Most migrants to Panama returned home, however, often with money, a sharpened social awareness and a new, flamboyant culture, to find reflection in West Indian literature. Lamming's old man Pa (*In The Castle*) recalls his own Panama days, and the author Eric Walrond recreates the exile's life in Latin America with compassion and depth in *Tropic Death* (1926).

West Indian migration of the 1940s and 1950s was, however, mostly migration into England—a search for a break complicated by the assumption of a shared heritage with the mother country. It was really the shattering of this illusion, of centuries of expectations fostered by colonial dependency and consolidated by a colonial education, that led to the trauma and alienation so vividly recreated by novelists such as Lamming and Selvon. Lamming's *The Emigrants* is a sombre and serious drama of the crumbling of the emigrant's illusions and of the alienation and personal disintegration that form the major part of his experience in the metropolis. In *In The Castle of My Skin*, Lamming's Trumper, the returned exile, posits a positive vision of exile and of the immigrant's experience as capable of fostering a sense of community and

race, and of enlarging the West Indian's vision of himself. In *The Emigrant* this hope is hardly realised. For if there is a sense of community on the ship that transports West Indian emigrants to England, it is generated only by a shared vulnerability and dependence. In the metropolis West Indian immigrants exist only on the periphery of mainstream British life, pushed there by a sense of exile and an irrelevance of function in a society whose past they cannot alter and whose future seems always beyond them. The eventual fragmentation and isolation of the immigrant community only enact the drama of individual dislocation and alienation which Lamming sees as the emigrant's lot. Another dimension of the theme is explored in Lamming's examination of the West Indian artist's relationship to exile. For the three artists whose lives, work and relationships Lamming scrupulously delineates, the costs and perils of exile are measured through the bankruptcy of an artistic existence without a supporting community.

In Selvon the theme of emigration is much more humourously explored. While Lamming's immigrants appear in a perpetual sombre cage, Selvon's migrants are constantly outside, often on aimless, fun-loving sprees but usually maintaining a sense of solidarity and community, a shared vocabulary and attitudes which make it possible for them to create their own 'portion' of England in spite of the wider loneliness they experience. Although the light-hearted tone often prevents a serious engagement and confrontation with the real psychological effects of dislocation and alienation, it establishes, much more so than Lamming, a sense of a warm and humane West Indian presence that often contrasts with the rigid coldness of the English neighbours. More recently, the new generation of West Indians, British children of West Indian immigrants, have added new tones, rhythms and dimensions to the theme. Where limited horizons, frustrations and a sense of unbelonging moved Lamming's characters to disintegration and set Selvon's on aimless sprees, these very pressures elicit harsh and angry rhythms from new generation poets like Lynton Kwesi Johnson and Bongo Jerry, moved partly by new conceptions of themselves not as immigrants but as deprived citizens.

The 'emigrant' experience outside the colonial metropolis presents interesting variations of theme. It would be worthwhile to compare the experience of migration and exile in novels by Claude McKay (USA), Paule Marshall (USA), and Austin Clarke (Canada), with the experience delineated by Lamming and Selvon. For there is a sense in which the emigrant's sojourn in the Americas is not complicated by the psychology of colonial relations and does not involve an intense shattering of illusions and expectations of a common heritage. Marshall's *Brown Girl, Brown Stones* is, for instance, more an attempt at reconciling a very strong Barbadian culture and consciousness with the demands of a different American culture, exploring as Austin Clarke also does, the conflicts and spiritual costs of this reconciliation.

MAJOR TEXTS

Eric Walrond, Tropic Death, New York: Boni and Liveright, 1926.

The stories in Walrond's collection dramatise the plight of West Indian migrants in search of work in Latin America. They evoke a grim picture of their squalid surroundings and their wretched lives. Set on the West Indian islands of the emigrants, on 'emigrant' ships and in Panama, the stories recreate a rounded picture of the 'nightmare' of migration.

George Lamming, The Emigrants, London: Michael Joseph, 1954; Allison and Busby, London, 1980.

The novel is a drama of the West Indian's journey from the islands towards 'a better break' in England. The long drawn out nature of the journey and the claustrophobic atmosphere of the ship allows Lamming to explore the physical and psychological needs that motivate the emigrants and to relate them later to the realities of their existence in the metropolis.

George Lamming, Water With Berries, London: Longman, 1971.

In this exhaustive exploration of the West Indian artist as an emigrant and immigrant, Lamming measures the cost of exile not merely in terms of personal disintegration and alienation but also in terms of the deterioration of West Indian creative talent in the absence of a supporting community.

Edward Brathwaite, 'The Emigrants' in Rights of Passage, London: Oxford University Press, 1967.

Brathwaite's poem records the loss of real roots, and explores the diminution involved in the experience of emigration. The sense of impersonality and invisibility which the emigrant experiences is for Brathwaite a bar to his full development as a person.

Samuel Selvon, The Lonely Londoners, London: Wingate, 1956; Longman, 1979.

Selvon's novel treats with humour and comedy the West Indian immigrant life in England. Against a prevailing sense of their way of life back home, Selvon explores their often comic adjustments to new lives in England, revealing the conditions of their existence outside mainstream British life.

Samuel Selvon, Moses Ascending, London: Wingate, 1975.

Selvon concentrates on the fortunes of a particular immigrant, recording his life after years of existence and struggle in England. The life story of Moses is really a reflection of the various stages in the West Indian immigrant's adjustment to life in England, a document of his social progress and personal awareness.

Linton Kwesi Johnson, Dread Beat And Blood, London: Bogle L'Ouverture, 1975.

Linton Johnson's poems convey in angry and passionate tones the experience of the urban black in England. Created in the tradition of oral poetry they draw on the vernacular for both vocabulary and rhythm.

Claude McKay, *Home to Harlem*, New York: Harper and Brothers, 1932.

McKay is mainly preoccupied with the black's existence and place in a predominantly white society. His Caribbean character, Ray, is the classic black intellectual tortured by a sense of alienation and feelings of unbelonging. His entire experience in the American city is a process of racial, social and political awareness.

Paule Marshall, *Brown Girl, Brown Stones*, New York: Avon Books, 1959.

Paule Marshall's novel about Barbadian immigrants in Brooklyn explores the community's new life, expectations and ambitions in America against the background of their Barbadian culture, attitudes and rituals. Most of the dilemmas and conflicts in the novel dramatise the relationship between a strong Barbadian identity and the cultural demands of the new society.

Austin Clarke, *The Bigger Light*, Boston and Toronto: Little, Brown, 1975.

In this novel about Barbadian immigrants in Canada, Clarke explores their cultural and personal alienation while at the same time depicting their experience as a process of self realisation and liberation.

The Rastafarian in West Indian literature

Rastafarianism as an ideology has held an interest and a fascination for West Indian writers at various stages in the development of the literature. Various writers have projected the Rastafarians' beliefs and rituals and featured their powerful speech rhythms in poetry and prose. In some respects this interest has been in response to the sense of self and dignity which the sect maintains through its very rejection of the imitative, bastardised version of 'British' society which most middle-class West Indians consider the norm for their own lives. It was really the strength and independence of mind behind their choice which made them attractive to a new generation of writers already dissatisfied with the mulatto self-image projected in earlier literature. Yet, interestingly, the Rastafarians themselves could not be farther away from the educated writers in terms of background and upbringing. They were originally the dispossessed products of Jamaica's urban life, for whom Garvey's message of blackness and racial pride had had a special meaning. For them, the coronation of the Emperor Selassie in Ethiopia was nothing but the fulfilment of a prophecy made by their leader concerning the redemption of the African race from its bondage to the Western world. For this belief they created a new world and religion in which the Emperor became God, and Africa his promised kingdom on earth. As a sect, Rastafarians grew steadily after the 1930s invasion of Abyssinia, becoming a mass movement that appealed mostly to the depressed of the slums and the 'dungle'. As a sect they have featured in various dimensions in West Indian literature. In Mais's *The Hills Were Joyful Together* and *Brother Man*, their humane philosophy of peace and brotherhood is explored as a positive unifying force in the pinched and deprived world of the slum. For Orlando Patterson, writing in 1964, however, the Rastafarians

signified the very futility of transcending the depression and depravity of the 'dungle'. Although in *The Children of Sisyphus*, the fantasy about escape to Africa is obviously born of the Rastafarian's rejection of his conditions and of his struggle to transcend them, Patterson presents it as part of the general absurdity of man's condition in the West Indies. But the very passion embodied in the Rastafarian's dream of escape is motivated by an awareness of his squalid surroundings and of the deficiencies of the larger social world around him. This is the paradox that emerges in Brathwaite's portrait of him in 'Wings Of A Dove' (*Rights*). For behind the Rasta man's illusion of escape, behind the dreadfulness and the labyrinth in which his perceptions are finally trapped, there is a clear sense of self and a true assessment of society. These perceptions are ultimately what appeals to a poet in search of 'self' and vision, and in this respect Brathwaite sees an affinity between the Rastafarian and the groping poet. Younger poets writing a few years after Brathwaite's *Rights* have suggested similar and subtle affinities between themselves and the Rastafarian figure. Anthony McNeill has, for instance, explored the ambiguities of the revolutionary consciousness, while in 'Squatter's Rites' (*Uncle Time*) Dennis Scott has dramatised how his personal strength and dignity are reborn in his son's reggae music and celebrated in the very form of the poet's art. These perceptions and representations of the Rastafarian are not merely romantic views, they are part of the poet's recognition of the link between the Rasta man's destiny and his own, and of the extent to which his own art demonstrates its responsibility to what he represents.

MAJOR TEXTS

Roger Mais, *The Hills Were Joyful Together*, London: Jonathan Cape, 1953; Heinemann Caribbean Writers Series, 1981.

Mais's novel evokes the pattern of life in the Jamaican slum-yard, concentrating on its poverty, squalor and constriction, and projecting their social consequences. On another level, it explores the character of the community, revealing how the shared experience of poverty and deprivation can give rise to a sense of community and humanity and how the Rastafarian Ras, embodies some of these aspects.

Roger Mais, *Brother Man*, London: Jonathan Cape, 1954; Heinemann Caribbean Writers Series, 1974.

The novel considers the possibilities that Mais hints at in *The Hills Were Joyful Together*. In the squalor, construction and evil of the yard Mais explores the possibilities of messianic leadership as embodied in the spiritual vision of the Rastafarian, Brother Man.

Orlando Patterson, *The Children of Sisyphus*, London: New Authors, 1964; Longman Caribbean Writers Series, 1986.

Patterson's novel portrays Rastafarians as a social phenomenon of the Jamaican slum world and as an escape route for the deprived urban dweller anxious to overcome the

conditions of his life. He presents the Rastafarian's dream of escape, particularly in relation to Africa, as a sophisticated personal and spiritual escapism which is part of the general absurdity of man's condition in Jamaica.

Edward Brathwaite, 'Wings Of A Dove' in *Rights of Passage*, London: Oxford University Press, 1967.

Brathwaite's poem reveals the paradoxes inherent in the illusion behind the Rastafarians' escapism, and the social perceptions that give rise to it. His portrayal uncovers the clear sense of self and the perception of middle-class rootlessness that inspire their dream of escape and rebellion.

Anthony McNeill, 'Straight Seeking', 'Saint Ras', 'Ode to Brother Joe' in *Reel From 'The Life Movie'*, Kingston, Jamaica: Savacou, 1972.

All three poems are explorations of the Rastafarians' significance to the poet. McNeill sees the passion of their dream as the quality that helps them to escape the crippling squalor of their surroundings. Although he mocks the illusory nature of the dream he pits it against the stark details of the Rasta's world, the poet recognises their passion and faith as positive contrasts to the general insensitivity of larger Jamaican society.

Dennis Scott, 'Squatter's Rites' in *Uncle Time*, Pittsburgh: Pittsburgh University Press, 1973.

The poem is a celebration of the link between the Rastafarian's condition and vision and the poet's art. The Rasta's personal strength and vitality are reborn in his son's recognition and respect and in the reggae which he composes in his memory.

Post-independence critiques

In the West Indies the literature of the 1960s and 1970s was essentially one of disillusionment and despondency. The pain, sorrow, silence and withdrawal of this period have contrasted with the excitement and explosion of literary activity in the 1930s and 1940s, and with the confidence and promise of the earlier nationalism. First the break-up of the West Indies Federation in 1962 erased the wider notion of a West Indian political unit, leaving small nations for which political independence was perhaps more a gift from the metropolis than an actively and independently worked out achievement. Thus, in the West Indies the aftermath of political freedom has been sadly ambiguous and most writers have reacted deeply to the very politics of freedom.

Is independence what it is? One day in July you say you want to be that there thing, an' one day in a next July the law say all right, from now you's what you askin' for. What change that can change? Might as well call your dog a cat an' hope to hear him mew. Is only words an names what don' signify nothin.

Most West Indian writers have echoed the disenchantment and cynicism of Lamming's character in *Season of Adventure*, for freedom has not brought self-knowledge and fulfilment, only the death of aspirations and the

entrenchment of class and social barriers. Indeed in writers such as Carter who had preached resistance and revolution in the 1950s, the despondency has been more traumatic. For Carter lived through the Guyanese racial strife of 1957 and the race war of 1962-64, and we have only to compare the fiery optimism of *Poems of Resistance* with the reticence and silence of Carter's later poetry to measure the extent to which the turn of politics had affected him. In 1963 when he wrote the poems in *Jail Me Quickly*, it seemed that he had lost the will to fight and had resigned himself to despair:

Men murder men, as men must murder men,
to build their shining governments of the damned.
(from 'After One Year')

In the works of Walcott and Brathwaite a similar disenchantment with politics and the establishment was taking place. Many of the poems in the *Gulf and Sea Grapes*, for instance, attack the continuing (and indeed increasing) shallowness of the imitative society, and in *The Star Apple Kingdom* and *The Fortunate Traveller* the tone of Walcott's political satire becomes increasingly sombre, following a deepening cynicism about the course of politics and of political values in the region. In Brathwaite the attack on politics and society is embodied in the poet's dual apprehension of the society in general and in the dual vision of sterility and growth which informs the poet's perspective in poems such as 'Homecoming', 'Trade Winds' and 'Pebble'. Brathwaite denounces 'the desert' of the political climate, the lack of vision, the exploitation of people and the seeming repetitiveness of history in the region:

and the wheel turns
and the future returns
wreathed in disguises

He balances this static fatalistic view with a sense of creative potential based on his sense of the poet's almost priest-like capacity to 'refashion futures' with a healer's hand. Even among younger poets like McNeille and Scott, the same bitter tones, the same violent denunciations of politicians persist, confirming Lamming's recognition in *Season of Adventure* that independence in the West Indies had been hollow and futile.

In the novel the presentation of post-independence society has conveyed similar disenchantment. Naipaul, who had already assessed West Indian potentiality in *The Mimic Men*, continued to examine the capacity of post-colonial independence societies to restructure themselves. In *Guerrillas* his Black Power revolutionaries are portrayed as part of the disorder of a chaotic and decaying society, and their revolution becomes the response which each revolutionary makes to the disorder outside. Naipaul's conclusions about West Indian society are similar to his conclusions in *The Mimic Men* because the vision of society is historically determined. In this society, he concludes, self-assertion and revolution will always become a pose, part of the answer to

the disorder outside. This view of the political and creative potential of the West Indies has been shaped by a vision of history that sees man as chained to his past and incapable of transcendence. But other writers of the region have conceived of a more fluid relationship between man and his past and have been able to envisage more open futures in which possibilities for re-fashioning the future exist.

A novelist such as Earl Lovelace, who also explores the West Indian's potential for change and vision in *The Dragon Can't Dance*, appears more open in his exploration and less consumed by historical determinism and fatalism. Although Lovelace also questions the West Indian's capacity for revolution, he locates the disability not in history *per se*, but in that loss of ritual and energy, that dissociation between West Indian man and his cultural, spiritual traditions which has created his paralysis and emptiness. Lovelace's perspective in *The Dragon*, the very metaphor of his explorations, establishes the presence and potency of the rituals of carnivals which his major characters stand in danger of bastardising and perverting. His portrayal of his characters' acts of rebellion which he presents as empty drama, find a link with that loss of ritual and energy which he symbolically dramatises in the major action of the novel. It is in the spiritual and moulding possibilities of carnival and dance that Lovelace locates possibilities. That is why *The Dragon Can't Dance*, for all its cynicism about revolution and change in the West Indies, is ultimately a novel of possibility.

MAJOR TEXTS

Martin Carter, 'Jail Me Quickly' in *Poems of Succession*, London: New Beacon, 1977.

The poems appear to mark the climax of Carter's movement from the exhilaration of promise in the 1950s towards the trauma of political strife in the 1960s, and the resignation and fatalism which were his response to the failure of Guyana's political hopes. They comment on the political situation and on people and society, the poet's tone moving from mockery towards a silent tragic resignation.

George Lamming, *Season of Adventure*, London: Michael Joseph, 1960.

This novel is perhaps the first serious analysis of the failure of nationalism. It examines the quality of freedom and independence through its ruthless portrayal of the apparatus of power and of the shallowness and insecurity of that class that holds it. It is both an indictment of failure and an exploration of wholeness. The search for true freedom is linked with the search for identity, and both are explored in the heroine's relationship with her forgotten racial, historical and cultural self.

V S Naipaul, *The Mimic Men*, London: André Deutsch, 1967.

A portrait both of the society that achieves independence in the West Indies and of the people who hold political power. Naipaul relates the region's political possibilities to the society and its history and sees failure in the region's past and its present disorder.

V.S. Naipaul, Guerrillas, London: André Deutsch, 1975.

In what appears to be Naipaul's ultimate statement on the West Indies, this novel recreates the aspirations and slogans of the Black Power revolutionaries against the background of a decaying and chaotic West Indian society.

Edward Brathwaite, Islands, London: Oxford University Press, 1969.

Poems such as 'Homecoming' and 'Trade Winds' denounce the region's politicians not just for exploiting and violating the people but for depriving the entire region of a future. Brathwaite sees possibilities for 're-fashioning' futures not in the hands of politicians but in those of the poet, humble, sensitive and priest-like, yet close to the grounded folk.

Derek Walcott, Sea Grapes, London: Jonathan Cape, 1976.

Walcott surveys and articulates the political climate of the Caribbean region through an artist's sensibility. His evocation and judgment centre on the ways in which the political climate affect the ordinary people. He sees the region's politicians as plodders without imagination, administering the last rites to their people; but the entire collection is informed by a vision of promise, of a vitality that is part of the creative resilience of the people, a power that can transform historical loss into promise.

Derek Walcott, The Star-Apple Kingdom, London: Jonathan Cape, 1980; New York: Farrar Straus and Giroux, 1979.

This collection is principally a political satire on Caribbean politics. It indicts the political leaders for failing to transform the region's potential. The poems take us on a journey through the archipelago, revealing the poet's deep disillusionment with the quality of life. In the 'Schooner Flight' the details of the protagonist's historical and contemporary experience explain his disillusionment and exile. Delineated as a symbol and victim of corruption, his story becomes the story of the region's failure.

Mervyn Morris, Shadow Boxing, London and Port of Spain, Trinidad: New Beacon, 1973; 1979.

In most of the poems in this collection Morris flays the various consciousness-raising movements that became part of the social and political scene in the 1960s and 1970s: black power movements, political groups, grass roots movements. He presents these satiric themes through the consciousness of a folk character whose dialect-speaking voice reveals its own genuine natural wisdom as it uncovers the fraudulent poses of the new radical men.

Derek Walcott, The Fortunate Traveller, London: Faber & Faber, 1982.

This collection is another critical evocation in which Walcott examines the relationship between the political apparatus and the quality of people's lives. Cleverly embodied in the point of view of a narrator and a Calypsonian protagonist, it is a devastating exposure of the ineffectuality of government and of the distance, indifference and contempt with which politicians have always regarded the mass of the people in the West Indies.

Carnival

Trinidad's annual theatrical event, though mainly distinguished now for its

pageantry and fun, is as old and singular as Trinidad's own history of settlement and slavery. This event, which has grown to capture the entire Trinidadian imagination and become almost symbolic of a fun-loving West Indies, ironically began as the entertainment of slave masters in eighteenth-century Trinidad. Carnival as an annual entertainment really began with the arrival in Trinidad of French-speaking planter immigrants and their African slaves. A vigorous, fun-loving people, the French immigrants soon settled down to a free and comfortable life in what was then a mainly undeveloped and neglected outpost of the Spanish American Empire. Their Carnival, lasting from Christmas to Ash Wednesday, was a major season of diversion and entertainment, a season of uninhibited gaiety, of music, dance and masquerade, during which they as planters they could even permit themselves to fantasise about the slaves they held, to assume their roles, mask their costumes and dance their *bamboulas*, their *ghombas* and their *kalindas*.

Originally a leveller of barriers, Carnival grew to absorb rather than exclude other planter immigrants who flooded Trinidad during this time, and newcomers from the Spanish Main and from the French and English-speaking islands easily found themselves a part of the yearly spectacle. The British conquest of Trinidad in 1797 encouraged a more stable development, though it could not stop the flow of migrants, and by the first half of the nineteenth century Trinidad's population had not only doubled but had been extended to include a diverse group of people and races. More slaves had been imported from Africa, and even after abolition, slaves captured from slaving ships were almost always resettled in Trinidad. In this slave-based society of distinct groupings, Carnival as an open entertainment was bound to be affected. The British colonial administration introduced measures bringing it into line with the society's strict colour stratifications. Slaves were excluded from entertainment; free coloureds could participate only under stringent regulations, and until emancipation, the festival was an entertainment strictly for whites and free coloureds.

After the emancipation of slaves these stringent measures could not effectively be maintained. Freed slaves literally crashed into carnival entertainment, taking their cue from plantation conditions and plantation life on the island. Planters had permitted themselves to fantasise about their slaves, masking their costumes and dancing their dances. Now freed slaves also took liberties and mocked the authority of the militia, staging mock battles and parodying the very authority which has been wielded over them. Such parodies, in addition to more traditional slave amusements at Christmas, became a frequent form of diversion at Carnival time. The 'moko jumbie' on stilts and the 'John Canoe' in semi-military costume became regular sights in carnival processions, generating a new atmosphere of pre-Carnival meetings, rehearsals and get-togethers which still survive in the feverish pre-Carnival activities in the tents. Freed slaves, it appeared, were taking over the Carnival.

The street masquerades now involved more and more scenes depicting aspects of slavery; street revellers were becoming noisier and noisier, and Carnival itself, as the white press saw it, was degenerating into a 'jamaican carnival', an underworld affair and a relic of barbarism.

In spite of several attempts, the ruling class was never able to suppress this new thrust in Carnival entertainment. Every attempt met with more heightened resistance, and even occasional rioting from the mass of revellers. The annual celebration had become more like a symbol of freedom for them and was now, as Errol Hill observes, 'no longer a European-inspired nature festival but a deeply meaningful anniversary of deliverance with a ritualistic significance rooted in the very experience of slavery'. The new thrust naturally created its own rituals, and the procession of torches with which the planters had celebrated the beginning of Carnival became a vigorous procession of drumming and singing, while the 'camboulay' originally associated with Emancipation celebrations became a part of the Carnival 'Dimanche Gras' ritual, giving a distinctive significance to the freed slaves' appropriation of the festival.

The emergence of steel band music, itself a response to the official banning of drums and shacks, provided Carnival with its special music, just as the eventual rise of the professional Calypsonian and the elaborate costumes and properties of the masquerade give dimensions of theatre, spectacle and further ritual to the entire entertainment. Thus from its beginnings as a white planter-class diversion, Carnival progressed into a white and free-coloured upper-class entertainment; it was then appropriated by ex-slaves and the common people who made it into a ritual symbolic of their freedom and their uninhibited self-expression.

It is this essentially historical meaning of Carnival that is continually in danger of being overpowered by spectacle and theatre, and West Indian writers who have used aspects of Carnival as metaphors for expressing or commenting on West Indian realities have always hinted at this danger. Walcott's 'mass man', for instance, presents a double vision of Carnival as on the one hand creative self-expression and on the other an excess of fantasy that obscures the real implications of the celebrations. His poet *persona* distances himself from the hedonism, fantasy and often cruel irresponsibility of Carnival revellers to project himself as the meditative poet who must stand back from the fantasy and spectacle to draw out the significance of the festival.

But I am dancing, look from an old gibbet
my bull-whipped body swings, a metronome!
Like a fruit-bat dropped in the silk cotton's shade
my mania, my mania is a terrible calm.

In spite of recognising Carnival as an important folk expression, Brathwaite has expressed a similar ambivalence about people's relation to the festival. In

Islands, the concluding section of his trilogy and the section particularly devoted to West Indian realities, Carnival becomes an important metaphor for the poet's examination of West Indian responses. The 'mass man' in 'Caliban' is depicted against a background of West Indian poverty and corruption and in an atmosphere of creative and political stalemate. His 'dance' in the second movement of the poem is, in this context, not a ritual celebration of the common man's freedom and self but a dance of escape, a descent into the 'limbo silence' of the self in a flight from the oppressiveness of the outer world. Carnival is thus not a medium of awareness and a spur to liberation but a deliberate blotting out of awareness and a rejection of the possibilities of regeneration. In 'Tizzic', Brathwaite's Carnival theme operates against the background of the ambiguity with which Tizzic himself is depicted. For, on the one hand, Tizzic is a folk character attuned to the soil and apparently liberated from bondage to slave master and plantation; yet on the other he is a man imprisoned in that irresponsible concept of manliness which the Calypsonian frequently celebrates in songs. His response to the ritual and music of Carnival is governed by his own personal contradictions, and the ceremony is for him both a source of contact with

days of green unhur-
ried growing

and an escapist dream of heaven that momentarily obliterates the impoverished and confusing present. Carnival is thus for him not a medium of spiritual regeneration but a temporary vision of glory which after its 'blazing apotheosis' returns Tizzic to the real world, to Lenten sorrows, Ash-Wednesday, 'ashes, darkness, death'.

It is perhaps only in the closing section of Brathwaite's *Islands* that Carnival becomes a metaphor of illuminations and a realistic summation and acceptance of the processes of life in the West Indies. For the poem 'Jouvert', signifying the morning of Carnival, celebrates neither the escapist prancing and 'limbo descent' of Caliban's carnival nor the borrowed glory of Tizzic's uplift. Its music and dance rather recall the losses and gains of history: the upheavals and displacements ('cries of arrows', 'lightning flashes', 'men asunder') the transformations, the compromises and the new fragile adjustments; the 'sorrows' burning to 'ashes', 'grey rocks' melting to 'pools'

of lashes'
sweat and flowers

Dawn rides over 'shattered homes',

and furrows
over fields

and musty ghettos
over men now

hearing
waiting

watching
in the Lent-

en morning
hurts for-

gotten, hearts
no longer bound

to black and bitter
ashes in the ground.

Thus, Brathwaite's final image of Carnival implicitly reiterates its historical roots as an affirmation and celebration of a people's sense of becoming.

In *The Dragon Can't Dance*, Earl Lovelace not only returns us to the historical roots of Carnival but also explores its meaning and significance in a twentieth-century post-war context. Carnival becomes both subject and metaphor as he portrays his slum world and delineates its attempts to become visible. Using the festival as both metaphor and form, he dramatises its potential as a ritual for regeneration and self-assertion while at the same time exploring its significance for the deprived characters of the slum. Thus, on the one hand, the whole ritual of Carnival is portrayed: the song and dance, the shout, the costume and the masquerade jump, celebrations of the self; and on the other, the novelist carefully scrutinises the nature of that self. Lovelace implies throughout that Carnival must go beyond the ritual shout, that finally each generation must interpret it in terms of its own particular social and political situation and needs. The 'mass man's' Dragon dance in the novel fails as an assertion of a meaningful self because it never moves beyond the pose of terror and menace, beyond the religion of idleness which had signified rebellion among emancipated slaves in an earlier age. Thus in spite of the faith, the memories and the effort of creativity, the 'mass man's' dragon succeeds only in drawing attention to itself. The novel's form works towards this illumination, and the 'dragon' recognises at last the limitations of his masquerade dance.

In other West Indian works, Carnival is often simply evoked as a folk festival to which characters respond either positively or negatively according to their peculiar social and psychological problems. Merle Hodge for instance, uses Carnival as part of a world and a way of life to which her protagonist responds with ambivalence. Tee's response is dramatised as part of her 'middle-class' embarrassment about the folk, but her spontaneous enjoyment of the yard scene is the author's subtle suggestion that the festival is part of her legacy.

Carnival as a folk form has evidently captured the imagination not just of the 'mass man' and 'pan man' but also of those writers working with the 'written'

form. This interplay between oral and written forms is a significant and unique aspect of West Indian literature, which will eventually contribute to defining its distinctiveness.

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Edward Brathwaite, 'Caliban' in Islands, London: Oxford University Press, 1969.

Brathwaite's portrait of the masquerade dancer points to the dance's potential for spiritual regeneration, but Caliban prefers the dance of escape, the dance or descent into self, as a means of obliterating an oppressive present.

Edward Brathwaite, 'Tizzic' in Islands, London: Oxford University Press, 1969.

Like Caliban's 'mass', Tizzic's carnival dance is also an escape. Caliban descends into the limbo silence of the self; Tizzic ascends into an imagined and borrowed heaven. Both fail to exploit the potential of the 'mass' and the dance.

Edward Brathwaite, 'Jou'vert' in Islands, London: Oxford University Press, 1969.

In this final section of *Islands*, Brathwaite gives a positive vision of Carnival and points to its potential as a means of catharsis and affirmation. Here the dance is a process of understanding and illumination rather than an escape, presenting a vision of the process of history and the adjustments and transformations of the West Indies, which is both cathartic and affirmative.

Earl Lovelace, The Dragon Can't Dance, London: André Deutsch, 1979; Longman Drumbeat, 1981.

A novel that explores the meaning of Carnival to the deprived masses of the city's backyard. Lovelace examines the popular concept of warriorhood in relation to rebellion. His 'mass men' see themselves as warriors shouting their self-affirmation, but Lovelace's drama flays both the meaning and value of that self.

Merle Hodge, Crick Crack Monkey, London: André Deutsch, 1970; Heinemann Caribbean Writers Series, 1981.

A novel that dramatises a growing girl's confusion in the class and cultural chaos of twentieth-century Trinidad. Hodge's heroine walks in two worlds, one that is open, natural and unsophisticated but warm and comforting, and another that is polished but stilted and unsure. The heroine's response to Carnival becomes a mirror of her inner conflict and her divided self.

Derek Walcott, 'Mass Man' in The Gulf, London: Jonathan Cape, 1969.

A poem in which Walcott defines his relationship to Carnival and at the same time distances himself from its excesses and its degeneration. The poem depicts both the creativity and spectacle of the festival and the loveless, often cruel, abandon of the general mass of revellers. Walcott projects himself as the poet isolated by the mindless gaiety of the people and therefore able to draw out the real historical significance of the ceremony.

The Calypso

The Calypso forms part of a tradition of verbal arts and biting commentary in the West Indies, and is historically linked to the post-emancipation 'takeover' of Carnival, first by freed slaves and later by the urban folk in the city's yards. The gradual transformation of Carnival created in its wake a variety of forms and expressions which helped to shape the Calypso. Freed slaves celebrated Carnival not with ballroom dances and promenades but with songs, street dancing, drumming and stick fighting, creating a general street theatre which gave ample opportunities for free and open expression and for uninhibited criticism. Songs of comment and abuse were part of this theatre and were often directed both at rival groups of revellers and at the authority of the ruling class. Each lead singer formed his own chorus to complete the yearly street drama, and the Carnival songs normally emerged spontaneously from these street contracts and provocations. Association with the yearly Carnival led to more planning and preparation and to the composition of special songs to match the themes of the masquerade bands. Though these preparations generally reduced the possibilities for spontaneous compositions and improvisations, they created a social setting as well as a regular audience. With such regular appearances in Carnival tents, the lead singer (Calypsonian) became a performer with costume, gestures and song, and the tents themselves became platforms for an often creative interpretation by both performers and an increasingly knowledgeable and discriminating audience.

Trinidadians value verbal expertise. For them, the way a thing is said is of paramount importance, and in these performances Trinidadians judged Calypsonians not only by the melody of their song but also by their lyrics, the quality of comment and the measure of verbal manipulation they employed in delivering it. Therefore the good and popular Calypsonian always composed within the context of the audience's assumptions and vocabulary but manipulated them to make judgments and criticisms, presenting them in a lyric powerful enough to stretch their imaginations as well.

In the course of time, frequent performances by lead singer and band led to the formation of special bands which performed throughout the year, but became especially active at Carnival time when Calypsos were composed around the general theme of Carnival bands. The lead singer of the band emerged as the Calypsonian of today, and the entire tradition of song, comment and provocation became part of an urban sub-culture. The Calypso itself developed into a distinctive form, capturing and interpreting aspects of Trinidad's oral forms, mostly the 'lime', the 'old talk' and the 'picong', and evolving special canons by which its practitioners could be appreciated and judged. Certain characteristics came to be accepted as peculiar to the Calypso, so that often, beneath the veil of levity and frivolity suggested both by the music and the performance, the Calypso might contain a great deal of incisive social

observation and commentary. The Calypsonian constantly monitored what was happening around him and used his songs and the platform of the tents to make social comments and expose wrongdoings and misdemeanours. His Calypso's point of view was often a combination of his own judgment and the judgment of the man in the street, and his pose was nearly always that of the bystander, the observer left to sift out a message and deliver conclusions. Very often he crystallised a general mood about a situation long before the general public had time to articulate it, and it is this special relationship between the Calypsonians and events in society that allows commentators to trace Trinidad's social and political history from a critical analysis of Calypsos composed over a period of years. Commentary in the Calypso ranges from the early jingoistic songs of the nationalist period (when Calypsonians sang in praise of a stable, happy and racially harmonious Trinidad) to the later satires and bitter presentations of the often sordid realities of politics and society on the island. The political satires often derived from two sources: from the clash between the politicians own self-image and the Calypsonian's depiction of it, and from the jarring effects of those songs of attack when couched in the form of earlier jingoistic Calypsos. Sparrow's 'Model Nation' and Sniper's 'Portrait of Trinidad', earlier Calypsos composed in this tradition, were for instance satirised in Black Stalin's 'New Portrait of Trinidad', sung in the same mode but with different images and completely opposite effects.

Generally, the Calypsonian is more of a social commentator than an outright political satirist and his Calypsos not only create a particular social viewpoint but also occasionally reflects some of society's own obsessions, contradictions and ambivalences. There is for instance, a tradition of calypso composition that specialises in the consistent bloating of a male super-ego and the embarrassment and degradation of women. The Calypsonian very often celebrates the male ego by depicting a sexually dominant male figure, often irresponsible and immoral but always strong, triumphant and ultimately 'heroic'. The female figure is almost always the butt of this type of Calypso and is often embarrassed, humiliated and finally rejected by an exultant male. Such depictions, rendered powerfully humorous by the Calypsonian's dexterity with language and rhythm, raise instant laughter, but the real Calypsonian, the man of substance, always attempts to move beyond such humour, to project himself as the commentator, poet and conscience of his society.

The Calypso features in West Indian literature as both theme and form, and there is a sense in which its special techniques as a folk and oral form have helped to give shape to a number of West Indian imaginative works. There is what may be termed a 'Calypso style', usually involving a certain way of presenting a situation and a particular way of manipulating both language and 'audience'. For as an oral folk form, the Calypso has always worked with the spoken language and with social and cultural assumptions shared by both Calypsonian and audience. Usually, as in the prose narratives of Selvon and

Lovelace, the rhythms of the spoken word are captured in prose narrative; well-known images are manipulated and combined with the favourite aside, 'the lime', 'old talk' and the popular joke, giving prose narrative the flavour of a Calypso song. All the episodes in Selvon's *Lonely Londoners* are presented in this way and in the creole language without the intrusions of 'standard' English, so that each episode becomes a kind of 'oral delivery' in itself. In *A Brighter Sun*, where standard English and the creole language are combined, the 'Calypso style' is incorporated into those sections where Selvon's characters are left to 'deliver' their responses to people and situations in creole, within the framework of assumptions they share with other characters and with the readers. For Lovelace, the Calypso is interestingly both language and movement and is enacted, notably in *The Dragon Can't Dance*, as both music and dance. The Calypso effect is achieved chiefly through the manipulation of structure and rhythm, for Lovelace's sentences enact the actual rhythms and movements of the Calypso dance, projecting its function as purgation and catharsis:

There is dancing in the Calypso. Dance! Dance to the hurt! Dance!
If you catching hell, dance, and the government don't care, dance!
Your woman take your money and run away with another man, dance!
Dance! Dance! Dance!

As subject and theme the Calypso has functioned in West Indian literature as a depiction of an aspect of West Indian life, and Calypsos have often been evoked to illustrate and confirm the observations and judgments of the general population. In certain instances, as in Naipaul's *Miguel Street*, the Calypso is evoked as a means both of social commentary and caustic satire, because often the very consciousness that its observations and judgments confirm is the consciousness that Naipaul exposes as a negative manifestation of slum life. Often the levity and irresponsibility that lurk beneath the Calypso's melody reflect similar qualities in the characters themselves and the affinity explains their continual wish to be identified with those values which are affirmed in the Calypso.

Other West Indian works feature the delineation of the Calypsonian and the dramatisation of the potency and traps of his craft. A J Seymour's poem 'To A Calypso Singer' and Edward Brathwaite's poem 'Calypso' both suggest the possibilities and the dangers of the art. Seymour sees the Calypso becoming an opium for inertia, a substitute for radical thought and action; Brathwaite manipulates his poem to suggest a seriousness that extends beyond the Calypsonian's flippant and superficial view of the islands. It is perhaps only in *The Dragon Can't Dance* that we are given a full portrait of a Calypsonian. Lovelace's Philo is by far the most detailed study of a Calypsonian in West Indian Literature, and his career dramatises the economic necessity and the spiritual impoverishment that lead to the degeneration of the Calypsonian and

his craft. Philo's predicament, rather than being his alone, is finally shown as equally that of a society which has lost track of the values of its forms and has compromised with mediocrity.

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V S Naipaul, Miguel Street, London: André Deutsch, 1959; Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1971.

A collection of stories in which Naipaul depicts the character, mentality and values of people in an urban backyard.

Relevant Stories

'The Thing Without a Name'

In Naipaul's *Miguel Street*, the values that people uphold are inimical to ambition and betterment, and Naipaul uses the Calypso's themes to illustrate these negative attitudes. The Calypso that immortalises Popo is a Calypso that sings of his jail sentence. When Popo acts responsibly he is shunned as an outsider; when he returns to the fold and becomes a criminal his 'reputation' is re-established and the street proudly affirms the Calypso that sings of his crime.

'The Coward'

A story that gives an ironical portrait of the street's 'bad John', a man for whom Carnival and street band are like ritual and religion. The Calypso is his main source of reference and he lives out its words and becomes the bully and terror of the street, though inwardly he is merely a frightened little man.

'The Pyrotechnist'

The Calypso functions here in a rather negative way. Naipaul points to its tendency to trivialise what is serious. Morgan tries all his life to be a comedian, to stir up laughter: When he finally succeeds, it is on account of something which is not at all funny.

'The Maternal Instinct'

Here the Calypso becomes a point of reference supporting Nathaniel's sadistic attitude towards women. In this story the degradation of women is merely a pose, fulfilling the street's concept of manliness. Ironically, it is Nathaniel himself who is beaten by his woman.

'Caution'

This is the only story that celebrates Calypso as a spontaneous creative act. News of the end of the war and of the coming peace provokes a Carnival, and a Calypso 'springs out of nothing'. But the song that emerges is negative, titillating and unrelated to the 'peace'.

'Until The Soldiers Come'

The story dramatises the impact of the Americans on the values of the people in Trinidad. The Calypso's observations on the American take-over are enacted.

Edward Brathwaite, 'Calypso' in Rights of Passage, London: Oxford University Press, 1967.

This poem dramatises the violence of the islands' history which the Calypsonian deflates in his flippant and superficial portrayal.

Earl Lovelace, The Dragon Can't Dance, London: André Deutsch, 1979; Longman Caribbean Writers Series, 1986.

This novel depicts the degeneration of the Calypso singer, pressed by economic necessity to cheapen and popularise an essentially serious talent.

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Reagan and the world

Peter Shearman

Turning the Tide: US Intervention in Central America and the Struggle for Peace

Noam Chomsky

Boston: Pluto Press. 1985. 298pp. £5.95pb

Reagan and the World: Imperial Policy in the New Cold War

Jeff McMahan

London: Pluto Press. 1984. 214pp. £3.95pb

The Reagan Administration's Foreign Policy: Facts and Judgement of the International Tribunal

Edited by Hans Kochler

London: Third World Centre for Research and Publishing. 1985. 470pp. £19.00hb/£15.00pb

Each of these three books examines the foreign policy of the USA under the Reagan Administration. But, one may well ask, does the USA under Reagan actually *have* a foreign policy? Does Reagan have a clearly defined purpose, and a carefully considered strategy through which to attain it, in the conduct of his international relations? Given a series of seemingly incoherent, instinctive and impulsive foreign policies, often undertaken without a consensus among the decision-making elite, it is often difficult to observe any pattern to Reagan's strategies other than a knee-jerk reaction to what is perceived (or stated to be) a 'Soviet threat' to US vital interests. However, Noam Chomsky, Jeff McMahan and the majority of the contributors to the Hans Kochler volume all argue that indeed Reagan *does* have clearly defined foreign policy goals, and that these have been consistently pursued during his tenure in the White House. The major reason that this is little understood, particularly in the USA itself, is the careful and deliberate manipulation of the media, which is used as a vehicle for disseminating the Administration's lies and propaganda. This is a common thesis in both the Chomsky and McMahan studies, and both authors seek through their books to set the record straight by exposing what they see as the Great Communicator's lies and revealing the real intent and purpose of his grand designs.

So what *are* the aims, strategies, and consequences of Reagan's foreign policy? The three books reviewed agree that the principal aim has been to

restore the USA to the position of global economic, political, military and ideological dominance it enjoyed during the Cold War period. The basic strategy employed has been a military one. This has involved the largest ever military build-up in peace-time in world history, undertaken in order to regain military superiority over the Soviet Union, whilst at the same time fuelling the arms race in order to cripple the Soviet economy. Concomitant with the military build-up has been an increase in propensity actually to use the military instrument in the Third World in order to safeguard US economic and strategic interests as in Grenada, Lebanon and Libya, or, where this has not been feasible due to domestic and international constraints, to employ surrogates to achieve the same purpose—witness the cases of Israel, the 'Contras', UNITA, Pol Pot and the Mujahedin. The consequences of such a strategy have been disastrous: thousands of innocent victims in Central America, Southern Africa, the Middle East and Asia; an increase in international tensions which has put the nuclear clock closer still to midnight; an undermining of the principles of customary and treaty international law; strains in the US alliance system (eg NATO and ANZUS); increasing indebtedness of Third World nations which does nothing for the progress of stability (or democracy). The net result of Reagan's New Globalism has been to increase the insecurity of the interstate system.

Chomsky and McMahan document and record vividly some of the atrocities committed by the death squads in Central America, perpetuated knowingly by the CIA in order to defend what Reagan terms 'democracy' against the infringements of Soviet 'totalitarian' communist power. One of the main villains in both books is the former US Ambassador to the UN, Jeane Kirkpatrick, whom Chomsky refers to as the '... chief sadist-in-residence of the Reagan Administration' (p 8). She is the one who sought to give some intellectual credibility to Reagan's strategy by making a distinction between 'traditional authoritarian' regimes and Soviet-style 'totalitarian' ones. Whilst acknowledging that the former fall somewhat short of the American democratic ideal, they are worthy of US support for, although the masses remain impoverished, the elites do not challenge the basic social and political structures which enable the population (and US multinational corporations) to enjoy some basic freedoms. Discussing Kirkpatrick's distinctions, McMahan points to the freedoms of Cuban 'totalitarianism' which favour well compared to her 'authoritarian' states: freedom to free health care, long life-expectancy, freedom from hunger, guarantee of employment, and high literacy levels. On any physical-quality-of-life index, for the bulk of the population in a Third World country, Soviet 'totalitarianism' would provide a much higher ranking than 'traditional authoritarianism'.

The threat of 'totalitarian communism' in Central America is said to come from without the region, from the Soviet Union itself, which then serves to justify Reagan's policy as the defence of freedom against external aggression.

Reagan's Central American policy is justified in these terms in order to gain support from Congress and the US public. However, according to Chomsky and McMahan these are simply official lies and the real reason for US attempts to overthrow the Sandinistas is to defend the interest of American big business. It is argued by McMahan that the Reagan Administration has a much closer link with big business than any other previous US government, with thirty millionaires among the top one hundred officials, at least twenty-two of whom are multi-millionaires. Yet to explain Reagan's military intervention in the Third World as a determination to protect the privileged positions of US corporations is surely to overstate the case. It is true that a direct link existed between the United Fruit Company and the overthrow of Arbenz in Guatemala in 1954, but the USA had no economic interests in Grenada in 1983. US oil corporations in Cabinda, Angola (defended by Cuban troops!) have no interest in supporting UNITA, and American businessmen in Libya did not react favourably when Reagan ordered them to leave before his military attack on Tripoli, and the embargo against Nicaragua has hurt the private sector and US corporations most of all. Opinion polls have shown that in the United States persons engaged in international trade have consistently supported a policy of détente with the Soviet Union. Thus, corporate business interests do not always coincide with state interests, and this is, at least to a degree, true under the Reagan Administration.

Whilst Chomsky and McMahan both refer to a basic continuity in US foreign policy over the course of several administrations, Carter's early policy on human rights is frequently contrasted favourably with Reagan's disregard for the bulk of the population in Central and Latin America. Human rights and international law under the Reagan Administration are subjects taken up in the Kochler volume, which comprises papers and proceedings of an international conference on 'Reagan's Foreign Policy' held in Brussels in September, 1984. The conference was organised by the International Progress Organisation, and the participants (politicians, Nobel laureates, and academics from First and Third World countries) are almost all highly critical of the Reagan Administration, which is judged to have seriously undermined the established principles of international law and customs of state behaviour. Most of the contributors take a partisan approach, do not provide sufficient evidence to support their claims, and make no attempt at any kind of objective analysis. This would be acceptable if the papers were well-written and stimulating—but, with only a couple of exceptions, they are not. This is certainly not a book to recommend to serious students of US foreign policy, and, given the price, I do not see a ready audience for such a book anywhere.

Taken together, these books offer a damning critique of Reagan's foreign policies. Chomsky and McMahan both provide substantial evidence and convincing arguments to support their theses regarding the dangers of Reagan's attempt to reassert American hegemony in the international system

(and, it must be said, much of the evidence cited comes from the same Western sources that they claim to be so biased). As I write this review, Reagan still has two years left in office, and his legacy for US relations with the rest of the world and for global security is still unclear. Most of the authors in these three volumes argue that for security in the second half of the twentieth century military restraint, active and intense diplomacy and disarmament are necessary requirements. During the past six years Reagan has certainly not shown much commitment to any of these goals, relying instead on the old assumption that to prevent war one must prepare for it and show the resolve to employ the military instrument in order to defend the 'national interest'. This approach is not unique to the Reagan Administration. The major fear, I believe, is that Reagan could go down in history as the American President who turned his back upon a historical arms control agreement thereby instigating the most dangerous escalation of the arms race since the development of the atom.

Jonas Savimbi

Victoria Brittain

Jonas Savimbi, A Key to Africa

Fred Bridgland

Edinburgh: Mainstream Publishing. 1986. 513pp. £14.95

Fred Bridgland's long book on the jigsaw of Southern African politics over the last decade or more is written straightforwardly from the viewpoint of a strong admiration for Jonas Savimbi and a conviction that he is the rightful leader of Angola:

I felt (10 years ago) he had been betrayed, cheated and misrepresented by a wide variety of people and by historical circumstance. I believed then—and no evidence has since been presented to persuade me to change my mind—that he would have emerged as the Angolan leader with most support if the elections promised by Portugal had ever been held.

Bridgland's book does not provide the historical context to judge this assertion. Like a man looking at a many-faceted wide panorama through a telescope, Bridgland's perspective is inevitably distorted by its simple focus on Savimbi. The UNITA leader himself, quick-witted and charismatic by other accounts as well as Bridgland's, has over the years successfully sold himself as the 'key to Africa' to the South Africans, the Saudis, the CIA, President Mobutu, King Hassan of Morocco and others of similar political persuasion.

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His fortunes are inextricably linked to geopolitical policies in Southern Africa quite outside his own control—specifically to Western fears of communism in the area and a deep commitment to defend capitalism in South Africa itself against such a threat.

Bridgland knows this, and documents much of Savimbi's external backing from this clutch of conservatives. However, he chooses to depict Savimbi as a hard-pressed nationalist unashamed of his backing, rather than the well-heeled opportunist who emerges from his narrative.

Bridgland is a correspondent for the conservative paper *The Scotsman*. Previously he was a Reuters correspondent in Central Africa. Rather unusually for a news agency man, he apparently enjoyed licence to spend a considerable amount of time flying, often in planes made available by Lonhro, to meet Savimbi in remote parts of Angola or in the heavily guarded home provided by King Hassan of Morocco in Rabat. In the lean years when Savimbi's boasts of being 'in Luanda by Christmas' were the most the outside world knew of him, Bridgland was one of the few journalists to continue to take him seriously. Even the USA was more interested in exploring possibilities of courting the MPLA.

By beginning his book with a quotation from George Orwell on the impossibility of reporting correctly anything you have not personally witnessed, Bridgland raises high expectations of moral and intellectual rigour in this ambitious work. But the academic respectability of this huge tome is questionable.

With disarming candour Bridgland admits 'I myself am not impartial.' And he demonstrates this on nearly every page of his work, by using his chief actor as his chief witness—one fatal flaw immediately revealed in the extensive and interesting footnotes. Besides Savimbi himself, the sources quoted include a good deal of *The Daily Telegraph* (London), UNITA communiqués, Western intelligence sources and so on. Not surprisingly, there are small errors of fact, for example, in the family origins of such important Angolans as Lucio Lara and Luis d'Almeida, or the assertion that the then Tanzanian minister Mohamed Babu was a friend of Savimbi, or that the Chinese journalist Co Liang was 'an agent' (*Time Magazine*'s version, although presented by Bridgland as fact). Such errors are unsettling for the reader. In addition, some of Bridgland's quotations from other journalists or writers are out of context.

There are errors of more substance. For instance Bridgland says that 'Western intelligence suggested that (President) Neto was assassinated' during an operation in the Soviet Union 'so that a more pliable man, less likely to flirt with the West, could be installed in Luanda.' Western intelligence knew more about Neto and about the Soviet relationship with Luanda to believe for a moment in such a possibility. Bridgland however prefers to rely on this kind of innuendo, relayed by *The Daily Telegraph*, than to consult more substantial

British sources such as the former British Ambassador in Luanda (now in a senior position in the UN), Marrack Goulding, whom he openly disdains.

His one-sided perspective and use of sources lead him to overlook the well-documented collaboration with the Portuguese military before independence which is an important strand of UNITA's origins. This viewpoint also brings him to a defence of the South African/US policy of 'linkage' and even to put forward the idea that South Africa is actually under 'possible military threat from Angola'. Even the South Africans themselves do not go to these lengths to try to defend their indefensible illegal occupation of Namibia. Nor do they, like Bridgland, any longer persist in the pretence that the original South African invasion of Angola from 23 October 1975 was in *response* to a Cuban military presence. As has been amply documented, the Cuban combat troops came after a government decision made in Havana on 5 November 1975. The 200 to 300 Cuban instructors in the country earlier had not been hidden either by the Cuban or the Angolan governments, and they were not the army which Bridgland claims to have discovered.

The interest of this book is that Bridgland is able to provide much vivid description of Savimbi's infrastructure inside the country and out. Who would have guessed that 'beautifully laundered embroidered sheets' would be the norm for a visitor like Bridgland to a guerrilla camp deep inside Angola! His own safety in such a camp or on the long journeys he describes with his UNITA guards would of course have been guaranteed, like all Savimbi's infrastructure, by South African air cover provided from the illegal air force bases maintained by Pretoria in the Caprivi strip and northern Namibia.

It is the implication of South Africa's backing for UNITA which Bridgland seems unwilling to grasp. In this he is unlike Savimbi who knew only too well that in making that alliance in 1975 he forfeited the support of such African leaders as Julius Nyerere of Tanzania. Within weeks Savimbi's South African connection brought recognition of the MPLA government by the majority of the continent and then by the rest of the world—except, of course, the USA which to this day prefers to ignore present reality in the hope of changing it by force.

The elections Bridgland talks of, in justifying his view of Savimbi as a misunderstood African nationalist hero, were never a possibility. Angolans have instead been targets of violent attempts to dictate their political future by South Africa and the USA since well before independence. Then the Reagan Administration's policies, which meant open support for Savimbi, significantly raised the level of violence. Today the infrastructure lies broken, great areas of the country have been razed by South African bombs, and hundreds of thousands of rural people are displaced from their homes or mutilated by the terror tactics of Jonas Savimbi's UNITA with the logistical support of the white regime in South Africa. Bridgland does not succeed in making a case for Savimbi which justifies this devastation of Angola.

States, regimes and citizens in Africa

John Wiseman

Political Domination in Africa: Reflections on the Limits of Power

Edited by Patrick Chabal

Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 1986. 211pp. £27.50hb/£9.95pb

Democracy and Pluralism in Africa

Edited by Dov Ronen

London: Hodder and Stoughton. 1986. 220pp. £25.00

Politics and Government in African States 1960–1985

Edited by Peter Duignan and Robert H. Jackson

London: Croom Helm. 1986. 442pp. £25.00

The academic study of politics in post-independence Africa illustrates many of the same features that have characterised the practice of politics on the continent, most notably a high degree of pluralism and an absence of consensus, tending, at times, to produce conflict of a largely unproductive kind. Thus to review three collections containing a total of thirty-eight different essays presents certain obvious problems and not just the impossibility of citing all contributions individually. In spite of this some degree of a common focus does emerge. The majority of essays are concerned in one way or another with the relationships between, on the one hand, states and their incumbent regimes and, on the other, the societies and their component populations. A general agreement that these relationships are poorly and rather tenuously structured, especially in terms of accountability, can also be discerned. As Bayart puts it in the Chabal book, there exists a 'relative externality' between the state and civil society.

Chabal's collection is by far the most sophisticated and makes an important contribution to the literature. It will be read with great profit and real intellectual pleasure by specialists in the field but by the same token may prove rather heavy going for all but the brightest and most committed undergraduates. It advocates, and by and large maintains, an approach grounded in 'universal political theory' rather than one (eg modernisation theory or dependency theory) which attempts to analyse the Third World as a segregated entity. Because of this, Staniland's brilliant essay on ethnocentrism acts as a cornerstone for the whole volume. The approach allows Callaghy, in another brilliant essay, to depict African political systems as examples of 'early

modern authoritarian rule'. When he writes that 'pseudo-modern forms of rule in Africa only partially mask the solid core of a patrimonialised colonial state structure that must contend with traditional and quasi-traditional politics, powerful forms of particularism and emerging class consciousness' (p 33) it seems to me that he says more about contemporary African politics in one sentence than many entire books on the subject manage to do.

Chabal's own examination of the failure of revolutionary democracy and agrarian socialism in Guinea-Bissau is a fascinating study of a little known and little understood state. It is little understood because in the past much of the writing concerning it has been of a heavily subjective variety which was distanced from empirical reality and failed to cope with post-independence political and economic decline. I do have doubts, however, as to the extent to which Chabal is accurate in placing as much weight as he does on the tragic assassination of Amilcar Cabral in 1973 as a major explanation of subsequent failure rather than the contradictions inherent in the model of 'revolutionary democracy' adopted. There is no doubt that Amilcar Cabral was a gifted and dedicated (and, perhaps above all, realistic) African nationalist leader but Chabal's arguments sound rather akin to those which suggest that the Soviet Union would have developed in a radically different way if only Lenin had lived a few years longer and blocked Stalin's seizure of power. Such arguments are logically impossible to disprove but personally I find them unconvincing. However, as an analysis of how things have developed in Guinea-Bissau, rather than how they might have developed, Chabal's essay is intelligent and persuasive and he is certainly to be congratulated on putting together an excellent collection of articles for this volume.

The Ronen collection began life as a series of papers presented at a symposium organised by the Africa Research Programme of Harvard University's Center for International Affairs. One gets the impression that this was a lively and interesting symposium. Whether it works as well on the printed page is quite another matter. The first problem is that most of the contributions are extremely short: over two-thirds of the essays are less than ten pages and several are less than five. Thus one finds that many interesting questions are raised (which is fine for a symposium) but few essays are long enough or detailed enough to provide satisfactory answers. Olorunsola's essay on the downfall of the Second Republic in Nigeria is a good example. Although he expresses doubts as to how far the political problems of Nigeria are amenable to solution through constitutional engineering, he does raise some interesting questions on the possible relationship between certain provisions of the 1979 Constitution and the eventual collapse of the system. It is disappointing that he then does not have the space to suggest any answers to his own questions.

One theme which emerges in a number of essays relates to the ways in which regime accountability may be mediated through the indigenous smaller scale pluralist segments of the polity, in either an institutionalised or informal

manner. Essays by Ayoade, Magang, Kabongo, Ronen and others (and in a different way the essay on Islam by O'Brien in the Chabal collection) raise this matter. Ayoade's conclusion that 'only small-scale governments can restore political participation and bind the society to the state by recognising the functions of both' (p 31) goes further than most but it deserves more detailed examination than is allowed for here. Great sensitivity to the distinctive features of different African societies is necessary both for those who construct contemporary African political systems and for those who wish to understand them.

The Duignan and Jackson collection has a quite different format to the other two. Rather than being organised around a set of themes it consists of chapters on individual African states, or, more commonly, groups of states, with some attempt at a common framework. Because of this it may well be more useful for students who initially know little of the details of the political developments of African states. Conversely it has less to offer the specialist reader. Perhaps only the essays by Young (on Zaire) and Clapham (on the Horn of Africa) will have much appeal for the latter. Even then Young's essay is basically a summary of his recent excellent book on Zaire (*The Rise and Decline of the Zairian State*) and one eagerly awaits the book on Ethiopia that Clapham is currently writing.

Several of the essays are devalued by a fairly strident ideological tone. Some contributors appear to wish to use their case studies as a vehicle for anti-Marxism. Unfortunately this leads to simplicities remarkably similar in style to those found elsewhere in writings whose authors see themselves as writing from a Marxist perspective (and are seen by some as basically pseudo-Marxist and nationalistic). It seems to me that ideologies, usually formulated to deal with circumstances quite different to those which pertain in Africa, are a singularly futile way to approach the complexities of empirical reality and that the substitution of one for another takes the debate sideways rather than forwards.

An example of this is the issue of statism. The Duignan and Jackson critique that much Marxist writing has worked to produce, or at least justify, over-intrusive state structures in many African states is basically sound. That such state structures, often incompetent, authoritarian and corrupt, have operated directly against the interests of the mass of the population, especially in the rural areas, is also unfortunately the case. However to move to an anti-statist market-dominated strategy does not seem to provide the answer. The question is not whether the state should or should not play a role in, for example, economic development, but what sort of role it should play and how abuses may best be checked. A new distribution of national resources which gives a much higher priority to the needs *and* the wishes of the peasant majority is needed but state action will be required if this is to take place. At the heart of this problem lies the question of accountability which has underlain this discussion of the relationships between state and society.

This book does contain much useful material and, at times, sophisticated argument but, as an admirer of Jackson's previous work on 'personal rule' (*Personal Rule in Black Africa*, with Carl Rosberg), I find it ultimately disappointing. I know it is boring of reviewers to point out silly mistakes, but, in case this volume is reprinted, Kaunda is not President of Zaire (p 188) and the BLS states are not Lesotho, Swaziland and Basutoland (p 334).

All these books tend to share a rough and ready consensus on the point that economic and political developments in post-independence Africa have, in the main, been far from encouraging. However, the air of gloomy pessimism and weary fatalistic determinism is not unmitigated. As Dunn (in the Chabal collection) concludes 'many of these crimes and follies are very likely to be repeated in the future . . . but not a single one of them *has* [his emphasis] to be repeated' (p 174). Greater responsiveness of governments to the people they govern and steady, if not very dramatic, economic development are at least possibilities for the African future.

The Mexican economy

Laurence Whitehead

Planning the Mexican Economy: Alternative Development Strategies

Jorge Buzaglo

London: Croom Helm. 1984. 310pp. £16.95

Economic Policymaking in Mexico: Factors Underlying the 1982 Crisis

Robert E Looney

Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press. 1985. 309pp. \$37.50

Mexico's Dilemma: The Political Origins of Economic Crisis

Roberto Newell and Luis Rubio

Boulder, Colorado: Westview (Distributed in UK by IPI). 1984. 319pp. £45.00

Mexico: Class Formation, Capital Accumulation, and the State

James D Cockcroft

New York: Monthly Review Press. 1983. 384pp. \$25.00hb/\$12.50pb

Modern Mexico: State, Economy and Social Conflict

Edited by Nora Hamilton, Timothy F Harding

London: Sage. 1986. 312pp. £16.50

In 1980, at the height of the oil boom, the Mexican government published several long-term plans for economic development. The underlying idea was to use the oil 'surplus' captured by the state-owned monopoly (PEMEX) to finance a rapid and sustained industrialisation programme aimed largely at the expansion of the home market. Special priority would be given to employment generation, and the public sector would play a leading role. Foreign investment would be carefully screened and regulated (the assumption being that multinational corporations would be very keen to gain access to the dynamic domestic market), a moderate degree of inflation would be tolerated (as a necessary side-effect of rapid growth), and profits would be allowed to grow faster than wages. The trade unions would cooperate with this project, since membership would be rising rapidly, and the end product would be a modern full employment industrial economy. If oil wealth made this vision possible, demographic realities made it essential. As the long-term plans all stressed, Mexico's high birth-rate and rapid urbanisation in the 1960s and 1970s made it inevitable that a huge investment would have to be sustained over the last twenty years of the century. Those already born would inevitably require education, housing, transport and, above all, jobs. For example, the labour force of 17 million in 1980 would more than double—on the most cautious assumptions—by the year 2000. Thus one million new jobs a year would have to be created, and this would only be possible with sustained and very rapid growth of the domestic economy.

Today such visions are the fantasies of a forgotten past, as Mexico flounders from crisis to crisis in a losing battle to service its \$100 billion external debt. It is hard to believe that only seven years ago reasonably serious policy-makers were thinking in terms of export revenues from oil mounting to \$50 billion per year. If this forecast had turned out even half right, the servicing of the current debt would hardly be a crippling problem. In fact, last year's oil export revenues came to only \$5 billion, perhaps rising to \$7 billion in 1987. Only in the area of inflation (currently running well above 100 per cent per annum) has the economy surpassed the government's expectations. There has been almost no net job creation for about five years, while real wages are down by about 40 per cent on the levels achieved in 1980. Since the debt crisis broke in August 1982 (when the Central Bank simply ran out of foreign exchange reserves) the highest ambition of the economic authorities has been simply to restore, by 1990, the level of income per head achieved in 1980. Hope is now fading for the chances of fulfilling even that modest aim.

Jorge Buzaglo's book reflects the vaunting ambition of Mexican economic

policy-makers before the fall. It is tightly constructed, well-informed, and (as far as the reviewer can judge) technically ingenious. Using a multi-sectoral, dynamic input-output type model that required the estimation of 772 equations, Buzaglo simulated the likely performance of the Mexican economy between 1980 and 1990, under three alternative policy regimes. The 'basic' forecast was derived from the official 'Global Plan', which governed the development strategy supposedly in force in the early 1980s. Buzaglo considered several alternative variants of this strategy which need not detain us here. His essential findings were that, depending on the precise policy variant chosen, output would grow cumulatively by between 8 per cent and 9 per cent a year over the decade, while employment would grow at between 5 per cent and 7 per cent per year. (In round numbers the labour force rises from 15 million to about 27 million within ten years, which he considered acceptable in that unemployment would be reduced substantially, although it might not be eliminated, by 1990.) Two alternative development strategies were then considered. More public investment could be allocated to the oil industry. This (according to the model) would ensure even faster growth of output, but it would not speed up job creation and it would worsen income distribution and the non-oil balance of trade. Agriculture would be particularly hurt. Finally, therefore, Buzaglo used his model to appraise a third development strategy, one that would channel more resources into agriculture and 'basic needs', while doubling the burden of direct taxation. This 'new development strategy' emerged triumphant from econometric scrutiny: real output would grow by 10.6 per cent per annum and employment would increase by 10 per cent per year. On this hypothesis Mexico would reach full employment either in 1986, or at worst by 1989.

With hindsight it is easy to ridicule this exercise, but in the euphoria of the 'second oil shock' simulations such as these were treated with considerable solemnity. Buzaglo has done us a service by setting out so clearly the basis on which such reasoning rested. The intellectual challenge for the reader is to pretend ignorance of what was actually going to transpire, and then to identify the crucial flaws that should have been noticed from the outset. Here are two casually-mentioned properties of the model that might help: 'financial and monetary markets are not included . . . (but) an exogenously determined rate of foreign savings is.'

Robert E Looney has been studying the Mexican economy for some time. His first book, forecasting the prospects for 1990, was published in 1978. In this substantial and well-presented volume he argues that the 1982 crisis was 'a case of illiquidity rather than insolvency', and he applies optimum control theory to Mexico's recent and current stabilisation policies. For this purpose he uses a simple, basically Keynesian, macro-economic model (only forty-two equations) with, according to the author, a 'structure and estimation procedure designed for semi-developed economies (which) explicitly take into account

Mexico's institutions and institutional constraints'. Nevertheless, 'government investment is assumed to be exogenous and controllable by the authorities' and 'Bank of Mexico credit to the government is assumed to be controlled by the central bank.' (Not everyone would accept these two propositions as accurate reflections of Mexican political realities.) At least, by comparison with Buzaglo, Looney's model pays some attention to monetary factors, and to the variable nature of external capital flows. Just as Buzaglo tried to improve on Mexico's official Global Plan of 1980 (Minister responsible: Miguel de la Madrid), Looney tries to improve on the 1983-85 IMF Stabilisation Plan (President responsible: Miguel de la Madrid). But unfortunately *neither* of these supposedly 'technocratic' documents has turned out to bear much recognisable relationship to the actual course of economic developments. Thus, Looney's simulations for 1987 range between a 'high' inflation outcome of 17.4 per cent and a 'low' of 3.8 per cent. (He discarded the 'zero inflation' option, because it would require an actual fall in the level of real government spending on consumption.) The most severe stabilisation alternative considered would have reduced GNP growth to only 2.3 per cent, quickly turning Mexico into a capital exporter. This is dismissed as 'overkill', but what language does that leave to describe the actual outcome?

In fairness to Looney, it must be stressed that he also provides a thoughtful and well-informed assessment of the main macro-economic processes that destabilised the Mexican economy in the 1970s. He sets out his assumptions very clearly, and it can therefore be seen that these were not unreasonable or out of line with informed opinion at the time; and he follows the logic of his argument unflinchingly, always seeking to quantify the results, so there can be no fudging of the implications. So again the question arises, why are these projections so flawed? Well, one critical assumption is that crude petroleum exports would 'only' rise by 6 per cent per annum in 1981-87 ('illiquidity not insolvency' is assumed, rather than demonstrated). Also, although there is some discussion of capital flight, the broader dynamics and the massive long-term repercussions are largely overlooked. Finally, the bank nationalisation of September 1982 (which shattered the confidence of the domestic bourgeoisie) receives no attention.

Roberto Newell and Luis Rubio, by contrast, have little doubt that in the aftermath of the 1982 crisis 'Mexico is on the brink of becoming an altogether different country.' They are also clear that the foremost event of 1982 was the expropriation (their word) of the private banks. (Both authors are executive directors of the Instituto de Banca y Finanzas.) They adopt a much longer-term perspective than either Buzaglo or Looney, tracing the 'origins' of the crisis back to the revolution of 1910 and beyond. They also argue against economic determinism, asserting on the contrary that in Mexico political forces (broadly interpreted to include implicit social pacts) frequently determine economic outcomes, rather than *vice versa*. Setting aside the intricacies of their argument

(which is uneven but contains flashes of insight) their key contention is that the revolutionary regime established in 1917 'espoused, from the outset, the contradictory objective of pursuing both capitalism and socio-revolutionary goals that were incompatible with capitalism'. For many years this insoluble dilemma was masked in various ways; but since the early 1970s the Mexican regime has lost legitimacy, mechanisms of elite consensus have crumbled, and social polarisation has increased. The result has been growing economic instability (traceable essentially to domestic political roots, rather than to international economic fluctuations) culminating in the 1982 crisis. Only through a far-reaching reform of the political system can economic stability and a resumption of development be accomplished. The authors are remarkably vague about what such an overhaul of the system would require (they refer to 'more participation', but not explicitly to 'democratisation'). It is difficult to escape the conclusion that what they are really recommending is wholehearted espousal of the 'capitalist' option, and the systematic abandonment of socio-revolutionary goals, but they never explicitly say so; and their occasional choice of vaguely Marxist terminology clouds the issue. Their account of economic policy-making in the 1970s and early 1980s contains much substance, but the strictly *economic* component of their analysis is surprisingly thin. Prospects for the economy are not quantified, and no attempt is made to relate the social consequences of economic crisis to the political tasks either of re-legitimation or of capitalist consolidation.

Vaguely Marxist terminology is also deployed by James D Cockcroft (who like Nora Hamilton and Timothy Harding, is an editor of *Latin American Perspectives*, a radical journal widely circulated in the USA). These two remaining volumes have no doubt about where responsibility lies for the 1982 crisis and for many other ills. It lies with the Mexican capitalist state. In contrast to Newell and Rubio, Cockcroft argues with considerable historical detail that the regime was always committed above all to *capitalist* development. He interprets its 'socio-revolutionary goals' as a strategy of co-optation and control, to thwart radical demands from the property-less majority. Like Newell and Rubio, however, Cockcroft also sees growing polarisation (he would call it 'class struggle') as the root cause of the current political and economic crisis, but from his perspective 1982 looks more like another incident rather than a great divide. He writes with some authority on Mexican history, and with some passion on social—particularly labour—conflicts, but his analysis is marred by rhetorical excesses and a cavalier attitude to inconvenient evidence. On two key issues Newell and Rubio are more convincing: they try to explain why there has been so little effective lower-class resistance to the regime whereas he implies that it must be ever-increasing; and they view the Mexican private sector as at least semi-autonomous, whereas Cockcroft writes as if state monopoly capitalism (dependent on transnational corporations) has a monolithic and uniquely determined character. These two positions lead

Cockcroft to this quixotic conclusion: 'As monopoly capital tightens its grip over people's lives in both Mexico and the United States, working and progressive people will increasingly have to forge international networks of unity and struggle if a better future is to dawn.'

Hamilton and Harding reprint twelve articles on Mexico that have been published in *Latin American Perspectives* over the past decade. Some of these are now distinctly dated and the general analysis is much the same as in Cockcroft, although for the most part better argued. However, there are two chapters that shed additional light on the crisis of the 1980s. Barry Carr provides a left-wing analysis of the labour movement, which nonetheless makes clear why little effective resistance to government policies has been forthcoming from that sector. His provisional figures indicate that about two million workers were dismissed from their jobs as a result of the 1982-83 recession; and it is safe to assume that the 1985-87 downturn has been at least as severe. This is bound to produce 'a substantial erosion of the material welfare, and self-confidence of organised labour, and perhaps a severe challenge to the authority of the trade union bureaucracies'. Traditionally, Mexican labour leaders would have turned to the regime for support and reassurance during such downturns, but since 1982 the government has lacked both the resources and the inclination to counteract market pressures. Interestingly, Carr suggests that the bank nationalisation may have had a sobering, even a 'demobilising' effect on much of the labour movement. After 1982 it no longer has the private bankers to blame, but it still remains extremely reluctant to attack the incumbent administration directly, so the result is the adoption of a highly defensive posture. In the same volume, Nora Hamilton contributes an undogmatic interpretation of the bank nationalisation and its impact on business/government relations. This essay also raises doubts about the thesis that 'class struggle' is necessarily becoming more open and relentless in contemporary Mexico. However, it was written at a time when Mexico was still being touted as an example of successful emergence from the debt crisis. With hindsight it seems that President de la Madrid's 'neo-liberal' economic strategy has been less successful than she supposed in cementing a new alliance between state planners, Mexican businessmen and foreign suppliers of capital.

After five years of debt crisis few illusions persist about the Mexican government's strategic capacity or foresight. On the other hand, predictions of imminent social conflict and the collapse of the regime have been repeatedly falsified. What has remained unaltered are the powerful long-term demographic and social realities that impelled the Mexican authorities to attempt their failed dash for growth. Whatever the oil price, or the inflation rate, or the availability of external finance, Mexico's labour force will continue growing rapidly for at least another generation. On present form it may be a dangerously wasted generation.

Reflections of Kampuchea

Craig Etcheson

Cambodia 1975–1982

Michael Vickery

Boston, Massachusetts: South End Press. 1984. 361pp. \$9.00pb

Kampuchea: Politics, Economics and Society

Michael Vickery

London: Frances Pinter; Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers. 1986. 211pp. £17.50. £6.95pb

Kampuchea Between China and Vietnam

Chang Pao-Min

Singapore: Singapore University Press. 1985. 201pp. \$20.00hb

Southeast Asia Divided: The ASEAN–Indochina Crisis

Edited by Donald E Weatherbee

Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press. 1985. 151pp. £17.25

Unlike Western innocence, Western ignorance about Indochina survived the Second Indochinese War intact. Even in the late 1970s, the quantity and quality of scholarly work on Indochina in general—and Kampuchea in particular—left much to be desired. The dearth of serious study on this much-abused corner of the world was extended by volume after volume of propaganda, disinformation and confusion. Over the years, however, scholars and writers have made some progress. The 1980s has witnessed a deluge of serious work on Kampuchean politics and the role of Kampuchea in international affairs beginning to fill some of the many gaps in our understanding of Cambodia. Four of these recent volumes form the subject of this review.

Numerous valuable works have been produced by such noted Kampuchea scholars as David Chandler, Ben Kiernan, Stephen Heder, and others. Books with a more journalistic orientation, such as those by William Shawcross and Elizabeth Becker, have also continued to add to our knowledge of that unhappy land. Less well known, but nonetheless well established Indochina watchers, such as Doug Pike and M E Osborne have also increasingly played an important role in producing new knowledge about Kampuchea. It is into this category that most of our present authors fall.

The exception is Michael Vickery, author of two of the volumes under

review. A member of the Centre for Asian Studies at the University of Adelaide in Australia, Vickery earned a PhD in history at Yale, writing on ancient Khmer chronicles. He is a fluent Khmer speaker known for his command of obscure dialects. Vickery is rightly regarded as one of the world's leading authorities on Cambodia, albeit one with a very definite perspective and an acid style. He offers first a contribution to history, focusing on the Khmer Rouge state of Democratic Kampuchea (DK): *Cambodia 1975-1982*; and second, a study of the present regime, the People's Republic of Kampuchea (PRK): *Kampuchea: Politics, Economics and Society*.

In *Cambodia 1975-1982*, with the skill of an aerialist, Michael Vickery treads a fine line between an intensely personal, journalistic approach, and a stance of objective, analytical scholarly inquiry. As his title implies, he studies the reign of the infamous Pol Pot regime, the Khmer Rouge state, DK. Dr Vickery is trained as a professional historian, and this is evident in his method. He pays strict attention to empirical evidence, and seems to trust only the data he has generated first-hand. This contributes to the fire in his passionately critical historiography. Among his fellow Cambodianists, Vickery's style elicits reactions ranging from delight to rage. Reading Vickery is an exhausting but a rewarding undertaking.

Vickery sets out a record of painstaking and expertly conducted field research, relying largely on his extensive interviews with Khmers of all kinds. He proceeds then to indict all of those writings at variance with his data. 'A chronicler, or journalist, may simply repeat stories . . . but an historian may not' (p 51). He begins this indictment in Chapter Two, 'Problems of sources and evidence', where he reviews the considerable challenges to serious historical analysis inherent in the Kampuchean situation.

Vickery synthesises the most lurid of journalistic and academic accounts of contemporary Cambodian history into what he terms the Standard Total View or 'stv'. The stv holds that, from the very beginning of their victory in 1975, the DK authorities instituted a uniform, nation-wide, and brutally effective programme of class genocide; that DK abolished all modern appurtenances such as money, schooling, medical care, and religion; that they consciously separated families; and that they did lots of other irrational and unpleasant things. Vickery's extensive evidence comparing people's experiences at different times and in different places confirms conclusions from my own research. He successfully refutes the view that the stv was an accurate description of the situation across time and space throughout the 1975-79 reign of the Khmer Rouge. The stv was probably an accurate description of the situation in 1977-78, that is, after Pol Pot had crushed all opposition to his programme within the party. The situation in the first two years of the Khmer Rouge state, however, was much more complex. It is clear from evidence uncovered in the Tuol Sleng prison archives and elsewhere that some of the people Pol Pot crushed really did oppose his policies. The heart of Vickery's

contribution is Chapter Three, 'The zero years', where he lays out much of his interview data, substantiating his overall argument about the srV. Chapter Four deals with the transition between DK and PRK, largely through the device of a 'debate' with Stephen Heder.

In Chapter Five, 'The nature of the Cambodian Revolution', Vickery attempts a theoretical synthesis of his empirical investigations. Unfortunately, this becomes a rather weird attempt to dissociate Pol Pot's organisation from the label, 'communist'. It is as if he does not wish to sully the terms 'socialist' and 'communist' by associating them with Pol Pot's Kampuchean Communist Party (KCP). This effort leads to the most strained logic in an otherwise impeccably logical presentation. He argues that they were 'petit-bourgeois radicals overcome by peasant romanticism' (p 287). Certainly, the KCP rejected a number of revered elements of Marxist dogma, such as proletarian internationalism and the vanguard role of the proletariat. Does this also mean that Mao was not a Marxist because of his alliance with the peasants, or that Lenin was not a Marxist on account of his bald-faced voluntarism? Though he is correct to emphasise the heavy influences of peasant chauvinism evident in the Khmer Rouge revolution, this portion of Vickery's argument is not persuasive.

Despite the reservations noted above, *Cambodia* is required reading for anyone with a serious interest in Indochinese politics. Vickery's aim in *Cambodia* is to find out 'why a peasant revolution . . . became so bloody that in the end it lost the support of its most favored class, the peasants' (p 66). His answer—that 'nationalism, populism, and peasantism really won out over communism' (pp 289-90)—is not likely to satisfy all his readers. While it is possible to dispute some of Vickery's conclusions, the evidence and arguments he brings to bear will influence the terms of the debate over what happened in Democratic Kampuchea, and why. One hopes that his style and tone will not have the same influence. Although Vickery's style is sometimes needlessly antagonistic, his contributions to our understanding of Kampuchea are substantial.

Vickery's second contribution *Kampuchea: Politics, Economics and Society*, is in many ways perhaps the more valuable of the two, on account of its uniqueness. Essentially, this volume is a much-needed country study of the current regime and society in Kampuchea. It is part of the Pinter-Rienner Marxist Regime Series, and is cast in the mould of the American University Foreign Area Studies series. His presentation covers geography and demography, a brief political history, social structure, the party, the constitution, governmental structure, the economy, and domestic and foreign policies. The general lack of information about current conditions in Kampuchea, both externally and internally, makes such an enterprise a daunting task indeed. Vickery made two trips to the People's Republic of Kampuchea to gather data, for three weeks in 1981 and another five weeks in 1984.

There are a few minor problems with the work. For example, the chapter on the PRK constitution is curious. Vickery analyses four successive draft versions of the Constitution, attempting with limited success to deduce the existence of factions within the nascent PRK. Missing from Chapter Seven is any comparison of the PRK Constitution with that of DK or any previous Cambodian regimes. Comparison with DK's Constitution might be instructive with regard to the existence of factions in Khmer communism, and might be decisive—either for or against—in respect of one of Vickery's unstated but underlying themes, *viz.* that the PRK represents the true, legitimate heritage of the Khmer revolution, as distinct from the 'petit-bourgeois', 'chauvinistic', 'feudal fascist' DK. It is also unfortunate that, though he devotes an entire chapter to a discussion of it, the book does not include the full text of the final PRK Constitution.

The weakest portion of the work is the chapter on foreign policy. The continuing international diplomatic and economic isolation of the PRK, enforced by the West, reduces the scope of this topic, but it does not reduce its importance. There are several critical dimensions of the PRK's foreign relations which Vickery barely mentions or neglects to treat. The triangular relationship among the Indochinese nations, relations with ASEAN countries, with the CGDK, Japan, the Non-Aligned Movement, the UN, with regional and superpowers; these matters would seem to be of great moment in Cambodian foreign policy, but they are not adequately treated here. This seems implicitly to give ammunition to those who assert that the PRK's foreign policy is made in Hanoi, and that the PRK does not enjoy sovereignty. This is at variance with the impression Vickery seems anxious to convey, and thus it is surprising that he devotes so little attention to this aspect of the PRK.

Overall, Vickery has done a very professional job with a difficult and sensitive topic. This is a useful and well produced effort. It stands in considerable contrast to Dr Chang's book.

Chang Pao-Min is a Senior Lecturer in Political Science at the National University of Singapore. Dr Chang specialises in Sino-Vietnamese relations. His *Kampuchea Between China and Vietnam* deals with the 'Cambodia problem' in Sino-Vietnamese relations. Parts of this book have previously appeared as articles in such publications as *Asian Survey*, *International Affairs*, *Studies in Comparative Communism*, and *Survey*.

This slim volume differs from the others under review here in that, unlike the Vickery and Weatherbee volumes, Kampuchea emerges in the book not as subject but rather as object, an object in the foreign relations of the socialist Republic of Vietnam (SRV) and the People's Republic of China (PRC). As such, Cheng's book is not really 'about' Cambodia *per se*, but rather the 'Cambodia issue' in Sino-Vietnamese-Soviet triangular relations. It is about superpower and regional power foreign policy.

Both Vietnam and China are vulnerable to the charge that they treat Kampuchea as an object to be manipulated. While it is to be expected that the state apparatus will objectify its environment, it is puzzling when this is done by a scholar. The greatest problem with the Chang volume is that it tends to treat Kampuchea on the same terms that China and Vietnam use. If one wishes to read Chang Pao-Min's volume, one would do well to have Vickery's *Kampuchea: Politics, Economics and Society* to hand. Chang treats the current government of Kampuchea as if it did not exist, which, as Vickery amply demonstrates, is indeed a severely fractured reflection of the situation. Not only does it exist, but it is probably the most benign government Kampuchean have seen in a generation or more.

Chang begins his work with an overview that demonstrates a great sensitivity to the respective positions and concerns of the Chinese and Vietnamese alike. For example, he very delicately observes in his introduction that if 'historically China has felt especially akin to Vietnam and also shown greater inclination to intervene in Vietnamese affairs, such an orientation has unfortunately not been matched by Vietnam's receptivity to Chinese influence' (p 12). This is followed by several chapters of historical review, including a chapter on the double invasions of 1979, and, finally, chapters focusing on SRV and PRC diplomacy.

However, in several chapters (notably Chapter Five) Chang's argument is coloured by an apparent sympathy for the Chinese point of view *vis-à-vis* that of Vietnam. The author concludes in the final chapter that Vietnam's behaviour is at the root of the problem in Indochina: 'Hanoi is apparently no longer satisfied nor feels secure with anything less than a thoroughly unified entity in the form of a greater Vietnam' (p 177). This view is extreme, and made more suspect by numerous examples of apparent anti-Vietnamese bias. Moreover, he is sometimes imprecise with facts; for example, citing out-of-date Vietnamese troop strength figures, mentioning the 200,000 strong invasion force present in 1980, but neglecting to mention that this level has steadily declined since then to about 130,000.

Throughout the volume he repeatedly suggests, but never really attempts to build the case, that the Vietnamese are colonising Kampuchea. There is no serious effort carefully to examine the evidence; this is perhaps fortunate, for given Chang's apparent attachment to the idea, examination would likely lead to disappointment. Chang seems to subscribe to the highly alarmist view that the SRV intends to absorb Kampuchea and exterminate or enslave the Khmer people: 'Kampuchea was being dismembered as a functioning society with dire consequences on the entire Khmer race' (p 106). In a meek effort to substantiate this view, Chang mentions the presence of some 250,000 Vietnamese residents in Kampuchea. He seems unable to connect this with the fact that the pre-war Cambodian population contained an ethnic Vietnamese cohort approximately twice that size, not that ethnic minorities who were

subject to persecution and expulsion under DK and its predecessor now feel free to return to Kampuchea under the PRK.

Chapter Eight is a valiant attempt to conclude with a sensitive and balanced summary. Unfortunately, it quickly flounders in continued feckless thrashing about the colonisation thesis, and a continuing neglect of the *de facto* government.

Topical books concentrating on policy issues can be rendered outdated by sudden turns of events. Although Chang's brief index mentions the recently retired Vietnamese leaders Truong Chinh, Le Duc Tho, and Pham Van Dong, there is no entry for Nguyen Van Linh, the new party Secretary.

Such weaknesses aside, it is disappointing that a book focusing on relations between Vietnam, China and Kampuchea has so little hard information on the history of party-to-party and state-to-state relations between and among the various parties and states. This information is crucial to any honest and expert assessment of the overall triangular relationship. Chang's failure to treat it adequately severely damages the usefulness and credibility of his entire effort.

Donald E Weatherbee, the Donald S Russell Professor of Contemporary Foreign Policy at the University of South Carolina, is the Executive Editor of *Asian Affairs*. His volume, *Southeast Asia Divided: The ASEAN-Indochina Crisis* is an edited collection of papers originally prepared for a panel, 'Competing Security Interests in Southeast Asia', at the International Studies Association Conference in 1984. To a greater extent than is typical in such edited volumes, there is a thematic and organisational coherence to this collection which makes it a valuable contribution. Moreover, comparison of the original conference papers and the final edited versions in the book show that the authors profited from the panel discussion and did more to revise their works than simply account for the intervening events by back-filling their arguments. The collection is enhanced by the reprinting of fifteen useful official documents and declarations by ASEAN, the PRC and related bodies, covering the period 1979 to 1984.

The volume begins with an overview by Professor Weatherbee. His contribution, 'The diplomacy of stalemate', briefly reviews the recent history of Indochina, outlining the current actors and their respective positions. He sums up the international situation in one masterful sentence: 'While Vietnam resists being bled and politically disciplined by the PRC and the PRC seeks to contain Soviet hegemonism by proxy, the ASEAN nations would like to free the region from great power conflict and domination' (p 8). This is a classic 'security dilemma', a multi-player non-zero sum game. But it is a real game, one that Weatherbee believes is largely controlled by forces beyond the ASEAN and Indochinese nations: 'Settlement' of the Kampuchean problem, he predicts, 'will result from great power, primarily the USSR and the PRC, perceptions of the linkages of their interests to the local interests', and 'neither

ASEAN nor the SRV may be happy with a formula that satisfies the great powers.'

A second contribution is by Karl D Jackson, Associate Professor of Political Science with the University of California at Berkeley. Jackson specialises in ASEAN politics. His 'Doves of peace or dogs of war' speculates on the geopolitical purposes underlying Vietnam's annual dry season offensives against the Khmer rebels in the Thai border area. He wonders from the perspective of early 1984 whether or not Vietnamese peace overtures in late 1983 and early 1984 presaged movement toward a negotiated settlement in Kampuchea. Jackson suggests that these moves were rather of a tactical nature in Vietnam's continuing effort to split the united front presented by the ASEAN states. Pointing to the roots of the conflict, Jackson argues that both the Chinese and Soviet positions on Kampuchea seem relatively stable, and that consequently no major movement should be expected in 1984. He turned out to be correct.

John F Copper is Professor of International Studies at Rhodes College in Tennessee, and has a long-standing interest in Southeast Asian politics. His 'China and Southeast Asia' deals directly with the China angle in Kampuchean politics, and his analysis is rather more incisive and analytical than Chang's. Copper focuses on the PRC's security relations with the ASEAN and Indochinese nations. He reviews the strategic transformation in Chinese Southeast Asia policy during the 1970s, when it changed from solidarity with Vietnam and subversion in ASEAN countries, to informal alliance with ASEAN and military aggression against Vietnam. Given the Chinese strategic security situation *vis-à-vis* the USSR, Copper concludes, 'China has no great interest in resolving the Kampuchea situation unless it can be resolved to its liking' (p 61).

Sheldon Simon is Director of the Center for Asian Studies at Arizona State University. His contribution to the volume is titled 'The superpowers in Southeast Asia', which, as the title suggests, focuses on Soviet and American entanglements in the area. Simon reviews US and Soviet policies in the region, and outlines their regional force deployments and their respective alliance concerns. He concludes that although the Soviet geo-strategic position would seem to have improved considerably in Southeast Asia in recent years, this is more true with respect to deployment of armed forces than with respect to political status. 'In East Asia,' Simon argues, 'a community of political, economic, and military interests is developing among the United States, Japan, Australia/New Zealand, the ASEAN states, and—as long as it seeks Western investment and market economy trade—China. The Soviets (*sic*) and their Indochina clients are left out of these relationships' (p 78). This is the strategic carrot that ASEAN and its allies have dangled before the SRV for several years, attempting to use offers of economic relations to lever the Vietnamese away from their growing reliance on the USSR. As yet this policy seems little closer to success than when first adopted.

The final chapter is called 'The view from the frontline states: Thailand and Vietnam'. Here is reprinted a set of local ASEAN views, including a statement from the Thai Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and editorials from Bangkok and Hanoi newspapers. This section of the book could have been improved by adding additional representative materials.

Collectively, the authors of this volume are in general agreement as to the intractability of the positions of the major players in the continuing Kampuchean crisis. They achieve a consensus that the factors giving rise to the situation are relatively stable and, thus, that the crisis is likely to continue for some time to come. As I write this in 1987, their collective judgement continues to hold.

Taken together, the four books under review give a reasonably well-rounded picture of the recent history of Kampuchea. Individually, however, each of the four has serious gaps. Moreover, some matters are not adequately covered in any of the four volumes: none of the four does much to penetrate the shroud of mystery surrounding the complex and crucial relationship between party politics in the People's Republic of China and political interaction among Kampuchean revolutionaries. Such gaps are perhaps inevitable in any historical conflict of a complexity and duration comparable to the Indochinese Wars. It is unfortunate that the field of Asian studies still awaits a definitive treatment of modern Cambodian history. For the time being, we must be satisfied with fragmented vignettes; as though the country could be seen only through a cracked mirror—a thousand incomplete reflections of Kampuchea.

The Yemens

Fred Halliday

PDR Yemen: Outpost of Socialist Development in Arabia

Helen Lackner

London: Ithaca Press. 1985. 219pp. £18.00

The People's Democratic Republic of Yemen: Politics, Economics and Society

Tareq Y Ismael and Jacqueline S Ismael

London: Frances Pinter. 1986. 183pp. £22.50. £6.95pb

The Economic Development of the Yemen Arab Republic

Ragaei El Mallakh

London: Croom Helm. 1986. 196pp. £22.50

The conventional images of the Arabian Peninsula—bedouin, oil, sudden riches—are very much a partial representation of that region. The peninsula's 14 million or so indigenous inhabitants are, on closer examination, divided into eight states, themselves no model of political or regional integration. In their simplest form, the divisions of the peninsula can be seen in three ways: between the historically nomadic and settled communities, between those states which have oil and those which do not, and between the six monarchies and two republics. It is an accident of history that the dividing line in the first dimension should coincide with the second, but the coincidence of monarchies with nomadic society, Oman excepted, and with oil is not. In the settled societies social tensions reached a pitch, issuing in social revolution that the more dispersed and atomised nomadic societies did not produce, while income from oil has given the monarchies of Saudi Arabia, Oman and the smaller Gulf states the capacity to resist pressures from below. In the south-western states of Arabia, where the settled majority of the population live, pressure from outside and revolt from below have produced two revolutions and two, very contrasting, post-revolutionary states: the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY), and the Yemen Arab Republic (YAR). This poor, republican, and rebellious Arabia is a very long way from the profligacy of the oil-rich dynasties.

The study of the PDRY by Helen Lackner provides a detailed, unique portrait of developments in that country since the British departure from Aden in 1967. Herself resident in the PDRY for seven years, she combines a study of the history and evolution of the revolutionary movement, with some measured personal observations. Economic and social development are given special attention.

Lackner is sympathetic to the social programme of the PDRY government, stressing the welfare benefits and guarantees provided, despite the country's lack of resources. But she brings out many of the economic, social and political difficulties underlying the attempt to develop towards socialism in the PDRY, as well as the ideological obstacles posed by being a poor revolutionary state on the edge of an oil-rich and conservative peninsula. We visit schools in the interior to which parents refuse to send their daughters because education is mixed. The social reasons for the decline in production of the PDRY's main export crop, fish, are spelt out. We get a thinly masked hint of her rage at the mediocre quality of imported Egyptian television programmes, a comment it would appear, on many exasperated evenings in front of the screen.

The work by Tareq and Jacqueline Ismael, two American academics, is without this personal element and does not draw on any interviews or primary research. But it provides a lucid, well-documented, introduction to the PDRY, as one in a series of excellent monographs on Marxist regimes. They spell out the unique—in an Arab context—ideological and political character of the PDRY regime, its foreign policies in an embattled Arabian context, and the

constitutional and political structures built since independence. There are a few aberrant points in their analysis: they overstate the degree to which tribal loyalties no longer operate within the state, and there is too little recognition of the importance of North Yemen in the overall development of the PDRY. Having decided to include Arabic titles of organisations, they should have taken more care to get the spelling right. But, overall, this is an excellent addition both to the literature on Arabia and to that on Third World revolutionary states.

Both Lackner and the Ismaels touch upon, but do not discuss at length, the underlying questions raised by the PDRY's development, and not least by the explosion of intra-regime factionalism in January 1986 when thousands of people lost their lives. Such murderous factionalism is by no means unique in Third World revolutionary states—China, Cambodia, Grenada and Angola have all exhibited this trend. Analysis of factionalism in the PDRY would have to combine general features of such regimes, with study of specific, local tensions, and of political culture, tribe, and, by no means least, personality. Lackner's observations on the absence of revolutionary commitment amongst junior personnel in the PDRY are particularly apposite here. But, beyond this question there lies the overriding issue of what kind of transformation is possible in a poor, illiterate, encircled and often badly led revolutionary state, and of how far a reforming state, however determined it may be, can change the values and practices of society. It is perhaps a failing of both Lackner and the Ismaels that they make too little use of the material provided on social problems by the PDRY's press.

The history of the Yemen Arab Republic, or North Yemen, has been as conflictual as that of the South, but it has a larger population base and a substantial agricultural sector. El Mallakh's study provides a wealth of statistical information on the YAR economy since the revolution of 1962, and discusses the central issue of migration in addition to the main sectors of the domestic economy. But overall this is a disappointing book: too much of it is 'wish-list' talk based on current, unfulfilled plans; there is no realistic attempt to assess the capacity of the state to develop the economy; difficult problems such as the social consequences of *qat* consumption and migration are treated superficially; and the issue of land tenure is ignored. The real question about the YAR economy must be whether the changes of the last quarter of a century constitute 'development' at all, or whether, given the running down of domestic agricultural potential, and the consumerist distortions of the economy, there has not rather been a process of growing 'underdevelopment'.

LITERARY PROFILE

Punching holes inside people: words of Wole Soyinka

Adewale Maja-Pearce

'We haven't begun actually using words to punch holes inside people.

But let's do our best to use words and style when we have the opportunity. To arrest the ears of normally complacent people, we must make sure we explode something inside them which is a parallel of the sordidness which they ignore outside.'¹

Wole Soyinka, the recipient of the 1986 Nobel Prize for Literature, made this statement while in self-imposed exile from Nigeria, in 1974. Though referring specifically to his prison journal, *The Man Died*, which had appeared two years previously, these words also serve as a general statement of Soyinka's intentions, a statement well borne out by his career to date.

Seven years after independence in 1960, Nigeria was plunged into civil war. By then, Wole Soyinka had achieved a considerable reputation as the country's most exciting dramatist. Some of his best-known plays had already been produced both at home and abroad to critical acclaim, including *The Swamp Dwellers* (1959), *The Lion and the Jewel* (1959), *A Dance of the Forests* (1963), *The Trials of Brother Jero* (1964) and *Kongi's Harvest* (1965).

The Swamp Dwellers was first produced in 1958 for the University of London's Annual Drama Festival. At this time, Soyinka was attached to the Royal Court Theatre as a script-reader, a position he held for eighteen months after taking a degree in Literature at the University of Leeds. In the same year he also presented an evening's entertainment at the Royal Court Theatre under the title, *The Invention and Other Tales*, which included some poems as well as a one-act play. But it was on his return to Nigeria for the Independence celebrations that his career really began to gather momentum. *A Dance of the Forests* won first prize in a competition organised by a British literary magazine. Soyinka produced it himself, with his own acting company, 'The 1960 Masks'. This acting company was the first of many which Soyinka formed, usually in association with his students at the various universities to which he was attached over the next few years. In using his own companies, he not only kept a great measure of control over the actual productions of his plays, but was continuing an established tradition within Nigeria. One of the most popular forms of entertainment in Yorubaland, the part of the country from which Soyinka comes, is the Yoruba Travelling Theatre, consisting of itinerant theatre companies which travel around the country putting on performances in

¹ 'Interview with Wole Soyinka in Accra, Ghana, 1974', in John Agetua (ed), *When the Man Died: Views, Reviews and Interview on Wole Soyinka's Controversial Book*, Benin City, 1975.

villages and towns. There are presently reckoned to be over one hundred of them in competition with each other, the most successful finding their way into the weekly television slots allotted to the Travelling Theatre companies. Each company usually operates under the direction of one man, who writes the material, directs the production and stars in the lead role.

During this period of creative activity Soyinka also wrote radio plays, a novel, *The Interpreters* (1965), as well as poetry and essays. At a time when many of the country's most promising writers were attempting to rescue the African past by re-creating pre-colonial African society from an African perspective, Soyinka alone was directing his full attention at the contemporary scene. *Kongi's Harvest*, for instance, which was later turned into a film with Soyinka playing the leading role, is a bitter attack on the corruption of power in a newly-emergent African state; *The Interpreters*, which focuses on a group of disaffected intellectuals, denounces the cynicism and incompetence of the ruling elite. In one of his earliest essays, 'The writer in a modern African state', first delivered at a conference in Sweden in 1967, Soyinka took his fellow-writers to task for ignoring what he regarded as the most pressing issue of the day:

In the movement towards chaos in modern Africa, the writer did not anticipate. The understanding language of the outside world, 'birth pains', that near-fatal euphemism for death throes, absolved him from responsibility. He was content to turn his eye backwards in time and prospect in archaic fields for forgotten gems which would dazzle and distract from the present. But never inwards, never truly into the present, never into the obvious symptoms of the niggling, warning, predictable present, from which alone lay the salvation of ideals.²

Not surprisingly, Soyinka was also known, to the authorities at least, as a trouble-maker. In 1965, at the height of the elections in which those in power exhibited a scale of corruption for which the country was to become legendary, he was charged with holding up a radio station at gunpoint and forcing the broadcasters to transmit a pre-recorded tape demanding that the ruling politicians 'get out of town'. He was subsequently acquitted on a technicality. The following year the army seized power but was unable to halt the slide into civil war. At the outbreak of the war Soyinka was arrested and spent almost the entire duration, from August 1967 to October 1969, in detention—most of it in solitary confinement. Since he was never formally charged and brought to trial the reasons for his incarceration can only be a matter for speculation; but it is certain that it had something to do with his clandestine missions to the break-away state of Biafra in order to try to convince the rebel leader, Lieutenant-Colonel Ojukwu, that the course he was embarking on could not possibly solve the underlying problem of Nigerian society. Soyinka seems to have believed in the existence of what he terms 'the Third Force'; in *The Man*

² Wole Soyinka, 'The writer in a modern African state', in Per Wastberg (ed), *The Writer in Modern Africa*, Uppsala: The Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, 1968, p 17.

Died (1972), he reproduces part of a conversation he had at the time with a colleague:

The army must be returned to its status as part of the proletariat. The politician-patrician mentality is already destroyed but it has begun a new life by its anonymous infiltration of a naive, purely instinctive Army. We need a Third Force which thinks in terms of a common denominator for the people. If the East [Biafra] will pause, ask for a cease-fire and give the Third Force time to proliferate through all the key places . . . well, the time is right. I did not come all this way to ask the East to surrender. But the secession must be called off.³

Self-dramatisation and political naivety are among the criticisms that have most consistently been levelled against *The Man Died*; and yet, however naive such a recipe might sound, his vision of the post-civil war state gives the true measure of the man:

Militarist entrepreneurs and multiple dictatorships: this is bound to be the legacy of a war which is conducted on the present terms. The vacuum in the ethical base—for national boundary is neither an ethical nor an ideological base for any conflict—this vacuum will be filled by a new military ethic—coercion. And the elitist formulation of the army, the entire colonial hangover which is sustained by the lack of national revaluation will itself maintain and promote the class heritage of society. The ramifications of the alliance of a corrupt and rapacious Mafia in society are endless and are nearly incurable. The war means a consolidation of crime, an acceptance of the scale of values that created the conflict, indeed an allegiance and enshrinement of that scale of values because it is now intimately bound in the sense of national identity.⁴

This is precisely what happened. What finally emerged by the early 1980s was a powerful group known as 'the Kaduna Mafia'—'a cohesive amalgam of Northern politicians, intelligentsia, top bureaucrats, investors, gentleman farmers, military and police commanders'⁵—who were sucking the life-blood out of the country. It is they, for instance, who are presently being held responsible for the murder of Dele Giwa, the investigative journalist and founder of the weekly *Newswatch* magazine, who was killed by a letter bomb delivered to his house in Lagos on 19 October 1986. At the time of his murder he was known to have unearthed fresh evidence concerning the Johnson Matthey Bank (JMB) scandal in which N100 million of government money had left the country illegally during the second civilian regime of the early 1980s. The scale of the corruption associated with that regime, of which the JMB scandal was only the most spectacular of many, was merely a continuation of the deteriorating moral climate which Soyinka had already identified.

Between the end of the civil war and the second coming of civilian government, Soyinka repeatedly hammered home the thesis at the heart of *The*

³ Wole Soyinka, *The Man Died*, Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1975; first published by Rex Collings, 1972, p 178.

⁴ *ibid.*, p 182.

⁵ Quoted in Chief Francis Arthur Nzeribe, *Nigeria—Another Hope Betrayed*, London: Kilimanjaro Publishing, 1985 p 28.

Man Died. His prison journal was itself only one of a quartet of civil war books which included a play, *Madmen and Specialists* (1971); a volume of poetry, *A Shuttle in the Crypt* (1971); and a novel, *Season of Anomy* (1973). This intensively productive period, which also included a re-working of Euripides' *The Bacchae* (1973), a book of literary criticism, *Myth, Literature and the African World* (1976), and a three-part poem, *Ogun Abibiman* (1976), which was inspired by Mozambican President Samora Machel's declaration of war against the Smith regime in Rhodesia, culminated in one of his finest plays, *Opera Wonyosi*. It was first performed in 1977 at the University of Ife, where Soyinka had been appointed Professor of Comparative Literature on his return to the country in 1975.

Opera Wonyosi, a Nigerian version of Brecht's *Threepenny Opera* covering the familiar ground of corruption, violence and hypocrisy in the modern state, was immediately attacked by the new breed of Nigerian Marxists who, according to Soyinka, complained that it did not go far enough to 'lay bare unambiguously the causal historical and socio-economic network of society in such a way as to enable us to master reality and, in fact, transform it.'⁶ In his foreword to the published version of the play, Soyinka is unequivocal about his intentions:

Opera Wonyosi is an exposition of levels of power in practice—by a satirist's pen. To ask for a 'solid class perspective' in such a work curtails creative and critical options and tries to dodge labour which properly belongs to the socio-political analyst. The Nigerian society which is portrayed, without one redeeming feature, is that oil-boom society of the seventies which every child knows only too well. The crimes committed by a power-drunk soldiery against a cowed and defenceless people, resulting in a further mutual, brutalization down the scale of power—these are the hard realities that hit every man, woman and child, irrespective of class as they stepped out into the street for work, school or other acts of daily amnesia.⁷

Soyinka has always been impatient with the critics who 'cover reams of paper with unceasing lament over the failure of this or that writer to write for the masses of the people, when they themselves assiduously engage—with a remorseless exclusivity—only the incestuous productivity of their own academic, bourgeois-situated literature'.⁸ In the essay from which this is taken, 'The critic and society: Barthes, leftocracy and other mythologies', Soyinka asserts that 'liberation', which involves 'strategies of reducing the status and structure of the power-wielding class in public consciousness, exposing and demystifying its machinery of oppression', is one of the overriding functions of the theatre. He adds:

The satirist operates with an implicit recognition of the social limitations of his art; his

⁶ Wole Soyinka, 'The critic and society: Barthes, leftocracy and other mythologies' in Henry Louis Gates (ed), *Black Literature and Literary Theory*, London: Methuen, 1984, p 39.

⁷ Foreword to *Opera Wonyosi*, London: Rex Collings, 1981.

⁸ 'The critic and society . . . ' p 28.

methodology is allied to the social strategy of preparation. The mastering of reality and its transformation requires the liberation of the mind from the superstition of power, which cripples the will, obscures self-apprehension and facilitates surrender to the alienating processes ranged against every form of human productivity.⁹

In other words, the ability to see clearly, and to report what one sees, is not only the proper function of the writer but is itself a revolutionary act.

The most interesting criticism of Soyinka has come, not from the Marxist camp, but from what might be called the 'authenticity school of African writing' following the publication of the influential critique of African literature by the Nigerian poet and critic, Chinweizu, in collaboration with two others. The theme of their book, *Toward the Decolonization of African Literature*, is stated succinctly enough in their introduction: 'The cultural task in hand is to end all foreign domination of African culture, to systematically destroy all encrustations of colonial and slave mentality, to clear the bushes and stake out new foundations for a liberated African modernity.'¹⁰

At the heart of the rot is what they identify as the tension between the universal and the local, the universal being, in the case of African literature, an invidious concept of what constitutes 'proper' literature, which is defined wholly in European terms. Of all African English-language writers, Soyinka is seen as coming closest to the European model. Their argument is rather long-winded, not to say hysterical, and involves a close examination of Soyinka's poetry. Because Soyinka is an often tortuous and even wilfully obscure poet—and not a very good one at that—he is identified by Chinweizu *et al.* as a 'euromodernist', one of those who, taking their cue from Eliot, Pound and Hopkins, have merely 'aped the practices of twentieth-century European modernist poetry'.¹¹ This is taken to be because they are ashamed of their own traditions, proof of which is Soyinka's refusal to explore sufficiently the possibilities of the African world: 'He appears to want to give center stage to the European cultural imports since he insists that to give center stage to traditional African phenomena is to create a neo-Tarzanist Africa.'¹² This sentiment, in their view, explains Soyinka's refusal to consider the African past as a fitting theme of African literature:

Those who reject the African past and would have as little to do with it as possible are those who, shamed by imperialist propaganda and misrepresentation, would wish to forget it entirely and hurry off into a euromodernist African future. Prominent among them are those . . . African neo-Tarzanists who dismiss African literature that deals with the African past as a 'literature of self-worship', a literature of narcissism.¹³

⁹ *ibid.*, p 40.

¹⁰ Chinweizu, Onwuchekwa Jemie and Ihechukwu Madubuike, *Toward the Decolonization of African Literature—African Fiction and Poetry and Their Critics*, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1985; first published by Fourth Dimension, 1980, p 1.

¹¹ *ibid.*, p 163.

¹² *ibid.*, pp 235–6.

¹³ *ibid.*, p 256.

It cannot be denied that there is an interesting and important idea buried in this argument, but Chinweizu *et al.* weaken their case considerably. This is partly because their argument against Soyinka assumes the level of a personal vendetta, but much more seriously because they underestimate the importance of language itself.

The language issue is absolutely central to any discussion of modern African literature. To the extent to which literature is language, one wonders how far it is possible to talk of creating authentic African literatures in the colonial languages. But Chinweizu's dismissal of the language issue is altogether too hasty, almost as though he intuitively understands its importance:

Ideally, African literature should be written in African languages. But the same historical circumstances that presently compel African writers to use Western languages . . . also compel African writers to write in them. *Until those historical circumstances are changed . . . it is pointless debating whether or not to use these Western languages in our literature* (emphasis added).¹⁴

It so happens that the historical circumstances and the Western languages are inseparable: the one is a result of the other. To continue to use those languages is to remain within the historical circumstances imposed upon the societies by the European colonial powers. One wonders just how Chinweizu imagines that the historical circumstances can be changed without the use of African languages to re-define the African reality. This redefinition must go far beyond any simple list of artefacts—which would result in an intolerably parochial literature dependent on exoticism for its narrow appeal—and has to do with an entire world-view. Meanwhile, since Soyinka writes in English it is as an English-language writer that he demands to be assessed.

On that assessment he stands head and shoulders above his contemporaries, including his fellow-countryman, Chinua Achebe, and the Kenyan novelist, Ngugi wa Thiong'o, both of whom were also contenders for the distinction of being the first African writer to be awarded the Nobel Prize for Literature. Achebe, in particular, is just that type of parochial writer who produces novels that depend almost entirely on a relentless accumulation of cultural artefacts for their appeal. The fact that his novels are immensely popular only confuses the question of his status; many second-rate writers may be popular without their meriting the status of literary giants. One of the critical problems of modern African literature is the absence of a sense of scale precisely because it is new. Soyinka, in winning the Nobel Prize, has placed himself at the forefront of an emerging tradition: all future Nigerian writers will have to come to terms with and be judged by the standard of what he has done.

Nigeria reached its lowest point during the second civilian administration of 1979–83, when the army finally relinquished power. Soyinka continued to expose the moral failings of the Nigerian leadership, and particularly those of the President, Shehu Shagari, who 'presided for four years over the most

¹⁴ *ibid.*, p 242.

unscrupulous and insatiable robbery consortium that the nation has ever known'.¹⁵ During the notorious 1983 elections in which 'Special Units of the anti-riot Police . . . baton-charged lines of voters'¹⁶ who were unwilling to accept another four years of the ruling party, Soyinka made a film, *Blues for a Prodigal*, intended, in his words, as 'an almost unambiguous call to arms' to 'mobilize people's opinion and outrage against the Shagari regime'.¹⁷ The film was based on an actual incident in which a student had been recruited by a political party to carry out raids on their opponents, but after squandering the money on a spending spree in London with his girl-friend, changed his mind and sought refuge with a group at the University of Ife. In the same year, Soyinka produced a full-length play, *Requiem for a Futurologist*, which charted the spiritual malaise and confusion of Nigeria through the career of a fortune-teller and 'con man'.

Chinua Achebe recently paid tribute to Soyinka's 'stupendous energy and vitality'.¹⁸ It is a fitting comment on a man who, in a distinguished career spanning thirty years, from his student days in Leeds in the 1950s to his present position as Head of the International Theatre Institute in Paris, has presented us with an enduring record of the corruption and decadence of modern Nigeria. In eschewing the political rhetoric of the Left as well as the Right—the 'smelly little orthodoxies', in Orwell's phrase—Soyinka has come much closer than anyone else to revealing the sinister forces in Nigeria society.

¹⁵ Wole Soyinka, 'Electoral fraud and the Western press', *Index on Censorship* 12(6) December 1983, p 13.

¹⁶ *ibid.*, p 11.

¹⁷ James Gibbs, 'Soyinka's blues', *New African* (London) June 1985, p 43.

¹⁸ 'An event to celebrate', *The African Guardian* (Lagos) 30 October 1986, p 16.

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Old wine in new bottles: re-publishing African writers

Alastair Niven

Things Fall Apart

Chinua Achebe

1986. 150pp. £3.50pb

Arrow of God

Chinua Achebe

1986. 230pp. £3.50pb

A Grain of Wheat

Ngugi wa Thiong'o

1986. 247pp. £3.95pb

Petals of Blood

Ngugi wa Thiong'o

1986. 250pp. £3.95pb

God's Bits of Wood

Sembène Ousmane

1986. 245pp. £3.50pb

Estrangement

Elechi Amadi

1986. 244pp. £3.95pb

London: Heinemann Educational Books (African Writers Series)

The Beggar's Strike

Aminata Sow Fall

London: Longman (African Classics). 1987. 112pp. £2.95pb

It was difficult for those people who, upon hearing of Wole Soyinka's recent award of the Nobel Prize for Literature, asked 'Who's he?' to understand the wave of jubilation that swept literate Africa when the news was announced. It was for readers of African literature an honour long overdue, not just for Soyinka himself but for Africa. Presumably the judges considered it indefensible to withhold the award from Africa any longer, though on my last visit to Sweden, in April 1986, there were gloomy voices

abroad saying that, as Senghor was too old, Achebe apparently written out (untrue in either case) and Fugard and Gordimer white, Africa's only hope for a Nobel Prize was Soyinka. And he was unlikely to make it because he was too abrasive, too intellectual, or too pessimistic for the Nobel assessors, who were deemed to be seeking spiritually uplifting authors for their approbation. Soyinka has never been a populist writer, and his reputedly cerebral attitudes are the basis of the charge which an influential school of Nigerian critics, led by Chinweizu in *Towards the Decolonisation of African Literature*, have made against him. His work, however, shows a versatility which is unique in African writing and one does not have to reach far into it to realise that his humanity is uncompromisingly present in everything he writes.

Soyinka's writing is now the natural starting-point for a discussion of contemporary African writing, and one may presume that it is only a matter of time before his books are re-issued with 'Nobel Prize Winner 1986' emblazoned on them. A few years ago, Chinua Achebe was the first person anyone mentioned in connection with African writing, a position that may arise again if the novel which he is now known to have completed lives up to even a fraction of the expectations that exist for it. Even now Achebe's is the first name in any chronological account of the post-war emergence of Anglophone African writing. *Things Fall Apart* has a unique status as the novel which taught African people 'that their past—with all its imperfections—was not one long night of savagery from which the first Europeans acting on God's behalf delivered them'. It was the first novel from Africa to be a world best-seller: the publishers say that over two million copies have been sold, but its readership, given its place on virtually every African literature syllabus inside and outside Africa, must be many millions more than that. It was No. 1 in the old Heinemann African Writers Series list and it is in the first batch of novels to be brought out under the same imprint in a newly vamped presentation. It is the progenitor of much modern African fiction and nothing is likely to detract from that status, not even the radical accusations of a few young African intellectuals who have taken to interrupting Achebe when he gives a public talk. Liberal, humanist, tragic by either an African or a Eurocentric aesthetic definition, ironic, concerned with balanced English rooted in indigenous culture—one can list the sins of this novel in the eyes of post-structuralists and oraturists. Yet, it is in the end a work of such compulsive intelligence that it is bound to hold its place not only among the foremost works of African literature, but internationally in modern fiction, which is in itself its ultimate crime, of course, for those who say that authenticity in African expression precludes cross-cultural comparisons. Joining it there will be Achebe's other master work, *Arrow of God*, which many people regard as the greatest African novel yet published. It, too, has been re-issued in the new African Writers Series.

Things Fall Apart and *Arrow of God* are among several well-known African books which are included in the new unnumbered African Writers Series. The story of the earlier series, which in effect came to an end when the commissioning editor, James Currey, parted company with Heinemann Educational Books (HEB) to establish his own Africa-focused publishing company, is one of the great unsung tales of twentieth-century publishing. Hardly an African writer of consequence was left out of the series, which launched the great and the minor writers, poets, playwrights and story-tellers, oral texts and translations, essays, autobiographies and criticism. Its transmogrification into the slow but as yet far less adventurous African Writers Series, Mark 2, has not been fully explained publicly, though it is easy to make some deductions not

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unconnected with take-over bids by multi-national companies which rate publishing as fairly marginal to their main profit direction. Perhaps, however, the time was also right for such a change. For the past ten years at least there has been, despite shortages of paper and ink, poor distribution and serious under-capitalisation, an extraordinary increase in the quantity—and quality—of indigenous African publishing. This phenomenon is another of the unsung triumphs of modern publishing and one of the many positive features of Third World life that are almost completely disregarded by Western commentators. The domination of the big European and American publishers in African literature has waned to such an extent that today most of the best new writers emerge first in Africa itself. This is surely how one would wish it to be, not least because it helps to pre-empt the kind of carping which Achebe and Ngugi wa Thiong'o in his James Ngugi days had to endure—namely, that they were writing for European readers and not for Africans.

Ngugi's *A Grain of Wheat*, included in the new African Writers Series, is a novel that I have always considered a half-way house between the Christian-centred early novels, *The River Between* and *Weep Not, Child*, and the full-blooded socialism of *Petals of Blood*, which is also re-issued by Heinemann. Other re-issues include Alex La Guma's *A Walk in the Night*, which groups a collection of short stories and the eponymous novella, and in which the atmosphere of urban oppressiveness bred by apartheid has never been better depicted; Bessie's Head's *A Question of Power*, with its searing personal account of a mind verging on insanity (how far apart in objectivity are these two writers of South African origin and how sadly close their deaths); and Nelson Mandela's *No Easy Walk to Freedom*, a celebrated assembly of articles, speeches and letters, including those statements from the dock in 1964 which we cannot today hear repeated too often: 'Fear cannot be allowed to stand in the way of the only solution which will guarantee racial harmony and freedom for all.' Perhaps most enduring of all the books which the African Writers Series has brought out afresh is *God's Bits of Wood*, Francis Price's translation of *Les bouts de bois de Dieu* by Sembène Ousmane. This tells what had hitherto been the little-known tale of how workers on the Dakar-Niger railway went on strike in 1947-48. It is in the best sense, a more densely written work than any of the others I have mentioned, graphic in detail, epic in scope, historically convincing in its portrait of the effects of colonisation upon the poor.

The new editions in the African Writers Series are colourfully presented and well marketed. They deserve to be successful, especially as the Series will from time to time include among its titles new works that have in no way acquired a classic status. The first crop, for example, includes *Estrangement* by Elechi Amadi. Amadi wrote two of the most deceptively simple and hence sometimes underestimated African novels, *The Concubine* and *The Great Ponds*. *Estrangement* examines what has to some extent become obligatory subject-matter for the modern Nigerian novelist—the civil war and its aftermath. Away from the world of gods, Amadi loses some of the haunting fatalism of earlier novels, but this is still a well-plotted and socially animated story.

The Longman company's own new series, Longman African Classics, has re-issued some well-known books in its first list—Isidore Okpewho's *The Victims* and Ama Ata Aidoo's *The Dilemma of a Ghost* and *Anowa*, for example—but none of these, frankly, is a masterpiece in the *Things Fall Apart* or *God's Bits of Wood* class and they tend only to underline the extent to which the old Heinemann African Writers Series had so cornered the African literature market. There is perhaps one 'classic' of this kind in the

Longman list, *La Grève des Bantu*, translated by Dorothy S Blair as *The Beggar's Strike*. This short novel by the Senegalese author, Aminata Sow Fall, distils some of the same concerns as Ousmane's but it is a more ironic and immediate depiction of a strike; and a novel totally lacking in portentousness.

The real distinction in Longman's African list lies with the works in the more simply named Longman African Writers series. Here is the place to find new novels by emerging authors whose names have already become worthy of note—Festus Iyayi, for example, whose new book, *Heroes*, is his contribution to the literature of civil war and who had in an earlier novel, *Violence*, begun to define a new kind of Nigerian urban sensibility. In the Heinemann publishing empire, meanwhile, it appears that the main section of the company, Heinemann itself (rather than the HEB African Writers Series in its new format), has been left to nurture new African writers. It has already introduced us to the brilliant Kojo Laing, whose latest work, together with that of Festus Iyayi, will be reviewed in the next issue of *Third World Quarterly*. This piece has been about the establishment of a pantheon. The tents outside its entrance must await a further visit.

The Real Life of Alejandro Mayta

Mario Vargas Llosa (Translated by Alfred MacAdam)

New York: Vintage books. 1986. 309pp. \$6.95pb

Reviewing an earlier Vargas Llosa novel, Anthony Burgess ascribed to Latin American fiction 'a total lack of hope, except in the demented form of chiliastic prophecy'. He was wrong about the fiction as a whole, but he was characteristically perceptive about Vargas Llosa.

In writings spanning twenty-five years, Vargas Llosa observes the interwoven fatalities to which he believes everyone is subject. In his first novel, *Time of the Hero* (1962), for example, a group of cadets in a military school are taught that the price of survival is to yield to the violent *machista* norms of adult social behaviour. In the parallel short novel, *Los Cachorros* (1967), Vargas Llosa poignantly describes the expulsion into a social wilderness (and eventual suicide) of a boy rendered useless by accidental castration.

The scenario recurs in all his novels. The socially marginal, the inadequate and the impotent seek a mode of survival in the wildernesses to which society assigns the eccentric and undesirable. In his elaborate novel, *The Green House* (1966), the attempt to create a community in the metaphorical desert is set in a number of Peruvian locations at different times. In every case, the attempt fails, leaving only an epitaph in folk memory. Those reluctant rebels wage an often heroic struggle to create a living space. Yet they never consciously seek to install an alternative power, nor to challenge what exists. They only claim the right to live outside the walls.

As long as they remain the sad victims of our rigid rules of social exclusion, Vargas Llosa reserves for them his curious blend of pity and fatalism. Thus in his extraordinary novel, *The War at the End of the World* (1980), Vargas Llosa uses the historical experience of the Canudos community as the apotheosis of his negative vision. In Canudos, the halt, the lame and the despairing gather around an evangelist called 'the

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Counsellor', to build a millenarian community in the isolated plains of north-eastern Brazil. Its very existence proved intolerable to the Brazilian government, which destroyed it, in the face of magnificent resistance, with exemplary ferocity. There is no suggestion that it could have been otherwise; the lines of fate are clearly drawn. This is a deeply fatalistic vision: It asserts that human beings can never achieve a level of understanding that enables them to effect a successful transformation of the world. The quest for such knowledge is the stuff of delusion. All that remains is the wisdom of revelation, of knowing what is, which can redeem the individual alone. The Canudos novel therefore ends with scientists examining the evangelist's head for signs of madness.

That is the background to Vargas Llosa's latest novel, *The Real Life of Alejandro Mayta*. I was struck by the significant substitution of 'real' for the word 'true' in the Spanish title. In my view this novel is anything but true, because its imperatives, its laws of motion as a novel lie outside its own field of action. In fact, it is a series of caricatures, at the centre of which is a quite vitriolic parody of the revolutionary, Mayta. It is not only that Mayta is presented as weak, self-indulgent and naive to the point of stupidity (an impression reinforced by the ingenuous American suburban youthspeak adopted by the translator), for it is much more than a portrait of a misguided individual.

Mayta takes the form of an investigation. Its context is a Lima which the narrator presents in apocalyptic terms; the city is 'the stinking garbage dump whose birth and growth I've witnessed' (p 4). The insistent question is, why has it come to this, and who is responsible? The novel traces back through time the life of a revolutionary, Alejandro Mayta, whose career has paralleled the decline and collapse of the city. Through interviews with his friends, his comrades and his critics, the narrator describes his role in a ridiculous attempted coup in the mountain town of Jauja in 1948, his subsequent immersion in sectarian conflict, his move to individual terrorism, and his new idealism born of the Cuban Revolution.

Mayta is also a homosexual, a sexual preference inescapably linked in the novel to self-delusion and corruption. Each political action has an immediate genital response: 'It was as true and concrete as the imminent revolt; he had had in his arms the boy he had desired for so many years' (p 142). Predictably, revolutionary ideas are shown as bad faith at best, manipulative dishonesty at worst, a way of getting gullible young men into bed. Ultimately, all Mayta's efforts fail, his friends remember him indistinctly as a deluded romantic, and he is finally rediscovered as a taciturn ice-cream seller in a state of terminal amnesia.

In his earlier work, Vargas Llosa appeared to recognise the nobility of the resister. Even if such rebellion was futile, it was the mark of an active humanity. Yet here, the rebel is a corrupter, a fool, and a dangerous threat to order as such (and no longer the repressive bourgeois order scrutinised in his earlier work). In *Mayta*, Vargas Llosa serves an ideology whose central concept is that the desire for change is the most dangerous subversion, a desire vilified in the person of Alejandro Mayta. Why does he reserve such venom for Mayta? Although a brief flirtation with Cuba in the 1960s earned him a reputation as a progressive, Vargas Llosa has always been a writer of the right, convinced that the autonomous product of the individual creator is the highest expression of which human beings are capable. Any collective action, by contrast, is futile by definition (since what exists is immutable), and thus becomes mere destruction.

Two years ago, Vargas Llosa headed a commission investigating the death of several

foreign journalists in Peru, reputedly at the hands of the guerrilla organisation, Sendero Luminoso. His report was a denunciation of the guerrillas, and a vindication of government repression. And it was informed with an explanation of the deepening crisis closely reflected in *Mayta*. The shadow of the guerrillas of Sendero falls across every page of the novel. Their surrogate, Mayta, is made responsible for the widespread repression in Peru in recent years, which culminated in the massacre of nearly 300 Sendero prisoners in the Lurigancho prison in 1986. Those responsible for the killing are still unidentified. But the writer finds other culprits—those, like Mayta or the revolutionary Trotskyist, Hugo Blanco, who have been prepared to offer their lives to the principle that the potential for a just world lies within the reach of the exploited and the dispossessed. He reserves particular vitriol for those intellectuals, such as the Nicaraguan poet and priest, Ernesto Cardenal, who have renounced their 'autonomy' in the name of the same belief (pp 79–80).

The violence of Vargas Llosa's reaction can only be explained in terms of the deepening economic recession which threatens the fabric of economically vulnerable societies such as Peru. In a time of crisis, the role of the intellectual as an 'independent' counsellor, wise in the futility of transforming action and close to the ear of power, is no longer clear. Having accepted the fatality of what is, Vargas Llosa sees no cause for the crisis other than the desire for change itself. The fate that governs his world is not a limiting condition, but an iron law, and those who have the impudence to defy it must reap the whirlwind. That is the unmistakable lesson to be drawn from *Mayta*.

This is not real history, and it offers no guide to the real tensions that gnaw at the heart of Peru. History is not made by individuals but by social forces. Mayta's errors were the fruit of idealism and a commitment to change. Vargas Llosa's error is to have offered us in the guise of truth the nightmares of a conservative.

MIKE GONZALEZ

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The Penguin Book of Modern Urdu Poetry

Edited by Mahmood Jamal

Harmondsworth: Penguin. 1986. 165pp. £3.95pb

It is a courageous translator who undertakes to translate a cross-section of the contemporary poetry of a language which is as different in diction and emotional ambience as Urdu is from English, since the poets and their aficionados remain to challenge his interpretation. There is a growing body of Urdu works translated into English to provide precedents, but, with few exceptions, the main forum for such translations is confined to specialist and academic periodicals and anthologies. There has been nothing as comprehensive, up-to-date and accessible as this much-needed volume from Jamal.

Jamal has in general selected well-known poets, many still active in their careers. Often too, he has chosen poems so well-known as to be committed to the memories of many readers (Faiz: 'Poetry's Theme', 'Do Not Ask of Me', 'My Love, Prayer', pp 24, 33, 41; Rashed: 'Revenge', 'Afraid of Life?' pp 47, 55). Many of these have appeared before in translation, and the space would probably have been better exploited by the

publication of fresh poems. Conversely, the inclusion of the powerful Saqi Farooqi (whose reputation was built in the West) and the undoubtedly talented Iftikhar Arif (primarily a lyricist and broadcaster) may perhaps best be explained by the fact that they live in London and create an immediate reference point for readers in Britain. It is perplexing to note, therefore, the exclusion of Zehra Nigah (also a British resident) who has been internationally acclaimed in the highest literary circles and has stood at the vanguard of the impressive and increasing number of established women poets. However, the selection of material and writers must ultimately remain the prerogative of the translator, particularly if his publisher/editor is working with an unknown medium.

Having made his choices, Jamal has proceeded with considerable acumen to select the most representative and characteristic of each poet's verse. In Riaz's 'Mohajir' (p 158) the poem expresses her personal conflict about being brought up in Sindh, which she loves as home, while belonging to a community which is still labelled as 'immigrant', despite of its having migrated during Partition. Also, 'She is a "Woman Impure"' (p 156) a poem which characterises Riaz's female consciousness, as do poems by other feminist writers, of whom Jamal includes only 'Kishwar Naheed' (pp 134-40). Pre- and post-independence verse from Pakistan, poems reacting to international events (Vietnam, Korea, Bangladesh, Palestine, Beirut) and poems addressing other universals such as censorship, personal dilemmas and emotional impressions are all well represented. This range enables the discerning reader to trace general concerns and trends which contribute to an overall impression of the broad field of contemporary Urdu poetry, as well as the phases of development and individual strands represented within it. Sadly, the poems do not always appear in chronological order, nor is any indication given of the approximate date of composition. Hence, there is little sense of a historical perspective within the volume.

Jamal amply demonstrates the wide-ranging and varied content of Urdu poetry, and translates with sincerity and reasonable accuracy, achieving an immensely readable anthology which conveys the essence of the original works. The field cries out for contemporary translations into English from the ever-developing and dynamic literary cultures of South Asia, a concern which formed the theme of the 1986 Frankfurt Book Fair. Jamal sets out to make Urdu poetry accessible to English-speaking readers, and I have little doubt that he will succeed in his aim. It would have been of additional value, however, had he concerned himself not simply with those who read solely for pleasure but also with those who hope for a literary dialogue with writers of another culture. The translations themselves, though true in terms of content, lack form and sometimes polish. Faiz, for example, almost always composed in recognisable metres and easily distinguishable structures perhaps best described as *vers libérés*, ie verse which begins from a set form and continually departs from it. The result is therefore of lines which contain the feet of recognisable metres but whose punctuation is varied spontaneously according to the individual sense of the poem. As a result of this liberation from a conventionally structured starting point, the poems contain both the movement of blank verse, and a pattern which is clearly distinguishable from it. This trend is almost universally true of Urdu poets writing in so-called blank verse. Thus, often when Jamal refers to 'free verse' (cf. N M Rashed, p 42) he fails to convey the sense that the poem in Urdu has a clear rhythm generally derived from one of the classical Persian metres inherited by Urdu in the late sixteenth century. Undoubtedly, the volume's introduction would have benefited from the inclusion of some notes on prosody, since attempts at

versification or metric approximation in translation often serve only to render the work into doggerel and thus divest it of its charm.

Given the kind of problems of language and metre that the translator faces, it must be said that Jamal (and Penguin in facilitating his publication) has done a competent and even laudable job in introducing to an international lay audience a true and representative sample of this very vital and popular force in South Asian culture. It is to be hoped that the book finds an appreciative audience.

SHAKRUKH HUSAIN

London

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The Jesse Jackson Phenomenon: The Crisis of Purpose in Afro-American Politics

Adolph L Reed, Jr

London: Yale University Press. 1986. 170pp. £4.95pb

Adolph Reed's essay is a passionate and remorseless dissection of Jesse Jackson's bid for the Presidency in 1984 and his claim to be the authentic political voice of the black masses. Reed, on the one hand, carefully rebuts exaggerated claims for Jackson's impact on black politics in the South, a region in which he had not lived for a decade. He shows that Jackson's campaign was only one of many factors in the increased registration and turn-out of southern black voters and that his 'coat-tails effect' on other black candidates was negligible. On the other, Reed challenges the uncritical acceptance by the media and the left of the view that Jackson, rather than elected black leaders, genuinely represented the black masses. He shows that Jackson, like earlier charismatic protest leaders, derived his authority from a supposedly 'organic' relationship with the black masses. Reed is particularly sceptical of the view that the authority of the black church is sufficient evidence of the existence of that 'organic' relationship. He argues that the lack of critical reflection on Jackson's claims sprang from either casual ignorance—the inability 'to distinguish between a social movement and a group of people shouting in a church'—or an exceptionalist approach to Afro-American politics which exempts black political leaders from judgement by conventional norms. Black political leaders, argues Reed, face a very real crisis, unable to satisfy their constituency because of the collapse of consensus in the Democratic coalition, the hostility of the Reagan Administration and the widening gap between the black middle class and the black poor. The authoritarian, anti-democratic and anti-rational campaign by Jackson, whose policies 'could be expressed on a bumper sticker', offered no solutions to that crisis. Reed's case is powerful and persuasive.

TONY BADGER

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The Struggle for the Third World: Soviet Debates and American Options

Jerry F Hough

Washington DC: Brookings Institution (Distributed in the UK by Costello) 1986. 300pp. £31.80. £12.50pb

In *The Struggle for the Third World: Soviet Debates and American Options*, Jerry Hough has achieved his central purpose in that he informed American policymakers, scholars and the general public that Soviet officials and scholars discuss issues of foreign policy. For those who do not realise that there are debates conducted in the Soviet Union concerning policy, and that every action the USSR undertakes in the international arena is not pre-ordained by the dictates of Marxist-Leninist ideology, this book should be enlightening. For the more sophisticated reader, this book provides a general overview of major debates that have occurred in the Soviet Union concerning the Third World. Dr Hough's analysis suffers from serious methodological problems which must be of concern to scholars conducting research in this field.

Though Dr Hough implies that there is a causal relationship between Soviet debates

and foreign policy, he does not substantiate the claim. At one point, he asserts that 'on the whole, it would be wrong to emphasise the direct influence of scholars on policy' (p 263). Yet, at the same time, Hough makes the point that 'if Soviet leaders knew what they wanted, they would not permit the kind of debates they do' (p 267). This suggests that Hough believes changes in Soviet viewpoints precede policy shifts, and therefore, are a driving force in Soviet foreign policy. Hough claims that everyone can draw their own conclusions about Soviet debates—in his judgement they matter, and are worthy of extensive research (Chapter 1). However, it is certainly possible that debates play little if any role in determining Soviet international behaviour. The Soviet domestic situation or international conditions may determine choices made by the Soviet leadership, while debates conducted in the Soviet Union simply reflect efforts to establish justifications for shifts in policy which are dictated by the environment. Thus, without establishing that a clear causal relationship exists between debates conducted in the Soviet Union and changes in Soviet behaviour, Hough is wrong to assume that these debates are important for explaining Soviet foreign policy.

Dr Hough also discusses debates conducted in the Soviet Union as if all participants are equally important in the policymaking process. Statements by Khrushchev and Brezhnev are slung together with statements by Soviet military officials, and scholars, providing no means to distinguish the relative impact each actor exerts on policy. It can not be assumed that the highest ranking official exerts the greatest influence on policy decisions. For example, military officials, possessing professional expertise and access to information, might be a more potent influence than the General Secretary on certain issues. In one instance, Jerry Hough claims that Evgenii Zhukov was the 'highest political scholar', sceptical of offering assistance to the 'bourgeois-nationalist' leaders in the mid-1950s (p 229–30). However, Hough does not explain why Zhukov merits the title, nor does he account for the fact that Zhukov's views did not prevail in determining Soviet policy. Without specifying the influence of various officials and scholars on policy outcomes, analysis of these debates is of no use for making explanations or predictions about Soviet behaviour.

Hough's analysis not only fails to satisfy the expectations of the scientifically inclined concerned with explanation and prediction, but analysts should also refrain from accepting the assumption that these statements can be utilised as a good barometer of Soviet behaviour, or that Soviet writings are relevant for a description of Soviet foreign policy. For example, Hough discusses the Soviet method of political analysis for less developed nations, among numerous other issues which he claims are relevant for Soviet foreign policy. Hough provides substantial documentation indicating that Soviet scholars emphasise the 'state' as the appropriate means of political analysis, and are concerned with such questions as 'which classes struggle for the creation of the political system and support it, and in whose interests does the state act?' (pp 123, 128). But Hough fails to clearly specify the policy relevance of classifications utilised by Soviet analysts. If these classifications indeed influence behaviour, should it be assumed that retaining an emphasis on the 'state' as the appropriate means of political analysis would be accompanied by a positive Soviet assessment of 'progressive' or 'socialist-oriented' regimes, systems in which the leaders of the state supposedly act in the interest of the working class, while a negative appraisal would be offered of the 'dependent capitalist' regimes in which Soviet analysts claim that the state leadership acts in the interest of the domestic and foreign entrepreneurial class? Further, should we expect that the level of

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Soviet military and economic interaction with 'socialist-oriented' regimes would be greater? Clearly this is not always the case since Soviet statements do not always provide a good indication of Soviet behaviour. For example, total combined military and economic transactions with the capitalist military regime in Brazil far exceeds the level of Soviet interaction that occurred with the 'progressive' military regimes that emerged in Latin America in the late 1960-70 period, despite the fact that the latter were given a more positive assessment in Soviet writings. Hough does not compare Soviet discussions to actual Soviet policy towards different types of regimes in the Third World to demonstrate the manner in which assessments actually correspond with behaviour.

Finally, even if we were to accept the assumption that debates matter, or that Soviet statements are a good indicator of behaviour, the analysis is further flawed by the fact that Hough fails to provide an adequate description of Soviet views at least on some issues discussed in this book. For example, Hough's analysis of Chile is not fully representative, generating conclusions about Soviet debates that may be inaccurate. Hough contends that in the early 1970s, Soviet analysts began to call for the establishment of democracy before socialism could be created in the nations of Latin America (pp 136-7). To support the point, Hough claims that Irina Zorina, a scholar at IMEMO, criticised Allende for lack of caution, and recommended that Allende undertake a greater effort toward 'political compromise, collaboration and alliances with the parties representing the peasantry and middle strata' (pp 136-7, 172).

Dr Hough fails to mention that many Soviet analysts were calling for the democratic phase preceding socialism in Latin America before the 1970s which has been carefully documented in the writings of Jaques Levesque and others. Moreover, many Soviet analysts of the Chilean coup, individuals typically considered more influential than Zorina, faulted Allende not for lack of caution, but for excessive caution. Boris Ponomarev, Chief of the International Department, and Sergo Mikoyan, editor of *Latinskaya Amerika*, criticised Allende's excessive concern with constitutional procedures, and stated that armed means should have been employed to counter societal forces which did not support the Allende regime. Even though Hough makes an issue of the tremendous research he conducted for this project, 'eight years of reading and re-reading Soviet sources, and talking with some 200 Soviet scholars', at least on some issues, the evidence indicates that his conclusions are not adequately supported.

SHARYL CROSS

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Linking the South: The Route to Economic Cooperation

Edited by Bernard Chidzero and Altaf Gauhar

London: Third World Foundation. 1986. 344pp. £20.95

'South-South' has been articulated over the last decade as a powerful ideological response to the elusiveness of North-South development and dialogue. It is also a forceful policy position in an era of differentiation within the South, among continents, countries and classes. This important restatement of South-South assumptions and assertions is distinctive because of its emphasis on Africa, on debt and on networks. If

the South fails to enhance its cause it will not be because of the absence of either ideas or institutions.

This current South-South 'debate' between statesmen and scholars deserves to be widely read because of its novel data and concepts. It constitutes a comprehensive 'South Agenda', with a timely emphasis on South(ern) Africa. As its resultant 'Harare Statement' recognises, the prestigious assembly on which this collection is based

was concerned in the context of the continuing dominance of the North in all economic spheres. The object was to stimulate forms of cooperation within the South which would decrease dependence on the North. Such a new relationship must be based on the economic strength and viability of the South, and is vital to future global peace and prosperity (pp 303-4).

Despite or because of its counter-dependence intentions, South-South constitutes a re-definition of 'internationalism' or 'mutuality' as Prime Minister Mugabe noted in his opening address (p 318). From such a perspective, self-reliance is not a retreat into isolation but a prerequisite for negotiation: an attempt to contain inequalities within and between both North and South. Hence the welcome moves to establish a 'South Commission' (pp 236-7 and 311-12) as a think-tank for the majority of the world's states and peoples: an institutionalisation of South-South aspirations and contributions to advance and enhance Third World positions in future negotiations. Happily the subsequent Harare Non-Aligned summit approved such a concentration and direction of South human resources.

The imperative of a new dispensation is apparent in the original data and descriptions of the debt crisis. Several eminent Third World (Dadzie, Ndegwa, Mulaisho) and sympathetic (Taylor, Avramovic) economists present important analyses of Southern, especially African, debt, relating it to inappropriate policies and unsupportable terms. They advocate a mixture of reorientation, renegotiation and refinancing for revival in which a new mutuality is defined: sufficient liquidity for global development. But arranging a coherent Southern position will be challenging, given the diversity of Third World debt needs and the North's insistence on case-by-case treatment.

Self-reliance is here advocated at collective as well as national levels, so that, in the words of Bernard Chidzero, 'the South as a group can acquire, through systematic cooperation, countervailing power or leverage in its relations and negotiations with the North' (p x). Yet, beyond the declaratory level, regional cooperation has been problematic, as the informed and candid chapters by Dadzie and Onitiri recognise. Their sympathetic yet critical contributions situate Africa's disappointments in the comparative context of Third World regionalisms and the new international division of labour: most South-South trade is amongst the NICs of Asia and Latin America. As Onitiri admits, inter-regional and international divergencies now limit Southern cohesion but these could be resituated to advance Southern development:

... there is little scope for Africa to play a major role in South-South economic cooperation unless there is a determined effort to promote or accelerate new arrangements, involving specific actions by the newly industrialising countries (NICs) of the South to support agreed programmes and projects for economic development and restructuring in the less developed regions. In particular, ... this would entail NICs making a significant contribution to African efforts (p 162).

The exclusively African record of exchange is more mixed despite the number of declarations, and Wanigatunga points to a particular frustration: the difficulties of convertibility among Third World currencies despite some ambitious regional clearing

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house arrangements. Thus designs for a 'South Bank' are laudable but idealistic given the absence of both liquidity and convertibility (pp 305 and 310).

Yet the incorporation of Africa's experiences and imperatives into Southern positions and institutions remains crucial for both continent and hemisphere. As Ramphal asserts,

Economic cooperation and collective self-reliance in Africa can be a major part of the continent's response to the current crisis; but they have significance beyond emergency needs . . . they complement national effort on the one hand and South-South cooperation on the other; but it is a complementary role that can be critical to Africa's destiny (p 18).

This collection may reveal ambiguities over how to define and advance self-reliance—How socialist? How isolationist?—yet there is a consensus that Third World dialogue is essential if the South is to secure countervailing power.

One important innovation in this volume is the appreciation and advancement of Southern networks for such a purpose. South-South intellectual and institutional development is crucial, as reflected in the Harare statement's support for ongoing 'consultations between Third World statesmen and scholars' (p 312). South NGOs and Human Resource Development will provide some welcome cohesion which recurrent difficulties with economic exchange and infrastructural coordination have served to erode. Hopefully, the South Commission will advance and legitimate such intellectual direction without established, often endangered, regimes becoming paranoid about popular as well as official definitions of Southern development. Meaningful linking and delinking require the participation of people as well as leaders in the South, let alone in the North.

TIMOTHY M SHAW

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The Political Economy of Development

J Faaland and J R Parkinson

London: Frances Pinter. 1986. 265pp. £22.50

Paths to Progress: Bread and Freedom In Developing Societies

William McCord and Arline McCord.

New York & London: W W Norton. 1986. 352pp. £14.50

It is widely accepted that one of the most important challenges facing the global community is the development of the so-called 'Third World'. Social scientists and policymakers are in agreement about the multi-faceted nature of the process. Development encompasses economic, social and political variables. Nevertheless, there is no widespread agreement about the process of development. That is, some stress economic growth, others social equity, and therefore dispute rages concerning whether some particular country has developed or not. Given the problematic nature of

development there are a plethora of strategies available to national governments and international agencies.

Political economy is a term which signifies not one but a variety of possible approaches. The conception of political economy employed by Faaland and Parkinson in *The Political Economy of Development* is that which conceives politics as separate but interlinked activities. In other words, this is a non-structuralist conceptualisation. They point out, correctly, that economic policy is shaped by the political and social setting and any attempt to analyse (economic) development must by necessity include an undertaking of political and social parameters and constraints. Both authors have served as economic consultants to a number of developing countries and this experience is brought to bear on the analysis. They are painfully aware of the constraints faced by poor countries and of the bureaucratic, historical, political and international factors which condition the operation of market forces. The market becomes a social rather than an economic construct and development policy must aim at securing economic objectives at a minimal cost whilst balancing competing forces.

This is a useful and welcome addition to the literature on development studies. It will disappoint those who from a cursory glance at the title expect a theory of economic development. The approach of this volume and its major strength lies in the cautious and sober appraisal of economic activity in the context of policy—it emphasises planning and the results which flow from different policy choices and political considerations. The focus is on real economies, with an emphasis on Bangladesh and Mozambique rather than on an abstract model of a typical developing country. Indeed, the authors show persuasively that the concept of a typical developing country is a myth. The economic and political differentiation of the developing countries is ably demonstrated by the wealth of empirical material collected. Nevertheless, Faaland and Parkinson do not lose sight of the similarities and of the very real distinctions between rich and poor countries. The eight chapters can usefully be divided into three sections. The first comprises Chapters 1 and 2. Here the authors provide a useful overview of the differences between developed and developing countries, the nature of developing countries and various strategies designed to foster economic growth. The implicit question is, 'Why have some countries achieved modern economic growth and others have not?' A related question is, 'What is the best strategy for achieving structural transformation of the economy?' Chapters 3 and 4 look in detail at the planning process—purpose, organisation, scope, techniques and the instruments available to governments. Chapters 5 to 8 discuss policymaking with respect to six issue-areas *viz.* agriculture, industry, population and family planning, employment, welfare and international development policy. Faaland and Parkinson review various controversies, analyse the effects of different options, assess the available evidence and present us with carefully reasoned conclusions. Cool, dispassionate and scholarly, with a wealth of empirical material from a variety of countries, this book deserves a wide audience.

Paths to Progress is an entirely different kind of book since it is an explicit attempt to provide a solution to Third World underdevelopment. It is in many senses an old-fashioned book. It is written, I suspect, with the general reader rather than an academic audience in mind. The argument proceeds through a plethora of illustrative examples but references to source materials are largely absent. Many of the claims made are tendentious but no attempt is made to support the 'factual' argument. The majority of the scanty footnotes relate to judgements and opinions rather than facts. The

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McCords have written an openly polemical book and no doubt will elicit a number of hostile responses since they confront head-on the arguments with which they disagree. This book is a defence of tolerance and the middle-way against extremes. Liberal capitalism, ie market-oriented economies, are the authors' ideal. They reject untrammelled capitalism, doctrinaire socialism and Islamic fundamentalism. They attempt to reconcile economic growth with political liberty. It is only through free institutions, they argue, that economic progress can be achieved and sustained and be compatible with man's longing for freedom.

I support the goals of increased material progress and political freedom but do not think that William and Arline McCord provide a convincing account of the development of the countries which they discuss or a sufficiently rigorous theoretical model of their 'fourth way'. This is a very odd mixture indeed—whirlwind economic history, ideological prescriptions and rampant inductivism. The links between the national and international are almost non-existent. For example, although one agrees with the castigation of local tyranny and dictatorship there is no analysis of the global forces which sustain these regimes. In the end, the weight of the evidence and the rigour of the analysis is not sufficient to sustain an interesting hypothesis.

MARC WILLIAMS

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Development Economics on Trial: The Anthropological Case for a Prosecution

Polly Hill

Cambridge: University Press, 1986. 174pp. n/p

The author describes her purpose in writing this book as follows:

As a polemical work it aims to expose both the unnecessary degree of unreality and the Western bias involved in most economic theorising about the rural tropical world, as well as economists' gullibility in their use of official statistics; its positive purpose is that of demonstrating . . . that economic anthropologists are well capable of generalising about broad issues in a way which should seem highly relevant to development economists (pp 66-7).

A key word in this statement of purpose is 'rural'. Polly Hill's book shows us ways in which development economists can misunderstand rural societies in the Third World and how economic anthropologists can understand them better.

As a plea for greater use of economic anthropologists' work by rural development economists, it is convincing. Some important rural development economists 'such as Chambers, Lipton, Myrdal and Schultz' are given due credit for their willingness to be multidisciplinary in this way. Some others are criticised for uni-disciplinary narrowness when analysing problems of agricultural development. As a general case against development economists, Chapters 1 to 4 are much too casual and selective. Despite the title *Development Economics on Trial*, Polly Hill seems mainly interested in tracking down one or two examples of particular errors in development economists' work. As a general indictment, her 'anthropological case for a prosecution' could hardly get beyond the academic equivalent of the Magistrate's Court.

This does not matter much, however, except perhaps as grounds for a counter-claim of wrongful arrest, or misleading advertising. The value of the book lies in its positive rather than its negative purpose. Drawing largely on her field work and associated study of parts of West Africa and South India, the author is able to cast important light on the workings of these rural economies—light which economists would be unlikely to generate by rubbing bits of their own conceptual apparatus together.

Specifically, the pervasive nature of social and economic inequality in rural areas is emphasised, in contrast with the economists' tendency to assume a homogeneous set of 'farm households'. Certain rural institutions, such as indebtedness, land fragmentation, bonded labour and townward migration, of which economists tend to disapprove, are shown to require a more careful, and more ambivalent, assessment. There is no doubt that the strong empirical and quantitative basis of Polly Hill's work allows her to speak much more confidently about the fine grain of Third World rural reality than development economists who rely on 'plausible assumptions' to achieve descriptive accuracy.

On the other hand, it clearly is difficult to achieve generalisations, rather than just well-based insights, using the geographically limited material deployed in the book. Indeed, in straining for generalisations, the author is in danger of putting herself in an equally vulnerable position to that which she finds some development economists have adopted.

JOHN TOYE

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Women in the World: 1975–1985, The Women's Decade

Edited by Lynne B Iglitzin and Ruth Ross

Santa Barbara, California: ABC-Clio Press. 1986. (2nd edn, revised). 484pp. £33.00

In their second edition of *Women in the World* . . . Iglitzin and Ross have put together a rich collection of country, comparative, and regional studies. Part 1, 'Industrial democracies', contains seven selections; Part 2, 'Developing countries', contains eight; and Part 3, 'Communist countries', three. The book is a veritable goldmine of solidly researched chapters, most of which are overviews of existing literature that highlight activities during the international decade for women. While no new empirical research is presented, the authors are experienced field researchers in areas about which they write.

Iglitzin and Ross provide a conceptual framework on the patriarchal model to compare and assess what they term the 'status of women'. For the editors, patriarchal institutions and ideologies sustain male supremacy and female inferiority. This second edition focuses on the ideological components of patriarchy and the attitudes it creates about women as dependent, apolitical wives and mothers who are naturally suited for particular work. Iglitzin and Ross propose that their model be a standard for comparing policy impacts on women and list questions that permit assessment of degrees of patriarchy. These questions are grounded in a Western view, with modernity representing a 'good'. Fortunately, most contributors do not use the model. Specific

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chapters stand out for the contributions they make to contextually rich analysis, as follows.

Mary Cornelia Porter and Corey Venning, in 'Italy and Ireland: women, church, and politics in two Catholic countries', make perceptive comparisons. Despite Italy's overwhelmingly Catholic population and a special status for the Church, the Italian women's movement has made impressive gains. Were it not for stimulation of the ILO, the EEC and other European institutions towards policies toward economic equity, the inhibiting effects of the church on Irish politics would have saddled the women's movement with a long political agenda.

In 'Law, education, and social change: implications for Hausa Muslim women in Nigeria', Barbara Callaway and Enid Schildkrout examine women's situation in a most religiously conservative part of Africa to which non-Hausa Muslims turn for doctrinal interpretation. Girls learn submissiveness, female civil rights were late in coming, and women are secluded (although they often earn incomes with the help of their children who act as intermediaries). In a fascinating section of this chapter, Callaway and Schildkrout analyse Nigerian constitutional debates of the late 1970s which resulted in the continuation of Sharia courts and laws about women that contradict other human rights provisions of the Constitution. The authors argue that universal free primary education will have far greater effects on reforms than legal change or confrontation over gender issues. Yet, school attendance figures cited for Kano State show 70 per cent for males as opposed to 30 per cent for females.

Eliz Sanasarian, in 'Political activism and Islamic identity in Iran', analyses retrogressive policies over the decade, with what she terms 'devastating effects' for women. Existing family laws were dismantled; women were removed from parts of the labour force; vigilante groups roamed the streets on the lookout for 'improperly' covered women; and women's education opportunities were narrowed and their quiescence enforced. Paradoxically, women participate and are encouraged to participate in public affairs that benefit the state, increasing numbers of female preachers are being trained, and images of veiled rifle-carriers are widespread.

In 'Women, the family, and the state: Hong Kong, Taiwan, Singapore—newly industrialised countries in Asia', Janet Salaff examines Chinese women in three economic 'success stories' where export-led manufacturing development strategies are pursued that rely heavily on female labour. Through an analysis of macro-policies and micro-level family survival strategies, Salaff shows the consequences of economies that are dependent on international market forces and of family collective advances on women.

Inevitably, questions will be raised about why the editors chose these eighteen countries, for they do not represent the world. Women in a number of African countries are more powerful economically and less subordinated by religions than these selections suggest. Similarly, women from countries in transition to socialism in (formerly?) dependent capitalist economies may have provided some contrast. However, readers are reminded of Chinese women in revolutionary transition in an historically grounded chapter, 'Women's rights, family reform, and population control in the People's Republic of China'. Kay Johnson details how party leaders compromised their anti-feudal ideology on marriage with the 'male peasant constituency whose aspiration and sense of manhood were shaped by and tied to traditional patriarchal, familial-religious institutions and ideals' (p 440).

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At the beginning of the decade in a widely reprinted essay, feminist theorist Gayle Rubin said that an understanding of women's oppression requires an examination of the 'endless variety' as well as the 'monotonous similarity' of women's experiences.¹ With the burgeoning literature on gender reflected in this collection, our understanding has certainly advanced. Jane Jaquette's selection, 'Female political participation in Latin America' addresses how Latin American scholars have reworked feminist thought to reflect realities in that region. With the decade behind us, we now need theoretical advances in and understanding of the feminisms in the world.

KATHLEEN STAUDI

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¹ 'The traffic in women: notes on the "political economy" of sex', in Rayna Reiter (ed), *Toward an Anthropology of Women*, New York: Monthly Review Press, 1975.

The Latin American Women's Movement: Reflections and Actions

Isis International Women's Information and Communication Service

Rome: Isis International. 1986. 99pp. \$6.00pb

This special issue of the *Isis International Women's Journal* is not a collection of academic research, but interviews with and reports by those actually involved in feminist politics. For academics, the volume is refreshing and essential reading, not bogged down with reviews of literature; rather, it is filled with accounts of women making their own literature. For activists, the volume is enormously useful for its reflective, even self-critical analyses of feminist theory as applicable to action, and for its valuable, twenty-page resource section with addresses of women's centres, audio-visual resources, information services and networks. The volume relays experiences of Peruvian women's centres, a Mexican feminist publication, and both Dominican and Brazilian feminists' use of comics as consciousness-raising tools.

Volumes like these forever put to rest the idea that feminism is a North American or European phenomenon. Latin American feminists, as Dominican Magaly Pineda and others put it, are now in a mature phase at the vanguard of progressive change, involved in the risky process of extending themselves outward and working with existing institutions. The volume reflects the diversity of feminism and its connection to other political struggles.

That connection is a problematic one, for contribution after contribution makes the point that male-dominated political machinery ranging from the state itself to the left and/or the 'democratic' opposition perpetuate the hierarchy and authoritarianism associated with female subordination. In her definitive essay, Ana María Portugal discusses how the second wave of feminism from the 1970s onwards concerns politics of everyday life, 'attitudes of comrades in the home', and 'sexism, authoritarianism, domestic violence and sexual repression' (pp 6-7). Women's movements make the important statement that if women are not part of the democracy, then no genuine democracy exists.

The section on politics contains contributions on both autonomous and integrationist

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feminist movements, but it is the latter that reveals special insights. Integrationism began in Chile when relatives of the 'disappeared', many of whom were women, talked together in lines outside autopsy buildings and government offices as they waited for information about their dead. Now they struggle within the opposition in the hopes that internal democracy will translate eventually into a democratic system for women as well as men, free of authoritarianism. As a Chilean feminist in exile Rafaella Lamberti describes, a key slogan of the movement is 'for democracy in our country and in the home' (p 10). The collection of the Argentinian Silvia Chester indicates that some feminists work with political parties, despite their authoritarian values, but most feminists view autonomy as a way to avoid diluting their issues. The Uruguayan feminist Carmen Tornaría, discusses women's role in Uruguay's transition to democracy, and their subsequent exclusion from central decision-making. The unsuccessful campaign of two feminists under the United Left in Peru's 1985 elections required immediate answers to lots of strategic questions: Was feminism autonomous? Should it legitimise itself in the electoral process? Which party should it align with? One of the candidates, Virginia Vargas, discusses how, with the theme 'Women, vote for yourselves', they were able to infuse the electoral process with issues related to violence against women, paid and unpaid work, and women's control over their bodies.

Still seeking integration, Tornaría concludes 'women don't only want to give life, we want to change it' (p 27). In the much-hoped-for transition to democracy in Latin America, women's participation will bear close watching for whether politics will be transformed or returned to the *status quo ante*.

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Big Deal: The Politics of the Illicit Drugs Business

Anthony Henman. Roger Lewis, Tim Malyon *et al.*

London: Pluto Press. 1986. 211pp. £4.50pb

In the continuing litany of woes that industrialised countries allegedly experience at the hands of wicked Third World nations, addiction to narcotics figures prominently. When Western medicine finally began to awake to the many ravages of its pharmaceutical inventions—morphine, heroin, the barbiturates and the amphetamines—source countries, largely in Southeast Asia, and now increasingly in the Andes, were targetted as being responsible for the West's thirst for intoxication.

One should not underestimate how effective this campaign has been in focusing largely on the supply side of the drug equation to find a solution for addiction. In the USA, for instance, no fewer than 102 bills related to international narcotics control were placed before the 92nd Congress, many calling for the suppression of US aid to countries that failed to 'demonstrate a vigorous and concerted effort to curb production and trafficking'.

There has been very little literature that has attempted to situate illicit narcotics use in the West in its larger and decidedly more significant North-South context. *Big Deal* will not change that. It is too disorganised, poorly documented and shrill to alter the course

of international debates and regulations. The first chapter—obviously the most important in any book by several contributors—is the weakest. At best, it reads like a collage of old newspaper articles; it has no analysis, and its concern with the role of the Mafia contributes little that is new or interesting. Another chapter, which takes the reader into the drug-oriented world of British punks and their friends, seems pointless, too self-consciously cute and anecdotal. One of the longer chapters, by journalist Tim Malyon, looks at the cannabis trade out of Latin America. But by dismissing evidence provided by such reliable organisations as the Narcotics Intelligence Committee, and shrilly claiming that the National Organisation for the Reform of Marijuana Laws (NORML) is an authoritative source, Malyon undermines his credibility badly. NORML has admitted to accepting substantial funds from *Playboy* magazine and drug-dealers to conduct its now totally discredited lobbying in Washington.

Professor Anthony Henman's contribution on the cocaine trade saves *Big Deal* from the intellectual oblivion to which it should otherwise be condemned. His objective, to look at the impact of the cocaine trade on class structure in Colombia, and its relationship to national and international capitalism is important and fascinating. There is an extreme paucity of documentation on the cocaine trade and a market-type analysis is necessary. But Henman does not organise his material well, and at times he is naive. His call for the legalisation of drug use is vaguely articulated. Worse, it ignores the central fact of the present global drug scene—that we are witnessing a rapid Westernisation of patterns of intoxicification with the number of intoxicants permitted being restricted to alcohol and legally produced psychotropics. For many, this may be deplorable, but to understand it, and certainly to marshal forces against it, will require a much more serious effort than that made by any of the contributors to *Big Deal*.

What this book needed was a tough editor, a clearer focus, and contributors who can draw a distinction between fact and personal opinion.

ANDRE McNICOLL

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Slavery and Human Progress

David Brion Davis

Oxford: Oxford University Press. 1986. 374pp. £6.95

In his latest book, Professor Davis of Yale, the Pulitzer Prize-winning author of *The Problem of Slavery in Western Culture*, questions the ambiguity in any moral idea of human or historical 'progress'. He ironically and subtly delineates the abrupt reversals in successive concepts of such progress throughout the world, as demonstrated by the history of slavery and emancipation.

Aristotle argued in his *Politics*: 'For all tame animals there is an advantage in being under human control as this secures their survival. . . By analogy, the same must necessarily apply to mankind as a whole.' With religious paternalism and complacent equanimity, Prince Henry of Portugal surveyed the first shipments of slaves from Africa in the 1440s as he 'reflected with great pleasure upon the salvation of those souls that before were lost'; but four hundred years later Palmerston was equally adamant that

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Britain was 'the main instrument in the Hands of Providence' for eradicating slavery in Zanzibar.

The human capacity for dignifying acts of exploitation—whether between the sexes, or by race, class, religious or national interests—seems depressingly infinite. When Locke criticised slavery, he did not extend his criticism to the then slave system in America from which he benefited. Eric Williams and others have lately persuasively argued that it was in fact economic pressure which underlaid the motives of many of the nineteenth-century emancipators, when slave labour became uneconomic.

Only a four-page epilogue in this book deals with events which have taken place in the most recent half-century. It is to be hoped that Professor Davis will, in a future book, pursue his theme as far as contemporary manifestations of slavery. He mentions Lord Shackleton's recent evidence that certain travellers in the Middle East sell slaves upon arrival 'using them as living travellers cheques'; one hopes he will now also examine other modern forms of servitude—including debt bondage and the labour camps of Hitler and Stalin—and the familiar if unappealing rationalisations of their defenders.

BEN WHITAKER

Minority Rights Group, London

A Year in the Death of Africa: Politics, Bureaucracy and the Famine

Peter Gill

London: Paladin. 1986. 191pp. £3.95pb

The History of Famine and Epidemics in Ethiopia Prior to the Twentieth Century

Richard Pankhurst

Addis Ababa: Relief and Rehabilitation Commission. 1985. 120pp. £2.50pb

The Challenges of Drought: Ethiopia's Decade of Struggle in Relief and Rehabilitation

Relief and Rehabilitation Commission

London: H and L Communications. 1985. 280pp. £9.95

'God cannot be blamed and the Emperor cannot be accused,' quotes Peter Gill from a medieval Ethiopian proverb. The relevance of the proverb seems as applicable to the Ethiopian famines of the 1980s as it did to those in ancient Ethiopian history. It is a proverb that underscores the cycles of famines in Ethiopian legends and in that nation's pre-twentieth-century history. It is one of the *leitmotifs* which sustains Richard Pankhurst's interesting overview of Ethiopian famines and epidemics.

Given that Pankhurst seems to have had the support of the Ethiopian Relief and Rehabilitation Commission in preparing this work, one might have assumed that the 'Emperor' at least would have indeed been accused. However, what stands out so clearly in my mind is the persistent attempts of Ethiopia's rulers throughout its pre-twentieth-century history to come to the assistance of their peoples. Such help was often belated, rarely sufficient to sustain a full-scale relief effort, and certainly not intended to deal with the root causes of the cycles of despair to which that country had

grown all too used. Nevertheless it was impressive to read of Emperor Menilek's efforts in the 'Great Famine of 1888' to set an example by taking 'a pick-axe to dig the soil and a hatchet to cut the wood', but even more important to prevent grain speculation and seek to import grain from abroad (p 103). When a plague of locusts swept through Tigre in 1627, it was once again the Emperor who was reported to have provided the afflicted 'with much alms and soon ordered the distribution among them of two thousand cotton cloths' (p 40).

Impressive as these gestures of charity might seem, in the end they merely sustained the myth that the causes of Ethiopia's persistent plights were not within the control of man. God could not be blamed, and ultimately disasters reflected His divine will and retribution. It was an attitude ingrained in the attitude of the Emperor and in the minds of the people. Indeed, it was a view fostered by those foreigners who even from the seventeenth century onwards sought to assist those stricken by disaster in Ethiopia. This link between Divine and the human condition made religious conversions all the easier; for, as Pankhurst notes, 'the famine stricken, naturally enough, were all too ready to throw themselves on the charity of any denomination' (p 108).

The rich harvest of converts gathered in by Catholic and Protestant missionaries during times of Ethiopia's hardships did not go unnoticed. The proud and ancient Abyssinian Empire developed more than a degree of distrust for those who came bearing relief from distant parts for motives which appeared mixed and unclear. The prospect that Ethiopia's plight would lay it open to the ambitions of foreigners was certainly uppermost in the mind of Emperor Menilek, for the horrifying famine of 1888-92 'actually heightened' Italian ambitions to claim the devastated areas (p 110).

Pankhurst's slim volume is indeed informative when it comes to capturing the history of Ethiopia's horrendous heritage of epidemic and famines. However, beyond interesting description, there is little analysis, little that one can suggest as a theme which transcends the blow-by-blow accounts of one disaster after another. This is a pity, for the fascinating historical material in this work transcends the pre-twentieth-century history of that beleaguered nation. The work deserves a broader context.

That 'the Emperor cannot be accused' might have had its late-twentieth-century counterpart in the Ethiopian Relief and Rehabilitation's *The Challenges of Drought*. On the contrary, there is little in the RRC's descriptive analysis of twelve years of relief and rehabilitation work that seeks to raise the 'Emperor' above the battle. In several instances, the RRC accepts areas of institutional inadequacy. It accepts that it has embarked upon rehabilitation programmes with which it really could not cope alone (p 138). It readily admits that, for example, mergers with smaller government agencies did 'raise problems of administration, deployment and integration' (p 142).

Yet, before one assumes that this work is the RRC's *mea culpa*, read on. On the whole, the RRC finds that, like the Emperor, it need not be 'accused'. Given the upheavals which surrounded the RRC's birth in 1974 and the interminable crises (eg: the Ogaden war, which hampered its rehabilitation efforts elsewhere in the country) the RRC gives itself high marks. What in effect one has here is less a work of 'ideological perspective' and more one of 'institutional self-justification'. The RRC, despite what outsiders might suggest, sees its rôle as the dominant *chef d'orchestre* of Ethiopia's relief and rehabilitation. The book does acknowledge the assistance provided by foreign agencies, in some instances, to the point of tedium, as the same list of names keep cropping up

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time and time again. Yet, one is not left with any doubt about who is and has been in charge.

In light of the controversy which surrounds Ethiopian resettlement policies, the RRC ostensibly makes no attempt to duck the issue. It plunges into the purposes, procedures and relative success of resettlement without attempting to consider the arguments of the opponents of resettlement. The RRC's case makes sense and its description of the various types of resettlement schemes seems well considered . . . until one happens across a statement such as this: that Special Settlement Schemes 'consist of 500 heads of families who are chosen on the basis of their age, physical fitness and willingness not only to settle but also to follow the rules and regulations issued by the RRC, along with the acceptance of the basic principles of producers' cooperatives' (p 160). There is something ominous, too unexplained, in that phrase 'rules and regulations issued by the RRC'. As stated, it brings to mind all the worst aspects which critics of resettlement had feared about the insensitive, bureaucratic and dictatorial methods underlying the policy. Or, perhaps, one is reading too much into the unstated; for throughout *The Challenges of Drought* there is more a sense of reading an internal government document than a literary work. What remains unstated may just be more the result of governmental prose than a conscious attempt to obfuscate.

Be that as it may, there is certainly no attempt to obfuscate when it comes to one abiding theme, that in which the international community is accused of failing to assist Ethiopia in her attempts to deal with the root causes of famine. From former RRC Commissioner Dawit's elegant introduction to the book's concluding section on 'The struggle for self-sufficiency', one cannot ignore the feeling that once again 'foreigners' have failed to understand the true plight of Ethiopia. The suspicion about outsiders' motives and the nature of their concerns which Pankhurst suggests in his description of pre-twentieth-century Ethiopia connects only too clearly with the RRC's review of the 1980s.

The RRC's analysis is by no means great literature. It serves to present a particular point of view, and it does so in a language that is full of 'bureaucratese'. Yet, for anyone wishing to understand that particular case, supplemented by several interesting tables on donor statistics, then the book is worth reading. One also might mention that the photographs of Ethiopia and the relief camps contained in the work are truly outstanding, and serve to add to the human poignancy which the book's prose all too often tends to dampen.

With a chance to hear the RRC's case, one cannot avoid asking to what extent 'foreigners' have indeed failed to appreciate Ethiopia's plight? To what extent was the famine of 1984 used by foreigners to pursue their own interests in that beleaguered land, in a way not totally dissimilar to those which Pankhurst describes in the 1888 famine?

Peter Gill's *A Year in the Death of Africa* goes a very long way to addressing these sorts of issues. In an excellently documented and researched analysis of the international response to the 1984-85 Ethiopian famine, Gill looks at the way the international relief community responded to the crisis, and in some respects certainly justifies Ethiopia's doubts about the motives of 'foreigners'. 'Like the British, whom they are said to resemble, the Ethiopians are an island race. . . And any prickly reserve may spring from the number of times they have been attacked and have repulsed those attacks,' writes Gill (p 34). It is a telling statement, for it goes some way to explaining the reserve which characterised relations between donors and government authorities. But, of

course, the reserve was founded even more so upon overt clashes of national interests; geopolitical differences, contending ideologies, and economic calculations, the sum total of which made the international donor community heed the plight of Ethiopia too slowly.

What *A Year in the Death of Africa* ably demonstrates is how such clashes affect the processes of the international aid community. Gill probes the inconsistencies between statements such as 'a hungry child has no politics' and the reality of lethargic donor responses. He takes a long hard look at the way the US Agency for International Development justified its initially meagre contributions, and comes down very hard on the hypocrisy of the British government's response.

Much of this sort of analysis is not new, and has been done by other authors describing different disasters. Gill certainly cannot be faulted for the way that he has described the governmental nexus, and these—no matter how well known the themes—still make the work worthwhile. However, where Gill has really added to the literature on the international relief community is in two areas: the press and the European Community. The insights which he gives on both make the work important. The world of the media Gill knows well, since as a reporter for *The Daily Telegraph* (London) and for Britain's Independent Television, he has seen the day-to-day workings of the media and all its strengths and weaknesses. The interplay between non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and the media, the rivalries between the media and the ultimate 'oxygen' which publicity gives to the relief process is a study in and of itself. Gill handles this area extremely well, and one gains real insights into a horrifying reality: the media is both a phenomenal mobiliser and perverse distorter of relief.

The European Community, with its mountains of grain, lakes of milk, and so on, often stands accused of incompetence, indifference and inefficiency. Gill takes a different view, and traces the frustrations of an international organisation that would be able to respond if given the scope. Here, too, the author opens up a wide area for further research: the interactions of member-states upon the functioning of what should be a major donor, that is, the EEC, in relief. Gill's analysis, however, is a more than adequate starting-point for future research. He captures, at least for me, the right balance between a large bureaucratic system and a potentially willing machine that could be more effective if given the latitude.

If there is any single criticism which might be made of *A Year in the Death of Africa*, it is that the author does not spend sufficient time in probing why donor organisations respond the way they do to such crises. He certainly explains in the case of Ethiopia (and, to a much lesser extent, the Sudan) what they did, but he might have devoted more attention to a more careful analysis of the procedures, perceptions, and processes that underlie institutional responses. Yet, perhaps this sort of criticism misses what Gill was trying to do. The additional analysis that could be included might be more relevant to a more academic work; and the author's intention is not that. Gill seems to have wanted a work that a wide body of people could read to understand the dynamics of relief. There is no doubt that, in a relatively short book, he has accomplished what he had set out to do. Dramatic, perceptive and well researched, *A Year in the Death of Africa* is the best work to date on the response to Africa's suffering in 1984–85.

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Mozambique: The Revolution Under Fire

Joseph Hanlon

London: Zed Books. 1984. 292pp. £18.95. £6.95pb

The sub-title of this book, 'The Revolution Under Fire', could not be more appropriate. Mozambique had experienced a generation of warfare: a decade of revolutionary guerrilla struggle against Portuguese colonialism and more than a decade of a counter-revolutionary war of attrition. Whilst the first period of struggle heralded the birth of a newly independent nation with a political leadership, Frelimo, dedicated to tackling the problem of 95 per cent illiteracy, a health service that only served the privileged few and an economic system geared to serve the interests of capital accumulation in South Africa and metropolitan Portugal, the subsequent war of destabilisation orchestrated first by Ian Smith's Rhodesia and from 1980 by the Republic of South Africa, has served to thwart at every twist and turn the new government's development policies. Destabilisation has been devastatingly effective.

Hanlon's book ably charts these events, pointing out governmental mistakes where they have occurred and Frelimo's attempts to redress these. It is particularly instructive on the crucial agricultural sector, where early neglect of the peasantry with a policy emphasis on heavy industrialisation and state farms did much to open the door of vulnerability to the destabilisation exercise. The search for quick results through large-scale mechanised agricultural production failed. Frelimo's Fourth Congress in 1983 went a good way towards redressing the balance with its emphasis on encouraging peasant-marketed production by trying to change import policy and domestic industrial production towards meeting the peasants' needs for producer inputs and basic needs consumer goods. The continuing war has made the practical implementation of this policy difficult in the extreme.

The book provides important insights into the policy-making process and the foreign policy balancing act on the East-West tightrope. It tackles the various aspects of class struggle inside the country and the difficult tasks of women's emancipation. It discusses the process of party formation and the building of the popular assemblies. A postscript covers the events surrounding the signing of the Nkomati Accord between the governments of South Africa and Mozambique. There is also a useful statistical appendix.

Events since the signing of the Nkomati Accord have brought the prospects for peace no nearer. The South African military transferred its main base of support for the anti-government Renamo (Mozambique National Resistance) forces to Malawi. The continuing involvement of the South African government in support for Renamo was clearly revealed in the capture of its leader's diaries in the combined Zimbabwean-Mozambican army assault on the guerrilla headquarters in the Gorongosa mountains in August 1985. Faced with mounting pressure in the international community for sanctions against South Africa, Pretoria has threatened retaliatory sanctions against the surrounding Frontline States. This has made the defence of the Beira corridor with its oil pipeline, road and rail links to the landlocked interior countries of Zimbabwe and Zambia all the more significant, for without this alternative trading link, the Commonwealth countries of the interior will be almost totally dependent on South African ports, road and railways.

It is clear to everyone that the prospects for development in Mozambique will remain

bleak in the extreme until there is a decisive change of power within South Africa. Whilst popular resistance inside that country has brought that day nearer, the power of the existing state is such that meaningful change will only occur in the medium to long term. Hence another decade of war, economic chaos and social disruption looms in the future for the people of Mozambique. In the frontline of the struggle against apartheid it is a country which deserves much greater support than received hitherto by the international community.

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Arms and the African: Military Influences on Africa's International Relations

Edited by William J Foltz and Henry S Bienen

London: Yale University Press, 1985. 221pp. £22.50

African Crisis Areas and US Foreign Policy

Edited by Gerald J Bender, James S Coleman and Richard L Sklar

London: University of California Press, 1985. 373pp. £33.95. £8.50pb

Both these books are concerned, mainly from the standpoint of US foreign policy, with the calamitous changes that have occurred in the international relationships of African states since the military revolts of 1974 in Lisbon and Addis Ababa. Since those events, wars and insurrections of varying scale and intensity have occurred in Ethiopia, Angola, Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Zaire, Uganda, Chad, Sudan and the Western Sahara. Often, they followed directly from earlier conflicts, but generally they became more portentous as a result of the appearance of Soviet logistic capacity to intervene decisively in African quarrels (in Angola in 1975 and Ethiopia in 1977) and of technical advances in the weaponry acquired by some African states.

Arms and the African, a Council on Foreign Relations book to which US government officers as well as academic writers have contributed, concludes with an expectation of further militarisation in Africa and suggests that force will be used increasingly in disputes between neighbouring states. This book contains studies of Soviet, French and South African military policies in Africa, and illuminating accounts of the rapid, but nationally uneven, growth in military capability in the continent. There are also essays on Africa's place in Great Power strategy and African military regimes as foreign policy makers. This book is a compact, informative and clearly expounded treatment of the matters indicated by its sub-title. An appendix usefully lists regime changes and coups, both chronologically and by country, up to September 1984.

African Crisis Areas, which contains nineteen papers and several shorter notes, originated in a conference sponsored by the African Studies Center and the Center for International and Strategic Affairs at the University of California, Los Angeles; understandably, it is less integrated as a book than the Foltz and Bienen volume. *Crisis in Africa* is defined as a state of armed conflict or acute tension produced by indigenous forces but involving, or threatening to involve, the USA and the Soviet Union either directly or through their surrogates. A crisis area is the locus of an actual crisis or a place

that is crisis-prone. The areas thus identified and discussed are Southern Africa (including Namibia, Angola and Mozambique as well as the Republic of South Africa), the Horn of Africa (Ethiopia and Somalia), Zaire, Chad and the Western Sahara.

For the most part, the papers argue an 'Africanist case' against the 'globalist' tendency in US foreign policy, and in favour of a 'regionalist' stance. Globalism means the interpretation of any crisis as a Soviet attempt to obtain a military or political advantage, and the thwarting of Soviet ambitions as the supreme objective of US policy. Regionalism is less easily defined, or understood, but can perhaps be summarised as the view that the real problems of African politics have nothing to do with the Cold War, and that in the long run American interests would be best served if helping the resolution of these real problems brought peace and prosperity to Africa.

It is easy enough to find evidence of foreign policies, not only American, that have penalised their authors as a result of neglect or ignorance of local conditions and indigenous forces. Africanists naturally, and rightly, warn against undiluted globalism in Africa—though it is far from apparent that the US government has ever practised such a thing. But the scope for regionalism, on the other hand, is obviously limited in practice by the need for the Soviet Union, as well as America, to follow this approach. As Colin Legum observes (p 283): 'a regional approach to policy-making is justified, or possible, only in cases where neither major power feels threatened by, or sees any major advantage in, a changing political situation.' Only the most naive observer would suppose the USSR, unlike America, to be free of considerations of military strategy in the policies it has followed in the Horn, Angola and some of the smaller West African states (Guinea, Mali, Cape Verde, Benin, Congo). In the words of Peter Duignan, another dissenting voice in this collection: 'Soviet interests are global; therefore, US interests must be global too' (p 292). Not regionalism, but 'educated globalism', would seem the direction for Great Power policy in Africa that is both most practicable and likely to be effective, and here, it may be suggested, America, for all its failings, has a long start on the Soviet Union.

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Education Priorities and Aid Responses in Sub-Saharan Africa

Edited by Hugh Hawes and Trevor Coombe with Carol Coombe and Kevin Lillis

London: HMSO for Overseas Development Administration and University of London Institute of Education. 1986. 190pp. £4.95pb

Education and Society in Africa

Mark Bray, Peter B Clarke and David Stephens

London: Edward Arnold. 1986. 191pp. £6.95pb

Education Priorities and Aid Responses in Sub-Saharan Africa is a report of a conference held at Cumberland Lodge, Windsor, in December 1984 and attended by participants from African countries, British universities and major donor agencies.

Though a report of a conference, it is not a conference report in a conventional sense. The editors draw selectively from a wealth of conference papers, 'think pieces', working group and plenary reports to present answers to two related questions: What are/should be the educational priorities for development in sub-Saharan Africa? And what is/could be the aid agencies' response? They answer these questions within the context of broader problems of socio-economic development which include population increase, food production and the management of natural resources, international recession and economic crisis. The book is aimed at those interested in problems facing educational development in sub-Saharan Africa and in issues of aid policy and management as seen by those who are at the 'sharp end' of political and professional decision making.

While an understanding of the problems facing educational development is logically prior to the rational development of aid policy, the book's attempt to address the questions simultaneously in conference-book form, sometimes leaves the reader with the impression that aid agencies are running the education systems of Africa. The discussion of education priorities which begins with an appreciation of diversity among African states focuses aggressively on common background, common problems and a common list of priorities for education which, it is assumed, can be agreed between aid agencies and national governments, between African national governments and within African states. However formidable and impossible a task, the discussion does appear to facilitate the book's second aim, namely, future directions for aid policy. Indeed, this was the main purpose of the conference conceived largely by the Overseas Development Administration 'to educate itself'. One of the most readable and most important chapters is Chapter 4, 'Reflections on the Conference', in which Roger Iredale, the ODA's Principal Education Adviser, presents a frank yet measured assessment of the conference discussion and offers nine new directions for (British) aid to education in the future. These include increased donor coordination, not only in education but across the whole aid spectrum; intersectoral coordination, whereby education specialists in donor agencies will work more closely with issues of health, agriculture and the environment; pump-priming of innovations at the margin for which Ministers of Education with their huge recurrent salary and maintenance burdens have no spare funds; the development of indigenous research capacity of existing institutions; greater selectivity, appraisal and exiguity on the part of aid recipients matched by a greater degree of 'genuine learning and discovery' among institutions in donor countries; greater support for voluntary agencies in developing countries; targetted training for overseas personnel at carefully selected courses; and structural change within agencies to enable educational aid to be integrated with other disciplines and sectors. Given the current British climate for government and aid expenditure, this last change requiring flexibility on the part of British government bureaucracy may be one of the most difficult to achieve.

Education and Society in Africa addresses many of the same issues in education and development but from a very different perspective. The book is intended for students of education, comparative education and sociology in universities and teachers' colleges in Africa and the West. It offers eleven chapters on different dimensions of the relationship between education and society. These chapters cover a wide range of material—education and development in an international context, education and nation-building, education and employment, education and social stratification, Islamic education, indigenous forms of education, education and the community, the school as

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a society, the curriculum and society, new ways and radical alternatives, education and the future. The authors' clear distinction of at least four levels of analysis in any discussion of education and society—the international, national, community and school—is a particularly helpful contribution to the literature on education development where propositions at one level are frequently misapplied to other levels.

The chapters stand on their own or can be read in sequence. Each chapter is clear, well-written and straightforward and is accompanied by a useful bibliography of material written by African and Western authors. Some of the chapters include case studies of projects or problems which help to set the general issues in context. Each chapter finishes with a set of questions and suggested project work to be addressed not only by students but also by teachers who choose to use this book as a course text. It is particularly notable that the three authors have produced a book so consistent in style—all in all, a useful text for courses not only in education, but also sociology, psychology and economics.

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The Music of Africa

J H Kwabena Nketia

London: Victor Gollancz. 1986. 278pp. £6.95pb

Professor J H Kwabena Nketia has written numerous books and articles which have earned him recognition as one of the leading authorities in the field of African music. He is currently the Andrew W Mellon Professor of Music at the University of Pittsburgh, as well as being the Director of the Institute of African Studies at the University of Ghana in Legon.

Up until the publication of this book in 1974, Profesor Nketia had been concerned with the music of his own people, the Akan of Ghana. However, with the increasing interest in Africa shown over the last two decades, a solid introduction to African music became necessary. *The Music of Africa* is an attempt at such a text. I call it an 'attempt' because if one considers that there are some 2,000 different ethnic groups in Africa, each with their own means of musical expression, then surely the mere 245 pages of this book cannot be anything more than a very generalised overview. One therefore has to question the use of a book such as this.

In the Preface, Nketia tells us that he has aimed the book at the general reader and the college student. But surely the subject is too vast to give the student any valuable insight into the music of Africa. Furthermore, for the uninformed reader the book is very misleading in that it is strongly biased towards Ghana and Tanzania, countries in which Nketia has had his own musical experiences. In fact, over half the 'analytical observations' and roughly 80 per cent of the 'appropriate illustrations' (p ix) concern Ghanaian and Tanzanian cultures. What about the music of the rest of Africa? While one or two examples are cited, Nketia has virtually ignored music south of Tanzania because, in his opinion, 'the music practised by these societies belongs to stylistic families outside Africa' (p 3). Curious.

Perhaps this is also his reason for only dedicating four-and-a-half pages to the influence of Islam, and for completely ignoring popular music (except for half a paragraph). By not discussing these topics, Professor Nketia leads his readers to believe that the music of Africa has remained unchanged throughout its existence, and will remain thus. A sense of history is lacking here.

The structure of the book, however, is excellent: beginning with a background discussion of social and cultural aspects, becoming more detailed through the next two sections, then returning to a more general topic to end the book.

Section two deals with musical instruments. In his introduction to the section, Nketia writes: '... the study of musical instruments may be approached from different angles ... historically ... culturally ... as material objects (p 68). Thankfully, he chose not to attempt a discussion from all these angles. Instead he offers a 'brief inventory' of the instruments, classifying them according to the Sachs-Hornbostel approach. He acknowledges that 'the literature on African music abounds in detailed studies of the musical instruments' (p 68) and he continually refers readers to these. He also uses numerous photographs to enhance descriptions. (Unfortunately, many of these do not indicate the culture which they represent, thus rendering them far less useful than they would otherwise be.) In these ways Nketia has presented a valuable starting-point for the study of the musical instruments of Africa.

The third section analyses the 'Structures in African music' and therefore includes numerous definitions of terms (eg: 'time line', 'additive rhythms', etc). Many of these are rather clumsy, so that the reader is left confused about what exactly it is that Africans *do* when they make music. The book would be greatly improved if descriptions by the people who actually make the music were included. For example: how do performers themselves interpret 'the interplay of polyrhythms' (p 35)? The section is very well illustrated although one might question his use of conventional staff notation in his musical examples.

Section four is a pleasure to read. It examines 'Music and related arts', ensuring that the reader acknowledges the inseparability of the arts. Nketia dwells on the importance of language in relation to music in his chapters: 'Speech and melody' and 'The role of song texts'. He also looks at various aspects of the 'Interrelations of music and dance', which is an angle many scholars under-estimate.

Chapter 21 is a summary which concludes the book well. This is followed by three appendices: a discography (which would be more useful if it were related to the text); a list of all ethnic groups mentioned in the text and their location; and a list of African terms used in the text. The usefulness of the bibliography is limited as one must remember that it was compiled over ten years ago.

I agree with Professor John Blacking when he states (as is printed on the back cover of the book) that this book should be 'read wherever music is taught in the UK', but let it be the *first* book read, so that the student can move on to more focused works and thereby acquire a more effective knowledge of 'the music of Africa'.

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Iraq in Transition: A Political, Economic and Strategic Perspective

Edited by Frederick W Axelgard

London: Mansell. 1986. 111pp. £15.00pb

This book contains five papers presented at a seminar held at the Centre of Strategic and International Studies at Georgetown University, Washington, in May 1985. In the first paper, the editor states the main aims of the book:

Iraq in Transition is an attempt to present insights into Iraq's response—in political, economic and foreign policy terms—to the trauma of its ongoing war with Iran. Its main justification is . . . Iraq's unchanging status as a major regional power and the belief that continuing US interest in the Middle East . . . in coming years will require more serious considerations of Iraq's role in the US approach to the region . . . [this] will almost certainly include moving US–Iraqi interaction toward a more open dialogue, and possibly discussion of limited US–Iraqi cooperation to maintain a strategic balance in the Gulf between Iran, Saudi Arabia and Iraq itself.

He goes on to say that the papers in the volume are an attempt to 'contribute to the understanding needed for constructive US policy choices *vis-à-vis* Iraq' (p 1).

In its own terms, therefore, the book does not claim to constitute a contribution to scholarship, and hence cannot be evaluated in such terms. It is informative to the extent that the authors give up-to-date data on topics such as the impact of the war on Iraqi oil production (Axelgard), the country's financial situation, its development programmes and the way in which foreign governments and companies have reacted to these developments, including a list of some major projects (Crusoe), or the way in which Iraq's foreign policy over the years has affected its standing and role within the Gulf (Ghareeb). Apart from this kind of information, however, the book offers little real insight into the situation in Iraq, even for the limited purpose of contributing to 'the understanding needed for constructive US policy choices *vis-à-vis* Iraq'.

In general, the book reads as if its main intention was not to inform US policymakers but rather to placate, or at least not to upset, the Iraqi government. None of the articles contains any statements openly critical either of the Ba'th or of Saddam Husain. This becomes particularly obvious in Dawisha's contribution, in which those familiar with the recent history of Iraq will be surprised to read that 'by 1963, [the Ba'th Party] had gained enough strength to take control of the government . . .' and later that 'its underground activities . . . continued to grow until July 1968 when the party engineered a series of coups that established it as the core political organisation in the country' (pp 21–2). In reality, a very small conspiratorial Ba'th group took power in Iraq in February 1963 through a particularly savage and bloody military coup, whose success could in no sense be attributed to the Ba'th's being a 'major political force'. Its subsequent resumption of power in 1968 was also achieved by means of a military coup, and was not a reflection either of its 'underground activities' or of a build-up of anything remotely resembling popular support.

More recently, the principal method used by Saddam Husain to maintain himself in power has been the physical elimination of all real or potential opponents; some of his closest friends and comrades were executed out of hand in July 1979 when they appeared to stand in the way of his assumption of total power. Dawisha refers to this episode in somewhat disingenuous terms: 'By the time he had assumed presidency in 1979, in the process ruthlessly ridding himself of any possible danger to his authority,

Hussain had achieved a position of clear dominance over the party' (p 23). It is scarcely possible that Dawisha should not be aware of the extent of torture, execution and imprisonment without trial that has characterised so much of Ba'th rule over the last two decades which he conceals behind such generalities as 'ruthlessness' or 'coercion'. Although Dawisha's contribution seems particularly marked by such evasiveness, this tone of bland over-optimism, itself all too familiar from much recent writing on contemporary Iraq, pervades the whole book and limits its usefulness accordingly.

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Forbidden Agendas: Intolerance and Defiance in the Middle East

Edited by Jon Rothschild

London: Al Saqi Books. 1984. 400pp. £6.95pb

This is a collection of eighteen articles that have previously appeared in the journal *Khamsin*. *Khamsin* was founded in 1975 by a group of anti-Zionist Israelis and Arabs who, in their own words, were 'united in their socialist vision and their opposition to economic exploitation, political domination, and social oppression. [The journal is] independent of all organised political tendencies, it is a forum for discussion of all the crucial issues of Middle East politics.'

Forbidden Agendas is organised into thematic sections including: Israel's Oriental subjects, Women, the Civil War in Lebanon, Religion, and 'A Dialogue'. The latter is a discussion between Moshe Machover and Said Hammami about the future possibilities for Arabs and Jews to live as equals in Palestine. It is a thoughtful and authentic attempt to come to grips with the multiple issues that must be sorted out and resolved before the two peoples can live together. It is also a fitting conclusion to a volume that provides a variety of perspectives on the most important questions confronting the region.

The articles are basically well-written and provocative, though there is some unevenness in quality. They are informed by the central concerns of *Khamsin* as stated above. One of the most interesting essays is Sadiq Jalal al'Azm's 'Orientalism and Orientalism in reverse', in which the author examines Edward Said's well-known perspective on Orientalism. It is a stimulating and thought-provoking piece; one only wishes that a rejoinder by Said was part of the collection. The point/counterpoint by Emmanuel Farjoun and Avishai Ehrlich on Oriental Jewish support for Menachem Begin is particularly useful.

It is enormously refreshing to find a book (and a journal) in which progressive Arabs and Jews are struggling to deal with such compelling issues. I would highly recommend *Forbidden Agendas* to all—scholars, students, and citizens—who are interested in the Middle East. While there will be many who will dismiss this work with the labels of 'radical', 'ideological', 'biased', etc. that conventional or mainstream political scientists, sociologists and journalists use to discredit ideas that do not conform to the dominant, orthodox ideas and to generally accepted conventional wisdom; there is nevertheless a truth in these pages that those who know the region will be forced to recognise. It is not

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even necessary to share the socialist vision to appreciate the value of the analyses in this volume, eg the subordinate place of the Oriental in Ashkenazi-dominated Israel, the negative role that religions play in the political processes throughout the Middle East, the oppression of women in the region, and so on. This book deserves to be widely read and thoroughly considered.

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Understanding Indonesia

Edited by Leslie Palmier

London: Gower. 1975. 113pp. £13.50

An up-to-date introduction to Indonesia both for academics and for professionals who intend to work in Indonesia is long overdue. In the 1960s the obvious book to turn to was the one edited by Ruth McVey entitled *Indonesia*. Since then there has been nothing comparable to keep us up to date, although there have been useful books by Polomka (*Indonesia Since Sukarno*) and McDonald (*Suharto's Indonesia*). *Understanding Indonesia*, then, could potentially have provided a useful service. Unfortunately, it does not live up to such expectations.

The text consists of an introduction by Palmier, chapters by Demaine and Walton on the economy, a chapter by Palmier on 'National integration', one on 'Drama and society' by Angela Hobart, and one by Michael Leifer on 'Attitudes to the world' (which seems to be a précis of his book on Indonesian foreign policy). The range of subjects covered in the book is, therefore, limited and it is difficult to see the readership for which it is intended. Business people going out to Indonesia will find the articles by Demaine and Walton useful, in so far as they contain a considerable amount of information, and reading them will save the reader the trouble of going over the relevant issues of the *Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies* and the *Far Eastern Economic Review* from which the information is largely derived. Angela Hobart's article is interesting but limited to one or two specific forms of theatre in Java and Bali. Leifer's article sketches some of the principal considerations but is too brief to do anything but skim the surface.

The most disappointing feature of the book is the omissions and inaccuracies. Readers who wish to know something about the Indonesia government's human rights record, or the political problems arising from the invasion of East Timor, or the implementation of the transmigration policy in West Iran will find nothing to enlighten them. Palmier's account of national integration gives a misleading impression of the current educational system, and the writer seems unaware of the changes which have occurred in the last ten years. A further irritating aspect of the book is the tendency of the writers to stray from their brief and, in their asides, misleading the reader. Examples of this are Demaine's remarks concerning the coup of 1965 and Leifer's comments on Sukarno and Pancasila. All in all, then, the book represents a lost opportunity. Even the suggestions for further reading, a mere six titles with no comment on them, are

inadequate. Anyone wishing to understand Indonesia is therefore advised to look elsewhere.

WILLIAM BODDY

London

An Indian Rural Economy 1880-1955: The Tamilnad Countryside

Christopher John Baker

Oxford: Clarendon Press. 1984. 616pp. n/p

Do not be misled by the book's title. While it is an academic monograph elaborating and extending Baker and David Washbrook's work on the Madras Presidency, it is more than that. What was to become the Tamil Nadu province of India had, in 1950, a larger population than any country—or colony—in Africa or, with the exception of Brazil, the Latin America which has dominated the literature on (under-) development. Aiming at economists and social scientists as well as historians, Baker makes a fine contribution to the study of the colonial economy and its links with the present. After a lengthy but lucid prologue on the history of rural Tamilnad which makes the work accessible to any reader, the author deals in five substantive chapters with colonial trade, agriculture, markets, towns and the state and countryside. Space precludes detailed comment here beyond noting that it is not just, as one would expect, erudite but lively; and, like the *Cambridge Economic History of India*, has some of the qualities of a great intellectual detective story. For those who are too busy keeping up with work on peasants in their own bailiwick, the Introduction and Conclusion are strongly recommended. The opening eighteen pages offer a splendid review of the battlefield: dependency, mode of production and like with some affectionate side-swipes at historical materialists with no sense of history, who see the pre-British period as some kind of changeless Dark Ages, and anti-colonialists who colonise Indian history from the steppes of Russia or the plains of Eastern Europe. The themes are announced and, in the Conclusion, revisited: pre-colonial history constrained the Raj and beyond; small-scale agriculture pre-empted capitalist farming in the south; since the early nineteenth century it has been the state rather than the individual farmer which has sown the seeds of progress. The legacy of colonialism in Tamilnad and in India has been not so much the emergence of a dominating rich peasantry in the countryside as the development of a powerful and purposive state. The state used the rural rich more than *vice versa*. Finally, the logic of state intervention has been to preserve and extend the society of small producers which is the foundation of the region's economy and history, before and after independence. If historians have come to appreciate structure, social scientists must surely respect and learn from history of this calibre.

T J NOSSITER

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Gift of The Devil: A History of Guatemala

Jim Hardy

Toronto: Between The Lines. 1985. 319pp. \$25.95. \$12.95pb

BOOK REVIEWS

The 'Gift of the Devil' in the title is a reference both to a Mayan description of the arrival of the Spanish in the sixteenth century and to the brutal entry of the Guatemalan military into the Indian highlands in the late 1970s and 1980s, when, according to the author, 'Guatemalan peasants endured a level of violence that far surpassed any experienced since the first days of the conquest.' It is hard to disagree when it is now known that as a result of army counter-insurgency operations from 1980 to 1985 between 45,000 and 60,000 Indians were killed, 440 villages destroyed, and at least half-a-million Indians forced to flee to Mexico or live as internal refugees within the country. The aptness of the title and the strength of the book lie in the emphasis put on the historical roots to what is only the most recent attempt by outside invaders to control both Indian land and the Indian population as a cheap source of labour (indeed, some Indian survivors of the repression have ascribed the army massacres to '*los españoles* from the city').

In general, the author succeeds in carrying out his main aim of 'making the Guatemala of the 1980s understandable through an examination of its history'. Although some of the summary paragraphs at the beginning and end of each chapter tend to be too reductionist, the main elements for understanding the present crisis are treated in an accessible and interesting style that makes the book an invaluable source of information and analysis for both the specialist and the student. The author seems right to play down the role of US policy in understanding the dynamics of Guatemalan politics (except in the case of the overthrow of Arbenz in 1954), and instead to concentrate on the distorted nature of Guatemalan capitalist development, the increased pressure on available land, the political suffocation resulting from a series of fixed elections and the rebirth of popular organisations addressing the country's racial divide as the essential ingredients that launched Guatemala into a full-scale civil war by the end of the 1970s.

Chapter ten on 'the economy and highland peasantry' is a particularly useful overview of the way in which Guatemala's impressive economic growth in the 1960s and 1970s only benefited a tiny agro-export elite, while over the same period the majority of highland peasants who form the cheap labour on the plantations actually became poorer in absolute terms. The author's conclusion that 'there can be no workable democracy until the coercive power of the local landowning elite, supported by the military, is destroyed through a substantial, broadly encompassing agrarian reform' (p 279), is a timely reminder that unless the recently-elected Christian Democrat government confronts the landed oligarchy, the December 1985 elections will only repeat the pattern set by previous elections of legitimising the socio-economic status quo.

The most obvious weakness of the book is its rather two-dimensional portrayal of the competing forces in the civil war. The text is dogged by the underlying assumption that the revolutionary Left is powerful and unified, while the Right is rapacious, repressive and faction-ridden. When the author writes, '(by 1982 the Guatemalan bourgeoisie and government) were tenuously held together by the national military which itself was rife with factions. Meanwhile, the popular forces that opposed the government forged strong and dynamic organisations that sought common goals through effective cooperation' (p 254), one wonders why the Left is at present confined to the hinterland and not installed in the National Palace. Handy's tendency to stress the similarities between the four guerrilla organisations is matched by his understating the military and political capacity of the armed forces. This weakness may be ascribed to the fact that much of the book seems to have been written in 1983 at a time when the Left and the

majority of writing on the Left was still infused with a good deal of triumphalism, but the text would certainly have been enriched by more indication of the major differences between the guerrilla organisations, which some observers claim were an important factor in their temporary setback.

However, in general, the author's sympathetic treatment of the Left and outrage at the army's atrocities do not mean that the general tone of the text degenerates into becoming a denunciatory tract. On the contrary, *Gift of The Devil* is a thoughtful and extremely useful background reader and acts as an important reminder of the urgent need to understand the indigenous roots of Central America's least publicised civil war before yet more Indians are wiped out in the name of fighting communism.

JAMES PAINTER

Latin America Bureau, London

BOOK NOTES

Namibia

Stanley Schoeman and Elna Schoeman
Oxford: Clio Press. 1984. 186pp. n/p

The Yemens: The Yemen Arab Republic and the People's Republic of Yemen

G Rex Smith
Oxford: Clio Press. 1984. 161pp. £20.75

The World Bibliographical Series aims to cover eventually every country in the world, with a format that provides for everything from flora, fauna and resources to international relations. Prime space is allocated to the section on 'Politics and the International Status Issue' in the Namibia volume, which includes major cases before the International Court of Justice, the status of Walvis Bay, human rights issues and the role of the churches.

The politics section of *The Yemens* regrettably numbers only ten pages and lists very few titles recent to the book's publication date. Nevertheless, a commendable effort to bring together documentation of an all-too-neglected area of study, and a reference tool that should be on every Middle Eastern scholar's bookshelf. In their systematic annotation of anthropological, cultural and social science documentation, the compilers of both bibliographies have rendered an invaluable service to the specialist seeking guidance on further sources of information.

World Resources 1986: An Assessment of the Resource Base that Supports the Global Economy

The World Resources Institute/International Institute for Environment and Development
London: Harper and Row. New York: Basic Books. 1986. 353pp. £11.95pb

No expense has been spared (£400,000) in putting together the first edition of this yearbook. Emphasis is placed on population growth as a major factor to be related to the four sections of the volume: world resource perspectives, reviews, issues and data tables. The compilers' commendable industry in bringing together so much essential information in one volume ensures that this inventory will appeal not only to the specialist and the policy-maker, but also to the general reader.

Parliaments of the World: A Comparative Reference Compendium

Volumes 1 and 2
Inter-Parliamentary Union
Aldershot, England: Gower. 1986. 721pp. £65.00

This publication covers 50 per cent more parliaments than the previous edition, which

was published in 1976. Eighty-three parliaments are described as they existed at 30 June 1985. The information was extracted from a questionnaire sent to all of the 142 Parliaments of sovereign states throughout the world, and also from documents at the Inter-Parliamentary Union's International Centre for Parliamentary Documentation.

The present edition contains fifteen sections each of which deals with some major aspect of the structure, powers or procedure of Parliament. These sections are broad—Parliamentary Procedure, Proceedings and Debates, Parliamentary Committees, Parliaments and the Media and so on. Each of the forty-seven chapters is illustrated by a comparative table giving basic data on each of the eighty-three parliaments. The statistics displayed serve to bring out important similarities and differences between the various parliamentary systems, and as such are a valuable tool of reference.

The Cambridge Encyclopedia of Latin America and the Caribbean

Edited by Simon Collier, Harold Blakemore and Thomas E Skidmore
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 1985. 456pp. £25.00

A sizeable proportion of this volume is devoted to Latin American and Caribbean culture, taking in languages, literature, music, visual arts, theatre, cinema, the media and science. This complements the remaining sections on physical environment, economy, peoples, history, politics and society. The result is recommended reading for the businessman, undergraduate, art historian and well-read traveller alike.

The Political Economy of Namibia: An Annotated Critical Bibliography

Tore Linne Eriksen with Richard Moorsom
Uppsala, Sweden: The Scandinavian Institute of African Studies. 1985. 423pp. n/p

This must be one of the most extensive bibliographies on Namibia to date, covering as it does the political past and present of Namibia. Its fifteen main sections include the pre-colonial era, German and purported South African rule and then the struggle for liberation, thus setting the tone for the ensuing sections on the Namibian economy, peasant society and migrant labour, women, education, culture, health and Namibia's international relations. Although much work has been published on the country since 1985, this bibliography still deserves to be recommended. A great deal of careful work has gone into annotating sources from several languages. Indispensable are the pages listing other bibliographies and periodicals on the country.

Encyclopedia of World Problems and Human Potential

Edited by Union of International Associations
London: K G Saur. 1986. 1439pp. £123.00

BOOK NOTES

This volume is intended to be a comprehensive sourcebook on recognised world problems, their interconnections, and the organisational and conceptual resources available to respond to them. The editors argue that by representing fundamentally incompatible viewpoints within the same context, readers will be encouraged to discover new approaches to understanding and action sufficiently complex to encompass the factions, conflicts and world views by which people are separated.

As much conceptual as factual, *World Problems and Human Potential* allocates relatively little space to classic 'mega-problems' such as over-population, nuclear war, resource depletion and hunger. More space is given to the thousands of less widely-acknowledged problems, which are claimed to compose or sustain these 'mega-problems' through a network of the 17,000 aggravating and alleviating relationships indicated in the book. Also included are the unforeseen stumbling blocks to the success of remedial projects. Problems described include: excessive public debt, acid rain, soil erosion, cruelty to children, juvenile suicide, discrimination against women in education, limited acceptance of international treaties, judicial error, incompetence, loneliness and permissiveness.

A navigational guide to the reader needing philosophical and perceptual perspectives, as well as contextual information, on the identification and solution of world problems.

Our Namibia: A Social Studies Textbook

Henning Melber

London: Zed Press. 1986. 167pp. £18.95. £6.95pb

Strangers in Their Own Country: A Curriculum Guide on South Africa

William Bigelow

Trenton, New Jersey: Africa World Press. 1985. 92pp. \$14.95pb

Our Namibia is the result of a cooperative project between the Social and Educational Division of the UN Institute for Namibia and the University of Bremen. A textbook for upper primary and lower secondary classes, this pioneering book is described by project members Hinz and Modise as 'the very first Namibian school book compiled by Namibians for Namibians'. The progression from the political geography of Part One to the social experiences of today and learning for the future in Part Three guide the young Namibian pupil—young in years but no doubt much older in suffering—through a learning and questioning process to a sound grasp of national self-respect and identity. Tasks set include: 'What do you think justifies characterising our country's present economic structure as a colonial one?', followed by: 'List the kind of employment of people you know' and 'Where do you think the priorities for an independent economic development lie?'. A resourcefully designed tool that will either be recommended for inspiration to self-determination or dismissed as propaganda.

Strangers in Their Own Country is a lesson-by-lesson handbook for educating the non-South African student on what it is like to live in South Africa. Materials recommended include fact sheets, biographies, fiction and simulation situations, all

designed to bring the pupil to an awareness of the oppression of a majority by minority that is the system of apartheid. One hopes that such books—along with multi-cultural and anti-racist educational resources—will eventually overcome the opposition they face, in the struggle for curriculum time in white and mixed-race classrooms.

HURIDOCs Standard Formats for the Recording and Exchange of Information on Human Rights

Bjørn Stormorken with Annie McMorris

Utrecht, Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff. 1985. 175pp. n/p

Information about human rights is hard to obtain, difficult to disseminate and yet essential to the protection and promotion of all human rights. In the countries of the South, resources tend to be concentrated largely in the hands of a few, mainly governments and multinational corporations. The absence of information retrieval and transmission facilities has hampered human rights groups as has the lack of agreed formats for the recording and retrieving of information. Those who have the resources and technology have a vested interest in withholding such information from the open market.

The Human Rights Information and Documentation System (HURIDOCs) is a universal network of non-governmental organisations, institutes, academics and activists concerned with information on and about human rights. These Standard Formats are the result of the two years' endeavour of Executive Consultant Bjørn Stormorken, to develop a set of bibliographical and documentation control tools to bring about a higher degree of standardisation and compatibility between organisations handling human rights information. It is hoped that these guidelines will enhance the exchange of information, and thus enable a more effective division of labour within the human rights network as a whole.

The next stage in HURIDOCs' programme is a referral data base on human rights organisations and their documentation holdings.

Directory of African Technology Institutions. Volumes I and II

Compiled by J C Woillet and M Allal

Geneva: International Labour Office. 1985. 619pp. SF 65pb

The number of centres dealing with appropriate technology has more than doubled over the last ten years, increasing from approximately 500 to over 1,000 between 1970 and 1980. The renewed interest in appropriate technology has resulted in the establishment of several regional technology centres such as the Regional Centre for Technology Transfer (RCTT) established in Bangalore by the UN, or the African Regional Centre for Technology (ARCT) in Dakar, set up by the Organisation of African Unity and the UN.

The directory lists the whole spectrum of public and private institutions, from university centres, technical departments of ministries, and research institutes, to rural

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development agencies, and handicraft promotion centres. The criteria for inclusion are long-term programmes of work in the development and adaptation of local or imported technologies, and a capacity to disseminate these technologies and to exchange information with institutions in the region.

The compilers of these two volumes have rendered an invaluable service to the promotion of Third World technology.

Cities of the World: Second Edition, Volumes 1, 2, 3 and 4

Edited by Margaret Walsh Young and Susan L Stetler

Detroit, Michigan: Gale Research Company. 1985. 3056pp. \$235.00

Cities of the World: Second Edition Supplement

Edited by Margaret Walsh Young and Susan L Stetler

Detroit, Michigan: Gale Research Company. 1986. 758pp. \$84.00

This guide offers information more pertinent than a geography book or a travel guide. Its five volumes give encyclopedic coverage to the social, cultural, political and industrial aspects of 2,400 cities in 137 countries. Maps and photographs illustrate each capital city, and information is easily found under categories such as Population, Government, Recreation, Schools for Foreigners, and so on. Individual volumes cover Africa; the Western Hemisphere (exclusive of the USA); Europe and the Mediterranean Middle East; Asia, the Pacific and the Asiatic Middle East; and a supplement provides an update on the four volumes a year after publication.

Cities of the World is doubtlessly a valuable source of information for the independent traveller, and the elementary researcher. But whether it could claim to be a comprehensive guide to the world's urban settlements is debatable. Gale Research has compiled this guide largely from 'Post Reports' issued by the US Department of State or its diplomatic personnel. Accompanying the volume's publication is the announcement that 'Countries where the United States has no embassy or consulates are not included . . . as there are no "Post Reports" issued for cities in those countries; and travel there by Americans is strongly discouraged.' This guide is clearly for the exclusive use of the Western traveller.

Western Sahara: A Comprehensive Bibliography

Lynn F Sipe

New York: Garland Publishing. 1984. 418pp. n/p

Over six thousand entries ensure that this is probably the most comprehensive bibliography on the Western Sahara, and a storehouse of treatises and documents on the last hundred years' history of the region. There is annotation of newspaper articles, dissertations, government documents, maps, yearbooks and conference proceedings, as well as the standard medium of books and journals. The four sections deal with physical

and human characteristics, Spanish colonisation, international legal aspects of decolonisation and sovereignty, and the struggle for the Western Sahara.

Political Handbook of the World

Edited by Arthur S Banks

New York: Center for Social Analysis, University of New York at Binghamton. 1986. 805pp. n/p

Now nearing its sixtieth anniversary, the *Political Handbook of the World* contains information on the constitutional development, political parties and current issues of every country, as well as information on the legislatures, cabinets, foreign policies and intergovernmental representation. It also carries basic data and a short country profile.

Over 100 pages have been allocated to intergovernmental organisations. During 1985-86, no newly independent territory entered the community of nations; the most recent addition being that of Aruba to the Netherlands Antilles as a locally autonomous component of the Kingdom of the Netherlands. Although neither the Polisario Front nor the South West African People's Organisation of Namibia qualify for entry, the Palestine Liberation Organisation occupies its own separate category between the two main sections. This special treatment is, according to the editor, due to the PLO's importance in Middle Eastern affairs. The Intergovernmental Representation category is unfortunately mostly limited to representation to the USA and the UN.

Biographical Dictionary of Marxism

Edited by Robert A Gorman

London: Mansell. 1986. 388pp. n/p

Biographical Dictionary of Neo-Marxism

Edited by Robert A Gorman

London: Mansell. 1985. 461pp. n/p

The Biographical Dictionary of Marxism contains essays on a worldwide selection of 210 Marxist philosophers and activists. In concentrating on philosophy and strategy, Professor Gorman has chosen to adopt a broad definition of materialism. Limitations of narrow geographical and temporal interests have thus been by-passed, and the result is an extensive coverage of Third World Marxists, whose contributions have redefined Marxism in terms of post-colonial liberation struggles throughout the world. A compelling combination of the 'orthodox' and 'unorthodox' has been achieved.

The Biographical Dictionary of Neo-Marxism complements the former volume by encompassing non-traditional philosophical variations of its Marxist theory. Whereas the first dictionary deals with materialist Marxist thinkers, this tome surveys proponents of non-materialist thought, and evinces an equally sophisticated and rigorous approach on the part of its contributors.

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- Al-Rahmin, Muddathir Abd, Badal, Raphael, Hardallo, Adlan and Woodward, Peter (eds): **Sudan since Independence**. Aldershot, England: Gower. 1987. 181pp. £19.50hb.
- Abdulghani, Jasim M: **Iraq and Iran: the Years of Crisis**. London: Croom Helm. 1986. 270pp. £15.00hb.
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* This is a list of books that have been received by *Third World Quarterly* for review; they are not available for sale through *Third World Quarterly*.

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- Clay, Jason W and Holcomb, Bonnie K: **Politics and the Ethiopian Famine 1984-1985**. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Cultural Survival. 1986. 237pp. \$9.95pb.
- Croll, Elisabeth: **Food Supply in China and the Nutritional Status of Children**. Geneva: United Nations Research Institute for Social Development and United Nations Children's Fund. 1986. 111pp. n/p.
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- Davis, Uri: **Israel: An Apartheid State**. London: Zed. 1987. 145pp. £28.95hb/£7.95pb.
- Dietz, James L: **Economic History of Puerto Rico: Institutional Change and Capitalist Development**. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press. 1986. 337pp. n/p.
- Economist Intelligence Unit: **The World in 1987**. London: Economist Publications. 1986. 130pp. £2.95pb.
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
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Third World Foundation News

1987 Third World Lecture

Bob Geldof, the recipient of the 1986 Third World Prize, awarded in 'recognition of his "extraordinary effort" in helping to relieve famine in Africa', delivered the annual Third World Lecture on Friday, 23 January 1987. The Lecture and prize-giving ceremony were held at the Queen Elizabeth II Conference Centre, London. The 1986 Lecture had been delivered in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia by Dr Oliver Tambo, President of the African National Congress on behalf of the 1985 Prize winners, Winnie and Nelson Mandela.

The Lecture and presentation, the seventh of its kind since the establishment of the Third World Prize in 1980, welcomed as its Guest of Honour Dr Julius K Nyerere, winner of the 1981 Third World Prize, former President of Tanzania and now head of the Independent Commission of the South on Development Issues (see 'Third World Foundation News', *Third World Quarterly* 9(1) January 1987). The presentation was made by the Secretary-General of the Commonwealth and Chairman of the Third World Prize Selection Committee, Mr Shridath S Ramphal. The opening address was delivered by Mr Altaf Gauhar, Secretary-General of the Third World Foundation.

The Citation prepared by the Third World Prize Selection Committee, composed of Shridath S Ramphal (Chairman), Robert K A Gardiner, Enrique V Iglesias, B K Nehru and Azim Husain (Member-Secretary), is reproduced below with extracts from the address of Altaf Gauhar and Shridath S Ramphal and the speech of Julius Nyerere.

Citation of the Third World Prize Selection Committee

Bob Geldof described his stunned reaction to the television pictures of famine in Ethiopia in these terms: 'I would send some money, I would send more money. But that was not enough. To expiate yourself truly of any complicity in this evil meant you had to give something of yourself.'

Give himself he did, to the exclusion of all else and to the point of exhaustion. The need to act, with all the urgency and energy he could muster, became a moral imperative. That irresistible motivation fired an individual whose creativity and flair had hitherto been confined to the world of rock music; whose idealism lay largely dormant and qualities of leadership undiscovered. From such improbable beginnings came a man and a cause that captured the public imagination of people throughout the world, young and old alike.

His initial aim was to raise money by doing what he knew best—making

music. But, in November 1984, he knew that to produce a No. 1 smash hit by Christmas, with a buying public of millions, he had to reach beyond the 'Boomtown Rats', to friends, colleagues and acquaintances across the British pop scene. 'Band-Aid' was born, with a glittering galaxy of stars, and with Bob Geldof's song: 'Do They Know Its Christmas?' It was a good song, but the rush to buy the record soon had little to do with the tune or its singers.

Sales of the Band-Aid single raised millions. But it was followed, in July 1985, by Live-Aid, a 16-hour concert in Wembley Stadium before an audience of 80,000, linked to a parallel event in Philadelphia and watched through global TV coverage by over a billion-and-a-half people. Technically, it was a stunning achievement, but it was also much more. Rock concerts had been dedicated to causes before; individual artists had announced their commitment; the public had watched. But Bob Geldof did more than mount a spectacle—he set in train a movement.

The active ingredients he gathered for Band-Aid sparked off a chain reaction which gathered momentum with Live-Aid and exploded into the mass participation of Sport-Aid. From building a community of artists with Band-Aid, he had created a world-wide community of concerned people. No longer passive spectators, they had become active participants, linked around the globe. Live-Aid not only raised a breathtaking sum for famine relief, it became an unforgettable experience. In Bob Geldof's words: 'Cynicism and greed and selfishness had been eliminated for a moment. It felt good. A lot of people had discovered something in themselves.'

The Sport-Aid 'Race Against Time', held in May 1986, took the process of people's involvement still further. Sponsored jointly by Sport-Aid and UNICEF, and timed to have the maximum impact on the UN debate on Africa which followed, it was preceded by a week of activities across the world. The 10 km run itself was staged simultaneously by thirty million runners around the globe, in over 270 cities and in seventy-eight countries, and through countless unofficial activities which developed spontaneously. Huge numbers, therefore, answered the challenge to 'Run the World' in a massive demonstration of support for Africa.

By the standards of voluntary giving, monumental sums were donated. Band-Aid, Live-Aid and Sport-Aid raised over US\$130 million in Europe, North America and elsewhere. Its success helped to swell total donations to UK charities by 25 per cent and donations to international charities as a group were up by a staggering 163 per cent. Most of the income was entirely new money.

Some of the aid has gone to emergency disaster relief and logistics, but the bulk has been devoted to long-term development and rehabilitation in six Sahelian countries: Ethiopia, Sudan, Chad, Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso. Projects have been small-scale and localised—helping those faced with famine with the means to rebuild their lives.

THIRD WORLD FOUNDATION NEWS

The driving force—initiator, organiser and leader—was Bob Geldof, who linked three separate if massive individual efforts and gave them continuity and substance. His insistence that he faced no alternative but to withdraw his consent from what he knew was happening drove him into a mammoth personal crusade against human suffering and human indifference to suffering, with which millions the world over identified. The plight of the Third World had been brought home to people around the globe with an immediacy and a clarity which was compelling.

Bob Geldof's appeal was to people of all ages, but young people in particular, through the medium of rock music, and calling in aid another formidable element of Western popular culture, the mass media. He has described how 'every camera became a symbol of political authority'. 'Band-Aid,' in his own words, 'wrested the political initiative from the parliamentary process into the hands of ordinary people.'

Strengthened as he was by such mass support, Bob Geldof's fierce pride, driving energy and stubborn refusal to compromise, has had a profound impact on governments and on politics. He has met presidents, prime ministers and leaders around the world, cutting through the mystification and justification of present inequalities and inadequacies with a combination of charm, irrevocable moral certainty and brutally direct advocacy. His plea was powerful: if people could respond as they had, why not governments?

Bob Geldof would be the first to acknowledge that, despite the enormous sums raised, popular subscription alone will not be enough to change the face of Africa or of the Third World. That remains the task of governments: governments, whether of West or East, North or South, which have not always taken kindly to his criticisms. But people move governments. Today they recognise, acknowledge, understand, that we are citizens of one world. They are determined to do something about it. Bob Geldof has shown them that they can.

His over-riding contribution has been to bring into life a dynamic relationship across the North-South Divide, moving aid from the realm of charity into the world of popular politics. Internationalism has thereby been given a new content in bringing relief to people in Africa afflicted by famine; in changing perceptions beyond Africa of a grossly unequal world; in mobilising millions to give millions; in altering the dynamics of aid and development as a political issue. Bob Geldof has rendered a service of immense proportions to all humanity. He has made a truly outstanding contribution to the Third World.

The Third World Prize Committee takes pride in awarding this year's Third World Prize to Bob Geldof.

Extracts from Address by Altaf Gauhar, Secretary-General of the Third World Foundation

'We are here this evening to honour Bob Geldof, the man who rescued a whole generation from despair—a generation trapped in a hundred ways of doing nothing was suddenly shown a way of doing something. Millions of people resigned to indifference and cynicism were thus rescued and introduced to the ecstasy of caring and sharing. Bob elevated charity to equality and transformed the act of participation. Both Julius Nyerere and Bob Geldof are concerned with the problem of poverty: Bob Geldof with its extreme manifestation, famine and starvation, and Julius Nyerere with its root causes, injustice and exploitation. While the awareness of the problem has been enhanced, its extent and gravity have not diminished.

Forty-four years ago I saw famine in Bengal through the eyes of a painter, Zain-ul Abedin. He painted scores of black and white sketches of crows, "scrawny and very ugly and lean", and of skeletons lying in "withered and thin and scorched fields". Zain-ul "created" the famine for the people of India to see. Forty years later when I went to Bangladesh I saw the same fields of hunger, dark with swarms of crows and skeletons, and those enormous black beautiful eyes of little children enlarged in cosmic wonder.

Bob Geldof, too, allowed us to see famine in Ethiopia. It is this hideous phenomenon of exploitation and injustice which Julius Nyerere has been fighting against and which drove Bob Geldof into a state of moral outrage. However briefly, Bob shook the world. This prize is a tribute to Bob for demonstrating that "Humankind cannot bear too much reality".'

Extracts from Address by Shridath S Ramphal, Secretary-General of the Commonwealth Secretariat and Chairman of the Third World Prize Selection Committee

'The Third World Prize is awarded each year for outstanding service to Third World development. Service to the Third World is invariably service to humanity as a whole. In making the world a better place, one makes it a better place for all people. In serving the Third World one serves all humankind. In the field of human service, life is one and the world is one.

In its Citation of the Award of the 1986 Third World Prize to Bob Geldof, the Committee has tried to convey to the public what it really did not need to be told: why it is appropriate that Bob Geldof should receive this honour. In a sense, the Citation says everything about the great impact his dedicated service has had in redressing human suffering in Africa, and the impact it has made upon his fellow-citizens of the world.

Geldof will be the first to assert that the 'Bob Geldof phenomenon' was part of a wider phenomenon—that of 'people action'. When he spoke of his own revulsion to famine and starvation in a world of plenty and of waste: 'To expiate

yourself truly of any complicity in this evil meant that you had to give something of yourself,' he spoke for millions of ordinary, decent people world-wide. They are people who find unacceptable the deepening desolation of the world's poor; the millions overborne by poverty, for whom life is survival until tomorrow, and always only tomorrow; millions who simply pass away from want without ever knowing the reason why.

More and more people are recognising that the evils of poverty and inequality imply some kind of complicity. They are giving something of themselves not merely in expiation, but in the resolve to end poverty. The people of the world are becoming involved in a massive quest for peace; peace which they understand as being more than the absence of war, more than freedom from armed conflict. It is a quest for peace in terms of people world-wide working together as brothers and sisters, not as adversaries; men women and children from all lands understand that their common humanity and their fate are inseparable on this small planet; people are aware that we have only one world and that we have to learn to share its bounty and its fortunes better than we do.

Despite the reverses that the spirit of internationalism has suffered in the last few years, people today to a far greater degree than ever before in human history recognise, acknowledge and understand that they are of one world. It is vested interests of all kind which cling to a status quo that denies this vision. Yet, people know it is a true vision, and they are doing something about it.

Bob Geldof has shown that if there is to be peace, real peace, not only every nation, but every city, every town, every village, every person has to live and work for it.

Today we have met to do him honour, and to honour him at the hands of one whom we have honoured in a similar way—Mwalimu Julius Nyerere.'

Extracts from Address made by Julius K Nyerere, 1981 Third World Prize winner and former President of Tanzania

'The Third World Prize has always been awarded to people involved, in one way or another, with the future of the Third World. The recipients have been promoters of, or agitators for, a New International Economic Order; or fighters for dignity and freedom in the Third World like the Mandelas; or major contributors to expanded agricultural output like the International Rice Research Institute.

This year, in an imaginative selection, the Prize has been awarded to a person who has concerned himself with trying to ensure that Third World peoples stay alive. Bob Geldof and those who worked with him, have made it much more difficult for governments in the North to excuse inaction on matters concerning gross international inequality; they can no longer plead that their peoples are unconcerned about poverty in the Third World. For in a dramatic

manner, Mr Geldof and his friends have demonstrated the strong feelings of human solidarity which exist everywhere.

Without wishing to raise controversy, I think it is true to say that as a general rule, governments allow their economic heads to govern their human hearts. Yet, actions by governments—even by the most democratic governments—are actions by people taken at second hand. Actions by governments are needed; there are some things which only governments can do. But it is direct voluntary actions and contributions which most clearly reflect our internal conviction about man's common humanity.

Mr Chairman, for a very long time I have been, and still am, an advocate of the need for international and official government and institutional action in a fight against world poverty. But governments act on behalf of their people; and they cannot for long ignore what their people think and believe. Neither can they replace the passion for justice, the sense of human unity and the personal actions of individuals. The world depends upon men and women acting for what they believe. In the end it is the human hand extended to help another in trouble which gives life.

It is from that standpoint that I salute today's prize-winner. I pay tribute to the work Bob Geldof has done for the future by increasing public awareness of the nature and problems of world poverty. I salute him for his initiative, the persistence of his anger on behalf of the suffering, and the unofficial and non-governmental action he organised to help Africa's famine victims to survive, and to give them another chance of life, and in life.⁹

Third World Foundation Consultative Status with the UN Economic and Social Council

Recognition of the growing importance of the work of the Third World Foundation was made by the UN Economic and Social Science Council (ECOSOC). In February 1987, the consultative status of the Foundation to ECOSOC was upgraded to Category I. Previously the Foundation had held Category II and Category III status on the roster, Category II status being granted in 1981. The upgrading of status followed from the council's recognition of the Foundation's greatly expanded role in a range of areas related to Council activity.

The decision to upgrade was taken by ECOSOC, the 19-member Non-Governmental Organisation's Central Committee. Support for upgrading had originally been canvassed from sixteen members of the Committee. The decision to upgrade was carried unanimously. It is worthy of note that the granting of full consultative status is unusual for an organisation so recently established. Of the seven Non-Governmental Organisations which had applied

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for Category I status at the Session, only the Third World Foundation was successful in its application.


The upgrading entitles the Foundation to participate more fully in ecosoc's work. It allows the Foundation to attend ecosoc and ecosoc-related conferences and meetings. It also allows the Foundation to:

- Propose agenda items to the Council and its subsidiary bodies
- Submit written statements on a range of areas
- Have greater access to Hearing facilities

In addition to the status accorded to ecosoc, the Foundation has facilities for participation in the activities of the UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) and consultative status with UN Industrial Development Organisation (UNIDO). The Foundation also has official relations with the UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO).



Bob Geldof with (left to right) Mr B K Nehru (Member of the Third World Prize Selection Committee), HE Mr Shridath Ramphal (Chairman of the Third World Prize Selection Committee), Mr Agha Hasan Abedi (Chairman of the Board of Trustees of the Third World Foundation) and Mwalimu Julius K Nyerere (winner of the 1981 Third World Prize).



Bob Geldof, after presentation of the Third World Prize scroll, with Mwalimu Julius K Nyerere, recipient of the 1981 Third World Prize.

North-South Monitor

UN SYSTEM

▲ International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD)

Governing Council: Tenth Annual Session

Rome, 9-12 December 1986

■ Representatives of IFAD's 141 member-countries met for the annual session of the Governing Council, where they decided on the formation of a high-level intergovernmental committee to consider the future method of IFAD's funding.

In his speech to the Council, IFAD's President, Idriss Jazairy, called for a more realistic and humane, if not rational, approach to global problems of agricultural adjustment, airing some radical proposals on the issues of external debt and agricultural subsidies. On debt, he noted that record levels of absolute indebtedness had been reached in Latin America, and of per capita indebtedness in Africa. Echoing a suggestion originating from Oxfam, he raised the possibility of indebted developing countries repaying at least a portion of their debt in their local currencies, into a special development fund, which would then be part-administered by an agency such as IFAD, and directed towards serving the needs of the rural poor. Jazairy pointed to the anomaly whereby surplus food production is subsidised to the tune of \$36bn in the North, while only \$8bn is directed towards encouraging vital food production where it is most needed—in the South. He then suggested that the reduction of surpluses in the North, coupled with an increase in official development assistance to the South, would, in conjunction with more equitable trading terms for primary commodities, benefit both taxpayers in the North, and the malnourished in the South.

While Idriss Jazairy was able to inform the Council that most of the funds pledged for the second replenishment of IFAD (IFAD II) had been received, the replenishment had been secured only after difficult and protracted negotiations. The major obstacle lay in the reluctance of members of the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) to continue providing 42 per cent of IFAD's funding (as opposed to 58 per cent from the industrialised countries), given the drastic decline in oil prices and the changed financial circumstances of OPEC member-countries. Consequently, agreement on IFAD II, for the period of 1985-87 had been reached only at the expense of a 50 per cent drop from previous funding levels.¹

The intergovernmental committee established by the Council was to consist of twelve members from each of IFAD's three categories. (IFAD consists of twenty OECD countries, twelve OPEC countries and 110 non-oil exporting developing countries, and is unusual in that each category has equal voting power within the organisation's governing bodies.) The committee was to consider various funding options, proposed by IFAD's President in a report to the Council. The Council's discussions of the report had apparently already established some common assumptions among IFAD members: that changing economic circumstances would have to be taken into account in reconsidering the capacity of donors to contribute to the fund; that IFAD's members were nevertheless committed to solving the problem of IFAD's funding, to

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enable it to continue its universally recognised achievements in targetting concessional loans to small-scale agricultural projects; and that any solution must preserve IFAD's unique structure and mandate. It was decided that the committee would meet four times in 1987, under the chairmanship of Idriss Jazairy.

The Council discussed a report on the implementation of IFAD's Special Programme for sub-Saharan African Countries Affected by Drought and Desertification. The Programme's separate budget of \$300m had been determined at the same time as IFAD II, partly to compensate for reduced overall funding levels, and was intended to assist twenty-two drought-stricken countries in Africa.² Apparently, \$197m of the target \$300m had so far been firmly pledged, and five projects had been scheduled at a total of \$30.6m, with eight further projects planned for 1987. The Council also endorsed a programme of new IFAD projects in 1987, at a cost of SDR 250m, roughly equivalent to \$300m.

The Governing Council voted by acclamation to extend Idriss Jazairy's term of office as President from three to four years, due to run until November 1988. It also approved the application for membership of IFAD's 142nd member-country, North Korea.³

● 'Would it be too bold to suggest that a link be established between the pangs of hunger and the burden of external debt? The President of the International Council of Voluntary Agencies . . . has recently suggested that careful consideration be given to converting at least a portion of the official debt of developing countries so that it be repaid in local currencies and placed in a development fund managed by an external donor such as IFAD, in conjunction with government and non-governmental organisations.' Idriss Jazairy, President of IFAD. *UN Press Release IFAD/86/51*, 9 December 1986.

WORLD BANK/INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND (IMF)

▲ International Development Association (IDA)

Meeting of Deputies

Rome, 15 December 1986

■ Deputies of the thirty-one donor countries which are members of IDA, the World Bank's concessional lending arm, agreed on the final terms of IDA's eighth replenishment (IDA VIII).

The total replenishment for the three years beginning on 1 July 1987, was determined as \$12.4bn, higher than the target of \$10.5-12bn originally set when negotiations began in Paris in January 1986, and higher than the level of \$11.5bn agreed as a minimum at the last meeting of the deputies in September 1986.⁴ The final sum was, however, considerably lower in real terms than the allocation of \$12bn in 1981-83.

The extra funds were forthcoming from Japan, and other countries including Italy and the Netherlands, which had made their increased contributions dependent on gaining a larger shareholding in the World Bank, and hence greater voting power. The US, meanwhile, had agreed to make such a redistribution possible by

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relinquishing some of its own shares. The deputies proposed a draft resolution providing for share increases for Japan, Italy, Canada, Korea and the Netherlands, while the US shares were to be reduced from 20 to 18 per cent. As a US condition of this change, another draft resolution recommended that the Bank's fundamental Articles of Association be amended to increase the majority by which major policy changes could be effected, from 80 to 85 per cent, thus preserving the USA's effective veto in such matters.

The terms of IDA loans were also modified. While the ten-year period of grace before capital repayments began was retained, the length of maturity was reduced from fifty to forty years for the least developed recipients, and to thirty-five for other countries. There was, however, provision for a regular review of the economic circumstances of recipient countries, to allow for adjustment in their terms of credit. While IDA's function in financing investment was reaffirmed, the deputies agreed explicitly to place increasing emphasis on conditional lending directed towards specific policy reforms and adjustment, sometimes in conjunction with the IMF's Structural Adjustment Facility (SAF). Such lending was to amount to \$3-3.5bn of the IDA total.

The deputies' proposals were approved by the World Bank Executive Directors on 27 February 1987.⁵

COMMODITIES

▲ International Coffee Organisation (ICO)

Governing Council: Emergency Meeting
London, 23 February-2 March 1987

■ An emergency meeting of the ICO's Governing Council, called to consider the reimposition of export quotas under the International Coffee Agreement (ICA), ended in failure. Producer and consumer countries were unable to agree over the method of distributing market shares among exporters.

The session of the Council had been called by the ICO Executive Board, which consists of representatives of both consumer and producer countries, following separate meetings where the two sides had coordinated their positions. The fifty producer countries were urging the reintroduction of export quotas as a means of lifting prices into the 120-140¢ per pound price range stipulated by the ICA. Export quotas had lapsed in February 1986, in anticipation of a shortfall in the 1986 Brazilian coffee crop as a result of drought, but prices had fallen since then, as the shortfall appeared to have been overestimated.⁶ There was, however, no provision within the ICA for the automatic reintroduction of quotas, despite prices having fallen below the support level. Producers had first, therefore, to convince consumers within the Executive Board that they were in agreement as to how the new quotas would be distributed among themselves, before the Board would call a full Council meeting at which to negotiate the reintroduction of quotas.

The producers' proposal, formulated at their meeting in London on 28-30 January 1987, aired at the subsequent Executive Board meeting, and tabled in the Council, was for an overall ICO export level of 58m bags, distributed on the same formula as

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had applied before quotas were suspended. The proposal included provision for the redistribution of 1.22m bags, however, as a result of shortfall declarations by Brazil (1m bags), the Organisation of African and Malagasy Coffee Producers (200,000 bags) and Angola (20,000 bags). The producers called for quotas to be resumed for twelve months from 1 March 1987. Producers also undertook not to engage in unilateral intervention in the market to support prices, a commitment which had been sought by the main coffee importer, the USA.

While consumers proved willing to convene a full Council meeting of the ico's seventy-five members, to renegotiate the introduction of quotas, they were opposed to the producers' specific proposal. The twenty-five consumers, led by the USA, with the support of Britain, West Germany and the Netherlands, objected to the traditional method of distribution, on the grounds that it reflected political influence rather than availability, and would fail to ensure importers a constant supply of coffee. Proposing their own method of distributing quotas on the basis of 'objective criteria', they advocated that calculations be based on average exportable production over the period 1980-86, rather than on gross production, as before. Countries standing to lose under this new system would include Brazil, the largest exporting country, accounting for roughly 30 per cent of the global market, and Ivory Coast, while other countries including Colombia, the second largest producer, and Indonesia, would gain. The consumers were supported in their opposition to the producers led by Brazil, by a dissenting group of seven producer countries: Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Papua New Guinea and Peru. Currently accounting for 16 per cent of the global market, the countries favoured a redistribution of market shares which would reflect production capacity rather than historical importance.

The meeting broke up in disagreement, with neither side willing to accept the proposal of the other. Brazil's chief negotiator, Jorio Dauster, questioned the existence of such things as 'objective criteria', and accused the USA of attempting to dictate rather than negotiate the reintroduction of export quotas. The US chief negotiator, Jon Rosenbaum, on the other hand, criticised Brazil for considering its past market share to be a historic right, calling instead for what he termed flexibility and fairness. Coffee prices were left, therefore, without a supporting mechanism, at least until the Council reconvened, probably in September 1987.⁷

●'For too many years we have gone along with what the producers wanted. We cannot go on like that.' Abraham van Overbeeke, spokesman in the ico for the consumers. *The Guardian* (London) 9 March 1987.

'We will not accept that our quota will be dictated by anybody.' Jorio Dauster, Brazil's chief negotiator. *The Guardian* (London) 9 March 1987.

'The way we've been treated is not democratic.' Luis Escalante, Economy Minister of Costa Rica, one of the producer countries which opposed the status quo with regard to quota distribution, supporting the USA against Brazil. *The Guardian* (London) 9 March 1987.

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DISARMAMENT

▲ Soviet Union–United States
Summit
Reykjavik, Iceland, 11–12 October 1986

Soviet Union–United States
Ministerial Meeting
Vienna, 6 November 1986

■ US President Ronald Reagan and the Soviet leader, Mikhail Gorbachev, met for the first time since their 'fireside summit' in Geneva in November 1985.⁸ The meeting, billed as an interim one to prepare for an envisaged summit in the USA, was suggested by Gorbachev in a letter of 19 September 1986, and agreed to by Reagan after the resolution of a dispute over the arrest in Moscow on 30 August 1986 of a US journalist, Nicholas Daniloff, on charges of spying.⁹ The Reykjavik summit followed two bilateral meetings of experts to negotiate possible arms control agreements to be signed at a forthcoming summit,¹⁰ and a meeting between US Secretary of State, George Shultz and Soviet Foreign Minister, Eduard Shevardnadze, on 20–21 September 1986 in New York, which had been dominated by the 'Daniloff Affair'.¹¹

The Reykjavik summit included four meetings between the two leaders, together with sessions of two working groups—on arms control and on humanitarian and regional issues. The summit itself was dominated by the issues of nuclear and space weapons and, after a temporary blackout on the substance of the talks, the positions of the two sides were made public. The Soviet proposals were explained in a speech by Mikhail Gorbachev on Soviet television, on 14 October 1986, while the US position was outlined in President Reagan's speech on US television on 13 October 1986, and in a US State Department text issued on 17 October 1986.¹²

At first, there appeared to have been an unprecedented level of agreement on the means of reducing strategic nuclear arms and intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF), as well as on the issues of nuclear testing and verification of arms control agreements. There were substantial concessions on the Soviet side, which went a considerable way towards accommodating both long-standing US proposals, and more recent suggestions at Reykjavik.

On strategic nuclear weapons, the Soviet Union proposed mutual reductions of approximately 50 per cent over five years, until 1991, when each side would be left with a maximum of 6000 warheads on 1600 launchers. As regards former obstacles to agreement, the Soviet Union conceded that US medium-range missiles in Europe and US forward-based systems need no longer be categorised as 'strategic' simply by virtue of their capacity to reach the other superpower's territory. The USSR also agreed to negotiate large cuts in its SS18 heavy Inter-Continental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs) with their ten warheads each. The two sides seem to have accepted that each bomber would be counted as one warhead (as opposed to previous Soviet demands for each bomb on a bomber to be counted as one warhead), and that sea-launched Cruise missiles would be the subject of later negotiations. The US apparently agreed to these proposals. Gorbachev proposed that over the following five years, from 1991

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to 1996, all remaining strategic nuclear weapons would be eliminated. Despite subsequent claims by the Soviet Union that Reagan had agreed to this formulation, the official US proposal later referred instead to the total elimination after ten years of only 'all offensive ballistic missiles', effectively excluding Cruise missiles and long-range bombers.

On INF, the Soviet Union proposed the removal of all US and Soviet medium-range nuclear weapons in Europe, including US Cruise and Pershing II missiles, and Soviet SS20 missiles. Despite Gorbachev's pointed reminder that this proposal mirrored the original US 'zero option', the USA rejected the offer, primarily out of concern over Soviet INF in Asia. In a subsequently modified proposal, the Soviet Union suggested the elimination of medium-range missiles in Europe coupled with their reduction elsewhere, until only 100 warheads remained on Soviet INF in Asia, and 100 warheads on US INF in the USA. The Soviet Union conceded that British and French nuclear forces would be exempt from restrictions (when it had previously demanded that they be frozen at current levels), and that there would be a freeze on short-range INF (with a range of less than 1000 kilometres) in Europe, which would become the subject of later negotiations to reduce their levels. The USA, while apparently receptive to the proposals on reducing medium-range weapons, made counter-proposals on short-range INF. It first suggested a mutual ceiling at current Soviet levels (which were higher than those of the US) and then advocated a reduction to at most the level prevailing in January 1982.

On nuclear testing, the Soviet Union accepted in principle US suggestions for a phased approach towards the ultimate ending of nuclear tests, rather than demanding that the USA match its own moratorium. The USA called for improved verification of the Threshold Test Ban Treaty and Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty, and for further constraints on the size and number of explosions, in parallel with nuclear arms reductions. The Soviet Union also accepted in principle US proposals for verifying agreements on strategic weapons, INF and nuclear tests.

The possibility of a historic agreement on these arms control issues receded, however, in the face of continuing differences on the subjects of defensive weapons in space, and the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty of 1972, which currently limits the superpowers' development of defensive weapons. It became apparent, after the common ground on other areas had tantalisingly been defined, that the Soviet Union intended to link agreements on strategic arms and INF to US acceptance of limitations on withdrawal from the ABM Treaty, and on the development of the US Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI, or 'Star Wars'). Such linkage appeared to reverse the understanding at the superpower summit in November 1985 that progress on INF would not be made conditional upon agreement on space weapons.

At Reykjavik, the Soviet Union proposed a mutual undertaking for both sides not to withdraw from the ABM Treaty for ten years (less than the proposed period of fifteen years tabled at the Geneva Nuclear and Space Talks).¹³ During that decade, successive cuts in strategic weapons would be made, and at the end of 1996, further negotiations would determine subsequent action. Explicit in the proposal was acceptance of an interpretation of the Treaty which precluded all development or testing of space weapons outside the laboratory. The USA answered with two successive positions. Initially it proposed that the ABM Treaty be adhered to for a five-year period, with the following five years made conditional on the success of the

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first five years' strategic reductions. Subsequently, it agreed to a commitment to observe the ABM Treaty for the whole ten-year period. In both cases, at the end of ten years, either side would be free to deploy defences, though in the second formulation the proviso was added: 'unless the parties agreed otherwise'. President Reagan, however, resolutely refused to countenance the restriction of SDI to the laboratory, claiming that research, development and testing (short of actual deployment) were permitted by the ABM Treaty. Given this fundamental disagreement, no accord was reached.

Despite earlier hopes that Reykjavik would pave the way for a further summit in the US, no such meeting was arranged. A subsequent ministerial meeting between George Shultz and Eduard Shevardnadze in Vienna during the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) Review, intended to preserve the momentum behind the arms control efforts at Reykjavik, also failed to secure any results. There was even a strong suggestion from the Soviet side that the USA was attempting to redefine its position at Reykjavik, notably by couching its version of the agreements reached there in such a profusion of technical detail as to obscure the common ground.¹⁴ President Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev did agree, however, that their proposals at Reykjavik should formally be tabled at the Geneva arms talks.¹⁵

● After Reykjavik, the infamous SDI has become more conspicuous as a symbol of obstruction in the way of peace, as a concentrated expression of militaristic designs and the unwillingness to avert the nuclear threat looming large over mankind. It is impossible to perceive it otherwise. This is the most important lesson of the Reykjavik meeting.' Mikhail Gorbachev in his television speech following the summit. *Soviet News* (London) 15 October 1986.

'SDI is America's insurance policy that the Soviet Union would keep the commitments made at Reykjavik. SDI is America's security guarantee—if the Soviets should—as they have done in the past—fail to comply with their solemn commitments, SDI is what brought the Soviets back to arms control talks at Geneva and Iceland. SDI is the key to a world without nuclear weapons.' President Reagan in his Address to the Nation. *US Information Service*, October 1986.

'The offer put to us in Vienna can be compared to a political theatre of the absurd. All those levels and sub-levels, limits and sub-limits, all that expert arithmetic which seemed to have been abolished once and for all in the Icelandic capital, re-emerged to obscure the substance.' Eduard Shevardnadze, the Soviet Foreign Minister, speaking after his meeting with the US Secretary of State, George Shultz, in Vienna. *The Independent* (London) 11 November 1986.

▲ Soviet Union—United States

Nuclear and Space Talks (NST): Sixth Round
Geneva, 18 September–12 November 1986

■ The fifth round of 'umbrella' NST, embracing arms control in the three fields of INF, strategic nuclear weapons and space and defensive weapons, had been characterised by a Soviet proposal to which the US had undertaken to reply by the opening of the sixth round.¹⁶

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The US response was apparently contained in a confidential letter from US President Ronald Reagan, to the Soviet leader, Mikhail Gorbachev, on 25 July 1986. The proposals it contained were said to be similar to those subsequently made in President Reagan's speech to the Forty-First Session of the UN General Assembly (UNGA) on 22 September 1986. They included the following:

- A continued US commitment to achieving mutual reductions of 50 per cent in strategic forces, focusing particularly on cuts in ballistic missile warheads, and a US willingness to countenance interim cuts of a smaller percentage;
- the global elimination of INF, or interim cuts towards this goal;
- an agreement committing the US and the Soviet Union to observe the ABM Treaty until 1991, while continuing research, development and testing 'which is permitted by the ABM Treaty', to determine the technical feasibility of defensive space weapons;
- the negotiation of a new seven-year treaty superseding the ABM Treaty, stipulating that if either side wished to deploy space weapons after 1991, 'that side would be obliged to offer a plan for sharing the benefits of strategic defence and for eliminating offensive ballistic missiles'. If after two years no agreement had been concluded, either side would be free to deploy an advanced strategic defensive system after giving six months notice;
- the USA would progress towards ratifying the threshold Test Ban Treaty and the Treaty of Peaceful Nuclear Explosions after what it regarded as essential new ideas regarding their verification had been discussed. Though opposed to an immediate Comprehensive Test Ban (CTB) Treaty, the US was prepared to seek a programme of limiting and ultimately ending nuclear testing, in parallel with arms reduction.¹⁷

The NSR were interrupted for the duration of the Reykjavik superpower summit, but were resumed after its conclusion. The USA formally tabled proposals which were said to derive from the Reykjavik talks. They included:

- a draft treaty on strategic arms reductions in two phases of five years, to achieve the elimination after ten years of all ballistic missiles, leaving both sides with nuclear bombers and Cruise missiles;
- strategic sub-limits in the first five years of 6000 warheads on 1600 launchers, no more than 4800 being on ballistic missiles and 3300 on land-based missiles. Of these 3300, no more than 1650 could be heavy missiles, such as the Soviet SS18s, and missiles with over 6 warheads. Long-range missiles were to be banned unless their limits could be verified, in which case they would be counted within the 1650 ceiling;
- a draft treaty on INF to eliminate all medium-range nuclear forces in Europe, leaving 100 warheads on Soviet INF in Asia, and 100 warheads on US INF in the USA;
- for both INF and strategic weapons, elimination would mean either destruction and dismantling or conversion to other uses, and accompanied by on-site inspection;
- mutual adherence to the ABM Treaty for ten years, with the reported qualification that the US reserved the right to withdraw if there were 'material breaches' in the Treaty or a change in the strategic situation endangering a nation's 'supreme interest'.

As the sixth round ended, Soviet negotiators tabled proposals which reflected their own position at Reykjavik. They advocated:

- a 50 per cent reduction in all strategic weapons over five years, including a 50 per cent cut in Soviet SS18 Inter-Continental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs), together with agreement on the complete elimination of all strategic nuclear weapons in ten years.

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● two treaties on INF, one banning all Soviet and US INF in Europe, and the other stipulating a limit of 100 warheads on US INF in the USA and 100 warheads on Soviet INF in Asia. A freeze on short-range INF (with a range of less than 1000 kilometres) would precede immediate negotiations to reduce their levels. A difference emerged between the two sides, however, on whether the US would be permitted to deploy INF in Alaska, within range of the Soviet Union, or whether the terms would preclude stationing the remaining INF within range of the other superpower's territory.

The USA meanwhile, was reported to have proposed a mutual pledge to adhere to the ABM Treaty for seven years, in parallel with a seven-year programme of mutual 50 per cent cuts in strategic arms.¹⁸

The seventh round of NST was due to begin on 15 January 1987.

THE NORTH

▲ Group of Seven (G7)

Ministerial Meeting

Paris, 22 February 1987

■ Finance ministers and central bank governors from six of G7's major industrialised countries (Britain, Canada, France, Japan, USA and West Germany) reached an agreement which was subsequently dubbed the 'Paris' or 'Louvre Pact'. The ministers agreed to cooperate to stabilise exchange rates at roughly their current levels, while intensifying efforts to coordinate their domestic economic policies.

The Italian Finance Minister, Giovanni Goria, withdrew from the meeting in protest against the holding of informal talks by the Group of Five (G7 minus Canada and Italy) on 21 February 1987, during which key details of the subsequent agreement had apparently been worked out. Wary of the Italian delegation's reduction to the status of a rubber stamp, the minister described the G5 meeting as a 'substantial violation of the Tokyo Summit agreement', by which G7 had been created to monitor international economic and financial matters of concern to all members.¹⁹ The Italian withdrawal was seen to jeopardise plans for the next Western Economic Summit, scheduled to be held in Venice in June 1987.

The Paris accord was the first since the breakdown of consensus among G5 members over the 'Plaza Pact' of September 1985, which had presaged the depreciation of the US dollar. This pact had been intended to increase the competitiveness of US exports, thereby helping to reduce international trading imbalances (particularly the US deficit and the Japanese and West German surpluses), and diffuse protectionist pressures in the US Congress.²⁰ Emerging differences between the major industrialised countries had, however, been highlighted during the last meetings of the G5 and G7 in Washington DC in September 1986. There, despite anxiety among Japan and the European countries for the stabilisation of the value of the dollar, the USA had expressed an unwillingness to arrest its fall in the absence of accelerated growth outside the USA.²¹ The dollar's continuing decline had prompted calls since January 1987 (notably by Japan, whose yen had appreciated by 60 per cent against the dollar in the past eighteen months) for a G5 meeting. Others, however, had been unwilling to

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disrupt the markets further by announcing a new meeting without the preliminary talks necessary to ensure its success.

In their Paris communiqué,²² the six ministers agreed on the priority of reducing global trade imbalances, and expressed concern over continuing pressures for the erection of 'self-defeating' protectionist barriers. Affirming that since the Plaza Pact, the key currencies (the US dollar, the Deutschmark and the yen) had come within ranges 'broadly consistent with economic fundamentals', they 'agreed to cooperate closely to foster stability of exchange rates around current levels'. The commitment in effect to intervene in currency markets to prevent a renewed slide in the dollar was, however, qualified by the phrase 'in current circumstances'. The agreement, rather than instituting the 'reference ranges' or 'target zones' previously advocated by the French Finance Minister, Edouard Balladur, and endorsed by the US Treasury Secretary, James Baker, was for a short-term standstill. The circumstances of intervention to enforce this standstill were left unspecified. Moreover, current exchange rates were described as likely to contribute to reductions in external imbalances *given* the implementation of a series of coordinated policy commitments, set out by the six in their communiqué. It was partly this apparent qualification of the commitment to intervene to stabilise exchange rates that raised doubts as to whether the US would continue to refrain from 'talking down' the dollar, if unsatisfied with the efforts of Japan and West Germany to foster growth.

In their communiqué, in an attempt to promote balanced global growth, the ministers agreed that surplus countries should increase domestic demand and reduce their external surpluses, while deficit countries would encourage steady growth, reducing their domestic imbalances and external deficits. Accordingly, Japan agreed to expand domestic demand as a means of reducing the external surplus, and to endeavour to implement tax reforms, in addition to cutting its discount rate by half a per cent on 23 February 1987. West Germany, while making no explicit commitments to increasing domestic demand, agreed to increase the tax cuts planned for 1988, and drew attention to the recent fall in its short-term interest rates. The USA, meanwhile, made specific commitments to reduce the fiscal 1988 deficit to 2.3 per cent of its GNP, from its estimated level of 3.9 per cent in fiscal 1987. It aimed to limit the growth in governmental spending to 1 per cent in the fiscal year 1988, in an attempt to reduce government spending from its present level of 23 per cent of GNP.

The communiqué recognised the responsibility of the major industrialised countries to foster an open and growing world economy, in order to support the efforts of the developing countries, particularly those with external debts, to restore growth and viable balance-of-payments positions. It also, however, issued a warning to Newly Industrialised Countries (NICs) whose recently accumulated trade surpluses were said to be contributing to unsustainable global imbalances, and hence to protectionist pressures. The NICs, which include Taiwan, South Korea, Hong Kong and Singapore, were advised to reduce their own trade barriers, and allow their currencies to reflect their true strength, rather than being kept perpetually undervalued against the dollar.

The ministers also agreed on further measures to enhance the multilateral economic surveillance accepted in the Tokyo Economic Declaration of 1986. They decided to institute periodic reviews of 'medium term economic objectives and

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projections', to ensure their mutual compatibility, and of actual current trends, to determine their consistency with these objectives and projections. These assessments would initially be made using six key variables: growth; inflation; current accounts/trade balances; budget performance; monetary conditions; exchange rates.²³

The next meeting of the G7 was expected to be held during the Spring meetings of the IMF and World Bank, in April 1987.

●The Paris Pact is 'a direct linear descendant of the Plaza meeting . . . Now, we have all agreed that the time has come for a period of stabilisation, and we will act accordingly.' Nigel Lawson, Britain's Finance Minister, speaking after the Paris meeting. *International Herald Tribune* (Paris) 23 February 1987.

I am 'not prepared to call the meeting Plaza 2. The agreement is simply to force stabilisation at current levels . . . the most difficult negotiations were on the stimulative measures to be taken by the trade-surplus countries.' US Treasury Secretary, James Baker, after the meeting. *International Herald Tribune* (Paris) 23 February 1987.

'Italy is very disappointed at the behaviour of the Five. They are clubbing together and clinging to an outdated privilege.' Antonio Baldini, Diplomatic Adviser to the Italian Prime Minister, Bettino Craxi, speaking in Rome after the meeting, of the G5's decision to hold an informal gathering prior to the G7 meeting. *International Herald Tribune* (Paris) 23 February 1987.

NORTH-SOUTH

▲Central American Common Market (CACM)—Contadora Group—European Economic Community (EEC)
Joint Ministerial Conference
Guatemala City, 9–10 February 1987

■Foreign ministers from the EEC, the CACM (Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua) and the Contadora Group (Colombia, Mexico, Panama, Venezuela) met principally to examine proposals of a renewal of EEC aid to Central America, but also to perform the customary review of the continuing conflict in the region. The meeting was the third in a series of annual ministerial conferences, begun in Costa Rica in 1984, and continued in Luxembourg in November 1985.²⁴ The fact that of the twelve EEC countries, only four were represented by their foreign ministers (Belgium, Denmark, Netherlands and Spain) was perhaps indicative of the low expectations they placed on the meetings, which had in the past resorted to bland protestations of support for the Contadora peace process.

In his opening speech, the Belgian Foreign Minister and President of the EEC Council of Ministers, Leo Tindemans, cautioned that without the political will to find a settlement for the region's problems, no amount of economic aid would help. Notwithstanding this warning, the meeting seemed marked by a widening gulf between on the one hand the US allies, Costa Rica, El Salvador and Honduras,

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which denounced Nicaragua as the chief cause of regional tension, and on the other, Nicaragua itself. A dispute between El Salvador and Nicaragua, resulted in El Salvador's Foreign Minister, Ricardo Acevedo Peralta, boycotting the opening session, though appearing in time for a press conference at which to lambaste the Sandinist regime. Acevedo had been scheduled to deliver a speech on behalf of the Central American countries, but withdrew after a protest from Nicaragua that it had not been invited to send a representative to the meeting at which El Salvador had been chosen as a spokesman for the region. Instead, the Nicaraguan Foreign Minister, Father Miguel D'Escoto, proposed that the relatively neutral Guatemala speak for the region. In the event, the Guatemalan President, Vinicio Cerezo, spoke both on his own behalf, and on that of Central America. On the European side, the meeting was characterised by a consensus that a military solution to the region's problems, as advocated by the USA, was undesirable.

Agreement on the wording of a final joint declaration was delayed by opposition to some clauses from the US allies. In particular, the Costa Rican Foreign Minister, Rodrigo Madrigal, initially objected to an expression of joint support for Contadora as the 'only viable solution' to the Central American crisis, no doubt mindful of Costa Rica's own fledgling peace initiative (see below). The eventual communiqué, however, both reiterated support for the principles of the Contadora process, including its search for a diplomatic solution, and announced the EEC's decision to maintain its aid to the region.²⁵

● 'The open or latent conflicts in this part of the world will find no solution unless there can be found the firm political determination to seek solutions.' Leo Tindemans, the Belgian Foreign Minister, and President of the EEC Council of Ministers, in his opening speech. *The Independent* (London) 11 February 1987.

'Contadora is a corpse which no one dares bury.' Rodrigo Madrigal, Foreign Minister of Costa Rica. *Financial Times* (London) 12 February 1987.

'All the conditions now exist for a regional war.' Ricardo Acevedo, El Salvador's Foreign Minister. *The Guardian* (London) 14 February 1987.

'We don't believe the problems of the area can be resolved by armed force.' Lady Young, the British representative at the meeting. *International Herald Tribune* (Paris) 12 February 1987.

▲ South Pacific Forum Meeting of Foreign Ministers Auckland, 4 March 1987

■ The South Pacific Forum (SPF) issued a joint appeal to France to postpone its referendum on independence for New Caledonia, scheduled to be held in July 1987, and to seek further consultations instead. The special meeting was attended by eleven of the Forum's thirteen member-countries (Australia, Cook Islands, Fiji, Kiribati, Nauru, New Zealand, Niue, Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu, Vanuatu and Western Samoa) and had been called by Sir Kamisese Mara, the Prime Minister of Fiji and current Chairman of the Forum.

Kamisese Mara expressed concern at what he perceived to be attempts by France to divide the Forum, following its pronouncements on New Caledonia at its last

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annual summit in Suva, Fiji, in August 1986.²⁶ There, Australia, New Zealand and the traditionally moderate Polynesian states had united behind the views of the more radical Melanesian countries, in criticising French moves to delay progress towards independence for the territory, and in initiating a successful campaign to have New Caledonia reinscribed on the agenda of the UN Committee on Decolonisation, as a 'colonised territory', as occurred on 2 December 1986. Since the summit, France had reduced its aid to Vanuatu and the Solomon Islands, which, together with Papua New Guinea, formed the most militant Melanesian contingent in favour of assisting the movement for independence in New Caledonia. It had also expelled Australia's representative in New Caledonia and suspended ministerial visits to Canberra. On the other hand, France had offered generous relief to Polynesia following the effects of recent cyclones, in an apparent attempt to woo its island states away from the rest of the Forum.

In a final statement, the foreign ministers asserted that the approach of the French Prime Minister, Jacques Chirac, to the issue of New Caledonian independence had 'serious shortcomings and clearly did not meet accepted principles and practices of the UN'. The proposed referendum, unlike that suggested by the former Socialist government, offered a stark choice between full independence (with no guarantee of French support) or continued colonial status. The SPF countries had also accused France of further manipulation by encouraging a recent influx of white settlers into the country, in order to ensure their predominance over the indigenous Kanak vote in the referendum. The UN alternative which the Forum countries supported entailed 'free, honest and genuine choice' in self-determination, with a long-term residence requirement for voting (rather than the French proposal of a minimum of only three years) and special recognition of Kanak rights. The Forum also advocated that all options on the status of the territory be left open, and not coupled with threats of punitive consequences, in order to sway voters.

The ministers decided in favour of continuing an attempt at dialogue with the French government, in an effort to secure postponement and consultation. Henceforth, however, negotiation on the territory would take place between France and the Forum as a whole, rather than with its individual member-countries. It was determined, though, that if its overtures elicited no response from France, the Forum's position would be reconsidered at its next annual summit, due to take place in Apia, Western Samoa, on 29 May 1987.²⁷

● 'They have been doing their best to divide the Forum with friendly pressure.' Sir Kamisese Mara, Prime Minister of Fiji and Chairman of the SPF, speaking of selective offers of French aid to particular SPF countries. *Far Eastern Economic Review* (Hong Kong) 19 March 1987.

SOUTH-SOUTH

▲ Non-Aligned Movement (NAM)

First Consultative Meeting on the External Debt

Lima, 12-14 November 1986

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■ Representatives from thirty-six heavily indebted countries in Africa, Asia, Latin America and Europe gathered under NAM auspices to discuss the world debt crisis. The meeting, which had first been suggested at the NAM summit in Harare in September 1986, was broadened to encompass other members of the Group of 77 (G77) and any interested debtor countries.

The official purpose of the meeting was technical rather than political. It was hoped that it would initiate an exchange of information on debt negotiations and establish a monitoring system and information base on debt statistics and their relation to other economic indicators within developing countries. A final communiqué, however, called for the replacement of the existing case-by-case approach to debtor countries by 'political dialogue' between creditors and debtors, based on the 'shared responsibility' of finding a permanent, global solution to the problem. Calling for long-term agreements rather than short-term rescheduling arrangements, many delegates advocated the automatic application of the generous terms allowed large debtors to smaller countries. Echoing the conclusions of a conference of Latin American and Caribbean Middle Country Debtors in San José, Costa Rica, in December 1985,²⁸ they argued that the present system of negotiating on an individual country basis operated to the detriment of the smaller, relatively powerless debtor countries, which were unable to dictate the terms of their own rescheduling agreements.²⁹

▲ Contadora Group—Lima Support Group
Meetings of Foreign Ministers
Rio de Janeiro, 17–18 December 1986
Mexico City, 21 January 1987

■ Foreign ministers from the four member-countries of the Contadora Group (Colombia, Mexico, Panama, Venezuela) and their Lima Support Group (Argentina, Brazil, Peru, Uruguay) met in Rio de Janeiro in an effort to revivify their search for peace in Central America. The four-year long Contadora peace process had been stalled in its efforts to find a non-military solution to the region's conflicts since June 1986, when US allies in the region (Costa Rica, El Salvador, Honduras) had rejected what Contadora members claimed would be the final version of the Draft Treaty on Peace and Cooperation in Central America.³⁰

In a final joint communiqué, the eight ministers expressed grave concern over recent events in the region, citing an increase in activity by the US-supported anti-Sandinist 'Contras' operating on the Nicaraguan border; increased political intervention from outside the region; and the suspension of dialogue aimed at a peaceful settlement. Calling on the USA to end its military and economic aid to the 'Contras', the ministers agreed to tour the countries of Central America, using the good offices of the Secretaries-General of the UN and the Organisation of American States (OAS). There was speculation that the group may have chosen to re-launch the peace process at a time when there were signs of disenchantment with US policy among the region's US allies, following the 'Iran-Contra' scandal in Washington DC, linking covert US arms sales to Iran with funding for the 'Contras'. There were also

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signs that the Contadora process was becoming increasingly pragmatic, abandoning its emphasis on the spurned legal peace treaty, and attempting instead to solve individual issues of contention on a bilateral basis. The communiqué also referred to a plan to create a Latin American Consultative Body to address regional problems such as foreign debt and trade.³¹

The tour of the five Central American capitals by the eight foreign ministers, together with Javier Pérez de Cuéllar, the Peruvian UN Secretary-General, and João Baena Soares, the Brazilian OAS Secretary-General, took place on 19–20 January 1987. The ten-member mission held talks with Presidents Oscar Arias Sánchez of Costa Rica, José Azcona Hoyo of Honduras, José Napoleon Duarte of El Salvador, Vinicio Cerezo Arevala of Guatemala and Daniel Ortega Saavedra of Nicaragua. As anticipated, the leaders of the three US allies in the region were reported to have emphasised the need for democracy in Nicaragua as a precondition for peace in Central America, though President Duarte went on to advocate the holding of a Central American summit as a means to resolving differences. President Cerezo of Guatemala, meanwhile, proclaimed Guatemala's continuing policy of 'active neutrality', and President Ortega issued his own statement expressing support for Contadora and a willingness to resume negotiations on its proposed peace treaty.³²

At a press conference in Mexico City after the tour, Pérez de Cuéllar issued pleas for the region's member-countries to put aside their 'marginal political differences' in order to resolve their problems, and for the superpowers to stay out of the region. His scepticism as to the existence of sufficient political will among Central American countries to find peaceful solutions was echoed in a final joint communiqué issued by the eight foreign ministers on 21 January 1987. They proposed, however, to continue their dialogue with all concerned parties, including the USA, in the hope of discovering a non-military solution.³³

● 'There will be no peace in Central America without democracy in Nicaragua. The day the Sandinista government can say it has been elected freely by the majority of Nicaraguans there will be no more problems.' President Arias of Costa Rica, at a press conference after his meeting with the mission. *The Times* (London) 21 January 1987.

'Our advice to Contadora is simple: stop pressurising the four democracies for concessions and start pressurising the Sandinistas for concessions.' Elliot Abrams, US Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, giving the US view of Contadora before its meeting in Rio. *The Guardian* (London) 24 December 1986.

'I don't think this is the last chance for peace. I think Contadora will keep on producing proposals and ideas. But neither Contadora nor the United Nations nor the Organisation of American States can do very much if there is not the political will and the sincerity to find peaceful solutions among the Central American governments.' Javier Pérez de Cuéllar, UN Secretary-General, at a press conference in Mexico City after the tour. *The Times* (London) 21 January 1987.

▲ Costa Rica—El Salvador—Guatemala—Honduras
Summit
San José, Costa Rica, 15–16 February 1987

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■ Leaders of the Central American countries met at the invitation of President Oscar Arias Sánchez, to discuss a Costa Rican regional peace initiative. The Nicaraguan President, Daniel Ortega Saavedra was not invited to the meeting, apparently on the grounds that Nicaragua did not qualify as one of the region's democracies.

The Costa Rican peace plan under discussion was reportedly first proposed at a meeting between President Arias and US President Reagan in December 1986. It was further considered at a meeting in Miami on 7 January 1987 between Madrigal Nieto, the Costa Rican Foreign Minister, Elliot Abrams, the US Assistant-Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, and Philip Habib, the US special envoy for Central America.³⁴ The plan was to some extent an attempt to wrest the peace initiative from the Contadora Group, whose peace treaty the USA strongly criticised for failing to demand stringent enough reforms from Nicaragua, and for lacking adequate enforcement measures. While the new initiative had received apparent US backing, it was uncertain as to how far the Reagan Administration, which had perpetually advocated the need for a solution obtained through military pressure on the Sandinist regime, was in accord with every aspect of the detailed peace plan.

The ten-point peace plan was proffered by President Arias for signature by all four leaders, in the hope of the summit's issuing a fifteen-day ultimatum to Nicaragua for its acceptance. Such an ultimatum was refused, however, notably by Guatemala, and the plan was endorsed though not signed by the leaders, thus failing to create the united front against an isolated Nicaragua, which the USA and its allies had reportedly been hoping for. It was decided to invite President Ortega to a further Central American summit in Esquipulas, Guatemala, within ninety days, at which the plan would be open to modification.

The ten-point plan and time-table for peace was made public in a document issued by the summit.³⁵ Ostensibly designed for all Central American countries whose governments were engaged in fighting guerrilla wars, its main force was directed at Nicaragua, which was singled out as the principal destabilising influence in the region, whose 'democratisation' was expressed as a precondition for lasting peace throughout Central America. The 'Arias Plan', which the document described as an 'indivisible whole', proposed the following (the timings referred to are from the time the plan takes effect, namely when all five Central American presidents have signed it):

- 1) where there are armed struggles, a general political amnesty within sixty days, and an immediate dialogue between government and internal opposition, as a means to national reconciliation;
- 2) an immediate cease-fire;
- 3) 'democratisation', entailing the immediate instigation of an 'authentic, democratic, pluralist and participatory process', including within sixty days (a) a free press and (b) freedom of association for political parties;
- 4) 'free, pluralistic, honest' and OAS-supervised elections in every country in 1988, for a Central American Parliament, as proposed in the Declaration of Esquipulas of May 1986;³⁶
- 5) an immediate suspension of overt and covert military aid to irregular forces and insurgent groups, at the request of the five governments on signing the document, and an end to arms trafficking;

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- 6) a renewed commitment to preventing the use of their territory by groups seeking to destabilise governments in the region;
- 7) negotiations beginning within sixty days on the reduction and control of troops and arms, with measures for the disarming of irregular forces;
- 8) the creation within thirty days of a follow-up committee consisting of the Secretaries-General of the UN and OAS and the eight foreign ministers of the Contadora Group and its Lima Support Group, for the purposes of verifying and supervising the implementation of the plan;
- 9) the holding of a summit of the five Central American leaders within six months, to evaluate progress towards the implementation of the plan;
- 10) economic and cultural agreements to promote regional development.

Among the significant aspects of the plan were its apparent concessions to Nicaragua. The negotiations advocated towards national reconciliation were to be between government and unarmed internal opposition, and not necessarily with the 'Contra' rebels, which the Sandinist regime had consistently dismissed as puppets of the Reagan Administration, demanding direct talks with the USA whenever talks with the 'Contras' were urged. These armed groups were to be covered, instead, by the political amnesty. Moreover, the suspension of US military aid to the 'Contras' was in effect to be immediate, while the obligation to begin arms control reductions was delayed for two months. Hence, the progressive demilitarisation of Nicaragua was no longer to be made a precondition for the ending of aid to the rebels, a departure from the scheme advocated by the USA.

Within a few days of the document's release, President Ortega had accepted the invitation to Esquipulas, despite earlier Nicaraguan condemnation of the San José summit as a US-inspired manoeuvre. President Ortega insisted, however, that the new initiative could not be seen as superseding the Contadora process, and should not constitute the sole subject of discussion at the projected summit in May 1987.³⁷

● 'A stable and lasting peace cannot be reached if there is not democracy in all the countries of the isthmus.' President Arias of Costa Rica, voicing the fundamental principle behind his new peace plan. *The Guardian* (London) 16 February 1987.

▲ Arab League

Extraordinary Ministerial Council Meeting
Kuwait, 25 January 1987

■ Foreign ministers from the Arab League's twenty-two member countries met during the fifth Islamic Summit Conference in Kuwait (see below).

According to the Arab League's Secretary-General, Chedli Klibi, the ministers ratified a plan submitted by the Council's committee on ending the 'camps war' in Lebanon. The seven-member committee had recently visited Damascus and Beirut. Describing the plan as 'positive and encouraging', Klibi said that the committee had been entrusted by the Council with supervising the implementation of the plan, and with continuing its contacts, notably at the Ico summit.³⁸

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▲ Islamic Conference Organisation (ico or oic)

Fifth Summit

Kuwait, 26-29 January 1987

■ Delegations from forty-four countries, including twenty-one Heads of State, attended the triennial Islamic Summit Conference, which had last convened in Casablanca in 1984. Leaders present included King Fahd of Saudi Arabia, President Assad of Syria, King Hussein of Jordan, President Gemayel of Lebanon, Yasser Arafat, Chairman of the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) and President Mubarak of Egypt, whose membership of the ico had been suspended following the country's Camp David peace accord with Israel in 1979, and reinstated in 1984. Notably absent were King Hassan II of Morocco, Colonel Qadhafi of Libya, President Suharto of Indonesia and President Saddam Hussein of Iraq.

The ico has forty-six member-countries, but Afghanistan's membership was suspended in 1980, following the Soviet occupation, and the country sent representatives of the Mujahideen as guests. Also absent was Iran, which boycotted the summit on the grounds that Kuwait fell short of a neutral location, which could guarantee safety to the participants. Kuwait, along with Saudi Arabia, had been a principal supporter of Iraq in the Gulf War, and was accused by Iran of allowing Iraq to use its airspace to launch attacks on Iranian targets, and its ports to tranship goods to Iraq, whose own ports had been damaged in the war. In boycotting the summit (having made an unsuccessful formal application to the ico's Secretary-General, Syed Sharfuddin Pirzada, for a change of venue), Iran declared that it would ignore any subsequent summit resolutions on the Gulf War.

The conference was dominated by the Iran-Iraq conflict being waged in close proximity to Kuwait, and by inter-Arab divisions centring mainly on the Palestinian problem and relations with Israel. Discussions on the Gulf War focused initially on plans to send a further ico mediation committee to negotiate with the two sides. Given, however, that Iran had previously announced its refusal to receive a mission without the ico's prior denunciation of Iraq as the aggressor, such deliberations assumed an air of futility.

More positive were signs of tentative rapprochement between various leaders in the Arab world, notably involving steps towards the political rehabilitation of Egypt. Egypt's readmission to the ico had been strenuously opposed by Iran, Libya and Syria at the sixteenth Islamic Foreign Ministers' Conference in Fez in January 1986.³⁹ At the summit in Kuwait, however, President Assad of Syria held a bilateral meeting with President Mubarak of Egypt, while at the same time criticising Egypt in his speech for its continuing relations with Israel. In his own address to the conference, President Mubarak chose not to respond to these criticisms, in the interests of preserving the harmony of the conference.⁴⁰ While the moves towards re-acceptance of Egypt by Arab leaders appeared to be partly in response to the threat they perceived from a powerful Iran, and in recognition of the need to offset that threat with the presence of another leading power in the Middle East, there were limits to the extent of that acceptance. In an informal meeting between five Arab heads of state on 28 January 1987, President Mubarak was not invited to join the leaders of Algeria, Jordan, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and Syria. Other bilateral meetings held during the conference included that between President Assad and King Hussein of Jordan, and between Assad and President Gemayel of Lebanon, whose relations

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with Syria had been strained since his rejection of a Syrian-brokered peace pact between Lebanese Christian and Muslim militiamen in January 1986. King Hussein also held a reconciliation meeting with Yasser Arafat of the PLO, resulting in a mutual agreement to provide more support to the virtually defunct joint Jordanian-PLO Committee on the West Bank. The rift between President Assad and the PLO, notably over Syria's support for the Muslim militiamen engaged in the 'camp wars' against Palestinian guerrillas in Lebanon, remained unhealed.

The conference issued a number of final resolutions, including the following. The summit:

- called for an international peace conference on the Middle East under UN auspices, with the participation of all concerned parties, including the PLO, on an equal footing, and the five permanent UN Security Council members. The summit rejected UN Security Council Resolution 242 of 1967 as a sufficient basis for the settlement of the Palestinian problem (a view held by the PLO but not shared by the 'moderate' Arab states, such as Egypt and Jordan). Continued US support to Israel was condemned;
- further condemned the resumption of relations with Israel by some states, and appealed to states contemplating such relations to forbear (Egypt and Morocco whose King Hassan had met with the Israeli Prime Minister, Shimon Peres, in 1986, were not explicitly named);
- called for an immediate ceasefire in the Lebanese 'camp wars', the lifting of their state of siege, and the return of people who had been driven from them;
- expressed concern at the escalation of the Gulf War and called for its immediate cessation and a withdrawal to international borders;
- called on the Soviet Union to withdraw its troops from Afghanistan;
- condemned the Pretoria regime in South Africa, calling for the imposition of comprehensive mandatory economic sanctions under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. Members of the ICJ were enjoined to contribute to the newly-established AFRICA Fund of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) for the Frontline States in Southern Africa (see below);
- issued two resolutions on international terrorism, one sponsored by Kuwait, which condemned the phenomenon, together with attempts to associate it with Islamic forces, and another sponsored by Syria, which denounced attempts to eradicate the difference between terrorism and 'people's legitimate national struggle';
- denounced US aggression against Libya, during its raids in April 1986, as a violation of the UN Charter and of international law. It urged that the US compensate Libya for the material and human costs incurred;
- called for Libya and Chad to resolve their differences without recourse to foreign pressure and intervention;
- called for efforts to combat the production, sale and smuggling of narcotics.⁴¹

The sixth Islamic Summit Conference was to be held in Senegal in 1990, and the seventeenth Islamic Foreign Ministers' Conference in Jordan.⁴²

● 'We tried hard to get them to come. We would have wished for the two parties to be here so we could reach a solution to this war.' Kuwait's Foreign Minister, Sheikh Sabah al-Ahmed al-Sabah, lamenting the absence of an Iranian delegation. *International Herald Tribune* (Paris) 27 January 1987.

'An Arab cannot be at the same time with the Arabs and with Israel. We must put

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an end to existing relations between Israel and certain other Arabs.' President Assad of Syria in his speech to the summit. *The Independent* (London) 28 January 1987.

▲ Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)

Ministerial Council: Twenty-Second Session

Riyadh, 17-18 February 1987

■ Foreign ministers of the GCC's six member-countries (Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates) issued a final communiqué in which they appealed to Iran to respond to the peaceful initiatives in UN Security Council Resolutions 582 and 588 of 1986, on the Gulf War. The Council also discussed inter-Arab differences and the possibility of securing sufficient agreement among Arab leaders to summon an Arab summit.

Appealing to all parties in Lebanon for an immediate end to the fighting, the ministers expressed support for all international efforts directed at lifting the siege of the Palestinian camps, and ending the attack on them.⁴³

▲ Organisation of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries (OAPEC)

Ministerial Council: Thirty-Seventh Meeting

Kuwait, 3 December 1986

■ Budget problems dominated OAPEC's biannual ministerial conference, which was attended by five ministers (from Bahrain, Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and Syria) and officials from four other countries. Tunisia was not represented, as it had notified the organisation of its intention to withdraw its membership with effect from January 1987.⁴⁴

Tunisia was among five of OAPEC's member-countries that had failed to pay previous budget contributions, resulting in arrears totalling \$13.6m. Appealing to Tunisia to postpone its withdrawal, the Council approved its request to pay by instalments its membership dues for the past three years. The ministers absolved Tunisia from further budgetary obligations until it once more became an active member of OAPEC. Iraq and Syria, also in arrears for several years, benefited from an arrangement made outside OAPEC, whereby the Gulf States would pay their contributions. Qatar and Algeria, which had delayed contributing, undertook to pay their dues in the near future.

The OAPEC members also pledged themselves to fulfilling the coming year's financial obligations, and voted a new annual budget of \$9.2m, 23 per cent less than the previous year. In a related move, Dr Ali Attiga, Secretary-General of OAPEC since 1973, announced that he would be tendering his resignation at the next meeting, due to be held in Damascus on 10 June 1987. Dr Attiga was known to be in favour of maintaining OAPEC's budget at its present levels, and developing the organisation into a wider Arab energy body, rather than acceding to the wishes of member-countries to reduce expenditure and limit OAPEC principally to a research role.⁴⁵

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▲ Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC)

Ministerial Committee on Pricing

Quito, 14 November 1986

Eightieth Ministerial Conference

Geneva, 11–20 December 1986

■ Twelve of OPEC's thirteen member-countries reached agreement on the key issues of pricing, price differentials between different types of OPEC crude oil, and production. Iraq dissented from the agreement, which was signed by the other twelve ministers on 20 December 1986.⁴⁶

The twelve member-countries approved the recommendations of OPEC's Ministerial Committee on Pricing, which had met in Ecuador, for a return to a fixed pricing system, based on an OPEC Reference Price of US\$18 per barrel. This decision followed a period presaged by an OPEC Conference in December 1985, of unrestrained OPEC production, as part of a strategy to retrieve for OPEC a 'fair share' of the global oil market,⁴⁷ followed by two interim agreements on temporary production curbs in August 1986 and October 1986.⁴⁸

Following the Quito recommendations, the ministers also agreed to base the reference price on the average values of a basket of seven crude oils, rather than maintaining the system of a single marker crude, namely Arabian Light. Despite initial objections to the change from Algeria and Iran, Saudi Arabia argued that the fixed marker had failed to make the various crudes equally competitive, placing a disproportionate burden on Saudi Arabia. It was agreed that the difference in value between Saudi Arabian Heavy at the bottom end of the scale, and Nigerian Light at the top, would be no more than \$2.6 per barrel over the next three months, and a table with the fixed prices of twenty-four crude oils was appended to the agreement. This figure was to be reviewed periodically by a Ministerial Committee on Price Differentials, composed of the oil ministers of the United Arab Emirates, Algeria, Kuwait, Libya, Nigeria, Qatar and Saudi Arabia, which would convey its subsequent recommendations to the next conference. The fixed Reference Price of \$18 per barrel was to come into force on 1 January 1987, with a one month period of grace during which to eliminate current contracts based on netback and other market-related pricing systems. In other words, no new discount deals were to be made after 1 January 1987, and no such deals continued after 1 February 1987.

In order to raise current oil prices and defend OPEC's new Reference Price, the ministers agreed to production cuts. The overall OPEC production ceiling was determined at a level of 15.8m barrels per day (b/d) in the first and second quarters of 1987 (representing a production cut of over 7 per cent from recent levels), rising to 16.6m b/d in the third quarter of 1987 and 18.3m b/d in the fourth quarter. The annual average output for 1987 was therefore to be 16.632m b/d. The agreement stipulated, however, that if in the light of actual production in the first half of 1987, perceived demand in the third quarter were lower than the agreed level, actual production in that quarter should be maintained at its level in the first half of the year.

The agreement was made possible by a shift in Saudi Arabia's position. Rather than countenancing only temporary curbs on production (as under his predecessor, Sheikh Yamani) the new Saudi Petroleum and Minerals Minister, Hisham Nazer, signalled a willingness to implement cuts in favour of a price of \$18 per barrel,

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provided that those cuts were distributed amongst OPEC members, rather than being shouldered disproportionately by Saudi Arabia. The December 1986 agreement did in fact accomplish such a distribution.

Unanimity proved elusive, however, owing to continuing wrangles between the protagonists of the Gulf War, Iran and Iraq. Iran insisted that Iraq, which had been exempted from the previous interim agreements on output curbs and allowed to engage in unrestrained production, should once again be forced to accept a fixed quota. When Iraq, which maintained its insistence on a quota at least equal to that of Iran, refused a Saudi proposal for a fixed quota at a lower level, Iran's Oil Minister, Gholamreza Aqazadeh, advocated that Iraq be censured and if necessary disciplined by expulsion from OPEC. Saudi Arabia, however, after consultation with Iraq and other Arab members, refused to support any motion of censure, and no mention was made in OPEC's final communiqué of Iraq's dissent. Iraq, meanwhile, issued a statement dissociating itself from the agreement, on the grounds that its suggested production level had not been determined by any logical criteria, and was far below the actual level of its output, and would inflict a revenue loss of 25 per cent on the country. Iraq consequently refused to recognise the agreement, on the basis that it had not been endorsed unanimously.⁴⁹

Iraq's dissociation from the agreement meant that projected production would have to be revised upwards, to take account of its probable extra output of 500,000 b/d in the first half of 1987 and 800,000 in the second half. While in practice these additions could have been offset by a shortfall in Iran's output, owing to air strikes on its export facilities, the likely level of output remained difficult to predict. The effectiveness of the entire agreement depended on its observation by each OPEC member, and the agreement contained the same stipulation as in previous accords, that in the event of an officially-confirmed unilateral violation, all other members would be released from their obligations.⁵⁰

The next regular OPEC Ministerial Conference was scheduled to begin on 25 June 1987, in Vienna.

● 'For the time being, we are married to \$18 a barrel, but we would not mind if it goes higher.' Rilwanu Lukman, Nigeria's Oil Minister, and President of the OPEC Conference. *International Herald Tribune* (Paris) 22 December 1986.

'The countries will have to be patient over the next couple of months. The system is not perfect, let's be frank about it.' Sheikh Ali al-Khalifa al-Sabah, Kuwait's Oil Minister, on the difficulties ahead in making the agreement succeed. *International Herald Tribune* (Paris) 23 December 1986.

▲ African Petroleum Producers' Association (APPA)

First Ministerial Meeting

Lagos, 26-7 January 1987

■ Oil ministers and delegates from nine African oil producing countries met to inaugurate the African Petroleum Producers' Association (APPA). First suggested by the largest African oil producer, Nigeria, the idea to launch the Association was supported by the three other African members of OPEC—Algeria, Libya and

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Gabon—at a meeting in Algiers in February 1986. APPA also included the non-OPEC members, Angola, Benin, Cameroun, Congo and Egypt. Together, the nine countries account for 96.7 per cent of Africa's oil production, 7.7 per cent of total world production.

The stated objectives of APPA include the promotion of cooperation among member-countries in exploration, production and refining of hydrocarbons, as well as in petrochemicals, manpower development, legal matters and the acquisition and adaptation of technology. It is also intended to promote technical assistance among member-countries. The Nigerian Oil Minister, and President of OPEC, Rilwanu Lukman, had already rejected objections, notably from Saudi Arabia, that the new organisations would undermine OPEC. He pointed out that OPEC member-countries had already formed themselves into regional sub-groups, such as OAPEC and the Latin American energy organisation (OLADE), and that APPA would be a means of bringing non-OPEC members into line with OPEC policies. At their inaugural meeting, which was opened by President Babangida of Nigeria, APPA members stressed cooperation with OPEC in influencing oil markets, and elected the Algerian Energy Minister, Balkacem Nabi as the first Chairman of APPA.⁵¹

The next APPA ministerial conference was scheduled for 20 June 1987, in Algiers.

● APPA is 'a symbolic representation of member-nations' dedication to the protection and promotion of the continent's petroleum interests . . . Africa's oil fortune must not be left in the hands of the multinationals.' President Ibrahim Babangida of Nigeria, in his opening speech to the meeting. *West Africa* (London) 2 February 1987.

▲ Organisation of African Unity (OAU)

Ministerial Council: Forty-Fifth Meeting

Addis Ababa, 13–18 February 1987

■ At its regular meeting, the Council of Foreign Ministers from the OAU's fifty member-countries considered the problems of Chad, Southern Africa and the funding of efforts to combat drought and famine in Africa.

Among the resolutions adopted by the Council were those:

- appealing to Libya and Chad to find a peaceful solution to their conflict, and to avert any action likely to contribute to the further deterioration of the situation;
- strongly condemning the USA, Britain and West Germany for opposing sanctions against South Africa, which constituted 'an act of hostility against member-states of the OAU';
- launching an appeal in favour of eradicating apartheid, mobilising increased support among the international community for the implementation of mandatory economic sanctions against Pretoria, and for the intensification of the armed struggle;
- appealing to OAU member-countries to contribute to the Special Emergency Fund against drought and famine in Africa, and to fulfil existing pledges to contribute. According to the OAU Secretary-General, Ide Oumarou, only four African countries and one non-African country had honoured their commitments to the fund, which had been established by the twenty-first OAU summit in Addis Ababa in July 1985.⁵² The

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fund currently stood at \$15.5m and the Secretary-General was urged to publicise the appeal for funds all over the world;

- setting up a ministerial commission to seek a solution to the problems of atrocities directed against the Palestinian camps in Lebanon. The commission was to consist of Angola, Burkina Faso, Congo, Egypt, Nigeria, Sudan and Tanzania.

The Council also adopted a budget of \$23.2m for 1987-88, a reduction of roughly \$2m compared with the previous year. Those, including Ide Oumarou, who favoured the maintenance of budget levels at \$25m were apparently defeated in debate by countries urging cuts, including Ethiopia, Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda and Zimbabwe. While the sectors destined to suffer cutbacks were not specified, Ide Oumarou offered assurances that funds designed to fight drought and famine or to assist the Southern African Frontline States, would be maintained. He made a plea, however, for countries to pay their budgetary arrears, as only two member-countries had yet paid their full contribution for 1986-87.⁵³

▲ OAU

Coordination Bureau Meeting

Cairo, 11 March 1987

■ Leaders of the nine member-countries of the OAU Coordination Bureau (including the Presidents of Congo, Djibouti, Egypt, Sierra Leone, Uganda and Zambia, and high-level delegations from Algeria and Mali) convened for a 'mini-summit' in Cairo. Johnny Makatini of the Executive Committee of the African National Congress (ANC) also attended as an observer.

Issues raised by a report of the OAU Chairman, President Denis Sassou-Nguesso of Congo, on the organisation's activities since the twenty-second OAU summit in July 1986, were discussed by the leaders.⁵⁴ Their final statement reaffirmed the OAU position on a number of these issues.⁵⁵

The statement condemned apartheid and the imposition of a State of Emergency within South Africa, while deploring the escalation of South Africa's destabilisation campaign against the Frontline States (FLS), including its actions in killing civilians and refugees, and destroying the economic infrastructure and communications, both through direct military actions and through the support of internal rebel movements. The leaders appealed to the international community to assist the FLS, and praised the establishment of the Non-Aligned Movement's AFRICA Fund (see below) to which all countries were urged to contribute generously. Comprehensive and mandatory sanctions were once more described as the only way of persuading Pretoria to abandon its policies. The leaders also reaffirmed UN Security Council Resolution 435 of 1978 on Namibia, as the only basis for a settlement of the Namibian question, urging the international community to press Pretoria to accept the plan for Namibian independence, and denouncing South Africa for its continuing refusal to do so.

Following discussions on the continuing conflict in Chad, where Libya is supporting the opposition to the French-backed government, the leaders noted that recent developments had further destroyed the social and economic infrastructure of the country, and increased the suffering of its people. They appealed to all parties to

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work for comprehensive national reconciliation, urging Chad and Libya to settle their dispute through peaceful negotiation.

The meeting also reviewed the economic situation in Africa, reaffirming the principles of self-reliance as enshrined in the Lagos Plan of Action. Their statement praised the efforts of African states to implement the UN General Assembly's Programme of Action for African Economic Recovery and Development 1986-90, as adopted at the UN Special Session on Africa, in May 1986.⁵⁶ While stressing that African resources should themselves form the backbone of such efforts, the leaders appealed to the international community to help mobilise the resources required by the programme. Reaffirming the need for an international conference to address the problem of Africa's foreign debt, they praised the efforts of the OAU Chairman to convince reluctant creditor countries of the existence of such a need.

Other subjects touched in the final statement included Western Sahara, the 'camps war' in Lebanon and the need for an international conference on the Middle East, and Afro-Arab cooperation.⁵⁷

▲ Non-Aligned Movement (NAM)

AFRICA Fund Committee: First Summit

New Delhi, 24-25 January 1987

■ Leaders of the nine non-aligned countries of the AFRICA Fund committee (Algeria, Argentina, Congo, India, Nigeria, Peru, Yugoslavia, Zambia, Zimbabwe) met to approve rules of procedure for the solidarity fund created at the NAM summit in Harare in September 1986.⁵⁸ They included Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi of India, the Chairman of the Fund; President Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia, its Vice-Chairman; Prime Minister Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe, the current NAM Chairman and President Denis Sassou Nguesso of the Congo, current Chairman of the OAU.

The AFRICA Fund, based on an acronym for Action for Resisting Invasion, Colonialism and Apartheid, was intended to strengthen the economic independence of the Southern African Frontline States (FLS), helping them to bear the cost of economic sanctions applied against South Africa. In particular, it was designed to counter the argument advanced by some of South Africa's major trading partners (notably Britain) that sanctions would damage South Africa's neighbouring countries more than they harmed Pretoria.

The leaders approved a document containing rules of procedure for the management and operation of the AFRICA Fund,⁵⁹ and were reported to have agreed on the following priorities in the use of the Fund:

- establishing strategic reserves of 150,000 tons of grain, together with other vital commodities, and entailing the building of fifteen grain silos in the region;
- up-grading various road and rail links from the FLS to the sea;
- developing Tanzania's ports at Dar es Salaam, Tanga and Mtwara;
- training and supplying security personnel to defend communications links from the actions of the South African-backed rebel movements, UNITA in Angola and the MNR in Mozambique;
- increasing the utilisation of refineries in Angola and Zambia, and providing emergency supplies of coal and fuel oils to Mozambique.

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The leaders also launched a world-wide appeal for finances to support the Fund, particularly from Western governments and voluntary organisations. It was reported that \$70m had been raised in initial pledges, including \$39 from India in goods, commodities and technical assistance over three years, \$15m from Nigeria and \$10m from Peru.

According to Eduardo Faleiro, India's Minister of State for External Affairs, the AFRICA Fund was not intended to provide military assistance to the FLS or to Southern African liberation movements. Donors would, he said, earmark their contributions for specific projects, and could ensure against their being diverted for other purposes.⁶⁰

●The AFRICA Fund 'will provide emergency assistance to the liberation movements in South Africa and Namibia. It will strengthen the economic infrastructure of the Frontline States. It will help them resist the blackmail of the racist regime.' Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi of India, Chairman of the Fund. *The Times* (London) 26 January 1987.

The Fund has 'served notice upon South Africa—and upon all those who bear sympathy for apartheid—that we mean business, that the Non-Aligned Movement is not the powerless organisation that some see us to be'. N D Tiwari, the Indian Foreign Minister, speaking before the meeting. *The Times* (London) 24 January 1987.

▲ Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC)

Eighth Annual Consultative Conference

Gaborone, Botswana, 5–6 February 1987

■SADCC's annual conference was attended by 1,200 delegates from the nine SADCC member-countries (Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe), thirty-four donor countries and seventeen international organisations.

The conference's theme for 1987 was 'Investment in Production', and marked a new receptiveness on the part of SADCC to the potential contribution of the private sector to agricultural and industrial development. Though the development of the region's infrastructure remained a mainstay of the organisation's efforts to achieve increasing independence from South Africa, it appeared that after seven years of SADCC's existence, and despite the continuing infrastructural damage wrought by South Africa's destabilisation policy, SADCC was partially shifting its attention towards the development of production and trade. These new preoccupations featured largely in the speech of Peter McPherson, head of the US Agency for International Development (USAID), who announced a US pledge (subject to Congressional approval) of \$93m in new aid to SADCC countries, over eighteen months. The aid, said to be additional to the regular \$175–200m provided by the USA for food and development in the region, was to be designated for three purposes:

- private sector-oriented reform policy;
- the facilitation of trade within the region and with other areas; and

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● regional transport projects.

McPherson made it clear, however, that the extra finances were not intended as compensation for the negative effects of sanctions imposed against South Africa, nor as insulation against South African retaliation against the FLS. Rather, he warned SADCC member-countries against imposing their own sanctions against Pretoria (as Zambia and Zimbabwe had announced they would do in 1987), on the grounds of the damage they would cause their own economies. None of the new aid was to be channelled directly into either Angola, whose MPLA government was not recognised by the USA; or Tanzania, whose failure to repay its soft loans to the USA made it ineligible under US law for new US aid; or Zimbabwe, with which the USA no longer had a bilateral trade agreement. McPherson announced that the priority would be in directing the aid to the routes in Mozambique which serve Malawi and Swaziland.

The commitments of Western donors were praised by the Chairman of SADCC's Council of Ministers and Vice-President of Botswana, Peter Mmusi. Singled out for particular commendation was the commitment of the Nordic countries to provide \$300m in regional bilateral aid over the next four years. Nonetheless, the combined donations did not amount to the \$540m which SADCC had estimated that it required, only 34 per cent of which, according to Peter Mmusi, had been secured, leaving the rest subject to negotiation. The conference had, however, succeeded in attracting the interest of regional and foreign businessmen, who held a meeting just prior to the consultative conference, at which they proposed that SADCC establish a business council, to lend structure to its relations with the private sector.⁶¹

The 1988 SADCC Consultative Conference was scheduled to be held in Arusha, Tanzania.

● 'No one in this room is any longer in doubt that apartheid is a danger to peace and security, let alone development in the region. The world seems to appreciate the intensity and the depths of the problems we are facing.' Richard Hove, Zimbabwe's Minister of Mines, assessing the level of agreement at the conference. *West Africa* (London) 23 February 1987.

'It would be tragic if the future of this region is mortgaged by counter-productive recriminations or further sanctions . . . which would jeopardise the economic future of all the parties in the subcontinent.' Peter McPherson, Director of USAID, warning the FLS against applying their own sanctions against South Africa. *The Times* (London) 7 February 1987.

'The private sector is not only an important player in economic growth—it must play the leading role.' Peter McPherson, explaining the priorities for the new sum of US assistance to SADCC. *West Africa* (London) 23 February 1987.

'All states act out of self-interest.' Armando Guebuza, Mozambique's Minister of Transport and Communication, conceding that the new US aid was directed chiefly at encouraging private enterprise in the region. *West Africa* (London) 23 February 1987.

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▲ Malawi-Mozambique

Joint Defence and Security Commission

Nampala, Mozambique, 4 December 1986

Lilongwe, Malawi, 18 December 1986

■ Two agreements were signed in Lilongwe between Malawi and Mozambique, following a first working session of their Joint Defence and Security Commission in Nampala. The two delegations were led by John Tembo, a member of the Malawi Congress Party Executive Committee, and General Alberto Chipande, Mozambique's Minister of National Defence.

The decision to establish a joint commission had been taken following an unprecedented summit between President Kamuzu Banda of Malawi and leaders of the Southern African Frontline States (FLS) in Blantyre in September 1986. At this meeting, the FLS leaders had accused Malawi of, among other things, assisting the South African-backed MNR rebel movement in Mozambique, and abetting Pretoria's regional destabilisation policy. They had resolved to exert pressure on the Banda regime to change its policies, and had possibly already suffered South African retaliation for presuming to apply this pressure.⁶²

The Lilongwe agreements comprised an accord on mutual cooperation and a bilateral protocol on defence, state security and public order. They reportedly enshrined the principles agreed between the two delegations at the earlier meeting in Nampala, where good neighbourliness, friendship, cooperation and mutual trust had been lauded. The two sides also reportedly discussed practical means of defusing tension, by eliminating terrorism and destabilisation along their common border, and established two working groups to consider further cooperation.⁶³

● There should be 'maximum cooperation between the two countries in wiping out banditry'. General Alberto Chipande, Mozambique's Minister of National Defence, speaking of his hopes for the agreements. *BBC Summary of World Broadcasts ME/8447/ii*, 20 December 1986.

▲ Southern African Frontline States (FLS)

Summit

Lusaka, 21 December 1986

■ The leaders of Botswana, Mozambique, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe, together with a representative of the Angolan government, held a one-day summit to review the situation in Southern Africa. The meeting was attended by Oliver Tambo, the President of the African National Congress (ANC), and Sam Nujoma, the leader of the South West Africa People's Organisation (SWAPO).

The leaders reportedly pledged support for the region's liberation movements and for Mozambique under its new President, Joaquim Chissano. This was not the Mozambican President's first attendance at a summit of the FLS, however, as he had been part of a delegation to a summit in Maputo in October 1986, which had discussed the circumstances of former President Samora Machel's death in an air crash on 19 October 1986.⁶⁴

No communiqué was issued by the summit, which was curtailed prematurely by the departure of the Zambian President, Kenneth Kaunda, on hearing the news of the death of one of his sons.⁶⁵

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NOTES

In these notes the following abbreviations are used for newspapers and periodicals: *Econ* = The Economist (London); *FT* = Financial Times (London); *FEER* = Far Eastern Economic Review (Hong Kong); *Gma* = Granma (Havana); *G* = The Guardian (London); *I* = The Independent (London); *IHT* = International Herald Tribune (Paris); *MEED* = Middle East Economic Digest (London); *MEER* = Middle East Economic Review (Washington DC); *MEES* = Middle East Economic Survey (Nicosia); *Obs* = The Observer (London); *S* = South (London); *SN* = Soviet News (London); *SW* = Soviet Weekly (London); *ST* = Sunday Times (London); *SWB* = Summary of World Broadcasts (London); *T* = The Times (London); *TWQ* = Third World Quarterly (London); *UNPR* = UN Press Release; *USIS* = US Information Service; *WA* = West Africa (London); *XNA* = Xinhua News Agency.

- ¹ On the agreement of IFAD II at IFAD's Governing Council session in January 1986, see *TWQ* 8(3) July 1986, pp 1031-2.
- ² See *TWQ* 8(3) July 1986, pp 1031-2.
- ³ *UNPR* IFAD/86/60, 12 December 1986 and IFAD/86/51, 9 December 1986.
- ⁴ For the meeting of IDA deputies in Washington DC in September 1986, see *TWQ* 9(2) April 1987, p 681.
- ⁵ *Econ* 20 December 1986; *World Bank News* (Washington DC) 27 February 1987; *WA* 22/29 December 1986 and 9 March 1987.
- ⁶ On the suspension of coffee export quotas, see *TWQ* 8(3) July 1986, pp 1036-7.
- ⁷ *G* 28 January 1987, 2, 9, 24 February 1987, 9 March 1987; *FT* 28, 29 January 1987, 20, 24 February 1987, 2, 3, 4 March 1987; *IHT* 2, 4 February 1987; *I* 5, 24 February 1987.
- ⁸ For the first Gorbachev-Reagan summit in Geneva, see *TWQ* 8(2) April 1986, pp 702-5.
- ⁹ The 'Daniloff Affair' was resolved by the US decision to release the alleged Soviet spy, Gennadi Zakharov, and the Soviet decision to release Daniloff together with the human rights activist, Yuri Orlov.
- ¹⁰ The expert meetings were on 11-12 August 1986 in Moscow, and 5-6 September 1986 in Washington DC.
- ¹¹ *IHT* 22 September 1986; *FT* 22 September 1986.
- ¹² Gorbachev's television speech is in *SN* 15 October 1986. Reagan's Address to the Nation of 13 October 1986 is available from *USIS*. Excerpts from these documents and from the US State Department text of 17 October 1986 can be found in *Survival* (International Institute of Strategic Studies, London) March/April 1987, pp 166-88.
- ¹³ On the Geneva Nuclear and Space Talks, Round Five, at which the Soviet proposal concerning adherence to the ABM Treaty was originally made, see *TWQ* 8(4) October 1986, pp 1379-82.
- ¹⁴ *FT* 5, 6, 7 November 1986; *I* 6, 12 November 1986; *IHT* 5, 6, 7 November 1986; *T* 3, 6, 7 November 1986; *G* 4, 5, 6 November 1986. Shultz's opening remarks at the Vienna conference are in *USIS* 6 November 1986. Shevardnadze's statement at his Vienna press conference is in *SN* 12 November 1986.
- ¹⁵ *FT* 9, 10, 11, 13, 14, 15, 16 October 1986; *IHT* 10, 11-12, 13, 14, 15, 16 October 1986; *T* 10, 11, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17 October 1986; *I* 10, 11, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17 October 1986; *G* 10, 11, 13, 14, 17, 18 October 1986; *ST* 12, 19 October 1986; *Obs* 12, 19 October 1986; *Econ* 11, 18, October 1986; *Armament and Disarmament Information Unit (ADIU) Report* (Sussex) November-December 1986.
- ¹⁶ On the fifth round of Geneva NST, see *TWQ* 8(4) October 1986, pp 1379-82. On the previous four rounds, see *TWQ* 7(4) October 1985, pp 1030-32, 8(1) January 1986, pp 289-92, 8(2) April 1986, pp 699-701, and 8(3) July 1986, pp 1042-4.
- ¹⁷ Reagan's speech to the UNGA is in *USIS* Official Text, 23 September 1986. See also *T* 23 September 1986; *G* 23 September 1986; *FT* 23 September 1986; *IHT* 23 September 1986.

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- ¹⁸ *IHT* 3, 7, 8-9, 13 November 1986; *T* 7, 8 November 1986; *FT* 7, 8 November 1986; 18 November 1986; *G* 26 September 1986, 1, 8, 11 November 1986; *Armament and Disarmament Information Unit (ADIU) Report* (Sussex) January-February 1987; *USIS Official Text* 13 November 1986.
- ¹⁹ On the Western Economic Summit in Tokyo in May 1986, see *TWQ* 8(4) October 1986, pp 1392-5.
- ²⁰ On the G5 Plaza Pact of September 1985, see *TWQ* 8(1) January 1986, pp 293-4.
- ²¹ On the G5 and G7 meetings in Washington DC in September 1986, see *TWQ* 9(2) April 1987, pp 685-6.
- ²² The G6 Paris communiqué is reproduced in full in *FT* 23 February 1987 and *IMF Survey* (Washington DC) 9 March 1987, pp 73-5. Excerpts are in *I* 23 February 1987 and *IHT* 23 February 1987.
- ²³ *FT* 20, 21, 22, 23, 24 February 1987; *IHT* 20, 21-2, 23 February 1987; *G* 20, 23 February 1987; *I* 20, 23 February 1987; *T* 23 February 1987; *Obs* 22 February 1987; *Econ* 28 February 1987; *FEER* 5 March 1987; *IMF Survey* (Washington DC) 9 March 1987.
- ²⁴ For the Luxembourg EEC-CACM-Contadora meeting in 1985, see *TWQ* 8(2) April 1986, pp 721-2.
- ²⁵ *I* 3, 9, 11, 12 February 1987; *G* 4, 11 February 1987; *FT* 9, 12 February 1987; *IHT* 10, 11-12 February 1987; *SWB* ME/8489/iii, 11 February 1987, 8490/iii, 12 February 1987 and 8491/iii, 13 February 1987.
- ²⁶ On the South Pacific Forum summit in Suva, see *TWQ* 9(1) January 1987, pp 308-10.
- ²⁷ *IHT* 27 February 1987; *I* 5 March 1987; *FEER* 19 March 1987, pp 29-30.
- ²⁸ On the San José Middle Country Debtors' Conference in December 1985, see *TWQ* 8(3) July 1986, p 1057.
- ²⁹ *G* 12, 13 November 1986; *WA* 1 December 1986.
- ³⁰ On the Panama City meeting in June 1986, see *TWQ* 8(4) October 1986, pp 1409-10.
- ³¹ *T* 20 December 1986; *G* 24, 31 December 1986; *IHT* 29 December 1986; *SWB* ME/8445/iii, 18 December 1986, 8446/iii, 19 December 1986 and 8447/iii, 20 December 1986.
- ³² See *SWB* ME/8471/D/1-2, 21 January 1987.
- ³³ *I* 19, 20, 21, 22, 23 January 1987; *IHT* 20, 22 January 1987; *FT* 22 January 1987; *T* 21, 22 January 1987; *Econ* 31 January 1987; *SWB* ME/8460/iii, 8 January 1987, 8470/iii, 20 January 1987, 8472/iii, 22 January 1987, 8473/iii, 23 January 1987 and 8474/iii, 24 January 1987.
- ³⁴ On the Miami meeting, see *T* 9 January 1987; *FT* 9 January 1987; *G* 9 January 1987.
- ³⁵ The San José summit document and ten-point peace plan are in *SWB* ME/8494/D/3-6, 17 February 1987.
- ³⁶ For the Declaration of Esquipulas of May 1986, see *TWQ* 8(4) October 1986, p 1408.
- ³⁷ *IHT* 14-15, 23 February 1987; *FT* 16, 17 February 1987; *G* 14, 16, 17 February 1987; *I* 16, 17 February 1987; *T* 17, 19 February 1987; *SWB* ME/8494/iii, 17 February 1987 and 8497/iii, 20 February 1987.
- ³⁸ *SWB* ME/8476/i, 27 January 1987 and 8477/i, 28 January 1987.
- ³⁹ For the 100 Foreign Ministers' meeting in Fez, see *TWQ* 8(3) July 1986, pp 1051-2.
- ⁴⁰ The speeches of President Assad and President Mubarak are in *SWB* ME/8478/E1-16, 19 January 1987.
- ⁴¹ The final resolutions of the Islamic Conference are in *SWB* ME/8481/E/1-7, 2 February 1987, 8482/E/1-8, 3 February 1987 and 8483/E/1-10, 4 February 1987, and are summarised in the Conference's final communiqué, in *SWB* ME/8479/E/11-20, 30 January 1987.
- ⁴² *IHT* 5, 19, 26 January 1987; *I* 26, 27, 28, 29 January 1987; *FT* 26 January 1987; *G* 26, 27, 28, 30 January 1987; *Obs* 5 January 1987 and 1 February 1987; *T* 30 January 1987; *Econ* 31 January 1987; *S* March 1987; *MEED* 31 January 1987;

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- ⁴⁰ *MEES* 12 January 1987, p C1, 26 January 1987, p C2 and 2 February 1987, pp C2-3; *Arabic*, March 1987; *SWB* ME/8477/E/1-3, 28 January 1987, 8478/E/1-16, 29 January 1987, 8479/E/1-20, 30 January 1987 and 8480/E/1-8 31 January 1987.
- ⁴¹ *SWB* ME/84936, 18 February 1987 and 8497/A/6-7, 20 February 1987.
- ⁴² On Tunisia's withdrawal from OAUPEC, see *TWQ* 8(4) October 1986, p 1405.
- ⁴³ *MEES* 8 December 1986, pp A2-3; *MEED* 6 December 1986, p 2 and 13 December 1986, p 2; *SWB* ME/8432/i, 3 December 1986 and 8434/ii, 5 December 1986.
- ⁴⁴ The agreement and subsequent press communiqué of the OPEC Conference are reproduced in *MEES* 22/9 December 1986, pp A5-8.
- ⁴⁵ For the OPEC Conference in December 1985, see *TWQ* 8(2) April 1986, pp 730-1.
- ⁴⁶ On the two OPEC interim agreements, see *TWQ* 9(1) January 1987, pp 314-6 and 9(2) April 1987, pp 692-3.
- ⁴⁷ For Iraq's statement, see *MEES* 22/9 December 1987, p A8.
- ⁴⁸ *FT* 11, 12, 13, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 22, 23 December 1986; *IHT* 11, 12, 14, 15, 16, 19, 21, 22, 23 December 1986; *T* 11 December 1986; *G* 15 December 1986; *WA* 22/9 December 1986, p 2662 and 5 January 1987, p 26; *MEES* 1 December 1986, pp A1-2, 8 December 1986, pp A1-2, 15 December 1986, pp A1-3 and 22/9 December 1986, pp A1-8; *MEED* 3 January 1987, p 22.
- ⁴⁹ *FT* 26, 27 January 1987; *T* 21 January 1987; *WA* 2 February 1987, p 226; *SWB* ME/8477/iii, 28 January 1987, 8478/ii and 8478/B/1 of 19 January 1987.
- ⁵⁰ On the OAU summit in 1985, see *TWQ* 8(1) January 1986, pp 324-5.
- ⁵¹ *WA* 16 March 1987, p 541; *SWB* ME/8501/ii, 25 February 1987, 8502/33 and 8502/B/3 of 26 February 1987, 8503/B/4-6, 27 February 1987, 8585/ii and 8505/B/5-6 of 2 March 1987, 8506/B/1-2, 3 March 1987.
- ⁵² On the twenty-second OAU summit in July 1986, see *TWQ* 9(1) January 1987, pp 322-4.
- ⁵³ The OAU's final statement is reported in *SWB* ME/8515/A/1-3, 13 March 1987.
- ⁵⁴ On the UNGA Special Session on the Critical Economic Situation in Africa, see *TWQ* 8(4) October 1986, pp 1372-4.
- ⁵⁵ *I* 2 March 1987; *FT* 12 March 1987; *WA* 23 March 1987, p 590; *SWB* ME/8514/i, 1 March 1987, 8515/i and 8515/A/1-3 of 13 March 1987.
- ⁵⁶ On the NAM summit in Harare, see *TWQ* 9(1) January 1987, pp 327-9.
- ⁵⁷ The document on the AFRICA Fund is in *Review of International Affairs* (Belgrade) 5 February 1987, pp 151-7.
- ⁵⁸ *Obs* 4 January 1987; *T* 24, 26 January 1987; *IHT* 26 January 1987; *G* 26 January 1987.
- ⁵⁹ *I* 5, 7 February 1987; *G* 6 February 1987; *T* 7 February 1987; *IHT* 7-8 February 1987; *WA* 23 February 1987; *SWB* ME/8486/ii and 8486/B/1-3 of 7 February 1987, 8487/B/9-10 of 9 February 1987.
- ⁶⁰ On the Blantyre summit in September 1986, see *TWQ* 9(1) January 1987, pp 326-7. For the follow-up FLS summit in Maputo in October 1986, at which South African retaliation was discussed, see *TWQ* 9(2) April 1987, pp 694-5.
- ⁶¹ *SWB* ME/8434/ii, 5 December 1986, 8435/ii, 6 December 1986, 8445/ii, 18 December 1986, 8447/ii 20 December 1986, 8448/ii 22 December 1986.
- ⁶² On the FLS summit in Maputo, see *TWQ* 9(2) April 1987, p 695.
- ⁶³ *SWB* ME/8449/ii, 23 December 1986.

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Gorbachev and the Third World: an era of reform?

At the time when this article is being written, Mikhail Gorbachev has been in power for twenty-eight months. This is about half the period of a normal term in office for many Western leaders, but in the case of the Soviet Union we can perhaps expect to see Gorbachev at the helm in the Kremlin into the next century. During the past two years the new Soviet leader has made numerous personnel changes at all levels of decision-making, drawn up a new Party Programme, and instituted radical economic and political reforms. These changes have been ratified by a Party Congress and Plenums of the Central Committee of the Communist Party. In effect we have a new government with a new manifesto. In this article I will examine Gorbachev's objectives and strategy toward the Third World, provide an assessment of Soviet policies in this arena since 1985, and finally make some tentative predictions for the future.

The two revolutions that provide a reference point for Gorbachev in the late 1980s are not those of February and October 1917, but that of rising expectations and the scientific and technological revolution. Both are related to the aims within the economy: the first being to prevent an increase in 'social contradictions' (now acknowledged to be a problem); the second being to develop high technology in order to be able to compete in global markets. Increased consumption for the Soviet population and the development of high technology are also linked to Soviet national security interests. Failure to meet domestic demands for more and better goods could at the least lead to discontent and increasing disaffection among the population, and at worst create a situation similar to that of Poland in 1980. Failure to develop high technology industries would not only mean poor economic performance in the global competition for markets, but also the increasing inferiority of Soviet weapons in comparison to those being produced in the West. Economic growth is thus linked both to Soviet domestic stability and to Soviet military capabilities, each essential for the maintenance of Soviet national security. It is not surprising, therefore, that Gorbachev's main priority is to restructure the Soviet economy.

Gorbachev has made it clear that this domestic priority largely

determines the conduct of Soviet foreign policy. The General Secretary himself has referred to the state of the Soviet economy in the late 1970s and early 1980s as in a 'pre-crisis' phase.¹ As such, the remedy required radical, even 'revolutionary' steps. The Brezhnev legacy was one of declining economic growth rates, corruption and political inertia. The Soviet Union had achieved strategic military parity with the USA, which marked a significant shift in the global balance of power. However, despite the fears of many Western commentators, the Soviet Union's position in global politics, and with regard to its border areas, in 1985 would have given Gorbachev little cause for optimism. The largest land border between two states is that between the Soviet Union and China (4,673 miles); not only had the Sino-Soviet rift remained unhealed, but China in the 1970s had actually moved closer to the USA. The Soviet Union shares a long border with Iran (1,227 miles); the continuing war in the Gulf, on the USSR's southern periphery, remains a major source of concern to Moscow. The threat of Islamic fundamentalism, while it should not be exaggerated, should likewise not be discounted as a potential destabilising force in Soviet Central Asia. The long border with Afghanistan (1,481 miles) has recently been penetrated by Afghan guerrillas, threatening to spread the Afghan war into Soviet territory. Looking westwards, political instability in Poland (sharing a 755-mile border with the Soviet Union) was undermining the cohesiveness of the Warsaw Pact. Romania (an 812-mile border) was in dire economic straits, and Turkey (sharing 382 miles of border) was engaged in increasing polemics with neighbouring Greece, threatening at any moment to engage in military conflict. Soviet-US relations had effectively reverted to a Cold War stance with little prospect of an arms control agreement. Western Europe, despite fierce opposition from large segments of public opinion, had begun to deploy a new generation of medium-range nuclear weapons aimed at the Soviet Union. The Reagan Administration's Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI) threatened to extend the arms race into space and, given US technological superiority, to subvert strategic parity in favour of the USA. In the Middle East the Soviet Union's principal client state, Egypt, had shifted allegiance to the USA, effectively excluding the Soviet Union from any significant participation in the peace process. The Palestinians were divided and Syria, which supports Iran in the Gulf war, had shown on a number of occasions its independence of the Soviet Union. In the late 1970s Somalia abruptly ended its close ties with Moscow.

¹ *Soviet Weekly* (London) 30 May 1987.

The gains the Soviet Union is said to have made in the Third World in the 1970s do not, it may be argued, compensate for the loss of Egypt and Somalia. Those gains have in any case been costly, with the new allies possibly of dubious loyalty and benefit to the Soviet Union. Ethiopia and Angola are two of the poorest countries in the world, riven by conflict and reliant on the Soviet Union essentially for a single commodity: military hardware. Vietnam costs the Soviet exchequer a daily figure estimated variously at between US\$1 and US\$3 million. Cuba, Moscow's relatively long-standing and only close ally in the Western hemisphere, costs considerably more (up to US\$9 million per day). Overall, the domestic and international situation which Gorbachev inherited from his predecessors left much to be desired, and the new General Secretary has made clear his intention to rectify his country's poor standing in global politics.

How does Gorbachev intend to improve the Soviet Union's position, and what specifically does this mean for Soviet Third World policy? In his speech to the Central Committee in March 1985 he stated that his objective was to ensure that the Soviet Union attains the 'highest world levels of production'.² At the 27th Party Congress in February 1986 he outlined some of his domestic economic reform proposals, adding that 'Our activity in the sphere of foreign economic contacts must be tied up more closely with the new tasks. There should be a large-scale forward-looking approach to mutually advantageous economic relations.'³ It is clear that Gorbachev's basic objectives in resolving the Soviet Union's economic problems will result in a reduced commitment to aid those poor Third World countries most prone to radical revolution. Gorbachev barely mentioned regimes of 'socialist orientation' in his Congress address, in stark contrast to Brezhnev's emphasis on such regimes in his Congress speeches as General Secretary. In a report to the Central Committee in June 1985 Gorbachev justified his policies by reference to Lenin, arguing that socialism would have influence on the rest of the world only through its own economic achievements.⁴ He went on to warn against the dangers of 'recent years' in becoming dependent upon the West for technology and manufactured goods, the 'lesson' being that the Soviet Union must be 'totally independent of the capitalist countries'. He was not here advocating autarky in the Stalinist mould, but rather self-sufficiency in

² *Pravda* (Moscow) 12 March 1985.

³ *Pravda*, 25 February 1986.

⁴ In M S Gorbachev, *Izbrannye rechi i stat'i*, Moscow, Politicheskaya Literatura, 1985, pp 108-36.

basic manufactured goods. Gorbachev acknowledged that Soviet products were poor competitors on the international market, hence the solution proposed was to improve the quantity and quality of Soviet exports.

As part of this strategy Gorbachev is seeking to strengthen Soviet economic relations with the more dynamic, capitalist-oriented states of the Third World. In the new (revised) Party Programme, reference is now made to the 'newly-liberated' countries, with no separate section on 'national liberation movements', as there was in the 1961 edition. Countries of 'socialist orientation' do get a brief mention in the new Programme, but the Soviet commitment to them is restricted to assistance that is 'within its means' to provide. The Soviet Union expects such countries to develop 'mostly by their own efforts', and not by relying on large injections of Soviet economic aid.⁵ The Programme does, however, explicitly state the new Soviet commitment to improve relations with the newly-liberated states 'following a capitalist path of development'.

In political terms, too, Gorbachev wishes to build up diplomatic links with these states in order to gain more influence and leverage in global politics, and to exploit anti-US sentiments. The Soviet leadership in the 1970s expected to increase its influence in global politics as a direct result of attaining strategic parity with the USA. Also, with an increased power projection capability and the capacity to supply military hardware to Third World client states, Brezhnev's Politburo hoped the correlation of forces would shift in their favour as radical regimes in Africa, Asia and Latin America requested Soviet military assistance. In the late 1980s the Gorbachev Politburo has come to realise that a sound economy and a more sophisticated and flexible diplomatic strategy are more conducive to enhancing Soviet state interests.

It is interesting that Gorbachev is now putting into practice something which has long been advocated by a number of scholars and Third World specialists in the Moscow-based area institutes of the Soviet Academy of Sciences. There has been a spate of literature in the West that traces changing Soviet perceptions of the Third World, the global economy, US politics, the dynamics of capitalist development, and revolutions of national liberation, largely based on their writings.⁶ Three years before Gorbachev came to power, the policy that he is now

⁵ See *Programma Kommunisticheskoi Partii Sovetskogo Soyuza*, Moscow, Politizdat, pp 64-6.

⁶ See, for example, Jerry Hough, *The Struggle for the Third World: Soviet Debates and American Options*, Washington DC: Brookings Institution, 1986.

pursuing towards the Third World was strongly championed by Karen Brutents, deputy head of the International Department of the Central Committee, in an article in *Pravda*.⁷ Viktor Volskii, the head of the Latin American Institute in Moscow, has also given his support for such a change in policy orientation.⁸ Cuba and Vietnam are large economic burdens to the Soviet Union, and in the specialist literature and in statements of public officials criticism of this burden is often implicit. It is also acknowledged by many in Moscow that Cuba and Vietnam do not provide an attractive model of economic development for other Third World states to emulate—particularly as such a model entails huge amounts of Soviet aid.⁹

So what impact has Gorbachev's new foreign policy focus had in practice? First, there have been a large number of personnel changes and these in themselves tell a story, indicating that the USA is still uppermost on the Soviet foreign policy agenda. It makes a difference who the leader is in any political system, although systemic factors obviously serve to constrain and limit the power any particular individual has in implementing his or her chosen policy. For example it makes a difference whether a Reagan or a Carter is in the White House, a Thatcher or a Kinnock in residence at No. 10, Downing Street. Likewise it makes a difference in the Soviet Union who occupies the post of General Secretary of the Communist Party. Whilst bureaucratic politics are clearly important in the formulation and execution of policy, it will also make a difference whether a Perle or a Shultz, a 'hawk' or 'dove', heads a particular organisation or ministry. In Britain there are Tory 'wets' (although in ever decreasing numbers) and Thatcherites, and their respective weighting in Cabinet will be reflected in the kind of decisions the government reaches. Given that there is only one party in the Soviet Union, and a single party line, it is far more difficult to identify different policy orientations among individuals, especially given the secretive nature of the system. However, it is not impossible.

In a very short space of time Gorbachev succeeded in revamping the Soviet leadership, removing his chief contender for General Secretary, Romanov, from the Politburo. Romanov was a hard-liner who advocated a more confrontational approach to the USA and was far less willing than Gorbachev to make concessions in order to reach arms

⁷ *Pravda*, 21 February 1982.

⁸ *Pravda*, 8 August 1985.

⁹ See on this Yu. Novopashin, 'Vozdeistvie real'nogo sotsializma na mirovoi revolyutsionny protsess', *Voprosy filosofii*, (8) 1982, pp 3-16.

control agreements.¹⁰ Gromyko, the stiff, uncompromising figure who had served for thirty years as Foreign Minister, was replaced by Shevardnadze, a slick, astute and intelligent Gorbachev loyalist. Ponomarev, who had served as head of the International Department since the 1950s, was retired in 1986 and replaced by Dobrynin, former Ambassador to the USA. Ponomarev, who joined the Bolsheviks in 1919 at the tender age of fourteen years, had a special interest and expertise in the Third World, national liberation and the world revolutionary process. Unlike Ponomarev, Dobrynin had not been a party ideologue before taking up his new post but a professional diplomat. Yakovlev, the new man in the Party Secretariat who coordinates Soviet propaganda on international relations, is likewise a former diplomat, having served previously as Soviet Ambassador to Canada. The new First Deputy Head of the International Department, Vitalii Shaposhnikov, is also not an expert on the Third World, but rather a specialist on Western Europe. Another West Europeanist, Anatoly Chernayaev, has recently taken over from Aleksandr Agentov as foreign policy adviser to the General Secretary. Georgii Arbatov, a leading Americanist and head of the US Institute in Moscow, continues to enjoy influence in the Kremlin. Konstantin Katushev, who served as Soviet Ambassador to Cuba from 1982 to 1986 is now the Chairman of the State Committee for Foreign Economic Relations—an organisation also responsible for foreign aid disbursements. Katushev had earlier served in the Central Committee Secretariat, and he is thought to be an economic hard-liner when it comes to giving aid to poor Third World states. At lower levels of the Foreign Ministry and the party apparatus there seems to be a trend towards the appointment of specialists on Europe and the USA, and fewer specialists on the Third World. One Third World specialist whose star has risen, Karen Brutents, is among those who have been advocating a change of direction for Soviet foreign policy, in courting states such as Mexico, Brazil, Argentina, India, the Philippines and the oil-rich states in the Gulf.

These personnel changes at the top of the Soviet foreign policy decision-making process suggest, despite some Western commentaries to the contrary, that Gorbachev still views the world in essentially bipolar terms. There are more US specialists in positions of authority than ever before. US-Soviet relations are still by far the most important in Soviet global calculations, and in many Third World areas the USA is

¹⁰ These differences in policy orientation between Gorbachev and Romanov come out clearly if one compares their writings and public pronouncements before the death of Chernenko.

still a central consideration in the formulation of foreign policy. This is perhaps inevitable given the realities of the international system and the central roles played by the superpowers in global politics. Whereas Khrushchev, in attempting to place missiles in Cuba in 1962, and Brezhnev, in his African adventures in the 1970s, both underestimated or failed to understand US concerns and perceptions or the effects these would have on superpower relations, Gorbachev, with a far more sophisticated team of advisers, is very much aware of the impact of Soviet behaviour in the Third World on US-Soviet relations. Gorbachev is very unlikely to risk a superpower crisis over unstable, impoverished Third World states of dubious loyalty or benefit to the Soviet Union. This is not to imply Soviet inaction and unilateral restraint. Far from it. It is rather to suggest a more sophisticated, pragmatic, cautious and self-interested approach in Soviet Third World policy.

In reviewing the first two years of Soviet foreign policy under Gorbachev, it is clear that the new Soviet leader has indeed made a difference in Soviet relations with the Third World, in style and in substance, although it is still too early to give a definite assessment of failures and successes. In terms of his overall economic priorities, Gorbachev has instituted a number of reforms in the way foreign trade is conducted. Between 1975 and 1985 the volume of trade between the Soviet Union and the thirty-nine poorest countries in the world (those designated by the UN as the 'least developed countries') increased fivefold. But with all developing countries (LDCs) taken together (i.e., including the more dynamic Third World economies) the increase was only two-and-a-half times during this same period—and the rate of increase has been slowing. As a percentage of Soviet foreign trade, the LDCs accounted for only 3.9 per cent in 1950, but this figure had increased to over 13 per cent by 1970, reaching 15 per cent by 1981 (see Table 1). By 1985, however, as the table demonstrates, as a percentage of Soviet foreign trade the LDCs accounted for only 12.2 per cent. By the beginning of the 1980s LDCs taken together conducted only 6 per cent of their foreign trade with the socialist bloc, which marks an increase of only 1 per cent since the mid-1960s. The problem, as Gorbachev recognises only too well, is that the Soviet Union has been unable to compete with the West in exporting manufactured goods. The principal Soviet export earner has been fuel and raw material products. Gorbachev noted at the 27th Party Congress that these account for 66 per cent of exports to the capitalist market, and yet in 1986 prices have

Table 1: Soviet foreign trade (as a percentage of total)

	1950	1960	1970	1975	1980	1985
CMEA:	57.4	53.1	55.6	51.8	48.6	54.9
Other socialist (PRC, Yugoslavia, North Korea):	23.7	20.1	9.6	4.5	5.1	6.2
Developed capitalist:	15.0	19.0	21.3	31.3	33.6	26.7
LDCs:	3.9	7.9	13.5	12.4	12.7	12.2

Sources: Various editions of the annual statistical collection *Vneshniaia Torgovlia*, Moscow, Finansy i Statistiki.

fallen by some 50 per cent. Gorbachev stated that it is necessary for the Soviet Union to reduce raw materials as a percentage of exports in favour of manufactured goods.

In order to stimulate production and raise the quality of Soviet manufactured goods, Gorbachev has extended his domestic economic restructuring (*perestroika*) programme into the field of foreign economic relations. Between August 1986 and January 1987 four important new decrees have been ratified which give increased freedom to a number of large enterprises and ministries to engage directly in foreign trade activity.¹¹ V M Kamentsev, Soviet Deputy Prime Minister, outlined these new reforms at a Moscow press conference in March 1987, estimating that during the course of the year some 40 per cent of export/import operations of machinery and equipment would be conducted outside direct state control. He stated that by January 1987, sixty-seven large enterprises and twenty-one ministries had been given the right to engage independently and directly with foreign companies.¹² These reforms are supported by the new Soviet Minister for Foreign Trade, Boris Aristov, who replaced Nikolai Patolichev, the incumbent from 1968 to 1985. Whereas Patolichev had worked his way up through the Party apparatus, Aristov is a representative of the new technical political elite, having earlier worked as Chief Technologist at a large engineering plant in Leningrad. Aristov has diplomatic experience too, having served in Warsaw as Soviet Ambassador during the crisis in Poland in 1980. It is perhaps worth pointing out that Gorbachev's new appointee (from December 1985) as Soviet Minister of Finance, Boris Gostev, also has a technical background with a specialism in light

¹¹ The text of these four decrees were published as a supplement to *Vneshniaia Torgovlia* (3) 1987.

¹² *Pravda*, 28 March 1987.

industry. Definite moves have been made, therefore, to restructure decision-making in the field of foreign economic relations aimed at improving the Soviet domestic economy and encouraging economic ties with the Third World for mutual economic advantage.

In the diplomatic realm, too, there has been a corresponding shift in Soviet foreign policy towards the Third World. The moderate, capitalist-oriented states with larger markets, more dynamic economies and regional influence have been the targets of this new diplomatic offensive. Whilst Gorbachev has expressed 'sympathy' for the poor states seeking 'national liberation' from 'neo-colonial oppression', he is actively courting the larger, relatively rich states in Latin America, Asia, Africa and the Middle East.¹³ Gromyko in all his years as Foreign Minister never once set foot in Africa or mainland Latin America. His successor, Shevardnadze, has already paid an official visit to Mexico, and Gorbachev himself will be in Mexico City later this year, as well as in a number of other Latin American capitals; he has also accepted invitations to visit African countries, including Algeria, Madagascar and Mozambique. Diplomatic relations have recently been established with the oil-rich states of Oman and the United Arab Emirates. Shevardnadze has visited a number of Pacific states, and Indonesia, the Philippines and Thailand are all actively being courted. Jordan, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia are similarly targets of Soviet diplomacy. Diplomatic relations with Egypt have improved significantly following a temporary break in official ties, and tentative steps have been made to restore diplomatic relations with Israel. But the one relationship that is held up as a model for others to follow is that between the Soviet Union and India, and it is significant that of all Third World countries it was India that received an official visit from Gorbachev, in November 1986.

In relation to regional conflicts, international debt, and international terrorism, Gorbachev has expressed his commitment to international cooperation to solve these problems through agencies such as the UN. Soviet officials now constantly refer to interdependency, the indivisibility of security, the inter-relatedness of politics and economic, and the need to strengthen the role of international law. Gorbachev has asserted that

The world is in a process of swift changes, and it is not within anybody's power to maintain a perpetual status quo in it . . . What is required is . . . tactical flexibility, a readiness for mutually acceptable compromises, and an

¹³ See his speech to the Central Committee, *Pravda*, 12 March 1985.

orientation on dialogue and mutual understanding rather than on confrontation.¹⁴

Gorbachev has called for a political solution to the conflicts in Afghanistan, Kampuchea, the Middle East, Central America and Southern Africa. He has put forward proposals for nuclear free zones in the Asian/Pacific region and the Mediterranean. And he has expressed support for the Group of 77's demand for a New International Economic Order (NIEO). But what do all these reforms, diplomatic initiatives, and proposals amount to in practice? In order to answer this question I will now turn to a more detailed examination of Soviet policy in different Third World theatres.

Asia and the Pacific region

In the hierarchy of Soviet interests in the Third World, this region has always been the most important. The Soviet Union itself is a power in Asia, with two-thirds of its territory and the bulk of its rich natural resource endowments to be found east of the Urals. The Soviet Far East is of critical importance for the Soviet economy and for Soviet security. In a speech to party activists in Siberia, Gorbachev noted that by the turn of the century the Soviet Far East will account for over 70 per cent of fuel supplies for the USSR, 25 per cent of electric power, 33 per cent of non-ferrous metals and 25 per cent of chemical products. He also stressed the geopolitical importance of the area as the Soviet Union's outlet to the Pacific, a '... dynamic region which plays an increasing role in world politics'.¹⁵ His speech focused upon the economic potential of the region, which, he stated bluntly, was not being adequately tapped. Gorbachev envisages Vladivostok (now a closed city to foreigners) becoming a major international trading centre, or, as he put it himself, the Soviet Union's 'window to the East'.¹⁶ In order to develop the Soviet Far East, Gorbachev has offered foreign companies the opportunity to engage in joint ventures in establishing industrial enterprises. In this context Japan, as the region's economic superpower, is obviously the most attractive potential partner. Indeed, in May 1987 the foreign trade association, Tekmashimport, signed an agreement with a group of Japanese companies for the construction of a plastics complex in Blagoveshchensk in the Soviet Far East. This represents the

¹⁴ Gorbachev's Congress speech translated in *Soviet News*, 26 February 1986.

¹⁵ Gorbachev, *Izbrannye rechi i stat'i*, pp 233-54.

¹⁶ *Pravda*, 29 July 1986.

GORBACHEV AND THE THIRD WORLD

Soviet Union's largest foreign contract for many years, valued at around US\$600 million.¹⁷ In the Third World arena Indonesia, the Philippines, Thailand and Burma offer the best potential markets in the Asia/Pacific region for imports and exports with the Soviet Union. As Table 2 demonstrates, Soviet trade with these states has increased in the 1980s. Foreign Minister Shevardnadze paid a visit to Indonesia in March 1987, and the Thai Foreign Minister visited Moscow in May 1987. These are the target states for increasing economic ties for mutual benefit, and some headway appears to have been made during the past two years.

It is India, as Table 2 clearly shows, that is the Soviet Union's main trading partner in Asia. Indeed Soviet trade with India is greater than

Table 2: Soviet foreign trade with Third World countries
(million roubles)

	1970	1975	1980	1985	1986
<i>Africa</i>					
Algeria*	118.3	247.0	155.1	405.2	327.8
	62.5	112.3	92.6	132.3	88.4
	55.8	134.7	62.5	272.9	239.4
Angola			84.9	96.5	158.2
	—	—	69.1	94.0	154.9
			15.8	2.5	3.3
Cameroon	7.5	36.6	10.4	39.6	31.0
	0.6	1.9	5.2	8.2	7.1
	6.9	34.7	5.2	31.4	23.9
Congo	1.5	4.2	14.3	9.9	10.3
	0.8	1.8	9.7	5.8	4.9
	0.7	2.4	4.6	4.1	5.4
Egypt	606.4	710.3	383.7	590.1	531.8
	326.9	262.0	172.7	282.5	263.6
	279.5	448.3	211.0	307.6	268.2
Ethiopia	2.1	5.3	146.5	317.2	182.3
	1.3	3.2	120.8	282.6	153.1
	0.8	2.1	25.7	34.6	29.2
Ghana	49.7	57.0	122.6	39.4	55.8
	9.9	10.7	0.3	1.0	1.0
	39.8	46.3	122.3	38.4	54.8
Guinea	14.2	34.1	64.0	98.5	87.0
	11.2	19.7	13.2	40.5	35.9
	3.0	14.4	50.8	58.0	51.1

¹⁷ *Soviet Weekly*, 30 May 1987.

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	(million roubles)				
	1970	1975	1980	1985	1986
Ivory Coast	1.9	32.7	79.7	130.2	128.9
	0.4	13.2	2.9	4.6	5.9
	1.5	19.5	76.8	125.6	123.0
Liberia	0.4	3.1	4.8	—	—
	0.4	2.6	1.8		
	—	0.5	3.0		
Libya	12.9	18.8	450.9	961.2	730.6
	12.9	18.8	163.4	83.4	35.2
	—	—	287.5	877.8	695.4
Madagascar	0.6	1.1	9.1	—	—
	—	—	6.0	—	—
	0.6	1.1	3.1	—	—
Morocco	50.1	86.9	198.0	178.7	118.1
	32.5	45.7	92.6	112.5	65.6
	17.6	41.2	105.4	66.2	52.5
Mozambique	—	—	19.6	85.6	59.6
			17.9	84.1	57.9
			1.7	1.5	1.7
Nigeria	31.2	108.3	99.6	190.1	109.4
	10.9	24.3	80.2	149.1	99.9
	20.3	84.0	19.4	41.0	9.5
Sierra Leone	1.6	2.2	8.3	—	—
	1.6	1.7	5.1		
	—	0.5	3.2		
Sudan	77.4	12.6	17.5	—	—
	32.5	4.7	5.6		
	44.9	7.9	11.9		
Tanzania	1.8	8.5	10.7	—	—
	1.1	2.6	0.8		
	0.7	5.9	9.9		
Tunisia	5.7	10.5	25.0	23.0	38.9
	3.1	3.5	19.5	11.4	19.7
	2.6	7.0	5.5	11.6	19.2
Asia					
Afghanistan	66.9	132.2	504.7	873.6	786.7
	36.0	67.9	247.7	550.6	542.1
	30.9	64.3	257.0	323.0	244.6
Bangladesh	—	52.2	53.7	76.4	67.7
		37.2	27.2	41.5	49.9
		15.0	26.5	34.9	17.8

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	1970	1975	1980	1985	1986
Burma	4.4	4.9	7.9	6.6	21.2
	3.0	4.5	6.4	—	1.2
	1.4	0.4	1.5	6.6	20.0
China (PRC)	41.9	200.9	316.6	1614.9	1822.0
	22.4	93.1	169.6	780.4	910.3
	19.5	107.8	147.0	834.5	911.7
Cyprus	9.3	16.8	42.6	33.1	23.1
	4.1	12.7	28.5	21.4	11.6
	5.2	4.1	14.1	11.7	11.5
India	364.9	685.6	1739.8	3084.4	2191.2
	122.3	292.1	861.2	1574.9	957.6
	246.2	393.5	878.6	1509.5	1233.6
Indonesia	29.5	28.6	59.9	94.2	45.4
	4.5	7.7	15.0	3.7	3.1
	25.0	20.9	44.9	90.5	42.3
Iran	231.2	509.7	334.6	348.4	76.0
	169.0	281.5	259.2	204.2	57.8
	62.2	228.2	75.4	144.2	18.2
Iraq	63.5	599.5	731.7	824.2	638.6
	59.4	274.1	473.2	261.5	293.0
	4.1	325.4	258.5	556.7	345.6
Jordan	6.4	4.0	14.1	—	—
	6.4	4.0	13.9		
	—	—	0.2		
Kampuchea	1.7	—	3.2	100.3	122.7
	0.3		1.6	91.2	114.0
	1.4		1.6	9.1	8.7
Korean D.R.	329.3	338.2	572.1	1059.2	1207.9
	207.0	186.8	287.9	654.8	757.2
	122.3	151.4	284.2	404.4	450.7
Kuwait	10.0	3.5	16.7	—	—
	9.7	3.5	15.2		
	0.3	—	1.5		
Laos	—	—	37.3	87.9	67.3
			37.0	85.6	62.2
			0.3	2.3	5.1
Lebanon	17.5	21.4	17.2	12.4	9.2
	13.7	15.2	13.1	12.2	8.2
	3.8	6.2	4.1	0.2	1.0
Malaysia	112.6	102.1	207.5	191.2	104.2
	1.6	0.8	14.2	10.8	7.6
	111.0	101.3	193.3	180.4	96.6

THIRD WORLD QUARTERLY

	(million roubles)				
	1970	1975	1980	1985	1986
Mongolia	230.9	480.4	883.6	1537.0	1547.4
	178.3	355.1	676.3	1150.3	1137.5
	52.6	125.3	207.3	386.7	409.9
Nepal	1.3	5.5	14.4	20.9	1.3
	0.7	5.0	9.2	15.7	0.1
	0.6	0.5	5.2	5.2	1.2
Pakistan	60.4	60.7	176.6	117.7	85.0
	32.1	37.1	126.2	58.6	37.1
	28.3	23.6	50.4	59.1	47.9
Philippines	—	12.8	134.2	39.7	17.4
		0.4	8.5	10.7	7.4
		12.4	125.7	28.8	10.0
Saudi Arabia	5.4	5.6	30.8	393.9	193.7
	5.4	5.6	30.8	15.1	18.6
	—	—	—	378.8	175.1
Singapore	8.4	14.5	83.3	90.3	62.6
	5.5	3.8	14.9	10.7	26.7
	2.9	10.7	68.4	79.6	35.9
Sri Lanka	17.0	22.4	30.3	38.1	25.1
	5.0	12.0	4.6	8.3	12.9
	12.0	10.4	25.7	29.8	12.2
Syria	59.1	167.8	321.0	514.0	472.5
	41.8	99.0	167.6	321.6	295.1
	17.3	68.8	153.4	192.4	177.4
Thailand	3.4	17.3	173.1	67.9	90.9
	2.6	4.0	8.6	13.4	10.2
	0.8	13.3	164.5	54.5	80.7
Turkey	83.3	95.3	443.1	316.1	220.5
	56.2	38.2	329.3	162.6	121.2
	27.1	57.1	113.8	153.5	99.3
Vietnam	183.2	206.5	612.4	1458.9	1612.7
	166.5	158.7	454.9	1176.1	1318.4
	16.7	47.8	157.5	282.8	294.3
North Yemen	11.0	5.6	48.1	15.2	10.1
	10.0	5.0	47.9	15.1	10.0
	1.0	0.6	0.2	0.1	0.1
South Yemen	4.5	13.9	61.2	153.7	107.2
	4.3	13.8	55.9	145.3	102.0
	0.2	0.1	5.3	8.4	5.2

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	1970	1975	1980	1985	1986
<i>Latin America</i>					
Argentina	29.9	304.4	1192.5	1292.9	245.7
	1.7	10.7	30.4	63.0	53.3
	28.2	293.7	1162.1	1229.9	192.4
Bolivia	3.1	12.6	25.5	—	—
	0.0	3.0	5.5		
	3.1	9.6	20.0		
Brazil	23.2	396.1	275.0	450.3	266.8
	2.4	93.3	22.1	70.3	30.3
	20.8	302.8	252.9	380.0	236.5
Chile	0.8	—	—	—	—
	0.5				
	0.3				
Colombia	10.9	9.0	21.1	26.4	4.9
	1.5	1.9	9.1	5.2	4.9
	9.4	7.1	12.0	21.2	0.0
Costa Rica	6.2	—	—	—	—
	—				
	6.2				
Cuba	1045.0	2589.0	4266.0	8017.5	7602.5
	580.0	1141.3	2288.4	3877.4	3802.3
	465.0	1447.7	1977.6	4140.1	3800.2
Ecuador	0.8	13.5	—	5.9	—
	0.1	0.6		1.1	
	0.7	12.9		4.8	
Guyana	—	24.5	—	—	—
		—			
		24.5			
Jamaica	0.7	11.2	—	—	—
	—	—			
	0.7	11.2			
Mexico	1.0	6.1	13.8	20.3	11.9
	0.7	4.4	11.9	4.2	4.3
	0.3	1.7	1.9	16.1	7.6
Nicaragua	—	—	5.6	213.1	284.1
			0.1	212.9	276.4
			5.5	0.2	7.7
Panama	0.1	2.6	15.1	7.1	10.5
	0.1	2.6	15.1	7.1	10.5
	—	—	—	—	—
Peru	0.3	118.5	13.3	119.8	84.4
	0.1	28.3	3.1	11.3	9.2
	0.2	90.2	10.2	108.5	75.2

	(million roubles)				
	1970	1975	1980	1985	1986
Uruguay	1.8	15.0	23.8	65.9	24.9
	0.8	1.0	2.4	33.5	4.3
	1.0	14.0	21.4	32.4	20.6
Venezuela	—	0.2	—	—	—
	—	0.2	—	—	—

* In each case the first figure is the total volume of trade the second figure Soviet exports, and the third figure Soviet imports.

Sources: *Vneshniaia Torgovlia SSSR, 1922-1981* (Moscow, Finansy i statistiki, 1985) and *Vneshniaia Torgovlia*, No. 3, 1987.

Soviet trade with Britain, and greater than the total volume of trade with the whole of Latin America (excluding Cuba). V Mordvinov, Katushev's deputy in the State Committee for Foreign Economic Relations, predicts that Soviet-Indian trade will increase 2.5 times between 1985 and 1992.¹⁸ Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi was the first foreign head of state to pay an official visit to the Soviet Union following Gorbachev's appointment as General Secretary, and on the eve of his visit the new Soviet leader gave an interview to an Indian press agency in which he held up Soviet-Indian relations as a model of peaceful coexistence in action.¹⁹ Gorbachev reiterated this during his Kremlin speech in honour of the visiting Indian Prime Minister on 21 May 1985.²⁰ In this speech Gorbachev spoke warmly of the long-standing, friendly and cooperative relationship the two states had enjoyed, based on 'equality and mutual respect', and predicted that the two sides would increase their ties to a 'qualitatively new level'. India has the longest-standing Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation with the Soviet Union of any Third World state (see Table 3), signed in 1971 for twenty years' duration. India has been allowed to manufacture Soviet weapons under licence on Indian territory for a number of years, including MiG fighter aircraft. There has also been a joint Soviet-Indian space flight.

The Soviet Union has maintained good relations with India without resorting to the application of political or military pressure. It has studiously avoided interfering in India's internal affairs or applying leverage to gain acquiescence in New Delhi in support of Soviet

¹⁸ V Mordvinov, 'SSSR-India: rost potentsiala ekonomicheskogo sotrudnichestva', *Vneshniaia Torgovlia* (4) 1987, pp 25-7.

¹⁹ Gorbachev, *Izbrannye rechi i stat'i*, pp 81-5.

²⁰ Gorbachev, *Izbrannye rechi i stat'i*, pp 88-92.

Table 3: Soviet Treaties of Friendship and Cooperation with Third World Countries

<i>Country</i>	<i>Date</i>	<i>Duration</i>
Egypt	May 1971 (abrogated March 1976)	15 years
India	August 1971	20 years
Iraq	April 1972	15 years
Somalia	July 1974 (abrogated November 1977)	20 years
Angola	October 1976	20 years
Mozambique	March 1977	20 years
Vietnam	November 1978	25 years
Ethiopia	November 1978	20 years
Afghanistan	December 1978	20 years
South Yemen	October 1979	20 years
Syria	October 1980	20 years
Congo	May 1981	20 years
North Yemen	October 1984	20 years

objectives. In a sense there has been no need, for both states share a number of common regional interests, including balancing the power of China, Pakistan, and the USA. Yet, by holding up Soviet-Indian relations as a model for other states in the Third World, Gorbachev is signalling that he is not so much interested in trying to spread socialism as in developing mutually advantageous political and economic relations with capitalist-oriented states, with larger markets and higher levels of development. Gorbachev returned Gandhi's visit to Moscow with a trip to India in November 1986. In a speech to the Indian Parliament he spoke about regional disputes between states, proposing the establishment within the UN of a 'multilateral centre for reducing the risks of war'. He also called for the implementation of conflict resolution methods contained in the UN Charter, including mediation, arbitration, judicial settlement, and regional agencies. Specifically for the Indian Ocean region, Gorbachev gave his full backing for an international conference on security which could lead to demilitarisation and the creation of a 'zone of peace'. He expressed a readiness to begin immediate negotiations with the USA and other non-littoral states for a mutual reduction of naval operations in the Indian Ocean, to hold talks with the USA and Asian countries on confidence-building measures, and to work out an international

guarantee for the safety of sea lanes, including the Persian Gulf and the Straits of Hormuz. He also suggested international cooperation of combating terrorism 'on the seas and in the air'.²¹

Shevardnadze, too, has been actively promoting not only increased trade relations with Asian and Pacific countries but also the concept of a zone of peace in the Indian Ocean and in the South Pacific. His 'peace offensive' in May 1987 took him to Australia, Indonesia, Laos, Kampuchea and Vietnam. He had earlier held talks in New York with the delegates to the UK from Australia, New Zealand, Fiji, Papua New Guinea, the Solomon Islands and the Cook Islands, seeking to gain support for a treaty establishing a nuclear-free zone in the South Pacific. The Soviet Union has called for a Conference on Security and Cooperation in Asia and the Pacific, modelled on the Helsinki process in Europe. There is every reason to believe that Gorbachev's proposals are serious, and that the USSR is willing to make mutual concessions in order to reduce tensions in the area and to create more stable relations with all the states in the region. These include China, the other great military power in Asia, and here again some tentative moves have been made to improve Sino-Soviet relations and to close the rift which developed in the 1960s after the short honeymoon of the 1950s.

Yet Soviet proposals for a Conference on Security and Cooperation in Asia are not likely to make much headway, and Gorbachev's comparison with the Helsinki process in Europe is really quite inappropriate. By the 1970s the European theatre was fairly stable, and it was a relatively simple exercise to establish a conference to ratify the status quo. In contrast, the situation in Asia is far more complex, with no bisecting 'iron curtain' dividing the continent into two blocs. There is a war under way in Afghanistan and the question of Kampuchea, as well as historical rivalry between China and Vietnam, India and Pakistan, and India and China. Furthermore, the whole idea of an Asian Security Conference is a non-starter because even India, despite its cordial relations with the Soviet Union, has failed to endorse it. Whereas Brezhnev had sought to isolate China in Asia during the 1970s, Gorbachev is encouraging full Chinese participation in his proposals for regional security, and the Indian Prime Minister is worried that his own position could be weakened by any collusion between the two communist giants.

During a visit to Vladivostok in the summer of 1986, Gorbachev made

²¹ Gorbachev's speech to the Indian Parliament, see *Soviet News*, 3 December 1986.

a most important speech which was principally aimed at a Chinese audience. He correctly pointed out that China and the Soviet Union in the late 1980s have similar priorities in improving their domestic economies (through 'modernisation' in China, and *perestroika* in the Soviet Union), and hence it would serve both countries well to men their differences and engage in constructive economic relations. In order to facilitate this the Soviet leader gave some small but nevertheless positive indicators of good intent towards meeting some of the conditions Peking has placed in the path of a normalisation of relations. He promised to send home six Soviet regiments from Afghanistan by the end of 1986, and to withdraw 'a substantial part of Soviet troops from Mongolia'.²² Another stumbling-block to improvement in Sino-Soviet relations is the question of Kampuchea with the Chinese demanding a withdrawal of Vietnamese troops from the country. China perhaps overrates the leverage Moscow has over the Vietnamese, but nevertheless, indications suggest that Gorbachev is putting pressure on Hanoi to reach a political settlement. In June 1987 Le Duan, then General Secretary of the Vietnamese Communist Party, was informed during a visit to Moscow that Gorbachev wished to see improvement in Vietnam's relations with China—and it was always clear that this would involve a settlement of the Kampuchean question. When Nguyen Van Linh, Le Duan's replacement as General Secretary, was in Moscow in May 1987, he was told by Gorbachev that a solution to the problem lay in a process of national reconciliation and 'unification of all patriotic forces' in Kampuchea.²³ In 1986 there was a radical turnover in the leadership of the Vietnamese Communist Party and the new General Secretary has displayed a greater degree of flexibility than his predecessor on the Kampuchean question. However, a solution to the problem does not appear to be in sight, and Gorbachev cannot afford to risk alienating Hanoi in his quest to improve relations with China. Vietnam is extremely important to Moscow, as evidenced by Vietnam's entry into the CMEA and the signing of a bilateral Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation in 1978 (see Table 3). Cam Ranh Bay and Da Nang military installations represent for the Soviet navy and air force significant strategic bases which are highly prized by the Soviet military.

Afghanistan is Gorbachev's most pressing problem in Asia. In his speech to the 27th Party Congress he referred to Afghanistan as

²² *Pravda*, 29 July 1986.

²³ *Soviet News*, 20 May 1987.

'bleeding wound', and expressed hope that Soviet troops would be withdrawn in the shortest possible time. However, speaking in terms of geopolitics, he also referred to Soviet 'vital interests' requiring a stable and friendly government in this neighbouring country.²⁴ The removal of six regiments from Afghanistan in 1986 was more symbolic, a gesture aimed at China rather than a significant move towards a complete withdrawal. However, Gorbachev clearly does wish to extricate himself from the imbroglio on the Soviet Union's southern periphery. Towards this end he has shown tactical flexibility and a willingness to compromise, being prepared to accept something substantially less than an ideal solution (i.e., a staunchly pro-Soviet Marxist-Leninist regime firmly in place in Kabul). Gorbachev recognises the complexity of the situation in Afghanistan, the lack of broad appeal that socialism has among the largely illiterate masses, and the need for what he terms a 'government of national reconciliation' which would incorporate all sections of Afghan society. In April 1986 Gorbachev engineered the removal of Babrak Karmal and his replacement by Najibullah, in the hope that he could create the conditions which would draw the opposition forces into a government of national unity. At the same time Gorbachev has given his support to the proximity talks between Afghanistan and Pakistan that take place under the auspices of the UN envoy, Diego Cordovez. A key to the success of these talks, Gorbachev argues, is the USA. In a speech in the Kremlin at a reception for Najibullah in December 1986, Gorbachev stated that if the USA really wished for a settlement in Afghanistan then the Reagan Administration should 'begin scaling down its interference' in Afghanistan's internal affairs.²⁵ It would appear that the General Secretary would be prepared to accept a neutral, coalition government in Kabul, and would agree to withdraw Soviet troops in stages if the USA and Pakistan were to cease their aid to the guerrillas. As part of the strategy to encourage national reconciliation, and as an important indication that the Soviet Union is not trying to impose a rigid socialist structure on the Afghans, Gorbachev is providing assistance to private entrepreneurs. Katushev was in Kabul in April 1987 to sign a new agreement on economic and technical cooperation, and part of this agreement provides assistance to the 'private sector' to further promote 'national reconciliation'.²⁶ Construction of a bicycle assembly plant and a leather goods factory are

²⁴ *Pravda*, 25 February 1986.

²⁵ *Pravda*, 13 December 1986.

²⁶ *Soviet News*, 22 April 1987.

two of the private enterprise projects mentioned. The bulk of Soviet aid to Third World countries has most often been given to the state sector of the economy; thus this perhaps marks a significant departure from traditional practice.

Despite Gorbachev's attempts at a political solution to the Afghan war, however, the situation on the Soviet Union's southern border has worsened, with no solution in sight. Tension on the Afghan-Pakistan border has intensified, and more ominous are the recent reports in the Soviet press about incursions of Afghan guerrillas into Soviet Central Asia. In April 1987, *Pravda* and *Izvestia* reported incidents of missiles being fired across the border into a Soviet village and an attack on a small town in Tadzhikistan by groups of Afghan rebels, with the deaths of two border guards and a civilian, and two injuries, including that of a child.²⁷ Furthermore, as long as Reagan occupies the White House, the Mujahedin are likely to continue receiving military assistance and Pakistan is less likely to agree to a political settlement. Najibullah has proven to be less popular than Karmal, and the guerrillas have shown little sign of being interested in sharing power with the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan which he heads. As with the USA in Vietnam in the 1970s, so Gorbachev in the 1980s needs to find an exit from Afghanistan which will not undermine his own domestic position nor his country's image as a superpower in global politics. This has so far proved an elusive task.

The Middle East

This is the Third World arena which, after Asia, is the next most important region on the Soviet foreign policy agenda. Gorbachev's call for an international conference to resolve the central issue of the Middle East, the Arab-Israeli conflict, is a continuation of long-standing Soviet policy. However, Gorbachev is pursuing this objective with more vigour than his predecessors and showing the same tactical flexibility that he has in other areas. It is apparent that Gorbachev realises that in the absence of unity in the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO), or of official Soviet diplomatic ties with Israel, the Soviet Union's role in any such conference would be severely restricted. Syria's tendency to make maximalist demands on Israel has also been a stumbling-block. Gorbachev has attempted during the past two years to overcome these

²⁷ See *Pravda*, 2 April 1987, and *Izvestia*, 22 April 1987.

difficulties whilst at the same time seeking to increase the Soviet Union's dealings with other states in the region, and generally to play a much greater role in the Middle East than hitherto. Diplomatic relations were established with Oman and the United Arab Emirates in September and November 1985 respectively. Prime Minister Ryzhkov has held talks with the oil ministers of Arab states, and Moscow, as the world's largest oil producer, has cooperated in fixing stable prices on the world market. Trade with Saudi Arabia has increased substantially (see Table 2) during the past two years. Relations with Egypt have improved perceptibly under Gorbachev. In 1986 Vladimir Polyakov paid two visits to Cairo for negotiations on the situation in the Middle East and on the rescheduling of Egypt's debt to the Soviet Union. Polyakov heads the Soviet Foreign Ministry's Near Eastern Department, and is the former Ambassador to Egypt who was expelled by Sadat in 1981. Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Vladimir Petrovsky visited Cairo in August 1986, paving the way for a new bilateral trade agreement between the two countries, the details of which were later worked out by the Chairman of the USSR State Bank who also spent two weeks in the Egyptian capital in December 1986. Since Gorbachev's rise to power a number of meetings have taken place between Israeli and Soviet officials, and although the Soviet Union denies that it is planning an immediate restoration of diplomatic relations (broken after the 1967 war in the Middle East) it is evident that this is the ultimate aim. The number of Jews being allowed to leave the Soviet Union for Israel is also increasing, which should perhaps be seen in the light of this objective.

Gorbachev has achieved a significant amount of success with his diplomatic offensive in the Middle East. With the loss of Egypt to the Western camp in the 1970s the Soviet role in the Middle East was restricted to supporting the radical Arab states of Syria and Libya, the relationship in both cases largely restricted to arms transfers. This posed a number of problems for Gorbachev. Not only did this limited presence in the Middle East marginalise the Soviet role in the region, but Syria and Libya were seen in the West as sponsors of international terrorism; also, they both took an uncompromising stance against Israel, and they undermined the unity of the PLO and the Arab cause in general. Gorbachev has gone some way to rectifying this situation through a combination of sophisticated diplomacy and practical policies. He has successfully courted the more moderate Arab states, and, as already noted, substantially improved relations with Egypt. He has deliberately

distanced himself from terrorism, openly denouncing those terrorist acts for which the West holds Libya and Syria responsible, and on 7 May 1987 the Soviet Union joined the International Convention Against Taking Hostages. Whilst seeking to gain some political capital out of the US air strikes on Libya in April 1986, the Soviet Union's active response was mild, and limited to diplomatic channels of communication. The Soviet Union does not have a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation with Libya and it would be a misnomer to refer to Libya as an ally of the Soviet Union. Libya is a maverick in international politics, and Gorbachev would not wish to undermine his overall strategy of expanding Soviet ties with the more important countries in the region by linking the Soviet Union too closely with such an unpredictable regime as that of Tripoli. The Soviet Union has put pressure on Syria, which is dependent on Soviet military supplies, to agree to peace talks with the Israelis under the umbrella of an international conference. Gorbachev has also been putting pressure on President Assad to use his influence towards the unification of the PLO, beset as it has been with vicious faction fighting. During a visit to Moscow in April 1987 Assad was told by Gorbachev that he was '... saddened by disunity, frictions and conflicts in the Arab world which are vigorously exploited by the imperialists ...'²⁸ Gorbachev stressed the need for unity, and the importance of an international peace conference on the Middle East. It is probably not coincidental that Assad has moderated his position on negotiations, helped to restore unity to the PLO, and even held discussions with his traditional arch-enemy, Iraq. Due largely to the success of Gorbachev's tactics in the Middle East, more and more moderate countries, including extra-regional states, are recognising the legitimacy of an active Soviet role in any international peace conference.

This Soviet diplomatic offensive extends to the Gulf region, with Gorbachev showing a much greater willingness than his predecessors to take a more active role in ensuring the freedom of passage through the Gulf for merchant ships. Here it is Kuwait which has taken the initiative by requesting superpower naval protection for its tankers. The Soviet Union, which had already leased three Soviet tankers to Kuwait, responded positively. It was President Carter who defined the Persian Gulf as vital to American security interests. There was a high dependency of the West on Gulf oil, and central to the subsequent

²⁸ *Soviet News*, 29 April 1987.

'Carter Doctrine' was ensuring that the Gulf was safe from Soviet encroachment. With the Soviet display of a forward policy in the area, both diplomatically and militarily, the Reagan Administration felt obliged to take a more active role itself in showing the American flag in the Gulf. The Iran-Iraq War has made the Gulf a perilous place for both superpowers. A Soviet freighter was hit by an Iranian gunboat on 6 May 1987 and then, a month later, within hours of each other, a Soviet tanker struck a mine off the coast of Kuwait and the US frigate, *Stark*, was hit by a missile from an Iraqi fighter aircraft. Neither superpower struck back directly against the perpetrators, but both have shown a greater willingness to become more actively involved. This is certainly not a case of collusion between the superpowers to keep the Gulf open to international shipping, but rather an attempt by the Soviet Union to gain unilateral advantage and a response by the USA in order to maintain its leading position.

One of the objectives of the Brezhnev Politburo in the 1970s was to gain acknowledgment from the USA of the Soviet Union's status as a global superpower equal to the USA, and hence a political power whose participation would be essential for the resolution of major international disputes. Gorbachev believes that this was not achieved, partly owing to the weak economic and political links existing between Moscow and the Third World. Gorbachev's policy in the Middle East and the Persian Gulf should be seen in this light as the Soviet Union seeks to strengthen its political and economic ties with the more moderate states. By increasing the Soviet stake in the region, Gorbachev seeks to gain US acceptance of a greater Soviet role. This strategy appears to be gaining at least limited success as the question of Soviet participation in a peace conference to help solve the central Arab-Israeli dispute is becoming more widely accepted. Furthermore, there are strong forces in Washington advocating that the UN Security Council should have the responsibility of protecting the Gulf, which of course would give the Soviet Union a legitimate and important role in an area that the USA has (since the withdrawal of British influence after the Second World War) traditionally viewed as its own preserve.

Africa

Of the thirteen Treaties of Friendship and Cooperation the Soviet Union has signed with Third World countries since the 1970s, six have been with African countries (see Table 3). With the decolonisation

process and the withdrawal of the European Colonial powers after 1945, Africa was the area which seemed to offer the best prospects for increasing Soviet influence. Indeed, Soviet interventions in African conflicts in the 1970s were largely responsible for undermining superpower détente, as the perception grew in the USA that Soviet behaviour in Angola and Ethiopia was designed to gain unilateral advantage and was incompatible with the basic principles thought to underlie the new relationship. Détente was therefore considered in Washington to be a one-way street favouring the Soviet Union in a 'zero-sum' game. However, the reality is somewhat different. Due to the changing structure of the international system, the collapse of the European empires, and the emerging bipolarity of the global balance of power, both the Soviet Union and the USA sought to take advantage of regional dynamics in the African continent. One of the failures of détente was the lack of any agreed rules of conduct for superpower behaviour in the increasingly important and unstable Third World arena. Khrushchev sought to buy influence for the Soviet Union by providing aid and assistance to the most radical African states; these were usually for the construction of high prestige projects such as the Aswan Dam in Egypt. Brezhnev's strategy, designed to achieve the same goal of increasing Soviet influence in Africa, was more pragmatic, as he sought to forge political and economic ties for mutual advantage with almost any state willing to reciprocate. However, where the opportunity arose, the Brezhnev Politburo did make substantial political, economic and military commitments towards those states considered 'progressive' and embarked upon a path of socialist orientation.²⁹

Reviewing the outcome of these previous policies in Africa, in March 1985 Gorbachev had little reason to feel satisfied. In Arab North Africa, Egypt had unilaterally abrogated the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation and, as already noted, relations with Libya have proved to be a mixed blessing; if anything, they have served only to marginalise Moscow's influence in the Middle East. The Horn of Africa seemed at one point to hold the promise of becoming a socialist enclave in a geo-strategically important region, but the Soviet Union was unable to prevent the war in the Ogaden, and subsequently 'lost' Somalia, when Siad Barre unilaterally abrogated its treaty with Moscow in 1977. In southern Africa the two states where the Soviet Union did gain

²⁹ See Peter Shearman, 'Soviet foreign policy in Africa and Latin America: a comparative case study', *Millennium* 15(3) Winter 1986, pp 339-66.

influence following the collapse of the Portuguese empire in the 1970s are both poor and struggling against economic decay and armed insurgencies. In the case of Zimbabwe, Brezhnev had backed the losing Nkomo faction in the struggle for independence with the result that Prime Minister Robert Mugabe initially distanced himself from Moscow. Other states labelled as 'progressive', such as Madagascar and the Seychelles, had strengthened their ties with the West, and even the key client states of Angola and Mozambique, whilst heavily dependent on the Soviet Union for military supplies, have actually increased their trade dependency on the West since independence. The Soviet impact in Africa is minimal and tenuous. So what, if anything, is Gorbachev doing to improve the situation?

It is evident from a reading of Gorbachev's speeches and statements on Soviet foreign policy that he has drawn a number of lessons from past failures. Decolonisation, on which so much store was set, is now all but complete and the Soviet Union did not make the gains that were expected in Africa. Nationalism, which the USSR sought to take advantage of, has not, as it was earlier hoped, naturally led to a socialist path of development. Supplying military equipment to those few states that have taken a progressive path, and cooperative intervention with the Cubans in areas of conflict, have not resulted in Soviet leverage and influence over its clients. The most telling example here is the Accords of non-aggression that South Africa signed with Angola and Mozambique, which were opposed by Moscow and mediated by Washington. The Soviet Union was unable to use its good offices, even had it wished to, for it has no official diplomatic relations with South Africa; as in the Middle East, Moscow's political influence is marginalised by its restricted diplomatic relations. The Soviet Union may be a military superpower in the global arena, but politically and economically in comparison to the USA it is a mouse. The lesson for Gorbachev lies in an appreciation of the need for the Soviet Union, if it wishes to strengthen its position in Africa, to increase its *political* stake in the continent. As we have noted in the above section, Gorbachev has achieved some success in the Middle East in part by improving political and economic relations with Egypt.

If Gorbachev's rhetoric is any guide he is seeking to improve his position in Africa, and the Third World generally, by a sophisticated diplomatic offensive designed to appeal to some of the core interests many Third World countries share. The catchword under Gorbachev has become 'disarmament for development' and many of his

disarmament proposals are diplomatic responses to the demands of Third World states for arms control agreements between the superpowers.³⁰ Gorbachev has also taken up the question of the New International Economic Order, arguing for a more equitable economic relationship between advanced industrial countries and the LDCs.³¹ Concerning conflict resolution in the Third World, Gorbachev articulates support for mediation through the UN and respect for international law, and for mutually acceptable compromises and dialogue.³² Gorbachev's public diplomacy reveals a power politician who recognises the inadequacy of the military instrument for the furthering of Soviet interests in a competition for influence with the USA. This is not to say that the Soviet Union is about to relinquish its military support to established client states such as Angola and Ethiopia. Rather, it is to say that Gorbachev will be unwilling to take on any more military aid commitments in Africa as long as he has the primary goal of improving the political and economic standing of the Soviet Union.

During his first two years in power, Gorbachev has had some success in Africa, but this has been due more to regional and local factors than to skilful diplomacy. However, where opportunities have materialised Gorbachev has been cautious not to commit the Soviet Union too deeply or to impair his other African objectives, again having learnt from past mistakes in the 1970s. President Gaafar Numeiri of Sudan, for example, was overthrown in a coup in 1985 and his successors began making overtures to Moscow, releasing a number of communists from prison in a gesture of goodwill. Under Numeiri's sixteen-year rule, Soviet-Sudanese relations were severely strained, but now the prospects looked promising for re-establishing close links with this geo-strategically important country, lying proximate to Egypt, Libya, Chad and Ethiopia. Relations have improved between the two countries, but Soviet coverage of internal developments in the Sudan has been fairly neutral, marked by a cautious 'wait-and-see' approach.³³ In an earlier period, these events would have been viewed in Moscow in a very positive light, providing an opportunity to step in with offers of Soviet assistance. However, the Sudan is in the midst of a civil war and suffers from famine, economic decay and a major refugee problem.

³⁰ See for example Gorbachev's speech at a Kremlin dinner in honour of the Angolan leader Dos Santos, *Pravda*, 7 May 1986.

³¹ Gorbachev articulated support for the NIEO in his Congress speech.

³² This line of argument can be found in a number of Gorbachev's speeches.

³³ *Pravda*, 9 May 1986.

nificantly, when the new Prime Minister, Sadiq al-Mahdi, visited Moscow in August 1986, he was not given the opportunity to meet Gorbachev, and no substantive bilateral agreements were concluded.³⁴

The Soviet Union has also improved relations with Zimbabwe since Gorbachev's rise to power. After initially distancing himself from Moscow, Mugabe paid a visit to the Soviet capital in December 1985 and negotiated a number of collaborative projects. In 1986, Harare hosted the summit of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), an organisation to which Gorbachev attaches importance in disseminating Soviet propaganda on disarmament issues and the NIEO. Mugabe's position as current Chairman of the Non-Aligned Movement thereby makes Zimbabwe a more important target state for Gorbachev's diplomacy than many other African states. Between 1985 and 1987 the Soviet Union has also re-established ties with Liberia, and increased economic and military links with Nigeria and Tanzania. During this period a number of African leaders visited Moscow and Gorbachev has accepted invitations to visit some of the African states, including Nigeria, Madagascar and Mozambique.

The Soviet Union has long been the principal supplier of arms and aid to the African National Congress (ANC) in its struggle against the apartheid regime in South Africa. This continues to be the case under Gorbachev, but there is evidence that the Soviet position on South Africa is becoming less radical and more pragmatic. For example, Gorbachev has made it clear that he does not support terrorism against civilian population, and Gleb Starushenko of the Soviet Academy of Sciences sees the Zimbabwean road to independence as the model for South Africa. In a conference paper Starushenko referred to the need for 'compromise' and 'guarantees' for the minority white population. His suggestion is for a two-chamber parliament, one of which would be based on equal representation and the right of veto for each community.³⁵ One Western specialist on African affairs suggests that these Soviet proposals '... come closer to the views of President Botha than his advisers than to the African National Congress'.³⁶ Gorbachev is distancing himself from those advocating maximalist demands in regional conflicts in order to gain wider influence with the more

Pravda, 12 August 1986 and *Pravda*, 13 August 1986.

Gleb Starushenko, 'Problems of struggle against racism, apartheid and colonialism in South Africa', paper presented at the Second Soviet-African Conference, Moscow 24-26 June 1986. Colin Legum, 'Soviet theoretician favours peaceful negotiations in South Africa', *Colin Legum's Third World Reports*, Richmond, Surrey: CSI Syndication Service, 13 January 1987.

moderate states and thereby to achieve legitimacy and acceptance for a Soviet role in the peace process alongside that of the USA. Gorbachev has called for a political solution to the conflicts in Southern Africa, based on mutual compromise between the antagonists, and under the auspices of the UN. Discussions have also been held between the USA and the Soviet Union on regional stability in Southern Africa and, although they have not made any headway in resolving the problems, it is significant that the superpowers are now communicating on the very regional issues that undermined their relations in the 1970s.³⁷

Latin America

Latin America has traditionally been an area of little concern to the Soviet Union, strategically, economically and politically. Given its place in what the Soviet leadership viewed as the US sphere of influence, little real attempt has been made to penetrate the area. The exception, of course, is Cuba, and this unique relationship is a legacy of the Khrushchev and Brezhnev eras. Had the Cuban revolution occurred in 1979 rather than 1959, it would most likely not have been integrated into the socialist bloc's economic sub-system. It has been noted above that Khrushchev's Third World strategy was to offer large amounts of aid to radical regimes in an attempt to 'wean them away from the Western orbit. It is remarkable that the one successful outcome of this strategy should be an island in the Caribbean just ninety miles off the coast of Florida, in the Western hemisphere. However, Cuba is an expensive drain on the Soviet economy, costing an estimated US\$9 million a day in aid and credits. Gorbachev has made it clear that other Third World states should not look upon Cuba as a developmental model, for no longer is the Soviet Union willing or able to provide aid on such a large scale. Nicaragua is a case in point, for since the Sandinista Revolution of 1979, whilst Soviet aid and trade with Managua have increased substantially, Moscow's commitment is relatively modest. Gorbachev is supplying the Sandinistas with military equipment sufficient to defend the revolution against the 'Contras', combined with only small amounts of economic aid. Gorbachev is aware that any radical increase in the degree of Soviet involvement in Nicaragua would not only stretch further the Soviet economy, but would run the risk of

³⁷ *Pravda*, 7 March 1986, reports on a meeting between C Crocker, US Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs and V M Vasev, head of the Soviet Foreign Ministry's Third African Department for talks on Southern Africa.

alienating countries, such as Mexico, that have become the main target for his foreign political and economic strategy. He is not willing to undermine relations with Mexico by engaging in risky and costly adventures in the poorer states of Central America.

It is noteworthy that Soviet specialists and policymakers do not refer to Nicaragua as a state of 'socialist orientation', which indicates that Nicaragua is not accorded a particularly important status in Soviet eyes. When President Daniel Ortega was in Moscow in April 1985, Gorbachev offered only 'diplomatic support' in defending the Nicaraguan revolution, a clear message to the Sandinistas that the Soviet leadership is not prepared to offer any direct military assistance.³⁸ The Soviet Union does not have a single Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation with a Latin American state, not even with Cuba (although the resolution of the missile crisis can be viewed as a guarantee against US military intervention).

Since 1985 a number of leading government figures from Latin American states (including Argentina, Brazil, Mexico and Uruguay) have visited the Soviet Union where the discussions have focused upon improving economic ties and forging closer cooperation in the fields of science and technology. By establishing joint collaborative projects with the more developed Third World states the Soviet Union could possibly be hoping to gain access to technology which it has been unable to get from the West. The Soviet Foreign Minister, Edvard Shevardnadze, paid a visit to Mexico in October 1986, and then in May 1987 his Mexican counterpart, Bernardo Sepúlveda, held talks in the Kremlin with Gorbachev. During this visit a new agreement was signed on cultural and scientific cooperation, and trade between the countries was expected to increase from US\$18 million in 1986 to US\$300 million during the next five years.³⁹ Gorbachev told the Mexican Foreign Minister that it was not the Soviet Union's objective to 'stage a series of socialist revolutions' in Latin America, for this would run counter to 'the new mode of thinking and the entire foreign policy concept to which we adhere'.⁴⁰ The Soviet leader expressed his support for the Contadora peace process in Central America and stated that he had no desire to interfere in relations between the USA and Latin America. Gorbachev has accepted an invitation to visit Mexico later in 1987, as well as a number of other Latin American states. The agenda has not yet been

³⁸ *Pravda*, 30 April 1985.

³⁹ See *Latin American Weekly Reports* (London) 14 May 1987.

⁴⁰ *Soviet News*, 13 May 1987.

drawn up, but thus far there has been no mention of a visit to Managua, and rumours in Moscow have it that he may not even pay a courtesy call on Castro in Cuba. Clearly Gorbachev is seeking to give the Soviet Union an image of a status quo participant in international relations, and to integrate the USSR into the world economy whilst distancing himself somewhat from the more radical revisionist Third World states. It is significant, as one Western correspondent pointed out, that the Libyan Foreign Minister, who was in Moscow during the same period as the Mexican Foreign Minister, was not given an audience with Gorbachev, and his visit passed almost without mention, whereas Sepúlveda's visit was given massive coverage in the Soviet media.⁴¹ Mexico has the longest-standing Latin American ties with the Soviet Union (and Cuba) and is the major regional power in Central America, an influential participant in inter-American relations, a member of the Five Continent Peace Initiative, an important influence in the Non-Aligned Movement, and a developing country with a potential market for Soviet trade. It is just such a state which has become the chief focus of Gorbachev's new foreign policy strategy.

Strictly speaking, Cuba should not be included in the Third World category, for as a member of the Council for Mutual and Economic Assistance (COMECON), Cuba is part of what the Soviet Union refers to as the 'world socialist system' or the 'socialist commonwealth'. Nevertheless, for our purposes, it is useful to place Cuba in the Third World and to assess briefly Soviet-Cuban relations under Gorbachev. Cuba has been Moscow's most reliable ally in the Third World—despite some early antagonisms and tensions. By the 1970s the Soviet Union and Cuba shared common objectives and engaged in close cooperation and coordination in order to attain them (for example, in Angola and Ethiopia).⁴² However, Soviet priorities have changed under Gorbachev and there may be a growing prospect of renewed strains in Soviet-Cuban relations as a consequence. At a reconvened session of the Cuban Communist Party's Third Congress, Castro attacked certain tendencies in the party which oppose his new disciplinary and moral crusade. These are apparently '... groups of technocrats ... with strong sympathies for and professional connections with the Soviet Union'.⁴³

⁴¹ *The International Herald Tribune*, 26 May 1987.

⁴² However, one should be careful not to underestimate Cuba's independence of action in the conduct of its foreign policy. See Peter Shearman, *The Soviet Union and Cuba*, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul/Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1987.

⁴³ *Latin American Weekly Report*, 11 December 1986.

In April 1987, Viktor Chebrikov, a member of the Politburo and head of the security services (KGB), visited Havana where he briefed Castro on the Soviet Union's *perestroika* campaign.⁴⁴ Two years earlier Mikhail Solomentsev, another member of the Politburo, was in the Cuban capital, and stated in a speech that the 'most important international duty' of the CPSU (Communist Party of the Soviet Union) was to ensure 'growth in the Soviet economy' and the 'well-being of the Soviet people'.⁴⁵ In his fraternal speech to the Cuban Party Congress, Egor Ligachev, the second most important figure in the Soviet Politburo, referred to the need for Cuba to rectify its poor economic record.⁴⁶ The Cuban economy has been in dire straits for the past couple of years, and the message from the Kremlin is that Castro should put his own house in order, as Gorbachev is himself trying to do in Moscow. To add to his problems, Castro now has to pay above world market prices for Soviet oil imports, and the price the Soviet Union pays for Cuban sugar is fixed at roughly the 1986 price for the next five years.

It is instructive to note the different approaches that the two leaders are taking to overcome similar structural economic problems. Whereas Gorbachev is introducing limited market mechanisms and small-scale private enterprise, Castro has recently abolished private peasant markets, outlawed the selling of private houses, and imposed more stringent centralised control over the economy. Whereas Gorbachev is appealing to economic instincts to motivate the labour force, Castro is tightening up on discipline and appealing to moral incentives to stimulate production. In foreign economic relations, whereas Gorbachev does not view the Soviet-Cuban link as a model for other Third World states, Castro argues that the type of economic relations existing between the two countries be established with other LDCs. And whereas Castro has consistently proposed non-payment by Third World states of their international debts, Gorbachev has consistently advocated a political solution to the debt crisis. The restructuring process that is at the centre of Castro's concerns is the NIEO, and here he argues that the Soviet Union, as part of the industrialised North, shares a similar obligation to the former colonial powers to redirect a percentage of GNP to Third World development. Gorbachev, whilst voicing support for the NIEO, does not feel that the Soviet Union has

⁴⁴ *Granma Weekly Review*, 15 April 1987.

⁴⁵ *SSSR-Kuba: Dokumenty druzhby i solidarnosti*, Moscow: Politicheskaya literatura, 1985, pp 39-47, p 44.

⁴⁶ *Soviet News*, 12 February 1986.

responsibility to share the burden for Third World development with the 'neo-colonialist' powers which have been exploiting the poorer states. These marked differences in perceptions and policies are relevant to our analysis of Gorbachev's Third World policy, for they demonstrate the extent to which Gorbachev's domestic economic priorities affect foreign economic ties.

Conclusion

It is evident that Gorbachev's Third World policy is subordinate to and dependent on the Soviet leader's other more important objectives. That Soviet national security and state interests take precedence over any commitment to socialism in the LDCs, with Soviet policy towards the Third World indeed designed to further these interests, is not a new phenomenon, but can be traced back to the 1920s. Elizabeth Valkenier shows how the Third World has been consistently manipulated to serve Soviet state interests, with any changes in policy simply reflecting responses to transformations in the international system and Soviet domestic priorities.⁴⁷ In the immediate post-revolutionary period after 1917, the colonies were briefly viewed as important in the pursuit of world revolution. From the late 1920s through to the mid-1950s this faith in world revolution evaporated as Stalin set about, at tremendous cost, constructing socialism in one country. In the 1950s and 1960s Khrushchev's policy was designed to extricate the Soviet Union from 'capitalist encirclement' by challenging the West's global alliance structure and offering large amounts of aid to selected developing states. In the 1970s, having gained military parity with the USA, the Brezhnev Politburo sought to gain acceptance as a political equal with a legitimate role to play in the Third World arena. Superpower détente (political, economic and military) was the principal goal, and the Third World in the early period of détente was accorded second place to improving relations with the USA. However, the Nixon Administration never intended to give Moscow the equal status it sought. It rather hoped to contain Soviet influence in the Third World through a strategy of linkage, combined with sophisticated diplomacy designed to exclude the Soviet Union from areas where it already had a stake. This US strategy was successful in the Middle East after the October War of

⁴⁷ On this point see Elizabeth Valkenier, 'Soviet decisionmaking and policy in Central America', in Peter Shearman and Phil Williams (eds), *The Superpowers, Central America and the Middle East*, London: Brassey's/Pergamon, forthcoming 1988.

1973, and thereafter the lack of ground rules for superpower behaviour in the Third World resulted in both sides seeking unilateral advantage in areas of regional conflict. Ultimately, Soviet policy in Angola, Ethiopia and Afghanistan helped to undermine the détente process, and with the election of Ronald Reagan to the White House, superpower relations reverted to their earlier Cold War character. In each period, then, Soviet Third World policy has been opportunistic and designed to further Soviet state interests, rather than the interests of the Third World.

Since the mid-1980s Soviet Third World policy, as this article has documented, has similarly been designed to promote Soviet interests. This is not obvious if one takes some of Gorbachev's statements out of context. The new Soviet leader often refers to the interdependence of global politics and economics and the need to pool international resources in order to assist the Third World to overcome problems of debt, poverty and hunger. Vadim Zagladin, a Deputy Head of the International Department, sees global problems in systemic terms, hence he calls for a systemic solution to overcome problems such as declining scarce resources in the face of an increasing world population, ecological problems stemming from man's impact on nature, and international security issues.⁴⁸ Gorbachev and Zagladin appear to be articulating views similar to those expressed by Jimmy Carter during the early period of his presidency, reflecting a concern with issues of global interdependence and the North-South divide. I am not here suggesting that Gorbachev is merely putting out propaganda and veiled rhetoric in order to conceal a Soviet grand design of spreading socialist revolution. His statements may well reflect a genuine perception of the complexities of global problems, but this does not imply a change in the Soviet hierarchy of interests or that the Third World is now seen separately from the interests of the Soviet state. Rather, Gorbachev realises that if the Soviet Union wishes to increase its influence in the Third World, and he clearly does wish this for his country, then a different strategy to that of previous periods is called for.

Gorbachev realises that the military instrument is no longer a useful means of gaining lasting and stable influence in the Third World (a lesson learned most graphically and painfully in Afghanistan). He also realises that the dominance of US influence in the Third World is due more to the strong American economy than to any other factor, and

⁴⁸ See V V Zagladin, 'Programmnye tseli KPSS i global'nye problemy', *Voprosy filosofii* (2) 1986.

therefore the Soviet Union needs to strengthen its own economy and productive forces in order to be able to compete effectively with the USA in global politics. As noted, Gorbachev has stated that the Soviet Union must reach world levels of production in order to stave off domestic discontent and to enable the Soviet Union to play the international role of a real superpower. The military instrument is not a viable proposition, and the economic instrument is as yet not competitive; thus, Gorbachev is employing a political strategy to increase Soviet influence in the Third World in competition with the USA. Verbal support for the NIEO and positive responses to proposals from the Non Aligned Movement and the Five Continents Peace Initiative are designed as much to give the Soviet Union credibility and legitimacy as a global power as they are to alleviate the problems of the Third World. Gorbachev is a power politician in a new mould, but a power politician nonetheless. With skilful diplomacy he has already increased the Soviet Union's prestige in the international arena even whilst Soviet troops remain in Afghanistan. Many leading Israelis and Americans now recognise the Soviet Union's right to participate in an international conference on the Middle East, many states in the Asian/Pacific region view the Soviet Union as a useful trading partner, and the larger Latin American states are strengthening their political and economic ties with Moscow. Gorbachev has gone a long way towards creating the image of the Soviet Union as a traditional participant in international affairs, which has actually been the reality almost since the Russian Revolution of 1917. The Soviet Union's foreign policy has always been formulated according to the demands of the domestic situation and the changing structure of the international system. Domestic economic problems and the complex and unpredictable nature of Third World politics have helped to shape a more pragmatic, moderate, less risk-taking Soviet foreign policy. Were the right person in the White House, whilst these forces are in operation and Gorbachev is at the helm in the Kremlin, it could be a most opportune moment to lessen international tensions and to help alleviate some of the problems which superpower competition has hitherto exacerbated in the Third World. For such a possible confluence of forces, we will have to await the outcome of the next US presidential election.

Test case for the Reagan Doctrine: the covert Contra war*

It is much easier and much less expensive to support an insurgency than it is for us and our friends to resist one. It takes relatively few people and little support to disrupt the internal peace and economic stability of a small country.

—CIA Director William Casey
13 March 1982

As Ronald Reagan enters his last year as US President, overthrowing the Sandinista government in Nicaragua continues to dominate his foreign policy agenda. Notwithstanding the major scandal over illegal aid to the 'Contras' and strident debate over future official US assistance, his Administration remains committed to a course of escalating intervention. This obsession, overshadowing all other foreign policy issues during the Administration's two terms in office, has ensured that the CIA/'Contra' campaign against the Sandinistas will become the heritage of the Reagan presidency. Thus, to assess Reagan's probable place in history and the significance of the so-called Reagan Doctrine of 'rollback', it is necessary to examine the evolution and implications of the US war on Nicaragua.

Genesis of the covert war

By the time Ronald Reagan assumed office in 1981, the Carter Administration had already expended \$1 million in covert funds to organise and bolster internal opposition groups in Nicaragua. Nevertheless, Carter's limited efforts to manipulate the course of the Nicaraguan Revolution were considered insufficient by the new Administration hardliners who viewed the Sandinistas' very existence as a challenge to US hegemony in the Western hemisphere. Achieving a *modus vivendi* with the Sandinist Front of National Liberation (FSLN)

* This article is adapted from the author's book, *Nicaragua: The Price of Intervention*, Washington DC: Institute for Policy Studies, 1987 and appeared, in part, as a chapter in Thomas W Walker (ed) *Reagan vs. The Sandinistas*, Colorado: Westview Press, 1987.

was all but ruled out from the beginning. Instead, the new team in Washington decided to make Nicaragua a test case of the Reagan Doctrine of taking the offensive against revolution in the Third World.

'We had just witnessed a five-year period where the Soviet Union tried out a stratagem of sponsoring guerrilla movements that would topple moderate regimes, and install their own totalitarian successor, and they had phenomenal success . . . in Angola, Ethiopia, South Yemen, Cambodia, Afghanistan, Mozambique [and] Nicaragua'; that is how the former National Security Adviser, Robert McFarlane, explained to Congress in May 1987 the impetus for applying the Reagan Doctrine in Nicaragua. Administration officials believed that failure to react so close to home would encourage the Soviet Union and jeopardise American ability to dictate events elsewhere in the Third World. 'If we could not muster an effective counter to the Cuban-Sandinista strategy in our own backyard, it was far less likely that we could do so in the years ahead in more distant locations', McFarlane continued. 'We had to win this one.'¹

Within the incoming Administration a general consensus existed on this objective but not on the means to accomplish that goal.² In early meetings of the National Security Council, Alexander Haig, Reagan's first Secretary of State, advised 'a determined show of American will and power' and a 'high level of intensity at the beginning'.³ To bolster his case that the covert war needed to go 'to the source' of revolution in Central America, Haig ordered Robert McFarlane to draw up an options paper, 'Taking the War to Nicaragua', that weighed the possibility of the open use of force against Cuban ships and planes and a naval blockade against Nicaragua.⁴

Yet the President's advisers, including Vice-President George Bush, Secretary of Defence Caspar Weinberger, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, vetoed Haig's call to war. Any overt display of force, they reasoned, would conjure up the image of 'another Vietnam' in the mind of the public, divert resources from more important battlefields in Europe and the Middle East, and jeopardise the Administration's efforts to garner congressional support for its domestic and foreign policy agenda.⁵

¹ See McFarlane's testimony before the special committees of the Senate and the House of Representatives investigating illegal arms sales to the 'Contras', 11 and 13 May 1987.

² For a description of early debates within the administration, see the *Wall Street Journal* (New York) 5 March 1985. See also William M LeoGrande, 'The United States and Nicaragua', in Thomas W Walker (ed), *Nicaragua: The First Five Years*, New York: Praeger, 1985, pp 425-46.

³ See Haig's memoirs, *Caveat*, New York: Macmillan, 1984, p 129.

⁴ *Los Angeles Times*, 3 March 1985.

⁵ Haig describes the objections of Reagan's advisers in *Caveat*, pp 129-30.

The decision to opt for a covert tack against the Sandinistas reflected the tension between Reagan's commitment to 'project American power abroad' and the political constraints on sending US troops into a Central American quagmire. Against the backdrop of the 'Vietnam Syndrome'—widespread public opposition to US military involvement in Third World conflicts—CIA operations emerged as the centrepiece of a low intensity warfare strategy that incorporated economic destabilisation, psychological operations, and diplomatic pressures.⁶

Initiation of the proxy war

The Reagan Administration's strategy depended on the creation of a proxy force of exiles such as the one the CIA had used to overthrow the Arbenz government in Guatemala in 1954 and in its failed effort to oust Fidel Castro at the Bay of Pigs in 1961. Accordingly, in 1981 a new generation of CIA-backed counter-revolutionaries emerged. The 'Contras', as this force came to be known, could bring direct pressure on Nicaragua's fragile economic institutions, complementing US efforts to undermine the economy from abroad. Moreover, implementing US policy through a surrogate paramilitary army enabled Washington to invoke a 'plausible denial' of responsibility for the 'Contras' actions, shielding the Administration from accountability to Congress and the US public.

The surrogate supply network

Revelations of CIA responsibility for the mining of Nicaragua's harbours provoked an avalanche of criticism at home and abroad. Around the world, Washington's allies openly castigated the CIA's action as a flagrant violation of international law. In Congress, even staunch Republican supporters of the 'Contras' such as the Chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee, Barry Goldwater, joined liberal Democrats in expressing outrage.⁷ Both the House and the Senate passed bipartisan resolutions condemning the mining operation.

The political uproar marked a turning point in the willingness of

⁶ For an analysis of low-intensity warfare as a new military strategy of intervention, see Sarah Miles, 'The Real War: Low Intensity Conflict in Central America', *North American Congress on Latin America (NACLA)*, May/June 1986.

⁷ In a scathing letter to Casey, Goldwater wrote that he was 'pissed off' at not being fully informed about an operation that he called 'an act of war' and a 'violation of international law.' See *Time*, 23 April 1984.

Congress to look the other way while the Reagan Administration violated international codes of conduct in pursuit of the goal of overthrowing the Sandinistas. Yet, even as it became apparent in 1984 that the Democrat-controlled House of Representatives would not pass further aid for the 'Contras', a White House emissary, L-Colonel Oliver North, was dispatched to Honduras to assure FDN leaders that 'President Reagan remain[s] committed to removing the Sandinistas from power,' and that the Administration would 'see to it that they received all the support that was necessary for that purpose'.⁸

To fulfil that promise, President Reagan authorised the National Security Council to create a surrogate network that would provide funds, training and armaments to the 'Contras'. The plan called for Oliver North, then an aide to Robert McFarlane, to work through designated intermediaries, such as retired Major-Generals Richard Secord and John Singlaub, to keep the FDN financially, materially, and militarily afloat.⁹ By the time Congress passed a second 'Boland Amendment' in October 1984, banning all 'direct and indirect' aid to the 'Contras', the Administration's surrogate 'Contra' aid network was already in place, and a real covert war was well underway.

This surrogate system relied upon four components: support from foreign governments such as Saudi Arabia, Israel, South Korea and Singapore; a covert re-supply operation directed by Richard Secord; right-wing 'humanitarian aid' organisations in the USA; and paramilitary groups willing to lend men and *matériel* to the 'Contra' cause. Operating from the basement of the White House with the blessing, if not full knowledge, of the President, the operation was carefully designed to provide 'plausible denial' of any Administration involvement.

Documents and testimony provided to the Senate and House Select Committees investigating what is now called the 'Iran/'Contra' affair' indicate that in the late spring of 1984, National Security Council officials approached both Israel and Saudi Arabia for assistance in sustaining the 'Contras'.¹⁰ Israel eventually supplied weapons. But by July 1984, Saudi Arabia was funnelling US \$1 million a month into a Grand Cayman Islands bank account controlled by the 'Contras'. In

⁸ Quoted in Peter Kornbluh, 'Machiavellian obsession: Reagan's effort to undermine Nicaragua', *The San José Mercury News*, 3 May 1987.

⁹ For a description of the plan see the *Associated Press*, 10 June 1986. For an overall view of the NSC network, see Robert Perry and Brian Borger, 'Reagan's Shadow CIA', *The New Republic*, 24 November 1986.

¹⁰ See the testimony of Richard Secord and Robert McFarlane, 5 May 1987 and 11 May 1987.

response to a personal request from President Reagan in February 1985, King Fahd doubled his financial contribution. 'From July 1984 through February 1985, the FDN received \$1 million per month, to reach a total of \$8 million', North reported to McFarlane concerning Saudi contributions on 11 April 1985: From February 22 to April 9, 1985, an additional US\$16.5m has been received for a grand total of US\$24.5m. Of this, US\$17,145,594 has been expended for arms, munitions, combat operations, and support activities.¹¹ By May 1986, Saudi Arabia had contributed approximately US\$32 million to the 'Contra' effort.

Most of these funds were used to finance an international covert network—codenamed 'Project Democracy'—set up by the former Special Operations expert, Major-General Richard Secord, to procure, transport, and airdrop arms to the 'Contras'.¹² Secord and his Iranian-born business partner, Albert Hakim, were 'almost co-equal lieutenants' of Oliver North, according to the initial Senate investigation.¹³ 'Dick [Secord] can do something in five minutes that the CIA cannot do in two days', North reported to Rear-Admiral John Poindexter, McFarlane's successor as National Security Advisor. North wrote in another memo that Hakim was the man who 'ran the European operation for our Nicaraguan resistance support activity'.¹⁴

In December 1984, less than ten weeks after Congress cut off official aid to the 'Contras', Secord's associates began to acquire massive quantities of rifles, ammunition, grenades, rockets and explosives in Portugal and Poland, using false documents provided by the Guatemalan military, and front companies in Canada, the USA and Switzerland.¹⁵ Funds to pay for these munitions were laundered through a complex maze of international bank accounts and dummy corporations set up by Hakim. In 1985 and 1986, more than 800 tons of

This 'top secret' memorandum is cited in the *Tower Commission Report*, New York: Times Books, 1987, p 458. Hereafter referred to as the *Tower Commission*.

The network also included Robert Dutton and Richard Gadd, both retired military officials with Air Force Intelligence backgrounds. In El Salvador, missions were overseen by two former CIA Cuban Americans, Felix Rodriguez, a Bay of Pigs veteran, and Luis Posada Carilles, who is believed to have masterminded the October 1986 bombing of an Air Cubana jetliner over Barbados, which killed seventy-three people. On Secord's role see the *New York Times*, 6 December 1986. See also the *Washington Post*, 7 December 1986.

Cited in Kornbluh, 'Machiavellian obsession . . .'

ibid.

The documentation, known as 'End-user Certificates' were supplied by Guatemala in return for increased US security assistance. Secord originally used a Montreal company, Trans-World Arms, as a front for purchasing the arms in Europe but later created a fictitious firm, Energy Resources International, to acquire the weapons.

weapons were transported by air and sea to El Salvador and Honduras for the covert war.

On the ground in Central America, Secord's 'Project Democracy' established an elaborate air-resupply system to ferry weapons to 'Contra' bases along the Honduran/Nicaraguan border, and inside Nicaragua. Facilities in El Salvador, Honduras, and Costa Rica were utilised for this operation. In San Salvador, Ilopango International Airport—codenamed 'Cincinnati'—served as 'the primary operational support base', according to documents released during the Iran/'Contra' hearings in May 1987. It was the main depot for storing arms and the service centre for six ageing aircraft used to airdrop equipment to the 'Contras'. El Aguacate—codenamed 'The Farm'—an airfield in southern Honduras—long used as a command-and-control post by the CIA, provided a 'forward operating location' for 'Contra' supply missions into northern and central Nicaragua. 'The Plantation', a clandestine 6,520 feet long airstrip in northern Costa Rica, provided an alternative refuelling and emergency landing site for aircraft flying airdrops to 'Contra' bases in southern Nicaragua.¹⁶

Under the supervision of the Restricted Interagency Group (RIG) (made up of Oliver North, Assistant Secretary of State Elliott Abrams, and the Director of the CIA's Central America Task Force, Alan Fiers) the Secord operation began flying dozens of 'Contra' resupply missions in April 1986.¹⁷ When Saudi money to finance these operations began to run out, US officials initiated the transfer of millions of dollars in profits from arms sales to Iran into a Geneva bank account controlled by North, Secord and Hakim as a way to sustain the 'Contras' until official US assistance could be restored. In July 1986, North noted in a memorandum to his superior, Vice-Admiral John Poindexter:

We are rapidly approaching the point where the Project Democracy assets in CentAm need to be turned over to the CIA for use in new programs. The total value of the assets (six aircraft, warehouses, supplies, maintenance facilities, ships, boats, leased houses, vehicles, ordnance, munitions, communications equipment and a 6,520 runway) is over \$4.5 million. . . . All of the equipment is in first-rate condition and is already in place.¹⁸

'Project Democracy's' sophisticated covert operations were camouflaged by a highly visible campaign of domestic support for the

¹⁶ For a full description of the assets and operations of 'Project Democracy', see evidence released during Richard Secord's testimony before the Joint Select Committee on 5 May 1987.

¹⁷ *Associated Press*, 14 January 1987.

¹⁸ *Tower Commission*, p 467.

'Contras' in the USA. 'Contra' charity became a *cause célèbre* of the new Right—encouraged, facilitated and, at times, secretly orchestrated by Administration officials, to divert attention away from the real source of rebel supplies. 'The name of one of several existing non-profit foundations we have established in the course of the last year,' North wrote in a 16 March, 1985 memo to McFarlane, 'will be changed to Nicaraguan Freedom Fund, Inc. Several reliable American citizens must be contacted to serve as its corporate leadership.'¹⁹ President Reagan then endorsed the organisation which his Administration had helped to create. As he later wrote to the head of the Freedom Fund, a 'Contra' charity ostensibly created by the Unification Church-owned newspaper, *The Washington Times*, 'Your efforts to help have my whole-hearted support.'²⁰

Working in concert with Colonel North, General John Singlaub emerged as the driving force behind an ostensibly private nationwide fund-raising campaign for the 'Contras'. As chairman of the US Council for World Freedom, an organisation chartered in 1981 to aid 'freedom fighters around the world,' General Singlaub became the principal generator of non-lethal aid to the 'Contras' in the USA, claiming by late 1984 to be raising \$500,000 a month.²¹ Through his position as head of the World Anti-Communist League (WACL), moreover, he collaborated with North to raise funds from Asian countries for the 'Contras' campaign. Singlaub also contributed—along with paramilitary groups such as Soldier of Fortune and Civilian Military Assistance—men to the 'Contra' cause. During a trip to Central America in March 1985, the general met with FDN leaders and promised to recruit 'a few American trainers' with 'specific skills' to fill in for CIA agents legally prohibited from working with the 'Contras'. Singlaub informed North that 'these will be civilian (former military or CIA personnel) who will do training only and not participate in combat operations.'²²

North, however, did recruit professional mercenaries for special combat operations. In December 1984, according to documents released during the hearings in the spring of 1987, he approached a retired British SAS commander, David Walker, about conducting paramilitary missions inside Nicaragua. 'Walker suggested that he

¹⁹ 'Fallback plan for the Nicaraguan Resistance', 16 March 1985. p 2.

²⁰ Kornbluh, 'Machiavellian obsession'.

²¹ The Council's tax returns for 1985 show grants totalling only US\$270,745. See Internal Revenue Service Form 990, statement of Program Services Rendered, 1985.

²² *Tower Commission*, p. C-4.

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would be interested in establishing an arrangement with the FDN for certain special operations expertise aimed particularly at destroying [Soviet-built] HIND helicopters.' North wrote in a memo to McFarlane: 'Walker quite accurately points out that the helicopters are more easily destroyed on the ground than in the air.'²³

In early 1985, North informed his 'Contra' liaison, Robert Owen, that Walker's people were engaged in 'sabotage work in Managua', and in a memo to McFarlane of 11 April 1985, he indicated plans for 'a special operations attack against Sandino airport with the purpose of destroying the [HIND] helicopters and the Sandinista maintenance capability'. However, a demolition raid of this kind never came to fruition, for after scouting the helicopter base, Walker told Adolfo Calero of the FDN that Nicaraguan security was too heavy to conduct a successful mission.²⁴

Restoring official aid to the 'Contras'

The Reagan Administration's surrogate support system enabled the 'Contras' to expand their ranks, acquire new weapons, and launch scattered but not insignificant attacks inside Nicaragua. Most important, the illicit aid network salvaged the 'Contras' from political extinction in Washington, buying time for the Administration to mount an effective propaganda campaign aimed at forcing Congress to restore official US assistance.

Beyond his role as military strategist, North served as a key political planner and propagandist for the 'Contra' cause. As internal NSC memoranda show, he proffered an endless stream of suggestions for keeping the 'Contra' issue in the political limelight. In March 1985, for example, he recommended a 'fallback plan for the Nicaraguan Resistance.' According to North's scenario:

The President would announce on or about April 2 [that] the American people should contribute funds ('... send your check or money order to the Nicaraguan Freedom Fighters, Box 1776, Gettysburg, PA. . . .') to support liberty and democracy in the Americas. He would note that monies raised would be used to support the humanitarian needs of those struggling for freedom against Communist tyranny in Central America.

'By necessity,' North wrote, 'the speech must be dramatic and surprise. It cannot be leaked in advance.'²⁵

²³ See Peter Kornbluh, 'What North might have wrought', *The Nation*, 27 June 1987. p 887.

²⁴ *ibid.*

²⁵ 'Fallback plan . . .' p 1.

This plan was implemented in part. On 15 April 1985, eight days before a crucial vote in Congress on the Administration's request for \$14 million in aid to the 'Contras', Reagan did make a major speech at a banquet for the Nicaraguan Refugee Fund, a new 'Contra' charity. Although he did not solicit donations, he lauded those who attended: 'You are America at its best.'²⁶

This initial attempt to sway Congress failed; the Bill was narrowly defeated; but, prompted by Daniel Ortega's ill-timed trip to Moscow, and the creation, at North's direction, of yet another civilian front for the 'Contras'—the United Nicaraguan Opposition (UNO)—the House of Representatives reversed its previous decision in June 1985, voting US\$27 million in non-legal aid.

The new legislation maintained the ban on CIA participation in the war, other than in providing intelligence data to the 'Contras'. Nevertheless, the Nicaraguan Humanitarian Aid Office (NHAO), created by Congress to disperse the funds, served as a vehicle for funnelling arms to the 'Contras'. The principal air freight company contracted by NHAO to ferry 'humanitarian' supplies to the 'Contras' was owned by members of Richard Secord's network. The firm, AirMach, received over US\$400,000 from the NHAO to fly clothing, medicines and foodstuffs from the USA to Central America. Once there, however, its planes were used by US operatives to drop guns and ammunition into Nicaragua.²⁷

Moreover, the passage of humanitarian aid served as a bridge to the Administration's February 1986 request for \$100 million for a full resumption of the CIA's war against Nicaragua. Throughout spring 1986, US officials, led by the President, waged an intense propaganda campaign to save the 'Contras'.

At that time, passage of the 'Contra' Aid Bill seemed unlikely. Reports of 'Contra' corruption, drug-running and human rights violations filled the newspapers. On the political front, a power struggle between the three 'Contra' leaders of UNO, Adolfo Calero, Arturo Cruz, and Alfonso Robelo, had produced cracks in the civilian façade that would eventually lead to the break-up of the organisation. 'The Nicaraguan resistance remains without a political infrastructure inside Nicaragua or a clear political message to give to the Nicaraguan people',

²⁶ Kornbluh, 'What North might have wrought', p 888.

²⁷ Internal NHAO memoranda show payments of \$182,000 to AirMach, a company owned by Secord associate Richard Gadd, and another \$80,000 to Vortex Air, a Miami-based company with no planes. For a description of their activities see the Associate Press, 13 November 1986. See also, the *New York Times*, 4 December 1986.

a House Select Committee on intelligence evaluation stated in March 1986. 'It has never developed urban support. In fact, years of US assistance have not produced an insurgency capable of sustaining itself among the population in Nicaragua.' According to the classified assessments of the CIA and DIA, the Intelligence Committee noted, 'only US forces could truly resolve the conflict in Nicaragua on a military basis.'²⁸

Ironically, the 'Contras' closest supporters agreed with that evaluation. In a confidential memo of 17 March 1986 to Oliver North, Robert Owen (North's liaison with the 'Contras') offered a candid assessment of Reagan's 'freedom fighters.' The leaders of the 'Contra' vanguard, the FDN, were 'liars and greed and power-motivated'. Owen wrote:

The reality as I see it is there are few of the so-called leaders of the movement who really care about the boys in the field. This war has become a business to many of them; there is still a belief the Marines are going to have to invade, so let's get set so we will automatically be the ones put into power.

'If the hundred million is approved,' Owen added, 'and things go on like they have these last five years, it will be like pouring money down a sink hole.'²⁹

Despite the corruption, the human rights atrocities and the lack of political appeal or military prowess of the 'Contras', on 26 June 1986 the US Congress acceded to the Administration's intense lobbying and authorised \$100 million to renew the war on Nicaragua. Far more important than the amount of money, the vote lifted all previous restrictions on CIA involvement in the paramilitary campaign. Nor did Congress reimpose any limitations on the purpose of supporting the 'Contras'. For the first time, US legislators unequivocally endorsed the Administration's strategy for a bloody war of attrition against Nicaragua.

In the ensuing months, the Administration's policy of punishment against the Sandinistas has escalated dramatically. Fully equipped 'Contra' forces reinfiltated Nicaraguan territory, attacking economic and civilian targets with a new ferocity. On 19 June 1986 the FDN scored a significant victory, shooting down a Soviet-built Mi 24 helicopter, killing all three Nicaraguan officials on board. Nevertheless, the prospect of any outright military overthrow of the Sandinistas without

²⁸ See the House of Representatives, Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, *Adverse Report*, 12 March 1986, pp 5-6.

²⁹ Owen to North, 'Overall perspective', 17 March 1986, pp 2, 4.

direct US intervention remained illusory. While the 'Contra' leaders predicted the eventual defeat of the Nicaraguan government, they still remained politically and militarily distant from power.

As the test of the Reagan Doctrine in Nicaragua enters its year of reckoning, the outcome remains unclear. Some conclusions, however, can be drawn. Beyond a doubt, the Administration has proved that the USA can, through surrogate forces, wreak death and destruction upon a revolutionary experiment in Central America. Yet the six-year-old war has also demonstrated that no amount of rhetoric nor CIA manuals can transform terrorists into freedom fighters—that despite the expenditure of hundreds of millions of dollars, an imperial war cannot be recreated as a legitimate war of national liberation. Moreover, as the Iran/'Contra' scandal suggests, the quest to 'win' hegemony in the Third World through a doctrine of covert wars can only result in a loss of prestige, credibility, power and influence for the very system of government which such policies are, ostensibly, meant to advance. The USA is as much a casualty of the Reagan Doctrine as is the Nicaraguan revolution.

Democracy and national strategy in the periphery*

It is well-known that the Third World is a heterogeneous grouping and that generalisations are therefore usually impossible. It can be agreed, however, that social inequalities are unfortunately all too often quite blatant, in fact scandalous, and that even the most primitive form of democracy is the exception rather than the rule. The lack of solidarity between Third World states in international economic negotiations is as marked as the animosity which frequently characterises their political relationships.

Is there a connection to be discerned among these three aspects: social inequality, lack of democracy, lack of solidarity? Doubtless, everyone will readily acknowledge that one exists. But the nature of the connection and its underlying causes is the focus of diametrically opposed theoretical and ideological points of view. There are in effect two perspectives on the global evolution of modern societies which, on this question as on others, radically contradict one another.

In the dominant 'linear' perspective, social inequality and the absence of democracy are the price of poverty. The accumulation of capital is necessarily accompanied, in its initial stages, by the impoverishment of the peasantry and the penury of the working-class, described by Engels in the case of England in the middle of the nineteenth century. Later on, when the rural surplus population had been absorbed, the labour movement managed progressively to impose both better material conditions and political democracy. Sir Arthur Lewis's familiar thesis concerning the 'dualism' of societies 'in transition towards development', like that of the Latin-American *desarrollismo* of the 1950s, makes the same point: economic development would create the objective conditions for a better social distribution of income as well as providing the basis for a democratic political life.¹ This thesis presupposes that the external factor (integration into the world economic system) is basically 'favourable', in the sense that it offers the

* Translated for *Third World Quarterly* by Thomas Clegg.

¹ For further reading see also various works of CEPAL, published under the direction of Raul Prebisch, during the 1950s and 1960s.

opportunity for 'development'. Development in this context proceeds at a rate which is governed by the internal conditions that characterise different Third World societies. These conditions are thus thought to be decisive in this process.

In the context of a linear perspective, today's developed countries form the image of the 'developing' countries as they will be tomorrow. A formalistic nationalism would also characterise various Third World societies during the first period of 'development'. The construction of the nation state would demand it. This nation state would assert itself by opposing others, notably its neighbours. As the European nations were constituted through an uninterrupted series of wars from the seventeenth to the mid-twentieth centuries, a similar confrontation among contemporary Third World states would not be surprising.

The thesis advanced in this article takes the opposite view. We contend that the emergence of capitalist expansion on a world scale entails an inherent inequality, which prevents the 'delayed reproduction' of the same evolutionary scheme. Social inequality and the absence of democracy are thus, in the periphery, the product of capitalist development.

I would like to illustrate this thesis, in what follows, by insisting on two aspects of the worldwide expansion of capitalism:

- i) that this expansion is accompanied by a growing inequality in the social distribution of income in the periphery, while at the system's core, it effectively creates the conditions for a lesser degree of social inequality (and greater stability in the distribution of income, the foundation of a democratic consensus);
- ii) that the bourgeoisie of the periphery is incapable of mastering the local process of accumulation, which thereby remains in a perpetual process of 'adjustment' to the constraints posed by accumulation on a world scale. In these conditions, the project of constructing a bourgeois national state is not merely handicapped by a basically unfavourable external factor, but is rendered completely impossible. The peripheral state is then necessarily despotic because it is weak. In order to 'survive', it has to avoid conflict with the dominant imperialist forces and attempts rather to improve its international position at the expense of its more vulnerable peripheral partners.

This twofold observation strongly suggests the conclusion that political and social democracy as well as international solidarity among peoples

require the abandonment of the myth of the 'national bourgeoisie', and the replacement of the 'bourgeois national' project by a 'popular national' project. This is the price to be paid for democracy:

Inequalities in the distribution of income at the core and at the periphery of the world capitalist system

Although empirical research concerning the distribution of income is relatively recent, there are figures available today for a great number of countries, both developed and underdeveloped, which measure the degree of inequality in income distribution by means of Gini coefficients and Lorenz curves.

In general, this research shows that inequality in the distribution of income is more pronounced in the periphery of the system than in its advanced core. This inequality arises for a number of reasons, including the following:

Firstly, labour productivity varies from unit to unit, and from sector to sector. Productivity would only become equalised given the theoretical hypothesis of an economy constituted by production units which were all equipped with the most efficient means (and thus a state of competition would no longer continue between them!). The most developed capitalist countries approach this model, while the underdeveloped formations diverge from it in an extreme way. This is why the distribution of value added per job from one sector to another is grouped relatively closely around its average in the OECD countries, but is very unevenly spread in the Third World countries.² The fact that a comparison gives results of this kind proves, in our opinion, that the law of value operates at the level of the world capitalist system, rather than at the level of its national components.³

Secondly, the differential in salaries and payment for work in the Third World, however small, is never as reduced as it would be if it were determined solely by the social costs of training. The spread here results from the strategy of those in power and of capital, from its history and from those political requirements compatible with the exercise of power by the hegemonic social bloc at the system's core.

Thirdly, the distribution of industrial, commercial, real estate,

² Samir Amin, 'Niveau de salaires, choix des techniques de production et répartition de revenu', in A D Smith (ed), *Cahiers de l'IIES* (Geneva, 1969).

³ See the argument concerning the content of the law of value operating at the world scale in Samir Amin, *L'avenir du maoïsme*, Paris: Minuit, 1981, pp 7-28; trans. *The Future of Maoism*, New York: Monthly Review Press, 1982.

agricultural, financial and other property is itself the outcome of the history of the social formation and of local capitalist development. If one admits that there exists no 'ideal model' of capitalism, but only its concrete historical forms, there is no reason why this important element in determining the structure of the distribution of income should operate in the same way everywhere.

Whatever the causes, it is possible to compare the current empirical distributions in the world. It is striking to see that the spread of Lorenz curves is by no means accidental. As a matter of fact, the curves of all the OECD developed capitalist countries are grouped in a tight bunch. In contrast, income distribution in all the contemporary Third World countries is considerably more unequal. Two clear medians placed within each of the two groupings correspond with the following values:⁴

- 25 per cent of the population disposes of 10 per cent of total income in the core, and 5 per cent in the periphery;
- 50 per cent of the population disposes of 25 per cent of income in the core, and 10 per cent in the periphery;
- 75 per cent of the population disposes of 50 per cent of income in the core and 33 per cent in the periphery.

The bunching of Lorenz curves for the developed countries implies that Western societies have obviously similar income distribution characteristics. The position of different countries within the core grouping of Lorenz curves also implies that the improvement in income distribution is linked to the existence of powerful social democratic forces, but that the real extent of this improvement is very limited. The most advanced social-democratic countries, in Northern Europe, are situated close to the minimum inequality curve; the most liberal (the USA) and the least developed (Mediterranean Europe) are close to the maximum inequality curve.

The spread of curves for the Third World may seem disconcerting at first sight. There is no visible correlation between the degree of inequality on the one hand, and the ranking of these countries in terms of factors such as per capita GDP, the degree of urbanisation, the level of industrialisation, and so on. But, as we will show later, a more attentive examination can provide a basis for an interpretation of this spread of results.

⁴ We will refrain from providing here the technical arguments which permitted us to elaborate these statistics based on the work of the World Bank (Hollis Chenery, Ahluwalia, etc., *Growth with Redistribution*) and of the ILO (WEP programme, the work directed by Dharam Ghai and others). For an explanation of the Gini coefficients and Lorenz curves used in our model, see our article in *Review* (cited in note 5).

We can now proceed to the more interesting questions in the following section: i) is it possible to move from the crude empirical level to a higher plane, to explain the essential reasons for the relative positions of different countries?; and ii) is there a direction to the movement observed (towards more or less equality) and how is it to be accounted for?

We will not go back over the details of the theoretical reconstruction of these curves, which have been expounded elsewhere.⁵ We will only set out the broad outlines here.

Regarding the distribution of income in the capitalist core, three successive theoretical hypotheses suffice to account for the median of the tight grouping of Lorenz curves representing the OECD countries.

First hypothesis: if the social formation were reduced to a pure capitalist mode of production, the structure of income distribution would be determined by the rate of extraction of surplus value. If it were the case that the entire population were proletarianised and all proletarians were to sell their labour power at the same price, which is the value of labour power, and if we retain the complementary assumption that the number of capitalists was negligible, the model of income distribution could be shown by a straight line whose slope would be determined by the rate of extraction of surplus value within a social formation.

Second hypothesis: we suppose that the prices paid to the labour force are distributed unequally around its average value, so that the ratio between the quartiles was 1 to 4.

Third hypothesis: we introduce within this scheme the existence of a certain number of small and medium-size firms and various activities (similar to those of the liberal professions), the salaried population comprising 80 per cent of the total population, and we suppose that individual revenues of members of these social groups are situated in the middle and high-income brackets within the total distribution.

In this way, a curve is finally obtained which is very close to one representing the empirical reality of the contemporary developed capitalist world.

With regard to the peripheral capitalist societies, we have proceeded in two steps. In the first instance, we looked at the case of a rural,

⁵ Samir Amin, 'Income distribution in the capitalist system', *Review*, Summer 1984; Samir Amin, *Classe et nation dans l'histoire et la crise contemporaine*, Paris: Minuit, 1979, pp 157-67; trans. *Class and Nation: Historically and in the Current Crisis*, New York: Monthly Review Press, 1980, pp 149-72.

'pre-capitalist' society in which 90 per cent of the population, also predominantly rural, is subject to exploitation of an 'egalitarian' kind by a state-class of rentiers who receive a tribute equal to half the total agricultural output. At the same time, the peasant communities have relatively little internal differentiation, but benefit to different extents from favourable natural conditions, resulting in per capita outputs ranging from 1 for the poorest quartile to 2 for the richest.

Next, one supposes that an agrarian society originally of this type is integrated into the global capitalist development of a 'semi-colony'. A small class of latifundists and rich peasant landowners (10 per cent of the rural population) appropriates tribute in the form of land rent. With demographic pressures acting over a period of fifty to a hundred years, and in the absence of industrial outlets, a third of the population falls into absolute poverty. This third of the rural population (landless peasants and minifundists) disposes of an income barely equal to that of the lowest quarter of the peasant farmers. Agrarian reforms have eventually taken place in most regions of this type. If one excludes the socialist countries (China, North Korea, Vietnam), these reforms, more or less radical in nature, have redistributed land in favour of the middle strata, to the detriment of the richest latifundists, without altering the fate of the poorest half of the peasantry.

In the end, the curve which best fits these hypotheses in fact corresponds with a median representing real situations existing in Southern and Southeast Asia, as well as in the Arab world today.

It is interesting to see that this structure, associated in the current phase of capitalist development with the hegemony of the local bourgeoisie (agrarian reforms and industrialisation), can be explained by four essential factors: i) the prior history of a rural class society which only allows the peasantry to keep roughly half its output; ii) the private appropriation of surplus in the form of land rent by latifundists and, following agrarian reform, by rich peasants; iii) a 'natural' inequality in the productivity of agricultural land ranging from 1 to 2; iv) an increase in rural population density and the formation of a reserve of surplus labour consisting about a third of the rural workforce.

The 'model' in question also corresponds, it seems, with the situation in Latin America, at least in the case of the bigger countries such as Mexico, Colombia, Peru, and Brazil. It fits less well the situation in certain Central American regions, of which Nicaragua under Somoza or Guatemala are prime examples. In contrast, the 'model' is certainly different in Sub-Saharan Africa where the prior experience of local class

societies is weaker, the availability of land greater, and so on. In these areas the distribution of income is no doubt less unequal, although precise information is unobtainable. Nevertheless, even here the trend is towards the appearance of greater differentiations, as all the empirical studies have shown.

In our second step, we introduce the concept of the urban economy into our model. In this instance we find a capitalist sector (which employs at most half of the urban working population), for which the conclusions reached above remain valid, given the following assumptions: i) a higher rate of surplus value resulting in a wage-profits ratio of 40:60 instead of 60:40; and ii) a steeper wage scale (1 to 6 instead of 1 to 4). Moreover, the 'informal' sector, which manages somehow to employ half the urban working population, earns incomes of roughly the same size as those of the poorest quartile of the capitalist sector.

In order to combine both curves, rural and urban, two principal factors must be kept in mind: i) the proportion of rural to urban population, which differs from one country to another; and ii) the large gap between net per capita output in rural and urban areas, when this output is measured in current prices and income, as it is in current statistics. This gap is always roughly about 1 to 3, that is, per capita output is three times greater in the urban economy than in the rural. The end result obtained, i.e. the curve constructed by combining the simpler elements, is an interesting one. The resulting curve is, as we have already seen, a median of the actual income distributions that occur in the contemporary Third World.

The question arises as to whether this situation is 'transitory' or not, i.e. whether the corresponding income distribution and that described are evolving towards the model outlined above. In other words, is there a 'tendential law' of the movement of income distribution, in conjunction with the movement of capital? On this difficult topic, the following three types of response can be identified:

- i) That there is no tendential law governing this movement. In other words, income distribution is only the empirical outcome of diverse economic and social factors whose movements, convergent or divergent, have their own autonomy. This proposition may be restated in 'Marxist' terms by noting that income distribution depends on class struggles in all their complexity, both national (such as bourgeois-peasant alliance, social-democracy) and international (imperialism and the position occupied within the

- international division of labour, and so on). The capitalist system is capable of adapting itself to all these different situations.
- ii) That there is a tendential law working to bring about a progressive reduction of inequalities. The situation in the periphery today is simply one of an unfinished transition towards capitalist development.
 - iii) That there is a tendential law of progressive pauperisation and growing inequality. It remains to be seen why pauperisation should take place, and by means of which preponderant force (one that cannot be countered by opposing forces?), and on what scale the process occurs (at the level of each capitalist state, of all the developed countries, of all the underdeveloped countries, or throughout the worldwide core-periphery system?).

The Marxist thesis of progressive pauperisation is an abstract formulation of a concrete issue: does capitalist expansion eventually benefit the majority of people in terms of relative standards of living, or, on the contrary, does it tend to polarise society?

The actual history of accumulation in the developed centres of capitalism is fairly well known. Disregarding local variants, a plausible generalisation could be constructed on the following lines. The peasant revolutions, which often introduced the capitalist era in these centres, reduced the degree of inequality in the countryside, at least when they adopted a radical form. This reduction of inequality took place at the expense of the feudal aristocracy, but at the same time led to the impoverishment of a minority of poorer peasants who were expelled to the cities. The working-class wage was fixed from the outset at a low level determined by the income of these poorer peasants. It tended to increase after stagnating for a period at this level (or even diminishing), when the expulsion of landless peasants from the countryside finally slowed down. From this point onwards (about 1860?) workers' wages and the real incomes of the 'middle' strata of the peasantry tended to increase together, in conjunction with a rise in productivity. There was even a tendency for a rough parity to be established between the average wage of workers and peasant incomes, although this tendency is not observable at each stage of accumulation (it depended on the structure of alliances between the hegemonic classes). In the stage of late capitalism, there is perhaps a 'social-democratic' tendency towards the reduction of inequalities. But this operates in conjunction with imperialism: a favourable position within the international division of

labour favours social redistribution. But it would be wrong to generalise here, as comparable cases of evolution, for example Sweden and the USA, diverge in this respect.

It is necessary to move beyond an examination of the capitalist core considered on its own, and take into account the evolution of the world system as a whole. Our thesis here is that the stability of income distribution in the core during the present presupposes rather than excludes a far more unequal distribution of income in the periphery. The realisation of value at the scale of the system as a whole requires this complementary opposition of structures.

One is thus led to an unavoidable question: what is the overall tendency of the changes in income distribution within the periphery? Although precise information in this domain is fragmentary, it seems that the most pronounced trend has been towards the worsening of inequalities, certainly during the last hundred years (1880-1980).

A thesis often advanced to explain this fact is that inequality in these regions is the price of accumulation, and once the first phase of the latter is completed (with the reduction of the labour reserve provided by the peasantry), the system will tend to reduce this inequality. This thesis has renewed its appeal among a wide variety of circles, from the traditional Right to certain Anglo-Saxon Marxists. The work of the late Bill Warren and various critiques which have been directed at our own stance are situated on this terrain.⁶ This thesis appears to us to replace the concrete analysis of the worldwide expansion of capitalism, which diversifies while at the same time unifying, with the abstract vision of a capitalism reduced to its tendency towards unification. The argument to which the supporters of this thesis turn as a last resort is that the worsening of inequalities is only 'provisional'. This abuse of the argument concerning time removes any political significance from the thesis in question. To say that capitalism aggravates the situation for a century or two, but that it will improve matters thereafter is not an answer to the problems of our society, but a way of sweeping them under the carpet. This line of reasoning suffers in general from an almost complete lack of any political analysis concerning the diversification of capitalist formations, and a consequent refusal to make any qualitative distinction between core and peripheral formations.

⁶ Bill Warren, *Imperialism, Pioneer of Capitalism*, London: Verso, 1980. See our commentaries in Samir Amin, *La déconnexion*, Paris: La Découverte, 1986, Ch. 4; Samir Amin, 'Expansion or crisis of capitalism?', *Third World Quarterly* 5(2) April 1983.

Without going into the details of this debate, let us say that our thesis here is that even the most radical bourgeois national projects in the Third World are probably destined to failure and will in the end submit to the demands of transnationalisation. As a corollary to this thesis regarding the transformation of the peripheral bourgeoisie into a comprador class, we believe that there is no discernible tendency towards diminishing inequality in income distribution in the Third World. If any movement can be observed, it is rather in the opposite direction: towards growing inequality. The idea of progress by stages which could be repeated after a given time-lag is obviously a powerful concept in its simplicity, but one which is obviously false. However, the belief that developed countries provide the model for the future development of the underdeveloped countries remains firmly entrenched, despite its refutation by four centuries of capitalist development, and particularly by the experience of the last hundred years.

According to the logic of the 'stagist' perspective described above, the issue of inequalities in the distribution of income is seen merely as a question of relative quantity, without any qualitative significance. But it is not just a matter of greater inequality: inequality itself determines the creation and development of a productive system in the periphery, which is qualitatively different from that which exists in the capitalist core.

If in fact the various resources (unskilled and skilled labour, capital) are allocated to the types of final consumption (of the different strata of population according to their income) which directly or indirectly command them, one finds:

- that in the core the various resources are allocated to the consumption of each stratum in proportions similar to the share of each of these stratum in consumption. For example, if necessary consumption (meaning necessary for the reproduction of labour power) represents 50 per cent of total consumption and surplus consumption 50 per cent, the shares of capital and of labour power with different skills (low, medium, high) allocated to necessary and surplus consumption respectively are 50 per cent-50 per cent for each category of resource (capital, unskilled workforce, skilled workforce).
- that in the periphery, on the other hand, the scarcer resources are allocated to the consumption of the wealthier strata in greater proportions than their share of total consumption. This 'distortion'

in favour of the upper strata within income distribution is all the stronger when distribution is more unequal. For example, according to our calculations concerning the employment of medium and highly skilled labour (with secondary, technical or higher education) in the Arab world, surplus consumption constitutes 50 per cent of total consumption, but absorbs 75 per cent of these scarce resources (as against 50 per cent in France).

In addition, one observes a tendency both for a deepening of inequalities in income distribution in the Arab world (before and after 1974) and for a worsening of this distortion in the employment of scarce resources. It is also noticeable that inequalities are more marked in the Arab world (where per capita GDP is higher than in other regions of the Third World, such as Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa) and that the distortion in the use of resources is at the same time more pronounced.⁷

The productive apparatus of the peripheral countries is thus not a mere copy of that of the core at an earlier stage of evolution. It differs qualitatively, and therein resides the very purpose of the international division of labour. These differences explain why, when in the core the Lorenz curve is stable (or is even moving towards less inequality), in the periphery it is shifting in the opposite direction, towards even greater inequality. The distortion in income distribution is a condition of expanded reproduction, of accumulation on a world scale.

On this point, Marx's thesis concerning progressive pauperisation is perfectly visible on a world scale. If income distribution tends to be more and more unequal in the periphery, which constitutes the majority of the world system's population, and is stable in the core, then at the global level it is moving towards greater inequality. The very fact that pauperisation manifests itself at the world level but not at the core is surely proof of the fact that the law of value acts at the global level, rather than at the level of individual capitalist formation. Marginalisation and impoverishment in the periphery, however, operate not only by means of an increase in the rate of extraction of surplus value, but also through the indirect extraction of surplus labour in non-capitalist forms, both traditional and newly-invented.

⁷ Samir Amin, *L'économie arabe contemporaine*, Paris: Minuit, 1980; trans. *The Arab Economy Today*, London: Zed, 1982.

From the bourgeois national project to the bourgeois comprador project

If in the nineteenth century the imperialist system is seen as having virtually extended colonial and semi-colonial regimes throughout Africa and Asia, national liberation movements in the aftermath of the Second World War reconstituted them into independent states. Has this major transformation of the world capitalist system put an end to the core/periphery dichotomy? The prevailing opinion in the West is that independence effectively opened the way for the creation of new bourgeois states with the capacity to advance along the path of capitalist development. This process would depend essentially on internal conditions within each state. Thus the pace and the orientations of economic growth, of social developments and of political organisation (the latter's despotic or democratic character) would be determined, for the most part, by internal class struggles. This thesis therefore denies that there is a qualitative difference between bourgeois national states in the core and in the periphery of the system. In other words, it accepts the hypothesis that a bourgeois national project is capable of being carried out. I think, for my part, that this thesis is mistaken and is refuted by what I call the failure of the bourgeois national option in the contemporary Third World.⁸

Of course, the Afro-Asian states, nations and peoples understood that the reconquest of political independence was only the means to an end, the final goal being the conquest of economic, social and cultural independence. But here the forces of national liberation were split between two visions: there was the opinion, shared by a substantial majority, that 'development' was possible through 'interdependence' within the world economy; and that of the socialist leaders who thought that abandoning the capitalist bloc would lead to the reconstruction, with the USSR, if not under its leadership, of a world socialist bloc.

The leaders of the capitalist Third World did not envisage 'delinking' from the capitalist system, but nor did they share a common strategic and tactical view of 'development'. While this is not the place to expand on our concept of 'delinking' (see *La déconnexion*) we should make clear that this concept is not to be confused with 'autarky'. It refers to the need to submit foreign relations to the logic of an internal popular strategy of development, as opposed to the strategy of 'adjusting'

⁸ Samir Amin, *La déconnexion*, Chs. 1 and 4. See also 'Bandung 30 years later', a paper presented at the UN conference in Cairo, 1985, unpublished.

internal development to the constraints of the global expansion of capitalism. Delinking therefore assumes opting for an internal price and income system autonomous from the global system. This national system would therefore constitute the yardstick for measuring a rationality which reflects popular interests, while the global system of so-called economic rationality, on the basis of which 'comparative advantage' and 'competitiveness' are measures, actually reflects the interests of international capital and its subordinate local transmission belt classes. To varying degrees, however, they believed that the building of a independent developed economy and society (even within a framework of global interdependence) would entail a certain amount of 'conflict' with the dominant West (the radical wing reckoning that would put an end to the control of the national economy by the capital of foreign monopolies). Moreover, careful to preserve their recently-won independence, they refused to enter into the global military game or to provide support for the encirclement of the socialist countries which American hegemonism had tried to impose. However, they also believed that to refuse to join the Atlantic military bloc did not imply the necessity of placing themselves under the protection of its adversary, the USSR. From this stance emerged 'neutralism' or 'non-alignment'.

The coming together of the Afro-Asian states had already begun with the constitution, within the UN, of the Arab-Asian group, aimed at defending the cause of the colonies still engaged in the struggle for independence. Bandung in 1955 reinforced this rapprochement and galvanised the struggle. From summit to summit during the 1960s and the 1970s, 'non-alignment' gradually shifted from a platform of political solidarity based on support for national liberation struggles and the rejection of military pacts, to that of a 'trade association of economic demands *vis-à-vis* the North'. The battle for a 'New International Economic Order' (NIEO) commenced in 1975, following the Israeli-Arab war of October 1973 and the subsequent upward revision of oil prices.

Neither on the political nor the economic plane was the West ready to accept the spirit of Bandung. Was it really only a coincidence that, one year later, France, Britain and Israel tried to overthrow Nasser through their aggression in Egypt in 1956? The genuine hatred which the West maintained towards the radical leaders of the Third World in the 1960s (Nasser, Sukarno, Modibo Keita, almost all of them overthrown in the same period, 1965-68, during which the Israeli aggression of June 1967 also occurred) shows that the political vision of

Bandung was not accepted by imperialist capital. It was thus a politically weakened non-aligned bloc which confronted the global economic crisis from 1970-71 onwards. The firm opposition of the West to the idea of a NIEO demonstrates conversely that there was a very real logic at work linking the political and economic demands of the Afro-Asian bloc following Bandung.

Thirty-two years after that historic conference, we have the factual lessons and the necessary hindsight to take stock of the situation. What were the real objectives of the Bandung project? Has it simply exhausted its force, having attained its goals? Or did it fail to attain its goals because they were objectively impossible? Of course, what with hindsight appears as an 'ideology of development' was never the subject of a consensus of interpretation. Having enjoyed its 'golden age' between 1955 and 1975, it has now, as we will later show, entered a perhaps fatal crisis.

The traditional socialist bloc was not prepared to accept the objectives which emerged from Bandung. In 1948, Zhdanov proclaimed the division of the world into two camps, capitalist and socialist, preemptively condemning as illusory any attempt to place oneself outside them, in other words to seek to be 'non-aligned'. In this spirit, the socialists did not foresee the possibility of the conquest of independence by a national liberation movement which they themselves did not lead. It was only following the first 'stabilisation' of 1950-55 (the victory in China, the armistice and division of Korea and Vietnam, the acknowledged defeat of guerrillas elsewhere in Southeast Asia); the demonstration of the viability of the new 'bourgeois' regimes of the Third World; the inception of these states' conflict with the West, albeit under a 'bourgeois' leadership; and the death of Stalin (1953) and the ideological opportunities offered by Khrushchev, that the possibility of a 'viable' third bloc and of a 'third path to development' began to be perceived.

On the other hand, the radical non-socialist nationalist leaders of the Third World certainly believed in the possibility of a 'third path to development' which would be neither 'capitalist' nor inspired by the socialist models of the USSR and China. Their rejection of Marxism combined a number of considerations: they occasionally perceived in Marxism an avatar of European culture incompatible with their own peoples' value systems; they sometimes simply feared the loss of their independence, particularly given the Soviet domination of Eastern Europe (which was then being denounced by Yugoslavia and China);

they were also drawn towards the Western model of efficiency and consumption, even of freedom (though perhaps this was a value to which they attached less weight), rather than to the Soviet and Chinese models, which seemed less efficient and more austere. It was perhaps from this ambivalence that the ideologies of 'particular socialisms' (African, Arab) progressively emerged.

A 'Bandung project' did, therefore, exist, in our opinion, although it was implicit and imprecise in nature. I will not shrink from labelling it our era's bourgeois national project of the Third World. Beyond the various concrete manifestations and specificities of its national expressions, the project can be defined by the following elements: i) the desire to develop the productive forces, to diversify outputs (notably by industrialising); ii) the desire to reinforce the nation-state's direction and control over this process; iii) the belief that the process did not imply in the first instance popular initiatives but only popular support for state actions; iv) the belief that the process did not fundamentally contradict participation in the international division of labour even if it did entail momentary conflicts with the developed capitalist countries.

The realisation of this bourgeois national project implied control over a series of processes by a hegemonic national bourgeois class, through its state, including at least the following: i) control of the reproduction of labour power, which entails a relatively complete and balanced development so that local agriculture, among other economic activities, is able to provide the essential elements for this reproduction in sufficient quantity and at suitable prices to assure the valorisation of capital; ii) control of national resources; iii) control of local markets and the capacity to penetrate the world market in competitive conditions; iv) control of the financial circuits permitting the centralisation of surplus value and the orientation of its productive uses; v) control of the technologies in use at the level of development reached by the productive forces.⁹

Seen from this angle, the development experiences of the Third World can be classed into two categories of objectives: that of those countries which have simply attempted to accelerate their growth without worrying about achieving the conditions listed above (Ivory Coast, Kenya, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia . . . the list is long); and that of the countries which have tried to realise the conditions in question (Egypt under Nasser, Algeria, Tanzania, India, Brazil, South Korea).

⁹ Samir Amin, *La déconnexion*, Chs. 1 and 2.

As can be seen, this classification does not necessarily match the division between those regimes anxious to promote a certain degree of social justice and bring about reforms, notably agrarian (such as Egypt under Nasser, or South Korea) and those which did not hesitate before accepting a worsening of social inequalities (Brazil for example). Nor does it correspond to the division created by their attitudes *vis-à-vis* transnational capital (Brazil and Kenya both welcome such capital, but the former tries to integrate it within its own national policies, while the latter is content to adjust to its demands), nor to the divide over the issue of maintaining political relations of conflict or alliance with East and West. Correlations do exist, but the nuances of the combinations formed to meet concrete circumstances make each Third World country a special case.

It is now no longer possible to ignore the inadequacies of all attempts at development, which have not withstood the reversal of favourable conjunctures. The food and agriculture crisis, the external financial debt, the increased technological dependency, the fragility of capacities to resist eventual military aggression, the waste produced by capitalist models of consumption and their ideological and cultural impact, point to the historical limits of this option. Even before the current crisis offered the opportunity for the 'offensive of the West' which managed to reverse the previous trends, these deficiencies had in many cases led to an impasse. I do not claim that these experiences in principle had necessarily to end where they did, and that consequently their 'bankruptcy' was predestined. I can only contend that, to go any further, a genuine 'revolution' was required, capable of putting an end to the twin illusion concerning the possibility of a national development without this being the product of a truly popular force, and the possibility of this development without 'delinking' from the world system. It is not certain whether some movements in this direction could not have been possible (and I am thinking notably of the case of Egypt). Yet significantly, popular revolution did not occur, and because of this, the historic page was turned.

In view of the experience outlined above, we can say that the project in question deserves to be called a bourgeois national project and as such was demonstrably impossible to achieve. In this way, history has shown that the national bourgeoisie within the Third World is not capable, in our era, of achieving what it achieved elsewhere, in Europe, North America and Japan in the nineteenth century. There is nothing new in this thesis, and the failure of the bourgeois national project has

been repeated many times in the past. One such failure is that of Egypt. The history of Egypt since Mohamed Ali is that of a series of challenges by the national bourgeoisie, broken each time by the conjunction of their internal fragility and imperialist aggression.

A detailed examination of the history of other countries and regions of the Third World would illustrate, in our opinion, the same thesis: that of a uninterrupted succession of bourgeois national bids, their repeated miscarriage and the submission to the demands for subordination which followed each time. This has occurred in Latin America since the nineteenth century (we cite here only the most recent examples of the Mexican Revolution of the period 1910-1920 and that of Peronism in Argentina), in India (whose evolution from Nehru's 'First Plan' to the return of the Right to government following Congress's first defeat is eloquent), and in numerous Arab and African countries.

The favourable conjuncture of the post-war period was due to an exceptional combination of circumstances. On the economic side, the strong growth of the 'North' facilitated the 'adjustment' of the South. On the political side, peaceful coexistence was accompanied by the rise of Soviet military and industrial might (from the first Sputnik to the achievement of strategic 'parity' during the 1960s and 1970s), combined with the decline of the ageing British and French colonial empires and the spread of Afro-Asian independence struggles. This conjuncture lent real weight to the concept of non-alignment.

But success may bring delusions with it. One such delusion is plainly encapsulated in the theory of a so-called 'non-capitalist path', concerning a 'gradual' evolution towards socialism. Of course, the theory in question did not convince everyone. In the 1960s it was violently attacked by China as an opiate meant to lull the peoples and douse the fires of the 'zone of storms'.

The page of history has today been turned. Since the beginning of the 1970s, the economic boom of the West had faded to make way for the current structural crisis, while the competition among Europe, Japan and the United States has replaced reconstruction under American protection. In the Soviet Union, Khrushchev's promises to overtake the American standard of living by 1980 and the expectations of a rapid democratisation following the 20th Party Congress (1956) gave way to immobilism under Brezhnev (which now appears to be under challenge from Gorbachev). In China, the revisions which followed Mao's death revealed that neither the question of economic efficiency, nor that of democracy, had yet found their 'definitive' answer. Throughout the

Third World, the hunger crisis, that of external debt and the impasse created by imported technology have led to a series of surrenders to the *diktat* of transnational capital, reorganised around the IMF, the World Bank and the consortium of big Western banks. In the countries with a radical orientation, the *coups d'état* and acts of military aggression (the 1967 war was not an accident) greatly contributed to putting an end to the experimentation of the post-Second World War period.

The basis of the new world conjuncture is formed by the aggression of the capitalist West against the peoples and nations of the Third World. The objectives of the capitalist West is to subordinate the subsequent evolution of the Third World to the requirements of the redeployment of transnational capital.¹⁰

But is this situation really only a conjuncture, fleeting in nature though painful, which will perforce be followed by a new hatching of advanced 'national bourgeoisies'? Or does it involve a historical turning-point which will no longer permit the pursuit of successive bids by the bourgeois national project, a project which has characterised the history of capitalism for at least a century? The real debate concerning the nature of future challenges and options is focused on these two considerations.

The hypothesis which we are putting forward is that the contemporary crisis marks the end of an era, an era which for Asia, Africa and Latin America might be termed the century of national bourgeoisies, in the sense that it has been characterised by successive attempts at bourgeois national construction. To note simply that these experiments have not produced results is hardly new. What is new, according to this hypothesis, is the affirmation that such attempts will no longer take place in the future. In other words, the bourgeoisie of the Third World has now finally accepted the pursuit of its development through economic subordination to the core. This is a project imposed upon it by the expansion of transnational capital, which has forced the new bourgeoisie to become comprador subordinates.

Many reasons militate in favour of this hypothesis. The depth of subordination of the periphery to the core and the globalisation of capital in the contemporary world indicate the existence of a political and economic situation which has little in common with the

¹⁰ Samir Amin, 'A propos du NOEI et des relations économiques internationales', *Socialism in the World* (29) 1982; trans. 'After the NIEO, the future of international economic relations', *Journal of Contemporary Asia* (12-14) 1982. See also Samir Amin, 'La crise, le Tiers Monde et les relations Nord-Sud et Est-Ouest', *Nouvelle Revue Socialiste*, Paris: September-October, 1983.

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circumstances existing at the end of the Second World War. A thousand indicators illustrate this point overwhelmingly, not only in terms of national economic planning, finances and technology, but also in terms of consumption, culture and the ideology of everyday life. The social structures formed and deformed by these phenomena draw our attention to the fact that the present challenge has little to do with that which once confronted the Soviet and Chinese people.

The alternative: popular national development, political and social democracy, and the ending of dependence

The worldwide expansion of capitalism is thus of a polarising nature. Since the origins of capitalism, four centuries ago, the core/periphery opposition has remained inherent within this system. This opposition, which constitutes the principal aspect of capitalism's contradictions, is unsurmountable within the framework of the world system. Inclusion within this world system, the 'external factor', is not only in itself an unfavourable influence, but I would go so far as to say that it is becoming increasingly so. It only took nineteenth-century Germany a few decades to 'catch up and overtake' England. How long will Brazil require to 'catch up and overtake' the USA? Later attempts to create bourgeois national states thus, as ever, remain doomed to failure, condemned, through compradorisation, to perpetuate polarisation in renewed forms corresponding to the development of the system as a whole.¹¹

It is this polarisation which is in fact responsible for the appearance of socially and politically unacceptable regimes in the periphery of the system. They are socially unacceptable because they are founded on impoverishment and the exclusion of the great mass of the people. They were politically unacceptable in the past in the sense that the setting up of the system required colonial domination; and they remain unacceptable because the pursuit of a form of local development integrated within the system demands that the new independent state remains despotic. Thus, democracy is not the 'rule', but the exception, produced from time to time by the impasses of capitalist development, but always vulnerable. Contrary to the 'optimistic' thesis of

¹¹ See Samir Amin, *La déconnexion*, and three other forthcoming studies: Samir Amin, 'L'Etat et le développement' ('State and Development'); 'L'accumulation 30 ans plus tard' (*Accumulation on a World Scale, 30 Years Later*); and 'A propos "The Third World Revolt"'.

development by stages, according to which social misery and despotism will be progressively overcome by capitalist expansion, that expansion will continually reproduce these conditions.

Given these conditions, capitalism has raised the spectre of its being overthrown through a 'revolt of the periphery'. In this sense the 'socialist revolutions', all of them emerging in the periphery or semi-periphery of the system (Tsarist Russia, China, etc.), constitute, along with the generically similar national liberation movements, the most essential change in our contemporary world. These struggles, effectively or potentially, usher in the 'post-capitalist' era.

I would contend that 'delinking' on the basis of a popular national social alliance (as opposed to the bourgeois national project) constitutes the only positive prospect for avoiding capitalist relegation to the periphery. By 'delinking', I mean in precise terms the subordination of external relations to internal demands for popular transformation and development, as against the bourgeois strategy of adjustment of internal growth to the constraints of the worldwide expansion of capital.

The unequal character of capitalist expansion, which cannot be overcome from within its own framework, thus objectively demands the reconstruction of the world on the basis of another social system. The peoples of the periphery are obliged to become aware of this demand and to impose the new system, if they are to avoid the worst, which may extend to genocide, as the history of this expansion shows.

These challenges to the capitalist order in the form of revolts in the periphery force one seriously to rethink the question of the 'socialist transition' towards the abolition of classes. However carefully formulated, the Marxist tradition continues to be handicapped by its initial theoretical view of 'workers' revolutions' paving the way, on the basis of advanced productive forces, at least in relative terms, for a fairly rapid transition characterised by democratic rule of the popular masses. While termed a 'dictatorship over the bourgeoisie' (by means of a proletarian state of a new type which will soon 'wither away'), this rule is nevertheless considerably more democratic than the most democratic of bourgeois states. Obviously, reality has not turned out like this. All revolutions of an anti-capitalist bent have so far taken place in the periphery of the system; all have been confronted by the problems of the development of the productive forces and the hostility of the capitalist world; none has yet been able to establish any real form of advanced democracy; all have ended up reinforcing the state system. They have reached a point where doubts are increasingly cast upon their

'socialist' character and on the prospects for effecting, at whatever time in the future, the definitive abolition of classes. For some people (of whom we are not a part and whose theses we have criticised in the past) these systems are nothing more than specific forms of capitalist expansion itself.¹²

The crucial task is not of course to 'label' these systems, but to understand their origins, problems and specific contradictions, the dynamics which they allow or exclude. We have arrived at the thesis that in cases of popular national states and societies; we stress that they are popular, and neither bourgeois nor socialist. In the same way, we reached the conclusion that this popular national 'phase' was inevitably imposed by the unequal character of capitalist development.

These systems are, because of this, effectively faced with the task of development of the productive forces and are founded upon social forces that refuse to accept the argument that development can be achieved by means of a simple 'adjustment' within the framework of capitalist expansion on a world scale. They are the product of revolutions led and supported by progressive social forces in revolt against the effects of the unequal development of capitalism. Therefore such systems are contradictory and conflicting combinations of three different forces.

The first of these, socialist or at least potentially so, translates the aspirations of the popular social forces which gave birth to the new state. The second, capitalist in nature, expresses the fact that, given the actual state of development of the productive forces, capitalist relations of production are still necessary, and hence require real social forces to maintain them. This is why each time an extension of market relations is tolerated within a country of the Eastern bloc, the situation improves. But the existence of capitalist relations should not be confused with integration within the capitalist world system. Many of the criticisms directed at China, Yugoslavia, and Hungary have foundered on this slippery terrain, wrongly objecting that these countries are undergoing 'reintegration' into the capitalist world system. On the contrary, the state is present to isolate these relations from the effects of inclusion within the system dominated by the capital of the core monopolies.

The third series of real social forces operating in these regimes, which we term 'statist', have an autonomy of their own. They are neither

¹² Samir Amin, *La déconnexion* . . . Ch. 4; Samir Amin, 'Expansion or crisis of capitalism', *Contemporary Marxism* (9) 1984.

reducible to a disguised form of capitalist relations (as statism effectively is in the capitalist Third World), nor to a 'degenerate' form of socialism. Statism represents real and potential social forces in their own right.

The problems faced by the capitalist Third World with the advent of political liberation were similar in nature. But the ambiguity of the strategies it adopted was more pronounced because, even where radicalisation had occurred during the struggle for independence, the option in favour of a programme of popular content and delinking was hampered by bourgeois aspirations and the illusory promise of the bourgeoisie national project. Why did the 'Third World' then not set off on the path to constructing a bourgeois national state by copying those of the capitalist core? To be sure, the outcome did not simply result from 'ideas' without any reference to the social base; it was rather the expression of certain social classes and strata of a bourgeois inclination, which dominated the 'national liberation movement' (i.e. the revolt against the effects of the unequal development of capitalism) and continue to dominate the states which emerged from it. History teaches us that the bourgeoisies of the periphery have attempted this task of constructing the state at each stage of world capitalist expansion, although of course in forms appropriate to their respective times. It also teaches us that in the end such attempts were always blocked by the conjunction of external aggression and the internal limits of these attempts.

The question of democracy, both in the socialist countries and in those of the Third World, must be placed within this context.

Let us be clear on this point: the critique which Marx directed at bourgeois democracy, i.e. of its limited and formal character, remains, to my mind, wholly correct. All the same, this democracy was not offered by the bourgeoisie to its people but conquered, relatively late in the day, by working-class struggles. For the capitalist mode itself does not require democracy. The spring behind its social dynamism is located on another level, that of the competition among capitalists and individuals. Moreover, capitalism separates economic and social management, ruled by fundamentally undemocratic principles, from political management, run today according to the democratic principle of election. We would add that this form of democracy only functions when its social impact has been annihilated by the exploitation carried out by the dominant forces of the core powers within the capitalist world system, that is to say once the labour movement has renounced its own

project for a classless society and accepted the capitalist 'rules of the game'.

In the periphery, democracy, even more restricted in nature, is barely more than the expression of the crisis of despotism which is here a form of the capitalist system. Countries in Latin America, South Korea and others, currently furnish blatant examples of the violent political contradictions afflicting a Third World in crisis. I mentioned earlier that Latin American *desarrollismo* had claimed that 'industrialisation' and 'modernisation' (along bourgeois lines and within the context of an even greater integration into the world system) would automatically lead to a democratic evolution. The 'dictatorship' was looked upon as the vestige of a supposedly pre-capitalist past. The facts have demonstrated that modernisation within the framework of this bourgeois project has only 'modernised dictatorship' and substituted an 'efficient' and 'modern' violence of a fascistic type for the old oligarchic, patriarchal systems. The bourgeois project, however, has not delivered the promised results: the crisis has revealed the vulnerability of this construction and the impossibility of the 'independence' which legitimated dictatorship for some. But were not the democratic systems, which were imposed in these circumstances, faced with a formidable dilemma? There are only two choices available: Either the democratic political system accepts submission to the demands of 'adjustment' to the world system, and is thereafter incapable of effecting social reforms of any importance, soon precipitating a crisis for democracy itself; or else popular forces, seizing the means provided by democracy, impose these reforms. The system then enters into conflict with dominant world capitalism, moving from a bourgeois national project to a popular national one.¹³ The dilemma of Brazil and the Philippines derives entirely from this conflict.

The popular option requires democracy. This is so because democracy is a necessary internal condition of socialism. Once the spring of competition amongst capitalists is broken, social relations based on cooperation among workers instead of submission to exploitation are unthinkable without the complete expression of democracy.

In the socialist countries complex reasons of a particular nature which relate to the history of Marxism, and which we have analysed

¹³ Is not the doctrine of the Brazilian PMAD, which believes in the possibility of reconciling liberal political democracy and a dependent economic development, a return to the illusions of *desarrollismo*?

elsewhere,¹⁴ have their share of responsibility for the deadlock created by the refusal of political democracy. Despite the national and social achievements which have brought with them eventual support of the popular masses, the denial of political democracy attests to the preponderance of statist forces to the detriment of the socialist tendencies present.

This situation is graver still regarding the radical experiments within the Third World. There the absence of political democracy works in favour of capitalism, either of the private or state form, and causes the system to degenerate towards a bureaucratic capitalism which ultimately risks becoming a form of compradorisation. In the socialist countries, this risk is unlikely to materialise, as the popular national state (although undemocratic) has sufficient solid historical grounding to allow the continuation of relative stagnation within the confines of statism, or the renewal by society of its move forward. In contrast, examples abound of complete failure among the radical states of the Third World and their subsequent 'recompradorisation'.

In every case democracy is the only means of reinforcing the chance for socialism within popular national society, of isolating the internal capitalist relations of production from the influence of their compradorised insertion into the capitalist world system, and hence reducing the degree of their external vulnerability.

What kind of democracy are we talking about? No doubt the heritage of Western bourgeois democracy is not merely to be scorned, bestowing as it does a respect for rights and for legality, freedom of expression for a diversity of opinions, the institutionalisation of electoral procedures and the separation of powers, the organisation of countervailing powers, and so on. But nor is this legacy the last word. Western democracy is lacking in any social dimension.¹⁵ The popular democracy of the moments of revolutionary social transformation (such as the USSR in the 1920s, Maoist China) also teaches us a great deal about the nature of any 'popular participation', to use a tired expression, which is to have real meaning. To conserve Western democratic forms without taking into consideration the social transformations demanded by the

¹⁴ Samir Amin, *La déconnexion* . . . Chs. 1, 2 and 4; see also Samir Amin, *L'avenir du maoïsme* . . .

¹⁵ There is no form of social phenomenon which does not allow for the occasional exception. Swedish social democracy is by no means inferior to the best achievements of the Eastern bloc. This is surely attributable to the peculiar history of Sweden and to its labour movement, without parallel elsewhere in the West. But it must also be conceded that the privileged position which Sweden occupies within the international division of labour has facilitated this exceptional evolution.

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anti-capitalist revolt of the periphery is to become trapped within a travesty of bourgeois democracy, which will remain alien to the people and consequently extremely vulnerable. In order to take root, democracy should above all inscribe itself within a perspective which moves beyond capitalism. This domain, like others, must be governed by the law of unequal development.¹⁶

Obviously, it is this prospect which imperialism finds intolerable. For this reason, the campaign concerning 'democracy', orchestrated by the West, stresses only certain aspects of the problem and neglects others. For example, it identifies multiparty political systems with democracy. No doubt the 'single party' has more often than not, become, the expression of statist dominance.¹⁷ But equally, it is often the product of the effective achievement of popular national unity: this is true in the case of the Chinese Communist Party and some other organisations which emerged from the liberation struggle. In these instances, the creation of 'other parties' might be an artificial operation, not an urgent item on the agenda of popular struggles. The democratisation of the Party, its separation from the state, the clear distinction between state and civil society, the opening up to debate of the party and social organisations (truly independent trade unions, peasant cooperatives) are the essential reforms here which false Western friends of the peoples of the Third World refuse to acknowledge as democratic advances.

The question of the divergence of interests and of conflicts between Third World countries should also be situated within this context.

The illusions fostered by the bourgeois national project lead the states of the periphery to emphasise the divergent interests dividing them, on account of their different functions within the world system. Thus producers of energy or raw materials and semi-industrialised countries, countries liable to become indebted to the world financial market and those lacking resources, countries with food deficits and those with food surpluses, will find it difficult to form a united front against the North. This front could only be established on the basis of the common denominator linking these countries; namely, their status as peripheral entities. On this basis the popular national regimes engaged in a strategy of 'delinking' could strengthen their national

¹⁶ See my general thesis regarding the significance of unequal development in Samir Amin, *Classe et nation* . . .

¹⁷ For the sake of argument one could cite numerous cases of 'one party' regimes or even regimes of 'no parties allowed at all' which do not provoke Western ire, simply because these states accept the neo-colonial submission. Similarly, there are many well-known examples of 'multi-party systems' which are in practice hardly democratic!

options by a form of regional cooperation, itself delinked from the world capitalist system. At present South-South cooperation is complementary to unequal North-South relations.¹⁸ As long as Third World countries continue to attempt to achieve a capitalist development integrated in the global expansion of capitalism, these countries will be bound to compete among themselves and therefore conflict among them will be the rule. Of course, the matter of intra-Third World conflicts is vast and complex, and could by itself constitute a subject for study, for which this is not the place. So to make this long story short, and recognising that the political (and sometimes military) conflicts between Third World countries are certainly not all of the same kind, I propose here to distinguish four different groups of such conflicts:

- i) Certain conflicts are merely the continuation of the struggle for liberation of the peripheral peoples against imperialism, due to the fact that certain radical regimes have constituted or constitute a target for the West to destroy, with the latter mobilising neo-colonial regimes to fight on its behalf. The actions of the accomplices of the permanent aggression of Israel and South Africa against Egypt and the Southern African front-line states respectively provide evidence of this type of conflict;
- ii) The illusions fostered by the bourgeois national project may have stimulated 'sub-imperialist' ambitions, about which much has been written in the past. Experience has shown that, far from establishing themselves as new imperialisms, even second class ones, these attempts have finally ended with the absorption of local surrogates within the sphere of influence of the real imperialist centres. The conflicts that occur within regional groupings, conceived as 'common markets' between local surrogates in which the activities of monopoly capital concentrate, and the other second rank states of the periphery (e.g. Kenya vs. Tanzania; Nigeria and Ivory Coast vs. the ECOWAS partners), are one outcome of this problematic.¹⁹ The Iran-Iraq conflict is the result of excessive regional hegemonist ambitions of the leadership of both these countries;
- iii) Without doubt conflicts of a purely local origin exist, both within

¹⁸ Fayçal Yachir, 'La coopération Sud-Sud, une alternative?' *Bulletin du Forum du Tiers Monde* (2) October 1983; Samir Amin, 'Afro-Arab co-operation, the record and the prospects', *Africa Development* (1987).

¹⁹ Samir Amin, *Impérialisme et développement inégal*, Paris: Minuit, 1976, Ch. 5; trans. *Imperialism and Unequal Development*, New York: Monthly Review Press, 1977, Ch. 5.

the frontiers of a single state and between neighbouring states. The heterogeneous and even artificial character of many Third World states is often responsible for these conflicts. It remains the case that these conflicts are frequently caused by struggles between different segments of the comprador ruling class. These segments mobilise in their support forces which the mere fact of social diversity (ethnic, religious, regional) would not alone have caused to confront one another, either spontaneously or under the force of necessity;²⁰

- iv) Nor do the conflicts between socialist countries stem from an inevitable clash of nationalisms traversing social classes and regimes. In some cases, they involve profound differences concerning international politics (for example the refusal of Yugoslavia and China to submit to the strategy of the Soviet superpower). In others, the conflict is rather the expression of the expansionist ambitions of powers aspiring to regional hegemony (such as that of Vietnam *vis-à-vis* Laos and Kampuchea). Here again democratisation is the only response capable of disarming adventurist leaderships and preventing their going astray.²¹

In all these cases the conflicts of minor or secondary powers in the contemporary world are, at some point, bound to conform with the strategies of the superpowers. It can thus be perceived that these conflicts do not simply replicate the confrontations which accompanied the formation of the core capitalist nations. On the contrary, they are themselves either the result of the polarisation between core and periphery, or a vector of its reproduction.

In conclusion I do believe that the issues of 'social justice' (a better distribution of income), political democracy and international solidarity (rather than intra-Third World conflicts) in the Third World are indeed connected, so that it is impossible to 'cure' any of these evils without considering the whole problem of their interlinkage. Our thesis has been that the global expansion of capitalism is responsible for growing social inequality, political despotism and growing intra-Third World conflicts. Therefore, opting for 'another development'—based on popular interests and democracy—and building international solidarity on the basis of this option necessarily involves 'delinking' from the logic of global capitalism. The drama of Third World nationalism is that it has

²⁰ Samir Amin, 'Etat, nation, ethnie et minorités dans la crise', *Bulletin du Forum du Tiers Monde* (6) 1986.

²¹ Samir Amin, *Classe et nation* . . . Ch. 7; Samir Amin, *Impérialisme et développement inégal*, Ch. 8.

continuously hoped that the global system could adjust to additional national bourgeois projects. History has proved that these projects are ultimately doomed to failure and are followed by comprador subalternisation, with all its negative social and political consequences.

Brazil's failure: what future for debtors' cartels?

I

In February 1987, the Brazilian government announced that, although 'it was not a moratorium', all payments of interest on its foreign debt were to be suspended. Two months later the Minister of Finance, Dilson Funaro, was forced to resign. Since then, the Brazilian government has begun moving towards the re-establishment of 'normal' relations with the international financial system and it is already clear that negotiations will begin (with Brazil in a particular weak position) for the resumption of payments on the foreign debt.

The handling of the domestic economy by Dilson Funaro and his team was less than skilful after the implementation of the 'Cruzado Plan' in February 1986. An explosion in domestic consumption since the last quarter of 1986 depleted Brazil's foreign exchange reserves. Also, in November 1986, ill-designed policies intended to adjust some aspects of that Plan backfired with a strong resurgence of inflation, widespread negative expectations for the future of the economy, and the heated protests of virtually all elements in society; these included the popular sector, that had initially supported the Cruzado Plan with great enthusiasm and high expectations, and which, just before the ill-fated November 1986 decisions, had given the government overwhelming electoral support.

Thus, the suspension of the debt payments was not undertaken from a position of strength, as would have been the case shortly after the implementation of the Cruzado Plan when the government enjoyed wide support and had a comfortable US\$12 billion in foreign currency reserves. Influential commentators suggested that the foreign debt was a desperate attempt by the government to divert attention from the domestic economic crisis, and once again to marshall strong national support. Whatever the correct explanation of the subjective motivations behind that decision, it had the effect of further focusing attention on the domestic crisis and giving credence to criticisms of the alleged 'irresponsibility' and 'technical incompetence' of the Finance Ministry. Furthermore, there was very little support from public

opinion and the popular sector; rather, most of the media and entrepreneurs' organisations, as well as most economists, were quick to argue (ever more loudly until Funaro's resignation) that the suspension of payments was a grave mistake, which was sure to bring about extremely negative consequences for the country. Even President José Sarney, who had announced the termination of foreign debt interest payments in a nationally televised address, soon made it clear that his support for Dilson Funaro (if not explicitly for the foreign debt decision) was wavering.

It remains a matter of speculation what might have happened had the decision on the foreign debt been made at the height of the Brazilian government's popularity and when there were ample foreign reserves, and, in addition, had the government (including its President and the Central Bank) solidly backed the policies initiated by its Finance Ministry. One lesson is at least clear: unilateral decisions on the payment of the foreign debt are too serious, and too likely to raise both domestic and international opposition, to make such a decision advisable in the politically and economically weak conditions that were prevailing in Brazil.

Yet, as this case suggests, there may be a perverse side to the problem. Precisely because the decision is so serious, and its potential consequences so damaging (both for the country and for the government), it was less likely to be made when things were going reasonably well, even if the spectre of the foreign debt loomed large in the medium and long term. Rather, the decision would tend to be made, if at all, out of despair at a critical economic and political situation. Yet, such a situation in many imaginable scenarios would in turn virtually ensure that there would be insufficient domestic support to enable the country to withstand the serious problems and innumerable pressures occasioned by such a decision.

II

Elsewhere,¹ I have analysed from the perspectives of game and coalition theory the reasons why governments of debtor countries fail to do the obvious: namely, to create a cartel that would greatly enhance their joint bargaining power in relation to their creditors. I will not repeat here the arguments that have unfortunately been supported by

¹ Guillermo O'Donnell, 'External debt: why don't our governments do the obvious?', *CEPAL Review* (27) 1986.

Brazil's recent failure. It is simply my view that the debtors find themselves in a 'prisoner's dilemma',² expressed and perpetuated by their inability to act collectively. The rational interest of the debtors is to form the cartel but, as we shall see, they are faced with extremely serious obstacles. From this point of view, and contrary to more conventional views on the matter, the rational interest of the creditors is not so much to maximise what they can collect from the debtors, but to prolong the imbalance of forces entailed by the fact that, while the debtors are locked in a 'prisoner's dilemma', the creditors themselves are cartelised.

What are the main obstacles to the formation of a debtors' cartel? They derive essentially from the ability of the creditors to do two things if a particular debtor country decides to attempt to act unilaterally, either by suspending payments or rescheduling its debt. One action by the creditors is to threaten, and eventually to apply, severe sanctions against that country. The other—simultaneous—action is to make what in game theory are called side-payments (differential benefits or, in other words, bribes) to other debtor countries that might otherwise be tempted to follow suit.

A rather complicated argument (for which I must refer the interested reader to my already cited article) shows that the cost-benefit analysis of the creditors will lead them to impose sanctions on any single country that defects from the rules of the game which they have laid down. But that same analysis suggests that if a 'sufficient' number of countries, holding a 'sufficient' proportion of the debt, defects, then the expected costs of sanctions may very well overcome the inconveniences of the defection (i.e., the changed balance of power). Such a calculation would entail the creditors accepting the new situation and consequently negotiating within the new parameters.

In terms of each debtor country, the situation is as follows: (1) Because of the risks directly involved, plus the side-payments, it knows that creditors will try to deflect its potential allies—and these benefits will be the larger the more crucial each ally is to the proposed cartel; each country cannot have any reasonable assurance, *a priori*, that a sufficient number of allies will follow its initial unilateral decisions on foreign debt; (2) If, nevertheless, a country takes the risk and makes such a decision, it should know that it thereby further increases the

² Among the many texts available for an introduction to game theory, a reasonably straightforward one is Henry Hamburger, *Games As Models of Social Phenomena*, San Francisco: W H Freeman and Co., 1979. For interesting applications of game theory concepts to international relations, see the special issue of *World Politics* 38(1), October 1985.

incentive for the creditors to offer more persuasive side-payments to its potential allies; (3) Consequently, the debtor cannot ignore the fact that, on the one hand, the likelihood of forming the cartel is low and, on the other hand, the costs that it would entail would be extremely severe, both in terms of creditors' sanctions and of the domestic disruptions likely to be generated by its unsuccessful attempt and the consequent sanctions; (4) This problem could be overcome by a decision made simultaneously by a 'sufficient' number of debtors, there serious obstacles in reaching such unanimity; (5) Consequently, before the cartel is effectively created there is a series of hurdles, each of which considerably diminishes the overall probability that such a cartel will come about (not to mention the further problems in guaranteeing that the cartel will endure for long enough to produce the intended effects); while the probability of success is small, the costs to be expected from an unsuccessful attempt are severe; (6) Given these circumstances, each debtor tends *not* to challenge the existing imbalance of power but rather attempts to get the best possible terms given the existing rules of the game—which, by that very policy, it helps to sustain; (7) Hence, whenever a particular debtor tries to break the rules of the game, other debtors may each receive side-payments from the creditors, thus maximising its interests within the given situation. (In game theory the lonely cooperator is called 'the sucker'.)

Of course, the maximum interest of each debtor is in changing the whole structure of the system, but we have seen that it is very unlikely first, that any single debtor will be able to effect such change and second, that the coalition that could do it may be formed. Let us now turn to actual events.

III

Creditors reacted to the Brazilian decision with extremely rational, graduated sanctions: severe criticism from the governments of most central capitalist countries; the immediate curtailing by international banks of US\$60 million in short-term and commercial and inter-bank credits to Brazil, with the explicit warning that more severe cuts were to follow; the refusal by the Advisory Committee of the creditor banks to endorse Brazil's request for a sixty-day renewal of its short-term commercial lines of credit, leaving the pertinent decisions to the individual banks, with the result that some of those credits were cut and

the spread increased.³ Yet, despite their significance, these reactions were less severe than a simplistic view of the issue might have led one to expect.

Instead, with the support and encouragement of the US government, the banks engaged in frenetic activity on another front to conclude negotiations pending with other debtor countries (including some of the largest, such as Mexico, Argentina, Chile, and the Philippines), by offering them significantly more favourable terms than those proposed before the Brazilian decision. No action or even gesture of support for Brazil came from those countries; rather, they played 'prisoner's dilemma', took the side-payments, and left Brazil in the position of the 'sucker'.

For its part, Brazil played the game of 'chicken'.⁴ Dilson Funaro announced that Brazil was 'in no hurry'; it was ready to wait all the time that was necessary for the banks to come up with negotiation proposals that would be consistent with Brazil's decision to grow at the rate of no less than 7 per cent in the foreseeable future.⁵ This strategy embodied an obvious miscalculation: it assumed that the Brazilian government (in effect, the already politically weak Minister of Finance) could adhere to its decision long enough to harm the banks to the extent that they would have to accept negotiations on Brazil's terms. Moreover, in order to avoid serious harm to the banks, if the Brazilian government failed to 'chicken' rapidly, the creditors would have significantly increased the severity of their sanctions (a threat they indeed made), not to mention the further sanctions that creditor-country governments would probably also have applied. Furthermore, the Brazilian strategy gave the creditors time to effectively isolate Brazil from its potential allies.

Thus, well before the full scope of sanctions was applied, the attempt by Brazil to change unilaterally the rules of the game was sadly defeated. The government team that led the attempt is out of office, the authority of the government has been seriously damaged *vis-à-vis* both supporters and opponents of the foreign debt decision, the domestic economic crisis has further worsened, and Brazil will surely have to pay

³ For further information on these and related aspects, see CEBRAP and Secretaria de Economia e Planejamento do Estado de São Paulo, *Análise de Conjuntura Econômica*. Março-Abril 1987, São Paulo (mimeo, 1987).

⁴ See Hamburger, *Games as Models* . . . The name of this game derives from reckless competitions between two automobile drivers set to run at high speed towards each other. The one who first swerves away from head-on collision (the 'chicken') loses; of course, if neither contestant gives way, the result is catastrophic for both.

⁵ Insistent statements to this effect by Dilson Funaro may be found in *Folha de São Paulo* (issues of March and April 1987) as well as in any other major Brazilian daily during this period.

a heavy price for its 'improper behaviour' and consequent 'loss of international credibility' in the coming negotiations on its debt.

Although such an outcome has undoubtedly entailed some significant costs to the creditors, it has had the great advantage to the creditors of acting as a powerful deterrent to similar 'adventures' by other debtor countries. What example could be more eloquent than the rather easy victory they had won over the world's largest debtor, the only country that could conceivably, in the absence of a cartel and owing to the sheer size of its debt, have unilaterally imposed its own conditions on the creditors? In this sense, acceptance of the game of 'chicken' proposed by Brazil, while at the same time also playing 'prisoner's dilemma' with other countries, was the correct strategy for the creditors (and a measure of the naiveté of Brazil). Furthermore, the strategy of applying carefully graduated sanctions, together with explicit threats about the more severe sanctions that would follow, was rational for the creditors: it did not expose them to the risks of further retaliation by Brazil or of generating in other countries feelings of solidarity that might cancel the effects of the side-payments. Finally, in terms of the dissuasive impact of this situation, the fact that restrained sanctions combined with rather rash threats were sufficient to defeat the Brazilian attempt may be an effective reminder of the further sanctions and disruptions that would afflict a country which attempted to adhere more tenaciously to a similar decision.

IV

What can be done? The case of Brazil does not allow for much optimism. The foreign debt decision was made in Brazil under unfavourable domestic conditions, and apparently there was little, if any, prior effort to rally support from other countries. The situation could only be resolved if countries holding a large percentage of the debt (large enough to make it too costly for creditors to apply sanctions against all participating countries) arrive at coordinated, simultaneous decisions.

The problems of making such moves are enormous. Operating under secrecy is scarcely feasible. The attempt to coordinate decisions would involve numerous consultations and negotiations, as well as intensive staff work among participating countries; it would be highly likely that the intelligence services of central capitalist countries would rapidly detect such moves. Furthermore, in democratic regimes the political

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leadership would be unable to ignore the fact that such decisions would entail considerable risks and uncertainties for the population; it is hard to imagine that those leaders would feel authorised, or find it compatible with their personal political interests, to attempt the coordinating strategy without prior public debate. On the other hand, an agreement reached by the foreign or finance ministers of the countries involved would be insufficient; they could promptly be dismissed or disavowed. Decisions taken by presidents or prime ministers would appear more binding, but they would in most cases have to obtain parliamentary approval or ratification of the agreements. During this necessarily slow, complicated and public process, the creditors—both banks and governments—would have ample opportunity to offer side-payments, apply some sanctions, and also (as the Brazilian example shows) mobilise powerful domestic sectors against such attempts.

As argued above, the likelihood of desertions along the road towards the formation of a cartel is high. If defections occur to a degree that the countries still cooperating lack sufficient weight in terms of their joint external debt, they would have played the 'sucker'. Furthermore, an explicit attempt at coordination would be more worrying for the creditors than single unilateral decisions (even if made by such a major debtor as Brazil); hence the inducement for the creditors to raise their side-payments to potential defectors would increase proportionately to the risk they perceived, and the sanctions applied to the 'sucker' countries could be correspondingly steep.

We see that the problem is a typical one of collective action. The main interest of each debtor is to coordinate its action with other debtors, but since they are held within a 'prisoner's dilemma', they are very unlikely to initiate it themselves. For the creditors this problem was solved by the pressures and threats that the largest banks (and creditors), jointly with the US government, applied to medium and small banks.⁶ Some international financial institutions, especially the IMF, have also been crucial in this respect. But who could do it for the creditor nations? To begin with, large banks have effective means of coercion over lesser ones; this is not the case among debtor nations: if coercion can effectively be applied against them, it is surely by central capitalist countries, not by other debtors.

At this point one is tempted to throw up one's hands in despair, and

⁶ See Charles Lipson, 'Banker's dilemma: private cooperation in rescheduling sovereign debts', in *World Politics* 38(1) October 1985.

hope that the overall situation will deteriorate to such an extent—and hence become so threatening to the survival of the whole capitalist system—that banks and governments of creditor nations will come up with some sort of solution. But, for reasons that are in part too obvious and in part too long to discuss here, such passivity would be less than ideal: there can be little doubt that, whatever their 'solution' to the debt problem, it would further tighten the screws of dependency and international exploitation.

Is there any way to achieve the coordination necessary to establish the debtors' cartel and then make it function for the time needed? The initial steps could perhaps be made by an international commission of distinguished economists and former statesmen. In a similar manner to the IMF's missions, such a commission could examine the economic and social situation of a given country. Such a review would not be made from the creditor's perspective, that is, of making the foreign debt the parameter to which domestic variables have to adjust; rather, the work of the commission would take a medium-term view to set parameters for assessing how much of the debt could be paid, and when, as well as calculating a reasonable rate of growth of the national product and of employment and estimates of the foreign exchange implications of social policies aimed at satisfying the basic needs of the population.

I am assuming (my observation of the daily routines of governing in Brazil and Argentina supports this view) that, given conditions of severe economic crisis and, often, of a precarious political situation, governments tend to deal with single issues, on a day-to-day pragmatic basis. Thus, if a serious crisis directly derived from the foreign debt can be postponed, government ministers will do almost anything to achieve such a postponement, ignoring most of the indirect consequences of foreign exchange constraints and directing their attention to other issues on their short-term agenda. This tendency to divert attention away from problems that are defined as too intractable to be confronted is substantiated by studies of complex organisations—even those that are in a much better condition to deal with their environment than the public bureaucracies through which governments must make and implement policy.⁷ Under these conditions, both a marked reluctance to take the risks of moving toward a debtors' cartel, and a willingness to accept whatever side-payments may be offered, are understandable. This is so even if those governments can neither ignore the constraints

⁷ See, especially, the classic work by James March and Herbert Simon, *Organizations*, New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1958.

presently placed on all areas of economic and social policy by the foreign debt nor the high probability that future crises stemming from debt payments will occur.

The international commission I am suggesting would offer a chance to alleviate the problem of the agenda of attention. Governments would agree to grant that commission similar access to their data to that usually provided to IMF missions. On this basis (assuming that it is adequately staffed) the commission would produce authoritative reports along the lines sketched above. Furthermore, those reports would include a projection of the strangulation points and more detrimental trade-offs (in terms of some basic goals of economic growth, employment and basic needs) that are likely to occur for the respective country if its present foreign debt arrangements, or relatively marginal variations of them, are continued.

The assumptions and hypotheses underlying such reports would indeed be controversial, and much would have to be learnt while working on the reports. But the assumptions and hypotheses underlying the reports of the IMF and other international agencies are no less controversial, even if a powerful ideology tends to sanctify them as the very embodiment of scientific rational economics. This is one reason why highly qualified economists should be part of the endeavour I am suggesting; a different logic and definition of interests—those of debtor countries and the fundamental responsibilities they bear towards their own populations—must be brought forcefully and urgently to international attention. Domestically, the information processed by the reports, their projections, and the alternatives they explore would at least improve the level of discussion about the foreign debt, both within and outside government circles. Furthermore, the availability of reports for several countries would help to focus attention on problems (in particular, strangulation points and trade-offs), as well as possibilities, that might be shared beyond the short-term.

Creating an informational and analytical basis that each debtor country is unlikely to be able to provide by itself would accomplish on a modest scale what (essentially but far from exclusively) the IMF does for the creditors. We need to increase greatly the visibility and respectability of the formulation of the alternative views and interests of the debtor countries, even for those who are eager to serve those interests but too often fall prey to what is no less than ideological domination: the view that there are really no 'serious', 'workable' solutions other than those to be found within the parameters defined at

the centre of world capitalism. The goal of technical and ideological legitimization of alternatives in the interests of debtor countries would be advanced by competent reports from the commission, prepared by skilled and respected professionals, and jointly analysed with the former politicians that would also be members of that institution. In addition, one should take into account the mushrooming of further discussions and studies that the report would surely motivate.

The gloomiest suggestion that springs from the recent defeat of Brazil may be that such a large debtor could accomplish as little as even a 'sufficient' cartel might, if there are no clear and thoroughly discussed ideas. These ideas would support a strategy that goes far beyond a simple negation of some of the consequences of the structure of foreign debt. Such ideas, particularly the alternative futures they would depict (both in terms of projecting an essentially unmodified continuity of the present parameters of the situation, and of exploring structurally alternative scenarios) may well be the only way to motivate a sufficient number of debtor countries to overcome their present 'prisoner's dilemma' and begin playing a cooperative game—the continuity of short-term views by each isolated country guarantees the perpetuation of the 'prisoner's dilemma'. Finally, those same ideas could provide the basis for sufficient domestic support for new and more feasible attempts to change the asphyxiating parameters of the present situation. The international commission I am suggesting may be an important step in this direction: something has to be done, and if the governments of debtor countries are unlikely to initiate it, active and conscious segments of civil society might take on the task.

Latin American debt: debtor–creditor relations*

Latin America is facing a deep crisis arising from financial issues. The abrupt reduction of the sources of external financing—concentrated in bank loans—has been one of the determinant causes of the low level of economic activity since the beginning of the 1980s. Together with the deterioration of the terms of trade, this has brought about such a shortage of foreign exchange that an intense recession in the region's national economies has been provoked. Thus, the utilisation rate of the available productive resources has declined steeply.

At the same time, the scarcity of foreign exchange, the recessive framework and the adjustment policies adopted have discouraged investment. As a consequence, capital formation has likewise been diminishing throughout the region since the early 1980s.

In this study three issues will be addressed. First, a brief account will be given of expected trends in the flows of capital, and of net funds to and from abroad, as well as of the behaviour of economic activity and investment; secondly, background information is presented regarding the flows of funds foreseen for the period 1985–90, according to the projections available. Third, there is a brief inquiry into the causes of the inefficiency of the adjustment registered to date; subsequently, a number of tasks are outlined that have to be met with respect to external financing, its conditionality and domestic development strategies.¹

External financing, economic activity and investment

For the fifth consecutive year, capital inflows to Latin America have

* Revised version of the text presented to the Seminar 'Latin America in the world economy', organised by SELA, held in Caracas from 5–7 June 1986. The author is indebted to the members of the Workshop on International Economics of CIEPLAN and to Carlos Fortin for their comments. Statistical material was updated from projections of the IMF published in October 1986 and of ECLAC in December 1986.

¹ The issues covered here are analysed in depth in the book *Mas allá de la crisis de la deuda: bases para un nuevo enfoque*. The volume, edited by R Ffrench-Davis and R E Feinberg, has been published by Ediciones CIEPLAN, Santiago de Chile, and Grupo Editor Latinoamericano, Buenos Aires. An English language edition will be published in August 1987 by the University of Notre Dame Press in the USA.

been at notably reduced levels. The outflow of profits and interest continues to exceed capital inflows. The subsequent net negative transfer amounted to an annual average of US\$28 billion in 1983-86. *Vis-à-vis* exports (which were declining owing to the deterioration of the terms of trade) the negative net transfer of funds represented 23 per cent of goods and services in 1986 (see Table 1).

Table 1: Net inflow of capital and net transfers abroad
(In US\$ billions per year and percentages)

	Net capital inflows	Net payments of profits and interest	Net transfers of funds	(3) as % of exports of goods and services
1974-77	15.1	6.4	8.8	18.8
1978-81	30.5	17.2	13.3	16.1
1982-86	9.7	36.1	-26.4	-24.8
1984	9.2	36.2	-27.0	-23.7
1985	2.4	35.3	-32.9	-30.2
1986	8.6	30.7	-22.1	-23.2

Sources: Calculations based on ECLAC (1986), *op. cit.*, Table 14.

Compared with the transfers of funds recorded during the years 1974-81, the contrast is noteworthy.² For instance, in 1978 (the year of the largest net inflow of funds) positive transfers were equivalent to 26 per cent of exports. This constitutes a difference of roughly 50 per cent of exports with respect to 1986.

After the recovery of exports in 1984, which inspired premature expressions of optimism, the value of exports again shrank in 1985-86. Several countries increased their export quantum, but as a whole Latin America did not succeed in raising the value of sales in foreign markets. A cumulative fall of 13 per cent in terms of trade in the biennium 1985-86 led to a similar decline in the real value of exports. In this manner, by 1986, exports were lower than in 1981.³ During a five-year period of adjustment and after a notable increase in real exchange rates

² In the 1974-80 period part of the funds received were allotted to supplement international reserves. These were used in the years following the crisis. Hence, the net debt (gross debt minus reserves) varied to a lesser degree than the net capital flows.

³ The quantum of exports of goods increased 27 per cent between 1980 and 1986, while unit prices fell 31 per cent. In the case of non-oil countries the quantum increased by 34 per cent while the drop of unit prices was 20 per cent. See ECLAC, *Balance preliminar de la economía latinoamericana*, Santiago: ECLAC, December 1986, Table 7.

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(real depreciations), Latin America has been unable to surmount the barriers presented by the world economy: namely, restricted access and markedly lower prices.

The GDP recovered in 1986, swept along by Brazil, with a slight improvement per capita. Nevertheless, in 1986 GDP per capita was 6 per cent below its level in 1981. This percentage is equivalent to a value of production of US\$40 billion annually; it represents the shortfall in the volume of economic activity which prevented the output per capita in 1986 attaining the level of 1981. In other words, assuming by conservative estimates that, without an external crisis, Latin America's per capita production in 1986 would have been the same as in 1981, the annual loss can be measured as US\$40 billion. Measured in this way, the cumulative GDP foregone in five years would be in the region of US\$190 billion.⁴

The productive setback of the region has meant the under-utilisation of its installed capacity. Labour, land and factories have been utilised on a reduced scale relative to 1981. Capital formation has similarly suffered from the recessive situation and from external financial stringency.

Rates of investment experienced a significant rise during the period of increasing indebtedness, which suggests that foreign resources contributed to the development of the region as a whole (see Table 2).

Table 2: Rate of capital formation, Latin America

	Rate
1977-79	24.4%
1980-81	23.1%
1982-83	19.1%
1984-86	17.5%

Source: IMF, *World Economic Outlook*, Washington DC: IMF, October 1986, Table A.7. Refers to Western Hemisphere, according to IMF, and to gross capital formation as a percentage of GDP.

There were, however, differences between countries as far as volume and quality were concerned. For example, those nations (such as Chile) which liberalised capital inflows, domestic financial markets and imports tended to show both lower investment and reduced domestic savings. On the other hand, a better performance was attained by those

⁴ Measured in this manner, the loss of production in Latin America is equivalent to four months of forgone output. In the case of Chile, a loss of eight months is reached.

countries (such as Brazil and Colombia)⁵ that reformed their trade and financial policies in a moderate and selective manner. This evidence suggests a need to accept a diversity of approaches, resisting the mechanical transmission of standard orthodox measures to semi-industrialised nations.

Regardless of the effectiveness of the use of external borrowing, after the shock of the reversal in net financial flows, investment has been limited by the shortage of funds. Both private and public sectors have had to channel a sizeable proportion of their savings into interest payments on the foreign debt. In effect, the net transfer abroad in 1985 represented between one-half and two-thirds of the net formation of capital recorded in that year.⁶

In the present adjustment process, investment and imports of capital goods have fallen substantially below pre-crisis levels. The recessive domestic setting, the notable uncertainty and the restrictions hampering public investment have all contributed to a decline in the rate of capital formation. What is required is a boost in investment with the purpose of creating new job opportunities and restoring growth.

The pattern of capital flows changed drastically after the crisis. Official loans increased in current dollars and also in relation to total loans. In the last triennium (1983–85) they accounted for nearly two-thirds of the net increase of the debt (see Table 3). Therefore, they did fulfil a compensatory role, although their increment covered only a small proportion of the drop recorded in private loans. The figures also reveal a considerable flow of long-term net loans from banks, with public guarantees from the debtor countries. At the same time, however, unguaranteed bank credits greatly diminished, as did short-term loans (which also principally correspond to claims from creditor banks). In sum, the background information reflects: first, an intense overall drop in non-official loans (from entities other than governments and multilateral institutions), which plummeted from an average of US\$44 billion annually in 1980–82 to US\$4 billion in 1983–85; second, the reduction of trade credit; and, third, the involuntary nationalisation by Latin American countries of the debt incurred with private bank creditors. The foregoing is disclosed by the fact that the bank loans *with*

⁵ See R French-Davis (ed), *Las relaciones financieras externas su efecto sobre la economía latinoamericana*, Mexico City: Fondo de Cultura Economía, Mexico, 1983, and M Wionczek (ed), *Politics and economics of the Latin American debt crisis*, Boulder, Colorado: Westview, 1985.

⁶ See French-Davis (1986), p 39. Also, J Estévez, 'Inversión, ahorro y ajustes externos en América Latina', *Notas Técnicas* (92), Santiago: CIEPLAN, December 1986.

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Table 3: Breakdown of the increase of the debt 1980-82 and 1983-85
(in US\$ billions and percentages)

	Value of increase		Percentage of total change	
	1980-82	1983-85	1980-82	1983-85
<i>Long term</i>	99.3	68.2	68.5	191.0
Official creditors	13.9	23.1	9.6	64.7
Banks with public guaranty from debtor country	46.2	66.3	31.9	185.7
Other private	39.2	-21.2	27.0	-59.4
<i>Short term</i>	45.7	-32.5	31.5	-91.0
TOTAL	145.0	35.7	100.0	100.0

Sources: Calculations based on IMF, *World Economic Outlook*, Washington DC: IMF, October 1986, Table A.47, for Western hemisphere. 'Other private' includes, among its diverse components, suppliers and bank loans without guarantee. As is known, these figures, based on changes in stocks, are affected by the exchange rate modifications recorded between 1980 and 1985.

guarantees rose by US\$66 billion during the recent triennium, while the rest of the short-term and long-term loans from private creditors (the majority from banks) decreased by US\$54 billion. This reflects the fact that re-scheduled bank loans, to illiquid or bankrupt domestic private firms, benefited after 1982 from *ex post facto* public guarantees from debtor nations.

Prospects of external financing

Since 1982 the debt negotiations have been carried out in the expectation of an early resumption of 'voluntary' loans on the part of creditor banks. This expectation has consistently proved to be erroneous. Nevertheless, it is retained as part of the rhetoric in support of the approach followed so far.

It is argued that it is essential to demonstrate 'good behaviour' so as to gain access to external funds, especially from banks. Yet, as already pointed out, figures to 1986 show that Latin America was effecting net transfers abroad rather than receiving funds.⁷

⁷ An analysis of the forces behind this result—within the theoretical framework of a bilateral monopoly—is developed by R Devlin, 'La deuda externa vs el desarrollo: América Latina en la encrucijada', *Colección Estudios CIEPLAN* (17), Santiago: CIEPLAN, September 1985.

Consequently, the valid argument does not refer to the means of retaining access to funds but rather of forestalling possible retaliation of another type: a cutting of short-term trade credit and other forms of retaliation by creditors and official institutions. It is of interest to highlight the fact that bank trade credit constitutes a powerful mechanism of pressure by creditors, despite representing barely a *tenth* of the foreign debt.

The negative sign of transfers has derived principally from the flows with private banks, whereas with official entities it has been positive, even though only to a small degree.⁸ Projections for the coming years depict a similar outlook. In particular, the flow of funds with creditor banks is foreseen to be negative at least until the early 1980s (Table 4).

Table 4: Net transfers from official and bank creditors
(in US\$ billions)

	Official (1)	Banks (2)
1982	3.0	- 9.9
1983	1.8	-18.5
1984	3.2	-25.2
1985	1.6	-23.0

Sources: See IBRD, *World Debt Tables 1985-86*, Washington DC: World Bank, 1986, for col. 1, years 1982-84; See R E Feinberg *op. cit.* for 1985. Col. 2 from R Ffrench-Davies and R E Feinberg, *op. cit.* based on information from IBRD and Bank for International Settlements; (2) includes only banks from industrialised countries.

If 'voluntary' loans are not resumed soon, the debtor countries will have to enter into repeated negotiations. The present policy of maintaining a 'short leash', as well as the constant process of renegotiation, will entail a prolonging of the instability, uncertainty and short horizons that debtor countries have had to endure.⁹

The October 1986 projections of the IMF for Latin America assumed that in 1986-87 the disbursed outstanding loans from private creditors would grow by a scant 1.4 per cent as opposed to an 11 per cent increase

⁸ See R E Feinberg, 'La deuda latinoamericana: renegociando el costo del ajuste', in R Ffrench-Davies and R E Feinberg (eds), *Mas allá de la crisis de la deuda*, Diálogo Interamericano, Ediciones CIEPLAN, Santiago, 1986; Illinois, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press (forthcoming).

⁹ The amortisation instalments due to banks, based on debt commitments recorded by IBRD, *op. cit.*, would reach to approximately US\$40 billion in 1988. This figure has not been adjusted by the renegotiations completed in 1985 and 1986, covering amortisations due in 1988.

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from official sources.¹⁰ As a counterpart, the IMF estimates an average Libor rate of 6.7 per cent for 1986-91 (associated with inflation rates of 3.3 per cent).¹¹

In spite of the diminished bank interest rates projected for 1986-87, which were consistent with the fall recorded in the Libor and prime rates in late 1986 but are clearly below those currently in force and foreseen by April 1987, the net flow of funds is likely to continue to be markedly negative throughout the period observed. Even taking into account the net loans proposed by the Baker Plan, amounting to some US\$7 billion annually in net financing to the main Third World debtors, Latin America would still continue to be subject to decidedly negative flows. Note that Table 5 shows that annual net transfers would amount to US\$20 billion, according to calculations based on the most recent projections published by the IMF.

The same projections estimate similar transfers for the 1988-91 quadrennium. Almost ten years after the emergence of the crisis, negative transfers to creditor banks would therefore be around US\$20 billion in current prices. Such a negative result is obtained in spite of debtor countries' 'good behaviour' and the rescheduling of most amortisations, while the going market rates of interest remain at nominal levels around 6.5 per cent in US dollars (as compared to the present ones of 7 per cent Libor and 7.75 per cent US prime rate in April 1987).

Meanwhile, the net flow of funds from official sources appear positive, though at very moderate levels. Moderate because the projected rate of increase disbursed of outstanding loans is only 7.2 per cent, while average interest rates are persistently drawing nearer the bank rates. Indeed, it is no longer a question of levels substantially below the private market but merely of marginally lower ones.

Hence, the outflow of interest payments to all creditors, in amounts that triple the net loans, constitutes a 'structural' obstacle to the recovery of economic activity and living standards, the return to higher investment ratios and the resumption of national development in debtor countries.

As discussed below, the negative sign of net flows with creditor

¹⁰ For capital-importing LDCs the rates of increase in DOD, according to IMF, *World Economic Outlook* October 1986, are 2.5 per cent and 6.5 per cent, respectively. This means that Latin America receives a smaller relative contribution from private sources and a larger one from official creditors.

¹¹ The Libor rates assumed by the IMF in the October 1986 *World Economic Outlook* are 7.3 per cent in 1986, 6.2 per cent in 1987 and 6.7 per cent for the 1988-91 period.

banks represents the stronger asset for debtor nations in a drive towards improving their position. Negative transfers, in face of an inflexible attitude on the part of creditors, gives space for unilateral actions to reduce the volume of transfers. This argument is illustrated by the action of Peru in July 1985 and the announcements of Brazil in March 1987.

It is interesting to underscore how the projections of the IMF have changed. For instance, the IMF (1984) foresaw an increase in private loans of 7 per cent per annum between 1986 and 1990; it also estimated drops in nominal interest rates, though smaller than those it now anticipates.¹² Yet in spite of this, the projected net transfers have worsened, even though more than a year-and-a-half has elapsed since the launching of the Baker Plan. In the projection of 1984 it estimated that as far as private creditors were concerned two-thirds of interest payments would be covered by new loans. Table 5,¹³ on the other hand, shows that this coefficient dwindles to one-fifth in the 1986-91 period.¹⁴ That is to say, it is now expected that the debtors will cover with other sources of funds four-fifths of the interest payments accruing to creditor banks.

Somehow, the contributions from official sources, though on a modest scale, are instrumental in aiding the banks to reap larger net transfers of funds in their favour. Doubtless, any increment in the official loans ought to augment the availability of resources—for investment and basic needs—in the debtor economies and not to support the transfers to banks.

The high outflow of funds occurs simultaneously with an increase in

¹² The nominal rates dropped in 1986, with the Libor falling below 6 per cent. This led forecasters to reduce the rates projected. The inflation foreseen is also lower now. Notice that in April 1985, the IMF projected an inflation rate of 4 per cent in 1986 for the industrialised countries. The figure estimated in the October 1986 IMF *World Economic Outlook* went down to 3.3 per cent, measured by the implicit deflator of the GNP of industrialised nations. In the first quarter of 1987 the rate of increase of the consumer price index was 1.1 per cent in twelve months. In 1986 several industrialised countries exhibited deflation of wholesale prices while some countries even achieved the same with respect to consumer prices (i.e. Japan and the Federal German Republic). Owing to its depressing impact on export prices faced by LDCs, this involves increase of the debt burden. The opposite happened in the 1970s when significant inflation in the world economy contributed to an erosion of the burden of debt.

¹³ See R Ffrench-Davis and S Molina, 'Prospects for bank lending in the remainder of the eighties', in *Journal of Developing Planning* (16), New York: United Nations. Table III.3. There comparisons with the projections of the IMF in 1982 are also presented (Table II.1).

¹⁴ There are some problems of comparability with regard to the previous projection, in as much as in Table 5 for 1988-91 the coefficients of all capital-importing LDCs have been used, for lack of disaggregated data for Latin America.

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Table 5: Projected net transfers
(in US\$ billions, annual averages)

	Net loans		Net transfers	
	Private Creditors (1)	Official (2)	Private Creditors (3)	Official (4)
1986-87	4.4	7.6	-20.4	3.1
1988-91	5.1	6.4	-19.6	0.6

Sources: See IMF, *World Economic Outlook*, October 1986. Col. (1) and (2), 1986-87, Table A.47 for Western Hemisphere; 1988-91 calculations based on Table A. 53, utilising the rates projected for the capital-importing developing countries, that assume cumulative rates of annual increase of 1.6 per cent and 7.2 per cent for private and official loans, respectively. Col. (3) based on col. (1) and the nominal interest rates from Table A.53, plus a spread of 1.2 per cent in 1986-87 and of 1 per cent in 1988-91. Col. (4) based on (2) and interest rate of 6.6 per cent for 1986-87 and 6.5 per cent for 1988-91.

the debt of 3 per cent annually between 1985 and 1991.¹⁵ Both phenomena—pronounced negative net transfers and an increase of the debt stock—are related to the prevalence of interest rates at excessively high real levels.

The negative bank flows are not the sole source of financial constraints on LDCs' development during the period after the emergence of the crisis. Flows of foreign investment have also diminished considerably. Projections were made by the IMF and the World Bank and studies realised by the Group of Thirty and by a researcher from the Third World.¹⁶ All of them indicate that the flows of foreign direct investment are expected to be on a modest scale, representing at best merely one-fifth of the projected net capital flows toward the LDCs in the coming years. Furthermore, in several countries the net transfers with foreign investors have turned negative too (net investment flows being smaller than profit remittances). Whatever discourages bank loans is also likely to affect negatively foreign direct investment.¹⁷ Within the

¹⁵ This increase is similar to that of the projected inflation. As it is assumed that the real GDP would rise by approximately 4 per cent, the coefficient $DEBT/GDP$ would improve by that proportion per annum, plus/minus the variation of the real exchange rate of each country.

¹⁶ See the survey by E White, 'Las inversiones extranjeras y la crisis económica en América Latina', in R Ffrench-Davis and R E Feinberg *op. cit.*

¹⁷ For a recent analysis of the behaviour of direct foreign investment see White *op. cit.* Note that the conversion of the debt into shareholding capital on the part of foreign investors does not

framework mentioned, the indiscriminate liberalisation of existing regulations on foreign investment in debtor countries principally serves the purpose of increasing the 'economic rent' of the outstanding stock of FDI.

The adjustment record and the need to modify it¹⁸

The management of the debt crisis has proved costly for the Latin American countries. Proposals such as the Baker Plan have argued that the costs have been due to the significant 'distortions' which have supposedly continued to shield Latin American governments. This rationale can be summarised in a set of reforms that are recommended for practice by debtor nations: to liberalise trade, facilitate the inflow of foreign direct investment, privatise public enterprises and in general, widen the scope of the market. In my judgement, the formula proposed is far too simplistic. It fails to interpret correctly the recent economic history of the semi-industrialised nations, and ignores the conditions required to carry out economic policies truly efficient in societies characterised by incipient processes of democratisation.¹⁹

There are three factors determining so costly an adjustment as the one which has taken place between 1982 and 1986: a) the unfavourable world trade setting; b) the difficulties faced by debtor countries in designing a development strategy consistent with domestic structural adjustment and the actual shortcomings of the world economy; and c) the abrupt cut in the flows of funds from lenders.

Exports and the debt burden

Within the scope of this study, the discussion should focus on the third issue. Yet the three are closely interrelated. An improved export performance following more favourable access to foreign markets would alleviate the shortage of funding.²⁰ Nevertheless, an increased volume of exports involves the use of domestic productive resources. In

enhance per se the *net* flow of capital towards the debtor countries. A situation may even arise where the foreign direct investment, which was to be undertaken in any case, will now be effected by means of promissory notes, resulting in lower net foreign financing.

¹⁸ As pointed out at the beginning the issues covered in this section are analysed in depth in the essays, comments and panels contained in R Ffrench-Davis and R F Feinberg *op. cit.*

¹⁹ See the articles by Dornbusch, Ffrench-Davis and Foxley in R Ffrench-Davis and R E Feinberg *op. cit.*

²⁰ The depressed situation of the markets together with the export drive undertaken by the majority of debtor countries are factors that have undoubtedly contributed to the deterioration of commodity prices.

this sense, for instance, a larger volume of exports to counterbalance stepped-up transfers to the banks cannot be a matter of indifference to a debtor country.

In other words, a more favourable international climate for exports is required, and in this the improvement of prices is decisive. However, it must be assured that the returns are channelled mainly into boosting national development, and not destined to support transfers to creditors in the magnitudes recorded in recent years, and foreseeable in the future if debtors do not decide to change the present framework for negotiations.

Conditionality and domestic policies

The second issue refers to adjustment policies and conditionality.

There is current agreement on the surface (to employ the terminology used by the advocates of different approaches) for the need for structural adjustment. This agreement on rhetoric was not the case only a few months ago when the official stand did not recognise the need for 'structural adjustments' in order to achieve constructive progress. Still, the substance of the policy approach apparently implied by the Baker Plan differs drastically from the real requirements of the region.

It seems to me that we should visualise a form of structural adjustment that also seeks to develop exports, substitute imports in an efficient manner and expand savings and investment. Yet by orthodox methods these goals cannot be attained, or may be only barely and partially attained, albeit with great social costs. The example of the monetarist experiments conducted in the Southern Cone during the 1970s, and still enforced in Chile, illustrate the shortcomings and social inefficiency of this approach.

Adjustment was and continues to be necessary. The question is how to render it more efficient, in the sense of being consistent with overall national development. Structural adjustment of the domestic economy involves great difficulties, and persists in being costly even if it is particularly well executed. Therefore, a greater abundance of liquid resources to smooth and make gradual the process of adjustment is bound to result in a high rate of social return. Hence, the importance of modifying the relationship with the creditor banks and of ensuring that the contributions from multilateral institutions and official sources represent effective net transfers to debtor nations rather than additional losses to the banks.

In the course of recent years, however, Latin America has been

transferring a massive volume of resources to the creditor banks in interest payments. The almost US\$30 billion remitted in 1985 implied supplementary US\$40 billion in production foregone: the remittances of the US\$30 billion implied a fall of US\$70 billion in aggregate demand.²¹ Thus, the social cost of each dollar transferred abroad equalled a value of between 2 and 2.5 dollars, a manifestly exorbitant distortion in the use of productive resources.

Given the constraints of external financing, the cost of adjustment is associated with an excessive reduction in expenditure (restrictions on aggregate demand) and an inadequacy or incompleteness in the policies used to restructure the composition of expenditure and of output (switching policies).

To propose an indiscriminate liberalisation of markets in order to face this situation merely implies accentuating the cost of adjustment, because it would tend to curtail the capacity of the government to implement effective reallocative policies. On the other hand, to bring about a positive change under these circumstances involves, in the first place, realising that the capacity of response of the diverse components of demand and production is heterogeneous and, secondly, better understanding the nature of the stimuli to which these structures of demand and production react. There is no doubt that the exchange rate or interest rates, if handled in a sensible manner, can produce positive results (permitting a real interest rate of 40 per cent, for instance, could prove as harmful, or even more so, as allowing a negative one of 40 per cent). Yet the use of these instruments by themselves is limited, since they act with the same force on all sectors, regardless of their specific capacity of response. This is where elements of a structural nature should also be taken into consideration, in order to achieve an adequate policy mix that could be termed 'neostructuralist'.

At this juncture, it is requisite to use the instruments of economic policy, recognising and valuing the structural elements and combining them with both the use of indirect mechanisms (exchange rates, interest rates, tariffs, utility rates, etc.) and the implementation of direct measures in favour of certain domestic objectives (investment by the central government and public enterprises, reallocating the purchasing power of the state, design of effective agricultural and industrial development plans, etc.). The restructuring of supply and demand facilitates an increased utilisation rate of installed productive capacity.

²¹ See Ramon and French-Davis in R French-Davis and R E Feinberg *op. cit.*, pp 233-36 and 245-50.

This, in turn, acts as an incentive towards an increased rate of capital formation.

The decline of the utilisation rate of productive resources—labour and capital—tends to lead to a drop in savings both in the public sector and in households and enterprises. Indeed, the drop in wages, unemployment and the non-utilisation of installed capacity have all gradually weakened the process of domestic saving. Add to this the reversal of the net flow of funds between creditor banks and the debtor nations. The level of investment and savings must be enhanced if reasonable growth rates are to be achieved once again. This is not an easy task to fulfil. Within each country it will be necessary to improve the macroeconomic framework, step up the domestic demand to a more normal level, apply a development strategy fully acceptable to the social forces and reduce the external gap and net transfers abroad. With that end in view, a combination of public and private investment is required. In particular, until the shaking macroeconomic framework becomes consolidated, public investment may help to attract private investment. The pursuit of the forcible privatisation of public enterprises during the present crisis would most probably tend to intensify that crisis.

In contrast, excepting cases of arbitrary and erratic interventionism which exist to a point, the formula of moving systematically towards free trade, of methodically selling public enterprises and of accentuating the passivity of the state to ensure its 'neutrality' contributes, in my opinion, only to enhancing the inflexibility of the relation between external resources (which will continue to remain scant) and economic activity. This leads to a significant rate of under-utilisation, and tends to result in reduced capital formation. All these effects reinforce each other in the short- and medium-term, producing weak and inefficient development.

As an alternative to this approach, which extols the passivity and neutrality of the state, there is another scheme which endeavours to restore a more pronounced if *selective* participation on the part of the state. The point here is to promote the existence of an active though highly selective state, conscious of its capacity as well as of its limitations to act, applying selective policies of relative prices as well as direct action on the structures of demand and production.

On the subject of selectivity in relation to the external sector, I would like to single out three areas of selective policies. One relates to import substitution. The innovative element as far as the historical experience of Latin America is concerned would consist in the substitution of

imports being selective and accompanied by an equally selective promotion of exports. Thus both policies, instead of being competitive, would complement each other.

Another related topic refers to regional integration. Intra-regional trade has experienced an acute decline during the crisis, dropping some 40 per cent since the early 1980s. Thus, there is broad under-utilised scope: there existed marketing channels and productive capacity which at present are not being used. The option of recovering past reciprocal trade transcends bilateral agreements and instead requires a 'structural' multilateral treatment: in fact, a political component is needed, namely the will to integrate and share the future. In addition, once the countries have overcome their misgivings, this policy would enable them to take advantage of their installed capacity and henceforth create new productive bases. The object is to avoid in the 1980s a return to the unstable trade agreements of the 1950s, which as a rule were of short-term duration. Latin America must lay down the groundwork for a more permanent and constructive type of cooperation. All this requires the concerted efforts of public and private enterprises in the context of an enhanced selective activity on the part of central governments.

The third aspect concerns the topic of transnational enterprises. These are not likely to solve the finance dilemma of Latin America; as discussed above, at best their contributions in capital could help to alleviate a tenth or a fifth of the external gap. Consequently, the importance of the transnational enterprises lies in another sphere: that of facilitating access to technology and to otherwise inaccessible markets. The experience of Latin American countries more advanced in this respect, such as Brazil, indicates that it is possible to obtain positive results when resorting to transnational enterprises as a mechanism to capture or conquer some segment of the external markets. The target is that these enterprises, in exchange for taking advantage of the host domestic markets (of one or of a group of countries), come forward with an effective contribution towards gaining access to new foreign markets. Once again we are faced with a task that demands organisation and selectivity on the part of the public sector.

The convergence of strategic elements developed at a direct and central level and the appropriate use of the price system, selectively and coherently applied, will contribute to a better utilisation of productive resources, and to the creation of a more propitious atmosphere for investment. In recessive markets, where the level of output per capita

has fallen by 6 or 9 per cent in a lapse of five or six years, the climate for investment is less than stimulating, and the scant private resources are siphoned off in the acquisition of public enterprises for privatisation. The recovery of investment claims the convergence of the concerted action of the public and private sectors. From this standpoint, dogmatic anti-statism could turn out to be the worst enemy of any efficient performance of the public sector and of a vigorous private sector.

Restructuring debtor-creditor relations

The third issue is that of the relations with creditors.

The crucial problem here concerns the magnitude of interest payments resulting from a high stock of debt and the high real interest rates relative to historical ones. Generally speaking, the creditor banks have been receiving interest payments at the current market rates. Indeed, the creditor banks have not suffered significant direct losses as a result of the critical situation which they helped to create.

There are diverse proposals, examined in studies by various authors,²² which aim to make the banks share, to an extent, the costs of a situation for which they are partly responsible. Without analysing in detail each type of proposal, it can be affirmed that the point at issue consists in reconciling three elements: a) the reality of the market; b) the need of the debtor countries to resume their development; and c) the contribution towards the 'normal' functioning of the international banking system or of a segment of it.

Ever since 1982, over-optimistic estimates have assumed—year after year—that the banks would soon renew 'voluntary loans'. The experience gained indicates how dubious it is that this will occur in a generalised way in the near future. This, then, is the 'reality' of the market and the sooner it is recognised the better for debtor nations, and presumably for producers of exportables in creditor countries.

To restore development involves allowing the debtor country to choose its own development strategy, mitigating the restrictions imposed by external financing constraints, lessening the effects of instability resulting from external factors²³ and lengthening the time horizon of rescheduling and new financing.

²² See ECLAC, 'Políticas de ajuste y renegociación de la deuda externa en América Latina', *Cuadernos de la CEPAL* (Santiago) (48); and F Bergstein, W Cline and J Williamson, 'Bank Lending to developing countries: the policy alternatives', *Policy Analysis in International Economics* (10) 1985, Washington DC: Institute for International Economics.

²³ Incorporating working 'contingency' clauses into debt negotiations and debt servicing might be a way of attenuating the effects of external instability, as in the cases of Mexico and Venezuela.

The drive towards a normal functioning of financial markets faced by LDCs makes it necessary to distinguish between the different components of the bank debt; in particular, it should be pointed out that the prospects for 'normalisation' of trade credits are better than for the other components of the bank debt of developing nations.²⁴ Therefore trade credit, and other *new net* loans, should be liable to current market interest rates and spreads. The remainder of the bank debt, on the other hand, should either be subject to drastically reduced interest rates and/or significant proportion of the balance of the debt should be written-off.²⁵

The magnitude of the net transfers in favour of the banks is the debtors' great potential bargaining leverage. Latin America annually makes net transfers to the banks instead of receiving funds. Consequently, the argument of many analysts that a tougher position of debtor nations could imperil their access to bank financing is notably outmoded: Latin America actually lost that access in the early 1980s, and will probably remain for a long period without access to net funding.

The crucial drawback for debtors is, of course, the eventual loss of trade credit. This is the strong bargaining asset for bank creditors, an asset representing roughly 10 per cent of the debt, while the strong asset for debtors is the captive debt (the remaining 90 per cent) and the periodical transfers that debtors are in a position to stop or reduce drastically.

As long as nations where creditor banks are based remain inflexible on the maintenance of market terms for interest payments, debtor countries will increasingly tend to be forced to act on their own, in isolation or collectively. I think that isolated action is more probable, but with each country learning more and more from each other's experience. In that sense, the Peruvian treatment of the debt service is illustrative. It is a positive example of how the debt service can be reduced drastically, without repudiating the debtor's liabilities, yet improving significantly the availability of net foreign financing and potential development prospects. However, those steps are not the solution, but a movement toward a solution.

The stable solution would need an overall change in the framework in

²⁴ As already mentioned, short-term credit (which includes so-called trade credit), only represents a tenth of the total debt.

²⁵ The proposal made by Senator Bradley of the USA, for instance, embraces both components. See *International Herald Tribune* 30 June 1986, and R Dornbusch 'La economía mundial: tópicos de interés para América Latina', in R French-Davis and R E Feinberg, *op. cit.*, p 31.

which specific bilateral negotiations are conducted. The change must be made multilaterally, with creditors and governments or creditor and debtor nations. The new framework would include broadly extended maturity terms for rescheduling, interest payments below market rates, some write-offs particularly of private debts contracted originally without public guaranty and contingency clauses. Net lending by multilateral banks should be increased and conditionality revised, in order to encourage rather than impede development. The approaches implicit in conditionality should be defined with the explicit and decisive participation of the Third World.

All changes would not be free and easy. They need courage, creativity and responsibility, with a good dose of organisation and cooperation among Third World nations. Utopia? It will depend to a large degree on LDCs themselves, but also on the existence of less 'unilateralism' in the North.

FRANCES STEWART

Money and South-South cooperation

Monetary arrangements may sound technical and of subsidiary significance. The production and distribution of goods and services are what matter for the pattern of development. From this perspective it would appear that the important international arrangements are those that regulate flows of goods and services and of investment, technology and labour: trade agreements, and rules or codes of conduct concerning investment, technology and labour would appear to take precedence over monetary arrangements. The experience and achievements of South-South agreements seem to exemplify this view: there have been more, and more effective, agreements on trade and investment than on money, and where monetary arrangements have been undertaken they have, typically, been introduced as a supplement to trade arrangements.

But a brief look at the world today shows how fundamentally mistaken this view of priorities is: money dominates economic affairs. The debt crisis—which is basically a monetary matter, being concerned with flows of finance and their repayment—is of overriding importance to most countries in Latin America and Africa and some in Asia. The International Monetary Fund (IMF)—the nearest we have to a world central bank—is now the central policymaker in two-thirds of the countries of Africa and Latin America. The collapsing exchange rate of the dollar threatens to bring about a trade war between the US and Japan, and possibly a world financial collapse. These events have a dramatic impact on countries in the Third World—in many cases far greater than that of their domestic plans and their own monetary policies. Yet in such areas they are virtually powerless—victims of decisions taken elsewhere, in which their interests are ignored completely or given very little weight. Decisions on the exchange rates of the major currencies are taken without regard to their effects on the Third World. Despite much pleading, the country-by-country approach to the debt crisis has been devised to rescue the major Western banks, with little concern for the Third World. Developing countries, which are overwhelmingly those most affected by IMF decisions, have a voice but no power over its decisions.

Monetary constraints and possibilities are also of decisive influence on South-South trade and investment, setting the limits to the effectiveness of trade agreements. This itself represents a powerful argument for Third World countries to support collective monetary arrangements. But there is more at stake than this. Third World countries need to take a more active role in monetary arrangements so that they can cease to be passive recipients (typically victims) of decisions taken elsewhere, and can instead begin to control events in their own interests. In the forty years since Bretton Woods—years in which the majority of Third World countries acquired political independence—there have been a number of attempts to develop South-South monetary arrangements on a regional basis. On the whole these have been successful in relation to their aims. But while this progress has been important, it has hardly impinged on the broader issues of control. Northern domination remains as strong as ever in monetary matters, and this domination reinforces Northern power over policymaking in Third World countries, over trade and investment, and even over politics.

South monetary arrangements, then, can be viewed at two distinct levels: in terms of their impact on trade and development within the region they encompass; and in terms of their effects in countering Northern domination. The two are by no means unrelated, but it is helpful to start by considering them separately. The aim of this article is to review the achievements of South-South cooperation at both levels: to consider the potential and past achievements in promoting Southern development through South-South flows of trade and investment; and to discuss how the South might develop monetary cooperation as a means of securing greater independence from Northern domination. The article concludes by suggesting specific institutional arrangements which would help greater realisation of the potential in the area of monetary cooperation.

To start with, it will be helpful to review some of the major functions of international monetary arrangements, and how these have developed over recent decades.

Functions of international monetary arrangements

International monetary arrangements can be viewed as institutions which reproduce internationally the functions that are performed

domestically by national currencies, commercial banks and government authorities, through the activities of the Central Bank.

Generally, within each country there is a single currency that is accepted as a means of payment for all transactions. In addition, commercial banks provide credit which facilitates transactions, and the central bank supports the commercial sector, being prepared to be 'lender-of-the-last-resort'. The central bank thereby prevents catastrophic bank failures, and it can also ensure adequate liquidity in the economy through its power of creating money. The system facilitates production and trade. There is no problem of currency inconvertibility, as there can be between countries, since there is only one currency. Similarly, problems of exchange rate fluctuations and uncertainty, which may also inhibit trade, are automatically ruled out. Assuming adequate but not excessive credit creation, the national monetary system provides the conditions for specialisation, production and exchange, and hence for growth and development.

International currency areas—generally associated with empires (both of the colonial and neo-colonial variety) and their aftermath—have much the same conditions as national currency systems, with a single currency (or if more than one, fixed exchange rates and full convertibility) and credit creation controlled by the imperial central bank. While this system has some of the virtues of a national system, it has disadvantages which have led most countries (other than those in the franc zone) to reject it soon after gaining political independence. First, it means that only the imperial centre controls credit creation, and the other countries have to accept whatever is decided there. Secondly, the exchange rate of each country *vis-à-vis* the rest of the world outside the currency area is determined by the imperial exchange rate. Thirdly, there can be no change in the exchange rate of a country with respect to the rest of the currency area. Each of these factors can severely inhibit development. In a national system, there may be other policies to compensate weaker members (e.g. tax and investment policies). In an imperial type system, this is less likely, and if it does apply, control tends to be with the centre. Probably, the decisive objection to the system, however, is symbolic: it is obvious that independence is only nominal in such a system. For most countries, the trappings of independence include separate currencies, national central banks, independently determined exchange rates. Yet once these are instituted, there immediately follows a need for international monetary arrangements, because without such arrangements trade may

be highly restricted except within national boundaries. Lack of currency convertibility between countries, the absence of credit to facilitate trade across boundaries, and exchange rate uncertainties all inhibit and may even prevent international trade flows.

For many Third World countries, a complete interruption of international trade could be near disastrous—more so than for most industrialised countries—for two reasons. In the first place, the very small size of most Third World economies (to be analysed more fully below) makes autarky very expensive. Secondly, their economies—partly as a consequence of the colonial experience with its single currency area and near-free-trade policies—were highly specialised when they became independent. Apart from food for self-subsistence, the production of many countries was concentrated on one or two primary products, for which the domestic market was almost non-existent. To diversify and industrialise, imports were essential. To make use of their inherited specialisation, and to earn foreign exchange to pay for the imports, they needed to export. Consequently, international monetary arrangements were necessary to permit trade and payments across countries.

The functions of international monetary arrangements, then, are to ease international trade and payments, given the existence of national currencies and national exchange rates. Broadly they may be categorised as (i) securing currency convertibility and/or providing an internationally acceptable means of payment. This function provides for the international counterpart of a national currency; (ii) providing international liquidity. Provision of liquidity to countries in foreign exchange difficulties can promote a greater degree of exchange rate stability, and prevent drastic trade-restricting action in response to temporary problems. Liquidity creation is also needed to ensure adequate levels of international liquidity and prevent liquidity shortages from depressing economic expansion and trade. The liquidity function represents the international aspect of the credit creation and lender-of-the-last-resort functions of national central banks; and (iii) providing international credit to help to finance international transactions. This is the function that is normally performed domestically by commercial banks.

Formal mechanisms are not always necessary to generate arrangements or institutions which perform these functions. Over the last forty years, a host of mechanisms have developed, some formal, the majority informal, to meet the international needs created by the

change from imperial currency areas to domestic currency systems among Third World countries. Formal institutions include the IMF, which provides international liquidity in the form of access to quotas and the creation of Special Drawing Rights (SDRs), and official export credit agencies in developed countries, which provide trade credit. There have also been regional monetary arrangements including those between Third World countries, to be discussed later. Informal mechanisms include the use of the dollar as a trading currency, and using dollars, other industrialised countries' currencies and gold as a source of foreign exchange reserves and international liquidity; as well as credit extended by commercial banks and companies to finance international trade and investment.

In one way or another, each of the three functions of international monetary arrangements has been fulfilled to some degree. But there have been major problems with the way in which they have been fulfilled. First, important functions have not been satisfactorily performed. This is especially true of the liquidity function, where levels of international liquidity have been very inadequate,¹ leading to a strongly deflationary bias in the world economy; and the lender-of-the-last-resort function has not been performed at all, thus putting the whole financial system at risk during the debt crisis.² The South has suffered from the excessive deflation, and the cautious view taken towards the debt situation, which have resulted from these deficiencies in international monetary arrangements. However, the second set of problems with the way in which international monetary arrangements have evolved is of even greater relevance to the discussion here. All the mechanisms have been directed towards North-South transactions, not South-South, and at the same time each mechanism has been dominated by the North which has retained much the same power as it had in the colonial system. This will become clearer with a more detailed discussion of how the three functions are performed.

Third World trade, for the most part, is dominated in dollars or some other industrialised country's currency, whether the trade is with the North or with other Third World countries. In general, payments for the sale of goods or for purchases are also made in such a currency, again whoever the trade is with. The only exception near to this near universal

¹ J Williamson, 'A new SDR allocation?', Washington, DC: Institute for International Finance, 1984.

² M Lipton and S Griffith-Jones (1984) 'International lenders of the last resort: are changes required?', Midland Bank Occasional Paper, No. 1.

rule is where there are specific regional payment arrangements, or countertrade arrangements (where the goods may be paid for with goods). Thus the international means of payment are Northern currencies.

The international liquidity function is performed formally by the IMF. Voting power in the IMF is determined mainly in relation to size of national quotas. This means that the USA alone has 19.3 per cent of the voting power. The USA, European countries and Japan together have more than half the voting power. One-third of the votes are needed to veto a decision, i.e. an alliance of the USA and three European countries is sufficient. Informal liquidity creation is a function of US monetary policy, as long as dollars are accepted as means of payment and international reserves. Both formal and informal mechanisms for international liquidity creation are therefore controlled in the North. The irony is that this is true even where it is South-South trade and payments for which the liquidity is needed.

Credit for trade and investment is provided by Northern export credit agencies (which are often subsidised by their governments) and commercial banks whose headquarters, regulatory procedures and owners are located in the North. The main exception here—apart from some regional arrangements—is the growth of international banks based in, or financed by, the Middle East. But these are of minor magnitude compared with the activities of Northern banks. Again, besides trade with the North which forms the bulk of their business, Northern banks also finance much of the trade within and between Third World countries—trade which, aside from the financing, has nothing to do with the North, but which can be stopped or promoted by decisions made by Northern banks.

The dominance of Northern institutions in monetary arrangements reinforces trading links between North and South, and gives no encouragement to the development of intra-South trading links. The biases in the international monetary system as it has evolved, with the institutional dependency which reinforces and creates other forms of dependency, themselves provide a very strong case for promoting Southern financial arrangements. But there is also a more positive case: monetary arrangements within the South could promote a dynamic, efficient and independent pattern of development.

Advantages of South-South trade

The historic—and current—biases which have favoured North-South trade and have discriminated against South-South trade justify corrective action. These biases are not only monetary, as described above, but include almost every element which facilitates trade—transport, insurance, technology, communications and culture. More positively, trade between Third World countries permits small and underdeveloped economies to exploit economies of scale, specialisation and learning, while maintaining some protection against competition from advanced economies which—if there were free trade—would limit or prevent any form of industrialisation for some countries.

The very small size of many Third World countries needs to be emphasised. It is not only a question of small populations—though this is true for many countries. Thirty-four members of the UN have populations of below 1 million, and another thirty-one have populations of between 1 and 5 million. But low per capita incomes, with a low proportion of those incomes spent on manufactured products, mean that the domestic market for manufacturing output is typically a fraction of the size of that of developed countries. This fact, together with the early stage of development, leads to very small manufacturing sectors in many countries. This is illustrated in Table 1, which excludes countries

Table 1: Size of manufacturing sector in Third World countries 1984
(\$ million, Gross Value Added)

40,000 and over (over 42% of UK manufacturing sector)	Brazil 50,525 Mexico 41,112
20-25,000 (21.4%-26.7% of UK)	Republic of Korea 24,702 India 24,340 Argentina 22,863
7-12,000 (7.5%-12.8% of UK)	Turkey 11,390 Venezuela 8,550 Philippines 8,210 Saudi Arabia 7,657
5-7,000 (5.3%-7.5% of UK)	Colombia 6,192 Malaysia 5,563 Pakistan 5,546 Greece 5,319
3-5,000 (3.2%-5.2% of UK)	Peru 4,698 Singapore 4,555 Chile 4,150

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1-3,000 (1.1%-3.2% of UK)	Nigeria	2,938
	Morocco	2,261
	Ecuador	1,875
	Kuwait	1,737
	Zimbabwe	1,236
	Libya	1,222
	Ivory Coast	1,137
500-1,000 (0.5%-1.1% of UK)	Tunisia	972
	Dominican Republic	933
	Cameroon	858
	Sri Lanka	760
	Bolivia	722
	Nicaragua	708
	Paraguay	658
	El Salvador	651
	Kenya	617
	Zambia	554
	Burma	552
	Jordan	515
100-500 (0.1%-0.5% of UK)	Ethiopia	450
	Senegal	430
	Jamaica	428
	Honduras	426
	Panama	409
	Yemen A.R.	265
	Ghana	224
	Mauritius	146
	Congo Republic	121
Under 100 (under 0.1% of UK)	Nepal	92
	Botswana	69
	Liberia	69
	Sierra Leone	54
	Central African Republic	45
	Togo	43
	Guinea	42

Source: World Bank, *World Development Report 1986*, Washington DC.

with population below 1 million. Twenty-eight countries have manufacturing sectors which are less than US\$1 million in value added, or less than 0.18 per cent of the US manufacturing sector (less than 1 per cent of the UK manufacturing sector). This small size makes it impossible for countries to exploit economies of scale and specialisation. A study in 1969 estimated that only eight of thirty-eight manufacturing industries would be efficient at a scale of production of 1

per cent of the UK market or below, while half the industries would only be efficient with more than half the UK market.³ Economies of scale tend to increase with technological change over time, so it is likely that efficient size has grown since then. Some industries may be efficiently produced in small developing economies, but only if there is just one firm and one plant. This means there is a lack of competition, which is liable to result in inefficiency, and also that consumers can only enjoy a single type of product.

One of Adam Smith's most important statements was that 'Specialisation is limited by the extent of the market.' And the reverse is also true: the market depends on specialisation, because specialisation produces increasing productivity through economies of scale and learning. Small and underdeveloped economies are thus trapped in a vicious circle. Because of their small size, they cannot raise productivity through increased specialisation. Moreover, they also lack industrial experience which is another important aid to improved productivity. Consequently, they cannot compete in international markets. Protection is therefore introduced to offset these disadvantages and permit industrialisation. But protection confines the economy to the size of its own market and therefore prevents specialisation and economies of scale.

Countries in the early stages of industrialisation need to extend their markets without having their industrial sectors totally undermined by competition from the industrialised countries. Trade between Third World economies achieves this: it extends the market and therefore the scope for specialisation, without destroying it. It permits countries to combine variety in their consumption, with specialisation in their production. It generates intra-industry trade—with different plants specialising in the production of different parts of a product—which is the quintessential feature of specialisation, and formed the core of the massive expansion in trade that occurred in Europe after the Second World War. It is also conducive to the development and adoption of more appropriate technology, since Third World markets offer potential for appropriate products designed for low-income consumers, and appropriate techniques are thus less likely to be rendered obsolete because they fail to produce the sort of sophisticated products demanded among high-income consumers in advanced countries.

Some Third World countries have overcome the disadvantages of

³ C F Pratten, *Economics of Scale in Manufacturing Industry*, London: Cambridge University Press, 1971.

very small size—nine countries have markets which are 5 per cent or more of the UK market, five of which are more than 20 per cent of the UK market. Most of these countries compete successfully in world markets, and do not face the dilemmas just described. But these economies today face other problems, for which trade with the South may offer a solution. First, the consequences of slowdown in growth in the North require a search for a new 'engine of growth'. For a variety of reasons—some to do with sociological and technological factors, and some related to society's objectives and policies—the 'old' industrialised countries are likely to grow more slowly than the 'new' industrialised countries would like to, and could, given fast-growing trading partners. These countries would find it easier to realise their growth objectives and potential through focusing on trade with each other. This is the argument put forward by Sir Arthur Lewis⁴ in favour of South-South trade. Secondly, and not unrelated to this, most of the countries in this group (in fact two-thirds) are in severe financial difficulties, largely because of debt-servicing problems. These countries are unable to buy imports essential for growth because they lack foreign exchange, are unable to sell their goods to earn foreign exchange in the North because of sluggish and protected markets, and are unable to sell their goods in the South because most Southern countries are also suffering from foreign exchange difficulties. The result is slow (or negative) growth. Trade with each other would permit faster growth for all.

South-South monetary arrangements

The functions of international monetary arrangements were described earlier. In summary, the main purpose is to facilitate trade. A large number of South-South monetary arrangements have been established on a regional basis, over the past quarter of a century. While the historic biases against South-South trade and the obstacles to its expansion extend well beyond monetary matters, monetary arrangements are a powerful and essential support for trading agreements.⁵

Three types of monetary arrangement have been instituted: clearing arrangements (typically also involving some credit), multilateral credit arrangements for balance-of-payments support, and monetary unions.

⁴ Sir W Arthur Lewis 'The slowing down of the engine of growth', *American Economic Review* 70(3) 1980, pp 555-64.

⁵ T A Medina, (1983) 'Monetary and payments agreements among developing countries' in B Paulic, R Uranga, B Cizelj and M Svetlicic (eds) *The Challenges of South-South Cooperation*

Complete monetary integration—which is rare, but there are two instances in Africa—performs both functions. Multilateral clearing arrangements aim to encourage trade within the area by multilateralising payments, making greater use of local currencies in trade between members, economising on 'hard' currencies, and extending credit among members. For example, before the establishment of the West African Clearing House the 'principal channel for effecting settlements [was] through the region's commercial banks. They in turn settle[d] in convertible currencies through correspondent banks in the major financial centres of Western Europe, and the United States'.⁶ By replacing this system, the Clearing House reduced the use of foreign exchange for transactions within the region, and also the transaction costs incurred by Western commercial banks. The second type of arrangement provides mutual support for temporary disequilibria in countries' balance of payments. Some of these arrangements involve formal pooling of part of countries' foreign exchange reserves. These schemes are not directed at intra-regional trade, but at mutual support, performing like a mini-IMF, with the resources of the associated countries.

A. Multilateral clearing arrangements include:

- 1) The Central American Clearing House (1961): this is a mechanism for multilateral clearing and reciprocal credits established by the central banks of Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua. The purpose is to expedite monetary transfers within the region and to support the Central American Common Market (CACM).
- 2) Reciprocal Payment and Credit System of the Latin American Free Trade Association (LAFTA) (1965): this agreement is between Argentina, Brazil, Bolivia, Colombia, Chile, Ecuador, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru, the Dominican Republic, Uruguay and Venezuela, with the aim of achieving the orderly settlement of balances, and the extension of some credit between members.
- 3) The West African Clearing House (1975): the agreement includes the members of the West African Monetary Union together with Cape Verde, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, and Sierra Leone. There is a common unit of account for trade between members and

⁶ P. Robson, *Integration, Development and Equity, Economic Integration in West Africa*, London: George Allen and Unwin, 1983.

transactions between members are debited/credited in the centralised clearing system, with the outstanding balances settled periodically. Additional credit, above that arising between settlement dates, is not provided. The system is intended to encourage use of local currencies for intra-regional trade, thereby economising on hard currencies and encouraging intra-regional trade.

- 5) The Asian Clearing Union (1974): this provides multilateral clearing for commodities traded between Bangladesh, Burma, India, Iran, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka. National currencies can be used so that members economise on foreign exchange reserves.
- 6) The Multilateral Clearing Facility of the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) (1977) covers Barbados, Belize, ECCA, Guyana, Jamaica, and Trinidad and Tobago, and as with the others involves multilateral clearing facilities and the use of national currencies for approved transactions. It is intended to support the CARICOM trade arrangements.
- 7) The Central Africa Clearing House (1979) between Zaire and the Central African States provides for multilateral clearing.
- 8) The Monetary Arrangement of the Economic Community of the Great Lakes (1978) has clearing arrangements supporting the Economic Community of the Great Lakes covering Burundi, Rwanda and Zaire.

B. Multilateral balance of payments support arrangements include:

- 1) The Central African Monetary Stabilisation Fund (1969) established among five central African states to provide financial assistance to correct temporary disequilibria in the balance of payments of member countries.
- 2) The Multilateral Mutual Assistance Agreement to correct Temporary Deficiencies of Liquidity (1969) for mutual assistance among LAFTA members.
- 3) The Central American Stabilisation Fund (1969).
- 4) The Arab Monetary Fund (1976), which has twenty-one members, aims to coordinate monetary systems with the objective of greater monetary and economic integration, as well as providing balance-of-payments assistance among members.
- 5) The Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) Swap Agreement (1977) including Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Brunei.

- 6) The Andean Reserve Fund (1976) among the five members of the Cartagena Agreement.

C. Monetary Unions include:

- 1) The West African Monetary Union (1962) covering six countries—Benin, Burkina Faso, Ivory Coast, Niger, Senegal and Togo. These countries have formed an integrated monetary area, with a freely circulating common currency which is pegged to the franc, and a common central bank, which holds the foreign exchanges of members in a common pool.
- 2) The Central African Monetary Union (1972) comprising Chad, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Congo and Gabon, which operates on similar principles.

Assessment

It is apparent from this brief review that there has been considerable progress in instituting monetary arrangements among Third World countries. Over half the countries in the South have been affected in one way or other. Each of the three major functions delineated above has been performed in one or other arrangement, i.e. means of international payment, liquidity creation, and credit for international transactions. The Clearing House Mechanism had been most extensive—this performs the means of payment function and typically involves some credit, but not normally a great deal. The mutual balance-of-payments support schemes effectively add to countries' liquidity.

It is not possible to make a definitive assessment of the schemes because (i) they have typically been associated with other attempts to promote intra-regional trade, particularly agreements on tariff liberalisation; indeed their major function is to support such measures; and (ii) in recent years, there has been a marked deterioration in the financial and trading environment for most countries. That being said, it seems the schemes were fairly successful while times were 'normal' in the 1960s and 1970s, but do not seem to have been able to counter the effects of the crisis of the 1980s. There were two aspects to their success in the 1960s and 1970s: first, the various schemes accumulated functions and members over time and were not limited or disbanded. In this respect they differed from trade agreements, which in some cases had a more chequered history, with some retreat and occasional complete breakdown. Secondly, South-South trade in general expanded fast over

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this period, and particularly intra-regional trade to which these schemes (together with trading agreements) have been directed.

South-South trade grew rapidly over the 1960s and 1970s, with the share of manufactures in the total growing from about 5 per cent of all South-South exports in the early 1960s to 30 per cent by 1980. (See Tables 2 and 3.)

Table 2: Growth in export volume, % p.a.

	1962-73	1973-80
<i>All exports</i>		
South to South	9.0	4.3
South to North	11.0	-1.4
North to South	7.1	10.2
North to North	11.1	3.6
<i>Manufactures</i>		
South to South	17.6	20.7
South to North	21.2	10.2
North to South	6.9	10.1
North to North	12.4	3.9

Source: Newson and Wall, *op. cit.*

Table 3: % of total exports going to developing countries

From	1960	1984
Low-income (excluding China and India)	29	30
China and India	25	44
Lower middle-income	25	32
Upper middle-income	17	33

Source: World Bank, *World Development Report*, 1984 and 1986, Washington DC.

From 1973 to 1980, South-South trade in manufactures grew faster than any other category of trade, growing at a rate of 20.7 per cent per annum, compared with 10.2 per cent (South-North), 10.1 per cent (North-South) and 4.1 per cent (North-North). But in the 1980s, the cutbacks in imports into Third World countries necessitated by the crisis have hit South-South trade more heavily than other forms of trade, and

South-South trade has fallen as a percentage of world trade and as a percentage of Southern exports.⁷

South-South trade is concentrated within regions. For example, one quarter of Latin America's exports went to other developing countries in 1980; of those exports going to developing countries, four-fifths went to other Latin American countries, and one-fifth to Asia and Africa. Similar ratios apply to Asia. Africa has a much lower proportion of exports going to developing countries (7 per cent in 1980), and a lower share of these are intra-regional (under 30 per cent). However, the rate of expansion in South-South trade in manufactures from 1965 to 1980 was roughly the same for intra and inter-regional exports. This was presumably the outcome of two opposing tendencies: on the one hand, rising income within OPEC countries led to growth in inter-regional trade; on the other, the various monetary and trade arrangements promoted intra-regional trade.

Evidence on the combined effect of specific monetary and trade agreements shows that, in general, intra-regional trade rose as a proportion of the total trade of the region in areas with agreements.⁸ For example, among LAFTA countries, trade among members grew six-fold and in manufactures twenty-fold between 1961 and 1974. The Andean Pact liberalisation efforts were found to have increased intra-regional trade, especially in non-traditional exports. The rate of increase of trade among countries of the Central American Common Market rose by over half following its establishment, with an increasing share taken by manufactures. Positive effects on intra-regional trade have also been found for the CARICOM countries, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the Central African Customs and Economic Union.

Each of the cases which have succeeded in increasing intra-regional trade has combined monetary and trade arrangements. This is what one would expect, since monetary arrangements will have little effect unless accompanied by tariff and non-tariff liberalisation. Their prime role—from the perspective of increasing intra-regional trade—is to permit such liberalisation to take place at less risk of causing monetary problems. In addition, such arrangements permit economy of foreign exchange reserves which should have a generally beneficial effect on

⁷ M Newson and D Wall, 'Policy and institutional obstacles to South-South trade in manufactures', UNIDO/IS. 584, 1985.

⁸ *Ibid.*

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levels of income among members, as well as reducing the need to seek outside help (e.g. from the IMF).

However, in the 1980s there has been a dramatic fall in intra-regional trade in Latin America. Trade within the region (excluding fuel) fell from a peak of 18.8 per cent of total trade in 1979 (rising from 11.6 per cent in 1970) to 9.3 per cent in 1984, the major fall occurring in 1982-83.⁹ This huge fall reveals the weakness of the monetary schemes during crisis. In principle, this was a time when there was special advantage to intra-regional trade, which could compensate for declining world trade, and could potentially provide a trade which made minimum use of the increasingly scarce 'hard' currency needed for debt servicing. Two factors explain the decline. The most important was the collapse in incomes and imports that occurred at this time in Latin America. Latin American imports as a whole fell by considerably more than those of any other region—with a drop of 17.7 per cent in 1982 and of 22.3 per cent in 1983, compared with a fall of 0.4 per cent and a rise of 4.6 per cent for all industrialised countries, and a fall of 3.7 per cent in US imports in 1982 and a rise of 13.0 per cent in 1983. This collapse in imports in Latin America, which was due to the stringencies of the debt crisis, meant that countries within the region found the markets of other countries sharply reduced, and this had little to do with monetary arrangements. The monetary arrangements, however, proved inadequate to offset these forces. This was due to the fact that for the most part imbalances in payments in the region were financed with hard currencies, so that countries were as cautious in restricting purchases from each other as from other sources, while some forms of credit that were not on offer in intra-regional trade were available in trade with the North. If regional payment arrangements are to protect intra-regional trade at times of general foreign exchange crisis, then it is essential that the imbalances within the region are not financed by dollars or other hard currency, but by credit with the payments union, or a non-convertible Latin American currency, a 'Peso'. (The Andean Reserve Fund has already issued such an 'Andean Peso', but on a limited scale, and with quite tight restrictions on its use.)

Broadly then, in the 1960s and 1970s the regional monetary arrangements within the South can be regarded as a significant achievement, in complete contradiction to the widely-propagated myth

⁹ J A Ocampo, 'Financial aspects of intra-regional trade in Latin America', *Fedesarrollo*, February 1987.

that unity among the South is all talk and no action. While the experience of the 1980s has revealed problems, countries in Latin America are now beginning to consider some strengthening of arrangements in response to these problems. There is considerable potential for further developments in regional payment arrangements—with respect to country coverage, and the content of the agreements. In particular, clearing house arrangements need to place much greater emphasis on credit creation for trade between members while mutual balance-of-payments support schemes could be extended in country coverage and in the quality of assistance provided.

Some of the schemes aim eventually at monetary union. While this has major benefits in extending the size of the market, reducing transactions costs, and economising on foreign exchange reserve (especially if trade restrictions are simultaneously abolished within the union), it can also create serious problems for weaker partners, which are not only bad in themselves, but may also prevent the realisation of the union or lead to its break-up. Consequently, monetary union should only be pursued if (i) a system can feasibly be introduced for protecting the weaker partners; and (ii) there is full political support for such close relationships, and for the limitations on sovereignty implied. In the absence of these conditions, less ambitious types of cooperation can be extremely fruitful and are likely to have greater long-term viability.

While there has been progress in regional arrangements, almost nothing has been achieved in the monetary area in terms of Third World countries as a whole. Yet all South monetary arrangements could be of tremendous benefit. In the first place, inter-regional trade is still very small.

The possibilities of developing dynamic export markets among fast-growing countries in different regions are great. An enormous variety of goods is produced within the South, so much so that the less developed countries could get everything they need from other Southern countries. Secondly, developing viable alternative technologies over a wide range of products requires a collective effort across regions. Thirdly, with the debt-led foreign exchange crisis which is so pervasive, South-South trade across regions, making little or no use of Northern currencies, could permit higher growth of output and employment and a higher level of investment. Finally, if the South is to counter the current Northern domination of financial institutions and monetary decisions, effective Southern institutions are needed. The rest of this article describes some possibilities. Each would not only

provide direct benefits to most countries, but would also improve Southern bargaining power on monetary matters.

Monetary arrangements for the South as a whole

Monetary and financial institutions for the South as a whole have been proposed in four areas: the institution of a South Currency or a Payments Union; the development of Commodity Reserves to act as foreign exchange reserves for the South; the institution of a Southern IMF; and a South Bank. There is some potential overlap between the proposals, and any new institution could in principle perform more than one of the proposed functions.

1) *A South Currency or Payments Union*: the proposal for a South currency is for Third World countries to issue their own currency—Rocnabs—for part payment for goods and services exchanged among themselves.¹⁰ By issuing their own currency, liquidity and purchasing power within the South would be increased. Countries' ability to buy imports from other Third World countries would increase, as would the markets for their products in other countries. The financial restraint on trade would be relaxed. The proposal would be equivalent to a Payments Union or Clearing House which offered mutual credit among members. But unlike existing clearing house arrangements it would cover all the South, or as many countries as wished to join, and would involve less administration than a clearing house, which generally requires all transactions among members to be cleared at the centre. The size of the Rocnab issue could be determined accordingly to the liquidity needs and trade potential of the South. The currency would thus permit Southern levels of liquidity and demand to be partially independent of Northern decisions.

The most frequently raised objection to this scheme is that some countries would accumulate Rocnabs—countries in permanent surplus with other countries in the South—while others countries, in chronic deficit with other Third World countries, would soon run out of Rocnabs. To avoid this, there would need to be incentives and penalties designed to encourage long-run balance. To some extent the scheme itself would automatically generate its own incentives, since those accumulated Rocnabs would be wasting purchasing power unless they switched their purchases to the South. But in addition, it would be

¹⁰ F Stewart, and M Stewart 'A new currency for trade among developing countries', *Trade and Development* (2) 1980.

possible to attach special penalties to the accumulation of *Rocnabs* over a prolonged period, e.g. by charging interest on them. In Keynes' proposals for a world clearing union, which he put forward at Bretton Woods, he devised a set of five penalties for persistent creditors.¹¹ While something similar would be appropriate here, there is a major difference between a world payments union and one that involves only a subset of countries; in the latter case, countries have the option of withdrawing from the Union and trading with other partners, whereas with a world system there is no alternative. However, given the strong mutual advantages to be gained from an operational system, many countries would be likely to opt in.

It must be emphasised that the same advantages would be achieved with a Southern payments union, which offered mutual credit. This credit would be like a Southern currency.

There have been some attempts to link existing clearing arrangements, and a Coordination Committee was established by UNCTAD to help develop such links. Linking existing arrangements could represent a first step towards a Southern payments union. However, the current arrangements cover only about half the countries in the Third World, and in general, credit forms a minor aspect. Establishing a new payments union—to which existing clearing arrangements could be linked—seems likely to be more effective both in terms of creating credit, and in establishing links between current arrangements.

2) *Commodities as foreign exchange reserves*: non-oil developing countries hold about US\$75 billion in reserves, consisting of gold and currencies of developed countries (dollars, chiefly, but also yen, sterling etc.). They use their own exports (of which a large proportion is commodities) to finance these reserves, thereby strengthening the currencies of the countries whose money is held as foreign exchange reserves, and the economies of gold producers. If they replaced foreign exchange reserves by stocks of commodities, their reserve accumulation would instead strengthen commodity prices and their own economies (see Gulati where this proposal is advanced).¹² This could be achieved by purchasing and storing commodities produced in the South. There is a variety of ways in which such a store could be financed. The initial build-up could be financed by contributions of commodities, by the use

¹¹ R F Kahn, 'Historical origins of the International Monetary Fund' in A P Thirlwall (ed), *Keynes and International Monetary Arrangements*, Macmillan: London, 1976.

¹² I Gulati, 'Co-operative monetary action: a few suggestions for the developing countries' in B Paulic, R Uranga, B Cizelj and M Svetlicic (eds), *The Challenges of South-South Cooperation*, Boulder, Colorado: Westview, 1983.

of Southern currencies and/or any Southern currencies and/or an Southern credit arrangement (as discussed above), or by using 'hard' currency from existing foreign exchange reserves. The commodity reserves could then be used as existing foreign exchange reserves selling them when countries needed foreign exchange, or borrowing against the security of the commodity stocks. Countries would need to make contributions to finance the storage costs in proportion to the quantity of reserves held.

Commodities would be more inflation-proof than currency reserves, but they would not earn interest. Therefore, at times of positive real interest rates, there would be a cost to countries of holding such reserves, which would include the cost of handling the stocks of commodities plus the real interest foregone. But at times of rapid inflation and negative real interest rates, countries holding commodities would gain as compared with holding dollars. There could also be cyclical problems. Countries are liable to need to run down reserves when commodity prices are low and accumulate them when prices are high. Consequently, not only would this tendency cause them to buy and sell at the wrong time, from the point of view of commodity prices, but also their actions would accentuate commodity price fluctuations. This represents a serious defect in the proposal. It would suggest that commodities should only form some proportion of total reserves, so that big losses could be avoided by using a combination of foreign exchange and commodity reserves. This cyclical problem could be countered if industrialised countries were also persuaded to hold commodities as reserves.¹³ But the latter proposal has not found support among the industrialised countries. While some of the problems noted suggest that commodities should not entirely replace existing reserves, there is a strong case for further exploration of the possibilities of diversifying Third World reserves into commodities and Third World currencies, taking on more of the responsibility for liquidity creation and commodity price stabilisation, and reducing dependence on the North.

3) *A Southern IMF*: This would represent an extension of the mutual balance-of-payments schemes, currently in use in some regions, to the whole of the South, so that countries in payments difficulties in one part of the Third World could get some financial support (and policy advice) from other parts. It would have considerable advantages compared with

¹³ A G Hart, N Kaldor and J Tinbergen, 'The case for a international commodity reserve currency', Geneva: UNCTAD, 1964.

regional arrangements, since regional payments problems tend to occur more or less simultaneously in all countries in the region, while there is much greater variation across regions, as for example with the OPEC surplus in the 1970s, and the Asian surpluses in the mid-1980s. A Southern IMF could not replace the present IMF, but could give countries some alternative source of finance and policy advice. The policy-formulation could turn out to be one of the most important aspects of a Southern IMF, as Third World countries would have the opportunity to develop their own conditionality, more in accordance with their objectives and philosophy, which could also prove extremely useful in negotiations with the 'real' IMF.

4) *A South Bank*: This was first suggested at a meeting of the Group of 77 in 1982, and UNCTAD produced a feasibility study in 1983.¹⁴ The bank would be financed by subscriptions from member-countries. As outlined, the bank would include some of the functions of a Southern IMF, providing balance-of-payments support to countries in difficulties, using its own conditionality. Other functions included provision of export credit, or export credit guarantees, finance for commodity price stabilisation and support for regional payments and credit arrangements. As developed, the proposal was probably over-ambitious, in covering so many functions, although there is considerable merit in each of the proposals considered separately. No real progress has been made in instituting such a bank.

Conclusions

Southern monetary arrangements can play a vital role in supporting Third World countries' trade and incomes, and offsetting the balkanisation that followed the previous imperial currency areas. Not only are Southern arrangements valuable for their immediate effects, but they can also strengthen Southern bargaining capacity and strength. Their role is particularly important at times of world economic crisis when North-South trade and financial arrangements falter. Over the past twenty-five years progress has been made in developing and expanding regional payments arrangements in the Third World. But these have proved rather ineffective during the crisis of the 1980s, and there have been no arrangements made at the level of the South as a whole. There are very great potential gains from schemes for the South

¹⁴ UNCTAD, 'The study of the feasibility of a bank for developing countries', UNCTAD, May 1983.

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as a whole, but also, obviously, many political obstacles to agreement. From a pragmatic point of view, more progress may be made by improving, extending and linking regional arrangements, than by grand new Southern schemes. But there is no reason why efforts should not be made in both directions. Third World countries could have much more control over economic and financial developments than they are currently exerting. Third World arguments for international monetary reform and a new Bretton Woods have had little response from the North. They could initiate their own South Bretton Woods as a step on the way to realising the international monetary reform which is within the reach of the Third World.

'Khalistan': India's Punjab problem

On 12 May 1987 the Government of India initiated a fresh approach to the escalating problem of terrorism and religious fundamentalism in the state of Punjab. The matter in issue was the creation of 'Khalistan', a Sikh theocratic homeland. On the advice of the Prime Minister, the Indian President dismissed the elected state government led by the Sikh political party, the Akali Dal, and brought the provincial administration directly under central authority. For some months the demand for central rule in the state had been evident within the ruling Congress party of Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi, and several national opposition parties had also repeatedly pressed for firm action. The proclamation of Presidential rule in Punjab was, however, linked directly to an appeal from the state's Governor, Siddhartha Shankar Ray.

After an appraisal of the situation in the state, Ray wrote to the President on 11 May 1987

'It is quite clear that the ruling party and its government have no political will to combat truly and seriously either the fundamentalist movement or the growing and unabated terrorism and extremism and have become quite incapable of even assuring effectively, far less safeguarding, the basic fundamental rights guaranteed under our Constitution . . .'¹

The Governor reported that the provincial administration had ceased to exercise any authority in the rural areas of the Punjab and that a parallel authority was functioning in the province under the leadership of extremist Sikh leaders. He charged that some ministers in the provincial Cabinet were deeply involved with terrorist and extremist activity and that they interfered in the functioning of the police. Such activities had lowered the morale of the Punjab police to a 'near dangerous level', while 'corruption has also become rampant and money is being taken for the passing of a number of orders . . . by some of the ministers and their relations . . .'.² The escalating lawlessness and killing of innocent people was confirmed by official figures. While 517 persons were killed

¹ Text of a letter from Siddhartha Shankar Ray, Governor of Punjab state, to the President of India, dated 11 May 1987, reproduced in *Times of India* (Delhi) 17 May 1987, p 5.

² *ibid.*

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in the Punjab in 1986, over 200 had died in the first four months of 1987.³

This acknowledged failure of a political solution to the Punjab problem could not have come at a worse time for the central government. In 1985, Rajiv Gandhi's Congress party, riding a wave of popular sympathy following his mother's assassination, had emerged with a formidable mandate in the national elections. It had won an absolute majority in parliament and control over eighteen state governments. In recent months, however, a combination of factional in-fighting within the party and political mismanagement has led to a serious erosion of its political credibility. Recent elections to state legislatures in two provinces were a clear indication of this. In the southern state of Kerala, the Congress-led alliance secured only sixty-one seats in a 140-member state assembly. With this defeat the Congress party lost control over all four southern states of the country for the first time in the history of independent India. In the eastern state of West Bengal the Congress party was also badly defeated in the state elections with twenty-one Congress state legislators losing their seats. The party's opposition role in the state assembly was reduced significantly from a strength of fifty-four to a mere forty members in a 240-member legislative council. Moreover, these electoral setbacks reflected directly on the popular appeal of the Prime Minister, who campaigned extensively for these elections, addressing almost 200 meetings in the two states.

Despite these electoral defeats, the Congress party continues to command massive strength in Parliament and in the state legislatures as a whole, with no real opposition threat to contend with at the national level. However, a series of controversies in recent months have seriously affected the credibility of the party and of the Prime Minister himself.

Since the election of Rajiv Gandhi, relations between the Prime Minister and the President have steadily deteriorated to a state of open acrimony and conflict. The President has repeatedly complained of a lack of consultation with him by the Congress government and alleged that he has not been informed of important matters of State. While the central government maintains that it has fulfilled its constitutional obligations towards the Head of State, the President has chosen to assert his authority over a number of issues. Since January 1987, he has publicly refused to approve a controversial amendment to the Indian

³ Figures quoted in Ajoy Bose and Harinder Baweja, 'Are we back to square one in Punjab?', *The Sunday Observer*, 17-23 May 1987, pp 4-5.

postal bill which authorised the government to screen private mail; has sought an explanation on the appointment of judges to the Supreme Court; and has demanded an elucidation of government policy on television coverage. While few dispute either the right of the President to be consulted and informed on matters of national importance, or the ultimate authority of a popularly-elected government, the controversy between them has deteriorated into a public examination of the constitutional authority of the Head of State to dismiss the Prime Minister. The Congress government for its part has reacted to this debate with thinly-veiled attacks on the Presidency. The authority and prestige of the central government has suffered as a result of these events.

Equally damaging for the Congress party have been allegations concerning serious irregularities in two major contracts involving the purchase of defence equipment, with reports of payments into secret Indian bank accounts abroad leading to intense speculation. Shortly after the institution of a commission of inquiry into one such contract, by the Defence Minister, V P Singh, in April 1987, he was dismissed from his ministerial post. A few months earlier, Singh had been moved from the Finance Ministry to the defence portfolio after he had initiated a strenuous campaign against tax evasion by big business. The ousting of V P Singh, widely regarded as a man of integrity, was seen by many as proof of the corruption of the Congress government.

With the recent damage to the credibility of the central government, and a growing conviction that its primary interest is in playing party politics, it is not surprising that the dismissal of the Sikh-led government of Punjab has been regarded with suspicion. It has been viewed as a ploy to win votes in the forthcoming state elections in the neighbouring Hindu majority state of Haryana. The situation in the Punjab is inevitably a major issue in Haryana and the state elections are regarded as a crucial test of the Congress party's support in the vast Hindi-speaking, Hindu majority area, comprising the states of Rajasthan, Haryana, Uttar Pradesh and Bihar; without support in these states no government of India can survive. Whatever the motivations for the proclamation of central rule in Punjab, the situation in the state has certainly deteriorated rapidly and the central government shares responsibility for failing to come to grips with this complex political problem.

The unrest in Punjab and the growth of Sikh fundamentalism and separatism are closely linked to the nature of contemporary Sikh

political organisation and communal consciousness. The agitation itself is centred around two Sikh bodies, the Sikh political party, the Akali Dal, and the Shiromani Gurdwara Prabhandak Committee (SGPC), a central committee for the management of Sikh shrines. Both these organisations have their origins in a Sikh social and religious reform movement, which had culminated in the institutionalisation of a distinct Sikh identity through the passage of the Sikh Gurdwaras (Temples) Act of 1925. Prior to this Act, the Sikhs did not consider themselves as a separate group or community outside the larger Hindu framework. The militant *Khalsa* (pure) brotherhood shared a set of common symbols, rituals and practices which superficially set them apart from the Hindus, but *Khalsa* Sikh numbers were fluid. Their numerical strength derived from converts from the Hindu community, and they relapsed into the Hindu community from time to time. Moreover, even as members of the *Khalsa*, they followed many of the practices, customs and traditions of the Hindus, and continued to be bound to the Hindus by ties of kinship and marriage. It was also common for one member of a Hindu family to adopt the garb of the *Khalsa* without being seen by the Hindus at large to have become a lesser Hindu in the process.

The 1925 Act, by defining the Sikhs as separate from the Hindus, provided a legal and institutional basis for Sikh communal separatism. Yet, even since then, Akali leaders have remained acutely aware that once a Sikh sheds the symbols of the *Khalsa* he becomes indistinguishable from the large body of Punjabi Hindus. Since its inception, the Akali Dal's persistent concern has therefore been the maintenance of Sikh communal distinctiveness, by means of preserving and developing communal boundaries with the Hindu community. While the source of the Akali leaders' commitment to the maintenance of Sikh distinctiveness remains ideological, it has been reinforced by the political dependence of their party on the existence and political position of the Sikh community as a separate entity. Sikh communal separatism has provided a political base and an appeal for the Akali Dal. Akali leaders believe that without political power in the hands of the Sikhs collectively, the disintegration of an independent Sikh community and its absorption into the mass of Hinduism is inevitable. The Akali Dal's primary political objective has thus been the pursuit of greater political leverage for the Sikh community and a political base in which the Sikhs would be secure as a separate people.

Since its inception the Akali Dal has controlled the SGPC, and its domination of this body for over sixty years has made it a formidable

force in Sikh politics. By virtue of its control over a large number of locally-elected committees for the management of Sikh shrines, the SGPC has served as an arena and a base for Sikh politics. Its control over Sikh shrines has provided it with access to the enormous resources of these shrines derived from religious property and daily offerings. Indeed, the annual budget of the SGPC from these sources amounted to more than US\$12 million in 1986. The utilisation of these funds for non-political purposes, and the distribution of patronage in the form of a variety of jobs required for the management of Sikh shrines, has enabled the SGPC, and through it the Akali Dal, to gather and maintain support from strategic groups within the Sikh community. The SGPC also administers a fund for the propagation of the Sikh religion through which an army of wandering preachers, missionary workers and folk musicians are recruited to tour the rural areas and spread its ideology. The Akali Dals's use of these preachers for political purposes has provided it with substantial support in its political campaigns. Further, control over all Sikh religious institutions has given the SGPC a quasi-religious authority and the Akali Dal has occasionally used this power to excommunicate its opponents from the Sikh community. Finally, the Akali Dal's domination of the SGPC has enabled it to claim to be the sole representative of the Sikh *panth* or community as a whole, made supreme in all temporal matters by the last Sikh guru. The Akalis have made use of this appeal for political purposes with considerable effect. In electoral politics the Akalis have presented their candidates as '*panthic*' candidates, and opponents of the Akali Dal have been labelled as traitors to the *panth*. The Akali Dal has thus consistently used an essentially religious platform and appeal in non-religious contests. Each Akali political campaign has been based on the holding of hundreds of ostensibly religious gatherings, often in the precincts of Sikh temples. The campaigns themselves have been conducted in a context of powerful religious and historical symbolism and ritual, casting the whole issue into the guise of a sacred function in the cause of the Sikh brotherhood.

In independent India, the Akali Dal first raised a demand for the formation of a Sikh majority state in 1948 in a memorandum to the Constituent Assembly, then engaged in framing the Constitution of India. They demanded special communal representation for the Sikhs in the Punjab legislature and in appointments to government services in the province. More importantly, the memorandum stressed that if these demands were not acceptable, the Sikhs should be permitted to form a

separate province comprising the districts in which they formed a majority. The Constituent Assembly refused to accept either of the Akali demands, on the grounds that they were contrary to the spirit of a secular India.

The first general election in India, held in 1952, provided the Akali Dal with an opportunity to resurrect the issue. However, Akali leaders had realised that a division of the country along communal lines would be totally unacceptable to the government. Since a demand for a reorganisation of Indian states along linguistic lines had been raised in other parts of the country, they now cloaked their demand for a Sikh majority state in linguistic terms. As the Punjabi language was the mother tongue of all Sikhs, while Hindi was the first language of a large body of Punjabi Hindus, a demand for a 'Punjabi Suba' or Punjabi-speaking state coincided with the demand for a Sikh majority state. Between 1952 and 1966 the Akali Dal launched a series of sporadic agitations aimed at enhancing Sikh communal solidarity and putting pressure on the government to concede their demands. To rally the Sikh community, a spate of charges were made of discrimination against Sikhs in government service and of official interference in Sikh religious affairs. From the sanctuary of the premier Sikh shrine, the Golden Temple in Amritsar, the Akali Dal waged a campaign of political demonstrations and civil disobedience by large volunteer groups, and Sikhs were urged to participate in this *dharam yudh* or religious war. Each government action against the demonstrators was successfully portrayed as an action against the Sikh religion and further strengthened the Akali campaign in which 26,000 Sikhs courted arrest. In 1966, the central government gave in. The Punjab State Reorganisation Act was passed authorising the trifurcation of the state. The southern, predominantly Hindi-speaking Hindu areas were formed into a new state of Haryana, and other Hindi-speaking parts of Punjab detached and merged with the neighbouring state of Himachal Pradesh. The new state of Punjab thus created had a population which was 54 per cent Sikh and 44 per cent Hindu.

The Akali Dal had achieved its long cherished goal of a Sikh majority state and through the party's strong support from the Sikh community had been amply demonstrated in its various agitational campaigns, Akali leaders found to their chagrin that in electoral politics, Sikhs did not vote exclusively along communal lines. The Congress party, with its cross-communal following, had always had enough Sikhs in positions of leadership to make it a powerful contender for Sikh electoral support.

Thus, in the five elections to the Punjab legislative assembly held between 1967 and 1980, the Congress party was able to command support from a significant body of Sikh voters and, as a result, the Akali Dal was unable to get more than 30 per cent of the vote. In elections to the lower house of Parliament held in 1980, the Congress won twelve out of thirteen seats from the Punjab, vividly demonstrating its political appeal to both Hindu and Sikh voters.

Between 1981 and 1984 the Akali Dal again launched a series of agitations against the central government. The initial motivation for Akali unrest was a desire to reassert its leadership of the Sikh community, following its defeat in the state elections. However, in 1980 the Akali Dal had split into two principal factions, a dominant group led by the Akali Dal's president, Harchand Singh Longowal, and the other led by a former president of the party, Jagdev Singh Talwandi. The two groups joined forces in the campaign at times, but there was also rivalry between them which led to a spate of escalating and contradictory demands, as each faction sought to assert its dominance.

The core of the Akali demand derived from a resolution adopted by the party in 1973 at Anandpur Sahib. The Anandpur Sahib resolution stated that one of the principal objectives of the Akali Dal was to strive 'to preserve and keep alive the concept of distinct and independent identity of the *panth* and to create an environment in which national sentiments and aspirations of the Sikh *panth* will find full expression, satisfaction and growth'. The primary political goal of the Akali Dal, the resolution further stated, was the 'pre-eminence of the *Khalsa* through creation of a congenial environment and a political set up'.⁴ To achieve this the resolution outlined seven basic objectives, the more important of which were that Punjab's capital city of Chandigarh, which it shared with neighbouring Haryana State, and certain Sikh population Punjabi-speaking areas presently outside and contiguous to Punjab, be merged with it; that in the new Punjab thus formed, the interests of the Sikhs and Sikhism be specifically protected; that the new Punjab and other Indian states be granted a degree of provincial autonomy beyond that governing relations between state and central governments under the existing Indian Constitution; and that the Akali Dal strive for legislation which would extend the authority of the SGPC to Sikh shrines all over the country.

The Anandpur Sahib resolution reflected the basic political

⁴ The Anandpur Sahib resolution is reproduced in Chand Joshi, *Bhindranwale: Myth and Reality*. New Delhi: Vikas, 1984, pp 45-6.

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philosophy of the Akali Dal in seeking greater political influence for the Sikh community. In addition, the demand for the enacting of legislation to bring all Sikh shrines in the country under the authority of the SGPC, was intended to extend the Akali Dal's reach to the Sikh population spread throughout the country, which now constitutes one-third of the total Sikh population of India. The passage of such legislation would vastly increase the SGPC's network of patronage and its annual income would more than double. In addition, the Akali Dal demanded a reapportionment of river waters between Punjab and Haryana states.

The Akali Dal was a coalition partner with the Janata party in the Punjab government between 1977 and 1980, but despite its affinity with the Janata party government at the centre, it did little to bring forward demands based on the Anandpur Sahib resolution to the attention of the central government. An Akali meeting in 1978 endorsed the principal and objectives of the 1973 resolution and in September 1981 a meeting of the dominant group of the party, the Longowal group, again confirmed that the implementation of the Anandpur Sahib resolution was its long-term objective. In response, a prominent member of the rival Talwandi group asserted that since the Sikhs were a nation, there should be a sovereign state of Khalistan—the land of the *Khalsa*. Later, at an annual meeting of the SGPC, a resolution stating that the Sikhs were a separate nation, and calling for the implementation of the Anandpur Sahib resolution, was adopted with the support of the Longowal group of the party.

Akali leaders now launched an intensive publicity campaign alleging discrimination against Sikhs by the government and official interference in Sikh religious affairs. Akali volunteers toured the rural areas to educate the people against this discrimination and the SGPC's vast network of preachers and folk musicians were employed to spread the message. A list of forty-five grievances was drawn up, combining the core objectives of the Anandpur Sahib resolution, grievances obviously intended to appeal to various segments of the Sikh community and others intended simply to lend credence to Akali allegations, and to reinforce Sikh communal solidarity. The central government's failure to settle the grievances was portrayed as indifference and discrimination towards the Sikh community. Thus the list stated that the government had kept the city of Chandigarh and certain Punjabi-speaking areas outside Punjab, denied internal autonomy to the state and failed to enact an all-India Sikh Temples Act. The government was further accused of discrimination against Sikhs for reducing the number of

Sikhs in the army, for being responsible for the paucity of heavy industry in the Punjab, for the denial of loans to farmers at advantageous rates and for the non-renumerative prices of agricultural produce. Moreover, the government had failed to designate any railway train as the Golden Temple Express, had not granted holy city status to Amritsar, had not installed a radio transmitter in the Golden Temple for broadcasting Sikh religious hymns, had not recognised a separate Sikh personal law, had projected Sikhs in an improper way in films, had violated the sanctity of Sikh traditions and had encourage anti-Sikh literature.

In October 1981, the central government began discussion with the Akalis over their demands.

At the outset of these negotiations the Akalis withdrew their forty-five grievances in favour of fifteen demands which largely reflected the core objectives of the Anandpur Sahib resolution.

These discussions continued intermittently for two and a half years, with each side repeatedly accusing the other of intransigence, bad faith and deliberate delaying tactics. Certainly the government of Prime Minister Indira Gandhi appeared to be content to let the Akali campaign run out of steam. Akali allegations aside, the central government appeared to have little to be concerned about. The Sikhs in India are a relatively secure community. They have a higher per capita income and a higher life expectancy than the national average. The Sikhs represent about 2 per cent of the population of the country but they constitute a considerably higher proportion of the Indian army and of all central government employees. Besides, in the 1980 parliamentary elections the Congress party had received strong support from the Sikh community in the Punjab. The central government, however, underestimated the ability of the Akalis to rally the Sikh community. Moreover, the Green Revolution which had brought unprecedented prosperity to the Punjab, and transformed the state into the 'wheat bowl' of India, had stabilised. A previous pattern of increasing prosperity for the predominantly agriculturalist Sikh community in the province had slowed, while increased mechanisation of agriculture and the lack of a proportionate increase in non-agricultural employment had contributed to a growth in unemployment for the educated rural young. Ironically, the economic success of agriculture in the Punjab was itself contributing to disaffection among Sikhs.

The inability of Punjab's economy to sustain the aspirations of the

Sikh community provided a ready constituency for the Akali Dal's propaganda. Akali leaders were quick to harness popular disquiet. While Akali negotiations with the central government continued, a campaign of civil disobedience was launched to demonstrate their following. The construction of a canal linking the Sutlej and Yamuna rivers which would carry water to the neighbouring state of Haryana became the initial focus of attention. Akali leaders alleged that the canal would deprive the Sikh peasantry of vital water resources. Though no evidence was presented to substantiate this, the allegation struck a popular chord, and an Akali campaign to obstruct the digging of the canal found ready volunteers. The Akali Dal also resorted to familiar tactics of charges of religious discrimination to intensify their agitation. Since smoking is taboo for Sikhs, the presence of tobacco merchants outside the Golden Temple was cited as an insult to the Sikh faith, and a series of demonstrations for a ban on smoking in the city of Amritsar were held. Counter-demonstrations by Hindu merchants forced the government to ban such gatherings, but this merely provided an opportunity for the Akalis to defy the ban, and the subsequent arrest of demonstrators lent a sharper edge to Akali propaganda.

The central government moved slowly in its efforts to counter the Akali campaign. It was a year after the initiation of mass agitation before it attempted to appease Sikh religious sentiment by announcing its willingness to accept some minor Akali demands. The more substantial issues such as the question of greater autonomy for the state of Punjab and the enactment of an all-India Sikh Temples Act were referred to official committees for deliberation. While this policy failed to wrest the initiative from the Akalis for leadership of the Sikhs, it also made little attempt to counter a further escalation of Akali agitation in a concerted manner. The government continued to deal with the campaign piecemeal, arresting Akali volunteers when they broke the law and releasing them shortly afterwards as an act of conciliation. In October 1983, in an apparently fresh initiative to deal with Sikh unrest, the central government dismissed the state's Congress party government and imposed central rule in the province. In substance, however, no new policy towards Sikh unrest emerged.

As the Akali Dal's campaign intensified, the rise of a young militant and fundamentalist Sikh preacher, Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale, added a further dimension to Sikh unrest. Bhindranwale toured Sikh villages, baptised hundreds of people and exhorted his congregation not to discard Sikh symbols. An essential feature of his preachings was that,

in keeping with Sikh traditions, all Sikhs should bear weapons. Bhindranwale's crusade for Sikh orthodoxy initially focused on the Nirankari Sikhs, a Sikh sect that worshipped a living guru in violation of orthodox Sikh teaching. His followers began clashing violently with Nirankari groups and in 1980 the Nirankari guru was assassinated. In September 1981, a new chapter of Sikh extremism began, with the murder of a prominent Hindu editor who had been critical of the new Sikh fundamentalism. Bhindranwale was arrested for his alleged involvement; though his complicity in the murder could not be proved, he had publicly applauded the killers. Shortly afterwards, Bhindranwale moved into the sanctuary of the Golden Temple and launched an intense campaign for the formation of a Sikh theocratic state of Khalistan with open incitements to violence against the government and the Hindu community. A well-conceived wave of terrorist activity in the Punjab began. Selective killings of Nirankari Sikhs and minor government officials and random bomb explosions were followed by the indiscriminate killing of Hindus. The intention of this terrorist activity was clearly to trigger an exodus of Hindus from the province. If such violence would prompt reprisals against Sikhs outside the Punjab, this in turn would only lead to Sikh emigration to the Punjab from other parts of India. By this process, the Punjab would become a Sikh state.

While Bhindranwale's terrorist campaign grew, drawing support from young unemployed Sikhs and from the radical All-India Sikh Students' Federation, the central government continued to deal with Sikh unrest in a haphazard manner. It did little to counter Akali propaganda or to deal decisively with Bhindranwale and his followers. In effect, government inaction served to embolden Sikh militants and enhance the myth of their invulnerability. The leaders of the Akali Dal, for their part, were caught in a game of their own making. Since Bhindranwale's allegations against the government were similar to their own, they chose to intensify their own rhetoric rather than to condemn the methods he advocated. Each new Akali initiative was followed by a fresh outburst of terrorist activity and each government action against Sikh extremists became another reason for the Akalis to agitate.

By April 1984 it had become apparent that Sikh extremists were using some Sikh temples as a secure base and there were clear indications that the Golden Temple was being fortified. The Akali Dal meanwhile announced that a new campaign of non-cooperation would begin in June 1984. At last, the central government acted decisively. The Punjab

was sealed off from the rest of the country and after two days of intense military activity the Indian army took control of the Golden Temple on 7 June. The Akali leaders inside surrendered but not before Bhindranwale and many of his followers were killed. The SGPC for its part excommunicated from the faith the Sikh Home Minister of India for his responsibility in the desecration of the Golden Temple.

Three years of growing unrest in the Punjab had had an enormous impact on Sikh communal perception. A concerted Akali propaganda campaign, official action against Akali agitations and the intransigence of the government in meeting apparently legitimate Sikh demands had won the Akalis the tacit support of a broad cross-section of the community. As Sikh communal solidarity with the Akali campaign grew, escalation competition for leadership among Sikh politicians and a multiplication of grievances and demands espoused by them had rapidly radicalised Sikh unrest. The emergence of Sikh extremism had also brought little condemnation from Sikhs in general. While few Sikhs publicly supported the terrorist campaign, the ambiguity and constant shifting of Akali demands prevented opposition to them from crystallising. Moderate and extremist Sikh activists used the same idiom to enlist support and made similar allegations. The assault on the Golden Temple was thus widely regarded as a deliberate attempt to humiliate the Sikhs. Substantial damage to sacred Sikh property became a powerful symbol of official repression. In October 1984, after extensive repairs, the Golden Temple was handed back to the SGPC. In the same month, Indira Gandhi was assassinated by two of her Sikh bodyguards.

The crisis in the Indian government was quickly resolved by the unanimous selection of Rajiv Gandhi as leader of the Congress party and the new Prime Minister. For the Sikh community, however, their sense of alienation was dramatically compounded by the outbreak of anti-Sikh riots in several parts of the country. For three days, until the Indian army imposed control, Sikhs in Delhi and some other areas became the target of unchecked mob violence. Sikh individuals were singled out and lynched and Sikh property destroyed. Over 2,000 Sikhs were killed and some 10,000 rendered homeless in Delhi and its suburbs, according to official estimates.

For the Sikh community, the situation was worsened by the civil authority's inability to control the situation quickly, and the general belief that violence directed at Sikhs was not merely an outburst of popular anger at the assassination of Mrs Gandhi. The Indian press

published a series of allegations charging the administration and the Congress party with complicity in the violence and a widely-publicised report by two local human rights organisations concluded that the attacks on members of the Sikh community in Delhi . . . far from being spontaneous expressions of 'madness' and of popular 'grief and anger' at Mrs Gandhi's assassination as made out by the authorities, were the outcome of a well-organised plan marked by acts of both deliberate commission and omission by important politicians of the Congress . . . and by authorities in the administration.⁵

As Sikh leaders cried out for justice, the central government refused to order an investigation into the violence on the grounds that such an inquiry would only inflame communal passions further. For many Sikhs, the government's attitude was confirmation of their worst fears.

Meanwhile, in January 1985 the new Prime Minister moved to consolidate his position by calling general elections. He vigorously attacked the Anandpur Sahib resolution as secessionist, and maintained that a dialogue with the Akali Dal was only possible if its leadership unequivocally disowned the extremists. The Akali Dal for its part refused to hold discussions with the government until its leaders were released. Once the election rhetoric had subsided, however, it was apparent that there could be no peace in the Punjab without a settlement with the Akali Dal. The central government consequently moved to break the stalemate through a carefully coordinated series of actions. The Akali leaders were unconditionally released and a package of economic assistance for the Punjab was announced. The Prime Minister muted his criticism of the Anandpur Sahib resolution and declared his willingness to hold discussions with Akali leaders, provided their demands were within the framework of the Indian Constitution. Close aides of the Prime Minister were given a specific mandate to prepare the groundwork for negotiations with the Akalis. The central government also ordered a judicial inquiry into the anti-Sikh riots in Delhi.

The release of Akali leaders inaugurated a renewed and intensified phase of competition between them, and a dramatic revival of terrorist activity. Violence against Hindus was now beginning to provoke a reaction. Hindu communal organisations were becoming active and terrorist violence against Hindus had brought a violent reaction against

⁵ Peoples Union For Democratic Rights and Peoples Union for Civil Liberties, 'Who are the Guilty? Report of a Joint Inquiry into the Causes and Impact of the Riots in Delhi from 31 October to 10 November, Delhi, 1984, p i.

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innocent Sikhs on several occasions. Thus, despite the militant postures, the president of the Akali Dal, Harchand Singh Longowal, seemed to realise that there was a strong possibility of mass communal violence between Hindus and Sikhs if Akali agitation was revived. A continued radicalisation of Sikh politics might also overwhelm the leadership role of the Akali Dal and have serious consequences for the future of the Sikh community in India. The central government's conciliatory stance paved the way for secret negotiations between Longowal and Rajiv Gandhi's closest aides. After a brief period of intense secret discussions in July 1985, it was announced that the central government and the Akali Dal had agreed to a memorandum of settlement which signalled the close of the confrontation between them.

The memorandum of settlement was aimed at beginning the process of negotiations. It conceded the basis of some of the demands which the Akali Dal deemed essential prerequisites for discussions, and set the parameters for addressing other demands. Thus the agreement stipulated that the central government would pay compensation to the families of innocent people killed in agitations or actions which had taken place since August 1982, as well as compensation for damage to property. However, the modalities for determining the extent of the compensation and to whom it was to be paid were not spelt out. It was further agreed that the city of Chandigarh, the shared capital of Punjab and Haryana, would be transferred to the Punjab; however a commission would be established to determine what territory Punjab would transfer to Haryana in return. Other territorial claims between Punjab and Haryana states would be referred to a boundary commission whose decision would be binding. The Akali Dal's demand for a reapportionment of river waters was similarly addressed. In addition, the central government reiterated its commitment to consider the formulation of legislation for the management of all Sikh shrines in consultation with the Akali Dal.

The question of greater autonomy for the Punjab and the controversial Anandpur Sahib resolution were dealt with in a similar spirit of compromise. The memorandum declared that the Akali Dal 'states that the Anandpur Sahib resolution is entirely within the framework of the Indian Constitution', and 'that the purpose of the resolution is to provide greater autonomy to the states with a view to strengthening the unity and integrity of the country . . .'.⁶ The portion

⁶ Text of the Memorandum of Settlement agreed to between the Indian Prime Minister and the President of the Akali Dal, reproduced in *Indian Express* (Delhi) 25 July 1985, p 2.

dealing with centre-state relations in the resolution would be referred to an independent commission which was to make recommendations to the central government on the question.

Predictably, the announcement of a settlement between Longowal and Rajiv Gandhi brought a storm of protest from other Akali leaders who had not been consulted, and they promised to scuttle the accord through intensified agitation. Sikh extremists, too, demonstrated their disagreement by a further escalation of terrorist activity. As a means of consolidating the peace process, the central government announced its intention to call early elections in the Punjab and to permit the formation of a representative government. This strategy proved to be correct. While more extremist Sikhs who had formed themselves into a new political party (the United Akali Dal) called for a boycott of the elections, intensive discussions began among rival Akali leaders in an effort to form a common electoral platform. By 20 August 1985 Longowal had succeeded in convincing the majority of moderate Akali leadership to participate jointly in the elections. That same day he was assassinated by Sikh extremists.

The assassination of Longowal created a wave of sympathy for his party and reinforced the fragile unity in Akali ranks. Moreover, both Punjabis—Sikh and Hindu—demonstrated their faith in the electoral process by participating in the state elections in large numbers despite the militants' campaign to boycott them and the ever-present threat of terrorist violence. The Akali Dal emerged as the clear victor in the elections, securing an absolute majority in the state assembly for the first time in its history.

Initially, the euphoria of victory overcame differences among Akali leaders and resulted in the unanimous selection of Surjit Singh Barnala, a confidant of Longowal, as the leader of the new provincial government. However, negotiations over the nature and level of representation in the state government for each of the principal factions in the party brought internal rivalry to the forefront. Prakash Singh Badal, a powerful Sikh leader and former Akali Chief Minister of Punjab, and his supporters, refused to serve in the Akali Dal government formed in September 1985. From the outset, Barnala was faced with a serious threat of dissension within the Akali Dal. His problems were compounded by the election of a rival Akali leader, Gurcharan Singh Tohra, as president of the SGPC in November 1985. Bhindranwale's use of Sikh temples as a base had considerably weakened the Akali Dal's control over the SGPC, but now the Akali

government had to contend with an independent SGPC whose hostility to the administration grew rapidly.

Soon after assuming office, the Barnala government sought to appease Sikh extremists by the release of many gaol'd activists. Many of those released, however, immediately resumed their demand for the formation of Khalistan. The new government was also faced with another spurt in terrorist activity and it became clear that extremists were regrouping inside the Golden Temple. Barnala was left with no choice but to continue police action against Sikh extremists. In this, he was strongly supported by the central government. In March 1986, at the insistence of the central government, Julio Francis Ribeiro, a distinguished police officer known for his tough methods, was appointed Director-General of Police in Punjab. Ribeiro's appointment brought an immediate change in anti-terrorist operations. He announced that in countering terrorist violence, bullets would be met with bullets, and the number of Sikh extremists arrested or killed by the police increased sharply. By the end of 1986 almost 1600 Sikh extremists had been arrested and 80 had been killed in encounters with the police.

The increased repression of extremist activity inevitably brought increased protests from leaders of the United Akali Dal and the All-India Sikh Students Federation. They charged that the Barnala government had done little to address basic Sikh demands and had unleashed a campaign of terror against innocent Sikhs through false encounters organised by the police. The state government's lack of control over the SGPC constituted a serious handicap in organising a counter-propaganda campaign, while the SGPC's vast network was increasingly used to espouse the extremist cause. Moreover, when Barnala did attempt to refute allegations against his government, he chose to appeal to popular sympathy in the same communal idiom as his detractors. Thus he repeatedly charged that rival Sikh leaders who were denigrating his government were themselves responsible for the loss of innocent Sikh lives. The end result of such allegations and counter-allegations was a further strengthening of Sikh communal solidarity and the almost complete alienation of the community from the mainstream of political life.

By the beginning of 1987, the Sikh extremists were ready to tackle the Akali Dal government directly. Following the formation of a new SGPC executive under Gurcharan Singh Tohra, the five head priests of the Golden Temple were dismissed by the SGPC and Sikh religious militants

appointed in their stead. The new priests issued a religious edict dissolving all factions of the Akali Dal on the grounds that the formation of a common platform was the only way to make the central government concede Sikh demands. The United Akali Dal and Prakash Singh Badal and his supporters in the Akali Dal immediately pledged the allegiance to the head priests. The remaining members of the ruling Akali party were given two days to resign from office or face excommunication from the faith. Barnala refused to comply, and after intense discussions within his party, managed to carry a majority of the Akali Dal's legislators with him. To demonstrate support, a large political gathering was organised in Longowal's home village which condemned the high priests for such interference in political matters.

Barnala was excommunicated from the Sikh faith by the head priest but the Badal group of Akali legislators was also disqualified from participation in the state legislature by its Speaker, on the grounds that its members had left the political party on whose programme they had been elected. While this represented a momentary political victory for Barnala, it also meant that his party could not command a majority in the state assembly except with the support of the Congress party members. Within the party, too, Barnala had to contend with the constant threat of further defection and was compelled to weaken his position by appointing virtually all the Akali legislators to ministerial or other important posts. With the government in a state of siege, the provincial administration deteriorated rapidly.

If the singular success of the Barnala government was its survival, the central government, too, did little to assist in isolating Sikh extremists and facilitating the return of peace to the Punjab. The political initiatives which led to the accord with the Akali Dal, and the calling of state elections in the Punjab when they would inevitably result in defeat for the Congress party, were positive acts of statesmanship on the part of the central government. However, once the Akali government had been installed, the central government reverted to the pursuit of a 'law and order' solution in the Punjab rather than a political one. It repeatedly urged the Barnala administration to take firm action against Sikh extremists but made no concessions from which the former could draw political mileage and strengthen its support within the Sikh community. Several important issues addressed in the accord were complex problems with a bearing far beyond the Punjab, but other issues, relatively unimportant in themselves, upon which popular Sikh resentment had focused could have been addressed. During the army

assault on the Golden Temple, some 370 persons were arrested within the complex and charged with waging war against the country. The detention without trial of these persons continued. The Prime Minister had made a commitment to have their cases reviewed during the accord with the Akali Dal and a commission to do so had been appointed. However, the central government did little to expedite its findings or to counter charges that the persons under detention included both women and innocent worshippers. Similarly, although it had been agreed that the city of Chandigarh would be transferred to the Punjab and appropriate compensation to Haryana state would be determined, the question of the transfer was allowed to drag on until the extent of the compensation had been worked out. When the commission charged with this question finally delivered its report, it recommended a transfer of 70,000 acres of land from Punjab to Haryana. The arithmetic of this compensation may well have been correct, but to implement it would have been political suicide for the government in the Punjab. The report of another commission to settle territorial disputes between the two states was similarly impracticable.

Perhaps the best example of political mismanagement by the central government was the saga of the judicial commission which investigated the anti-Sikh violence in Delhi. Having been eventually appointed (after an initial refusal to do so) by the central government, this commission was tainted from the outset. During its deliberations, several human rights organisations charged it with disregarding the evidence they presented but the commission continued its deliberations with scant regard for the popular feeling it was appointed to placate. When its report did appear, it exonerated the Congress party from complicity in the violence and lent credence to those who believed that the nature of its findings was a foregone conclusion.

Having given little political support to the Barnala government, the central government finally succumbed to the harsh realities of increased terrorism in the Punjab and to political pressures for action from within the party. Yet the state elections of 1985 and the gathering at Longowal village showed that when issues were clearly defined, the bulk of the Sikh community was not averse to firm action against the extremists. Certainly, Siddhartha Shankar Ray, the Governor of Punjab and his police chief, Julio Francis Ribiero, who now lead the Punjab's administration, appear to have no illusions as to the nature of the task ahead of them. In a recent interview, Ray, commenting on the Punjab problem, noted, 'It is not a pure law and order problem, it is a political,

emotional, psychological and economic problem,'⁷ and Ribiero commented, 'No terrorism can be fought unless you win the hearts and mind of the people . . . And when I say people, I mean the Sikhs. They have to come to our side . . . Otherwise we can go on fighting.'⁸

However, Ray's success in the Punjab will ultimately be decided by the political support provided to him by the central government. But, if the central government's policy towards Sikh unrest has hitherto been guided with an eye on the vast Hindu majority of India, the results of recent elections in Haryana will only reinforce this concern. These elections have resulted in a crushing defeat for the ruling Congress party which won only some five seats in a ninety-member legislature as compared to the sixty seats it controlled before the elections. Fifteen of sixteen Congress ministers in the state lost their seats. The new government of Haryana can also be counted upon to be more energetic in pursuing rival claims with Punjab and more difficult to placate in accepting political concessions for Punjab. In finding a political solution to Sikh unrest, the central government now has its back to the wall. Yet a durable solution to Sikh unrest can only emerge if the government realises that its present policy can eliminate terrorists but not terrorism in the Punjab and that there can no longer be an early solution to the demand for Khalistan.

⁷ *The Sunday Observer*, pp 4-5.

⁸ Quoted in *India Today* 12(9) 1-15 May 1987, pp 126-7.

Can the rest of Asia emulate the NICs?*

The high growth rates of the East Asian newly industrialised countries (NICs)—Taiwan, South Korea, Singapore and Hong Kong—have made the economic performances of many other countries, including advanced ones, appear poor by comparison. Sustained real growth rates of 8 or 9 per cent have expanded the limits of the possible well beyond the expectations of the 1950s and 1960s. Never before had countries been transformed so quickly from poor, underdeveloped economies into middle-income, industrial economies. The question naturally arises as to whether other countries can emulate the NICs, or, to pose the question quite differently, whether other countries are likely to adopt the strategies of South Korea and Taiwan in particular. Posing the question in these two ways raises a fundamental issue that will underlie the present discussion, that of whether economic success is principally due to the actions of governments in finding and applying the right policies.

This article focuses on four countries of Southeast Asia—Indonesia, the Philippines, Malaysia and Thailand—and four countries of South Asia—Nepal, Bangladesh, Pakistan and India—and discusses their prospects for industrial growth over the next twenty-years. While it is possible to analyse current conditions and growth prospects, history is notoriously unpredictable, forever throwing up combinations of circumstances that no one can foresee. The present stage of Philippine history is an excellent example of this difficulty.

It needs to be asked at the outset what it is about the NICs that others want to emulate. The most remarkable aspect of the NICs' performance is their sustained high real growth rates of GDP (see Table 1). It is necessary to distinguish fast growth from the more general concept of development, although the two are clearly related. 'Development' is taken here to mean the general improvement in human living conditions, including access to more consumption goods, better health care, greater job security, and better working hours and conditions.

* I would like to acknowledge the valuable comments of Sisira Jayasuriya, Hal Hill, Jamie Mackie and Colin Barlow, all of the Research School of Pacific Studies, Australian National University. The conclusions reached are my own.

Table 1: Comparing sizes and growth rates

	Gross Domestic Product \$bn		Annual growth rate of GDP 1973-84	GNP per capita \$ 1984	Annual growth rate of GNP per capita 1965-84	Share of GDI in GDP 1984
	1965	1984				
South Korea	3	83	7.2	2110	6.6	29
Taiwan	3	57	8.5 ^a	2794 ^b	6.7 ^c	21 ^d
Hong Kong	2	30	9.1	6330	6.2	24
Singapore	1	18	8.2	7260	7.8	47
Indonesia	4	80	6.8	540	4.9	21
Philippines	6	33	4.8	660	2.6	18
Malaysia	3	29	7.3	1980	4.5	31
Thailand	4	42	6.8	860	4.2	23
Nepal	1	2	3.1	160	0.2	19
Bangladesh	4	12	5.0	130	0.6	16
Pakistan	5	28	5.6	380	2.5	17
India	46	162	4.1	260	1.6	24

^a 1971-85. ^b National income per capita. ^c 1966-85 GDP per capita. ^d Share of gross fixed capital formation.

Sources: World Bank, *World Development Report* 1986, Washington DC; Taiwan, *Statistical Yearbook* 1986, Taipei.

There are various quantitative indicators of these which are commonly used—per capita income and its distribution, the level of employment, life expectancy and so on. These indicators of development do not cover the broader social changes that characterise the process. We will ignore development and concentrate on growth, although development does not necessarily follow growth.

Growth itself does not tell us anything about the process through which it occurs. Many forms of economic change involve fast growth. The dominant force behind rapid growth in the countries with which we are concerned here can be defined as the accumulation of industrial capital involving the expansion of investment in productive activities.

Accumulation of industrial capital can occur in various forms. The ownership of capital can be in domestic or foreign hands; the markets served by industrial firms may be at home or abroad; ownership may be private or public. We are concerned here with capitalist development,

that is, the accumulation of capital in private hands. Some countries may have more state or collective enterprises than others, but in the NICs which are being emulated and the countries which are attempting to emulate them, it is private capital that is the principal dynamic force behind economic growth. As will become apparent in the discussion below, growth and development in socialist countries require a different mode of analysis.

It should also be stated at the outset that we are not arguing that industry is the only source of growth. The agricultural, mining and service sectors are also of central importance. But the developed countries and the NICs have, uniformly, become advanced through the development of industry.¹ Other sectors, especially services and mining, may come to be the most dynamic sectors, but it is industry that leads most countries from underdeveloped to developed status.

What is it about industry that gives it this special status? Three factors can be identified. Firstly, industry takes a leading role partly because of its technological character, in particular its amenability to the investment of capital (mechanisation) and its proneness to technical advance. Secondly, as income rises, consumption preferences shift to industrial products. Thirdly and most importantly, industry has proven to be the principal bearer of capitalist social relations. Capitalism—the relationship between private ownership of the means of production and wage labour—has been and remains the central dynamic force for accumulation, the expansion of the means of production.

The question of the prospects for growth in Asia may not be expressed in this form: What are the prospects for the rapid and sustained accumulation of industrial capital? The conditions which permit sustained accumulation are both economic and political. First international economic conditions will be considered, then internal economic conditions and, finally, the amenability of domestic power structures to accumulation.

Notice first, however, that considering the prospects for growth and development in Asia, or in the Third World generally, implies that the conditions facing each country are shared. This inevitably puts a great deal of stress on the importance of international economic conditions in determining the rate of growth. International economic conditions may be very important, especially for a small country, but they may also be irrelevant if the internal conditions are not conducive to growth. These

¹ Clive Hamilton, 'Price formation and class relations in the development process', *Journal of Contemporary Asia* (forthcoming in 1987).

include the internal political conditions, which vary enormously and are particular to each country's history.

Moreover, the question of emulating the NICs often implicitly assumes that the starting position of the rest of Asia is that of the NICs in the 1950s or early 1960s. In fact, circumstances have changed dramatically. Internationally, world markets are much tighter; there is increased competition between less developed countries. National economies have also changed very substantially; indicators of structural change in our sample of countries are included in Table 2.

Table 2: Changes in economic structure

	Share of agriculture in GDP		Share of industry in GDP		Growth rate of industry	Labour force in agriculture (per cent) 1980
	1965	1984	1965	1984	1973-84	
South Korea	38	14	25	40	10.9	36
Taiwan	24	6	30	46	10.5 ^a	20
Hong Kong	2	1	40	22	8.0	2
Singapore	3	1	24	39	8.6	2
Indonesia	59	26	12	40	8.3	57
Philippines	26	25	28	34	5.3	52
Malaysia	30	21	24	35	8.7	42
Thailand	35	20	23	28	8.7	70
Nepal	65	56	11	12	—	93
Bangladesh	53	48	11	12	7.6	75
Pakistan	40	24	20	29	7.6	55
India	47	35	22	27	4.4	70

^a 1971-85.

Sources: World Bank, *World Development Report* 1986, Washington DC; Taiwan, *Statistical Yearbook* 1986, Taipei.

International Factors

The foremost common factor influencing the growth prospects of developing countries is the growth of the world economy. The growth of markets for exports depends on the general buoyancy of the world economy and changes in levels of protection aimed at products from developing countries. With the rapid growth in world trade over the last

twenty-five years, the potential trading opportunities for South and Southeast Asia are greater than they were for the NICs in the early 1960s. Continued growth of South-South trade and the opening of the People's Republic of China to imports provide further opportunities.

While recent increases in protection by some industrial countries have been most detrimental to labour-intensive exports from developing countries, this protectionism is unlikely to be extended, given the political dominance of free trade ideology, and may be wound back. Nevertheless, the region is now crowded with NICs, near-NICs and aspiring-NICs so that the competition for markets between exporters has become intense. This is reflected in the attempts by various countries in the region to attract foreign export-producing capital by means of ever more tempting subsidies.

The World Bank² predicts a growth rate of per capita GDP in developing countries of between 2.0 and 3.9 per cent for the decade 1985-95, with exports growing at a rate of between 3.2 and 7.1 per cent. The influence of the growth of the world economy on each country will clearly depend on its degree of integration into world markets. An indication of the degree of integration of our selected countries is the share of exports in GDP which appears in column 1 of Table 3. According to World Bank projections, middle-income oil importers such as Thailand will perform particularly well, especially if they are exporters of manufactures, whereas oil exporters such as Indonesia and Malaysia will find it more difficult in an era of lower oil prices. Low-income Asian countries—including those in South Asia—have quite good prospects despite, or perhaps because of, their low dependence on the world economy. However, it is difficult to see good prospects for the stagnant economies of Nepal and Bangladesh which are barely managing to grow in per capita terms (see column 5 of Table 1).

Those countries which have a high dependence on exports of commodities are likely to have difficulty with the volatility that this dependence imparts to their economies. Sustained growth is based on sustained investment and the latter requires a degree of stability and certainty about the future. Indonesia, Malaysia and Bangladesh are more likely to suffer (see column 6 of Table 3), although Bangladesh is not heavily dependent on exports. It is not possible to predict changes in prices of primary commodities on world markets.

A few other features of the world economy have changed substantially since the early 1960s when the NICs entered their periods of

² World Bank, *World Development Report 1986*, Washington DC, 1986.

Table 3: Features of the trade regime

	Share of exports in GDP 1984	Growth rate of exports 1973-84	Shares in 1983 exports of Fuels, minerals etc	Other primary	Other	Commodity concentration ^b 1985
South Korea	37	15.1	3	6	91	26
Taiwan	57	14.4 ^a	2	8	90	11
Hong Kong	107	12.9	2	6	92	—
Singapore	—	7.1	31	13	56	32
Indonesia	23	1.4	80	12	8	64 ^c
Philippines	21	5.6	13	36	51	14
Malaysia	56	7.5	35	43	22	45 ^c
Thailand	24	10.4	6	62	32	26
Nepal	11	—	5	43	52	20
Bangladesh	8	2.9	4	35	61	66
Pakistan	11	7.4	2	34	64	36 ^c
India	6	3.3	18	29	53	—

^a 1971-85. ^b Percentage contribution of three major commodities or items in total merchandise exports. ^c 1984.

Sources: World Bank, *World Development Report* 1986, Washington DC; Taiwan, *Statistical Yearbook* 1986, Taipei; Column 6—Asian Development Bank, *Key Indicators of Developing Member Countries of ADB*, July 1986.

rapid industrialisation. Firstly, there is much greater international trade in technology. It is now technically easier to set up factories and to introduce new production processes than it was twenty-five years ago, so that the logistical difficulties of establishing a new industry are much reduced. On the other hand, access to some of the more sophisticated technology is much more expensive. Secondly, the growth of international banking now provides much easier access to credit for financing industrial investments. This will be discussed in more detail in the next section, but it is worth noting here that the greater availability of finance is, like technology, offset by its much greater cost.

Domestic economic conditions

Within each country various economic factors contribute to or detract from the overall rate of growth. These factors can be roughly divided into those which contribute to the availability of savings and those which influence the productiveness or efficiency of potential investments.

They are not sufficient in themselves to ensure high levels of productive and self-sustaining investment; several political conditions, to be discussed in the next section, are required to ensure that high savings are transformed into productive investments, but the savings and investment criteria can be thought of as necessary conditions.

The principal factors which ensure the availability of savings to investors are a high domestic savings rate, the absence of serious foreign drains on domestic resources through debt burdens, the associated access to foreign credit, and financial institutions sufficiently developed to permit savers and industrial investors to come together. This last factor should not be overemphasised, however, because while the existence of sound institutions can encourage additional savings, in the absence of official institutions, informal lending in kerb markets will always spring up to satisfy the needs of at least some savers and investors. For example, South Korea has long been held up as an example of the problems of financial disintermediation, but in practice, flourishing kerb markets have satisfied most commercial needs.

Some indicators of these principal factors appear in Table 4. The savings rates for the NICs in columns 1 and 2 indicate the levels required for sustained growth. The Southeast Asian countries more or less satisfy this domestic savings condition, but among the countries of South Asia only India has been able to attain a savings rate of 20 per cent. A high level of foreign debt may be indicative of the confidence international lenders have in the growth prospects of the country concerned; more often, high levels of debt have not been covered by a compensatory expansion of productive capacity. In these circumstances, the significance of accumulated debt lies in the drain it represents on for resources for potential investment. When export revenues fail to grow the debt provides a very serious strain on the economy. Debt-service ratios for 1984 are recorded in the fourth column of Table 4. Note that these ratios refer to long-term debt only, so that in practice a substantially greater proportion of annual export revenue is being spent on debt servicing. Those countries that have substantial debts and are unlikely to be able to expand export revenues rapidly, such as the Philippines, Indonesia, Thailand and Pakistan, are likely to experience problems. The credit ratings of column 5 are indicative of the ease with which each country will be able to obtain foreign loans. The Philippines among the Southeast Asian countries will have difficulties, and only India among the South Asian countries will have easy access to foreign funds.

Table 4: Factors contributing to the availability of savings

	Domestic savings rate		Long-term debt service in 1984 as percentage of		Credit rating ^f 1987	M2/GDP 1983
	1970-81	1982-84	GNP	Exports		
South Korea	24	27	6.6	15.8	59.9	38
Taiwan	32	24	—	—	74.5	56 ^a
Hong Kong	28 ^a	26	—	—	69.3	110 ^a
Singapore	29	42	—	—	74.8	73
Indonesia	20	20	5.5	19.0	45.5	21
Philippines	25	20	4.5	17.9	22.1	25
Malaysia	25	29	—	—	57.0	61
Thailand	21	20	5.4	21.5	53.6	48
Nepal	15 ^b	9	0.4	3.4	—	29
Bangladesh	9 ^c	1	1.3	14.2	19.2	26
Pakistan	13 ^d	6	2.8	27.1	30.4	44
India	20 ^e	22	1.1	13.8	50.6	42

^a Savings exclude net current transfers from abroad; elsewhere these are included.

^b 1976-81. ^c 1973-81. ^d 1972-81. ^e 1970-79. ^f Country credit ratings provided by leading international banks. ^g 1977. ^h 1980.

Sources: Columns 1 & 2—World Bank, *World Tables* 3rd edition, Washington DC; World Bank, *World Development Reports* 1984-86, Washington DC; Taiwan, *Statistical Yearbook* 1986, Taipei. Columns 3 & 4—World Bank, *World Development Report* 1986. Column 5—*Institutional Investor*, March 1987. Column 6—IMF, *International Financial Statistics* 1985.

Since the mid-1970s a great literature has burgeoned on the growth-inhibiting effects of financial repression. Too much has been made of this; both South Korea and Taiwan maintained very fast growth for years while their financial systems were severely repressed by tight government control. Informal markets are impossible to suppress, although the high interest rates they charge can deter potentially productive investments, especially by small farmers. This is why governments committed to both high growth and financial regulation always need to provide public loans at low rates to industrial and other ventures. In column 6 of Table 4 we record the ratio of M2 (money and quasi-money) to GDP which provides a rough indication of levels of financial development. It is apparent that only Indonesia and the Philippines among the Southeast Asian countries may run into problems in supplying private savings to investors, while the ratios of

Nepal and Bangladesh, though low, are probably adequate for their stages of development.

The conditions that are required to translate a high volume of savings into a high volume of productive investment are in large measure political and will be discussed in the next section. For the present it is important to attempt to get some idea of how productive these investments might be. It is very difficult to determine this in advance even for a single project, but there are some features of the economic environment which are *prima facie* conducive to greater productiveness of invested resources. One of these is the quality of the workforce. Some indicators of the quality of the workforce for the eight countries under study are provided in Table 5. Note that there is a strong relationship between income levels on the one hand and school enrolments and literacy rates on the other. While causation clearly runs more strongly from income levels to educational levels, countries which start out with higher quality workforces will, *ceteris paribus*, have an advantage. India and the Philippines stand out from their groups in this regard.

Notice also that investment in improving the quality of the workforce overall is undermined by rapid population growth (column 3 of Table 5). Nepal, Bangladesh and Pakistan will find it difficult to raise the quality of labour, while high educational levels in the Philippines will be eroded if population continues to grow at the present rate.

A further dimension of the workforce environment of investments is the level of application of labour, including the number of hours worked. Comparative data on this is patchy.³ The degree of control by management over the labour force depends on both political factors such as repression of trade unions and economic factors such as the level of unemployment and alternative sources of income. Data on these are notoriously unreliable, but it would seem that most of the countries in question provide conditions amenable to stern control over industrial labour, with possible exceptions being provided by the Philippines, Malaysia and India where trade union movements are relatively strong.

Some of these factors are expressed in the labour costs which industry faces but not always in a direct way. It may be that countries with stern control over labour have higher levels and growth rates of wages. Nevertheless, other things being equal, lower labour costs are important for the productiveness of investments principally in the case

³ ILO, *Yearbook of Labour Statistics*, Geneva 1985.

Table 5: Factors contributing to the productivity of investments

	Secondary school enrolments as percentage of age group 1983	Literacy rate 1980	Population growth rate 1980- 2000	Annual growth rate of real wages in manu- facturing in the 1970s	Average monthly salaries of industrial workers US\$ 1978
South Korea	89	96	1.4	9.0	312
Taiwan	56 ^a	90	1.3 ^b	7.2	165
Hong Kong	68	90	1.2	2.4	254
Singapore	69	84	1.0	6.5	198
Indonesia	37	62	1.9	—	130
Philippines	63	83	2.2	-6.6	75
Malaysia	49	60	2.1	1.4	150
Thailand	29	86	1.7	5.9	126
Nepal	22	19	2.6	—	—
Bangladesh	19	26	2.4	1.4	—
Pakistan	16	24	2.6	4.2	—
India	34	36	1.9	2.0	—

^a Estimate only. ^b 1985 growth rate only.

Sources: Column 1—World Bank, *World Development Report* 1986; Taiwan, *Statistical Yearbook* 1986. Column 2—ADB, *Key Indicators* 1986. Column 3—as for column 1. Column 4—ESCAP, *Economic and Social Survey of Asia and the Pacific* 1985, Table I.29 (The years of coverage vary; see the source for details); Taiwan, *Statistical Yearbook*, 1986. Column 5—Limquenco (1983, p 291).

of traded goods. Once again reliable comparative data are scarce, particularly as wage rates within a country are not uniformly high or low but vary between markets for different types of labour. However, one can determine in general whether a country's wage levels are appropriate for its level of development and for a given level of reliance on international trade. High wage growth in Pakistan and Thailand may present difficulties, while falling real wages in the Philippines would be favourable to further industrial growth.

A second set of factors influencing the potential productivity of investments relates to the appropriateness of the technology employed and the efficiency with which machinery and equipment are used. These are management decisions and reflect the quality of management of

industrial enterprises. The determinants of the quality of management are probably more difficult to isolate and quantify than the determinants of the quality of labour, but this factor can be of crucial importance. Long experience in a commercial environment is undoubtedly important; industrialists in Korea and Taiwan could draw on their experience in the industries that grew up in the period of Japanese occupation. Exposure to the management practices of foreign companies can help in principle, but many countries have complained of the unwillingness of foreign companies to pass on their managerial skills. Within our group of countries, India and Pakistan, with longer histories of industrial production, have a natural advantage, while the *bumiputra* policies of Malaysia are likely to expand rapidly the cadre of effective managers. Indonesia, *per contra*, lacks a broad, high-quality management base and will take many years to acquire it.

A further significant factor in creating a favourable economic environment for investments is the development of physical infrastructure. A rough indication of the infrastructural development effort is contained in columns 1 and 2 of Table 6. Among the Southeast Asian countries, Indonesia and Malaysia appear to spend much more of their GDP on economic services than the Philippines and Thailand, while among the South Asian countries, India lags well behind the others possibly because of its relatively well-developed base. In the case of Nepal, and less so Bangladesh, geological instability and the very underdeveloped infrastructural base necessitate the channelling of a great proportion of government spending into building basic transport and power systems.

High levels of military expenditure can be a serious drain on resources which would otherwise be available for productive investments. Indications of levels of military spending appear in the third column of Table 6. In Southeast Asia, the Thai military extract a high price for staying out of government while in South Asia tension between Pakistan and India imposes serious burdens on their economies.

A final key factor affecting the general efficiency of investments is the influence which tariffs, subsidies and other measures that affect relative prices have upon resource allocation. Inefficient tariffs, for instance, can direct investments into areas of production which will not be internationally competitive and will therefore require continued protection. On the other hand, judicious use of tariffs can permit the establishment of new industries which may form the backbone of sustained development. The Korean government and Taiwanese

authorities were unhesitating in their use of protection to foster local industry. Despite the recent, ideologically motivated clamour for liberalisation, no valid general statement about the merits or demerits of protection as such can be made.

The focus of this article has been on factors which directly influence industrial development rather than the agricultural sector. In fact, sustained urban industrial growth needs to be preceded or accompanied by a transformation of traditional agrarian social structures and production techniques. If this does not occur, the rural sector will impose an intolerable drain on industrial production, on account of:

- 1) the failure of the farming majority to provide a market for manufactured consumer goods. Even under export-oriented industrialisation, the bulk of demand for industrial output remains domestic;
- 2) continuing high agricultural terms of trade resulting in high food prices and thus high wages in the cities;
- 3) the obligation for governments to divert substantial resources into agriculture without significant productivity increases resulting;
- 4) the burden of the traditional social relationships rooted in agricultural systems which work against the dynamic social instability that is characteristic of periods of rapid economic change.

Agriculture will provide a sympathetic environment for rapid industrial development if it has been shaken out of its fixed ways and is amenable to penetration by new relationships and technologies. Taiwan and Korea started out after the Second World War with a natural advantage in this regard. Japanese colonialism had thoroughly transformed traditional agrarian social relations and revolutionised methods of agricultural production, the former especially in Korea and the latter especially in Taiwan.⁴ Land reform in the 1950s grew out of the rural turmoil left by the Japanese and took the process of agricultural transformation further. Not only did land reform destroy the rural power base of the landlord classes, but owner-cultivation was a means of improving agricultural productivity when combined with sympathetic state policies.

Elsewhere, the development of capitalism in agriculture has been a powerful force in destroying old social relations and the dead weight of custom, as well as providing a means for rapid improvement in productivity. Of the three principal forms of agricultural production

⁴ Clive Hamilton, 'Capitalist industrialisation in East Asia's Four Little Tigers', *Journal of Contemporary Asia* 13(1) 1983.

relations—landlord-tenant, owner-cultivator and capitalist—the first has tended to be associated with rural stagnation and political opposition to industrialisation policies, while the last, capitalism, has tended in recent times to be a dynamic force for growth. However, the relevance of the forms of agricultural production relations for industrial development lies not so much in the form or forms which dominate agriculture but in the *transition* from one form to another or others. It is the process of change itself that has been seen to be historically important.

It should be made clear that the sorts of agrarian revolutions we are talking about generally leave a large part of the rural population pauperised and starving for long periods, perhaps several decades. They are the casualties of social and economic transition; capitalist growth generally entails the impoverishment for long periods of large sections of the population.

In Southeast Asia, the Malaysian system of large plantations combined with small cash-crop farming has provided the necessary level of unsettlement in the rural sector. Less than half of Malaysian farmers own land,⁵ and wage labour is very prevalent. While share-cropping is also widespread, capitalist farming is the dynamic mode. Indications of the prevalence of tenancy and the development of capitalist agriculture elsewhere can be found in Table 6. It is worth noting that tenancy is not nearly as widespread in South and Southeast Asia as it was in Northeast Asia (Japan, Korea, Taiwan) before the Second World War.⁶ On the one hand, this frees South and Southeast Asia from some of the restraints on generalised growth and development imposed by traditional landlord-based agriculture; on the other hand, these countries are less able to benefit from the liberating effects of the overthrow of these traditional systems.

In India and Indonesia tenancy is relatively uncommon while wage-labour in agriculture is widespread. In Indonesia over recent decades, tenancy has been declining while wage labour has been growing, especially in Java. The technology of the Green Revolution and associated state policies, particularly in India, have strengthened the tendency towards capitalist farming. In India this was given an initial impetus by land reforms in the 1950s. In Thailand, tenancy is fairly

⁵ F Halim, 'Rural labour force and industrial conflict in West Malaysia', *Journal of Contemporary Asia* 11(3) 1981.

⁶ Anne Booth, and R M Sundrum, *Labour Absorption in Agriculture*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986.

Table 6: Factors contributing to the productivity of investments

	Share of government expenditure in GDP 1984	Proportion of government spending on economic services 1972-1984	Share of defence in central government expenditure 1983
South Korea	17	24	32
Taiwan	14	20	—
Hong Kong	15	22	—
Singapore	34	18	19
Indonesia	23	62 ^b	12
Philippines	11	36	14
Malaysia	35	26	—
Thailand	18	19	20
Nepal	19	52	5 ^c
Bangladesh	14	51 ^c	—
Pakistan	25 ^a	32 ^d	35
India	15	24 ^d	20

^a 1983. ^b 1975-84. ^c 1973-84. ^d 1975-80. ^e 1982.

Sources: Column 1—ADB, *Key Indicators* 1986. Column 2—ADB, *Key Indicators* 1986; World Bank, *World Tables*, 3rd edition. Column 3—World Bank, *World Development Report* 1986.

uncommon but so is agricultural wage-labour, which suggests a predominance of family farms of sufficient size to provide a living. This helps explain the low level of fertiliser application in Thailand (see column 4 of Table 7). However, wage labour in agriculture has been rising rapidly since the early seventies,⁷ suggesting significant change in traditional systems.

In the Philippines, the figures misleadingly indicate a relatively low level of use of wage-labour and a predominance of owner-cultivation. The capitalist plantation sector is more important than the figures suggest. The degree of landlessness and the prevalence of wage-labour have been rising in recent years. The instability of the agricultural sector in recent times, apart from the political difficulties it creates, is likely to stimulate the industrialisation process. Land reform, if it is significant, is likely to raise levels of output, reinvigorate the rural economy, and

⁷ *ibid.*

CAN THE REST OF ASIA EMULATE THE NICs?

Table 7: Characteristics of agriculture

	Percentage of holdings wholly owned ^a	Percentage of farms hiring in labour ^a	Growth rate of agriculture 1972-85	Fertiliser consumption per hectare 1983
South Korea	—	—	7.7 ^b	3311
Taiwan	—	—	1.5	—
Hong Kong	—	—	—	—
Singapore	—	—	-2.6 ^b	7833
Indonesia	74	70	4.0 ^c	745
Philippines	58	24	3.8	320
Malaysia	—	—	4.7	1115
Thailand	85 ^d	29	4.5 ^d	240
Nepal	—	—	1.7 ^e	137
Bangladesh	58	45	1.7 ^f	596
Pakistan	42	37	3.0	586
India	92	89	2.4 ^c	394

^a Figures are for the years, in order of appearance in the table, 1973, 1971, 1978, 1977, 1972, and 1970-71. ^b 1981-85. ^c 1972-84. ^d 1973-85. ^e 1976-85. ^f 1979-1985. ^g South, September 1986 reports that in some areas 40 per cent of farmers were renting all or part of their land.

Sources: Columns 1 and 2—Booth and Sundrum (1985), Tables 6.6 and 1.7. Column 3—ADB, *Key Indicators* 1986. Column 4—World Bank, *World Development Report* 1986.

weaken the power of big landowners who resist the policies and changes necessary for rapid industrial growth. However, significant land reform in the Philippines is very unlikely.

In Bangladesh and Pakistan the use of wage-labour is common and so is tenancy. The situation is similar in Nepal. However, Bangladesh and Pakistan have experienced rises in landlessness (about a third of households were landless in Bangladesh in 1977) and a concomitant rise in the use of wage labour. In Pakistan particularly there has been a significant trend towards tenant evictions and a shift in power to middle-level farmers.⁸ In Bangladesh and Nepal the patterns of farm ownership and production are settled and rigid and will not lend themselves easily to the upheavals that inevitably accompany industrial transformation. Where possible, the introduction of Green Revolution

⁸ *ibid.*

technology can help to transform these old patterns, though at the expense of the landless and owners of miniature farms. This has been true in Pakistan where capitalist farming has been replacing tenancy since the 1960s.

Domestic political conditions

The availability of adequate savings and opportunities for productive investment do not ensure that productive investments will actually occur. The transition from adequate savings to productive investment depends on political conditions broadly conceived. It has been argued that growth means that circumstances are favourable for the accumulation of industrial capital. These circumstances are complex products of diverse historical processes and generally involve the absence of political dominance by classes which derive wealth from unproductive, or zero-sum, activities. In order to encourage growth, political power must be in the hands of people at least sympathetic towards industrial development and perhaps under the influence of 'growth coalitions'⁹ made up of a nascent class of industrialists, technocrats committed to 'modernisation', a 'progressive' military and possibly foreign capital. A growth coalition may ride on the back of popular political movements motivated by nationalism or by revolt against old exploitative relationships.

There are various sources of wealth accumulation which limit the scope for industrial accumulation and which lie at the root of low growth and underdevelopment. The traditionally most widespread form of holding wealth in underdeveloped countries is land ownership, and in many countries, as we will see, this remains the source of economic and political power of the ruling elites. It is important to distinguish landlords who derive income from renting out land to tenants, and capitalist farmers who employ wage-labour and gain income from the sale of agricultural products.

The second principal form of unproductive wealth accumulation lies in merchant activities. Commercial or merchant capital derives profit from trade, including international trade, without adding value to goods. Revenue is often derived through some sort of monopoly position and the ability to engage in speculation. While wholesale and

⁹ J A C Mackie, 'Economic growth in the ASEAN region: the political underpinnings', Paper prepared for the Industrialisation Workshop, NCDS, Australian National University, Canberra ACT.

retail activities are essential to industrial production and are in these circumstances productive, these services can contribute to overall economic growth only up to a point, a point beyond which they result only in redistribution. Another source of wealth often closely associated with commercial capital is financial capital, which often appears as informal lending and borrowing in both urban and rural areas. While financial capital may, like commercial capital, be subordinated to the needs of industrial capital, the dangers are that usury will become more attractive than productive investment and that the indebtedness of industrial firms may lead to asset stripping by creditors.

A third form of zero-sum activity covers a range of activities that might be summed up as profiteering and corruption, and includes profiteering from government contracts and aid monies. In some countries this form of wealth accumulation is extremely well developed and dominates the business activities of the urban propertied classes especially. It may result in the syphoning-off for consumption purposes of the bulk of the resources available for investment.

The fourth major form of unproductive wealth is represented by foreign capital flows. This may take the form of monies being deposited abroad by local wealthy elites, or it may be in the form of profit-taking by transnational corporations operating within one's borders. It is quite possible for outflows of funds overseas to diminish dramatically the resources available for productive investments at home, just as it is possible for capital inflows to add to domestic productive investments.

The last important drain on potentially productive resources is the state. Bloated, inefficient bureaucracies can soak up huge amounts of revenue, while military spending to maintain unstable or unpopular regimes can absorb vital development resources.

The distinction between productive and unproductive investments corresponds to the distinction between social and private profitability. An investment is socially profitable if it mobilises national resources in a way that expands national output. Such a project may also be privately profitable, but an investment which is privately profitable may not necessarily generate social profits. Private profits in such circumstances result from redistribution rather than efficient resource mobilisation and these investments are unproductive.

The importance of each of the above forms of asset accumulation is that they give control over potentially productive resources to groups which are likely to invest them in unproductive activities such as land ownership for rental purposes, usury, commodity speculation,

extravagant consumption, military expansion and overseas bank accounts. One of the essential thrusts of economic policymaking in the NICs, especially Taiwan and South Korea, was to limit severely, and in some cases to eliminate, opportunities for zero-sum activities. Landlordism was abolished, corruption was largely eliminated, speculation and usury were controlled and foreign exchange flows were wholly regulated.

The difficulty all of this raises for the prospects of growth is that nascent industrial capital generally lacks the political as well as the economic power to impose on the economy and society the conditions it needs for rapid accumulation. One historically proven method is the industrial capital to accumulate gradually—in favourable economic conditions—until it can gain political power through economic strength. This was the case in Britain. If there is entrenched resistance from the old ruling class the supremacy of industrial capital may be attained through violent revolutions which sweep away the old social forces, such as in France, the USA and most recently perhaps the Philippines.

In the Third World today, to achieve political power or at least to gain significant power over policy, industrial capital needs an ally. Sometimes, it seeks such an ally in military regimes, which may appear committed to economic development, to breaking the power of the landlords and promoting business. South Korea and Taiwan may seem to provide examples of this though detailed analysis of these situations reveals greater complexity.¹⁰ Often, however, military regimes are aligned with reactionary social forces, especially landlords (such as in Latin America) or they may be wholly committed to their own enrichment and military adventure.

Sometimes, foreign powers see some advantage in encouraging development in their colonies or spheres of influence. They then give support to burgeoning business interests to ensure that they gain political power. This was the case in Singapore, for example.

Workers and peasants may align themselves with business classes under a nationalist banner in order to expel a common foreign enemy or a landlord-dominated or corrupt regime. These sorts of alliances sometimes back-fire on the bourgeois classes since the suitability of political conditions to capitalist hegemony may also make a country suitable for a revolution from below. In addition to the lower classes,

¹⁰ Hamilton, 'Capitalist industrialisation . . .'

intermediate classes including powerful bureaucracies, the police and the petty bourgeoisie, as well as professionals, may be brought together in the cause of nationalism.

The essential political condition for capitalist industrial growth was defined above as the absence of the political dominance of classes which derive wealth from unproductive activities or which are otherwise hostile to industrial development. This implies that the state should be free from the overwhelming, if not the total, influence of these classes—landlords, speculators, money-lenders, the military and foreign interests inimical to industrial development.

It would be a mistake, however, to believe that the dominance of the state directly by industrial capital will bring about ideal conditions for industrial accumulation. The business class collectively may need protection from itself. Unconstrained, it may well create economic conditions which are comfortable for existing businesses but inimical to continued growth, for example and in particular, through protection from foreign competition. The transition from import-substituting industrialisation to a more open industrial economy needs to occur at a point where domestic business is strong enough to withstand international competition but not so well established as to be able to protect itself indefinitely.¹¹ Businesses need to be allowed to fail in order for the economy to continue to be efficient. This defines a further political condition necessary for sustained accumulation: economic policy needs to be aimed at economic growth through private accumulation rather than at simply protecting private capital. That is, it is necessary to have a state that is capable of taking hard decisions which are contrary to the interests of sections of the business class.

These carry with them a further implied political condition, namely that the state is both sufficiently strong and sufficiently independent from particular class interests to implement policies that will promote accumulation at the expense of other interests. Four of the most important of these sorts of policies are land reform, suppression of corruption, regulation of finance capital, and the control of labour. State power may be democratically or undemocratically based.

The next task is to apply these general statements to the particular histories and class structures of the eight countries selected for study. The purpose is to look very briefly at the social parameters that determine whether industrial capital can become the dynamic economic

¹¹ Mackie, 'Economic growth . . .'

force within each country. In such brief reviews
are lost.

Indonesia

In Indonesia, the landlord class, such as it is, has not in recent times held the position of political authority that it has in countries like Malaysia and the Philippines. On the other hand, the Chinese who have dominated business in Indonesia have not been powerful enough in the face of ethnic and class hostilities to form political organisations to dominate the state. Some years after the fall of Sukarno in 1965, a very powerful bureaucratic-military elite emerged and remains the source of political power today.

The political power of the military-bureaucratic elite has been translated into economic power, so that powerful military or ex-military families now form the main focus of wealth accumulation in Indonesia. This wealth accumulation, however, is not based directly on productive activities, but takes the form of 'tributes' extracted from the productive and unproductive activities of others. The dominant sources of government wealth have been oil sales, foreign investments and foreign aid and the spending of this revenue has been the making of fortunes for favoured businessmen and others connected to the government. Generals and important military families take a share of most foreign ventures permitted to operate in the country, and the government allocates lucrative contracts and franchises to favoured families including, and especially, the family of Suharto. Nevertheless, a substantial portion of oil revenues in the boom years did go into building infrastructure and agricultural improvement.

The scale of corruption is unusual: it is so deep-rooted in the present political structure that it almost forms a mode of economic reproduction of its own. But even corruption needs to be based on some form of productive activity, and these are the businesses run by foreign and local, mostly Chinese, companies. The military-bureaucratic elite has largely stayed out of managing and furthering productive activities, relying on its partnership with these business groups. Moreover, this relationship and the continued viability of the regime has required that from time to time the more extreme abuses of political power be controlled, as in the case of the reform of the customs service in 1985.

While corruption has imposed a massive burden on the economy, by the end of the boom years of the 1970s a substantial class of domestic

capitalist class emerged,¹² or rather, had been established, since its expansion had been very much a product of the economic activities of the state. This capitalist class has limited political power and is not so much the ally of the state as its prisoner. While the economy was flushed with oil revenue, the government could afford to be serious about building an industrial economy based on indigenous capital accumulation. The drastic decline in oil revenues has demonstrated that the state's commitment to growth and development is constrained. To pursue industrialisation, Indonesia would now need seriously to attack corruption and to expose much of domestic business to the cold winds of international competition as the economy can ill afford to featherbed domestic industry. The close ties between senior members of the government and some key business interests make this unlikely.

The economic self-interest of the ruling group will prevent it from ending the corruption and protection of local business that would be necessary for sustained growth. If we compare the present Indonesian military regime with that of South Korea in the 1950s and 1960s, the striking difference is how little the South Korean officers became directly involved in business and how ruthless they were in suppressing corruption. Both regimes were strong enough to take the necessary measures, but only the South Koreans have been willing to take them.

Philippines

Under Marcos in the Philippines, the principal sources of wealth for the ruling classes were rents and profits from land ownership, including the sugar and coconut plantations, and the profits to be had from corruption, speculation and government favour. Some of the foreign loans accumulated in the Marcos era were used to finance property deals and to expand personal bank accounts (especially of political friends and relations of the President) rather than to finance productive enterprise. While the ruling class has since the 1950s diversified into industry and commerce, the foundations of the wealth and power of many families remain in the provinces. The Aquino family falls into this category. Nevertheless, within the propertied classes a new group has emerged whose interests are tied directly to industrial accumulation.

The downfall of the Marcos regime was a product, as much as anything else, of the disaffection of major segments of the business class whose interests were being seriously harmed by the economic decline

¹² Richard Robison, *Indonesia: The Rise of Capital*, Sydney: Allen and Unwin, 1986.

brought on by government mismanagement. But the bourgeois revolution of 1986 was directed much more against the close associates of the former President than at the old oligarchy itself.

The old oligarchy remains very much in place (as do many of the cronies) although there is no doubt that, for the time being, many forms of zero-sum activity associated with the Marcos regime are now more difficult. Rapid industrial development now depends on whether the new government has the political will to weaken drastically the power of the old landed oligarchy while maintaining an independence from the new business class. While land reform is a real possibility, it is going to be neither far-reaching nor confiscatory, so that the mass of workers and peasants will have to pay off the loans made to compensate the landowners. Nor will there be moves to turn landowners into industrial-capitalists, a scheme which had some success in South Korea, Taiwan and Japan.¹³

Under present conditions, the political power of the old oligarchy, backed by powerful sections of the military, is too strong to permit the unleashing of industrial progress. The government remains heavily under the influence of classes whose interests lie other than in rapid industrial expansion, and is not in a position to take the harsh measures necessary for industrialisation to become the principal economic force.

Malaysia

In Malaysia, plantation wealth was mostly in the hands of foreign companies until taken over by the state in the 1970s. This means that the powerful landlord class that industrial capital has had to contend with elsewhere has been less influential. Nevertheless, landed interests are a significant force within the United Malay National Organisation (UMNO), the dominant political party. The political influence of the landlords is partly neutralised, however, by that of the Malay peasantry, whose welfare is important to the political leadership.

The traditional centres of economic power in Malaysia have been the foreign, especially British, companies based on the plantations, and Chinese businesses engaged in commerce and some industrial processing. While there is no clearly dominant political class, the state has weakened the power of these groups firstly by acquiring ownership of the largest parts of the plantation, mining and banking sectors, and secondly by giving preference to ethnic Malays over Chinese in

¹³ Hamilton, 'Capitalist industrialisation . . .'

encouraging new ventures. The New Economic Policy (NEP) set out explicitly to create a class of Malay capitalists, not so much in place of but complementary to the Chinese businesses. The strategy of state acquisitions followed by divestment to Malays (in the 1990s) could be quite successful. Certainly in South Korea, the government had success in creating a class of indigenous capitalists by handing over state property formerly owned by the Japanese.

Industrial growth will depend largely on the ability of the state to limit zero-sum activities. This may prove difficult. While heavily involved in the economy, the government is firmly committed to seeing private capital as the motor of industrial development. On the other hand, the governing class's commitment to growth is tempered by its need to keep various class interests satisfied, including those of the Malay working and peasant classes. At present the state is required to respond to strong demands from various segments of society and relies to some extent on broad support. This makes it difficult to take severe measures which will cause some to suffer. In the years ahead, the state will become increasingly dominated by the class of wealthy Malays it is now creating. The scope for corruption and nepotism—which is already significant in the NEP—will expand and industrial growth will be more difficult. Nor is there a politically powerful, cohesive, technocratic bureaucracy, as in Thailand, which can act as a counter to sectional interests.

The military is not politically important, but any dramatic decline in economic fortunes, as occurred for instance in the Philippines, could precipitate military involvement in politics. The economic structure of the country—with its very heavy reliance on exports of few primary commodities—makes it prone to this. The danger in Malaysia is not a lack of allies for the industrial bourgeoisie, but a lack of a countervailing force to restrain it.

Thailand

Thailand is unusual in that there is not a wealthy class of landowners with the political power to match its counterparts in other countries. The centre of economic power in Thailand lies with large business groupings some of which are centred on banking. This financial-industrial bourgeoisie continues to be family-based although in recent years attempts have been made to encourage public incorporation. The banks do not simply control the formal financial market but extend their influence through ownership of industrial and commercial enterprises. This business class is a post-war phenomenon stimulated further by the

Vietnam War and US aid, much as the Korean War was important in giving prominence to business interests in South Korea.

Although by no means as thoroughly as in South Korea, successive Thai governments have attempted to eliminate the less socially desirable forms of wealth accumulation including corruption and the suppression of informal money markets. For instance, the government engineered the collapse of the wealthy chit funds. Nevertheless, foreign loans have been pumped into unproductive investments such as urban property development and, in particular, military spending.

The political power of the financed-based bourgeoisie does not match its economic power. Political power is held by generally pro-business parties backed by sections of the military and middle classes, in addition to the bureaucracy which has provided administrative stability at a time of rapid changes in political leadership. On the one hand, this means that the government is reluctant to make any move that will upset the military leadership. On the other hand, the military is professional in the sense that it confines itself to military and political affairs rather than taking on commercial and speculative and corrupt economic ventures, as in some countries of the region. This is connected to the parliamentary form of political power in Thailand.

While a system of corruption and patronage dominated leading circles in the 1950s and 1960s, the emergence of the industrial bourgeoisie and professional classes, including the influential technocrats in government, has ensured that economic growth and development have become dominant government objectives. The independence of the state from particular economic interests, apart from the military and bureaucracy whose interests are not primarily economic, has enabled it to take some of the difficult decisions that are necessary for industrial growth. However, the relatively pluralistic nature of state power weakens the ability of government to unbalance economic power relations as industrialisation commonly requires.

Nepal

In Nepal, the wealth of the dominant classes comes first of all from land ownership. While not as widespread as in other countries, tenancy and sharecropping operate at a sufficiently broad level to provide large incomes to local elite families. As in the Philippines, provincial wealth forms the basis of political power in the capital. In addition to landed wealth, there is a powerful class of merchants who dominate the foreign trade on which the economy wholly depends.

Political power is wielded principally by the royal family and the nobility, with the Palace Secretariat being the senior partner in an 'alliance' with the official parliamentary government. Economic and political power coalesce in an alliance of the landlord and commercial classes with the ruling nobility; indeed, individuals generally are members of more than one of these groups. Landlords are often engaged in commerce. The royal family has a stake in most of the largest commercial activities including the airline, hotels and trading companies. Foreign aid, which in comparative terms is very great, also provides a major source of income for the dominant classes.

The principal sources of wealth accumulation, then, are land ownership, foreign trade, and local businesses based on tourism and foreign aid. There is no significant industrial capitalist class and only minor industrial output of jute goods, cement and iron products. Industrial expansion is severely constrained by the stranglehold on the economy held by Indian manufacturers and trading houses, and a reluctance by Nepalese commercial interests to jeopardise their own trading revenues by encouraging possibly independent domestic producers. On the other hand, there is emerging an increasingly influential cadre of 'modern' bureaucrats mostly with overseas education who, despite being drawn predominantly from the ruling classes, have a stronger commitment to economic development. These technocrats are in a better position to understand the precarious future of the present structure, but are not powerful.

While the state may be strong enough to take measures to create an industrial bourgeoisie, it shows little willingness to do so since it serves so assiduously the interest of the aristocratic landowning and commercial classes. Land reform, which would be only a very first step in breaking the power of the land-based oligarchy and expanding agricultural productivity, is not on the agenda. There is no significant class of capitalist farmers that could spearhead moves for rural transformation. Nepal's extraordinary level of dependence on foreign powers—India for trade, and aid donors for revenue, military support and basic infrastructure—also works against major economic reform.

Bangladesh

In Bangladesh, despite legislative attacks on the landlord-tenant relationship there has been no widespread development of capitalist agriculture. Landlords remain the dominant economic class in the countryside, especially in the north and west of the country. While

landownership is the principal form of wealth, the limited prospects for productive accumulation have led rural wealth into a variety of unproductive activities in addition to further land purchases and sharecropping. These include usury and mortgages on land, petty commodity trading and conspicuous consumption.

The industrial-commercial classes are very weak in Bangladesh. The political power of the landlord and business classes was seriously weakened after separation from West Pakistan in 1971 since these classes were closely associated with West Pakistani dominance of East Bengal. With the taint of collaboration, these interests could have little influence in nationalist political parties. Some redistribution of land occurred after independence but the landlord class, while shaken, retained its economic power under the rule of the Awami League.

The industrial-commercial capitalist class suffered through large scale expropriations. The state took over banking, insurance, transport and large industries, mostly owned by non-Bengalis, but big Bengali-owned companies were nationalised too. The 'socialism' of the Awami League weighed most heavily on the class of industrial-commercial capitalists. The shift to a policy of economic liberalisation after 1975 has, however, included some serious attempts to revive private investment through incentives and disinvestment by the state. The Ershad government is particularly keen to promote manufacturing and has pursued policies reminiscent of early South Korea and Taiwan. Growth of manufacturing has been at the reasonable annual rate of about 4 per cent since the late 1970s, but by starting at such a low base and with a high population growth rate, significant progress will be slow.

While the industrial capitalist class in Bangladesh remains small, its lack of political influence on a government that is nevertheless seriously committed to promoting industry is potentially conducive to industrial growth. However, the repression dealt out by the present regime is a reflection of its weak position rather than its strength. While political parties wrangle over the transition to civilian rule, the military remains the basis of political power. In these circumstances, it is likely that the centre of wealth accumulation in Bangladesh will remain land ownership, usury and the profits from foreign aid.

Pakistan

In Pakistan, land reform has failed to bring about significant transfers of land to the poorest farm workers. Nevertheless, the various attempts at land reform in the 1970s reflect the conflict in the countryside

between landlords, tenants and a newly-emergent class of capitalist farmers responding to the Green Revolution. While this conflict found expression in the populist Bhutto years in attempts at land reform, the Zia regime since 1977 has seen the dominance of a military-bureaucratic apparatus that has been largely independent of particular sections of the propertied classes both rural and urban yet not sufficiently strong to override them. The regime has, however, continued to encourage the spread of capitalist farming.

The principal sources of wealth accumulation are in agriculture—both in land ownership and through capitalist production—and industry-commerce, with a strengthening class of manufacturing capitalists particularly in food processing and textiles. These manufacturers received a serious blow with partition of the country in 1971, as not only were their assets in East Pakistan seized but the lucrative flow of export revenues, from jute products especially, was cut off. However, industrial-commercial capital has received important support from the Zia regime through disinvestment in public enterprises and tax reductions. This class has not acquired sufficient size and economic power for it to become a major political influence on the government, but it is viewed sympathetically by the new technocrats in the bureaucracy.

In addition to these relatively productive sources of wealth, many fortunes have been made and reproduced through illegal and speculative activities, some connected with the war in Afghanistan, the spoils of which are the objects of conspicuous consumption. The prevalence of illegal activities and the degree of violence on the streets are indicative of the current regime's lack of control over the country. Despite the large commitment of resources to the military, the state is not strong. The government has difficulty maintaining civil order and cannot wholly suppress organised political opposition.

The military-turned-civilian regime draws some support from right-wing, urban petty bourgeois elements and claims the allegiance of Islamic fundamentalists. However, the loyalty of these groups is by no means uncritical. The Zia regime has also alienated big landlords, particularly in provinces other than Punjab, so that its social foundations appear quite unstable. This is compounded by serious regional conflicts which destabilise the whole country. US support has been very important in propping up the military and funding the rapid growth rates of recent years.

India

The economically dominant classes in India today are the industrial and commercial capitalists and wealthy capitalist farmers. A sizeable industrial bourgeoisie grew up in the period of import-substituting industrialisation in the 1950s and 1960s, although many industrial and commercial sectors are controlled by state enterprises. Capitalist farmers now dominate the countryside with the decline of landlordism under the pressures of land reform and the Green Revolution. This locates the predominant forms of wealth accumulation in industrial and commercial as well as agricultural production. In the absence of the more prominent forms of zero-sum activity found in other countries, these factors would suggest that India has good prospects for rapid industrial advance. However, this is not the case.

Political power is shared principally by industrial-commercial capital and wealthy capitalist farmers in conjunction with a class of bureaucrats which administers government and government enterprise. This is an uneasy alliance since there are serious structural conflicts between them. Note, however, that capitalist farmers tend to wield their political power in state governments, where most agricultural policy is made, rather than centrally. They come into conflict with industrial capital over matters such as the agriculture-industry terms of trade. Bureaucrats see their role as one of regulating and constraining industrial-commercial capital in particular. In practice, industrial-commercial capital is not strong enough to dominate state policy but it is strong enough to avoid most of the impact of the bureaucracy's regulatory measures.

This power-sharing arrangement, operating within parliamentary democratic forms, means that the state is not sufficiently powerful and independent to enforce the difficult measures that rapid industrial development requires. While the principal sources of wealth accumulation outside agriculture are in private and public industrial and commercial enterprises, neither of these is very efficient. Public enterprises generally do not generate a reinvestible surplus and thereby impose a drain on the economy. This is partly because they provide subsidised inputs, including finance, to private businesses. Private businesses are not rapid accumulators on the whole because they have been able to protect themselves from the competitive forces that would make them more efficient.

If the private sector were more dynamic and productive it would make sense, in terms of developing a more powerful class of industrial

capitalists, to hand over public enterprises to private business as in South Korea and Taiwan. The important factor is not the level of state intervention and control but the degree of effectiveness it is permitted. South Korea and India have similar levels of state participation in national economies. The difference is that in South Korea, government intervention is used to discipline private businesses, whereas in India government economic management is not insulated from particular sectional interests and serves to cosset domestic industry rather than forcing it to be efficient. As long as the government accurately reflects the interests of the dominant classes, the hard decisions necessary for rapid industrialisation will not be taken. The recent liberalisations are unlikely to have a significant impact on this situation.

Conclusions

One of the important analytical points to emerge from this study is the error of 'policy voluntarism'. It is correct to conceive of the problem of growth in capitalist societies as one of choosing the correct set of government policies. Economic (and other) policies arise out of particular social conditions. This is a trite statement, but it is extraordinary to find large numbers of economists who make policy prescriptions that are doomed to failure from the beginning because they are not consistent with the pattern of class dominance. The fundamental thrust towards industrial growth and development grows out of the impersonal and largely uncontrollable social forces that make up history. Within these constraints economic policies can make a difference, sometimes an important difference, and as hinted in the country case studies above, the state can help *to create* the classes that will carry out industrialisation. But this leaves us with the questions of the *sort* of state that will be interested in such acts of creation, why they are interested, and whether they can be successful. In this light it is little wonder that the simple-minded World Bank formula of 'get the prices right' has more often than not foundered on the rock of hostile class interests.

The error of policy voluntarism is allied with another error of received economic opinion of the World Bank variety, that of the negative influence on growth of government involvement in the economy. The simple data of Table 6, column 1 and a wealth of further evidence demonstrate that economic growth is not necessarily inhibited by government involvement. We have previously pointed to the case of

South Korea where the extent of government ownership and regulation at detailed levels of the economy have been used to maximise the efficient growth of the economy. It is not the quantity of government intervention and planning that matters but its quality. In the successful NICs the quality has been consistently high while the quantity has varied considerably. The quality of government intervention and planning is less a product of the educational levels of government officials than of the independence of these officials and their political masters from sectional influences. Corruption, nepotism, undue outside influence, the lack of an overall vision and motivation, bureaucratic parochialism, officiousness and political weakness all contribute to low quality planning.

The present study has had two purposes. The first has been to lay down an analytical framework for making sensible assessments of the growth prospects of nations. The second has been to apply this framework to the eight selected countries. A summary of the arguments for each country can be found in Table 8, where each factor is denoted favourable (F) or unfavourable (U) in its likely impact on future growth. An overall assessment of future prospects on a scale of 1 to 5, from 'poor' to 'good', appears for each country at the foot of the table.

Both Indonesia and the Philippines have poor overall growth prospects, principally because of the economic and political dominance of classes which derive wealth from unproductive activities and the structural unwillingness of their governments to attack these classes. The growth prospects of Nepal are poor for similar reasons, although there the problem is compounded by the relative absence of opportunities for productive investments.

In Bangladesh, while faced with economic difficulties similar to Nepal's, including the unsympathetic character of agriculture, the prospects are a little better in so far as the state is more independent of the interests of unproductive classes. India has fewer of the political advantages of Bangladesh but has improved chances due to high availability of savings and productive investment opportunities, and an agricultural system that is more amenable to the rapid structural changes that industrialisation brings about.

Pakistan has overall prospects similar to India's but for different reasons. Agriculture is sympathetic to industrial development, and recent industrial and infrastructural growth provide a foundation for future growth. While the government is relatively independent of wealthy interests it does not have firm control over civil order and

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Table 8: Summary of economic and political conditions

	Indonesia	Philippines	Malaysia	Thailand	Nepal	Bangladesh	Pakistan	India
1. <i>State of world economy</i>	U	—	U	F	—	U	F	F
2. <i>Availability of savings</i>								
Domestic savings rate	F	F	F	F	U	U	U	F
Access to foreign loans	F	U	F	—	U	—	U	F
Financial intermediation	U	U	F	F	F	F	F	F
3. <i>Productiveness of investments</i>								
Quality of workforce	—	F	F	—	U	U	U	F
Control of workforce	F	U	U	F	F	F	F	U
Labour costs	U	F	U	U	F	F	U	F
Quality of management	U	F	F	—	U	U	F	F
Infrastructure	F	U	F	U	U	—	F	—
4. <i>Sympathy of agriculture</i>	F	F	F	F	U	U	F	F
5. <i>Political conditions</i>								
Dominance of unproductive classes	U	U	F	F	U	F	F	F
Independence of state	U	U	F	—	U	F	F	U
Strength of state	F	U	U	F	F	U	U	U
Proven commitment to growth	U	U	U	F	U	F	U	U
<i>Overall growth prospects</i>	2	1	4	5	1	2	3	3

U=unfavourable, F=favourable
1=poor, 3=doubtful, 5=good

economic policy. As a result, sufficient savings to finance industrial expansion are likely to be increasingly difficult to obtain.

Malaysia is rated as having better prospects. It has a political system that is relatively independent of the influence of unproductive classes, although there remains doubt over whether the government is sufficiently strong to take the steps necessary to restrain the emergent Malay capitalist class. The agricultural system has the required flexibility but the degree of control over labour is questionable.

Thailand appears to have the best prospects of the eight countries surveyed, with a strong political structure and a demonstrated willingness to make hard decisions. There remains some danger that finance capital may, in times of difficulty, withdraw from industrial investments, particularly since there is some doubt about available investment opportunities. While the flexibility of agriculture and current debt problems raise further doubts, the quality of Thai planning should see it through.

The arms trade: changing patterns in the 1980s

Since 1965, Third World countries have jointly comprised the world's leading market for conventional weapons, accounting for as much as three-quarters of the international trade in military systems. Between 1978 and 1985 alone, the less-developed countries (LDCs) ordered an estimated \$258 billion worth of arms and ammunition (in current dollars) from foreign suppliers, and actually took delivery of \$220 billion worth of such equipment. Included in these transactions were some 13,960 tanks and self-propelled cannon, 27,605 armoured personnel carriers, 4,005 supersonic combat aircraft, and 34,948 surface-to-air missiles.¹ These transfers have resulted in a significant shift in military resources from the industrialised 'North' to the underdeveloped 'South,' producing new configurations of power and contributing to the intensity and duration of regional conflicts.²

The flow of modern arms from North to South has long been of interest to political analysts, and has been the subject of several major studies.³ As a result, many of the basic parameters of this trade are now familiar to students of international relations. It is important to note, however, that many of these parameters were established during the 1970s and early 1980s, and have since experienced considerable flux. Indeed, there have been a number of significant changes in the character of the international arms flow—changes that are likely to become increasingly pronounced.⁴ In this essay, I will attempt to

¹ Richard F Grimmett, *Trends in Conventional Arms Transfers to the Third World by Major Supplier, 1978–1985*, Washington DC: Congressional Research Service, 1986, pp 30, 36; and earlier editions. (Hereinafter cited as: CRS, *Trends 1978–1985*.)

² For discussion, see: Michael T Klare, *American Arms Supermarket*, Austin: University of Texas Press, 1984, ch. 5, 7, 10 and 11; Andrew J Pierre, *The Global Politics of Arms Sales*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1982, Pt 3.

³ See, for instance: Philip J Farley, Stephen S Kaplan, and William H Lewis, *Arms Across the Sea*, Washington DC: Brookings Institution, 1978; Klare, *American Arms Supermarket*; Stephanie G Neuman and Robert E Harkavy (eds), *Arms Transfers in the Modern World*, New York: Praeger, 1979; Pierre, *The Global Politics of Arms Sales*; Uri Ra'anani, Robert L Pfaltzgraff, Jr, and Geoffrey Kemp (eds), *Arms Transfers to the Third World*, Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1978; and Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), *The Arms Trade with the Third World* Stockholm: Almqvist and Wiksell, 1971.

⁴ The author first discussed these changes in 'The state of the trade', *Journal of International Affairs* 40(1) Summer 1986, pp 1–21.

identify and assess these changes, particularly their impact on the Third World.

By far the most pronounced change has been the apparent decline in arms purchases by the LDCs. From a high point of \$43.6 billion in 1982, Third World orders for new weapons dropped to \$28.2 billion in 1983, \$32.2 billion in 1984, and \$29.9 billion in 1985 (in current dollars).⁵ This decline has generally been attributed to the global economic slump of 1982-85 and to the 'saturation' of Third World arsenals with sophisticated arms purchased in the 1970s and early 1980s.⁶ Presumably, this assessment leads to the supposition that international arms trafficking will revert to earlier patterns when these conditions no longer prevail. However, deeper analysis suggests that this decline in Third World arms purchases reflects other important factors, which are unlikely to disappear with the restoration of pre-1982 economic conditions.

To appreciate the nature and significance of these structural changes, it is useful to begin with a brief survey of the basic arms transfer patterns of the past fifteen years. In conducting this survey, I will employ the standard statistical sources covering international arms transfers: *World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers*, published annually by the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA); the *SIPRI Yearbook*, published annually by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI); and the annual report on conventional arms transfers published by the Congressional Research Service (CRS) of the US Library of Congress. Each of these sources provides useful statistics on various arms export patterns; they do not employ the same definitions or accounting methods, however, so they cannot be used interchangeably.⁷

Prior to 1970, world military exports rarely exceeded \$5 billion per year, and Third World countries accounted for less than half this amount. In 1972, however, the arms trade began to experience a sharp upward thrust, with Third World countries generating the bulk of new orders. According to the ACDA, total world arms transfers jumped from \$6.4 billion in 1971 to \$36.4 billion in 1981, while imports by the LDCs

⁵ CRS, *Trends 1978-1985*, p. 30.

⁶ See: Michael Isikoff, 'US manufacturers and dealers are struggling to hold their market share', *The Washington Post* (National Weekly Edition) 12 January 1987, p. 8.

⁷ For a discussion of the methodological problems associated with arms transfer data, see: Frank Blackaby and Thomas Ohlson, 'Military Expenditures and the Arms Trade: Problems of Data', *Bulletin of Peace Proposals* (13) 1982, pp. 291-308.

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Table 1: Conventional arms transfers to the Third World as tallied by various sources

Year:	(In billions of US dollars)				
	CRS: Orders (current dollars)	CRS: Deliveries (current dollars)	ACDA: Deliveries: (current dollars)	Deliveries: (1982 constant dollars)	SIPRI: Deliveries (1975 dollars)
1970	n.a.	n.a.	4.15	n.a.	2.94
1971	n.a.	n.a.	4.72	n.a.	3.71
1972	n.a.	n.a.	7.42	n.a.	3.47
1973	10.45	6.67	10.26	20.12	3.63
1974	20.26	7.26	8.86	15.97	5.06
1975	19.72	8.04	9.25	15.30	6.30
1976	24.26	12.01	12.35	19.32	7.31
1977	23.28	16.05	15.35	22.68	9.70
1978	19.92	20.54	18.61	25.61	11.15
1979	29.32	23.86	22.62	28.69	9.60
1980	40.88	24.92	23.75	27.65	10.45
1981	33.67	30.42	29.66	31.59	8.45
1982	43.60	33.87	32.08	32.08	9.18
1983	28.17	32.57	28.67	27.50	8.56
1984	33.15	32.67	n.a.	n.a.	9.20
1985	29.94	21.52	n.a.	n.a.	7.13

Source: CRS=Congressional Research Service, US Library of Congress, *Trends in Conventional Arms Transfers to the Third World, 1978-85* (1986) and earlier editions; ACDA=US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, *World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, 1985* (1985) and earlier editions; SIPRI=Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, *SIPRI Yearbook 1986* (1986).

n.a.=not available.

rose from \$1.7 billion to \$29.7 billion (in current dollars)⁸ (See Table 1).

Not only did the LDCs obtain greater *quantities* of weapons in the 1970s, but they also acquired arms of enhanced *quality*. Prior to 1970, Third World countries were generally obliged to make do with the obsolete and unsophisticated arms that were supplied at little or no cost by the major powers. By the early 1970s, however, many Third World buyers had accumulated sufficient political and economic leverage to seek and obtain the most sophisticated weapons available. This shift first became apparent in 1972, when the USA agreed to sell 80 ultra-sophisticated F-14 *Tomcat* jet fighters to the Shah of Iran, and it

⁸ US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, *World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, 1970-1979*, Washington DC: Government Printing Office, 1982, p 85. (Hereinafter cited as: ACDA, *WMEAT 1970-79*.)

was confirmed in succeeding years by sales of late-model US, Soviet, and French aircraft to other countries in the Middle East. As a result of these and other sales of high-performance systems, the inventories of many Middle Eastern states have come to resemble those of the front-line states in NATO and the Warsaw Pact.⁹

Despite this increase in both the quantity and quality of arms sold to the LDCs, the Third World market has remained, until very recently, the exclusive preserve of a relatively small number of major suppliers. According to the CRS, just six nations—the USA, the Soviet Union, France, Britain, West Germany and Italy—together accounted for 91 per cent of all military sales to Third World countries between 1973 and 1980. Even among these six, the military traffic was highly concentrated, with the two superpowers jointly supplying two-thirds of all the arms imported by the LDCs.¹⁰

These general trends persisted into the early 1980s, with 1982 setting a record of \$43.6 billion in Third World arms orders.¹¹ In 1983, however, these trade patterns began to exhibit a number of important shifts.

The most dramatic shift was, of course, the sharp decline in new military orders—from \$43.6 billion in 1982 to \$28.2 billion in 1983. (Arms *deliveries* have not declined this sharply, due to the large backlog of high-technology arms ordered prior to 1983 and still in the process of manufacture.) The principal cause of this decline, in the view of most analysts, was the worldwide economic recession of the early 1980s and the mammoth debt burden carried by many Third World countries. 'This downward trend has been largely determined by economic factors,' Michael Brzoska and Thomas Ohlson wrote in the 1985 *SIPRI Yearbook*. 'Many countries are facing budget constraints, and many countries, particularly in the Third World, are burdened by debts and can no longer allocate so much funding to armaments.'¹² This assessment is confirmed by the fact that several of the USA's major

⁹ The growing sophistication of the arms inventories of Third World countries can be charted by consulting the listings in successive editions of *The Military Balance*, published annually by the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) in London. For discussion, see Leslie Gelb, 'The Mideast arms race: new weapons, old fears', *The New York Times*, 24 January 1982; and Celeb S Rossiter, *US Arms Transfers to the Third World: The Implications of Sophistication*, Washington DC: Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, 1982.

¹⁰ Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, *Changing Perspectives on Arms Transfer Policy*, Report Prepared for the Subcommittee on International Security and Scientific Affairs of the House Committee on Foreign Relations, Washington DC: Government Printing Office, 1981, p. 13.

¹¹ *ibid.*, *Trends 1978-1985*, p. 30.

¹² *SIPRI*, *World Armaments and Disarmament: SIPRI Yearbook 1985*, London and Philadelphia: Taylor and Francis, 1985, p. 345. (Hereinafter cited as *SIPRI Yearbook 1985*.)

arms customers, including Egypt, Morocco, the Sudan, Turkey and Zaire, have fallen behind in their payments on US Government-guaranteed military loans or have had to have such payments rescheduled.¹³

Another factor underlying the decline in new military orders is the temporary *saturation* of many Third World arms inventories. As the large quantities of sophisticated arms ordered in the 1977-82 period began arriving in the LDCs' arsenals their military personnel had to be trained in the operation, repair and maintenance of all these new and complex weapons. This process ordinarily takes several years, thus inhibiting—for a time—the demand for additional weapons.¹⁴

These economic and institutional factors may begin to ease in the years ahead, producing a renewed demand for imported arms. However, while the current slump in military orders may prove temporary, some of the changes now taking place in the weapons trade may not. Indeed, the available statistical data reveals some important—and probably durable—shifts in the underlying structure of the international arms traffic.

To begin with, we can detect a substantial long-term decline in the relative market share retained by the traditional arms suppliers, and a corresponding growth in sales by smaller and less familiar suppliers—including several Third World countries which have only recently begun producing for the international arms market.

As noted earlier, six major suppliers—the two superpowers plus the 'big four' Western European suppliers—have long dominated the international trade in armaments. While these primary suppliers still account for a large proportion of international sales, their total market share has been declining since the late 1970s. This shift is particularly noticeable in the CRS data on new military purchases. Whereas the six 'majors' accounted for 90 per cent of Third World orders in the 1970s, their total share dropped to 75 per cent in 1981-85.¹⁵

Accompanying this contraction in the total market share of the six majors have been some important shifts in the relative market dominance of the individual suppliers. Most noticeable in this regard is

¹³ See US General Accounting Office, *Military Loans: Repayment Problems Mount as Debt Increases*, Washington DC: Government Printing Office, 1985.

¹⁴ For discussion, see Michael Brzoska and Thomas Ohlson, 'The future of arms transfers: the changing pattern', *Bulletin of Peace Proposals* (16) 1985, p 131; and Lawrence Ingrassia, 'World weapons sales slow, and competition by suppliers heats up', *The Wall Street Journal*, 30 May 1984.

¹⁵ CRS, *Trends 1978-1985*, p 30 and earlier editions.

a shift in the respective shares of the two superpowers on one hand and the four European suppliers on the other. Between 1973 and 1980, the USA and the Soviet Union jointly received 66 per cent of all Third World military orders while the Europeans received 25 per cent; in 1984, however, the superpowers' share had dropped to 55 per cent while the Europeans' share has risen to 32 per cent.¹⁶ This shift appears to reflect more vigorous marketing efforts on the part of the Europeans—particularly France and Britain—as well as efforts by some Third World buyers to diminish their military dependency on one or the other of the superpowers by turning to European sources of supply. (Between the USA and the Soviet Union, however, we can detect little change in status: both countries have jockeyed in and out of first place over the past few years, with neither gaining a long-term lead over the other.)¹⁷

Perhaps the most striking phenomenon of the recent period is the steady growth in military sales by the 'second tier' producers—nations which lack the extensive productive capabilities of the six majors, but which have nonetheless succeeded in staking out a significant market niche as suppliers of inexpensive or specialised equipment. Included in this category are Australia and Canada, as well as a number of smaller countries in East and West Europe. Also included are several Third World suppliers, the most prominent of which are Brazil, China, Egypt, India, Israel,* Singapore, North Korea and South Korea. (See Table 2). Ten years ago, these LDC suppliers hardly figured in the standard statistical data on arms exports; today they loom as significant actors in the international marketplace.¹⁸

The emergence of these second-tier suppliers is clearly documented in the statistics compiled by the CRS. From 1973 to 1980, the six majors accounted for 90 per cent of all shares to the Third World, while all other suppliers shared the remaining 10 per cent. From 1981 to 1984, however, the 'other' category jumped to one-quarter of all new

¹⁶ CRS, *Trends 1977-1984*, p 24 and earlier editions.

¹⁷ For discussion and statistical data, see Klare, 'The state of the trade', pp 7-8.

* *Third World Quarterly* does not consider Israel to be a Third World country. However, for the purposes of this article, Israel is categorised by the author as a part of the Third World. This classification follows the conventions of the statistical sources used by the author. (Editor)

¹⁸ For discussion of this phenomenon, see Jean Klein, 'Arms sales, development, disarmament', *Bulletin of Peace Proposals*, 14(2) 1983, pp 157-9; Stephanie G Neuman, 'International stratification and Third World military industries', *International Organization* 38(1) Winter 1984, pp 167-97; Stephanie G Neuman, 'The arms trade and American national interests', in Vojtech Mastny (ed), *Power and Policy in Transition*, Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1984, pp 155-8; and Miguel S Wionczek, 'Growth in military industries in developing countries', *Bulletin of Peace Proposals*, 17(1) 1986, pp 47-58.

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Table 2: Major second-tier suppliers of conventional arms transfers to all countries, 1979-83

Country:	(Current US dollars in billions)	
	Value of Transfers	Percentage of World Total
Czechoslovakia	3,950	2.3
China	3,320	2.0
Poland	3,100	1.8
Switzerland	2,030	1.2
Korea, South	2,010	1.2
Romania	1,980	1.2
Korea, North	1,805	1.1
Israel	1,360	0.8
Yugoslavia	1,340	0.8
Spain	1,115	0.7
Netherlands	920	0.5
Belgium	890	0.5
Bulgaria	840	0.5
Brazil	830	0.5
Canada	800	0.5

Source: US Arms Control & Disarmament Agency, *World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers*, 1985. Represents value of arms exports by top 15 suppliers after the USA, USSR, France, Britain, Italy, and West Germany.

orders.¹⁹ Unfortunately, the CRS figures do not provide a breakdown between European and non-European suppliers in the 'other' category. From different sources, however, we know that arms sales by Third World countries have risen dramatically in recent years. According to the ACDA, military exports by Third World suppliers grew by 543 per cent between 1973 and 1983 (from \$600 million to \$4.05 billion, in constant 1982 dollars), while exports by the developed countries increased by only 33 per cent. As a result of this surge, Third World exports represented 11 per cent of all world arms transfers in 1983, compared to 2 per cent in 1973.²⁰

¹⁹ CRS, *Trends 1977-1984*, p 24 and earlier editions.

²⁰ US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, *World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers*, 1985, Washington DC: Government Printing Office, 1985, p 89. (Hereinafter cited as ACDA, *WMEAT 1985*.)

Third World arms suppliers

Further examination of the ACDA data suggests that the surge in Third World arms exports is substantially due to the efforts of a relatively small number of countries to become major military suppliers. Of the \$16.1 billion in arms exports posted by Third World countries in 1979-83 (in current dollars), nearly three-quarters (11.6 billion) were supplied by nine countries: Brazil, China, Egypt, Israel, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Turkey and North and South Korea.²¹ In some cases (e.g. Saudi Arabia), these sales represent the re-export of arms previously acquired from the major industrialised powers; in others, however, they represent the export of indigenously designed and produced systems. For the most part, these suppliers have focused their arms marketing on other Third World countries, although a number of them have succeeded in finding buyers among the advanced industrialised nations.²²

The potential of these new trade patterns was first demonstrated in the war between Iran and Iraq, which has been waged since 1980. Although both belligerents have continued to receive some arms and equipment from their traditional suppliers (France and the Soviet Union in the case of Iraq, the USA in the case of Iran), they have become highly dependent on imports from the second-tier suppliers to make up for losses in ammunition and equipment. While there are no reliable figures on the extent of these transactions, SIPRI reports that both belligerents have purchased billions of dollars worth of arms and equipment from other Third World countries, including Argentina, Brazil, China, Egypt, Israel, and North and South Korea.²³

The Iran-Iraq experience has drawn particular attention to Brazil, which has supplied both sides in the Persian Gulf conflict while at the same time increasing its sales to other Third World countries. By

²¹ *ibid.*, pp 94-130. For profiles of the major Third World arms producers, see Michael Brzoska and Thomas Ohlson, *Arms Production in the Third World*, London and Philadelphia: Taylor and Francis, 1986, pp 35-250.

²² Brazil, for instance, has sold significant numbers of its EMB-312 *Tucano* trainer aircraft to Canada and the United Kingdom (see *SIPRI Yearbook 1985*, p 376). For discussion of these emerging trade patterns, see Neuman, 'International stratification', pp 187-97 and Neuman, 'The arms trade . . .', pp 155-58. For a comprehensive register of arms exports by Third World producers, see Brzoska and Ohlson, *Arms Production in the Third World*, pp 351-60.

²³ *SIPRI Yearbook 1984*, pp 195-201. See also: Michael Brzoska, 'Profiteering on the Iran-Iraq War', *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, June 1987, pp 42-5. Leslie H Gelb, 'Iran said to get large-scale arms from Israel, Soviet and Europeans', *The New York Times*, 8 March 1982; Elaine Sciolino, 'Iran, in 6-year search for arms, finds world of willing suppliers', *The New York Times*, 25 November, 1986; and David K Shipler, 'Level of world arms sales to Iran regarded as largely unchanged', *The New York Times*, 11 April 1987.

concentrating on the lower end of the technology scale, the Brazilians have found a ready overseas market for a wide variety of their military products, including the EE-9 *Cascavel* armoured car, the EE-11 *Urutu* armoured personnel carrier, the EMB-312 *Tucano* trainer aircraft, the EMB-110 *Bandeirante* light transport and the EMB-326 *Xavante* counter-insurgency aircraft.²⁴ A similar strategy has been pursued by Israel (which also produces a wide variety of arms and equipment for the Third World market), and is being emulated by such aspiring producers as Egypt, India, Singapore and South Korea.²⁵

The emergence of Third World arms suppliers has many important implications for our assessment of the global arms trade. Not only have these producers begun to offer significant competition to the traditional suppliers, but they have also introduced some new South-to-South to South-to-North trade patterns into what has hitherto been an exclusively North-to-South traffic. As we shall see, this phenomenon also calls into question the accuracy of the standard statistical sources on international arms trafficking.

Since a number of the more affluent and developed nations of the Third World (i.e. those nations which have in the past accounted for a substantial share of the world's arms imports) are now producing weapons themselves, it is likely that a certain segment of the global military market has been permanently closed to the traditional suppliers. Although these Third World producers continue to rely on the major industrial powers for high-performance jet aircraft and other sophisticated systems which exceed their domestic manufacturing capabilities, they have become relatively self-sufficient in the production of small arms, artillery, trainer and counter-insurgency aircraft, and other basic items.²⁶ According to SIPRI, twelve Third World countries now produce combat aircraft, thirteen produce trainers and

²⁴ See the 'Register of arms transfers' in *SIPRI Yearbook 1985*, pp 389-439, and in earlier editions of the *Yearbook*. On the Brazilian arms industry, see Clovis Brigagao, 'The Brazilian arms industry', *Journal of International Affairs* 40(1) spring 1986, pp 101-14; Brzoska and Ohlson, *Arms Production in the Third World*, pp 79-104 and 352-55; Everett G Martin, 'Brazil's fledgling arms industry making a hit with weapons-hungry Third World armies', *Wall Street Journal*, 4 January 1985; John Hoyt Williams, 'Brazil's arms industry on the move', *Armed Forces Journal*, December 1984, pp 106-12; and John Hoyt Williams, 'Brazilian weapons', *National Defense*, September 1986, pp 57-64.

²⁵ For discussion, see: *SIPRI Yearbook 1985*, pp 329-39; Geoffrey Aronson, 'The Third World's booming new industry: weapons', *The Washington Post*, 16 June, 1985; Brzoska and Ohlson, *Arms Production* . . . especially pp 35-77 and 105-231; Aaron S Klieman, 'Middle-range arms suppliers: the Israeli case', *Journal of International Affairs* 40(1) Summer 1986, pp 115-28; and Wionczek, 'Growth of military industries', pp 51-4.

²⁶ Brzoska and Ohlson, *Arms Production* . . . pp 7-32.

transport aircraft, twelve produce major fighting ships, eleven more produce armoured vehicles of some sort, and ten produce artillery systems; in addition, a much larger number produce small arms and ammunition.²⁷

In most cases, these domestic production efforts are motivated by a desire to reduce dependency on foreign arms suppliers and to diminish hard currency transmittals. Some countries, including Brazil, Egypt, Israel, Singapore and South Korea, also view the establishment of domestic arms industries as a means to spur the development of 'high-tech' civilian industries, and/or to enhancing their international trade position. In addition, there are the so-called 'pariah' countries—Chile, Israel, Taiwan, and South Africa—that have developed indigenous military industries in order to circumvent arms embargoes and other trade restrictions.²⁸

From an economic point of view, Third World arms producers can be divided up into a number of basic categories. To begin with, there are a handful of relatively developed countries which possess sufficient technical and industrial capacity to undertake the development of a relatively elaborate arms-production infrastructure. These countries, which at present are limited to Argentina, Brazil, China, Egypt, India, Israel, North Korea, South Africa, South Korea and Taiwan, produce a wide variety of weapons types (including aircraft, armoured vehicles and ships), and have begun to manufacture indigenously-designed systems. These countries can be further divided into those which produce arms principally to satisfy their own military requirements (as in the case of Argentina, China, India, North Korea, South Africa and Taiwan), and those which place equal stress on production for the international market (as in the case of Brazil, Egypt, Israel and South Korea).²⁹

Many more Third World countries produce arms of some type, but lack the broad-based infrastructure of the ten producers listed above. Some of these other countries have expressed the intention to establish an elaborate military infrastructure of their own, but very few possess the necessary combination of national income (or borrowing power),

²⁷ *SIPRI Yearbook 1985*, pp 331-3.

²⁸ For discussion, see Brzoska and Ohlson, *Arms Production . . . Klare, American Arms Supermarket*, pp 173-76; and Wionczek, 'Growth of military industries', pp 47-58. On the 'pariah' countries, see Raimo Vayrynen, 'Semiperipheral countries in the global economic and military order', in Helena Tuomi and Raimo Vayrynen (eds), *Militarization and Arms Production*, London: Croom Helm, 1982, pp 163-92.

²⁹ See Brzoska and Ohlson, *Arms Production . . .*

industrial capacity and technological expertise to undertake such an effort. Of those nations with the necessary resources, perhaps five or six—among them Chile, Indonesia, Pakistan, Turkey and Saudi Arabia—are likely to become major military producers by the year 2000.³⁰

Clearly, domestic arms ventures of this sort consume at least some of the funds that were previously spent on imported weapons. Exactly *how much* is consumed this way cannot, however, be readily calculated. Michael Brzoska and Thomas Ohlson of SIPRI have estimated that the total value of all major weapons produced by Third World countries between 1980 and 1984 amounted to \$8.5 billion (in constant 1975 dollars), but this figure excludes small arms, ammunition, and other 'low-tech' items which constitute the bulk of Third World military production.³¹ On the other hand, many of these enterprises have been undertaken for nationalistic or developmental reasons (for example, to spur the growth of modern industrial enterprises), and so we cannot be certain that all of that \$8.5 billion would actually have been spent on imported arms in the absence of these domestic programmes. Nevertheless, it seems reasonable to conclude that at least some of the decline in North-to-South arms trafficking that has occurred since 1983 can be attributed to rising military production in the Third World.

There is, however, another side to this equation that we must consider. Despite their quest for self-sufficiency, most Third World producers are generally dependent to a greater or lesser degree on imports of technology—in the form of blueprints, technical assistance, specialised machinery and parts, and so forth—from the major industrial powers. Indeed, many of the major weapons produced in Third World arms factories incorporate components or sub-systems that have been acquired from the older industrial powers. Most of the combat planes produced in the Third World, for example, are powered by jet engines manufactured in Europe or the USA.³² As a result, 'the Third World remains heavily dependent on the developed countries,' Stephanie Neuman observed in 1984, even those countries with indigenous arms industries. 'The more complex components are often beyond prevailing [Third World] technical skill levels or prove to be uneconomical to produce domestically.' As a result, 'natural resources,

³⁰ *ibid.*, pp 7–34, 251–88. On the obstacles to the development of a broad-based arms-making infrastructure, see Neuman, 'International stratification', pp 169–87.

³¹ Brzoska and Ohlson, *Arms Production* . . . p 8.

³² See *SIPRI Yearbook 1985*, pp 336–41. For discussion, see Klare, *American Arms Supermarket*, pp 175–6 and Neuman, 'International stratification', pp 175–81.

production equipment, designers, technicians, and sometimes managers and labour are provided from abroad.³³

This dependency on imported skills and technology has become a significant—if hard to measure—factor in the global military trade. For the most part, sales of technical data, blueprints, production equipment and raw materials are not incorporated into the statistical data compiled by the ACDA, SIPRI, and the CRS. These sources also tend to exclude data on the export of kits for the repair, modification and modernisation of imported weapons already in the inventories of the LDCs. While no one has yet attempted to put a dollar value on all of these technology and equipment flows, there is no doubt that they are compensating to some degree for the decline in exports of finished military systems. As noted by SIPRI, there is 'an increasing flow to recipient countries of weapons-related items, such as spare parts, components, upgrading and modification kits, and so on. These items are imported instead of ready weapons systems and are omitted from SIPRI's and most other estimates of the size of the global arms trade.'³⁴

Despite this omission, and the relative scarcity of data on military exports by Third World producers, it is clear that these activities have come to play an important—and durable—role in the international arms traffic. While it is obvious that the traditional suppliers are not likely to lose their dominant positions in the immediate future, it is also obvious that Third World suppliers have become significant actors in the international arms market. Whether foreign military sales of this sort will actually provide Third World producers with significant economic benefits is, however, still open to question. While the establishment of a domestic arms industry may generate considerable export earnings, it also requires a very substantial level of investment (both of capital and of skilled personnel) and thus can result, as we have seen, in continued dependence on the major industrial powers for specialised technical products and services.

Lessons from war

There is another aspect of the current arms traffic that is inadequately expressed in the standard reference data: the growing emphasis being placed by many Third World buyers on procurement of small arms,

³³ Neuman, 'The Arms Trade . . . ' p 162.

³⁴ SIPRI Yearbook 1985, p 345.

ammunition, supply vehicles, communications equipment, and other low-technology systems of little apparent glamour.

In the boom years of the 1970s and early 1980s, many Third World countries made significant purchases of high-performance jet fighters, guided missiles, and armoured vehicles. These were the 'big ticket' items whose sale drove up the export tallies and produced so many newspaper headlines. Since 1983, however, there have been far fewer reports of such transactions, reflecting the decline in Third World purchases of costly, 'high-tech' weapons. But while there appears to be a decline in the demand for sophisticated arms, we can see a growing market for less-sophisticated weapons and support systems, and for spare parts, ammunition and upgrade kits for existing systems.³⁵

To some extent, this shift in priorities reflects the lack of cash or credit with which to buy large quantities of high-performance weapons, along with the 'saturation' factor noted earlier. At the same time, however, it appears to reflect a number of other critical factors: the growing incidence of insurgency and 'low-intensity warfare' in the Third World; the need for fresh supplies of guns and ammunition to replace losses from the Iran-Iraq conflict and other conflicts of the 1980s; and, perhaps most significant, a widespread sense of disenchantment regarding the combat utility of many high-performance weapons.

While terrorism, insurgency, counter-insurgency, and small-scale conflicts have always been important features of the global military landscape, these elements of what is now called 'low-intensity conflict' have become, in the mid-1980s, a major strategic concern. 'Today one out of every four countries around the globe is at war', the US Under-Secretary of Defence, Fred C Ikle, observed in 1986. 'These are not wars . . . where armies roll across borders, [or] where hundreds of aircraft fight for control of the skies.' Rather, they are insurgent and local conflicts in which 'people get killed . . . by grenades, bullets, mines [and] bombs dropped from aircraft.'³⁶ Such strife, the US Secretary of Defence Caspar Weinberger wrote in 1985, 'will likely remain the most immediate threat to free world security for the rest of this century.'³⁷

While not all military leaders would agree with this assessment, there is no doubt that many nations are worried about the growing incidence

³⁵ See Wayne Biddle, 'The big business in arms and add-ons', *The New York Times*, 29 September 1985.

³⁶ Fred C Ikle, 'Taking sides in small wars', *Defense* 86, March-April 1986, p 7.

³⁷ Caspar Weinberger, *Report of the Secretary of Defense, Fiscal Year 1986*, Washington DC: US Department of Defense, 1985, p 41.

of low-level conflict—and are managing their weapons allocations accordingly. Hence, in a place of the jet fighters and modern tanks that figured so prominently in the arms transfers of the 1970s and early 1980s, many Third World governments now emphasise purchases of small arms, helicopters, counter-insurgency aircraft, off-road vehicles, and other items suitable for operations in remote areas against guerrillas and other lightly-armed forces. In the Philippines, for instance, President Corazon Aquino has eschewed the 'high-tech' arms purchases of her predecessor, Ferdinand Marcos, and instead has sought large quantities of small arms and other counter-insurgency systems needed for the struggle against the insurgent New Peoples' Army.³⁸ Similar priorities appear to govern the arms buying of Angola, Colombia, Guatemala, Indonesia, Morocco, Nicaragua, Peru, Thailand, and other nations threatened by insurgent or low-level conflict.³⁹

Many governments have also studied the lessons of the Iran–Iraq war, and, as a result, have ordered large supplies of ammunition, spare parts, and basic combat systems. Because modern warfare can consume vast quantities of bullets, shells and weapons in a very short period of time, and because it is not always easy to obtain replacement *matériel* from foreign suppliers in time of war, countries with large stockpiles of such *matériel* are likely to enjoy a significant advantage over those with much smaller supplies. Thus Iran, which lacks spare parts for its US-supplied aircraft, tanks and helicopters, suffered enormous losses in the early stages of the conflict with Iraq, and has since relied on 'human wave attacks' and First World War tactics in order to overcome the numerically smaller but better equipped Iraqi army.⁴⁰

Heavy procurements of basic combat equipment are a natural concomitant of high levels of international tension and conflict. There is, however, another factor at work here. Many of the belligerents in recent conflicts have discovered that their 'high-tech' weapons have not always performed as reliably in wartime as they did under benign peacetime conditions. In many cases, these weapons were also found to require elaborate maintenance work of a sort that is not possible in the chaos of war. The Iranians, in particular, have suffered the recurring

³⁸ See Jim Hoagland, 'Aquino is having more success than Marcos against the rebels', *The Washington Post* (National Weekly Edition) 9 March 1987.

³⁹ See the 'Register of arms transfers' in *SIPRI Yearbook 1985*, pp 389–439, and in earlier editions of the *Yearbook*.

⁴⁰ See Efraim Karsh, *The Iran–Iraq War: A Military Analysis*, Adelphi Papers No 220, London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1987.

incapacitation of many of the 'high-tech' US arms purchased by the Shah in the 1970s.⁴¹ As a result of such experiences, many Third World governments have come to place greater reliance on their older, simpler, and more easily repairable weapons. Similarly, the 1982 conflicts in Lebanon and the Falklands/Malvinas have demonstrated the importance of such non-combat systems as transport planes and logistical vehicles, modern communications equipment and electronic devices for the detection, tracking, and disablement of enemy combat systems.⁴²

These experiences, all of which have been the subject of much discussion in the military press, have led many Third World governments to place a premium on the acquisition of basic combat systems, along with the large quantities of spare parts and supplies needed to operate these weapons under the demanding conditions of protracted warfare. Similarly, many countries have chosen to upgrade existing equipment with modern engines and electronics rather than to invest in entirely new and unfamiliar systems.⁴³ Acquisitions of this sort are generally much less costly than the more sophisticated items favoured in earlier transactions, so that heavy purchases of such hardware may not be reflected in the CRS data on the dollar value of new military purchases. Some of the non-combat systems being acquired, moreover, are excluded from the basic statistical sources cited in this essay, thus further explaining the apparent decline in military purchases by Third World countries.

It is possible, of course, that many recipients will again place orders for 'high-tech' weapons when economic conditions prove more favourable. Given the lessons learned in recent conflicts, however, it is likely that Third World buyers will approach future purchases of sophisticated combat systems with somewhat more caution and scepticism than they did during the 1972-82 period. If there is a compelling need for such weapons, and if the funds are available, these countries are likely to go ahead and procure late-model equipment; if, however, the same mission can be performed almost as well by a less advanced model (or by an upgraded version of an existing product), they may opt for the less costly option.

⁴¹ *ibid.*, pp 36-40. See also William S Lind, 'Simple tanks would suffice', *Harper's*, September 1982, pp 22-4.

⁴² For discussion, see Robert E Harkavy and Stephanie G Neuman (eds), *The Lessons of Recent Wars in the Third World*, vol I, Lexington, Massachusetts: Lexington Books, 1985.

⁴³ For discussion, see Gerald M Steinberg, 'Recycled weapons', *Technology Review*, April 1985, pp 28-38.

Black and grey market sales

Accompanying the trends noted above has been a significant increase in the sale of black- and grey-market munitions to Third World buyers. Given the persistence of revolt and upheaval in the Third World, there has always been some demand for illicit supplies of firearms; today, with the protracted conflicts in Central America, Lebanon, Southern Africa and the Persian Gulf, the demand for such arms has multiplied many times over. Moreover, as a result of the US-Iran-‘Contra’ arms scandal of 1986–87, we now know that major governments have also turned to the clandestine arms market when overt transactions were proscribed for one reason or another.

Illicit arms transactions of this sort require some explanation. *Black-market sales* generally entail illegal sales of military hardware stolen or misappropriated from government stockpiles, and then shipped via devious and clandestine routes to their ultimate destination. *Grey-market sales* generally entail the transfer of ‘dual-use’ systems (i.e. helicopters, communications systems, computers, and other products that can be used for both military and civilian purposes) to military users through legitimate export channels, usually on the pretext that they are intended for civilian rather than military use. Typically, black market transfers are conducted by criminal bands or underground organisations operating in contravention of established government authorities; grey-area transfers, on the other hand, usually involve established companies that use commercial export channels—often with the tacit approval of their governments—to ship dual-use equipment to military users in Iran, Libya, South Africa or other countries that have been subjected to an international arms embargo.⁴⁴

None of the established research organisations provides systematic data on illegal military shipments as they do for official government-to-government transactions. Nevertheless, it is possible to gain an awareness of the scope and magnitude of this trade from some of the more significant arms-smuggling schemes that have recently come to

⁴⁴ For background on black- and grey-market sales, see the two-part series on clandestine arms exports by Joel Brinkley and Jeff Gerth in *The New York Times*, 25 and 26 September 1985. See also Gaylord Shaw and William C Rempel, ‘Billion-dollar Iran arms search spans US, globe’, *The Los Angeles Times*, 4 August 1985; William C Rempel and Larry Green, ‘London center of Iran arms smuggling’, *The Los Angeles Times*, 3 September 1985; Caryle Murphy, ‘Papers, testimony shed light on murky world of arms ring’, *The Washington Post*, 21 August 1985; Elaine Sciolino, ‘The arms market: shadowy world’, *The New York Times*, 4 December 1986; and Michael T Klare, ‘Weapons market employs a multitude of channels’, *Baltimore Sun*, 14 December 1986.

light in the USA. In February 1985, for instance, the US Commerce Department revealed that up to 80 US military helicopters, worth a total of some \$2 billion, had been illegally diverted to North Korea after being shipped to West Germany with US government approval.⁴⁵ Five months later, in July 1985, seven persons—including several US Navy supply officers—were indicted for conspiring to ship an estimated \$75 million worth of F-14 aircraft parts to Iran.⁴⁶ Then, in April 1986, a retired Israeli general and sixteen other suspects were arrested for plotting to sell an estimated \$2 billion worth of American aircraft, tanks and missiles to Iran.⁴⁷ Then, of course, there was the Iran-‘Contra’ arms scheme of 1985–86, which involved the Central Intelligence Agency, the Department of State, and the National Security Council, as well as a clandestine network of private arms dealers, professional gun-runners, and international financiers.⁴⁸

Even these few examples—and they represent but a small fraction of the major smuggling cases exposed in the USA in recent years—suggest that we are looking at a very significant flow of advanced military hardware.⁴⁹ Nor is the USA the only source of black-market arms. Articles in the international press suggest that certain firms and dealers in West and East Europe have also contributed to the clandestine arms traffic. Thus, there have been several recent reports of illicit West German sales to South Africa and the Middle East.⁵⁰

For obvious reasons, it is impossible to put an exact dollar figure on the total volume of this traffic. Some analysts believe, however, that it amounts to many billions of dollars per year.⁵¹ Much of this traffic can be attributed to purchases by Iran and Iraq, both of which reportedly are spending as much as \$1 billion per month to obtain arms and spare

⁴⁵ See *The Wall Street Journal*, 4 February 1985; *The Washington Post*, 4 February 1985; and *The New York Times*, 22 January 1987.

⁴⁶ See *The New York Times*, 15 and 23 July 1985; and *The Washington Post*, 16 July 1985.

⁴⁷ See *The New York Times*, 2 and 3 August 1985 and *The Washington Post*, 2 August 1985.

⁴⁸ See *The Tower Commission Report*, New York: Bantam and Times Books, 1987 and The National Security Archive, *The Chronology: The Documented Day-by-Day Account of the Secret Military Assistance to Iran and the Contras*, New York: Warner Books, 1987.

⁴⁹ The breadth and scale of this trade is suggested by ‘Significant export control cases, January 1981 to June 1985’, a list of illegal arms and technology transfer cases under investigation by the US Department of Justice (supplied to the author by the US Customs Service).

⁵⁰ See Rempel and Green, ‘London center of Iran arms smuggling’; Paul A Chadwell, ‘Illegal arms exports’, *National Defense*, January 1984, pp 13–14; Paul A Chadwell, ‘Alleged illegal arms exports’, *National Defense*, April 1986, p 8; Paul A Chadwell, ‘Sub designs for South Africa’, *National Defense*, March 1987, p 13; Herbert H Denton, ‘Arms sellers get rich on Gulf war’, *The Washington Post*, 13 July 1984; and John M Goshko, ‘US Allies selling arms to S Africa’, *The Washington Post*, 27 March 1987.

⁵¹ An estimate of \$9 billion per year was provided by an unidentified US Government analyst cited by Wayne Biddle in *The New York Times*, 29 September 1985.

parts for their continuing conflict.⁵² Other major customers for such arms include Libya; South Africa, the sectarian militias in Lebanon, and the various guerrilla forces in Central America.⁵³

Although black and grey market transactions do not approach the official arms traffic in total dollar terms (after all, a few planeloads of spare parts and ammunition cost considerably less than one new jet fighter), they probably have an equal impact on political and military developments in the Third World. This is because many of the recipients of such arms are engaged in struggles to overthrow duly constituted governments (as in the case of the 'Contras' in Nicaragua and the UNITA forces in Angola), or because there are sensitive political and moral issues involved (as in the case of secret US arms shipments to Iran and South Africa). Black market transfers are also helping to sustain many of the conflicts currently continuing in the Third World—including the bloody fighting in Lebanon and the Persian Gulf.

The changing market-place: prospects and consequences

These findings on technology transfers, arms stockpiling, and black-market transactions suggest that the basic data sources on international military sales may be significantly misrepresenting the true 'state of the trade'. Black-market sales of \$5 to \$10 billion per year, coupled with a substantial trade in arms-making technology, could—if factored into the standard export tallies—eliminate much of the statistical decline in Third World military imports observed since 1983. While the accurate measurement of such supplementary transactions is probably beyond the capacity of researchers operating outside the intelligence community, it is obvious that more analytical attention needs to be addressed to these phenomena.

This shift in trading patterns is producing a significant and permanent restructuring of the international arms traffic. In all probability, we shall be seeing fewer of the large, multi-billion dollar transfers of high-performance aircraft and missiles from North to South that were so common in the late 1970s and early 1980s. Instead, we are likely to see a larger trade in infantry weapons, electronic and communications

⁵² The \$1 billion per month estimate was provided by an unidentified government sources cited by Herbert H Denton in *The Washington Post*, 13 July 1984.

⁵³ On illicit US sales to South Africa, see Thomas Conrad, 'South Africa circumvents embargo', *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, March 1986, pp 8-13; and Michael T Klare, 'Evading the embargo, illicit US arms transfers to South Africa', *Journal of International Affairs* 35(1) Spring/Summer 1981, pp 15-28.

equipment, and combat-support *matériel* of all sorts. Supplying these weapons, moreover, will be a more diverse group of First, Second, and Third World producers, as well as a very active crew of black-market suppliers.

This restructuring of the international arms traffic has many significant repercussions. One of the more obvious consequences is a sharp increase in the intensity of supply-side competition. The major producers are placing far more emphasis on marketing and advertising, and are vigorously courting potential Third World buyers. There has also been an increase in the number and frequency of military trade fairs (or 'arms bazaars', as they are sometimes called), with more and more companies renting exhibit space at such events.⁵⁴ Even if the demand for high-performance arms expands in the late 1980s, this competitive climate is unlikely to recede much, because yet more new suppliers are now entering the marketplace.

With the increase in competition, many of the restrictions on arms exports once imposed by some Western European governments have been significantly diluted. Thus France, which played down the military side of its aerospace trade when the Socialist President, François Mitterrand, took office in 1981, has since lifted its restrictions on military sales to all countries save Chile and South Africa.⁵⁵ Similarly, West Germany—which previously maintained tight controls on the sale of military *matériel* to Third World combat zones—significantly relaxed its export controls in 1982.⁵⁶ Despite considerable domestic opposition, Britain has relaxed its restrictions on military sales to Chile and other countries cited for human rights violations.⁵⁷

Increased competition among the suppliers has also had an effect on recipient behaviour in the international market-place. As noted by Brzoska and Ohlson in the 1985 *SIPRI Yearbook*, 'Today the arms market is a buyers' market', which endows recipients with greater leverage when negotiating terms for new purchases. This leverage has been used in several significant ways: to secure concessions in price and credit terms; to obtain 'offset' and barter agreements; and to gain access to advanced military production technologies.⁵⁸

⁵⁴ On the increase in 'arms bazaars', see: *SIPRI Yearbook 1984*, pp 205–6. See also Ingrassia, 'World weapons sales slow'; and Rick Atkinson and Fred Hiatt, 'Arms merchants' shrinking market', *The Washington Post*, 23 June 1985.

⁵⁵ See Klein, 'Arms sales, development, disarmament', p 160; and Roger Ricklefs, 'France, a big exporter of weapons, is hurt by a decline in volume', *The Wall Street Journal*, 20 July 1984.

⁵⁶ Klein, 'Arms sales . . .' p 161.

⁵⁷ See *SIPRI Yearbook 1984*, pp 188–90.

⁵⁸ *SIPRI Yearbook 1985*, pp 363–4.

Given the enormous debt burden carried by many Third World countries, it is hardly surprising that credit allowances of various sorts have figured in recent arms transactions. Nations that previously were obliged to pay cash for their purchases, or to borrow the funds at regular market rates, are now able to buy on long-term credit—often at concessionary interest rates. To ease further the credit problems of favoured customers, the USA agreed in 1986 to defer interest payments on arms-related loans.⁵⁹

Offset and barter agreements have become a prominent feature of the arms trade. Through such agreements, the arms supplier agrees to accept partial payment in the form of raw materials produced by the recipient, or to purchase a certain quantity of other goods in the recipient country and market them elsewhere, or to award sub-contracts to the recipient for the production of certain components or to help modernise the recipient's industrial infrastructure.⁶⁰ Although such agreements impose a significant burden on the recipient, they have reportedly become a 'fact of life' in the international market-place as recipients gain more leverage. According to one report, US arms exports of \$22.4 billion in 1980–84 generated an estimated \$12.3 billion in offset commitments.⁶¹

One of the most common forms of offset is the transfer of military technology from supplier to recipient. Specifically, the buyer may insist that the weapon in question be partly manufactured or assembled in its own factories, or that it serve as a subcontractor to the original supplier by producing certain key parts. (In this manner, the recipient gains access to modern production techniques and establishes a base for the manufacture of indigenously-designed weapons.) Such 'co-production' and licensing arrangements now figure in most major military sales to Brazil, Egypt, India, Israel, South Korea and Taiwan, and are increasingly setting the pattern for sales to other Third World countries with an indigenous arms-production capability.⁶²

Accompanying these features of a buyers' market is the growing tendency for recipients to diversify their sources of arms, rather than to depend on one or two main suppliers.

⁵⁹ See Brzoska and Ohlson, 'The future of arms transfers', p 135 and *The New York Times*, 25 December 1986.

⁶⁰ For a discussion of this phenomenon, see Thomas Friedman, 'Defense sales offsets', *National Defense*, March 1987, pp 28–33 and Stephanie Neuman, 'Coproduction, barter, and countertrade: offsets in the international arms market', *Orbis* 29(1) spring 1985, pp 165–213.

⁶¹ Friedman, 'Defense sales offsets', p 28.

⁶² For discussion, see Klare, *American Arms Supermarket*, pp 173–80 and Neuman, 'The arms trade . . .', pp 164–5.

This pattern first became evident in the 1960s, when some of the major Latin American countries began buying European arms in order to signal their independence from Washington, and has since become the pattern throughout the Third World.⁶³ Many nations in the Middle East, for instance, have chosen to turn increasingly to France and Great Britain for their major equipment, rather than to remain dependent on one or other of the two superpowers (which tend to exact a higher price in terms of political subservience than do the European suppliers). Thus, Saudi Arabia decided in 1985 to acquire 72 *Tornado* combat planes from Britain, rather than continue an uphill battle to gain US Congressional approval for the purchase of additional F-15 fighters.⁶⁴ A similar pattern can be seen in such countries as Libya, Algeria and Iraq, which have turned to French and Italian suppliers rather than maintaining a sole-source relationship with the Soviet Union.⁶⁵ This trend towards diversification is clearly evident in the statistical data: according to Stephanie Neuman, the number of LDCs receiving arms from four or more suppliers tripled between 1972-73 and 1981-82 (from ten to thirty-two), while the number buying from only one or two primary suppliers declined.⁶⁶

The process of diversification has, of course been aided by the entry of more and more suppliers into the world arms market. Although production of supersonic aircraft and other 'high-tech' systems is still limited to a handful of countries, many other weapons are available from a wide range of suppliers.⁶⁷ Because the newer suppliers tend to offer more attractive economic terms (ie, lower prices, easier credit terms or superior offsets) than the traditional suppliers, it is not surprising that many Third World buyers are increasingly turning to these secondary suppliers—including other Third World countries—when acquiring less sophisticated equipment.⁶⁸

⁶³ On Latin American buying patterns, see Klare, *American Arms Supermarket*, pp 77-107; Luigi Einaudi, Hans Heymann Jr, David Ronfeldt and Caesar Sereseres, *Arms Transfers to Latin America*, Santa Monica, California: RAND Corporation, 1973; and US Department of State, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, *Arms Sales in Latin America*, Washington DC: Government Printing Office, 1973.

⁶⁴ See *The Washington Post*, 10, 17, and 27 September 1985.

⁶⁵ See *SIPRI Yearbook 1984*, p 188.

⁶⁶ Neuman, 'International stratification', p 195.

⁶⁷ For a register of the indigenous and licensed production of arms in Third World countries, see Brzoska and Ohlson, *Arms Production in the Third World*, pp 305-50.

⁶⁸ Customers for Brazilian arms, for instance, have included Algeria, Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Egypt, Gabon, Guyana, Honduras, Iran, Iraq, Libya, Nigeria, Paraguay, Saudi Arabia, Suriname, Uruguay, Venezuela and Zimbabwe. See: *SIPRI Yearbook 1985*, pp 389-423.

These trade developments—the proliferation of arms suppliers, the diversification of acquisition patterns, and the breakdown of established trading patterns—are also likely to have an impact on political and military developments in the Third World.

To begin with, it is apparent that the strong patron-client relationships forged between the major arms suppliers and their Third World customers in the 1960s and 1970s are progressively weakening as recipients diversify their sources of supply. Until fairly recently, Third World countries tending to obtain the bulk of their military equipment from a single supplier—usually one or the other of the two superpowers—were in a majority. Today, most Third World countries buy from a variety of sources, and some, as we have seen, have established their own indigenous arms industries. In many cases, this has resulted in a greater degree of political autonomy on the part of Third World countries—often at the expense of the two superpowers, which have both suffered dramatic political reversals in recent years (the United States in Iran, Nicaragua, and the Sudan; the Soviet Union in Egypt, Somalia, and Iraq).⁶⁹

This same process of diversification has also made it easier for belligerents to obtain the arms and equipment needed to sustain high levels of combat—even in the face of an embargo imposed by the major suppliers. This is perhaps the outstanding lesson of the Iran-Iraq conflict, which has continued for seven gruelling years despite the nominal efforts of both superpowers to limit arms transfers to the protagonists. A similar pattern can be seen in the continuing struggles in Central America, Lebanon and Southern Africa.

The growing emphasis on purchases of basic combat equipment, spare parts, and ammunition is also ominous in this regard. While many of the high-performance jets acquired in the 1970s are likely to spend much of the time during future conflicts on the ground (because of the difficulties encountered in maintaining them under wartime conditions), the large quantities of less-capable systems now being stockpiled are not likely to sit idle. Indeed, the whole emphasis on such hardware suggests conscious planning for sustained, high-intensity conflict on the part of many Third World governments. This is particularly evident in the Middle East, where both Israel and Syria

⁶⁹ For discussion, see Klare, *American Arms Supermarket*, chs 6, 7 and 10. On the Soviet experience with arms sales, see Pierre, *The Global Politics of Arms Sales*, pp 73–82; and Rajan Menon, *Soviet Power and the Third World*, New Haven: Yale University Press, ch 4.

have stockpiled vast quantities of combat equipment in anticipation of another conflict in Lebanon.⁷⁰

It would be foolish to argue that increased arms transfers automatically increase the risk of war—the decision to wage war is determined by numerous factors, and it is almost impossible to calculate the relative importance of any single one. Nevertheless, there is no doubt that the widespread availability of modern arms has made it easier for potential belligerents to choose the military rather than the diplomatic option when seeking to resolve local disputes. Stark examples of this phenomenon include Argentina's decision in 1982 to occupy the Falklands/Malvinas, Israel's decision in 1982 to invade southern Lebanon, Libya's decision in 1983 to intervene in the Chadian civil war, and, most notably, Iraq's decision in 1980 to invade Iran. Similarly, the widespread availability of black-market arms has made it easier for insurgents in a score of countries to sustain protracted hostilities against the existing government.

Arms transfers have also contributed to the destructive *intensity* of many recent conflicts, particularly those fought with large numbers of modern munitions. The war in the South Atlantic, for instance, entailed relatively high levels of destruction (12 ships sunk or damaged, 124 planes shot down) despite the limited nature of the conflict, while the 1982 conflict in Lebanon produced an estimated 50,000 casualties in just one month of fighting. This trend toward increased combat intensity is additionally disturbing because it increases the likelihood that future Third World conflicts will escalate to the point where they threaten the geo-strategic interests of the USA and/or the Soviet Union, thus inviting intervention by the superpowers and risking even higher levels of escalation.

Even in the absence of significant military activity, arms transfers are contributing to instability in the Third World by absorbing vast sums needed for famine relief and economic development. At a time of economic austerity and scarce credit, excessive spending on imported arms exacerbates debt problems and precludes investment in non-military development programmes. 'Arms imports soaks up foreign-exchange loans that could otherwise finance purchases of capital goods', Professor Lance Taylor of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology noted in 1981. 'Econometric studies suggest that each extra dollar spent on arms reduces domestic investment by 25 cents and agricultural

⁷⁰ See Charlotte Salkowski, 'Arms buildup, raid on PLO threaten Mideast', *The New York Times*, 2 October 1985.

output by 20 cents.⁷¹ Also disturbing is the fact that African countries spent some \$20.4 billion on imported arms in 1981-84,⁷² just at the moment when the continent's fragile agricultural infrastructure was about to come under severe strain.

All of this suggests a pressing need for fresh consideration of proposals for curbing the global traffic in conventional arms. Without some international cooperation in controlling the flow of weapons, we can expect no mitigation of the dangers described above. Unfortunately, such cooperation has few precedents and is unlikely to occur easily or swiftly. It is important, therefore, that we consider any preparatory work that has been done in this area.

By far the most ambitious initiative in this field was the draft agreement forged by US and Soviet negotiators during the Conventional Arms Transfer (CAT) talks of 1977-78. Although these talks failed to produce a formal treaty before being suspended by President Carter, they did produce agreement on many terms and protocols for such a concord—particularly as relate to the control of high-tech arms transfers to overseas conflict zones.⁷³ It is to be hoped that this earlier effort will facilitate the adoption of US-Soviet agreements if the two superpowers can agree to resume their negotiations on this issue.

Even if the CAT talks are resumed, however, it is obvious that the other major suppliers—particularly France and Britain—will have to be included in any future arms control arrangement if such initiatives are to have significant impact. As noted above, Western European countries now account for as much as one-third of the military trade with the Third World, and it is likely that these producers could further expand their output if excluded from a US-Soviet accord on conventional arms transfers.

Even more important is the need for *recipient* cooperation in conventional arms control. So long as recipients are willing to turn to secondary suppliers and/or their own industrial capabilities to procure arms unavailable from the major producers, mutual restraint by the superpowers and the West Europeans will have limited impact. Thus, if

⁷¹ Lance Taylor, 'The costly arms trade', *The New York Times*, 22 December 1981. See also Wassily Leontieff and Faye Duchin, *Military Spending: Facts and Figures, Worldwide Implications and Future Outlook*, New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983.

⁷² ACDA, *WMEAT 1985*, p. 43.

⁷³ For discussion, see Klare, *American Arms Supermarket*, pp. 94-95 and 230-31; Pierre, *The Global Politics of Arms Sales*, pp. 285-90; and US Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, *Prospects for Multilateral Arms Export Restraints*, Staff Report, 96th Congress, 1st Session, 1979, pp. 19-24.

Third World countries are to diminish the risks posed by regional conflicts and to channel more of their funds into domestic economic development, they must work together in curbing arms imports into their areas.

While undeniably difficult to attain, such agreement among recipients does not lie entirely outside the bounds of possibility. Particularly encouraging are the recent efforts of the 'Contadora' countries (Colombia, Mexico, Panama and Venezuela) to construct—and then seek regional support for—a treaty limiting arms imports into Central America.⁷⁴ Similar agreements have also been discussed in other regions of the Third World. Ultimately, such cooperative measures offer the only hope that Third World countries will be able to exercise some control over the international traffic in conventional arms.

⁷⁴ For text and discussion, see Jim Morrell, 'Contadora: the Treaty on balance', *International Policy Report*, June 1985, pp 1–8.

Populations on the move¹

During the last two decades the distribution of population and the movements which alter it have increasingly occupied the attention of those concerned with problems of population and resources in the Third World. These issues are of concern both to those who make and implement policy, and to social scientists whose work may influence policy. There are a variety of reasons for this concern.

The 1950s and 1960s witnessed the drive to reduce fertility in Third World countries to complement reductions in mortality and thus to limit rates of population growth. Though significant progress was achieved, success was by no means complete.² For the foreseeable future, the pressure of population and consequent demands on scarce resources will continue to present major problems, including those arising from the unequal distribution of resources and of people. These inequalities are attributable to the influence both of long-term factors such as the physical environment (which while not immutable is capable of relatively modest change through human intervention) and of shorter-term factors such as the political and economic decisions taken by former colonial powers and their independent successors. All of these factors are enmeshed within an extending and increasingly complex global economic system.³ In parts of the Third World, and particularly in Africa, environmental, political and economic factors have combined over the last twenty years to produce conditions of drought, food shortages and famine in which longer-term population pressures on

¹ The migration literature is multidisciplinary and diverse in nature and therefore immense in volume. In this paper it has been possible to do no more than list examples to illustrate the major concepts and features which are considered.

² L Tabah, 'World population trends: a stocktaking', *Population and Development Review* 6(3) 1980, pp 353-89.

N Eberstadt (ed), *Fertility decline in developing countries*, New York: Praeger, 1981.

J C Caldwell, *Theory of fertility decline*, New York: Academic Press, 1982.

T E Dow Jr and L H Werner, 'Prospects for fertility decline in rural Kenya', *Population and Development Review* 9(1) 1983, pp 77-97.

³ H C Brookfield, *Interdependent development*, London: Methuen, 1975.

M M Kritz et al, *Global trends in migration*, New York: Center for Migration Studies, 1981.

R H Balance et al, *International economy and industrial development*, Brighton: Harvester Press, 1982.

R Sabot, *Migration and the labour market in developing countries*, Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1982.

A L Mabogunje, *The development process: a spatial perspective*, London: Hutchinson, 1980.

resources have been exacerbated to the point of social and economic breakdown.

Inter-regional and international movements of people have been viewed as both resulting from inequalities in income and wealth, and contributing to such inequalities. Possible means of controlling population distribution and movements are subject to a wide divergence of opinion. There is, however, certainly a recognised need for changes in population distribution. Many governments are now more concerned with problems of distribution than with problems of fertility, and surveys by the UN have shown that existing distributions of urban and rural populations are thought to be unsatisfactory by many governments in Third World countries.⁴

This article sets out the broad nature of population movements and changes in distribution which are taking place in the major continental areas of the Third World, while making comparisons and contrasts. It outlines the differing approaches to these movements, and the interpretations of varying ideological and disciplinary points of view. It describes contemporary practical problems and indicates possible future developments.

Population movements are currently occurring within and among countries of the Third World and between the Third World and countries with more developed economies.⁵ Within the Third World, and particularly in tropical Africa, movements many not always be clearly distinguishable as internal or international. The major concern here is with movements which are essentially 'internal' in nature even

⁴ UN, *World Population trends and monitoring report. Vol. 2. Population policies*, New York: UN Population Division, 1978. Of 116 governments of less-developed countries, 53 reported satisfaction with fertility rates, only six were satisfied with their distribution of population.

S I Abumere, 'Population distribution policies and measures in Africa south of the Sahara', *Population and Development Review* 7(3) 1981, pp 421-433.

R J Fuchs, *Population distribution policies in Asia and the Pacific: current status and future prospects*, Paper No. 83 Honolulu: East-West Population Institute, 1983.

J I Clarke and L A Kosinski (eds), *Redistribution of population in Africa*, London: Heinemann, 1982.

L A Kosinski and K M Elahi (eds), *Population redistribution and development in South Asia*, Dordrecht: Reidel, 1985.

A L Mabogunje, 'Objectives and rationales for regional population redistribution in developing countries', in *Population distribution policies in development planning*, UN Department of International Economic and Social Affairs, New York: UN 1981, pp 19-29.

⁵ F Frobel *et al*, *The new international division of labour*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980.

W Bohning, *Studies in international labour migration*, New York: St. Martin's Press, 1984.

J H Bradbury, 'Regional and industrial restructuring processes in the new international division of labour', *Progress in Human Geography* (5) 1985, pp 35-63.

J R Lewis, 'International labour migration and uneven regional development in labour exporting countries' *Tijdschrift voor Economische en Sociale Geografie* 77(1) 1986, pp 27-41.

if not strictly so by definition. No specific attention is given to international movements such as those from South and Southeast Asia to the petroleum-producing countries of the Middle East or those between the Third World and more developed countries.⁶ This focus is intended to make more manageable a theme which is complex and unwieldy.

General considerations

In global terms there have been greater movements of population during the present century than at any time in the past. With an expanding world population, to which the Third World is making the major contribution, there are more people to move, and the means for them to do so have been much improved by progressively developing transportation networks. Even for those for whom the most sophisticated forms of transport are not available, there are now means of relatively easy movement which did not exist even two or three decades ago.

Many countries in the Third World record high rates of natural increase which are producing pressures upon resources in a variety of ways; these pressures in turn influence major redistributions. There are major movements of people within rural areas and from rural areas into towns.⁷ High rates of urban growth (from continuing high rates of natural increase among urban populations as well as from rural-urban movement) are far in excess of those experienced by expanding towns

⁶ I Serageldin *et al*, *Manpower and international migration in the Middle East and North Africa*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983.

F Arnold and N M Shah, *Asian labour migration to the Middle East*, Honolulu: East-West Population Institute, 1984.

J Conde *et al*, *International south-north migration: a case study of migrants from the Senegal River Valley in Mali, Mauritania and Senegal*, Paris: OECD, 1986.

⁷ J Abu-Lughod and R Hay (eds), *Third World urbanization*, London: Methuen, 1977.

B du Toit and H I Safa (eds), *Migration and urbanization*, The Hague: Mouton, 1975.

R N Thomas and J M Hunter (eds), *Internal migration systems in the developing world, with special reference to Latin America*, Boston: G K Hall, 1980.

L Yap, 'The attraction of cities: a review of the migration literature', *Journal of Development Economics* (4) 1977, pp 239-64.

P A Morrison (ed), *Population movements: their form and functions in urbanization and development*, Liège Ordina Editions, 1982.

Migration, population and development, Population Information Program, The Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, Population Reports Series M, No. 7, September-October 1983.

J Connell, 'Islands under pressure: population growth and urbanization in the South Pacific', *Ambio* (12) 1984, pp 306-12.

G Swamy, *Population and internal migration*, World Bank Staff Working Paper No 689, Washington DC, 1985.

in the now developed world in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. There is urbanisation without complementary economic development, industrial or otherwise. Large numbers of new town dwellers find that the means of economic support are limited and many are initially 'migrating to unemployment'. Urban growth is also occurring without complementary expansion in urban services. Administratively, socially and economically, large towns and cities in the Third World experience great stresses in coping with their increasing populations. There are shortages and low standards of housing, and inadequate water supply, sewerage and waste disposal. The combined effects of these traumatic conditions on physical and mental well-being are considerable.

With increased populations, man-made and natural disasters are promoting population movements in much greater volumes than in the past.⁸ Africa has now more refugees who have fled from war and political disruption than any other continent, but refugee numbers are also considerable in parts of Latin America and Asia. Africa is widely prone to natural disaster, particularly drought, and though the numbers affected are difficult to ascertain, a large proportion are forced to move in order to survive. There is no such widespread environmental devastation in Latin America and in Asia.

Political refugees and those moving because of natural disasters fall within a category of being forced to move.⁹ In a second broad category are those who may be described as economic migrants. They may be under varying degrees of pressure to move but they have the expectation and hope of improving their circumstances by doing so. Those in the first category are unable to plan their movements, while there is some element of planning for those in the second. A classification of this order is for convenience only and in reality is not always a clear dichotomy between 'forced' or 'involuntary' and 'unforced' or 'voluntary' or between 'non-economic' and 'economic' in describing the motivation for movements. The UN High Commission

⁸ See *Disasters* (The International Journal of Disaster Studies and Practice), Relief and Development Institute, London.

⁹ See various publications of the UN High Commission for Refugees.

A Hansen and A Oliver-Smith (eds), *Involuntary migration and resettlement: the problems and responses of dislocated people*, Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1982.

E Meng-Try, 'Kampuchea: a country adrift', *Population and Development Review* 7(2) 1981, pp 209-28.

J Rogge, *Too many, too long: Sudan's twenty-year refugee dilemma*, New Jersey: Rowman and Allenheld, 1985.

for Refugees estimates a total of 10 million refugees in the Third World, but this figure does not include persons displaced by environmental catastrophe. 'Economically active migrants' are said by the International Labour Office to number between 20 and 22 million, but this can be no more than a vague estimate, given the problems of defining a migrant and of determining migrant status.¹⁰ Many movements are made illegally, and these, together with many legal movements, go unrecorded.

The emphasis in this article is on people who may be influenced by factors which are primarily economic, though perhaps in conjunction with political, social and psychological factors.¹¹ They are able to exercise some choice as to whether to move or not, and in the kinds of movements which they make. Their movements are not uniform in character and there are important differences among these which need to be recognised.

Movement types

The many different types of movement vary in their causes, manifestations and implications. They may be comprehended initially in terms of their spatial and temporal characteristics.¹²

Distinctions may be made between origins and destinations of movements, according to which are rural and which are urban, and movements defined which are rural/rural, rural/urban, urban/rural and urban/urban (intra-urban and inter-urban). In general in the Third World the majority of people are still located in rural areas, increasing numbers are moving to urban places, and large numbers move between rural and urban locations. There is also increasing movement between and within urban places.

Relatively little attention has been given to the distinction which should be made between migration (mobility involving permanent change of residence) and circulation (mobility away from place of residence but with eventual return to it). Circulation has long been

¹⁰ ILO, *World labour report*, Geneva: International Labour Office, 1984.

¹¹ J Balan, *Why people move*, Paris: UNESCO Press, 1981.

G E de Yong and R W Gardner (eds), *Migration decision-making multi-disciplinary approaches to micro-level studies in developed and developing countries*, New York: Pergamon Press, 1981.

¹² W T S Gould and R M Prothero, 'Space and time in African Population mobility', in *People on the move: studies on internal migration*, L A Kosinski and R M Prothero (eds), London: Methuen, 1975, pp 39-49.

recognised as of great importance in tropical Africa, and increasing attention has been directed to it in other parts of the developing world.¹³

Two types of migration may be distinguished. Regular migration involves a permanent change in place of residence in which the decision to move has been taken in circumstances offering the migrant relatively free choice. Irregular migration involves a change of residence under pressure, which may therefore not be wholly permanent but may involve further movement, whose timing and direction are uncertain.

Circulation away from a recognised permanent place of residence may be classified according to varying periods of time: daily (away for up to twenty-four hours); periodic (away for more than twenty-four hours but less than twelve months); seasonal (similar to periodic but where the time absent is related to the span of one or more seasons); long-term (away for more than twelve months and possibly extending over years). These time distinctions are inevitably arbitrary and other time criteria have been used.¹⁴

When these spatial and temporal dimensions are combined in an attempt to comprehend the totality of mobility they provide a typology in which twenty-four different types of population movement may be identified. There are many more types than are commonly recognised and increased awareness of them can contribute to a better understanding of the nature, causes and consequences of movements. However, it is important at the same time to appreciate that in reality, among specific groups of people or among populations in specified areas, only rarely is one type of mobility practised. Types, which are distinctive in their spatial and temporal characteristics and in their causes and consequences, occur in varied associations with one another. People may be involved concurrently in more than one type of

¹³ M Chapman, 'Circulation', in *International Encyclopaedia of Population* Vol 1, J A Ross (ed), New York: Free Press, 1982, pp 93-98.

M Chapman and R M Prothero, 'Themes on circulation in the Third World', *International Migration Review* 17(4) 1983, pp 597-632.

R M Prothero and M Chapman (eds), *Circulation in Third World Countries*, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1985.

G Standing (ed), *Labour circulation and the labour process*, London: Croom Helm, 1985.

¹⁴ R D Bedford, 'A transition in circular mobility: population movement in the New Hebrides 1800-1970', in H C Brookfield (ed), *The Pacific in Transition*, Canberra: Australian National University, 1973, pp 187-227.

G W Jones and H V Richter (eds), *Population mobility and development: South East Asia and the Pacific*, Development Studies Monograph No. 27, Canberra: Australian National University.

G J Hugo, 'Circular migration in Indonesia', *Population and Development Review* 8(1) 1982, pp 59-83.

M Chapman and R M Prothero, *op. cit.*, 1983.

movement and possibly in several types. This complexity has been inadequately recognised in emergencies, when providing for people moving under stress (through political disruption or environmental disaster), or in planning for those who are moving under pressure, albeit of a less urgent nature. Movements primarily influenced by economic factors need to be considered in ways additional to the spatial/temporal dimensions which have been outlined. While economic factors may be predominant they are unlikely to operate to the exclusion of political, social and psychological factors. These factors will operate differentially at a variety of scales—ranging from individuals to variously sized collectivities of movers. While a combination of economic and/or political factors may predominate in determining rates of movement (the proportion of a population which moves), the incidence of movement (those persons in a population who move) will be influenced much more by social and psychological factors associated with kin groups, household, families and individuals.¹⁵

There are circumstances in which the whole population moves (for example groups of hunter-gatherers or nomadic pastoralists or shifting cultivators) and does so in order to survive, by exploiting and conserving scarce resources which are dispersed and variable in their distribution in space and in time. These movements are delicately balanced, based on an assessment of the availability and potential of resources, and a judgment on the basis of accumulated experience as to how these should be best used. Such groups of 'ecological migrants' have been able to survive, if not always to thrive, in the most extreme environments in which life is possible. The numbers of people now involved in activities which require total movement are relatively small and the ecological niches which they inhabit have become progressively more restricted. They are frequently under great pressure, often requiring support for subsistence let alone for the survival of their traditional ways of life. The intense pressures come from the degradation of already marginal environments through natural and man-induced changes (for example, nomadic pastoralists in the West African Sahel) and through political and economic disruption (for example, Indian tribes in Amazonia), and sometimes from a combination of these. Traditional nomadic pastoral life for many Somali people in the Horn of Africa has to a very large extent been

¹⁵ J.C. Mitelman, 'The causes of labour migration', *Bulletin, Inter-African Labour Institute* (6) 1959, pp 12-13. Reprinted in J Middleton (ed), *Black Africa: its Peoples and Culture Today*, New York: Macmillan, 1970, pp 257-69.

disrupted. For some, it has been totally destroyed during the recent period of unsettled Somali-Ethiopian political relations coupled with adverse environmental conditions, particularly drought.

Unlike the above groups whose movements are severely constrained, those who move in the expectation and hope of achieving economic improvement constitute a minority of the populations from which they originate. They are able to exercise some degree of choice as to whether or not they move, though the extent to which they are constrained in their choices is of course one of opinion and interpretation. These interpretations differ sharply, depending on disciplinary and ideological biases which produce a range of varied reasons for movement. These differences are evident in several explanatory frameworks which have been applied to both migration and circulation. They are illustrated with particular reference to work in sub-Saharan Africa.

Explanations of movements

Neo-classical economic explanations of movement have tended to be mechanistic in their approach and macro in scale. They stress 'economic man', concentrate on sectoral differences and under-emphasise regional differences, and exaggerate the permanence of rural-urban migration to the neglect of other movements.¹⁶ In general they have underplayed the importance of social and psychological factors in influencing movement. Work on migration in tropical Africa and more widely in Third World countries has emphasised econometric models which 'integrate the two-way relationship between migration and population distribution on the one hand and economic variables on the other, into a more comprehensive analytical framework designed to improve development policy'.¹⁷

This work has been premised on the capability of economic research methodologies, econometric techniques and data analysis to produce 'a steadily increasing volume of new insights' at macro- and micro-levels. Non-economic factors are acknowledged to have some relevance but the emphasis is on *migration being explained primarily by economic factors*, with the dismissive and arrogant comment that '... "non-economic" social science migration models offer little practical policy guidance for decision makers in developing countries'. The essentials of

¹⁶ M P Todaro, *Internal Migration in Developing Countries: A Review of Theory, Evidence, Methodology and Research Priorities*, Geneva: International Labour Office, 1976.

¹⁷ *ibid.*

the model are that migration is a response to urban-rural differences in expected rates of actual earnings; that migrants consider the various labour market opportunities available and select the one which will maximise the expected gain from migration, as measured by the differences in real incomes between urban and rural job opportunities and the probability of a new migrant obtaining an urban job. The original model and many of its revisions have little to say about circulatory movements of people and why they continue, and on the function of the informal sector in urban economies, though some recent work (eg on internal migration in Mexico) has considered job prospects and earnings in the informal sector.¹⁸

A sociological/social anthropological explanation of the movement of labour is less mechanistic and less singularly focused, and has recognised that different factors operate on different scales.¹⁹ In the pluralistic colonial economy and society of South-Central Africa, labour movement involved a continuing dialectic between modern needs and traditional demands. On the one hand there were the centrifugal attractions of wage employment in more economically advanced places (e.g. mines and towns), and on the other the centripetal attractions of ties, relationships and obligations in home places. This approach distinguishes between 'necessary' conditions (macro and mainly economic) and 'sufficient' conditions (macro/personal and mainly social) which influence decisions to move, and which influence the 'rate' and 'incidence' of movement. It concludes that the causal factors in labour migration can be appreciated only by trying to see town and country as one social field and to analyse the forces operating within it, but doubts that social science is yet in a position to be able to do this. Further work has viewed this total field of 'social and economic relationships involving both town and country', within which the decisions of potential movers are constrained through time, as composed of 'setting' (macro in scale and involving economic, political and administrative factors) and 'situation' (micro in scale and involving individual and personal circumstances).²⁰

¹⁸ H Garrison, 'Internal migration in Mexico: a test of the Todaro model', *Food Research Institute Studies* 18(2) 1982, pp 197-214.

¹⁹ J C Mitchell, *op. cit.* 1959, and 'Structural plurality, urbanization and labour circulation in Southern Rhodesia', in J A Jackson (ed), *Migration*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1969, pp 156-80.

J Gugler, in J A Jackson (ed), 'On the theory of rural-urban migration: the case of Sub-Saharan Africa', *op. cit.*, pp 134-55.

²⁰ J C Mitchell, 'Towards a situational sociology of wage-labour circulation', in R M Prothero and M Chapman (eds), *op. cit.*, pp 3-53.

Explanations of movement by neo-Marxist political economists, and those of similar persuasion in other disciplines, have strongly advanced the view that too little attention has been paid to the externally determined political and economic structures within which movements occur.²¹ They maintain that traditional societies in the Third World were penetrated in the colonial period by capitalism which expropriated their surpluses for its growth and continuation. By increasing local need for cash (e.g. by introducing new currencies, taxes and consumer goods) capitalism has forced people in peripheral rural societies to move to satisfy their needs to areas of more precocious economic development where there are demands for wage labour. Consequently, regional differences and inequalities are intensified; village economies are impoverished and those who remain in them have to subsidise absent members who will return to be supported when their labour is not required elsewhere (e.g. during economic recessions and in old age). The stratification of rural societies is either initiated or enhanced. Samir Amin, among the most forthright in advancing structural explanations, has written of the draining of the human resources of the interior of West Africa to promote developments on the coast and in the coastal hinterland; he argues that movement is not a consequence of unequal development due to the varying potential of different regions, but that it is an element in promoting unequal development.²²

Structural explanations are criticised for being strong on theory but having limited supporting empirical evidence, and this criticism is borne out in Amin's work. His analyses are at macro scale, with sparse supporting evidence that can be refuted on several grounds. The explanations are based on an over-simplified dichotomy of West Africa into major regions (the sources and destinations of movements), with inadequate attention paid to significant variations within these regions, relating to the physical environment and to ethnic and social factors. Amin ignores the fact that only a minority of the total population has

²¹ C Meillassoux, 'From production to reproduction: a Marxist approach to economic anthropology', *Economy and Society* (1) 1972, pp 93-105.

T J F A Gerold-Scheepers and W M J van Binsbergen, 'Marxist and non-marxist approaches to migration in tropical Africa', and others papers in T J F A Gerold-Scheepers and W M J van Binsbergen (eds), *Migration and the transformation of modern African society*, Leiden: Afrike-Studiecentrum, University of Leiden, 1978, pp 21-35.

L Cliffe, 'Labour migration and peasant differentiation: Zambian experience', *Journal of Peasant Studies* (5) 1977, pp 326-46.

K Swindell, 'Labour migration in underdeveloped countries: the case of Sub-Saharan Africa', *Progress in Human Geography* (3) 1979, pp 241-59.

²² S Amin, 'Introduction', in *Modern Migrations in Western Africa*, S Amin (ed), London: Oxford University Press for the International African Institute.

been involved in movement, notwithstanding the macro-political-economic system within which people are supposedly locked and over which they are said to have little control. Structuralist interpretations, involving the interdependence of traditional and capitalist modes of production, would imply continuing movement of a circular character, yet Amin's analysis of West Africa in this century is that after an initial phase of temporary seasonal (circular) movement there was permanent movement of the population from the interior to the coast and the coastal hinterland. He dates what he terms 'modern migrations' in West Africa from about 1920, with a major hiatus in the development of movements consequent on the impact of exploitative colonialism and capitalism; antecedent conditions are ignored and no consideration given to elements of historical continuity in movements, for which there is evidence. However, neo-Marxist structuralists are not alone in neglecting historical perspective; sociologists and neo-classical economists are also guilty.

There has been some recognition of the value of this perspective and of its potential for better explaining movement. A review of regional mobility and resource development in West Africa has adopted a realistically historical view of movements which have had positive effects both on those who have moved and for their communities of origin and destination.²³ This work comments on how attention has been diverted away from movements which are historically established as well as continuing, diverse and directionally complex (e.g. associated with trading and land colonisation). It argues that seasonal contrasts in the environment in the interior of West Africa were used positively by people in the economically marginal northern areas, to integrate agricultural production there in the wet season with other ways of earning income during the dry season, either at home or by moving elsewhere. All of these aspects of movement may be viewed as helping positively to spread those values which have been vital in stimulating development in many parts of West Africa.

Movements can thus be seen as phenomena with roots in traditional custom and practice, which change and develop according to challenges, potential and opportunities. From time immemorial, people have been redistributing themselves, temporarily and permanently, voluntarily and under some degree of pressure. Circumstances change, new opportunities are presented, some

²³ A L Mabogunje, *Regional Mobility and Resource Development in West Africa*, Toronto and London: McGill and Queen's University Press, 1972.

constraints are removed and new ones introduced. The human capacity to adjust to change is based very much on experience from the past; people are not inexorably constrained by systems over which they have no influence, they do have some control, and respond by literally 'voting with their feet'.²⁴

It is clear from the above examples that explanations of the causes, nature and consequences of movements are widely divergent. Evaluation and direct comparison of these differences are difficult to make since each explanation is concerned with a particular type of mobility, and often with mobility in a particular area. For example, circulation in South-Central Africa developed within a pluralistic colonial administrative and economic system, and was thus much more controlled than the traditional forms of circulation in West Africa which accommodated themselves to economic developments attendant on colonial/capitalist contact. These various approaches to and explanations of movement influence the nature of research, the results obtained, and the conclusions drawn for policy. Any study must face problems of objectivity, with constraints from ideological, disciplinary and personal biases, but there is a need to find ways through the present maze of conflicting viewpoints on movements. Otherwise, as has been said of theories of development and underdevelopment, there is the risk of being lost '... in a never-never land of ideological polarisation, conceptual sterility and empirical ignorance'.

A wide diversity of opinions is intellectually stimulating but can also be confusing, and this confusion does little to help those who have to make and implement practical policy.²⁵

Features of movement

Long-standing views that the majority of societies in the Third World were traditionally relatively static and immobile have been countered by recent evidence. This has emphasised considerable fluidity and movement, as already mentioned in relation to West Africa, of both spontaneous and an involuntary nature. These movements may be both advantageous and disadvantageous, but with the balance in favour of the former. Contemporary movements need to be understood in the

²⁴ K Swindell, 'Family farms and migrant labour: the Strange Farmers of the Gambia', *Canadian Journal of African Studies* (12) 1978, pp 3-17, and 'Seasonal agricultural circulation: the Strange Farmers of the Gambia', in R M Prothero and M Chapman (eds), *op. cit.*, pp 178-204.

²⁵ J K Hart, 'Migration and the opportunity structure: a Ghanaian case study', in S Amin (ed), *op. cit.*, pp 321-24.

broad context of evolution over time. Movements in the past were predominantly within rural areas; the high volume of movement from rural to urban areas is comparatively recent in most parts of the Third World.²⁶

In both rural and urban areas, populations continue to grow through substantial rates of natural increase. Despite out-movements from the former, rural depopulation is occurring only in very limited areas. While inflows of people contribute substantially to urban growth, this contribution is less than that from natural increase; the large proportions of urban populations in the younger reproductive age groups produce rates of fertility much in excess of those of mortality. Efforts to control the growth of urban populations must thus concentrate on this natural element as well as on in-movement from rural areas.

In Latin America, Asia and Africa the volume of movements of rural people is large, within rural areas as well as from them to the towns. Rural-rural movements are influenced by the negative pressures of land shortages and of poor quality land, and by the positive attractions of more and better quality land or by the possibilities of higher wages in areas of more advanced rural development. In some instances movement involves individual or small-scale pioneer colonisation of unoccupied or sparsely populated lands; as in the dry zone of Sri Lanka where population growth since 1945 has been twice that for the whole country. In others, people are moved to government-organised settlement/colonisation schemes in which varying amounts of infrastructure and support are provided (in Amazonia, peninsular Malaysia, Indonesia and the Philippines).²⁷ In general those who move are among the more enterprising and sometimes have experience outside rural areas; those who move to colonisation schemes in Latin America, while having a rural background, are not always peasants.

Apart from movements which result in permanent rural resettlement there are many rural-rural movements which comprise seasonal or periodic circulation and supply labour requirements at times of

²⁶ W H McNeill, 'Human migration in historical perspective', *Population and Development Review* 10(1) 1984, pp 1-18.

²⁷ R J Pryor (ed), *Migration and development in South-East Asia: a demographic perspective*, Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1979.

G W Jones and H V Richter (eds) *op. cit.*

L J A Mougeot, *Alternative migration targets and Brazilian Amazonia's closing frontier*, Centre for Development Studies, University College of Swansea, No. 18, Norwich Geobooks, 1984.

J Hardjono, 'Transmigration: looking to the future', *Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies* (22) 1986, pp 28-53.

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maximum demand in areas of more advanced agricultural development. Relatively little is known about such mobility in Latin America but it would seem to be quantitatively important in Central America, the Caribbean, Brazil, Colombia and parts of Argentina. It has been increasingly revealed in parts of South and Southeast Asia and in the Pacific.²⁸ In Africa seasonal labour movements have been most distinctive in West Africa. There, the east-west orientation of regions of contrasting environment, with various kinds and levels of agricultural development and varying labour demands, has predisposed the area to north-south movements between them. They also occur in other parts of the continent.²⁹ Sometimes they involve the crossing of international boundaries, especially in West Africa, exposing those who move to increased pressures and risks of exploitation since their movements may be considered as illegal.

The major focus of attention in recent decades has been on rural-urban movements, to the detriment of investigation and understanding of movements in rural areas. Rural-urban movements are much more visible, contributing to high rates of urban growth and with their consequent impact on employment and the demands they make on urban services. The urban proportion of populations is increasing. In Latin American countries it is generally more than 50 per cent, higher than in Asia (25 per cent) and much higher than for most countries in Africa south of the Sahara (generally less than 20 per cent). The earlier and longer colonial experience in Latin America partly accounts for this distinction. Urban places were established as centres of colonial administration, commerce and religion from the earlier parts of the sixteenth century. The rural areas were subject to major land expropriation into large estates, for the production of crops for markets controlled by the colonial powers. Colonial capitalism was firmly established and those dispossessed of their land moved to expanding urban places. Though colonial rule came to an end a century or more ago, and despite various land reform measures, land alienation in large holdings continues and land scarcity and landlessness are still endemic. In many of these large holdings productivity is low, and often when

²⁸ R D Bedford, 'The variety and forms of population mobility in Southeast Asia and Melanesia', and other papers in G W Jones and H V Richter (eds) *op. cit.*, pp 17-50.

S Goldstein, 'Circulation in Southeast Asia', in M Chapman and R M Prothero (eds), *Circulation in Population Movement: Substance and Concepts from the Melanesian Case*, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1985, pp 377-406.

²⁹ R M Prothero, 'The context of circulation in West Africa', in M Chapman and R M Prothero (eds), 1985, *op. cit.*, pp 407-28.

improvements are made to raise productivity they result in reduced requirements for agricultural labour. Some of these longer-term socio-economic-political factors are enhanced in certain areas in the shorter term by environmental pressures (in the drought areas of north-east Brazil), and in others by political instability (in Nicaragua and El Salvador). Rural-urban flows continue, most of them involving permanent migration.³⁰

Compared with Latin America the colonial experience in Africa was more recent and of shorter duration. African countries are still in the process of adjustment to political independence and related socio-economic changes which have not been experienced in any of these countries for more than three decades. Colonial impacts in Africa were politically and economically varied with large land expropriations and settlement by Europeans in some countries and not in others. Land shortages and landlessness have been less immediate factors influencing rural-urban movements in Africa than in Latin America. With the notable exceptions of indigenous urbanism in some parts of North and West Africa, African urban centres were recent creations for colonial administrative and commercial purposes.³¹ Colonial conditions influenced rural-urban movements more in some parts than in others. In South-Central Africa the economic and administrative requirements of European settler populations promoted the development of 'Africans for towns rather than towns for Africans'. In these circumstances a sharp dichotomy was established between rural and urban areas; people came from the former for limited periods to work in the latter and then were obliged to return. This situation has continued until recently in South Africa under the system of influx control, while the relaxation of control with independence in Zimbabwe has led to a sharp increase in the population of its capital, Harare. In those parts of West Africa with indigenous urbanism there is not the same sharp dichotomy between rural and urban areas; one is seen in continuum with or as an extension of the other people move with ease in both directions.

The intermediary position of South and Southeast Asia in the proportion of the population which is urban reflects both traditional

³⁰ R. W. Fox, *Urban growth trends in Latin America*, Inter-American Development Bank, Washington DC, 1975.

R. Skeldon, 'The evolution of migration patterns during urbanization in Peru', *Geographical Review* (67) 1977, pp 394-411.

D. Bitterwort and J. K. Chance, *Latin American Urbanization*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981.

³¹ A. G. Connor, *The African City*, London: Hutchinson, 1983.

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urbanism and the colonial experience. There is a diversity of circumstances which makes generalisation difficult. In Southeast Asia there is evidence of a spectrum of movements from circulation to permanent migration in both rural and urban areas and between them. Movements were in the past perceived largely as migration and only recently has research identified commuting and circulation which are similar to those in Africa.³² In India, with a relatively well-developed urban system, the dominance of rural-urban movements has been replaced by urban-urban movements. Cities of regional and national importance have markedly more extensive fields from which migrants are drawn.³³

Movements from rural areas into towns are accomplished through a variety of complex processes. Where the urban hierarchy is well-developed, movement may be of a step or stage nature, migrants progressing from rural areas through smaller to larger towns and possibly ultimately to the larger cities. These step or stage processes have positive advantages since they provide opportunities for the progressive acquisition of skills which are required for urban employment and for adjusting to life in urban places. They may be inter-generational in their time sequence. They would seem to have been identified most clearly in Latin America and Asia where urban systems are more developed than in Africa. However, studies in several large cities in Latin America (Monterrey, Bogotá and Santiago) and Asia (Bombay, Bangkok) have shown that moves to them may be direct, often by people from nearby areas, which fact is indicative of the distance factor which is available in its effect but may be a deterrent to movement. On the whole, in Latin America, Africa and Asia little is known about movements to small and intermediate-sized cities or their functions in migration systems.³⁴

Migrants to towns are generally in the younger active age groups and have higher levels of education and skills than those who remain in rural areas. There is some evidence of a positive relationship between levels of education within areas of origin and the amount of out-movement

³² S Goldstein, *Circulation in the context of total mobility in Southeast Asia*, Paper No. 53, Honolulu: East-West Population Institute, 1978.

³³ M K Prem and J A I Tom, *City characteristics, migration and urban development policies in India*, Paper No. 92, Honolulu: East-West Population Institute.

³⁴ D A Rondinelli, 'Intermediate cities in developing countries: a comparative analysis of their demographic and socio-economic characteristics', *Third World Planning Review* 4(4) 1982, pp 357-86.

which occurs.³⁵ Those in rural areas with higher standards of education are generally economically better off, they can afford to move and their skills, though limited, offer some prospect of employment in urban areas. The poorest cannot afford to move. These relationships are more clearly demonstrated where literacy and educational levels have been more advanced, as for example in Latin America as compared with Africa where until recent times many of those involved in rural-urban movements are contributing strength rather than skill in their areas of destination.

The selection of those who move operates naturally to discriminate in favour of the younger, the more active, the more educationally advanced and the more economically advantaged. However, discrimination may also be an artefact of investigations. Past attention to those who move has been directed at males, and heads of households who are usually male, and little has been given to women other than as dependents of men. Within the last two decades women have been identified as important in movements in their own right and they have been studied more specifically.³⁶ In Africa movement has been male-dominated, but women migrants have been important for some time in Latin America and they are of increasing importance in Asia. These changes are associated with the enhancement of the status of women, particularly through the advancement of female education. Women are coming to play an increasingly important role in the service, manufacturing and informal sectors in urban centres of the Third World. Their movements have causes and consequences which differ from those of men, owing to differences in women's social and economic roles in the family and the household, and within the economies of their areas of origin and destination.

Evidence from most parts of the Third World indicates that both women and men have distinct preferences for urban as against rural life, notwithstanding the problems that have to be faced in towns. In Latin America, Asia and Africa they are not deterred by high levels of urban

³⁵ H N Barnum and R H Sabot, 'Education, employment probabilities and rural-urban migration in Tanzania', *Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics* 39(2) 1977, pp 109-26.

W T S Gould, 'Migration and development in Western Kenya 1971-82: a retrospective analysis of primary school leavers', *Africa* 55(3) 1985, pp 262-85.

³⁶ E Boserup, *Women's role in economic development*, London: Allen and Unwin, 1970.

J A Herold, 'Female migration in Chile: types of moves and socio-economic characteristics', *Demography* (16) 1978, pp 257-58.

'Women in migration', Special issue *International Migration Review* 18(1) 1984.

W Ezzard, 'Migrants and mothers: case studies from Botswana', *Journal of South African Studies* (11) 1985, pp 258-80.

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unemployment and underemployment. The disadvantages are outweighed by prospective opportunities for improved incomes which may be realised only in the long-term, together with the advantages of urban services and amenities. Although it may take time to achieve improved incomes there are shorter-term means of support for newcomers to towns, through relatives and kinsmen who are already established there and through employment in informal sectors of the urban economy. Services and amenities are under great strain, with demand greatly in excess of supply, but nonetheless there is better access to them than there would be in rural areas.

Apart from the difficulties of finding employment, housing is the most acute problem for migrants arriving in towns and particularly in the larger cities. The basic nature of these problems is common to all Third World countries, but they have received more attention in Latin America where they have been recognised for longer. Migrants to Latin American cities have tended to concentrate in the central areas and in squatter and shanty settlements occupying interstitial and peripheral locations. Though previously viewed in a negative fashion, more positive attitudes have recently been taken of these settlements in Latin America and elsewhere; they help to meet immediate pressing needs for shelter and can be progressively improved through self-help schemes with basic services being provided.³⁷

Urban areas in the Third World certainly display a great capacity to absorb and support newcomers for rural areas. Where rural-urban relationships are close and long-standing, as in parts of West Africa, they assist those who come to cities for short stays and those intending long-term stays in the early stages after first arrival. Towns in the West African Sahel have demonstrated this absorptive capacity for people forced out of rural areas by drought in the last decades.

Particular ethnic and regional groups may be significant in their propensity to move, and members of these groups sometimes follow particular occupations in the places to which they move. Relationships based on ethnicity, regional identity, family and kinship are important in assisting in adjustments to urban life. Ethnic and regional enclaves, where people of similar origins and characteristics concentrate, have been features of urban places in Latin America, Africa and Asia,

³⁷ J F C Turner, *Housing by People*, New York: 1977.

D Drakakis-Smith, *Urban Housing and the Development Process*, New York: St. Martin's Press, 1980.

P Ward (ed), *Self-help Housing: A Critique*, London: Mansell, 1982.

though their distinctiveness is probably not now as strong as it was in the past.³⁸ They have provided new urban migrants with an environment in which their economic and socio-psychological problems could be mitigated. Information is received from relatives and friends and perceptions of urban life are formed before moves are made, and from them come economic and moral support during periods of initial adjustment. These adjustment mechanisms are often formalised in ethnic and 'home-place' unions which migrants join when they move to towns.³⁹ Migrants to towns have been identified as economically and psychologically unstable and sources of social and political disruption. However, the evidence on the whole does not support these stereotypes. The positive contributions that squatter settlements and mechanisms for socio-economic adjustment make for migrants are now recognised. Some evidence points to the possession by those who move, whether in rural areas or to urban places, of the capacity for self-improvement, and suggests that such movements may contribute in the longer-term to upward social mobility through economic advancement. Whether these improvements occur at the expense of non-migrants or of the total socio-economic system is debatable.

The nature of the impact of rural-urban movements on rural areas of origin may be both positive and negative and is by no means always clear. Movements may remove surplus population and relieve limited resources but, in selecting the better, more active and more enterprising elements, may have detrimental effects. Evidence from Africa, India, Southeast Asia and the Pacific shows that migrants remit substantial proportions of incomes and other resources to their places of origin, and that these will vary with the types of movement which have taken place.⁴⁰ Interpretations vary as to whether remittances change income

³⁸ B du Toit and H I Safa, *Migration and Identity: Implications for Ethnic Development and Political Conflict*, The Hague: Mouton, 1975.

E Schildkrout, *People of the Zongo: the transformation of urban identities in Ghana*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978.

M Chapman (ed), *Mobility and identity in the Island Pacific*, Special issue, *Pacific Viewpoint* 26(1) 1985.

³⁹ K Little, *West African urbanization: a study of voluntary associations in social change*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1965.

J Gugler and W G Flanagan, *Urbanization and social change in West Africa*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978.

G Krause, 'Economic adjustment of migrants in the city: the Jakarta experience', *International Migration Review* 13(1) 1979, pp 46-70.

G Martine, 'Adaptation of migrants or survival of the fittest: a Brazilian case', *Journal of Developing Areas* 14(1) 1979, pp 23-41.

⁴⁰ M Lipton, 'Migration from rural areas of poor countries: the impact on rural productivity and income distribution', *World Development*, 1980, pp 1-24.

distribution patterns in places of origin. They may be used largely for conspicuous expenditure and not for investment. In the Caribbean, they are said to undermine commitments to agriculture in some of the islands.⁴¹ Conversely, 'migrant unions' in Nigerian towns and elsewhere subscribe to improvements in their rural home places, and migrants returning to rural areas either temporarily or permanently may contribute positive feedback in the effecting of socio-economic change. In West Java it has been found that village households with members who had moved out had higher incomes than households without migrants. The short and long-term impacts of remittances are probably different and an understanding of these will come only with long-term studies of comparable empirical information, which have not yet been undertaken.

Clearly the flows of people, money and goods indicate the importance of the continuous interaction between places of migrant origin and destination. These links need to be taken into account in approaching the investigation of movement. An increasing number of studies, mainly at small scale for the data available do not permit otherwise, are documenting links between communities of origin and destination, and indicate the bi- and multi-local nature of the socio-economic structures which encompass them. The destinations to which people move become in part extensions of their places of origin, whatever the cultural-social-political circumstances of these destinations may be.⁴² Links continue to exist not only when there is circulation but also when permanent migration may seem to have taken place.

These views run counter to ideas which have been expressed on the likely evolution of movements over time. One explanation of labour

J Connell *et al*, *Migration From Rural Areas: The Evidence From Village Studies*, New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1976.

A S Oberai and H K M Singh, 'Migrant remittances and rural development', *International Labour Review* (119) 1980, pp 229-41.

G J Hugo, *Population mobility and wealth transfers in Indonesia and other Third World countries*, Paper No. 87, Honolulu: East-West Population Institute, 1983.

J Connell, *Remittances and rural development: migration, dependence and inequality in the South Pacific*, Development Studies Centre, Canberra: Australian National University.

⁴¹ R A Pastor (ed), *Migration and Development in the Caribbean: The Unexplored Connection*, Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1986.

J D Momsen, 'Migration and rural development in the Caribbean', *Tijdschrift voor Economische en Sociale Geografie* 77(1) 1986, pp 52-8.

⁴² D Ryan, 'Bi-locality and movement between village and town: Toaripi, Papua New Guinea', in M. Chapman and R. M. Prothero (eds), 1985 *op. cit.*, pp. 251-68.

S J Watts, 'A model of the rural settlement process, the community and population mobility in the Ilorin area of Nigeria', *Tijdschrift voor Economische en Sociale Geografie* (76) 1985, pp 213-22.

circulation has implied that it will cease when there is a balance between counterpoised sets of influences which are operating centripetally and centrifugally, in the transition between a basically rural and a predominantly urban society.⁴³ A similar view of the transitory nature of circulatory movements has been set out in a hypothesis which views circulation as occurring in the process of modernisation.⁴⁴ This hypothesis assumes that the experience of the developed countries will be repeated in the Third World; that societies evolve through four phases of mobility which are characterised by decreasing circulation and increasing migration. It takes little account of circulatory movements and related linkages which existed before the onset of modernisation processes in the developing countries coincident with the colonial and post-colonial/independence periods. Nor does it consider the fact that different types of movement are occurring coincidentally and not discretely in either time or place.

There is evidence to suggest that bi- and multi-local structures and the processes associated with them have traditional indigenous roots and that they will continue into the future. A theoretical model of the circular process in rural-urban movements, applied to case studies in South-East Asia, has suggested that urbanisation in the Third World will take much longer than might have been anticipated from the experience of the developed countries.⁴⁵ Evidence from Nairobi has shown that increasing periods of urban residence are not necessarily accompanied by the emergence of an urban proletariat, which depends entirely on urban wages and which has increasingly tenuous links with rural areas of origin. A common pattern is that of 'one family, two households', one in the rural home area and the other in an urban place. By working diligently in the latter but at the same time retaining a place in the former, it is possible for families to maximise their incomes and their welfare and to avert or minimise risk. The employment of such a general strategy of risk avoidance has been noted to occur widely—in the South Pacific, in Central America and elsewhere in tropical Africa. People involved in inter-island movement in the Pacific maintain rights

⁴³ J C Mitchell, *op. cit.* 1959 and *op. cit.* 1985.

⁴⁴ W Zelinsky, 'The hypothesis of the mobility transition', *Geographical Review* (61): 1971, pp 219-49, and 'The demographic transition: changing patterns of migration', in *International Union for the Scientific Study of Population, Population science in the service of mankind*, Liège: 1979, pp 165-189.

⁴⁵ B G McGee, 'Rural-urban mobility in South and Southeast Asia: different formulations, different answers', in W. H. McNeill and R S Adams (eds), *Human Migration Patterns and Policies*, Bloomington and London: Indiana University Press, 1979, pp 199-224.

to land in their home islands, and a Mexican study has shown recently how peasant households survive through 'relay migration', in which the father and, later, the children leave to obtain employment in towns in order to enable the family to continue in agriculture and to reproduce itself.⁴⁶ In Northern Nigeria a systems approach to population movement examined the responses of farmers to drought in the 1970s and showed that their goals—to survive in the face of risk, to accumulate wealth and to achieve status—were sought and attained through structuring and maximising various opportunities in home places and elsewhere. Movement was one of the options available, and the study concluded that 'The spatial fragmentation of this opportunity structure, and the nature of the risks involved, lies at the root of the bi-local lifestyle which is becoming common among African populations'.⁴⁷

Money earned away from rural home places, and particularly in urban areas, confers benefit on recipient households in the former, ensuring not only their basic needs but sometimes their very survival.

Spatial fragmentation and bi-locality continue even when migration and a permanent change of residence occurs. The pivot of circulation can shift from a rural to an urban location, from which movements are made periodically back to a rural home place. The purpose of these movements may be primarily social, but it may also be economic and even political as when town-dwellers return to be counted in a census or to register their voice in the places from which they originate.

Futures for migrants

Movements may be viewed *positively*, as responding to regional disparities with the more enterprising people improving themselves by moving to more dynamic regions; or *negatively*, as emphasising regional disparities with bias in favour of urban areas, and with little investment in rural areas resulting in low agricultural productivity, insufficient food production and the need to import food, even though there is enough land to grow the food required. Whatever view is held there are no simple policy solutions, and policies which are available are limited in their effectiveness. Taking the varying viewpoints into account it has been suggested that policies may be either directly intentional in their

⁴⁶ L. Arizpe, 'Relay migration and the survival of the peasant household', in J. Balau (ed), *Why People Move*, Paris, UNESCO Press, 1981, pp 187-210.

⁴⁷ M. J. Mortimore, 'Framework for population mobility: the perception of opportunities in Nigeria', in J. I. Clarke and L. A. Kosinska (eds), *op. cit.*, 1982, pp 50-57.

influence on movement or may influence it in a less direct fashion. The following are major strategies which may be employed:⁴⁸

- 1) Stop movements out of rural areas.
- 2) Redirect movements within rural areas, particularly to 'frontier' areas which require people for their development.
- 3) Redirect urban migrants from large cities to intermediate-size urban 'growth poles'.
- 4) Prevent migrants from entering large cities or discourage them from staying.
- 5) Accept what is happening and accommodate to it in both rural and urban areas.

Measures which relate to these strategies in the rural areas include land reform, measures to increase income, and community development to improve service manufacturers. Experience indicates that there have been limited successes and many failures. The 'green revolution' in India has benefited those of the farmers who were already better off and able to acquire the inputs which enhanced their economic status. In Africa the experience of Tanzania and Mozambique in reorganising and redistributing their rural populations has been variable. The *ujamaa* villageisation policies in the former have improved and extended rural infrastructures but have done little if anything to improve agricultural productivity and rural incomes.⁴⁹

Colonisation and resettlement schemes involve fundamental changes in both social and economic life-styles and therefore make great demands upon settlers and those organising them. These are evident in a range of schemes in different countries—in West Malaysia, in the *terai* of Nepal and in the Mahaweli project in Sri Lanka. The Malaysian

⁴⁸ A B Simmons *et al*, *Social change and internal migration: a review of research findings from Africa, Asia and Latin America*, Ottawa: International Development Research Centre, 1977.
S Findley, *Planning for internal migration: a review of issues and policies in developing countries*, Bureau of Census, Washington DC, 1977.

S A Abumere *op. cit.* 1981, pp 421–33.

A S Oberai, 'State policies and internal migration in Asia', *International Labour Review* 120(2) 1981, pp 231–44.

P Peek and G Standing (eds), *State policies and migration studies in Latin America and the Caribbean*, London: Croom Helm, 1982.

A S Oberai (ed), *State policies and internal migration*, London: Croom Helm, 1983.

R J Fuchs, *op. cit.* 1983.

⁴⁹ P Collier *et al*, *Labour and poverty in rural Tanzania: ujamaa and rural development in the United Republic of Tanzania*, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986.

MGM da Araujo, 'Communal villages and the distribution of rural population in the People's Republic of Mozambique', in J. I Clarke *et al.*, (eds), *Population and Development Projects in Africa*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1985.

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experience shows that land needs may be met at the time of resettlement, but that landlessness may occur subsequently for members of succeeding generations. The prospects for successful 'frontier' or 'pioneer' settlement are limited not only by the availability and suitability of land. Transmigration in Indonesia, from densely populated Java to sparsely populated Sumatra and other islands, has presented those who move with a range of health hazards which they have not had to face previously, and settlement in Amazonia involves conflicts of interest with existing sparse aboriginal populations. In Ethiopia the forced resettlement of large numbers of people has still to be assessed but in its progress has caused considerable infringements of human rights.

All rural development schemes will be costly if they are to provide both economic incentives and a social infrastructure which will retain people on the land, as are schemes to provide the same facilities in small and intermediate size towns and cities. Much attention has recently been devoted to smaller towns as alternative destinations to metropolises for migrant flows from rural areas, but relatively little is known about their functions in systems of movement. Sri Lanka is an unusual example, displaying a pattern of decentralised urbanisation with the highest rates of growth of urban population occurring in the small towns during the greater part of this century. This has resulted from a continuing encouragement of peasant agriculture and of small urban centres based on commerce and trade, with an accompanying policy of decentralised industrialisation. These measures have limited differences between rural and urban areas, and checked the development of extreme urban primacy in the capital city, Colombo.⁵⁰ In contrast, India, which in planning in the first two decades after independence concentrated on the industrial development of large cities, has now recognised the need for a better balance and greater complementarity between rural and urban areas, and for smaller towns to be geared to the needs of their rural hinterlands.⁵¹

Attempts to develop disincentives to urban living, by removing shanty towns and squatter settlements in Latin American and African cities, have met with opposition, with reoccupation and rebuilding after forced expulsion and demolition, and with eventual acceptance by

⁵⁰ D Abeysekera, *Urbanization and the Growth of Small Towns in Sri Lanka 1901-1971*, Paper No 67, Honolulu: East-West Population Institute, 1980.

⁵¹ India Planning Commission, *Sixth Five-Year Plan 1980-85*, New Delhi: Planning Commission, 1981.

urban authorities that they should remain and be upgraded. Attempts to return urban migrants from metropolises and from large cities to smaller urban places and rural areas have had little success other than by the exercise of considerable duress.

In the 1960s Cuba successfully redirected population away from Havana, but such measures require the exercise of considerable coordination and control which Tanzania, for example, has been unable to achieve in the case of its main city, Dar es Salaam. De-urbanisation of the most extreme kind was undertaken in the south of Vietnam in the second half of the 1970s, with the reduction of the population of Ho Chi-Minh City (formerly Saigon) from three million to one million. However, it is unlikely that many countries would wish to resort to comparable coercive measures.⁵²

In any discussion of population distribution and movement and measures for their control and the integration of rural and urban areas, China is a special case in many respects and requires consideration for the lessons which she may provide for other developing countries. It is special in its size and diversity and in its political ideology and related economic structures—a population of over 1000 million, ethnically varied and distributed over a great range of contrasting environments, subject to a strict regime which is committed to development that will in principle reduce if not eradicate socio-economic inequalities. At the time of the 1982 census four-fifths of China's population were rural and 200 million were urban, with major differences in their respective qualities of life. There is great potential for massive urban growth and therefore concern that this should not be too rapid and that it should be controlled in quantity and in distribution.⁵³

In the rural areas development to increase agricultural production and income is based on 'the responsibility system'. Established in 1979, this system involves contracts between the state, the communes and individual households to meet production quotas with improved efficiency. A consequence of this system is to create surplus rural

⁵² A B Simmons, 'Slowing metropolitan growth in Asia: policies, programs and results', *Population and Development Review* 5(1) 1979, pp 87-104, and *A review and evaluation of attempts to contain migration to selected urban centers and regions*, in UN Department of International Economic and Social Affairs, 'Population distribution policies in development planning' *Population Studies* No. 75, New York: United Nations, 1981, pp. 87-100. N Thrift and D Forbes, *The price of war: urbanization in Vietnam 1954-1985*, London: Allen and Unwin, 1986.

⁵³ This section China is based with acknowledgement on S and A Goldstein, *Population mobility in the People's Republic of China*, Paper No 95, Honolulu: East-West Population Institute, 1985.

population. Policies are thus directed to ensure that this surplus should not flood into the larger cities and that population movements and urbanisation should effectively complement one another. There are restrictions on movements into the larger cities from rural areas and from small towns; but at the same time there is relative freedom of movement between places of similar size and the encouragement of movement leading to the growth of towns and small cities, including the development of new towns. Small urban places oriented to their adjacent areas are seen as having an important function in the promotion of modernisation.

China possesses means of implementing policies formulated to achieve the above goals. Through the Chinese household registration system, which records vital events, education and employment, there is control over people's access to grain rations, jobs and housing. A permit is required for a permanent change of place of residence. Notwithstanding this control there is considerable movement; although no question was asked in the 1982 census that would determine this, there is indirect evidence of there being more than 100 million mobile persons. Despite restrictions on permanent migration, there has been a great increase in temporary mobility (which may vary in length of stay from days to years) which is specifically recognised and encouraged in planning policies. It has been described as a 'flexible adjustment mechanism' which confers benefits without imposing undue burdens.

Some of the surplus rural population becomes engaged in non-agricultural activities in urban places other than large cities; it is employed in construction, service provision and the sale of agricultural produce and rural crafts in relatively free market conditions in smaller towns. The latter develop positive rural-urban linkages which are neither pressured nor parasitic. Without controls, the amount of movement would be much greater, but with some degree of freedom the controls have permitted movements to take place which can contribute to the achievement of integrated national goals.

The Chinese experience is unique and not readily transferable in total, even to other centrally planned economies. In the absence of central planning of population movements and population distribution or the means to implement policy relating to them, what may be said for a strategy which would largely accept the existing circumstances and attempt to accommodate to them in the future? It could not be a *laissez-faire* approach which would leave the future entirely to the operation of free market forces. There is the need for a variety of active

and positive measures which can be taken to improve the conditions of people who move both in rural and in urban areas. They are at a variety of scales, ranging from global to individual, and would involve official, international, intercontinental, national, regional and local bodies, together with non-governmental organisations which also range from international to local in their scope.

However, the prospects for improvements at these various scales are not particularly encouraging. Major structural changes can be conceived at the international level which would fundamentally alter patterns of economic development to better meet the needs and improve the prospects of migrants. Along these lines it is possible to think of changes which could affect the present massive outflow of migrants from Mexico who enter the USA for the most part illegally. However, the reality of effecting such changes is another matter. At a sub-continental scale, where there are groupings of states to facilitate political and economic developments, the results have not been strikingly successful. The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) has done little to alter and ameliorate the circumstances of migrants moving between the member states. Rather there has been deterioration, with major expulsions of alien migrants from Ghana and Nigeria in particular, but also from other countries, during the last decade.⁵⁴ In Southern Africa the Frontline States, despite their opposition to the apartheid policies of the Republic of South Africa, have reduced but failed to stop the movement of their citizens, illegally and otherwise, to the employment opportunities which are available in the Republic.⁵⁵

Changes within countries require the will and determination of governments to redress imbalances between rural and urban areas which are largely to the detriment of the former.⁵⁶ The decline of investment in agriculture and in rural infrastructure is common in the economies not only of less well-endowed countries in the Third World

⁵⁴ O O Fafowura, 'On the expulsion of illegal migrants from Nigeria', *Population and Development Review* 9(2) 1983, pp 391-92.

A Adebayo, 'Ghanaian migrants to Nigeria: causes and consequences', *Migration Today* (13) 1985, pp 29-32.

⁵⁵ F Wilson, *Migrant labour in South Africa*, Johannesburg: South African Council of Churches, 1972.

C Colclough, 'Some aspects of labour use in Southern Africa', *Institute of Development Studies Bulletin* 12(4) 1980, pp 29-39.

F de Vries, 'Recent trends of black migration to South Africa', *Journal of Modern African Studies* (23) 1985, pp 667-702.

⁵⁶ M Lippin, *Why poor people stay poor: urban bias in developing countries*, London: Temple Smith, 1977.

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but also of those with significant economic resources. In Nigeria during the oil boom of the 1970s the neglect of rural interests and of support for agricultural production was so great that despite ample reserves of land the country has become a net importer of food and has lost its previously important revenues from agricultural exports. Urban bias has accelerated rural-urban movements and those who remain in the countryside produce largely for their own needs.

When there is the will to change, the nature of that change is of major importance. Experience in many countries has shown that when there is investment in prestigious and costly large-scale agricultural projects they often function inefficiently. Only limited numbers of people benefit from them and they may have detrimental effects on large numbers of people who are not directly involved. Consequent on these negative experiences has been an increasing concern to develop smaller-scale projects which spread the resources available for investment, are more labour intensive and involve within their organisation the small groups and individuals which they affect.⁵⁷

The need to reduce urban bias and to benefit rural areas must be balanced so as not to lead to the neglect of towns. Continuing improvement in urban economic opportunities and social infrastructure is of paramount importance for existing urban populations and for the additions to them which will come from natural increase as well as from further in-movements of people. Investment in alternative growth poles through the development and expansion of smaller urban centres needs to be organised so that they integrate in national and regional contexts, as in China.

There is great virtue in small-scale approaches to the problems of migrants. Notwithstanding the indigenous support systems for newcomers, there are circumstances in which small groups and individuals find themselves in difficult if not desperate circumstances, comparable to those of people fleeing from political disruption and environmental catastrophe. In general, these circumstances are much less obvious than they are among people affected by disaster. To establish real need would be much more difficult. Where such need does exist it should be met with relief measures which are not only immediate and short-term but which also provide for the future through longer-term investment for self-sustaining economic development. Such assistance might be channelled through existing support systems—

⁵⁷ P Richards, *Indigenous agricultural revolution: ecology and food production in West Africa*, London: Hutchinson, 1965.

self-help groups and ethnic unions—likely to increase its efficacy. These systems may also be helped to maintain and develop contacts between the places of origin and the destinations of those who move, thus conferring mutual socio-economic-psychological benefits.

While those who move primarily for economic reasons face similar problems to those faced by political and environmental 'refugees', the pressures which produce these problems operate on different time-scales. For the former they tend to be cumulative rather than immediately catastrophic and are thus likely to be less obvious and obtrusive and more insidious. Economic migrants are enormously resourceful in coping with the difficulties associated with their moves and the problems which they have to confront at their destinations. They cope positively and often ingeniously through individual and group efforts. Any assistance for them should be very carefully devised in form and application so as to enhance these positive efforts rather than stifling or attempting to replace them.

Why 'Third World'?: origin, definition and usage

The aim of this article is limited; namely, a general consideration of the term 'Third World' in its early and current usage and an attempt to discover the origin and authorship of the term. I first tried to do this in an article in the inaugural issue of *Third World Quarterly* in January 1979 and the discussion was then taken up by four other academic writers. An immediate and critical response came from Peter Worsley (University of Manchester) in 'How many worlds?' (*Third World Quarterly* I(2) April 1979) and this, in turn, encouraged S D Muni (Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi) to submit a third contribution, 'The Third World: concept and controversy' (*Third World Quarterly* I(3) July 1979). Joseph Love (University of Illinois) then took Worsley to task in his article, "'Third World': a response to Professor Worsley' (*Third World Quarterly* 2(2) April 1980), and the discussion was concluded by Grant McCall (University of New South Wales) in 'Four worlds of experience and action' (*Third World Quarterly* 2(3) October 1980).

The first matter to be settled by the discussion was the origin of the term 'Third World'. I had suggested that it appeared to have originated with Alfred Sauvy in 1952, but Worsley brushed this aside: 'In the second edition of my *The Third World* (1967), I pointed out (p 302) that Claude Bourdet had used the term at least as early as April 1949 (citing John T Marcus' *Neutralism and Nationalism in France*. New York: Bookman Associates, 1958, p 33). Hence, Mr Wolf-Phillips' statement that Alfred Sauvy 'coined' the term in 1952 is incorrect. Who actually first coined and used it might be discoverable in Paris.' Muni did not contest the attribution to Sauvy, but Joseph Love firmly supports it: 'Alfred Sauvy, the French demographer and economic historian, did coin the term "Third World". Contrary to the assertions in Peter Worsley's article . . . John Marcus . . . does not say that Claude Bourdet originated the phrase, nor does Worsley himself even say this in the second edition of his *The Third World* . . .' Love gives the source of the term as in an article 'Trois Mondes, une planète' in *L'Observateur* (Paris) 14 August 1952, and draws attention to the book published by Sauvy's colleagues at the Institut National des Etudes Démographiques

in 1956—*Le Tiers Monde: Sous-développement et développement*—which is dedicated to Sauvy and which credits Sauvy with introducing the term 'Third World' (p 369). My own investigations since the 1979–80 *Third World Quarterly* series of articles support the original attribution to Sauvy and the exact dating by Love.

In the first of three volumes titled *Unité et diversité du tiers monde* (Paris, 1980), Yves Lacoste gives an account of his correspondence with Sauvy concerning the origin of the term in Chapter I, 'Une Unité fondée sur quoi?', and in the section 'Le jeu de mots de Alfred Sauvy' says quite firmly: 'Tiers monde, ce fut d'abord en 1952 une formule imaginée par Alfred Sauvy', and discusses, as did Love, the August 1952 article in *L'Observateur*. That seems to be that, unless other candidates present themselves with as yet undiscovered conclusive evidence in their favour?

Leaving the provenance of 'Third World' as reasonably well established, what of its usage in the 1950s? The original analogy used by Sauvy was to the *Tiers État* and, as both Lacoste and Love point out, he was alluding to the 1789 oratory of the Abbé Sieyès—'What is the Third Estate? Everything. What has it been till now in the political order? Nothing. What does it want to be? Something.' The use of *Tiers Monde* in this analogical context would express ideas of 'neglect, exploitation and revolutionary potential' (Love). However, there was a second idea expressed in 'Third World'—that of 'non-alignment'.

As late as 1972, the term 'Third World' is not included in William Safire's *The New Language of Politics* among his dictionary-type entries. It does appear in the text, but under the entry 'Third Force': 'Strictly speaking, the phrase in English should be "Third World" following the French *tiers monde*, but "Third Force" is used more frequently.' Safire argues that *tiers monde* was originally popularised in France during 1947–49 to describe the parties that took their stance between the Gaullist *Rassemblement du Peuple Français* and the regime of the Fourth Republic (1946–58). During his presidency of the Fifth Republic, Charles de Gaulle used the phrase *tiers monde* to describe the role of a France independent of US foreign policy alliances. Safire also quotes a usage from the 1960s attributed to Max Frankel in the *New York Times*; writing about the involvement of the USA, Frankel commented, '... there is simply no meaningful Third Force around which to build. The United States' answer has been to encourage the transformation of the present military government ... into a regime that might eventually come to resemble a "Third Force".'

Safire offers as a working definition of *tiers monde*, 'Third Force . . . a weight added at the fulcrum of the balance of power; a group of nations, or an ideology, between the communist and the Western camps.' In this sense of political non-alignment, *tiers monde* was used by the leaders of the newly-independent nations in the 1950s—such as Kwame Nkrumah—when they called for the establishment of a bloc of uncommitted nations as a 'non-nuclear Third Force' between the East–West confrontation of the 'Cold War' period. Worsley and I are in agreement when he says: 'What the Third World originally was, then, is clear; it was the non-aligned world. It was also a world of poor countries . . .' and his *The Third World* (2nd edn 1967) and *Three Worlds of Development* by Irving Louis Horowitz (1966) should be consulted on this aspect of interpretation.

With the lessening of the tensions of the Cold War period and the creation of scores of new and independent sovereign states in the 1960s and early 1970s, the term 'Third Force' both takes on a new meaning and becomes less used; the term 'Third World'—going back to Love's interpretation of Sauvy's original usage—becomes more strongly associated with 'neglect, exploitation and revolutionary potential' than 'non-alignment'. Indeed, it is the very condition that the developing countries find themselves in that separates them from the former colonial powers. 'Non-alignment' becomes a positive force for the unity of the poor countries of the world, despite Lacoste's query 'Une Unité fondée sur quoi?'

The change in the use of 'Third Force' has four aspects: first, the confrontation was seen in the 1960s as between the 'rich countries' and the 'poor countries', the former also being referred to as 'industrialised' or 'developed'; second, the East–West confrontation was supplemented by a 'North–South' confrontation, the great majority of the poor countries lying in the southern hemisphere; third, the original East–West confrontation was retained in the gradual adoption of the term 'First World' to denote the industrialised developed market-economy countries (the 'capitalist countries' or 'the Western world') and the term 'Second World' to indicate the industrialised or industrialising centrally-directed economies (the 'socialist camp' or 'the Communist bloc'); and, fourth, the rather later introduction of the term 'Fourth World' to denote the least developed and chronically poor countries; this categorisation was perhaps encouraged by the World Bank economists who distinguished between 'low income developing countries' and 'middle income developing countries' in the early World

Bank *World Development Reports* (published annually since 1978). In 1979, this distinction would have placed Bangladesh (with an estimated GNP per capita of US\$90, a life expectancy of forty-seven for the newly-born, an undocumented literacy rate, a 17.4 per cent annual inflation rate, and with 47 per cent of the population without access to a safe water supply) among the worst affected in the 'Fourth World'. Those in the 'Third World' would probably not feel over-privileged for that category was reserved for those with a GNP per capita of more than US\$300 (for comparison, the GNP figure for the USA in 1979 was US\$8520); Ghana, for example, had a 1979 GNP figure of US\$380, a life expectancy of forty-eight, a literacy rate of 30 per cent, an inflation rate of 30.9 per cent, and 65 per cent of the population were without access to a safe water supply. The 1987 *World Development Report* has six categories: 'Low income economies' (where the GNP figures range from US\$110-US\$400); 'Lower middle-income economies' (US\$401-US\$1570); 'Upper middle-income economies' (US\$1640-US\$7420); 'High-income oil exporters' (US\$7170-US\$19,270); 'Industrial market economies' (US\$4290-US\$16,690); and 'Non-reporting non-member economies' (Albania, Angola, Bulgaria, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, German Democratic Republic, Korean Democratic Republic, Mongolia, USSR). Despite these euphemistic categorisations, the *Report* reveals that 86 countries have GNP figures of less than US\$2000, that there are at least ninety-five countries worse off than Mexico, that Spain is twice as well off—in terms of GNP—than at least ninety-six other countries, and that the GNP of the United Arab Emirates is about 175 times that of Ethiopia (US\$19,270 compared to US\$110). The 1987 GNP figure for the USA is US\$16,690.*

There is the obvious criticism that the 'Four Worlds' classifications are too crude when they are based solely on GNP relativities and such criteria (to select a few currently used) as 'least developed', 'developing', 'developed', 'non-industrialised', 'newly-industrialising', 'industrialised'. This point is taken up by Worsley, Muni and McCall in their *Third World Quarterly* articles and is a common enough observation. Few, however, would go so far as Shiva Naipaul in his article 'The myth of the Third World: a thousand million invisible men' (*The Spectator* (London) 18 May 1985):

The Third World is a form of bloodless universality that robs individuals and societies of their particularity . . . Blandly, to subsume, say, Ethiopia, India

* See statistical tables in Appendix to this article.

and Brazil under the one banner of Third Worldhood is absurd and denigrating as the old assertion that all Chinese look alike. People only look alike when you can't be bothered to look at them closely . . . It is a flabby Western concept lacking the flesh and blood of the actual . . . a Third World does not exist as such . . . it has no collective and consistent identity except in the newspapers and amid the pomp and splendour of international conferences . . . The idea of a Third World, despite its congenial simplicity, is too shadowy to be of any use . . .

Like much polemical writing, the attraction of this article lies in its over-exaggeration and I tried to put another point of view to Naipaul in a brief and friendly correspondence which was abruptly terminated by his untimely death in July 1985. His long and detailed article should be read for its uncomfortable honesty, if for no other reason.

Now that we have some idea of how the term 'Third World' and its siblings 'First', 'Second' and 'Fourth' came into being, it might be useful to sketch out its general acceptance in developmental literature. Raúl Prebisch in his *The Economic Development of Latin America and its Principal Problems* (1950) was writing in pre-Sauvy days and the nearest he came to this kind of expression was when he spoke of ' . . . the industrialisation of the new countries' (p 2). Samir Amin presented his doctoral thesis on 20 June 1957 and, in discussing the term 'les pays sous-développés', observed that 'La définition généralement admise est que les économies sous-développées sont des économies de "misère", incapables d'assurer les "coûts de l'homme".' The term 'Third World', though probably known to Amin by then, would not have been well regarded in the austere circles of French scholarship. 'Under-developed' was a term used in the 1940s and Love points out that the UN study, *Relative Prices of Exports and Imports of Underdeveloped Countries* (1949), provided the empirical base for the 1950 work by Prebisch cited previously and H W Singer's theories of 'unequal exchange' published in the *American Economic Review* 40(2) May 1950. The next year, the UN document E/1986ST/ECA/10 of 3 May 1951 was titled *Measures for the Economic Development of Under-Developed Countries*, but as the UN membership expanded with the addition of 'under-developed' countries the term began to be regarded as derogatory and was gradually dropped in favour of 'less-developed' or 'developing'. This move led Gunnar Myrdal to refer to 'diplomacy by terminology' in his *Asian Drama* (1968).

French writers were more familiar with *tiers monde* in the early 1960s; M Allais in *Le Tiers Monde au Carrefour* (1963) uses the term

confidently and interchangeably for 'developing countries', but, in the same year, the term 'Third World' is used in C Geertz's *Agricultural Innovation: The Process of Ecological Change in Indonesia* (1963) as though it were not yet generally accepted—in the lower case and quotation marks—when he writes of the need for 'an adequate understanding of the new countries of the "third world"' (p xviii). Michael Brecher reported on a conversation he had with Jawaharlal Nehru in his *The New States of Asia* (1963); Brecher and Nehru discussed the meaning of 'non-alignment' and when Brecher asked if it was akin to the concept of 'Third Force', Nehru reacted characteristically to the use of the word 'force' by repudiating the suggestion, and, apparently misunderstanding Brecher's question, did not offer 'Third World' as a substitute term. The transcript of this conversation (p 206) suggests that 'Third World' was not a term that Nehru yet used. A little later, Peter Worsley published *The Third World* (1964) which concerned itself with 'the political sociology of the under-developed countries' but unlike Allais (1963) did define his use of the term (see pp ix–x, xii). Another French author, Pierre Jalée, uses the term in a book title, *The Pillage of the Third World* (translated by Mary Kloppe, 1968; first French edition 1965): 'This expression apparently came into use in 1956 and implies that the countries covered by it depend neither on the capitalist nor the socialist system, that they belong to neither of the other two "worlds".' There is still the stress on the earlier 'non-alignment' interpretation here and his list of the membership of the 'Third World' is specific: Latin America (excluding socialist Cuba); the whole of Africa; Asia (excluding Israel and Japan and the socialist countries); and Oceania (excluding Australia and New Zealand). Jalée makes a similar distinction in his *Le Tiers Monde dans l'économie mondiale* published in 1968. Irma Adelman and Cynthia Taft Morris use the earlier expression 'under-developed' in their *Society, Politics and Economic Development* (1967) when they describe their work as 'a systematic analysis of social, political and economic characteristics of nations at varying stages of economic development'. They classify seventy-four as 'under-developed' and follow Jalée in excluding Israel but not in also specifically excluding Southern Rhodesia and South Africa. In the same year, Sanwar Ali published his *Economic Planning in Developing Countries* (1967) and felt obliged to justify his choice of title: 'The term "developing nation" is a euphemistic name given to an under-developed or relatively poor country . . . which is increasingly in vogue.' This is the same point

('diplomacy by terminology') that Myrdal made the following year; there is no mention or even hint of the term 'Third World' in Sanwar Ali's book. The Pearson Commission Report *Partners in Development* (1969) spends some time in discussing terminological problems; they stressed that there was 'no firm line between developed and developing countries' and that 'the developing countries number more than one hundred' (two years earlier Adelman and Morris had put the number as seventy-four). After considering 'rich-poor', 'advanced-backward', 'highly developed-underdeveloped' and even 'donor-recipient', the Commission decided to adopt the dichotomies 'developed-developing' when they wished to indicate the difference between industrialised countries and those with weaker or poorer economies.

Paul Bairoch is quite specific in his use of the term 'Third World'; in *Diagnostic de L'Evolution Economique de Tiers-Monde 1900-1968* (1969; English translation by Cynthia Postan, *The Economic Development of the Third World since 1900* (1975)). He explains 'Nous voulons simplement préciser que dans la présente étude nous utilisons les termes de "sous-développé", de "non-développé" et "tiers-monde" en tant que synonymes . . .'. In her translation, six years later, Postan inserts the words 'non-industrialised' as an additional synonym.

There are many examples of the increasing acceptance of 'Third World' in the early 1970s. Dudley Seers and Leonard Joy edited *Development in a Divided World* (1971) and commented ' . . . we can take the "poor" countries of the world as broadly those of Africa, Asia and Latin America. A phrase that is convenient to cover all of them is the "Third World".' Two years later, Matthew McQueen, Paul Alpert and Ernst Schumacher all showed an easy familiarity with the term. McQueen in *The Economics of Development* (1973) makes the point that ' . . . the multitude of terms . . . ranging from the older ones of "under-developed" and "poor" countries to the more modern ones of "the third world", "developing" and "less developed" countries are . . . essentially interchangeable'; Alpert in *Partnership or Confrontation* (1973) writes of 'The Third World—that is, the developing countries'; Schumacher titled Part 3 of his influential *Small is Beautiful* (1973) 'The Third World', clearly referring to the developing countries. George Dalton in his *Economic Systems and Society: Capitalism, Communism and the Third World* (1974) considers the situations of 'The Third World of African and Asian nations (and) . . . the capitalist and communist nations', and later implicitly equates 'Third World' with 'under-developed' nations in general (see pp 200

and 202); in the earlier part of his work, Dalton had pointed out that 'Before the Second World War we had two models of industrialisation; the capitalist model . . . and the communist model . . . what we could now call the Third World did not exist as a set of national economies or as a subject in economics.' (p 21). Although Charles Elliott and Françoise de Morsier use the title *Patterns of Poverty in the Third World: A Study of Social and Economic Stratification* for their 1975 publication, they call their areas of study 'the so-called Third World'. Peter Odell has no such doubts in the fourth edition of his *Oil and World Power* (1975): '. . . India, Guinea and Brazil (to give but one example from each of the continents constituting the Third World)' (pp 59, 96), and his continental definition is paralleled by Mahbub ul-Haq ('The definition of Third World as used in this book covers all the developing countries of Asia, Africa, the Middle East and Latin America . . .', in *The Poverty Curtain: Choices for the Third World* (1976)) and Gerald Meier ('. . . two-thirds of the world's population—the poverty-ridden peoples in the less developed countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America', in *Leading Issues in Economic Development* (1976)). Maxine Rodinson again implies a wide acceptance of the term 'Third World': '. . . the prosperous and sated world of the industrialised communities and the hungry universe in which the remainder of mankind struggles for life . . . this Third World as it is called', in *Islam and Capitalism* (1977).

Michael Todaro in his widely-used text-book *Economics for a Developing World* (1977) spends more time than most writers in defining his terms and indicating his purpose:

The 97 African, Asian and Latin American member-countries of the United Nations often collectively refer to themselves as the 'Third World'. They do this primarily to distinguish themselves from the economically-advanced 'capitalist' ('First World') and 'socialist' ('Second World') countries . . . (it) is widely used among developing nations in a concerted effort to generate and represent a new sense of common identity and a growing unity of purpose . . . 'Third World' economics . . . is concerned with the economic and political processes necessary for effecting rapid structural and institutional transformations of entire societies in a manner that will most efficiently bring the fruits of economic progress to the broadest segments of their populations . . . (pp xix, 2, 7 and 10).

From about the mid-1970s onwards the term 'Third World' passes from the realms of academic debate and student texts into general everyday use in the popular and periodical press and news broadcasts.

Authors using the term in their titles no longer explain their choice, or if they do it is to refine the normally-accepted usage. The collection of essays published by József Nyilas in Budapest in 1978 (*The Changing Face of the Third World: Regional and National Studies*) does not define the term and it would appear that in this part of the 'Second World' at least the general usage was accepted. Paul Harrison's titles *Inside the Third World: The Anatomy of Poverty* (1979) and *The Third World Tomorrow* (1980) needed no explanation for the thousands of general readers who bought the Penguin paperback edition, and a series of books in the early 1980s similarly employ the title without further thought: Elbaki Hermassi, *The Third World Reassessed* (1980), André Gunder Frank, *Crisis in the Third World* (1981), Paul Hallwood and Stuart Sinclair, *Oil, Debt and Development: OPEC in the Third World* (1981), Jacques Loup, *Can the Third World Survive?* (1983), Daniel Chudnovsky and Masafumi Nagao, *Capital Goods Production in the Third World* (1983) are but a few examples. Eamonn Butler and Madsen Pirie use 'Third World' and 'developing countries' interchangeably in their *Aid by Enterprise: Market Solutions to the Problems of Development* (1984), and Attila Ágh in his *National Development in the Third World* (Budapest, 1984) is amongst those who begin to talk of 'the emerging "Fourth World" . . . these poorest countries'.

The final acceptance of 'Third World' both into the English language and as the brain-child of Alfred Sauvy surely comes with the following entry in Volume 4 of *A Supplement to the Oxford English Dictionary* (1986)?:

Third World The countries of the world, especially those of Africa and Asia, which are aligned with neither the Communist nor the non-Communist bloc; hence, the under-developed or poorer countries of the world, usually those of Africa, Asia and Latin America. (1956 G BALANDIER *Le Tiers Monde: Sous-développement et développement*, 369.

La conférence tenue à Bandeong en avril 1955, par les délégués de vingt-neuf nations asiatiques et africaines . . . manifeste l'accès, au premier plan de la scène politique internationale, de ces peuples qui constituent un 'Tiers Monde' entre les deux blocs, selon l'expression d' A. Sauvy.)

Appendix**The 'Four Worlds': basic statistical data**

The arrangement of the national statistics of 162 countries under the categories 'Fourth World', 'Third World', 'Second World' and 'First World' differs from the categories used in the *World Development Report 1987* ('Low income economies'; 'Middle-income economies', divided into 'Lower middle-income economies' and 'Upper middle-income economies'; 'High income oil exporters'; 'Industrial market economies'; and 'Non-reporting non-member economies') but draws on the same data—see 'World Development Indicators', Table 1, *World Development Report 1987* pp 202–3, and 'Basic Indicators for UN and World Bank member countries with populations of less than 1 million', *World Development Report 1987*, p 269.

The *World Development Report 1987* was published on 1 July 1987 by the Oxford University Press for The World Bank, Washington DC.

1) *Population (millions) mid-1985*

The estimates of population for mid-1985 are based on data from the UN Population Division or from World Bank data files.

2) *Area (thousands of square kilometres)*

The data on area are derived from Food and Agricultural Organisation (FAO), *Production Yearbook 1985*, Rome: 1986. Areas of less than one thousand square kilometres are indicated by (.).

3) *GNP, per capita, US dollars, 1985*

4) *GNP, per capita, US dollars; average annual growth rate (per cent), 1965–85.*

A detailed explanation of the *World Bank Atlas* method of calculating GNP per capita figures is presented in *World Development Report 1987*, pp 268–71. It is conceded that 'perfect cross-comparability of GNP per capita estimates cannot be achieved'. Information is not given for 'non-reporting non-market economies' (Albania, Angola, Bulgaria, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, German Democratic Republic, Korean Democratic Republic, Mongolia, and the USSR), because of difficulties associated with the availability of data and the determination of conversion factors.

5) *Inflation: average annual rate (per cent) 1965–80.*

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6) *Inflation: average annual rate (per cent) 1980-85*

The average annual rate of inflation is that measured by the growth rate of the GDP implicit deflator; the GDP deflator is calculated by dividing (for each year of the period) the value of GDP at current purchaser values by the value of GDP at constant purchaser values (both in national currency). The 'least squares' method is then used to calculate the growth rate of the GDP deflator for the period. See *World Development Report 1987*, p 271.

7) *Life expectancy at birth (years), 1985*

These calculations are based on data from the UN Population Division, supplemented by World Bank data files; they indicate for each country the number of years a new-born infant would live if patterns of mortality prevailing for all the people at the time of its birth were to remain the same throughout its life. See *World Development Report 1987*, p 271.

Lack of appropriate data in the statistical tables below is indicated by '..'; for more detailed information, see *Technical Notes* (pp 268-83) and *Bibliography* (pp 284-5) in *World Development Report 1987*.

Table 1: Least developed countries—'Fourth World'

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
1. Ethiopia	42.3	1,222	110	0.2	3.3	2.6	45
2. Bangladesh	100.6	144	150	0.4	14.9	11.5	51
3. Burkina Faso	7.9	274	150	1.3	6.5	7.2	45
4. Mali	7.5	1,240	150	1.4	..	7.4	46
5. Bhutan	1.2	47	160	..	..	..	44
6. Nepal	16.5	141	160	0.1	7.8	8.4	47
7. Malawi	7.0	118	170	1.5	7.3	11.4	45
8. Zaire	30.6	2,345	170	-2.1	24.5	55.3	51
9. Guinea-Bissau	0.9	36	180	-1.5	..	30.4	39
10. Burma	36.9	677	190	2.4	8.7	2.6	59
11. Burundi	4.7	28	230	1.9	8.4	6.6	48
12. Togo	3.0	57	230	0.3	7.1	6.9	51
13. The Gambia	0.7	11	230	1.1	8.3	8.8	43
14. Comoros	0.4	2	240	-0.3	..	..	55

THIRD WORLD QUARTERLY

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
15. Madagascar	10.2	587	240	-1.9	7.7	19.4	52
16. Niger	6.4	1,267	250	-2.1	7.5	8.5	44
17. Benin	4.0	113	260	0.2	7.4	9.7	49
18. Central African Republic	2.6	623	260	-0.2	8.4	10.8	49
19. India	765.1	3,288	270	1.7	7.4	7.8	56
20. Rwanda	6.0	26	280	1.8	12.5	7.6	48
21. Somalia	5.4	638	280	-0.7	10.1	45.4	46
22. Kenya	20.4	583	290	1.9	7.3	10.0	54
23. Maldives	0.2	(.)	290	1.9	..	..	53
24. Tanzania	22.2	945	290	..	9.6	19.6	52
25. Sudan	21.9	2,506	300	..	11.5	31.7	48
26. Haiti	5.9	28	310	0.7	7.3	7.0	54
27. Guinea	6.2	246	320	0.8	2.8	8.3	40
28. São Tomé and Príncipe	0.1	1	320	0.8	..	5.8	65
29. Sierra Leone	3.7	72	350	1.1	7.8	25.0	40
30. Senegal	6.6	196	370	-0.6	6.5	9.7	47
31. Ghana	12.7	239	380	-2.2	22.8	57.0	53
32. Sri Lanka	15.8	66	380	2.9	9.5	14.7	70
33. Pakistan	96.2	804	380	2.6	10.2	8.1	51
34. Zambia	6.7	753	390	-1.6	6.4	14.7	52
35. Afghanistan	17.2	648	..	..	4.9	..	36
36. Chad	5.0	1,284	..	-2.3	6.2	..	45
37. Uganda	14.7	236	..	-2.6	23.8	..	49

Table 2: Developing countries—'Third World'

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
38. Mauritania	1.7	1,031	420	0.1	7.5	8.1	47
39. Cape Verde	0.3	4	430	5.0	..	17.6	63
40. Bolivia	6.4	1,099	470	-0.2	15.7	569.1	53

WHY "THIRD WORLD"?

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
41. Lesotho	1.5	30	470	6.5	8.6	11.4	54
42. Liberia	2.2	111	470	-1.4	6.5	1.6	50
43. Guyana	0.8	215	500	-0.2	8.0	9.4	65
44. Solomon Islands	0.3	28	510	3.5	7.1	10.9	58
45. Indonesia	162.2	1,919	530	4.8	34.3	10.7	55
46. Yemen Arab Republic	8.0	195	550	5.3	..	9.7	45
47. Morocco	21.9	447	560	2.2	5.8	7.8	59
48. Philippines	54.7	300	580	2.3	11.8	19.3	63
49. Egypt (EAR)	48.5	1,001	610	3.1	7.5	11.0	61
50. Ivory Coast	10.1	322	660	0.9	9.2	10.0	53
51. Western Samoa	0.2	3	660	..	..	15.9	65
52. Swaziland	0.7	17	670	2.7	9.1	9.6	54
53. Papua New Guinea	3.5	462	680	0.4	8.1	5.5	52
54. Zimbabwe	8.4	31	680	1.6	5.7	13.2	57
55. Honduras	4.4	112	720	0.4	6.3	5.4	62
56. Tonga	0.1	1	730	..	..	..	64
57. Nicaragua	3.3	130	770	-2.1	8.9	33.8	59
58. Dominican Republic	6.4	49	790	2.9	6.6	14.6	64
59. Nigeria	99.7	924	800	2.2	14.5	11.4	50
60. Thailand	51.7	514	800	4.0	6.8	3.2	64
61. Cameroon	10.2	475	810	3.6	9.0	11.8	55
62. El Salvador	4.8	21	820	-0.2	7.0	11.6	64
63. Botswana	1.1	600	840	8.3	8.0	5.2	57
64. St. Vincent	0.1	(.)	850	1.2	10.8	5.9	69
65. Paraguay	3.7	407	860	3.9	9.2	15.8	66
66. Vanuatu	0.1	0.01	880	..	..	..	56
67. Jamaica	2.2	11	940	-0.7	12.6	18.3	73
68. Grenada	0.1	(.)	970	-0.1	11.2	6.6	68
69. Peru	18.6	1,285	1,010	0.2	20.5	98.6	59
70. Turkey	50.2	781	1,080	2.6	20.8	37.1	64

THIRD WORLD QUARTERLY

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
71. Mauritius	1.0	2	1,090	2.7	11.8	8.5	66
72. Dominica	0.08	1	1,150	0.4	12.7	4.8	75
73. Ecuador	9.4	284	1,160	3.5	11.3	29.7	66
74. Belize	0.01	23	1,190	2.7	7.2	1.2	66
75. Tunisia	7.1	164	1,190	4.0	6.7	10.0	63
76. St. Lucia	0.01	1	1,240	2.8	9.3	3.8	70
77. Guatemala	8.0	109	1,250	1.7	7.1	7.4	60
78. Costa Rica	2.6	51	1,300	1.4	11.2	36.4	74
79. Colombia	28.4	1,139	1,320	2.9	17.5	22.5	65
80. Chile	12.1	757	1,430	-0.2	129.9	19.3	70
81. St. Kitts- Nevis	0.04	(.)	1,550	2.4	9.8	5.0	64
82. Jordan	3.5	98	1,560	5.8	..	3.9	65
83. Syria (SAR)	10.5	185	1,570	4.0	8.4	6.1	64
84. Brazil	135.6	8,512	1,640	4.3	31.6	147.7	65
85. Uruguay	3.0	176	1,650	1.4	57.5	44.6	72
86. Fiji	0.7	18	1,710	2.9	10.4	5.2	65
87. Malaysia	15.6	330	2,000	4.4	4.9	3.1	68
88. Antigua	0.08	(.)	2,020	0.2	9.1	4.0	73
89. Mexico	78.8	1,973	2,080	2.7	13.2	62.2	67
90. Panama	2.2	77	2,100	2.5	5.5	3.7	72
91. Argentina	30.5	2,767	2,130	0.2	78.5	342.8	70
92. Republic of Korea	41.1	98	2,150	6.6	18.7	6.0	69
93. Algeria	21.9	2,382	2,550	3.6	9.9	6.9	61
94. Suriname	0.4	163	2,580	3.4	11.8	4.2	66
95. Venezuela	17.3	912	3,080	0.5	8.7	9.2	70
96. Malta	0.3	(.)	3,310	8.1	3.5	1.7	73
97. Gabon	0.9	268	3,670	1.5	12.7	10.1	51
98. Cyprus	0.7	9	3,790	..	-2.1	8.1	74
99. Barbados	0.2	(.)	4,630	2.3	11.3	8.4	73
100. Trinidad and Tobago	1.2	5	6,020	2.3	14.2	7.6	69
101. Oman	1.2	300	6,730	5.7	20.5	4.9	54
102. Bahamas	0.2	14	7,070	-0.5	6.4	5.2	70

WHY 'THIRD WORLD'?

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
103. Libya	3.8	1,760	7,170	-1.3	15.4	-0.3	60
104. Singapore	2.6	1	7,420	7.6	4.8	3.1	73
105. Saudi Arabia	11.5	2,150	8,850	5.3	17.6	-3.2	62
106. Bahrain	0.4	1	9,420	..	..	0.2	69
107. Kuwait	1.7	18	14,480	-0.3	14.1	-3.6	72
108. Qatar	0.3	11	16,270	-7.0	..	..	72
109. Brunei	0.2	6	17,570	-1.2	..	-2.7	74
110. United Arab Emirates	1.4	84	19,270	..	..	-1.4	70
111. Djibouti	0.4	22	..	..	..	..	48
112. Equatorial Guinea	0.4	28	..	..	..	..	45
113. Iran	44.6	1,648	..	..	15.2	..	60
114. Iraq	15.9	435	..	..	..	..	61
115. Kiribati	0.06	1	..	..	..	6.9	53
116. Lebanon	..	10	..	..	9.3	..	..
117. Seychelles	0.06	(.)	..	..	12.1	..	69

Table 3: Centrally planned economies—'Second World'

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
118. Mozambique	13.8	802	160	..	..	25.8	47
119. China (PRC)	1,040.3	9,561	310	4.8	..	2.4	69
120. Yemen (PDRY)	2.0	333	530	..	..	5.7	46
121. Congo (PRC)	1.9	342	1,110	3.8	7.1	12.6	58
122. Hungary	10.6	93	1,950	5.8	2.7	5.6	71
123. Poland	37.2	313	2,050	..	..	35.2	72
124. Yugoslavia	23.1	256	2,070	4.1	15.2	45.1	72
125. Albania	3.0	2	..	..	..	..	70
126. Angola	8.8	1,247	..	..	..	..	44
127. Bulgaria	9.0	111	..	..	..	..	71
128. Cuba	10.1	115	..	..	..	..	77
129. Czechoslovakia	15.5	128	..	..	..	..	70

THIRD WORLD QUARTERLY

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
130. German Democratic Republic	16.6	108	..	..	..	..	59
131. Kampuchea	..	181	..	..	..	..	..
132. Korea (KDR)	20.4	121	..	..	..	..	68
133. Laos (LPDR)	3.6	237	..	..	..	..	45
134. Mongolia	1.9	1,565	..	..	..	..	63
135. Romania	22.7	238	..	..	..	..	72
136. USSR	277.4	22,402	..	..	..	..	70
137. Vietnam	61.7	330	..	..	..	..	65

Table 4: Industrialised market economies—'First World'

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
138. Portugal	10.2	92	1,970	3.3	11.7	22.7	74
139. South Africa	32.4	1,221	2,010	1.1	9.9	13.0	55
140. Greece	9.9	132	3,550	3.6	10.3	20.6	68
141. Spain	38.6	505	4,290	2.6	12.2	12.6	77
142. Ireland	3.6	70	4,850	2.2	11.9	10.8	74
143. Israel	4.2	21	4,990	2.5	25.2	196.3	75
144. Italy	57.1	301	6,250	2.6	11.2	14.2	77
145. New Zealand	3.3	269	7,010	1.4	10.1	9.8	74
146. Belgium	9.9	31	8,280	2.8	6.5	5.9	75
147. United Kingdom	56.5	245	8,460	1.6	11.2	6.4	75
148. Austria	7.6	84	9,120	3.5	5.7	4.9	74
149. The Netherlands	14.5	41	9,290	2.0	7.5	3.5	77
150. France	55.2	547	9,540	2.8	8.0	9.5	78
151. Iceland	0.2	103	10,710	2.4	27.1	49.2	77
152. Australia	15.8	7,687	10,830	2.0	8.8	9.1	78
153. Finland	4.9	337	10,890	3.3	10.5	8.6	76

WHY 'THIRD WORLD'?

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
154. German Federal Republic	61.0	249	10,940	2.7	5.1	3.2	75
155. Denmark	5.1	43	11,200	1.8	9.2	8.1	75
156. Japan	120.8	372	11,300	4.7	7.5	1.2	77
157. Sweden	8.4	450	11,890	1.8	8.0	8.6	77
158. Canada	25.4	9,976	13,680	2.4	7.4	6.3	76
159. Luxembourg	0.4	3	14,260	4.0	6.3	10.0	74
160. Norway	4.2	324	14,370	3.3	7.7	8.5	77
161. Switzerland	6.5	41	16,370	1.4	5.3	4.5	77
162. United States of America	239.3	9,363	16,690	1.7	6.1	5.3	76



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FEATURE REVIEWS

Perspectives on the Philippines

Walden Bello

Crisis in the Philippines: The Marcos Era and Beyond

John Bresnan

Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press. 1986. 284pp. n/p

The Philippines Reader: A History of Colonialism, Neocolonialism, Dictatorship and Resistance

Daniel B Schirmer and Stephen Roskam Shalom

Boston, Massachusetts: South End Press. 1987. 425pp. \$11.00hb

The Philippines After Marcos

R J May and Francisco Nemenzo

London: Croom Helm. 1985. 239pp. £19.95hb

Touching Ground, Taking Root: Theological and Political Reflections on the Philippine Struggle

London: Catholic Institute for International Relations. 1986. 214pp. £5.75pb

Like the escalating Vietnam conflict in the early 1960s, the continuing Philippine crisis is now the subject of intense scrutiny by Western officials, specialists, and journalists. What led to the rise and fall of Ferdinand Marcos? How does one explain the Cory Aquino phenomenon? What role has the USA played in the Philippine drama?

Crisis in the Philippines, edited by John Bresnan, provides the liberal establishment's responses to queries such as these. Theodore Friend's essay, which attempts to provide the broader historical context for recent events, strikes the note for the rest of the book by painting US colonialism and post-colonial US policy as benign and well-intentioned. Even when Friend concedes that there is something unfair about arrangements like a military bases agreement with a 99-year rent-free lease, he puts the onus of responsibility on the Filipinos because of 'Filipino assent to these developments'.

Marcos and other Philippine problems are indigenous in origin, and when America is abused by Filipino critics, this is largely because, like Mount Everest, it's there:

The fact remains that the United States, with a gross domestic product more than eighty

times as great as that of the Philippines, and with a trade volume forty times as great, will influence the Philippines heavily without planning, without trying, without even wanting to do so. (Theodore Friend, 'Philippine-American tensions in history' in *Crisis in the Philippines: The Marcos Era and Beyond*.)

Critics who attempt to pierce through the colonial apologia are subjected by Friend to a most unfriendly sort of labelling. Thus, Renato Constantino, unquestionably the most influential historian in Philippine studies, is dismissed for his 'battering-ram style humourless neo-Marxist didacticism'.

Though suffused with the same American paternalism, David Steinberg's 'Tradition and Response' is a less unbalanced piece which acknowledges that American colonial policy did encourage placing political and social power in the hands of the local oligarchy or *ilustrados* ('enlightened ones'). However, it fails to explore the more important questions. In the real world, arrangements governing the exercise of power very seldom spring from good intention and very often from self-interest. What benefits did the colonial power derive from its sanctioning (some scholars would say, strengthening) continued oligarchical domination of the Philippines? How did the various permutations of elite rule—from the appointed elite of the Commonwealth period to the elected elite of the neo-colonial period to the authoritarian elite of the martial law period—serve US interests?

Exploring these avenues would probably have led to a more sophisticated understanding of the US response to its status of being, unlike Britain and France, a late colonial and imperial power. The US rise to world dominance came at a time—the first half of the twentieth century—that traditional forms of colonial rule were being challenged throughout the world. Moreover, it was unique in that it was an imperial power with anti-colonial pretensions.

Thus, in contrast to the British and the French, the USA pioneered in forms of indirect rule more appropriate to an era of decolonisation by cultivating a reliable indigenous stratum. This elite was handed control of the political administration, and it readily adapted elections and other institutions of US-style representative democracy to the realities of a semi-feudal social structure: patron-client relations, kinship, bribery and coercion were the operative principles in electoral contests between competing elite factions.

The elite also received economic pay-offs in line with the colonial strategy of making the Philippines an exporter of primary commodities to the USA and an importer of US manufactured goods. Thus, the duty-free entry of sugar into the US market gave the sugar barons, perhaps the most powerful section of the oligarchy, a strong stake in the colonial division of labour. By allowing the local elite to participate in the fruits of empire under conditions of seeming sovereignty and democracy, the USA was, in effect, laying a more solid basis for the continuation of the essence of imperial rule than the French and British efforts to monopolise power and maintain the visible emblems of empire. Mass education stressing the anti-colonial, democratic spirit and values of the

American Revolution and Civil War counteracted the other, dominant side of this imperial democratic republic. And 'preparing the islands for independence' was the rationale which gained for the Americans the time necessary for an orderly transition from colonialism to neo-colonialism.

The failure of Friend and Steinberg to explore the symbiotic relationship between US colonial and neo-colonial rule and the local oligarchical order is paralleled in the essays on contemporary politics by the omission of any discussion of the role of the USA in facilitating the rise and downfall of Marcos.

While one can understand why Carl Lande, a favourite adviser to the State Department might overlook the US hand in recent political developments, it is surprising in the case of two usually perceptive students of the Philippine political scene: Lela Garner Noble, a leading specialist in Muslim affairs, and Carolina Hernandez, who is admired for her expertise on the Philippine military.

Neither Lande, Noble nor Hernandez mention the significant increases in military assistance to Marcos in the period from the declaration of martial law in 1972 to 1983 which played such a key role in consolidating the regime. By the early 1980s, US military assistance comprised 10.5 per cent of the military budget and financed most of the Armed Forces of the Philippines force modernisation programmes.¹ Equally crucial to Marcos' staying power was the political and ideological support he received from the USA. 'We found few if any Americans who took the position that the demise of individual rights would adversely affect US institutions,' asserted the staff of the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee after surveying the attitudes of key American officials shortly after the imposition of martial law:²

US officials appear prepared to accept that the strengthening of presidential authority . . . will enable President Marcos to introduce needed stability; that these objectives are in our interest; and that military bases and a familiar government are more important than the preservation of democratic institutions, which were imperfect at best.

And, of course, during the Reagan period, Marcos' form of authoritarian rule received not only ringing endorsement from Vice-President George Bush ('We love you, sir. We love your adherence to democratic rights and processes') but also ideological justification from influential conservative theorists such as the US Ambassador to the UN, Jeane Kirkpatrick, who may very well have had Marcos in mind when she wrote:

The fabric of authority unravels quickly when the power and status of the man at the top are undermined or eliminated. The longer the autocrat has held power, and the more pervasive his influence, the more dependent a nation's institutions will be on him.

¹ US Defense Department, 'Answers to Questions on Defense Issues Posed in the August 20, 1984 Letter of the House of Representatives Subcommittee on Asia-Pacific Affairs', Washington, DC, 1984, pp 12-13.

² US Senate Foreign Relations Committee Staff, *The Philippines and Korea*, Washington DC: US Government Printing Office, 1973.

Without him, the organized life of society will collapse, like an arch from which the keystone has been removed.³

Similarly, the erosion of US support for Marcos and US pressure on him to open up the political system by holding elections are also, curiously, ignored by all three writers in explaining the triumph of Aquino. How can one ignore the decisive role of US pressure in Marcos' fateful decision to call for snap elections in November 1985, which sparked the chain reaction that led to his overthrow?

The record of US intervention in the Philippine political process is clear, even to non-specialists exposed to extensive media coverage of recent years—which makes the absence of any reference to it all the more disconcerting.

A possible explanation is a theoretical framework that assigns primacy to internal factors in explaining change and considers US influence to be both secondary and external. Such a narrow, unsophisticated framework, however, immediately excludes from one's purview developments pregnant not only with political significance but with theoretical meaning. Is it purely a matter of coincidence that around the same time period—the early 1960s to the mid-1970s—civilian oligarchical systems in US-dominated or allied states like South Korea, Chile, Brazil, Uruguay, and the Philippines were wracked by deep crises which led to the establishment of authoritarian military or civilian-military regimes? Is it pure coincidence that these regimes had similar features, including a strong pro-US stance, violent repression of the left, technocratic-led 'development from above' based on attracting foreign capital and exploitation of cheap, unorganised labour? Was there a correlation between the rise of authoritarian regimes in US-allied states and the disillusionment with liberal democracy as a form of political stabilisation in the Third World and the more overt justification of repressive rule by US policy-makers? In this context, the 'US factor' assumes a significance which not only cannot be dismissed or ignored, but bids fair to be a leading variable in explaining regime changes.

Similarly, it is not possible, in my view, to understand US encouragement of political decompression in Haiti, the Philippines, and South America without taking into account the failure of the authoritarian model it had formerly sponsored as a mechanism of political containment of revolutionary pressures and agent of economic growth. It had the character of a desperate manoeuvre to cut one's losses—ie, prevent further radicalisation of oppressed populations—after years of being identified with the dictatorship in the popular mind.

The Cory Aquino phenomenon thus cannot be viewed simply as an expression of the Filipino people's yearning for democracy. It is certainly this. But it has other, less endearing dimensions. It is also a 'Third Force'—a

³ Jeane Kirkpatrick, 'Dictatorships and double standards', *Commentary*, July 1979, p 37.

movement encouraged by the US in order to take the wind out of the sails of what was a surging left in the last years of the Marcos dictatorship. The authors would do well to listen to the words of the US Under-Secretary of State, Michael Armacost, the key architect of policy toward the Philippines during Marcos' twilight years, when he spoke to American foreign service officers two months after the February 1986 Revolution that 'Our objective was to capture . . . to encourage the democratic forces of the center, then consolidate control by the middle and also win away the soft support of the NPA [New People's Army].'⁴

The pieces on the economy and US-Philippine economic relations by Bernardo Villegas and Jesus Estanislao have an analytical sophistication missing in most of the other essays. Both are, in fact, very cogent and masterfully argued presentation of the neo-classical perspective on what went wrong with the Marcos economy and what needs to be done to resume growth. The neo-classical International Monetary Fund-World Bank critique runs as follows: External forces were not responsible for failure of the Marcos economy. The causes of the economic disaster were local in origin. One was the increase in state intervention in the economy. A second was 'crony capitalism', or the monopolisation of the economy by Marcos cronies, which led to a massive theft and squandering of resources and to inefficiency. But most important was Marcos' failure to dismantle the protectionist, import-substitution policies which prevented the efficient integration of the economy to the international market. The way forward, Estanislao declares, with a fervour reminiscent of partisans of Reaganomics in the early 1980s, lies in much greater reliance on the market, as opposed to administrative 'tinkering', and on 'liberalisation', which represents 'a decisive internationalism, a wholehearted acceptance of international economic rules, as they are, and a confident positioning for exports and economic growth within these rules'.

But the same wrong premiss that undermines the historical and political essays in this volume also gravely weakens Villegas' and Estanislao's analysis and policy prescriptions. To discount the role of external forces in contributing to the technocratic state economic structure is simply wrong. With its drive to coordinate an ambitious, massive, and diverse country programme, the World Bank, which poured in US\$3 billion through Philippine government agencies between 1973 and 1983, helped to create the bloated Marcos economic state apparatus. The Bank's philosophy of development from above not only sanctioned but encouraged technocratic centralisation and intervention. Distrustful of the 'irrational' conflicts spawned by parliamentary democracy, the technocrats of the World Bank were attracted to Marcos' early martial law rhetoric about breaking the 'democratic deadlock'. The Philippines was designated a 'country of concentration', and the enormous resources of the

⁴ Speech at Foreign Service Institute, Rosslyn, Virginia, 23 April, 1986.

agency was placed behind a centralised development programme administratively controlled by an authoritarian-technocratic elite.

A key confidential World Bank policy statement noted approvingly in 1976, 'The proclamation of martial law in 1972 and the abolition of Congress provided the government with almost absolute power in the field of economic development.'⁵ Indeed, the Bank went beyond sanctioning the regime's technocratic initiatives and even rationalised its political initiatives. Thus, at a time that agencies such as Amnesty International were already documenting massive abuses of human, political, and labour rights, Michael Gould, head of the Philippine programme office at the World Bank, stated in 1976: 'While the country is formally under martial law, the basic strategy of government is to resort as little as possible to outright coercion and to broaden popular support through the development of effective economic and social programs.'⁶

Similarly, one cannot understand the rise of 'crony capitalism' by attributing it merely to the greed of Marcos and his associates. While Marcos' friends might have outdone others in plunder, similar capitalist cliques tied to ruling regimes were found in Brazil, Chile and other countries that enjoyed a privileged relationship with international banks. Even before the accumulation of petrodollar deposits after the OPEC oil price rise in 1973, foreign lenders were aggressively pushing loans on to favoured clients in the Third World. These favourites included countries such as the Philippines, Chile and Brazil, which were deemed good credit risks because of their conservative, pro-Western economic policies and the surface stability produced by their authoritarian governments. Massive loans coursed through government agencies found their way into the hands of favoured capitalists who used them to buy up and corner key industries or shunted the capital into their private accounts in Geneva or New York. Serving as important intermediaries in this multi-billion dollar swindle were the very pillars of Western financial rectitude—the World Bank and the IMF. In the mid-1970s the World Bank assessed the Philippines as having 'a great absorptive capacity for foreign capital', and up until 1982, both the Bank and the IMF continued to give the Marcos regime an A-1 credit rating, despite all indications that loans were being squandered in unproductive projects, corrupt deals and capital flight. 'Crony capitalism' existed in a symbiotic relationship with international finance capital; one cannot be fully explained without the other.

Villegas and Estanislao's main thesis is that the martial law economy failed because of its imperfect integration into the international capitalist order. In fact, one can make the opposite case that it was precisely too much integration that torpedoed the economy. On the import side, the dizzying rise in the price

⁵ World Bank, 'Priorities and prospects for development', Vol. 1. Confidential Draft, Washington DC, 1976, p 8.

⁶ World Bank, 'Philippines: country program paper', Memo from Michael Gould, Washington DC, 26 March, 1976, p 7.7.

of oil after 1973. On the export side, the collapse in the international prices of sugar and coconut, traditionally the Philippines' leading foreign exchange earners. The ultimately disastrous results of the Philippines' colonial integration into the capitalist world economy are exemplified in the wreck that is the Philippine sugar industry. The international price of sugar is four cents a pound while the cost of production comes to 14 cents a pound, forcing hundreds of thousands of acres out of production and threatening 350,000 workers and their families with starvation.

Contrary to Villegas' and Estanislao's interpretation, Marcos followed World Bank-IMF advice to move the economy into greater dependence on export markets. He might have hesitated to radically dismantle the protectionist barriers surrounding industry, but he and his technocrats did push export-oriented industrialisation, as recommended by the World Bank and the IMF, in the process building up a number of 'export processing zones' and making Philippine labour among the cheapest in Southeast Asia.

Labour-intensive manufactured exports—mainly electronics and garments—registered great advances to become the country's biggest export earner by 1982. But they too ran aground by 1984, not because of an overvalued exchange rate or other 'penalties' imposed by local protectionism but on account of the stagnation in world trade and protectionist measures against Third World manufactures in the USA and other advanced capitalist markets.

It is stagnating world trade and rising protectionism that would make it not only ill-advised but suicidal for the Aquino government to follow the path of export-oriented growth charted by the so-called New Industrialising Countries (NICs) in the 1960s and early 1970s. The international conditions just are not the same, but somehow what Susan Strange terms the 'bondage of liberal economics' continues to lead otherwise sensible people like Villegas and Estanislao to paint rosy, unrealistic scenarios of the prospects for Philippine export manufactures. The Aquino government would do well to listen instead to a hardnosed, realistic appraisal of the chances of new NICs, even if it comes from the CIA:

We believe, then, that the NICs are unlikely to be joined by an equally dynamic second tier of LDCs. New LDC sources of manufactures will surely appear, with some achieving rapid export growth. However, in our judgement, the number of NICs will be limited to four to six countries with the country composition changing over time. We believe many of the factors inhibiting the future growth of some of the second-tier LDCs' manufactures exports—a slowly expanding world market for manufactures, mounting protectionism, and heightened competition in trade—will constrain the growth of the NICs' manufactures exports. As a consequence, the change in the composition of the NICs will more likely be the result of a country falling from its ranks rather than advancing to the status of industrial country.⁷

⁷ Gregory Moulton, 'Future newly industrializing countries: more competition?', Research Paper, Mclean, Virginia, Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Global Issues, March 1984, p 8. Confidential.

There is, in other words, no substitute for the development of a vibrant domestic market as the anchor of one's economy. And, contrary to neo-classical doctrine, this will require a reasonable degree of protectionism, government intervention and planning, and massive income redistribution to create a viable market for an integrated industrial structure. Unfortunately, with the levers of economic policy now in the hands of Villegas, Estanislao and like minds, the Aquino government is likely to pursue the neo-classical utopia, with predictable results.

In summary, *Crisis in the Philippines*, with its failure to examine the relation of developments in the Philippines to the very strong influence and impact of the USA, international economic institutions, and trends in the world economy, is of limited value in providing an understanding of the Philippine crisis that goes beyond the superficial.

A good antidote to this limited perspective is *The Philippines Reader*, edited by Daniel B Schirmer and Stephen Shalom, two of the foremost historians on US-Philippine relations. The volume brings together some of the most significant documents and writings on the US-Philippine 'special relationship' from the time of US aggression in 1898 to Aquino, with concise introductions provided for each piece. While explicitly acknowledging their progressive sympathies, Schirmer and Shalom strive for fairness in their selections, and include State Department analyses, Pentagon position papers, an interview with a member of the rightist Reform the Armed Forces Movement (RAM) that launched the military uprising against Marcos, and even a piece from the ultra-rightist Heritage Foundation. Of special value to scholars and the general public are the confidential US government policy documents, which provide a ringside view of Washington's imperial decision-makers grappling with the periodic crises that threatened to unravel the special relationship.

In so far as this volume has a problem, it is one of form rather than content; it should probably have been conceived as a two-volume work. Because of the one-volume constraint, many pieces are abbreviated, sometimes too much. Or, perhaps, fewer pieces might have been chosen and placed *in toto* in one volume to allow the reader not only the key points of each text but also to appreciate its context.

Form is also the main problem with *The Philippines After Marcos*, edited by R J May and Francisco Nemenzo. The type is so small as to make reading difficult and of such quality as to give one the feeling that he is reading a typed draft rather than the finished product. But, despite this drawback and the fact that the contributions were written in 1984, prior to Marcos' departure, most of the essays are quite stimulating and a few are excellent.

Brian Fegan's 'Rural Philippines: Central Luzon' gives us provocative insights into the political and social consequences of the internal differentiation of the peasantry created by the limited land reform efforts which took place in Central Luzon during the Marcos period. (Central Luzon was the showcase of

the Marcos land reform effort.) Al McCoy's contribution, 'Rural Philippines: Technological Change in the Sugar Industry', is a fine, admirably researched essay on the relationship between market crisis, technological innovation, and labour displacement that is indispensable for understanding why the once powerful sugar industry is now dying, with immense consequences for the whole economy.

Francisco Nemenzo's essay, 'The Left and the Traditional Opposition', confirms what many consider to be his status as the leading political scientist in Philippine studies. Despite the fact that the essay was written a year and a half before the February 1986 uprising, one of the post-Marcos scenarios he laid out ('Constitutional Democracy Restored'), uncannily projects much of what later transpired. Of special interest is the accuracy of his prediction of the response of the Philippine left to a constitutional democratic outcome:

Since this arrangement conforms to popular sentiments, it would be foolhardy for the Left to oppose it. The Left will probably reciprocate the gestures of reconciliation, even as it remains vigilant knowing that the military is lurking in the shadow of the provisional government. The NPA [New People's Army] will refuse to disarm but agree to a truce. The NDF [National Democratic Front] will also preserve its clandestine network while taking advantage of every occasion for propaganda and organising work. While abstaining from outright attacks on the provisional government, the CPP [Communist Party of the Philippines] and its associated organisations will keep a political distance. (*The Philippines After Marcos*, p 66)

At a time when most of the Philippine left (and indeed practically everybody else) viewed the restoration of constitutional democracy as a remote possibility, Nemenzo, a committed progressive, posed the question which now constitutes the central issue of debates within the progressive movement:

The prospects for a national democratic revolution in the 1990s depend to a large extent on how correctly the Left analyses and responds to the fluid situation in the next seven years. Imbued with an overwhelming self-confidence that borders on arrogance, some CPP leaders are not beyond committing fatal errors that could wipe out their phenomenal gains during the Marcos years. It is interesting to observe if the CPP leadership can transcend its dogmatic tendencies and execute a strategic switch should scenario no. 2 ['modified authoritarian rule'] or scenario no. 3 ['constitutional democracy'] materialise. What happened in the 1950s (when the PKP [old Communist Party] plunged the Huk movement into a colossal débâcle) may happen again if at a critical juncture in the immediate post-Marcos period the CPP misjudges the real situation and drives the movement along a disastrous line of march.

Edicio de la Torre is one of the influential figures in this debate within the Philippine progressive movement. Currently one of the leaders of the Volunteers for Popular Democracy (VPPD), de la Torre spent nine years in jail during the Marcos period. The reason de la Torre was feared so much then and continues to be feared by the military lies in the key role he has played in effecting a powerful alliance between the secular left and progressive Christianity. *Touching Ground, Taking Root* brings together a number of his

most significant articles, speeches, letters and poems from 1968 to 1985. The result is a fascinating chronicle of a brilliant activist evolving from a reformist Christian confronted by the Marxist challenge to a revolutionary attempting to fuse the best of the two traditions.

There is an immediacy in this volume that is not found in the other books under review. The sights, sounds, heat, terrors, and rewards of the fourteen-year struggle against the dictatorship come through in the poems and letters, and the essays are grounded not in abstract questions but in the burning issues of the day. *Touching Ground, Taking Root* not only offers insights into the extremely creative union of Christianity and Marxism in the Philippines but also allows the reader to come in touch with the dynamism of the progressive movement that played such a vital role in ousting the Marcos regime and which now challenges the Aquino government to deliver on its promises of effective social and economic reforms.

Winds of change in Moscow

Stephen White

The Sixth Continent: Russia and Mikhail Gorbachev

Mary Frankland

London: Hamish Hamilton. 1987. 292pp. £12.95hb

The Waking Giant. The Soviet Union under Gorbachev

Martin Walker

London: Michael Joseph. 1986. 282pp. £14.95hb

The Soviet Paradox: External Expansion, Internal Decline

Seweryn Bialer

London: I B Tauris. 1986. 391pp. £19.50hb

The Soviet Union under Gorbachev

Edited by Martin McCauley

London: Macmillan. 1987. 247pp. £29.50hb/£9.95pb

It is still hard to believe that it is scarcely more than two years since Mikhail

Gorbachev was elected General Secretary of the Soviet Union's ruling party. Scholarly as well as popular consensus had on the whole inclined to the view that the Soviet Union was a country that changed slowly, if at all (one of the themes that emerged most clearly from the academic work of the 1970s on Soviet political culture was the striking continuities between the contemporary and the pre-revolutionary systems). At the same time it has been widely accepted that the Soviet Communist Party holds an exceptionally high degree of centralised power within that country, and that the General Secretary of the Party tends in turn to become exceptionally powerful within the party's leadership. At least part of the fascination of the early years of Gorbachev's secretaryship has been to see which of these two elements will prove stronger: or in other words, to find out the extent to which the Soviet system is capable of reforming and renewing itself. If a single theme emerges from the four very varied volumes under review it is that it would probably be premature to attempt to answer such questions, and that an unqualified answer would certainly be inappropriate.

The four volumes under consideration provide two different kinds of answers to the questions that arise in connection with the new regime in the USSR: two are by journalists (Frankland and Walker), and two by academics (Bialer and McCauley in association with other contributors). Perhaps surprisingly, given the lively and topical nature of the material with which they are dealing, it is the books by academics that provide the greater degree of satisfaction. Frankland and Walker are two British representatives of the long succession of foreign correspondents based in Moscow who write up their experiences. They invite comparison with the books by Hedrick Smith and Robert Kaiser which appeared during the later Brezhnev years, as well as with more recent offerings by Michael Binyon, Richard Owen, Kevin Klose and others. Mark Frankland, in his study, adopts a chronological approach, following Soviet developments from the death of Brezhnev up to the end of 1986; Martin Walker, by contrast, adopts a thematic approach, which avoids the danger that his account will be overtaken by events by the time it appears. Both books, in fact, have much of interest.

Mark Frankland, who has worked for many years for the *Observer* (London) and has taken a long-standing interest in Soviet affairs, has the better credentials of the two journalists, but has not necessarily produced the better book. His chronological account is nicely written, full of pen-portraits and illustrative anecdotes, and supported by copious references to the Soviet press and scholarly literature. Yet the story is in most respects a familiar one, not least to those who have read Frankland's *Observer* despatches over the period with which it deals. There is a curiously dated feel to the accounts of corruption in the later Brezhnev years, and little of great novelty that he can contribute to the early Gorbachev years, which have been covered with great intensity by the Western press as a whole as well as by knowledgeable insiders such as Zhores

Medvedev. Particularly regrettable, to this reviewer, is the lack of a considered verdict on the new regime and on the degree of success that the reforming leadership of Gorbachev is likely to enjoy. The final chapter deals almost exclusively with foreign affairs; the last paragraph (ending 'Only when the Soviet Union at last knew what it wanted to be itself would it also know the terms on which it wanted to live with the rest of the world.') is almost studiously noncommittal. 'What', as Americans would ask, 'is the bottom line?'

Martin Walker's book, by contrast, succeeds better because it does advance an overall thesis (broadly speaking, that this new regime is 'transforming Russia and the world we live in'), and does so by considering a variety of aspects of Soviet life rather than following political developments at the centre in chronological sequence. Martin Walker became the *Guardian's* Moscow correspondent in 1984, only the third resident Soviet correspondent in the paper's history (his predecessors were Arthur Ransome and Malcolm Muggeridge, surely a hard act to follow). Walker's enthusiasm for the changes that are currently taking place in the USSR have made him a mildly controversial figure within the journalistic community. There can, however, be little doubt that his sympathy with the Gorbachev regime and the privileged access to information that this has brought him have allowed him an unusually good opportunity to write about the changes that are taking place in the USSR. His book discusses the position of women, economic reform, the armed forces and many other aspects of current Soviet life. Perhaps best of all, for this reviewer, is his sympathetic treatment of the attempts that are being made to restore parts of historic Moscow, an effort which has recently found favour at the highest levels of the Soviet leadership.

Seweryn Bialer's book is essentially a product of the Andropov-Chernenko years, but it also includes a preliminary assessment of the first few months of Gorbachev's secretaryship. For the student of Soviet domestic politics the two most interesting chapters are those in which he deals with the early Gorbachev regime and then with the 'politics of reform' more generally. The account presented is a broadly 'pessimistic' one, while still sympathetic to the objectives of the new leadership. Bialer does not expect Stalinist forms of economic management to be replaced, at least within the current decade, and yet, 'without major reforms, the slide of the Soviet economy will not be arrested, and its effectiveness will decline further'. The vested interests that oppose change are still strong and will remain so, and in any case it is not yet clear (in Bialer's view) that Gorbachev and his associates are seeking more than marginal changes. He remarks upon the superficial character of their diagnosis of the faults of the Soviet system, and describes their governing style as 'managerial-reformist'. A year or more later, and notwithstanding the January plenum and cautious moves towards the legalisation of individual economic activity, it is not yet clear that this is a mistaken (though it may be an ungenerous) assessment.

Martin McCauley's symposium also predates the January plenum, but it does take into account the 27th Party Congress of early 1986 and the new Party Programme, Party Rules and Five Year Plan. This is a book of eleven brief chapters, with no conclusion and no agreed overall assessment of the new Soviet administration. It does, however, contain some useful pointers. Ronald J Hill, for instance, in his chapter on state and ideology, notes the reconsideration that is now in progress of Brezhnev's notion of 'developed socialism', and points to the possibility of the extension of electoral choice (as duly occurred in the June 1987 local elections) and the use of the referendum as a device for popular consultation. Philip Hanson, in a solid chapter on the economy, points out that the main emphasis is still on streamlining a centralised system, and argues that there is less than total unanimity within the leadership about the pace and nature of further change. The final chapter, by Margot Light, provides a brief but useful *tour d'horizon* of Gorbachev's emerging foreign policy.

Are any more general conclusions in order? It is, of course, still early days; some may recall the Chinese philosopher, quoted in E H Carr's *What is History?*, who was asked for his assessment of the French Revolution and replied that it was 'too soon to offer an opinion on so recent an event'. Two main themes, however, have emerged still more starkly since these books were written. The first is the far-reaching ambitions of the Gorbachev leadership, extending into social statistics, history and literature as well as the areas considered in these volumes. The second, however, is the deep-seated resistance to change that has become apparent not only within official circles but also at the level of the ordinary population (*perestroika*, as Gorbachev complained at the January plenum, always seemed to be someone else's business, and the campaign against alcoholism has not been popular or even—it appears—particularly effective). The nature of change in the USSR has in a sense always depended upon these two rival tendencies; two years or more into a new leadership committed to a programme of far-reaching change, it is still far from clear that the forces of reform will ultimately prevail.

The future of China

Shaun Breslin

China—Politics, Economics and Society: Iconoclasm and Innovation in a Revolutionary Socialist Country

Marc Blecher

London: Frances Pinter, Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner. 1986. 232pp.
£22.50hb/£6.95pb

The China Challenge: Adjustment and Reform

David S G Goodman, Martin Lockett and Gerald Segal

London: Routledge and Kegan Paul (for Royal Institute of International Affairs). 1986. 86pp. £5.95pb

The Political Economy of Reform in Post-Mao China

Edited by Elizabeth J Perry and Christine Wong

Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press. 1985. 331pp. £11.95pb

The confirmation of Deng Xiaoping as *de facto* leader of China at the third plenum of the Twelfth Chinese Communist Party (ccp) Central Committee in December 1978 marked the beginning of a new era in Chinese politics. Under the banner of achieving 'The Four Modernisations', the post-Mao leadership has implemented a series of reforms intended to restore stability and order to society and legitimacy to the party after the tumultuous years of the Cultural Revolution. There has been much debate recently within the Chinese leadership about the success or otherwise of the reforms to date, and how far and in what direction they should be pursued in the future. Those discussions have been echoed by Western sinologists and are at the core of these three very different books on China.

Of the three books, *The China Challenge* and *The Political Economy of Reform in Post-Mao China* both had their origins in academic research papers. The former is the result of a study group on China for the Royal Institute of International Affairs, and the latter started life as a workshop on 'Recent Reforms in China' at Harvard University. Blecher's work, however, is part of the *Marxist Regimes* series, and as such has different obligations placed on its content matter. While *The China Challenge* and *The Political Economy of Reform in Post-Mao China* deal specifically with the post-1978 period, *China—Politics, Economics and Society* is designed as a textbook on China under ccp rule, and as such spends a lot of its time dealing with the pre-1978 period. Obviously, *The China Challenge* and *The Political Economy of Reform in Post-Mao China* refer to what came before in order to place the present reforms in context, and particularly in *The China Challenge*, knowledge of Chinese politics and history is often assumed. Blecher, however, starts with the decline of the empire and the ineptitude and corruption of the Guomindang and works his way through to the present day. It differs from other textbooks on China because its analytical framework is a study of the class nature of social relationships in China at any one time since the turn of the century. He therefore has to spend quite some time explaining how class relations and bases pre-1949 were important insofar as they effected, through broad class coalitions, the ability and willingness of the party to undertake reforms that would lead to the transition to socialism once they came to power. Although

the book occasionally becomes rather overburdened by narrative, it contains a thorough examination of the importance of class relationships and inequality in China, and the lessons that can be learnt from this regarding the more general study of the dialectics of socialism. Because the meat of this argument is contained in one short and intense chapter, the book becomes slightly unbalanced, and was also spoilt by occasional outbreaks of epidemics of parentheses that break the flow of the arguments being presented. Not surprisingly, Blecher does not appear to be over-enamoured by the effect of the Dengist reforms on the social and political order in China. He accuses the party of virtually abandoning Marxist theory, and creating structural inequality with policies such as the introduction of key-point schools, policies that may have a profound effect on the future of socialism if the post-Mao experiments become a blueprint for reform in other socialist countries.

The China Challenge concerns itself specifically with an appraisal of the reforms implemented in China up to the first half of 1986, and engages in the always uncertain task of assessing the prospects for China in the future. The book is split into a study of the effects and reasons for the reforms in three key areas: 'Power and Policy' by David Goodman, 'Economic Growth and Development' by Martin Lockett, and 'Modernising Foreign Policy' by Gerry Segal, although it is accepted that all three areas are inextricably linked. Goodman assesses the question of leadership and stresses the importance of the role of collective leadership in post-Mao China, notably playing down the role of Deng Xiaoping and showing the importance of other figures, such as the veteran economist, Chen Yun. For Goodman, the key factor has been the search for stability, which can be seen in the way that despite the fact that differences of opinion still occur, they are now freely aired and discussed and do not prevent leaders working together. This has led to China being politically more stable now than at any time since 1949, but the dangers for the future lie in a generation of leaders who are all growing old with no younger generation waiting to take their places. With regards to the economy, Lockett discusses the extent to which the changes that have been made are real reforms, or merely readjustments made to the present system. His conclusion is less than optimistic, as he suggests that there is a lack of coordination in the economy and that the reforms are limited and uneven and, as such, only partially deal with the real problems in the economy, thus implying that the successes seen since 1978 will not be sustained in the future. The state of the economy is seen by Segal as being closely linked with the attempts by the present leadership to overcome the failures of the foreign policy pursued by Zhou Enlai and Mao Zedong. He suggests that in this area at least, there have been dramatic reforms rather than just readjustments and cites the move away from giving aid to states to further the cause of socialism (with a few exceptions) to a desire to emphasise the importance of the economic rather than the military and ideological imperatives of foreign policy. He also plays down the relationship

between China and the USA, saying that the honeymoon of the 1970s is over as the decline of the Soviet threat has led to a more balanced approach to relations with the superpowers. As far as the future is concerned, he shows a reluctance to speculate, emphasising that foreign policy depends upon political stability which, in turn, depends on successes, or otherwise, in the economic sector. Each section of *The China Challenge* is well written, informative and thought-provoking, which makes the whole an excellent handbook for those interested in the present and future of China.

The Political Economy of Reform in Post-Mao China is a series of ten essays by political scientists and political economists ranging in subject matter from the effects of reform on socialist agriculture through the single child family policy to the financial reforms in the industrial system. Its aims are similar to those of *The China Challenge*, but it differs insofar as it goes into much more detail about the actual mechanics of the reforms and, in many cases, is much more technical. For example, Louis Putterman examines in his chapter on 'The Restoration of the Peasant Household as Farm Production Unit in China', the differences between the economic theory of incentives and the Chinese explanation of their use of incentives. A further difference between *The China Challenge* and *The Political Economy of Reform in Post-Mao China* is the way in which the latter's authors use personal interviews, statistics and comments from the Chinese press to back up their arguments. There are times, notably in Terry Sicular's chapter on rural marketing and exchange, where the number of figures being quoted almost reaches saturation point and tends to overshadow the general argument. However, the contrast of Elizabeth Perry's chapter on rural collective violence highlights the vast variety of topics included in this volume. If a recurring theme can be found, it is that the reforms may be producing good results at present, but that lack of coordination has meant that some reforms, such as agricultural restructuring, have not gone far enough, and others, such as the decentralisation of investment and spending powers to production units, have gone too far. Christine Wong sums up this basic underlying theme in her chapter on industrial reform and the local sector when she says, 'Serious problems loom on the horizon.' Other chapters deal with the effect of the reforms on peasant income, the politics of industrial reform and the changing role for grass-roots cadres. It is hard to judge a book like this as a whole and the diversity of the subjects studied, together with the editor's professed wish that the volume will be used for classroom work, leads me to the conclusion that, unlike *The China Challenge*, it is not a good idea to read this book from cover to cover, but merely to refer to relevant chapters individually. Unfortunately, as the information for the book was collected in April 1983, it is perhaps not as up to date as it might be; this does not prevent it from being, on the whole, a more than useful insight into the mechanics of the post-Mao reforms in China.

Apartheid observed

Donald Woods

Move Your Shadow: South Africa, Black and White

Joseph Lelyveld

London: Sphere Books. 1987. 390pp. £3.95pb

Black and Gold: Tycoons, Revolutionaries and Apartheid

Anthony Sampson

London: Hodder and Stoughton. 1987. 280pp. £12.95hb

The Sanctions Handbook

Joseph Hanlon and Roger Omond

Harmondsworth: Penguin. 1987. 389pp. £4.95pb

South Africa: No Easy Path to Peace

Graham Leach

London: Methuen. 1986. 312pp. £2.95pb

King Solomon's Mines Revisited: Western Interests and the Burdened History of Southern Africa

William Minter

New York: Basic Books. 1986. 401pp. n/p

It is ironical that the period of intensification of censorship in South Africa has coincided with the richest yield in valuable books about that country, and five of the best among these are the above titles.

Move Your Shadow is, to me, the best book about South Africa by a non-South African. Joseph Lelyveld had been expelled from South Africa more than a decade ago as *New York Times* representative, and when, during its brief period of 'reformist' zeal, the South African government approached the newspaper about opening up an office there again during the era of 'Constructive Engagement', the *New York Times* said the first person it would send would be Lelyveld. Someone present at the discussion recorded that Pretoria's Foreign Minister Roelof 'Pik' Botha clutched his head at the thought as he reluctantly agreed. Botha must have clutched his head again on reading *Move Your Shadow*, because it records in the most damning way the collision

course mentality of South Africa's whites. The title comes from the only Fanagalo or pidgin-Nguni ever learned by most whites, and is used by golfers to their caddies as they are about to putt. The phrase is, of course, also an apt reflection of how white South Africans regard blacks, how insubstantial they really wish blacks were, and how easily they would like them to be wished away like the shadows of the golf caddies.

For me the most memorable part of the book is where Lelyveld records how he rode the early-morning commuter buses which so many blacks have to use, rising long before dawn and returning home as late as ten o'clock at night because the places of work are so far from the areas in which blacks are allowed to live. On reading this I wondered why it had first to be done by an American, and why we South African journalists hadn't thought of doing this sort of thing before Lelyveld did.

His brief word-sketches of whites in authority are all the more damning because he simply records their words and lets them hang themselves on their own evidence. He also turns the spotlight on the black 'homelands' leaders and, by a similar process, illuminates the extent of their collaboration and corruption. His descriptions of Ciskei's Lennox Sebe and his brother Charles are gems of journalistic annihilation.

This is a brilliant book, which will surely continue for years to be one of the classics on South Africa as observed by a foreigner who clearly cares deeply for the country and its people.

Black and Gold is in the same league, and has special authority because it is by the most respected writer on the two subjects of South Africa and international finance. Anthony Sampson has unique credibility and credentials. When he writes on Tambo and Mandela he is writing not only of political figures but of close personal friends in the Johannesburg of the 1950s, and when he advises a Rockefeller in New York or an Astor in London he is talking of respected friends to respected friends.

In this case his message is that the West should disengage from the economic underpinnings of apartheid and throw its influence and power behind the movement for liberation of the majority in South Africa. Though the message is nothing new—Sampson has been advocating this for more than a generation—what is new is the readiness of Western power-brokers to listen to him on the subject. The difference is that they are at last getting the message that their best interests are not compatible with a close identification with Pretoria.

Sampson traces the history of British and American financial involvement in South Africa and its various stages of intensification, and concludes that the time for the final choice of sides by the West in South Africa is now, and that if the right choice is not made or is delayed the West will have reason to regret it.

The Sanctions Handbook is unique. Here, for the first time, the facts for and against sanctions in regard to South Africa are laid out without the weighting of

special pleading in their enumeration, though the authors are anything but vague as to their own sympathies and preferences. Joseph Hanlon has become an authority on the economics of the Southern African sub-continent during South Africa's drive for destabilisation of the region, and Roger Omond has long been one of the most reliable writers on the subject of apartheid and its statutory machinery. The great value of writers like Omond is that while his innermost passion in opposing apartheid is no less than that of any other writer, his brand of professional integrity makes him unable to bend or suppress any relevant truth in the assembling of his information, so that he can be trusted utterly on issues of fact. This book is crammed with the kinds of facts which all persons concerned with the South African issue need to know. Being largely a book of facts, it will no doubt be quoted, sometimes out of context, by those who oppose sanctions. But as one of those who support sanctions I find it an invaluable reference, and one that can be used to outquote the opposition.

South Africa: No Easy Path To Peace is, like *Move Your Shadow*, a book by a foreign journalist who has developed a deep affection for South Africans and South Africa and its particular value lies in the vivid descriptions by its author, Graham Leach, of the 'aboveground' politics and politicians of the country as he has met and interviewed them. Understandably some of his historical references are open to challenge, as when he describes Botha as the first South African leader since the early part of the century to tour Europe. Jan Smuts and even D F Malan had far warmer welcomes to Europe during their premierships. He also gives the impression that the first demolition raids on Crossroads near Cape Town were in 1978, whereas they started in August 1975 and were the subject of controversial debates in 1976 and 1977 when Minister Steyn after denying that shacks were levelled by bulldozers was forced to concede that his denial rested on the fact that the bulldozers were more correctly termed 'front-end loaders'.

But what Graham Leach does so usefully for us is to relate his own valuable experiences as an observer at Crossroads, Soweto and Sharpeville and to bear out yet again the validity in some circumstances of the old saying: 'The onlooker sees most of the game.' His professionalism as BBC correspondent in Southern Africa enables him to take the wide view while bringing us up to date on some of the personalities who are central players in the Southern African drama. It is his kind of trained observance that will be most missed as censorship bites increasingly in South Africa.

King Solomon's Mines Revisited is in many ways a companion piece to Anthony Sampson's *Black and Gold*, with essentially the same message—that time is running out for the West in its relations with the majority who will inevitably govern post-apartheid South Africa.

This is a powerful book, hard-hitting, in the sense that it leaves the West no excuses for the sordid support of successive repressive regimes in South Africa for material gain, and it deals mercilessly and appropriately with the most

sordid chapters of all in this long history of support—the Republican years of Nixon, Kissinger, Reagan and Crocker culminating in the infamy of ‘Constructive Engagement’. William Minter has performed an invaluable service with this volume. It is compulsory reading for anyone seriously interested in South Africa.

Environmental warfare

Alastair Hay

Herbicides in War: The Long-Term Ecological and Human Consequences

Edited by Arthur H Westing

London: Taylor and Francis. 1984. 210pp. £15.00hb

Environmental Warfare: A Technical, Legal and Policy Appraisal

Edited by Arthur H Westing

London: Taylor and Francis. 1984. 107pp. £12.00hb

Environmental issues are on the political agenda once more. Public concern about the threat to forests and inland waterways from acid rain is forcing governments in Europe and North America to take steps, albeit hesitant, to control it. Pollution, like disease, has no frontiers and is at last being seen for what it is, a threat to us all.

Twenty-five years ago, we were not so aware. When the US started to use herbicides in Vietnam to defoliate the forests there was no public outcry. The Kennedy Administration expected one and at first only agreed to a limited herbicide spraying programme, until it could assess public reaction. Anticipating accusations that the United States was waging chemical warfare, Kennedy was reassured when none were made.

Pressed by his military to allow increasing use of herbicides, Kennedy agreed. With no evidence to suggest that the chemicals presented any health hazard, and with reports from commanders in the field that the denuded trees reduced enemy cover and, with it, the risk of ambush, Kennedy had little choice but to agree. But there was a health risk. It was made public seven years later in a report leaked from the US Department of Health. The report showed that Agent Orange, one of the herbicides in use in Vietnam, caused birth deformities when tested in animals. This laboratory study implied that the

herbicide could have the same effect in man, and it undermined the Pentagon's case that the herbicides were safe; clearly they were not.

The new evidence about birth deformities—suppressed for eighteen months until the report was leaked—and growing public protest about the Vietnam war in general and herbicide use in particular, forced the Pentagon to stop the defoliation programme. The day of reckoning had arrived. Since then a growing appreciation of the damage caused by the defoliation has led many people to the conclusion that this sort of warfare must be stopped.

Herbicides in War and *Environmental Warfare*, both volumes emanating from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) help to make the case for stopping. The former volume is the published proceedings of a conference held in Ho Chi Minh City (formerly Saigon) in January 1983 to assess the long-term effects of the defoliation programme. It is made abundantly clear that those effects were devastating. Between 1962–1971 the US sprayed some 19 million gallons of herbicide over 10.3 per cent of Vietnam's inland forests, 36 per cent of mangrove forests, 3 per cent of cultivated land and 5 per cent of other land. Most of the herbicide used was Agent Orange, although others, Agents Blue and White—so called because of the painted bands on the drums in which the herbicides were shipped to Vietnam—helped to make up the total.

Convened, in the main, to review the work of Vietnamese scientists, the Ho Chi Minh Conference brought together scientists from many countries with expertise on environmental issues. *Herbicides in War* contains the reports of their working groups which evaluated the impact of the defoliants on Vietnam's ecology and on the health of the population. Chemists addressed the problem of how to measure the concentration of the toxic contaminant dioxin (2,3,7,8-tetrachlorodibenzodioxin) present in Agent Orange—and responsible for the birth deformities in the animal tests—in the environment.

Background to these subject areas is provided, in the main, by Vietnamese scientists, while the overall findings are set in context by reviews written by American, Swedish and British scientists. Their conclusions are that Vietnam's inland and mangrove forests suffered immediate and extensive damage as a result of the spraying and that the effects persist. Only a massive replanting programme—already started by the Vietnamese—will heal the scars of war. For this work to succeed international aid will be essential. Sadly this has not come to pass. Help on the scale envisaged by the conference has not materialised. Vietnam is being left to replant her own mangrove forests with seeds imported from the south of the country. Drawing on the expertise of her own scientists, Vietnam is slowly but surely replacing these coastal forests.

The picture is far grimmer inland. Repeated spraying of the forests during the war and the felling of sprayed timber by villagers has denuded large tracts of once thickly afforested land. With the trees gone, the fertility of the soil has fallen, assisting low-grade bamboo and elephant grass to recolonise the area.

Replanting has become a major problem and some of the mistakes that have been made were perhaps inevitable, as the Vietnamese tried different approaches to stitch up the wounds to the countryside. It is not something they should have to do on their own.

The USA is still blocking attempts by UN agencies to provide funds and expertise to help with the problem. The Reagan Administration even attempted to stop the agencies sending representatives to the Ho Chi Minh Conference. Some were pressed to stay away, but others such as UNESCO, and the Food and Agriculture Organisation and the UN Environment Programme sent officers. Any help they have been able to provide since then has been trivial.

While the damage to the environment is clear-cut, assessing the effects of the various chemicals on the health of the population is more difficult. Vietnamese scientists believe that the herbicides are responsible for an increase in liver cancer and in the number of children born physically handicapped. Regrettably, the evidence to assess both claims is far from complete and the conference recommended further work to gather more information.

With former US veterans of the war having successfully sued the chemical companies that supplied the herbicides for compensation, for injuries they alleged were caused by exposure to the chemicals, the Vietnamese are more convinced than ever that their health has suffered. Many international scientists are of the same opinion, and are currently helping to collect evidence to prove it.

It is small consolation for Vietnam that the havoc visited on her has led to moves to prevent the same thing happening again elsewhere. Attempts to manipulate the environment of Indochina also included seeding clouds with silver iodide to increase rainfall, and breaching reservoirs to cause flooding. Outrage at these practices, amongst others, led to the enactment of the Environmental Modification (ENMOD) Convention in 1977. Designed to prohibit acts of war intended to change the natural environment, the Convention still fell short of what was needed.

Environmental Warfare is written with the object of filling in the gaps. Drawing on other historical incidents such as the dynamiting of the Huayuankow dyke on the Yellow River by Chinese forces in 1938 to block the advance of Japanese soldiers, this book drives home the point that environmental warfare is indiscriminate in its effects. When the dyke broke, the subsequent flood drowned several thousand Japanese soldiers and removed the immediate threat to the Chinese army. But it was not only the Emperor's forces who perished; several hundred thousand Chinese also drowned and millions were made homeless as the Yellow River burst its banks.

Non-combatants bear the brunt of any act of environmental warfare and in Vietnam it was the civilians who were the real victims. Something is needed to remedy the situation. *Environmental Warfare* makes suggestions on how this

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might be done. The book reviews the ENMOD Convention and suggests tightening the text to exclude *any* manipulation of the environment—as some is still permitted—by armed forces, and the outlawing of research on methods of manipulation for hostile purposes.

In the light of the evidence, few would cavil at these recommendations; we will all benefit from them. The three years since these books were published have witnessed growing concern about the fragility of our environment. A disaster such as the Chernobyl nuclear reactor explosion has had effects far beyond the Soviet border. Chernobyl, acid rain, damage to the ozone layer and the felling of tropical rainforest help to ram home the message that we live in an interdependent environment. These two publications also remind us of this and show how devastating environmental warfare can be, and why it has to stop.

LITERARY PROFILE

Searching for a centre: the writing of V S Naipaul

John Thieme

Few writers arouse more controversy than V S Naipaul. Comments he has made for his disaffected reports on the Third World, such as 'Africa has no future',¹ 'It was on Mauritius that the dodo forgot how to fly',² and 'Muslim fundamentalism has no intellectual substance to it, therefore it must collapse',³ have stirred up considerable animosity towards him in many of the countries he has visited. His dismissal of his native Trinidad as 'unimportant, uncreative, cynical'⁴ and of the West Indies as the 'Third World's third world'⁵ has elicited a similar response in the Caribbean, while his two books about his ancestral homeland of India, *An Area of Darkness* (1964) and *India: A Wounded Civilization* (1977), which dwell on the outdoor defecating habits of Indians and the way in which the Hindu doctrine of *karma* has enmeshed the populace in a quietism tantamount to psychic paralysis, have brought his name into fairly general disrepute among intellectuals on the sub-continent.

His most serious criticisms of the Third World, which have guaranteed that the critical response to his work has seldom been lukewarm, have mainly appeared in his non-fiction. In his novels and short stories there is a more oblique approach to the malaise that he finds endemic in colonial and post-colonial societies, and social themes are subsumed in narratives which focus primarily on the psychology of trapped and displaced individuals. Non-fiction works such as *An Area of Darkness* and *India: A Wounded Civilisation*, which initially appear to be social diatribes, can be read as intensely personal documents dramatising the author's own sense of deracination. Similarly, novels such as *A House for Mr Biswas* (1961), *Guerrillas* (1975) and *A Bend in the River* (1979), which initially appear to be concerned with specific inter-personal relationships, can be read as allegories of colonial and post-colonial experience. It is his continuing concern with the consequences of imperialism and its aftermath—particularly the psychological consequences—which makes Naipaul difficult to ignore, despite his many dismissive remarks about the Third World.

Naipaul's origins cast considerable light on the theme of personal

¹ 'Meeting V S Naipaul', Naipaul interviewed by Elizabeth Hardwick, *New York Times Book Review*, 13 May 1979, p 36.

² *The Overcrowded Barracoon*, London: André Deutsch, 1972, p 256.

³ Naipaul interviewed by Edward Behr, *Newsweek*, 18 August 1980, p 38.

⁴ *The Middle Passage*, Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1969, p 43.

⁵ *The Overcrowded Barracoon*, p 250.

displacement which looms so large in his work. Although his subsequent absorption into the English tradition has tended to obscure his West Indian East Indianness, his early life and the family structure into which he was born prove to have been crucial determinants of his personality and writings. His grandparents migrated to Trinidad from India under the system of indentureship, but both the Naipauls and the Capildeos (Naipaul's maternal ancestors) were untypical of the majority of Trinidad's East Indian population in that they were brahmins, and both sides of the family could boast pundits (who ministered to the spiritual needs of the new agricultural work-force) among their members.

To be a high-caste Hindu in Trinidad was to be something of a contradiction in terms, since, as Naipaul's younger brother Shiva points out in his African travel journal *North of South*, 'Our ancestors, when they crossed the black water (the *kala pani*), lost caste. Complex purification rituals would have to be performed if they were to be cleansed of their defilement and restored to the fold.'⁶ Naipaul frequently illustrates the problematic situation of the high-caste East Indian West Indian and provides extended commentary on it in *A House for Mr Biswas*, where the Tulsi family, closely modelled on the Capildeos, are depicted as a bastion of the old India in Trinidad, fighting a losing rearguard action against the encroachments of the larger Creole society of the West Indian melting-pot.

Yet displaced Hinduism is only one aspect of the sense of deracination that pervades Naipaul's early fiction. In *The Mimic Men* (1967) the narrator/protagonist, Ralph Singh, says this of the history of Empire he once dreamed of writing:

It was my hope to give expression to the restlessness, the deep disorder, which the great explorations, the overthrow in three continents of established social organizations, the unnatural bringing together of peoples who could achieve fulfilment only within the security of their own societies and the landscapes hymned by their ancestors, it was my hope to give partial expression to the restlessness which this great upheaval has brought about.⁷

And, while Singh's narrative persona should not simply be identified with Naipaul, these sentiments provide a useful summary of both this novel's larger concerns and those of Naipaul's writing more generally. The disharmony engendered by the sundering of supposedly organic links with ancestral landscapes lies at the heart of his view of the colonial predicament.

On a more personal level, his father, Seepersad (1906-53), proved a crucial formative influence, as Naipaul makes clear in his Foreword to *The Adventures of Gurudeva* (1976),⁸ the revised British edition of a volume of short stories which Seepersad Naipaul had originally published in Trinidad in the early

⁶ *North of South*, London: André Deutsch, 1978, p 73.

⁷ *The Mimic Men*, London: André Deutsch, 1967, p 38.

⁸ *The Adventures of Gurudeva*, London: André Deutsch, 1976, pp 7-23.

1940s.⁹ Seepersad was for many years a journalist on the *Trinidad Guardian*, the island's leading newspaper, and both his journalism and his fiction provided an inspiration for the young Naipaul. This is particularly evident in *A House for Mr Biswas*, where, following his father's advice to take him for a subject,¹⁰ he wrote a fictionalised version of Seepersad's life-story, based on aspects of his fiction and journalism and details from his life, particularly his response to the practices of Hinduism.

Naipaul was born in Chaguanas in central Trinidad in 1932. His actual birthplace was the 'Lion House', an imposing building in the town's main street with a unique Indian design. The house provided the original on which Hanuman House in *A House for Mr Biswas* was based and it was here that Naipaul spent his earliest years until his family moved, in 1938, to Port of Spain. In 1942, like Anand in *A House for Mr Biswas*, he came third in the island's exhibition exam (from which free secondary school places could be gained) and won a place at Queen's Royal College, Trinidad's leading secondary school. Naipaul attended the school from 1943 to 1949, specialising in French and Spanish in the upper forms. During these years, in a manner akin to the nomadic wanderings of Mr Biswas and his family, the Naipauls moved several times, before eventually settling, in 1947, in a house in the St James area of Port of Spain. This house was the original for the final house in *Mr Biswas*.

In 1949 Naipaul was awarded a Trinidad government scholarship to study abroad and the following year left Trinidad to take up a place at University College, Oxford. It was a wish come true. In an oft-quoted passage he records his desire to escape from his colonial homeland:

When I was in the fourth form I wrote a vow on the endpaper of my *Kennedy's Revised Latin Primer* to leave within five years. I left after six; and for many years afterwards in England, falling asleep in bedsitters with the electric fire on, I had been awakened by the nightmare that I was back in tropical Trinidad.¹¹

So, like the unnamed boy narrator of *Miguel Street* (1959), Naipaul was able to leave Trinidad through the escape route offered by a metropolitan education. Yet the island society and, more specifically, his Hindu origins had left an indelible mark on him.

At Oxford Naipaul read English, but was disappointed to find himself studying a syllabus 'seemingly aimed at juvenile antiquarians'.¹² Although he distinguished himself at Oxford—J R R Tolkien, who was one of his examiners, rated his Anglo-Saxon translation the best of his year¹³—he was disenchanted with the academic curriculum and already determined to become

⁹ *Gurudeva and other Indian Tales*, Port of Spain: Trinidad Publications, n.d. (1943?).

¹⁰ *The Adventures of Gurudeva*, Foreword, p 17.

¹¹ *The Middle Passage*, p 43.

¹² 'An Area of Brilliance', *The Observer* (London) 28 November 1971, p 8.

¹³ *ibid.*

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a writer. While still at Oxford, he completed a long novel, which was not published.

After coming down from Oxford in 1954, Naipaul worked briefly in the Cataloguing Department of the National Portrait Gallery, London. Apart from part-time jobs in Trinidad while waiting to take up his scholarship, and a period of ten weeks writing advertising copy after reading an unfavourable review of his first novel, this is the only non-literary work Naipaul has ever undertaken and it is one of his proudest boasts that he has known no other profession than that of writer. During his early years in London, he lived in several areas. After initially staying with relatives in Paddington, where he suffered from asthma attacks for four months, he subsequently lived in Kilburn, Muswell Hill and Streatham. It was in Streatham that *A House for Mr Biswas*, a novel which he has referred to as 'very much a South London book'¹⁴ was written. His experience of living there also clearly lies behind his one 'English' novel, *Mr Stone and the Knights Companion* (1963). In 1955 Naipaul married Patricia Anne Hale, an English woman he had met at Oxford.

From 1954 to 1956 Naipaul worked for the BBC's *Caribbean Voices*, a programme of which he became editor. It was broadcast weekly from London to the West Indies and had already built up a considerable reputation as a showcase for new Caribbean writing; it had provided several of the important generation of West Indian writers who came to the fore in the 1950s with an invaluable early outlet for their work. It was while he was working for the BBC that Naipaul began to write stories for what was eventually to take shape as *Miguel Street* (1959).¹⁵ The book was written quickly in a period of six weeks, at the end of which time Naipaul felt he had found himself as a writer. A publisher was not, however, immediately forthcoming and it was only after the publication of his first two novels, *The Mystic Masseur* (1957) and *The Suffrage of Elvira* (1958) that *Miguel Street* found its way into print.

In these early books the colonial situation of the characters is for the most part implicit, but it is nevertheless central to an understanding of their predicament. In *Miguel Street* the inhabitants of the fictional Port of Spain street which gives the book its title either imitate foreign role models or strive to find a sense of identity through a macho ethic similar to that embodied in calypso, Trinidad's most important folk narrative medium. Yet they was not, however, immediately forthcoming and it was only after the their quest for self-fulfilment. In *The Mystic Masseur* the narrative takes the form of a rogue's progress, as the picaroon hero gradually rises to the top of the society. In *The Suffrage of Elvira* the formula is reversed: the action focuses not on a trickster, as in *The Mystic Masseur*, but on a protagonist who is the victim of trickery, a candidate from Port of Spain who comes to the rottener-than-

¹⁴ 'Portrait Gallery', Naipaul interviewed by David Bates, *Sunday Times Magazine* (London), 26 May 1963, p 13.

¹⁵ See *Finding the Centre*, London: André Deutsch, 1984, pp 17-33.

rotten constituency of Elvira in South Trinidad to buy himself a seat in Trinidad's second election under universal suffrage, and finds himself no match for the locals' sharp practice as he is forced to bribe and bribe again. As polling-day approaches, he begins to fear defeat, but there is no such *peripeteia*. He has paid through the nose for the seat and he wins it. This, Naipaul's dead-pan manner suggests, is the way things work in Trinidad. Everyone and everything has a price and to succeed one must pay it. The ground rules are clear enough. The irony of this, Naipaul's most richly comic novel, emerges not from exposure of the characters' moral aberrations, but from the implicit suggestion that this is a society in which concepts of justice and morality do not operate.

It is a view of society which is articulated more clearly in Naipaul's Caribbean travel journal, *The Middle Passage* (1962), in which he writes about the supremacy of the trickster figure in Trinidad and claims an affinity between the society in which he grew up and the amoral world of the Spanish picaresque novel:

Every person of eminence was held to be crooked and contemptible. We lived in a society which denied itself heroes. . . . For talent, a futility, the Trinidadian substituted intrigue; and in the exercise of this, in small things as well as large, he became a master.¹⁶

By 1960 Naipaul's British reputation was already considerable. He was the author of three successful books, two of which won prizes, and he had been reviewing fiction for the *New Statesman* since 1957. He was, however, still struggling to make a living as a writer. He was hard at work on *A House for Mr Biswas*, his longest novel and the work which many critics regard as his masterpiece.

Mr Biswas is both a minutely circumstantial account of an individual life and a novel which may be read as an allegory of the East Indian's situation in Trinidad, or of the colonial predicament more generally. Naipaul has described the colonial mentality as a kind of existentialist impotence, a condition in which the individual feels powerless to exercise freedom of choice:

. . . to be a colonial is, in a way, to know a total kind of security. It is to have all decisions about major issues taken out of one's hands. It is to feel that one's political status has been settled so finally that there is very little one can do in the world.¹⁷

From early on in his life Mohun Biswas is a victim of this condition; he feels a sense of displacement and resolves to own a house of his own. The succession of houses in which he lives—mostly as a tenant—forms a structural pattern which covers many aspects of Hindu life in pre-Independence Trinidad and, by extension, the colonial psychology. Central to this pattern is Biswas's alternation between periods of passive dependence on his in-laws, the Tulsis.

¹⁶ *The Middle Passage*, pp 43–4.

¹⁷ 'Without a Place', V S Naipaul in conversation with Ian Hamilton, *Times Literary Supplement* (London), 30 July 1971, p 897.

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who represent the older Hindu way of life, now struggling to maintain a sense of distinctiveness in the larger Creole society of Trinidad, and attempts to assert his independence (to decolonise himself?) which are mainly channelled into the ideal of the house.

Two early attempts at building his own house fail and, since throughout there is a correlation between Biswas's psychic health and the houses in which he lives—he breaks down when the first of these two houses is destroyed in a storm—the suggestion seems to be that he is not yet a sufficiently emancipated person to stand alone. Finally he is duped into paying too much for a jerry-built modern house where he dies at the age of forty-six. The wheel has come full circle, since the novel's Prologue has adumbrated this conclusion, but now that the full story has been told, the ending is fraught with ambiguity. Though Biswas has been cheated and though the expense and worry of the final house may well have contributed to his early death, he has succeeded in attaining his ideal of the house, in claiming his own 'portion of the earth'.¹⁸ The Prologue has concluded with the remark that it would have been 'terrible' for Biswas to have died 'unnecessary and unaccommodated'¹⁹ and this has been averted, since he is accommodated both literally and metaphorically. The acquisition of the final house may be seen as representing a partial freedom, a limited movement beyond the colonial psychology.

After completing *A House for Mr Biswas*, Naipaul was awarded a three-month scholarship by the Trinidad and Tobago government, which enabled him to return to Trinidad. While he was there, the Prime Minister and distinguished West Indian historian, Dr Eric Williams, suggested that he should write a book about the Caribbean, and the scholarship was extended to enable him to visit other parts of the region. Naipaul spent a total of seven months travelling in the Caribbean, visiting Dutch and French societies as well as other Anglophone territories. *The Middle Passage*, the first of Naipaul's many non-fiction works, was the result of these travels. The book is as much a social investigation as a traveller's journal and throughout it demonstrates a concern with cultural identity in the Caribbean and Guianas. While the section on British Guiana (Guyana) is the longest, the Trinidad chapter looms largest, for here Naipaul is writing as much from past experience as from his present visit, and the result is a response characterised by provocative remarks about the island's inhabitants, such as: 'Port of Spain is the noisiest city in the world. Yet it is forbidden to talk,'²⁰ and 'Like monkeys pleading for evolution, each claiming to be better than the other, Indians and Negroes appeal to the unacknowledged white audience to see how much they despise each other.'²¹

Not surprisingly, such remarks have made the book notorious in the West

¹⁸ *A House for Mr Biswas*, London: André Deutsch, 1961, p. 13.

¹⁹ *ibid.*

²⁰ *The Middle Passage*, p. 58.

²¹ *ibid.*, p. 87.

Indies and attacks on it include a review by the Jamaican novelist, John Hearne, who raises the charge of negrophobia.²² Outside the Trinidad chapter, the writing is more matter-of-fact and, while the remainder of the work is not without its moments of waspish satire, it lacks the vitriolic and tendentious quality of this section.

Now launched on a second career as a travel writer, Naipaul in 1962 received a Phoenix Trust Award to write a book about India. He has always felt it necessary to be physically absent from the places he is treating in his fiction and while in India he wrote his only novel with an entirely English setting and protagonist, *Mr Stone and the Knights Companion* (1963). Despite the change in setting, this is a work which demonstrates considerable similarity with the two masterpieces of Naipaul's fictional *oeuvre* so far, *A House for Mr Biswas* and *The Mimic Men*. Like these two novels, it is a fable about cultural identity and like his most recent work, *The Enigma of Arrival* (1987), it is a 'Condition of England' novel.²³

In a 1971 interview Naipaul said:

In writing my first four or five books (including books which perhaps people think of as my big books) I was simply recording my reactions to the world; I hadn't come to any conclusions about it. . . . But since then, through my writing, through the effort honestly to respond, I have begun to have ideas about the world. I have begun to analyse.²⁴

This suggests that a change occurred in his attitude to writing and responding to experience about the time he first went to India and the journey to the sub-continent did mark a watershed in Naipaul's development. Never having felt at home in Trinidad or England, he travelled to India in the hope that it would offer a culture where he would experience a sense of belonging. He came away feeling 'It was a journey that ought not to have been made; it had broken my life in two.'²⁵ His experiences in India are recorded in *An Area of Darkness* (1964), but an article reprinted in *The Overcrowded Barracoon* (1972) provides the most succinct account of his reactions as a returned colonial:

A colonial in the double sense of one who had grown up in a Crown colony and one who had been cut off from the metropolis, be it either England or India, I came to India expecting to find metropolitan attitudes. I had imagined that in some ways the largeness of the land would be reflected in the attitudes of the people. I have found . . . the psychology of the cell and the hive.²⁶

An Area of Darkness is a highly personal book, finally far more an account of personal trauma than an analysis of the social malaise Naipaul detects in India.

²² *Caribbean Quarterly*, 8 December 1962, p 65-6.

²³ This theme is developed in my article 'Naipaul's English fable: *Mr Stone and the Knights Companion*', *Modern Fiction Studies* 30(3) Autumn 1984, pp 497-503.

²⁴ 'The Writer as Colonial', V S Naipaul interviewed by Adrian Rowe-Evans, *Transition* (40) 1971, pp 56-7.

²⁵ *An Area of Darkness*, London: André Deutsch, 1964, pp 279-80.

²⁶ 'In the Middle of the Journey', *The Overcrowded Barracoon*, p 44.

It does, however, attack India on several levels. The hierarchical division of labour occasioned by the caste system, the Indian lack of a sense of history and the conflicts he finds between Hindu tenets on cleanliness and the omnipresent excrement he sees are all particular objects of his irony. Though Naipaul may appear to be attacking a variety of targets, virtually all the Hindu failings which he documents in *An Area of Darkness* can be traced to the influence of *karma*, the doctrine that says that one's fate in life is determined by one's behaviour in previous incarnations. Naipaul sees it as a paralysing, defeating philosophy, which induces a quietism that precludes Western-style self-realisation and progress.²⁷

Naipaul's voice in *An Area of Darkness* purports to be that of a detached outsider. Throughout, however, he emerges as an irritable and hypersensitive traveller and this has the effect of undermining the credibility of his reportage. Towards the end, this pattern comes to a head, when he goes on a pilgrimage to see the Shiva *lingam* in the Cave of Amarnath. Disgusted by the insanitary habits of his fellow-pilgrims, he finally refuses to enter the cave. His Muslim companion returns to say that no *lingam* has formed this year, but this does not obviate the fact that Naipaul has declined to encounter the symbol of the Hindu continuity. He remains a spectator, retaining an aura of detachment through non-participation. It is an attitude which is close to the *karma*-induced resignation that he deplores and, to his credit, Naipaul subsequently admits as much in a passage which links Indian non-involvement with his own: 'It is only now, as the impatience of the observer is dissipated in the process of writing and self-inquiry, that I see how much this philosophy has also been mine.'²⁸ It would appear to be this discovery that makes for the more analytical stance in Naipaul's later work.

In 1966 Naipaul spent six months as Writer-in-Residence at Makerere University in Uganda. During this period he travelled in East Africa and Zaire. It provided the material from which the title-novella of *In a Free State* (1971) grew. Towards the end of his time in East Africa, Naipaul lived in a hotel in western Kenya. While in Uganda and Kenya he wrote the London sections of *The Mimic Men*; the West Indian parts were written in London.

The Mimic Men (1967) is another major exploration of the colonial psychology, as the protagonist, Ralph Singh (né Ranjit Kripalsingh), seeks, like Mr Biswas and Mr Stone, to impose order on his life. The novel takes the form of Singh's autobiographical memoir and finally he concludes that the act of writing has provided the order for which he has previously searched without success. This is a direct development of themes explored in Naipaul's previous two novels. One of the avenues through which Mr Biswas seeks self-fulfilment is writing and Mr Stone's Knights Companion scheme is very much a literary project.

²⁷ See *India: A Wounded Civilization*, London: André Deutsch, 1977, p 25.

²⁸ *An Area of Darkness*, p 198.

For the first time in his career Naipaul is strongly indebted to Joseph Conrad, the novelist who supplanted his early masters, Charles Dickens, and H G Wells, as the most significant literary influence on his work. In *The Mimic Men* the Conradian influence can be seen in incidental allusions, but more generally it is manifest in the use of a fragmentary and unchronological narrative structure, a form employed by Conrad in such novels as *Lord Jim* and *Nostromo*, and in the use of a narrator through whom events are filtered to the reader. In Conrad Naipaul found a kindred spirit. Both are non-English writers (Conrad was Polish) whose absorption into the English tradition has done little to dispel their sense of displacement. Such displacement shows itself in their work on both formal and thematic levels. Formally, the disjointed narrative method and the use of a narrator whose values may be questioned, have the effect of creating a relativistic atmosphere, far removed from the certitudes of most traditional English novels. On a thematic level, Naipaul attempts to dramatise the relationship between the socio-political and the psychological consequences of imperialism in *The Mimic Men* and, in words he was later to use in an essay on Conrad, follows the Pole in writing:

Not as a man with a cause, but a man offering, as in *Nostromo*, a vision of the world's half-made societies, as places which continuously made and unmade themselves, where there was no goal, and where always 'something inherent in the necessities of successful action . . . carried with it the moral degradation of the idea.'²⁹

Singh's quest for an ideal order takes many forms: he looks for it in London ('centre of the world'³⁰), the Aryan past of his ancestors, the Edenic state of pre-Columbian America, the pastoral world of Latin literature and even, when he dreams of retiring to one of the few cocoa estate houses remaining on Isabella, in the heyday of the plantocracy. Yet, from the outset, the voice of Singh the narrator makes it clear that 'All landscapes turn eventually to land, the gold of the imagination to the lead of reality.'³¹ He fails to find the fulfilment he is seeking through any of these avenues and turns all too easily to vapid sexual encounters and a cynical political role which involves "the moral degradation of the idea". Only writing appears to offer any release from the disorder that he feels characterises his life, but even here the problematic use of Singh as the narrative persona leaves open the question of whether he has truly progressed. More complex than any of Naipaul's previous novels, *The Mimic Men* ushered in a new period in his writing, in which there is a more overt concern with imperialism and its latter-day consequences.

In *The Middle Passage* Naipaul had written about the difficulties encountered by historians trying to find an appropriate tone in which to write about the West Indies. In *The Loss of El Dorado* (1969), a highly personal history of Trinidad, he faced the problem himself. The method he adopted was

²⁹ *The Return of Eva Perón*, London: André Deutsch 1980, p 216.

³⁰ *The Mimic Men*, p 22.

³¹ *ibid.*, p 13.

unusual. He decided to confine himself to an account of 'the two moments when Trinidad was touched by "history"' ³²; the latter stages of the quest for El Dorado by Sir Walter Raleigh and the Spanish conquistador, Antonio de Berrio; and the attempt to make Port of Spain a lucrative trading-post during the period of political turmoil in the Caribbean at the end of the eighteenth century.

Both stories are fully documented and bring to life figures who receive comparatively little attention in other historical accounts: de Berrio; Thomas Picton, the British governor of Trinidad at the end of the eighteenth century; and Luisa Calderon, a mulatto girl falsely accused by her lover of theft, in the latter period. But despite the scholarship which informs *The Loss of El Dorado*, it is 'a novelist's history', ³³ characterised by an accretion of circumstantial detail and an authorial stance which denies colonial society any autonomous life of its own. The tone is much less dispassionate than that of most historians and one is always aware of a voice which, without ever quite identifying itself with the coloniser, holds itself aloof from the society that is being discussed.

By this point in his career Naipaul had won all Britain's leading literary awards, with the exception of the Booker Prize which he received in 1971 for *In a Free State*. *In a Free State* (1971) brings together a novella, in which two English expatriates journey through an independent East African country, and a number of shorter pieces: a Prologue and Epilogue from an otherwise unpublished Egyptian travel-journal and two stories about displaced Indians. All the sections treat the theme of displacement in the neo-colonial world. In the first story, 'One Out of Many', Santosh, a Bombay domestic, goes to Washington with his diplomatic employer and finds himself lost in the 'capital of the world', ³⁴ in 'Tell Me Who to Kill' two Trinidadian brothers are affected in different ways by their experience of deracination in England; in the novella which gives the work its title, neither of the two protagonists belongs in England any longer. The excerpts from the travel-journal centre initially around an elderly English tramp, a self-styled 'citizen of the world' ³⁵ who, during a crossing from Piraeus to Alexandria, succeeds in stirring up his cabin-mates' enmity through an unspecified offence, and, in the Epilogue, around the ultimate displaced character of Naipaul's fiction, the author himself. Naipaul has confessed to being 'totally involved' ³⁶ in *all* the characters of *In a Free State*, and here in the final section the mask drops, at least partially, as he intrudes himself as the central persona.

In each of the sections freedom proves to be an uneasy, anguished state. The

³² *The Loss of El Dorado*, Harmondsworth: Penguin: 1973, p 15.

³³ Robert Hamner, *V S Naipaul*, New York: Twayne: 1973, p 30.

³⁴ *In a Free State*, London: André Deutsch, 1971, p 25.

³⁵ *ibid.*, p 11.

³⁶ 'Life on Approval', Naipaul interviewed by Alex Hamilton, *The Guardian* (London), 4 October 1971, p 8.

geographical freedom of the tramp of the Prologue renders him an outcast and the reader is left feeling that his unrevealed crime may well be his failure to belong. Santosh runs away from his employer, only to find he has exchanged one kind of bondage for another, since he is now an illegal immigrant. In 'Tell Me Who to Kill', the Trinidadian Indian narrator, nourished on Hollywood myths, devotes himself to furthering his younger brother's education in England, but comes to realise that metropolitan achievement is as far beyond his brother as himself. He is left with a desire to kill the 'enemy' who is the author of his sufferings. But no enemy is to be found. Once again Naipaul is dramatising the psychology of the colonial, who has been denied freedom by forces beyond his control. And in the title-story Naipaul's English expatriates are seen to be leading equally constricted mental existences in their East African 'free state'.

Thus far, *In a Free State* follows the negative vision of Naipaul's earlier fiction, but in the Epilogue the author becomes involved in the action with a positive gesture of commitment. As he watches desert children being lured to approach an oasis rest house for scraps of tourists' food and then horse-whipped by the coffee waiter for coming too near, he suddenly becomes incensed, rushes into the middle of the scene in protest and abruptly stops the flagellation. Subsequently he feels the act has been futile, but it has demonstrated the extent of Naipaul's movement away from the inertia of the *karma*-psychology and the colonial mentality. Similarly, the more analytical mode of *In a Free State* represents a development in Naipaul's approach and, in the year of its publication, he said in an interview, 'I've decolonised myself through the practice of writing, through what I've learned from writing, looking at the world.'³⁷

After his first journey to India in 1962, Naipaul began to travel widely, often recording his impressions of the societies he visited in articles for the British and American quality press. *The Overcrowded Barracoon* (1972) brought together twenty-one journalistic pieces he had published between 1958 and 1972. Since its publication Naipaul has continued to engage in such journalistic writing, but has preferred in-depth pieces which have sometimes furnished him with the raw material for his fiction. In 1973 he travelled to Trinidad to do research for two long *Sunday Times* articles on the Abdul Malik ('Michael X') killings in Trinidad³⁸ and this material provided him with the germ for his next novel *Guerrillas* (1975), where Malik's career is paralleled by that of Jimmy Ahmed, another self-styled 'black' radical of mixed parentage.³⁹

There are, however, considerable differences between these two portraits of

³⁷ 'Portrait of an artist: what makes Naipaul run', *Caribbean Contact* (Bridgetown) May 1973, p. 18.

³⁸ *Sunday Times Magazine*, Part One, 12 May 1974, pp. 16-35; Part Two, 19 May 1974, pp. 24-41.

³⁹ For a discussion of similarities between Malik and Jimmy Ahmed, see my article "'Apparitions of Disaster": Brontëan parallels in *Wide Sargasso Sea* and *Guerrillas*', *Journal of Commonwealth Literature* 14(1) August 1979, pp. 125-6.

the false redeemer. In *Guerrillas* the treatment of Jimmy Ahmed is less concerned with the damage such a figure does to a certain section of society (the major emphasis in Naipaul's treatment of Malik) than with his own personal tragedy. The emphasis is shifted so that it falls mainly on Jimmy as a displaced person, a typical Naipaul protagonist, trying, like Ralph Singh, to order his life through writing and also very close to Mr Biswas in his belief that "men must claim their portion of the earth".⁴⁰ Jimmy is, however, only one element in a larger design, one of a triptych of main characters. The others are Jane, a middle-class Englishwoman who becomes involved with Jimmy, but has come to the island secure in her sense of being privileged and her knowledge that she has a return air ticket, and Roche, her lover, who, though he has the best of white liberal credentials (having been imprisoned and tortured in South Africa) is revealed as a man lacking in ideology or any form of personal belief. Both characters provide case-studies in what Naipaul has referred to, in his essay on Conrad, as the 'corruption of causes'.⁴¹

A 1975 return visit to Zaire provided Naipaul with source material both for another in-depth journalistic essay, 'A New King for the Congo'⁴² (included in *The Return of Eva Perón* (1980)), and for his next novel, *A Bend in the River* (1979). The relationship between fictional and non-fictional accounts is similar to that between 'The Killings in Trinidad' and *Guerrillas*. It is well summed up by Elaine Campbell who argues that 'a refinement of rage'⁴³ takes place between the writing of the essay, which is characterised by Naipaul's by now familiar dismissive approach to the Third World, and the novel, which is more concerned with the plight of individuals. In both works the present predicament of Africa is vividly encapsulated in a powerful image of a world gradually becoming increasingly clogged up and moving towards stasis, the image of the water-hyacinths on the Zaire river which in the last generation have increasingly disrupted navigation. However, whereas in 'A New King for the Congo' these are seen as threatening to 'imprison the river people in the immemorial ways of the bush',⁴⁴ in *A Bend in the River* they become a more multivalent image, relating to personal as well as social paralysis. Both texts show post-independence Africa as reverting back to the bush, after what the novel calls 'the miraculous peace of the colonial time',⁴⁵ but in *A Bend in the River*, while the personal and the public cannot finally be separated from one another, this situation is more the backcloth for another Naipaul study of individual displacement than the epicentre of the narrative.

The narrator/protagonist, Salim, begins his story with the words 'The World

⁴⁰ *Guerrillas*, London: André Deutsch, 1975, p 17.

⁴¹ *The Return of Eva Perón*, p 216.

⁴² *The New York Review of Books*, 26 June 1975, pp 19-25.

⁴³ 'A refinement of rage: V S Naipaul's *A Bend in the River*', *World Literature Written in English* 18(2) November 1979, pp 394-406.

⁴⁴ *The Return of Eva Perón*, p 184.

⁴⁵ *A Bend in the River*, London: André Deutsch, 1979, p 41.

is what it is; men who are nothing, who allow themselves to become nothing, have no place in it.⁴⁶ Survival is at the very heart of the fiction from this moment until the very end, which sees Salim taking flight from the town at the bend in the river (primarily based on Kisangani), where, after previously fleeing from the East African coast, he has built up a business as a shopkeeper. Salim, like so many of the characters of Naipaul's later novels, emerges as a casualty of Empire, a man who finds himself running short of places which offer him a secure existence. Where he differs from many of these characters, however, is in his capacity for pragmatic action to ensure his own survival. Naipaul has said that he chose the title of the novel for the 'uplift'⁴⁷ in it and, while at first sight this remark may puzzle many readers, Salim's capacity to adapt and take a new direction, when his world falls apart at the end, does offer a more positive vision than *Guerrillas*. On the other hand the presentation of Africa in *A Bend in the River* is remorselessly negative.

Naipaul's next book, *The Return of Eva Perón with The Killings in Trinidad* (1980), brought together four of his journalistic essays: the pieces on Michael X and Zaire, already mentioned; the long title-essay on Argentina; and a shorter piece on Conrad. While initially this volume may appear, like *The Overcrowded Barracoon*, simply to be a collection of Naipaul's journalism, in fact there are clear thematic parallels between the various component parts. The accounts of Malik, Eva Perón and Mobutu (the Congo's 'new king') and their societies all show how charismatic leadership ministers to the fantasies of those who find their lives in some way deficient. Yet it ultimately fails to offer anything other than a leadership cult which can destroy leaders and followers alike, while contributing nothing to the improvement of society. The essay on Conrad places everything which has preceded it into context by focusing on Conrad's absorption with the forerunners of today's Third World societies, the juxtaposition of cultures and the 'corruption of causes'. In each of the previous pieces there has been at least one reference to Conrad's work and now, in retrospect, his influence appears to have been underlying the whole volume.

During the latter part of 1979 and early 1980 Naipaul spent seven months travelling in Muslim societies in the Middle and Far East and this experience provided the subject of his next book, *Among the Believers: An Islamic Journey* (1981). He visited four non-Arab Muslim countries—Iran, Pakistan, Malaysia and Indonesia—and his account presents itself as a personal attempt to explain the 'Islamic revival'. The picture of contemporary Islam which emerges is for the most part a negative one, characterised by confusion and contradiction. The believers' passionate conviction is seen as a force which is impotent to bring about greatly needed social change. As in *The Mimic Men*, Naipaul suggests that it is paradoxical that Third World societies which reject the West nevertheless depend on it for its technology and material goods. *Among the*

⁴⁶ *ibid.*, p 9.

⁴⁷ Naipaul interviewed by David Pryce-Jones, *Radio Times* (London), 24–30 March 1979, p 11.

Believers has been criticised by Muslim intellectuals, who have found it superficial, biased towards Western rationalism, guilty of identifying the 'Islamic revival with fanaticism'⁴⁸ and, finally, unrepresentative because of its exclusion of Arab and African Islamic societies. It is hard to disagree with such evaluations. Despite the considerable amount of penetrating first-hand observation and analysis offered in the text, its point of view remains blinkered and guaranteed to reinforce Western prejudices. The disenchanted polemical stance is comparable with *An Area of Darkness* and *India: A Wounded Civilisation*. All three works offer an account of how one of the world's great religions is stultifying individual development in Asia. But whereas the two Indian books are written out of a passionate love-hate relationship with Hinduism and considerable knowledge of the culture, *Among the Believers* finally comes across as more of a tourist's-eye view, redeemed only by sensitive witness and a sense of authorial integrity.

Naipaul's two most recent books, *Finding the Centre* (1984) and *The Enigma of Arrival* (1987) incorporate a greater amount of autobiography than anything he has written hitherto, and reveal the extent to which his personal experience has informed all his work. *Finding the Centre* is comprised of two very different narratives: 'Prologue to an Autobiography', described by Naipaul as 'not an autobiography, a story of life or deeds done', but 'an account of something less easily seized: my literary beginnings and the imaginative promptings of my many-sided background',⁴⁹ and 'The Crocodiles of Yamoussoukro', a travel-piece about a recent journey to the Ivory Coast. The two pieces have much in common, for both—like so much of Naipaul's work—concern a quest for signification. The search for a centre comes to stand both for the attempt by marginalised countries and peoples to find order, and for the writer's search for kernels of narrative which can express this predicament. In his Foreword, Naipaul says 'both pieces are about the process of writing' and 'seek in different ways to admit the reader to that process'.⁵⁰ *The Enigma of Arrival* (reviewed below) presents itself as a novel, but is in fact mainly autobiography—autobiography of the same kind as William Wordsworth's *Prelude* or Derek Walcott's *Another Life*, that is to say a text in which the writer explores the genesis and growth of his artistic impulse. Taken together these two recent works provide a fitting climax to Naipaul's career so far. They show him discussing his origins and how these have shaped him as the kind of writer he is—tetchy, alienated and élitist, yet unfailingly committed to documenting his personal vision of the world with a consistency of purpose and an integrity which make him difficult to put aside even when he is at his most illiberal.

⁴⁸ Amin Malak, 'V S Naipaul and the believers', *Modern Fiction Studies*, 30(3) Autumn 1984, p 564.

⁴⁹ *Finding the Centre*, p 9.

⁵⁰ *ibid.*

LITERARY FEATURE REVIEWS

Taking stock of dead people: Argentina's reflections on the 'Dirty War' years

Nick Caistor

A State of Fear: Memories of Argentina's Nightmare

Andrew Graham-Yooll

London: Eland. 1986. 180pp. £9.95hb/£4.95pb

Requiem for a Woman's Soul

Omar Rivabella

London: Penguin. 1986. 116pp. £2.95pb

The Duke: Memories and Antimemories of a Participant in the Repression

Enrique Medina

London: Zed. 1985. 120pp. £8.95hb/£3.95pb

The Shadow by the Door

Gerardo Di Masso

London: Zed. 1986. 96pp. £8.95hb/£3.95pb

The Long Night of Francisco Sanctis

Humberto Costantini

London: Fontana. 1985. 184pp. £3.50pb

'I don't take no stock of dead people' Huckleberry Finn

The ghastly terrors of the Second World War holocaust led many writers of poetry and fiction to feel that whatever they had to say was pointless. Faced with the evidence of man's inhumanity to man, the written word seemed utterly irrelevant. The torturers' own imaginative efforts appeared to have far outstripped those of the imaginative writers. People working to achieve some grasp of life and emotion in the unyielding black and white of the printed word felt themselves overwhelmed by the scale of the horror perpetrated by the Nazis, and by minds that could imagine the death of whole categories of human beings. Some writers chose silence. Others turned to prayers. Most American and British writers retreated into the easier anguishes of the bedroom, drawing room or common room.

Mercifully, Western Europe and the USA have been spared direct experience of man's apparent capacity for boundless cruelty since then. They have of course exported some of their own: to Malaysia, Algeria or Vietnam (remember My Lai?), but have gradually and gratefully allowed themselves to forget the horrors of the 1930s and 1940s. This lapse in memory has produced a smugness which locates barbarity in the Third World and sees it as one of the things, like over-population, extreme poverty, subsistence farming, or revolution, that these unfortunate developing regions are to be encouraged to give up in the name of progress and civilisation.

Unfortunately for this view, much of the horror in the modern world is itself enacted in the name of that civilisation. Argentina is a case in point. In the 1970s, that country degenerated into a state of violence in which guerrilla kidnappings and murders were answered by a monstrously bloody campaign by the armed forces. Following its *coup d'état* in March 1976, the military killed at least 9,000 people between 1976 and the return to civilian rule in 1983, in what they described as a *guerra sucia* or 'dirty war'. The first leader of the military junta, General Jorge Videla, spoke of their enemy as 'not just someone with a gun or bomb, but also someone who spreads ideas that are contrary to Western and Christian civilization'.¹

To fight this threat, Videla and his colleagues ordered thousands of people to be seized illegally from their houses, places of work or from the streets. They were carried off to secret detention camps, routinely tortured for information, then killed when they were no longer considered of any use. Throughout, the armed forces denied any knowledge of these people, and tried to destroy all records proving their existence. At the root of all the books under review is the determination that this terror shall never be allowed to happen again; they are there to provide a record, as a deliberate act of remembrance, since, as Andrew Graham-Yooll puts it: 'Argentina has never had the capacity to recollect that it loses some of its life every time it loses its memory'.

First came the lists. Within Amnesty International, the International Red Cross, and then inside Argentina itself, the names of the *desaparecidos* ('disappeared') were collected. It seemed futile, ridiculous, to be trying to figure out simply how to spell a person's surname correctly, piecing together from scraps of information just when and where he or she was last seen. Yet this effort has proved vital in countering the plans to make so many people disappear into thin air, without even allowing their names to survive. Andrew Graham-Yooll also set himself the task of compiling a day-by-day chronicle of all the news items related to the violence and repression, while he was still able to work as a journalist in Argentina. In *A State of Fear* he is the honest witness who observes all that is going on around him and tries to maintain some basic

¹ *The Times* (London) 4 January 1978, quoted in *Nunca Más (Never Again): A Report by Argentina's National Commission on Disappeared People*, London: Faber and Faber, 1986, p. xiii.

sense of decency, some belief that the society in which he was born and grew up cannot be wholly evil. He does not seek to glorify his own role, nor to derive sensational effects from the horror, but powerfully conveys the sense of being engulfed by such a situation while able to do little to prevent it, except to cling to a stubborn kind of personal integrity. For his pains, his life was threatened many times and he was forced into exile in September 1976. Perhaps the most disturbing part of his book are the final chapters which concern his return to Argentina six years later. Here he describes his meeting with a torturer—smart, alive and well and living in Buenos Aires—and it is obvious that this man's cruelty, like that of many others, still remains a threat, simply awaiting orders to be unleashed again.

Graham-Yooll is circumspect in his description of torture, being more concerned with discovering the motivation behind it. In their report, *Nunca Más* (*Never Again*), the members of the Argentina's National Commission on Disappeared People decided that they would only describe one person's experience of torture in detail, so that they would not be providing 'merely an encyclopedia of horror'.² *Requiem for a Woman's Soul* left me distinctly uneasy in this respect. Purporting to be a novel ('a remarkable piece of literature' according to Norman Mailer on the back cover) the book is in fact all taken from the testimonies in *Nunca Más*. These testimonies are woven into the story of a priest who is given fragments of notes written by one of the disappeared which relate her terrifying experiences in a secret torture camp. As the priest sifts and orders these notes, he finds himself increasingly despairing and isolated from his community and his Church hierarchy. His only friend, a bishop, dies at the end in a suspicious car accident (again, this is based on a true incident, the death of Bishop Angelelli of La Rioja, as related in *Nunca Más*), which event finally tips the priest into madness. Omar Rivabella is described as being 'a strong advocate of human rights' whose work has been published in *Penthouse*, but this book is a distasteful example of the voyeurism of horror that Graham-Yooll avoids by his honesty, and *Nunca Más* by its reticence. Rivabella spares us absolutely none of the grisly details of torture, but fails to make literature of it. By this I mean that it serves no other purpose than to horrify, and lacks the saving grace of any imaginative attempt to take us beyond the terror, to explain and even reconcile it at some deeper level. This must surely be the claim that literature upholds, however difficult it may be to fulfil in the light of Auschwitz, the killing fields of Cambodia, or the clandestine camps of Argentina.

Some such attempt is what makes *The Duke* by Enrique Medina, a fifty-year-old Argentine novelist, more palatable and more interesting, despite the brutal sadism of some of its scenes. The 'Duke' in question is an ageing boxer, who now makes his money by torturing and killing people for an

² *Nunca Más*, p 20.

underworld gang. One strand of the book is the Duke's monologue (to his last companion, a rat) as he prepares to escape from the revenge threatened by another gang which he has double-crossed. His monologue ranges over his life, pointing up the deprivation and lack of love that has characterised it, while interspersed with brief moments of glory in the boxing ring, where, as everywhere else, society's rules have been to batter the opponent into submission, to kill if necessary. The brutality of the boxing-ring is mirrored in his treatment of women, which is in turn explicitly compared to his job as a slaughterer in one of Argentina's huge slaughterhouses (it is no coincidence that the main instrument of torture turned against the 'disappeared' was the electric prod used to control cattle on their way to slaughter):

the girl was great it's no different from spending the day banging cows on the head in the end I started liking it and felt something like pleasure when the tip of the hammer hit the mark it was like I felt a charge of electricity or something from the handle of the hammer from the cow's brains to my hands and my whole body that was the only way to get used to it to like the work and when I was able to find it a pleasure was when I beat Mirna for the first time.

Another strand of the novel consists of interviews with people who knew him, suggesting that his attempt to escape has been a failure, while the third component is his involvement with the sadistic killer, Walter (who, like Hitler, was a weekend painter).

Medina's virtue is to take to the extreme the attempt to shock, and to make the printed word convey outrage. As the world is increasingly interpreted through visual images—such as the stark television pictures of a man shot through the head in Vietnam, children starving to death in Ethiopia, a US newsman executed in Somoza's Nicaragua, the massacres in the Palestinian refugee camps in Beirut—as our memory and sensibility become dominated by this graphic flood, so writing and the intellectual effort of interpreting abstract hieroglyphs on a page may appear increasingly distant from actual horror and the possibility of acting to avert it. Yet, books can perhaps have a more profound effect, not so easily dismissed as the mundane images of the 'banality of evil' presented by television and the Press. This possibility seems to lie at the heart of the appeal that Medina is making to his reader, that of not forgetting so easily.

Memory is also central to Gerardo di Masso's short novel, *The Shadow by the Door*. Here the main protagonists are members of a guerrilla organisation of the kind which in the 1970s sought to resolve the social injustices within countries such as Uruguay, Chile or Argentina, with their own brand of revolutionary nationalism. Ill-prepared both ideologically and militarily, they fell easy prey to the armed forces who were only too happy to engage in the 'dirty wars' necessary to wipe them out. Here, as in the other books, we are offered scenes of torture, and the stock character of the torturer who outside the chamber leads a 'normal' life, but this novel offers memory as the only

refuge from the horror. The past offers consolation and warmth, images of love and nature that can sustain in a moment of utter defeat. It also offers, beyond individual memory, the image of struggle as part of the historical memory of Latin America, and from this image is conjured a slender hope: 'to start again, to continue the tireless struggle, totally involved in a history which is scarcely theirs, inextricably caught in a beautiful dream handed down from the naked Indian and the Conquistador pinned to a tree by a lance . . .'.

In Humberto Costantini's book *The Long Night of Francisco Sanctis*, this guerrilla has become Lucho, a scared, emaciated youth whose revolutionary dreams have been shattered by the reality of state terror. He sits in a café cut off from everyone, trying desperately to escape from Buenos Aires before he is caught. Even so, he represents the last hope that Francisco Sanctis has of avoiding involvement in the world of Argentine hidden violence. Sanctis, a forty-one year-old book-keeper who is Buenos Aires' 'Mr Average', has suddenly had thrust on him the responsibility for warning two men that they are in danger of 'disappearing'. He has until dawn to do this, but as the hours of the evening and night drain away he realises that there is no one, not even his wife or friends, with whom he can share the burden. One of his best friends turns out to be all in favour of what the armed forces are doing: 'Get rid of two hundred thousand and the country'll run like clockwork' is his view. This meeting and his encounter with Lucho finally convince Sanctis that the horrifying events which until then had been mere rumours for him in his routine existence are frighteningly true, and he is inextricably caught up in them. Dawn finds him desperately trying to save at least one of the men, but 'he still hasn't seen the two shadows emerging from behind the elevator nor the car slowly drawing up from Olazabal Street nor the glint of the gun-barrel pointing at him from the darkness of the building site next door'.

Writing from exile in Mexico, Costantini has not only provided us with a distressingly convincing picture of how ordinary people become sucked into the maelstrom of violence, but has brought us full circle both to the word as witness as in Andrew Graham-Yooll's book and to the lists of the disappeared. The very last page of *The Long Night of Francisco Sanctis* is the original Amnesty International list of *desaparecidos*: 'Sanctis, Francisco Nicodemo, 41, book-keeper, Buenos Aires, 12 Nov 1977'. Lists and prayers.

Caribbean contrasts

Michael Gilkes

Frangipani House

Beryl Gilroy

1986. 111pp. £3.50pb

Apata: The Story of a Reluctant Criminal

Harold A Bascom

1986. 279pp. £3.95pb

Beka Lamb

Zee Edgell

1986. 171pp. £3.50pb

The Wine of Astonishment

Earl Lovelace

1986. 146pp. £3.50pb

The Lights on the Hill

Garth St Omer

1986. 119pp. £3.50pb

London: Heinemann Educational Books (Caribbean Writers Series)

In Georgetown, British Guiana, during the late 1940s there was a retirement home for upper middle-class ladies called 'The Gentlewomen's Home'. It was a chintzy, exclusive place, set aside for elderly whites, and near-whites, of 'good' background but impecunious circumstances. Beryl Gilroy's *Frangipani House* with its 'sleepy-headed windows dressed in frilled bonnets of lace . . . sleek and comfortable on the town's edge' (p 1) recalls that genteel establishment. But hers is a fictional Home for working-class black women in colonial Georgetown, and sets out to give dignity to the lives of those forgotten 'relics of work-filled bygone days', consigned to Frangipani House by relatives glad to be directly rid of them. The story revolves around Mrs Mabel Alexandrina ('Mama') King, an ailing grandmother in her seventies who shows remarkable energy and resourcefulness. The author, in attempting to give Mama King

dramatic stature, makes her a kind of picaresque, poor black Caribbean Queen Lear. Discarded by her 'pelican' offspring, she begins to fear madness, fantasising about her past and brooding on the ingratitude of her family. She escapes from the Home in the company of a group of itinerant Hindu beggars ('the only real kindness I ever get was from beggars'), is attacked by 'choke-and-robbers' and falls into a coma from which she awakes in hospital. Surrounded by her now concerned offspring, all wanting to take care of her, she chooses to go with her granddaughter, Cindy, who is pregnant. The novel ends with the birth of Cindy's twins (Mama King having taken over from the starchy midwife) and the re-establishment of the old woman as loved matriarch.

The novel's intention—to protest against the institutionalising and isolating of the elderly—is admirable, but badly served by a hyperbolic, self-conscious style: 'Every step to hospital was like an orchestral instrument contributing its part to a symphony of pain . . . pain tailored by fate to fit her frail body.' (p 76) When the women in the Home decide to sing a hymn, one of them says: 'I'll call the others. Let us blend our voices in a thick, heavenly sound.' (p 30) The brown, middle-class 'Matron' is a kind of dragon lady ('The resentment in her voice could have roasted a dozen yams'), and while the beggars' natural goodness is contrasted with uncaring middle-class attitudes, 'the unstirring contentedness of their lives' to which Mama King is admitted, comes across as pseudo-pastoral nostalgia. The novel is effective, however, in its rendering—through a dialect voice—of Mama King's inner life, her memories of the past. Through the unwinding of the reel of memory, 'my whole life pass before me—like a film at a picture show.' (p 16) The picture of colonial Guyana that emerges (of the hard but vital life of the black working class and of the colour-based, hierarchical society in general) is imaginatively and powerfully evoked:

I go to a fete with Ginchi and we meet two boy. One name Cyril and the round-face one name Danny. They follow us like two dog. I like Danny and the next day I look he out by the market . . . he say . . . 'you want to start friendsing with me?' . . . 'He too black'. Ginchi Thorley say. 'We must wash out we children.' (p 6)

Harold Bascom's *Apata*, also set in colonial Guyana, is a fast-moving tale of a police manhunt in the rainforested interior. Subtitled 'The story of a reluctant criminal', it was inspired by a real event: the 1959 manhunt in the jungle of British Guiana for the criminal, Clement Cuffy. The hero, Michael Apata, is an orphan of African and aboriginal Indian parentage: a 'black Buck'. A brilliant student, he suffers the double humiliation of poverty and colour prejudice, losing a scholarship to higher education because of his short temper and inability to suffer fools gladly. Gradually, resentment turns to violence, then to robbery and finally to murder. A potential hero is subverted by a colour-based, colonial society to become a fugitive gunman and killer. The novel's thrust is clear. Apata himself spells it out: . . . 'I'm bloodywell tired of being "us humble

people" . . . What we have here is a colour movement, not true? "White sees the light. Brown stick around, **BLACK STAY BACK!**" (p 99)

In creating a 'reluctant criminal', however—a good man turned the wrong side out—the author leaves us with a one-dimensional, moral tale: cut is the branch that might have grown full straight. The villains are Imperialism and the Colonial Mentality. Nowhere is there a suggestion of individual failing or responsibility. A fatalistic note underscores the novel where flashbacks and flashforwards are signalled by the words **BACKSWING OF THE PENDULUM:** and **FORWARD SWING OF THE PENDULUM:** The final, colonial irony comes when, the manhunt over and Apata safely dead, 'the colony settled down to anticipate the arrival of Her Gracious Majesty the Queen'. (p 279)

Mr Bascom's intention is both to expose the roots of prejudice that lie beneath the social tragedy and to write a good adventure story. If the former seems a trifle strident, the latter is nevertheless very well executed indeed. This is an exciting tale, moving with great speed and power. The style suggests film technique (the novel was originally conceived as a film):

The launch rides in against the stream but many within her are apprehensive. Adam's apples rise and fall. Lips are pursed and licked. Throats grow dry and are cleared on the sly. Eyes stare. A flight of blackbirds bursts from a thicket. (p 214)

The characters speak a Georgetown dialect that sounds authentic, but may occasionally leave the non-Guyanese reader struggling for meaning. When it is discovered that the post office bank has been robbed, a bystander comments: 'No pension rass. **ALL DE MONEY GAWN FUH CHANNA!**' Similarly, only a Guyanese ear can fully grasp the mixture of fear and awed respect in the outburst of a member of the crowd listening to an announcement by the police of the growing list of Apata's victims: '**RASS BHAI! APATA IN 'E RIKATIKS!**'

Nothing is made of the tantalising correspondences between the twentieth century fugitive, Clement Cuffy, and Cuffy the ill-fated leader of the 1763 slave rebellion in Berbice county. Nor, more surprisingly, is any correspondence suggested between Michael Apata and Michael X (Abdul Malik), a famous Trinidadian fugitive who was hunted down in the Guyanese interior in the late 1970s. Nevertheless, the ending of the novel does leave the reader with the image of Apata as Archetypal Fugitive Spirit. The body is never found, and by the dawn of the seventh day the search is abandoned. Apata passes into legend.

The blend of narrative activity and social concern is more effective in Zee Edgell's *Beka Lamb*. The young Belizean girl, Beka, wins a scholarship and, that evening, asleep on her parents' verandah, dreams the novel in flashback. Her 'dreaming' is also an act of remembrance, a 'wake' for her friend, Toycie, killed in a recent hurricane. Belize is facing independence on one hand and a territorial threat from Guatemala on the other; and the link between politics

and Beka's scholarship is made early on by her grandmother, a member of the People's Independence Party: '[she] felt she deserved some credit for the shift Beka was making from the washing bowl underneath the house bottom to books in a classroom overlooking the Caribbean Sea.' (p 2)

The novel is a loving evocation of Belizean life and landscape. Place-names such as 'Manioc Road', 'Rum Lane' and 'Haulover Creek', like the mixture of African, European, Carib and Hispanic elements in the population, add to the uniqueness and flavour of the book. Characters like Mandolyn Jawbone Greasy, Miss Flo and Granny Ivy move through the narrative with a zesty life of their own. But while the power of provincialism is celebrated, it is also seen as an impediment, holding the community in a static, colonial posture. Father Nunez's journey from 'beans and tortillas almost every day, to ordination as a Jesuit priest in Rome', while an occasion for local pride, alienates him from his provincial flock. The social message is clear, but not obtrusive. In one flashback sequence Beka and Toycie notice that Toycie's guitar, the gift of an English lady, is labelled 'made in Spain'. Toycie decides to alter the label: 'I doubt if we make guitars like this one here, Toycie.' 'One day we might.' Toycie said determinedly, poking the pencil through the hole to scrawl 'Belize' on the label. (p 37)

In the multiracial, colonial society of Belize, however, independence will involve far more than a change of labels. The hurricane that kills Toycie is a reminder of the unknown dangers ahead. The book ends with a positive image, however: Beka's Bougainvillea, cut back at a neighbour's insistence, has begun to put out new shoots.

The Caribbean folk-figure of the hero turned 'bad-John' is central to Earl Lovelace's *The Wine of Astonishment*. The novel is a fictional treatment of the banning of the Spiritual Baptist Church (the 'Shouters') in Trinidad by the British colonial government in 1917, and its reinstatement in 1951. It is a Black church, and therefore 'undesirable' in colonial eyes. Bolo, a powerfully-built, champion stickfighter, is the hero of this poor community. He sees the threat to the people's church as a challenge to their dignity and self-respect, but in opposing the colonial authorities and their spokesmen, he is forced into the role of troublemaker and bully. Bree, the pacifist leader of the church, begins by condemning Bolo's determined stance as a lawbreaker and vagabond. When Bolo affronts the community by abducting two of its nubile daughters, however, Bree finally understands: 'Why don't you just call the police for him? . . . is their job,' I tell Bree. 'No. This is something we self have to do. We have to show him we is a people.' (p 121)

The degraded poor of Bonasse village are forced to confront the real enemy; their own apathy as a community.

Lovelace writes with the immediacy of a living vernacular; his people sound utterly authentic, at one with their surroundings:

Then the rain really fall. I mean it had rain. Rain, rain, rain with thunder and big

lightning flashing. I, home, hear the news from Trotman who come running up the road bawling above the rain; . . . (p 128)

The story is narrated by the village matriarch (a device not without its problems), and effectively serves Lovelace's continuing high purpose: to reinforce the sense of community as the foundation for true 'personhood'. It is a positive, engaging and direct response to the all-too-familiar theme of Caribbean 'identitylessness' and fragmentation.

By contrast, Garth St Omer's *The Lights on the Hill* pictures a community caught in the backwaters of colonialism, like gulls in an oil slick. The constipated 'hero', Stephenson, meanders through life doomed to the status of a perpetual spectator. He is the Caribbean Marginal Man *par excellence*. Racially mixed and illegitimate, he is 'Ti Béké' (little white man) in the country, 'white Nigger' in the town. Both terms define him as an outsider. His sense of directionless drifting, of chance as the controlling factor in life, sounds existential; but he is a casualty of colonial Caribbean inertia. The novel is set in the late 1950s, just prior to the failure of the West Indies Federation. Hailing from small-island St. Lucia, Stephenson is keenly aware of the fragile, fragmentary nature of island reality. As a graduate of the new, Jamaica-based University College of the West Indies (part of the Federal experiment) he has merely escaped any claims his island may have on him. His aimless affairs (too casual even to be called 'womanising'), like his refusal to think beyond the present, reflect a neurotic fear of involvement. He is a 'castaway' within his own society. Even the death of the one friend he admires (he is struck by lightning at a football match!) brings not grief, but a sense of relief: 'He had been envious of Eddie. Now there was nothing to envy any more.' (p 112)

St Omer's laconic, economical style brings to mind V S Naipaul's wittily ironic approach, but reveals an even more uncompromising vision of the society's impotence. As a boy, Stephenson remembers seeing a group of black American sailors beat up a local policeman:

They beat the fallen policeman until he no longer moved. The street was empty. Everybody looked from behind closed windows. Nobody went to help. Later they took the policeman to hospital and he went with the other boys to look at the blood on the street. (p 95)

Stephenson is one of many St Omer protagonists who bear witness to a society's collective paralysis, and who are all linked by a 'commitment to futility'. Originally published as part one of *Shades of Grey* (1968), *The Lights on the Hill* shares with other St Omer novels an unnerving sense of the fragility of personhood, the feeling that madness waits just below the surface. The book begins and ends with the shrieking of one of the inmates of the local lunatic asylum. Its most disturbing image is of a snail, subjected repeatedly to a torturing probe, finally refusing to emerge from its shell.

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Thinly-veiled autobiography

The Enigma of Arrival

V S Naipaul

London: Viking, 1987. 318pp. £10.95hb

Between 1963 and 1979 V S Naipaul published novels at regular four-yearly intervals. After 1979 he brought out three non-fictional books, but no new novel appeared until *The Enigma of Arrival* and at first glance this hardly seems to be fiction at all. Naipaul's previous book, *Finding the Centre* (1984), contained a 'Prologue to an Autobiography' and it is not difficult to read *The Enigma of Arrival* as the life-story apparently presupposed by this piece. It is thinly-veiled autobiography: a personal meditation by a Trinidadian writer, whose origins replicate Naipaul's, who has written a series of books which (although never named) exactly match Naipaul's own and who, since around 1970, has, like Naipaul, been living on Salisbury Plain, the area which provides the novel with its main setting.

Besides barely being fiction—only some of the portraits of the novelist's Wiltshire neighbours seem to depart significantly from fact—the book contains few of the staples of the novel form: it is thin on both narrative momentum and sustained characterisation. The former is replaced by reflective soliloquy; the latter by a series of thumb-nail sketches of individuals encountered on or around the manorial estate which is the pivotal point of such action as there is. The rotundity of a work such as *A House for Mr Biswas* is nowhere in evidence. What is left is an account of the protagonist's personal wrestling-match with himself, written in a spare and unembellished style and, while this psychomachia may be absorbing for confirmed Naipaul watchers, there will be others who find it 'precious waffle'.

But such a reading misses much. *The Enigma of Arrival* is also a 'Condition of England' novel and another investigation of the theme which has dominated Naipaul's work since the mid-1960s, here referred to as 'that great movement of peoples that was to take place in the second half of the twentieth century'. It is a book about writing and a novelist's gradual discovery of his subject, as he learns to reject the bogus metropolitan material of his early fantasies for the territory he has made uniquely his own. Far more than personal indulgence is involved. As in *A House for Mr Biswas* and *The Mimic Men*, a private history functions as a microcosm of late colonial/post-colonial historical processes.

The England of the novel in which the writer is living is an ancient, multi-layered landscape, containing numerous 'sacred sites' including Stonehenge, Winchester—a candidate for King Arthur's Camelot—and Victorian churches expressive of the certitudes of the Indian Summer of Empire. Initially his imagination perceives it through the filters provided by his own cultural baggage—Wordsworth, notions of a Book of Hours, a sentence from *King Lear*, Constable's paintings of the area, *Sir Gawain and the Green Knight* and E H Shepard's illustrations for *The Wind in the Willows*. However, even as he subjects the local countryside to these refractors, he has a vision of it as 'natural' and immutable and it is only after a period of time that he comes to realise the extent to which it is a 'constructed' landscape, liable to change and decay, forces which begin to loom particularly large in the latter stages of the book.

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His particular situation as a tenant on a decaying Victorian-Edwardian estate is a central image. The estate is presided over by a reclusive landlord who has been suffering from 'accidie' since his early manhood and, though actually in residence, is effectively almost as much an absentee as many of the owners of the sugar plantations of Naipaul's Caribbean origins were in the heyday of imperialism. This image suggests the writer's ambivalent relationship to a vanishing England which has helped to shape his sense of literary vocation, as well as, more generally, his identity. Far from being accidental, his presence on the estate proves to be a product of the migrations occasioned by Empire and he identifies with the inertia of his landlord who is allowing ivy to proliferate and gradually to strangle the trees in his grounds. As so often in Naipaul's writing, an accretion of precisely realised circumstantial detail, after all the essence of the realist novelist's craft, assumes a broader allegorical force. The colonial son has found a resting-place in a landscape that seems 'benign' to him, but the manor where he has his cottage is a 'semi-ruin', without the traditional appendages of farms and lands; and the remains of the older Establishment that it represents collapse in the course of the narrative.

Loss is central to the novel in other ways. The title derives from a surrealist painting by Giorgio de Chirico, which had caught the writer's attention shortly after he moved to his Wiltshire valley. He had hoped to write a story based on the painting, which would tell of a traveller's arrival in a classical city, his involvement in a mysterious religious ritual, his gradual realisation that he is its intended victim, his narrow escape back to the wharf where he arrived and his discovery that his ship has gone and that his life is over. Ostensibly this story—perhaps not surprisingly, since it is more Borgesian than Naipaulian—has never been completed. But the writer comes to see that it has permeated an African story he was writing at the time (fairly obviously the title-novella of *In a Free State*) and beyond this fact, it is the story of his own life and of the present work.

The idea of enigmatic arrival informs all the book's major concerns: the writer's journey to a metropolis which fails to match his youthful fantasies; his relationship to his Hindu past; his success as a writer exploring the predicament of colonial fragmentation which he has tried to escape; his disappointment when the history of Trinidad that he wrote in the late 1960s (exactly similar to *The Loss of El Dorado*) was rejected by the publisher who had commissioned it, and failed to afford him the sense of fulfilment he had anticipated; and his discovery that his Wiltshire surroundings are largely a product of human artifice, rather than organically whole.

Like the traveller in the fiction, he is left contemplating the prospect of his own mortality. Death is prominent throughout this elegiac, autumnal work and in the final section entitled 'The Ceremony of Farewell', the writer is taken back to Trinidad by the death of his younger sister. The remnants of Hinduism—now even more vestigial than in Naipaul's early novels—which he encounters there suggest that the valediction of the title of this section is as much a requiem for his ancestral culture as for his sister. It is typical of Naipaul that the book should come to rest here. But, from the opening dedication to his brother Shiva who died at the age of forty in 1985, to this conclusion, the whole work is pervaded by intimations of mortality. It is ultimately as much a generalised lament for human transience and an expression of the writer's own sense of vulnerability, as an elegy for any particular individual or community.

The Enigma of Arrival may not be the surrealist work that the de Chirico painting

initially promised to inspire, but in its absorption with language and the process of writing, it *does* share many of the preoccupations of a writer such as Borges. In passages like that in which the writer describes himself as 'living in a world where the signs were without the meaning intended by their makers', it offers penetrating commentary on the problematics of using English in Third World contexts. It is a novel which, through its constant stress on the 'constructed' nature of landscapes and life-styles, forces a reassessment of the view of Naipaul which sees him as laying bare the 'realities' of situations and experiences through the use of a transparently lucid style. And it is a disturbing book, not only because of its emphasis on artifice or because it is a sustained *memento mori*, but also because of the exclusions it practises. Its commitment to the 'I' pronoun seems to make for a kind of linguistic solipsism which leaves one pondering the absences it implies, not least among them that of the real writer's wife, who is never allowed to intrude into the pages of the 'novel', even in an impersonal 'we'. Perhaps it is just such omissions that have led Naipaul to term the book a 'novel' and not an 'autobiography'.

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Unmasking Mexico

The Good Conscience

Carlos Fuentes

London: André Deutsch. 1986. 148pp. £8.95hb/£3.95pb

A Change of Skin

Carlos Fuentes

London: André Deutsch. 1986. 462pp. £6.95pb

The Old Gringo

Carlos Fuentes

London: André Deutsch. 1986. 199pp. £8.95

Carlos Fuentes (born 1928), the Mexican novelist, essayist and polemicist, has recently spent a year at Cambridge University as the Simón Bolívar Professor of Latin American Studies. The three novels under review provide a rich image of the kind of writer he is. They range from an early novel, *The Good Conscience*, published in 1959 and translated in the USA in 1971, and *A Change of Skin* published in 1967—the boom years of the Latin American novel—and first published in translation by Cape in 1968, to a recent novel, *The Old Gringo*, published in 1985 and translated in 1986.

Fuentes perceives himself to be in the same position as any foreigner who first crosses the frontier into Mexico; all his fictions and essays are probes into the opaque mysteries of an alien land that seems to refuse to reveal itself, even to its own confused inhabitants. The attempt to understand Mexico, its cities, its peasants and plutocrats, its landscape

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and history, is the starting point for Fuentes; his fiction tries to explain deeply perplexing enigmas. In each of the three novels under review there is a poignant moment when characters are forced to reveal repressed secrets that contribute to unmasking the false image of official Mexico. For Fuentes, the novelist is the subversive, the interrogator, the mocker who establishes the reader as a kind of witness and judge of events. The central paradoxes of Mexico, as manifest in these novels, are: the Revolution of 1910 and its aftermath, the cynical changing of the old guard, the chasm of misunderstanding between the powerful USA and Third World Mexico, and within these conflicts, the problem of how to live as a poet, that is, authentically.

These concerns can be detected as early as in his second novel, in the dedication and epigraphs of *The Good Conscience*, part of a trilogy Fuentes never completed. Fuentes dedicates this novel of Sartrean overtones (bad conscience), to Luis Buñuel, the surrealist film-maker exiled in Mexico, and a close friend. Like Buñuel, Fuentes is prone to centring his plot on grotesque set-scenes, vast visual symbols: in *The Good Conscience* it is a gaudy Christ who under his robes tapers to a piece of wood, in front of which the protagonist masturbates; in *A Change of Skin* it is Cholula, the enormous Aztec pyramid destroyed by Cortés, that today supports over 400 churches; in *The Old Gringo* it is a grand hacienda ballroom lined with hundreds of mirrors where the revolutionary peasants—and the main characters—see themselves for the first time. All these set-scenes take on a didactic intensity that allows the reader immediate, even obvious, access to Fuentes' intentions. As in Buñuel's films (*The Exterminating Angel* or *Viridiana*, for example) these scenes furnish critical symbols that undo the characters' certainties and falsities. It is not unfair to say that Fuentes is as interested in understanding Mexico as in exploring the idiosyncracies of his characters in the conventional novelistic sense; his characters represent more than the sum of their individuality, in the way that Artemio Cruz in *The Death of Artemio Cruz* (1962) (surely, with *Terra Nostra*, one of his best novels?) lives a life of cynical choices that explicitly mirror key moments in twentieth-century Mexican history, with dates and all. Artemio Cruz embodies a collective Mexican experience of inauthenticity.

The Good Conscience follows the birth, childhood and adolescence of the last member of an immigrant family made good in provincial Guanajuato. Jaime Ceballos is adopted by his sterile businessman uncle and pious, unloved aunt. His weak father is brushed aside and his mother, spurned, turned into a whore. We follow him through his prissy, privileged education, a religious crisis and a forbidden friendship with a poor Indian scholar, until he finally comes to his senses and conforms to his class duties. It is a novel exposing the hypocrisy of the provincial bourgeoisie which successfully adapts to whatever political and historical events befall Mexico, even the Revolution. There is one moment when young Jaime is offered an alternative future, when he shelters a trade unionist on the run, but he lacks the courage to abandon his class and education and join the real revolutionaries. There are some stunning scenes such as that already mentioned, of Jaime masturbating in front of a Christ, or that when he discovers his two-faced uncle dancing in the brothel.

Yet on the whole the novel remains a case-history, and Fuentes as narrator does not penetrate sympathetically into Jaime's subjectivity; the main pious characters become stereotypes, easy targets for a Balzacian satire where a corrupt, self-satisfied class clings to its past, and limps through life, more dead than alive. The novel tries to become an alternative and shocking history of a Mexico on the make, but in its obvious didacticism,

as it pins personal events to historical ones, it fails to achieve its artistic goals. Sam Hileman's translation is faithful, but to the point of being too literal.

By the time of *A Change of Skin*, the technique involving the reader in the process of judging the characters has been subtly refined. The earlier omniscient narrator now enters the fiction, and *A Change of Skin*, as its title implies, becomes a *mea culpa* of a Mexican generation—Fuentes' own—faced with the New Age of beatnik, hipster, Vietnam draft dodger, 'druggy' and Beatle fan. This active narrator addresses his principal characters as 'you'. He provokes them, through jogging their memories, to face up to their past, their string of little cowardices and failures, and in a psychoanalytical way, to confront themselves. The novel takes the archetypal form of a journey from Mexico City to Cholula in 1965, with countless flashbacks to Greece, Germany, New York, Buenos Aires and wherever else the four main actors have lived, until they penetrate the labyrinthine catacombs of the vast, ruined Cholula pyramid where Franz, on the run from a Nazi past is, or appears to have been, murdered. Fuentes makes much of how in Mexico the past feeds on the present. None of the characters escapes the acts committed in their pasts as they try to discover their true identities.

However, this open, sprawling novel is far more than a revelation of guilty characters. Fuentes has followed Julio Cortázar's lead in *Hopscotch* (1963), a novel crammed with such a density of information and debate that Fuentes called it 'a Pandora's box'. In *A Change of Skin* (itself dedicated to Cortázar) Javier, the failed poet turned bureaucrat, is writing an unfinished novel called *Pandora's Box*. And out of this book-box come discussions and digressions on love, sex, machismo, fidelity, travel, writing, reading, pop music, Nazism, Jewishness, cinema, Machiavelli and more, in a frenzy of allusions that include Fuentes' own, earlier fictional characters. This collage technique works reasonably well until the final section of the novel where the narrator reveals himself, and invites some American rock musicians and hippies called the Monks to act and judge the earlier characters. Here, time has been cruel to this novel. Fuentes gives us a kind of Ken Kesey 'happening', as if in 1965 he really believed that a New Age of sexual liberation was being ushered in. The Monks, and the generation who listened to the Beatles and rock music, such as the sexually free Isabel, become prototypes and judges of Mexicans still captive to Victorian upbringings, unable to liberate themselves from their past and their desire for a clean, moral life. Sadly, this illusion faded, the 1960s flower children growing as old and guilt-ridden as the four who took the car journey to Cholula into murky, devious pasts, where permanent revolution—for a country such as Mexico with its official revolution—is just media hype.

A novel, then, betrayed by its last hundred pages; yet I feel it was worth resurrecting *A Change of Skin*, for it anatomises a generation of cosmopolitan Mexico City Mexicans whom the narrator addresses as wanting 'your own opium trip, for you should have wanted risk, confusion, a crazy mixture of things', middle-aged beatniks refusing to grow old. The novel is also a fine exploration of a stale and childless marriage between Javier, the pill-addicted poet 'with his busy little prick', and his promiscuous American wife, Elizabeth; a conventional theme lurking behind the heady 1960s glamour. Fuentes satirises these Mexicans hooked on Pepsicoatl—his catch-phrase for the attraction of Yankee consumer culture—where Mexico is a land 'that has given up its poverty in order to achieve only vulgarity, only to ape the lousy States'; the problem lies in the ambiguity of a USA that also offers hippies and New Age liberation.

Faced with a dead Revolution and a country run by 'pompous mummies' (ie, its

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politicians), Fuentes derives the energy of this novel from a vision of Mexico as the only country in the world where the gods are 'still on the loose, laughing, mocking, setting everything upside down, making national heroes of the most blatant traitors . . .'

It is in *The Old Gringo* that Fuentes movingly renders into novel form this alternative, dark Mexico, antidote to gringo progress, order and civilisation. He takes as a subject an old gringo who crosses over into Mexico in order to die; only at the end do we realise that this old man is Ambrose Bierce, the writer who in 1913 disappeared in Mexico. Fuentes has created a plausibly sought-after death, as well as a character as rich and quirky as Artemio Cruz. The novel is movingly narrated by Harriet Winslow in old age, remembering the days when she came to her fullest realisation of life in the hurly-burly of Pancho Villa's Revolution in northern, desert Mexico. She formed a triangle of intimacies with macho General Arroyo and bitter old Bierce; she is seduced by Arroyo in an overtly symbolic love-scene where Arroyo's 'rattlesnake' of a penis is compared to the 'dismal dwarf' of Harriet's New York fiancé, and where Fuentes waxes on the theme of the Latin lover's compensatory vitality. But she takes her revenge on Arroyo, who shoots Bierce in the back after he has burnt the General's land deeds, and himself is executed by Villa.

Into this narrative Fuentes has woven crucial symbolic encounters: the ballroom of mirrors; a scene where the future General is handed the keys to the hacienda, and the land deeds, but where, more tellingly, Fuentes dramatises the differences between gringos and Mexicans, where Mexico stands for awakened senses, emotive landscapes, and feelings. The novel also shows how the Revolution stirs Mexicans from a 'drugged' sleep, and sets them in motion, 'forgetting their ancient fealty to one place and one landscape and one graveyard'. Each of the three main characters, as well as the General's Mexican mistress, confess their secrets. The novel ends with Harriet, the governess who invented the death of her father to save family honour, discovering new ways of seeing Mexico, having learnt to live with it, rather than trying to change it into a mimic version of the USA. For Fuentes in this novel 'each of us carries his Mexico and his United States within him, a dark and bloody frontier we dare only cross at night . . .'. The novel has added attractions: wonderful descriptions of the desert, and fluent shifts between characters, what they say and what they think. It is admirably translated by Margaret Sayers Peden and Fuentes himself.

Behind these three novels, as with all Fuentes' work lies a fascination with Mexico as a 'fatally foreign land whose only reality was the stubborn determination never to be anything other than its eternal miserable, chaotic self'. His characters slowly reveal the lies and evasions that prevent them from embodying this anarchic land.

JASON WILSON

London

Alternative realities: novels from Brazil

Dona Flor and Her Two Husbands

Jorge Amado

London: Serpent's Tail. 1986. 553pp

High Art

Rubem Fonseca

London: William Collins Sons. 1987. 345pp. £9.95

Maíra

Darcy Ribeiro

London: Picador, Pan Books, 1985. 353pp. £3.50

Dona Flor and her Two Husbands depicts a universal human dilemma, and one which not many of us—except Dona Flor—seem to have any success in resolving: the need for the comfortable routine that allows us to plan, organise and control, and, at the same time, the craving for the unexpected, fascinating chaos of the realm of spontaneity.

In Dona Flor's case the dilemma is experienced in terms of her sexuality, or perhaps more accurately in terms of how she wishes to experience her sexuality. The story is simple. Dona Flor is married to that breed of charming scoundrel who, apart from being a constant source of problems for her, is able to provide the most exciting—and tender—love-making she has ever experienced. Vadinho is indeed a remarkable character, whose phenomenal ability to take advantage of every opportunity presented to him is matched by a true innocence. Perhaps it is this innocence which prevents Dona Flor from realising her secret desire to leave him. But Vadinho suddenly dies; his unexpected death brought about by the intensity and madness with which he chooses to lead his life. It is with Vadinho's death that Dona Flor perceives that though he had brought anguish and problems to her life, he had given her a precious opportunity to realise her sensuality.

After a few years, during which Dona Flor maintains a willing and determined mourning, she finally gives in to the pressure of family and friends by marrying a man who in everyone's eyes is potentially the perfect husband. Dr Teodoro Madureira is everything that Vadinho was not: responsible, caring, mature and—unfortunately—essentially boring.

For the first year Dona Flor, who is only just tasting the agreeable feeling of responsible love, does not realise that when the predictability of life is guaranteed, it becomes hard to endure. But Vadinho comes to her rescue in an ethereal form which nonetheless—for all practical purposes—restores the spontaneity and fascination that was lacking from her life. Yet, she now faces a new dilemma: that of making fidelity and loyalty to her new husband compatible with the full realisation of her sensual longings, which only Vadinho seems able to help her fulfil. Dona Flor's final response to that dilemma could only happen in a novel, but Jorge Amado's skilful treatment leads us to imagine—at least in theory—that similar resolutions could be open to us all.

There is in *Dona Flor* an absence of moral judgment, a genuine recognition that in the many different ways in which we can choose to go through life, there exists a degree of honesty and inevitability: Vadinho can be exasperating, cruel and single-minded, but we are always reminded that he is as he is in spite of himself. The same is true for Dona Flor, Dr Teodoro and most of the other characters who populate the world we are presented with. Dona Flor would like to be endowed with consistency, faithfulness and loyalty. Alas, reality is different. Dr Teodoro can only love in the way he knows. After all, the sign on the wall of his pharmacy—'A place for everything and everything in its

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place'—merely encapsulates his true self, the real bureaucrat for whom life can only be experienced in an orderly fashion.

Dona Flor also represents, in a disguised form, the truly independent woman, whose career (we have to remember she is a real artist as far as cooking is concerned) is as important as her love life. She never relinquishes that right even when Dr Teodoro unsuccessfully attempts to make her give up her job. It is not just the money, she argues, it is something she wants to do. It is precisely this right and the sense of the legitimacy of her own wishes when all the social pressures are against her, that makes Dona Flor an independent woman. But Dona Flor is a complex character and the process of discovering her true self is a difficult one. In the long run she gets away with murder—that is in her own eyes—and the final proof of her own independence is that she does not rely on anyone's approval or disapproval. This acceptance of herself as she is is Dona Flor's major achievement, something that perhaps few women manage to achieve in their lifetime.

There are also some delightful secondary characters, and in this respect Dona Flor's mother deserves some special attention. Dona Rozilda indeed epitomises the stereotypical Latin American mother-in-law, whose main objective in life is to acquire some sense of personal importance through her offspring's successful marriages. But once again, even in her worst moments, she cannot help being the way she is.

This is a remarkable and fascinating book, with a very rare capacity to allow us glimpses of other possible realities and to bring them to life, while leaving us wondering about their fictional characters. It is also a sheer joy to read. Amado's outstanding talents for description and character creation are reminiscent of some of the classics of contemporary literature. Yet this is not a classic in all respects. It is a truly Brazilian novel, insofar as the characters could not exist outside Brazil, or even Bahia, and certainly not outside Latin America. In this respect Amado shares the talents of Gabriel García Márquez, including the ability to transform fantasy into reality and make it credible. García Márquez once remarked that in writing *One Hundred Years of Solitude* he had simply given literary form to some of his childhood experiences. Amado has done something similar, in capturing what could be called a purely Brazilian way of being in the world. By this I mean a willing acceptance of some quite exuberant and complex elements of reality which are not always susceptible to rational scrutiny.

High Art, by Rubem Fonseca has been described as an accurate portrait of contemporary Brazilian society, but in contrast to *Dona Flor and Her Two Husbands*, the picture of Brazil that we are presented with is a very violent one. Set in Rio de Janeiro, the novel tells the story of a lawyer's attempts to solve the murder of two prostitutes. Gradually it grows into a complex mystery which combines individual perversion with the intrigues that seem to characterise a world inhabited by the rich and powerful. It is not an easy novel to read; perhaps our appreciation of it depends on the importance we attribute to violence as a defining element of our reality.

It does seem that the author attempted more than what is usually expected from the average mystery novel; that is, a good plot which keeps you interested for the pure sake of discovery. Fonseca tries to go further, and I am afraid he does not succeed. If his original intention was to uncover the secret underpinnings of the Brazilian power structure, he falls short. If, on the other hand, his aim was simply to reveal the very complex, dubious and tortuous elements that are sometimes present in sexual behaviour, this kind of novel will contribute nothing to the debate, even in its literary

form. Regarding elements of some importance such as character development, it is possible to say that we do form some kind of picture of the storyteller. Mandrake, the lawyer, appears as a fairly indecisive, dissolute and generally incompetent sort of professional. If the message is that murder cases sort themselves out regardless of the effort particular individuals put into solving them, then it is effectively conveyed.

Judging from the treatment of his women characters, Fonseca appears to have a tendency towards misogyny. In *High Art* women seem incapable of love or generous feelings. Women are at their best naïve; at worst ruthless manipulators. Even in the case of Ada, the woman whom Mandrake is supposed to love, we are presented with a mildly vain creature who has the bad luck to be in the wrong place at the wrong time. Or if women are capable of love, they suffer from the naïvety of believing that love can be reciprocated by men. The following paragraph early in the novel is representative:

I listened to the noises coming from the kitchen. The first time: Ada walking across her living room appreciating herself through my eyes, as if my eyes were the mirror in the studio in which she made love to her own body. That was how Ada walked toward my embrace; and sensing her narcissism, I had turned my body away slightly, to prevent the embrace from becoming more intimate.

Or further on: 'I loved Ada. But that didn't prevent me from being interested in other women. (Ah, men)' Yes, 'Ah, men.' This is not supposed to be a feminist novel, therefore things should not be asked of it that it is not intended to deliver. It is nevertheless sad to find that, in a novel which attempts to be more than just a mystery story, the female human condition is depicted in such ungenerous terms.

As for other characters, particularly that of Lima Prado, a crucial pawn in the game, Fonseca spends too few words to reveal their complexities. Surely murderers and their accomplices have some redeeming features? Or do they?

The perpetual theme of *High Art* is violence: its characters are divided into two kinds, those who inflict violence and those who are subjected to it. I would question this as the main defining element in an accurate portrait of Brazilian society. *Dona Flor and Her Two Husbands* exists to prove it.

A different kind of violence is depicted in *Maíra* by Darcy Ribeiro—perhaps a more credible and real kind of violence: dominant white culture struggling to reach the ends of the earth; with the ends of the earth and their inhabitants presenting due resistance.

Like *High Art*, *Maíra* is a difficult novel, but for very different reasons. Set in the Brazilian jungle, the story also begins with a death. In this case that of a woman whose body has been found on a beach of the river Iparana. It is a particularly macabre form of death, given that the thirty-year-old woman died in childbirth, giving birth to twins who are found dead beside her. The Swiss citizen who happens to find the body has given his statement to the police:

He also verified that she had bled during childbirth. He verified that on her forehead there was a small scar from an old wound, now a cicatrix. And, more over, that her face, hands and legs were marked by striated scratches, some of which were partially infected. These latter considerations prompted him to assume that a crime might have been committed.

The scene is set. From it, develops a very complex and intriguing mystery. Yet, it is the kind of mystery that reveals alternative conceptions of reality. What would a white woman be doing in the middle of an Indian village? Why did she die in such horrific circumstances? Slowly the mystery begins to unravel, and we come to know the characters step by step. Religion or the world of myths—'primitive' and 'civilised'—play

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an important part in this novel. How do we come to believe what we believe, and how are the realities we inhabit and the actions we accomplish determined by those beliefs?

This is an interesting novel, partly owing to the fact of Ribeiro's training as an anthropologist. He manages with reasonable success to describe the inner conflicts of both the 'primitive' and 'civilised', and we can see that both worlds are inhabited by frightened beings, desperately trying to come to terms with their own ghosts. A thoughtful novel, well worth the struggle that the reading of the first few chapters will require.

MARIA ALICIA FERRERA-PENA

BBC Latin American Service, London

Perceptions of Nicaragua

To Bury Our Fathers

Sergio Ramirez

London: Readers International. 1984. 253pp. £5.95pb

Stories

Sergio Ramirez

London: Readers International. 1986. 118pp. £3.95pb

The Jaguar Smile: A Nicaraguan Journey

Salman Rushdie

London: Picador. 1987. 171pp. £2.95pb

Vice President Sergio Ramirez of Nicaragua is also one of the region's most celebrated novelists and short story writers. He spent many years in exile in both Central America and Europe, and it was during his two years in Berlin from 1973-5 that he wrote *To Bury Our Fathers*. It was first published in Caracas in 1977, to be followed by other Latin American and Spanish editions and translated into German, Norwegian and Dutch. In 1985, it became the first of Dr Ramirez's works to appear in English.

Despite the racy colloquialism of this translation, *To Bury Our Fathers* is a book entirely outside any European tradition, and equally outside the 'magical fantasy' material which European readers of Jorge Luis Borges and Gabriel García Márquez so frequently anticipate. By Ramirez's own account (as given to Salman Rushdie, among others) the book is literally true, and further substantiates the common observation that truth is far stranger than fiction. The fruit of years of research into the Sandino period from 1930 to 1961, it uses a novelist's range of skills in blending characters and situations from actual and written records with a dense plot and much dramatic action. At times the complexity of plot is so excessive that it seems impossible to keep track of this or that personality, of who did what to whom and when; time sequences become confused through the continual use of flash-backs and flash-forwards, and the scene shifts vertiginously as the four central characters slip in and out of internal and external exile.

What carries the book along so inimitably is its perfectly tuned pace, so pitched that the details of time and space become irrelevant, as the reader is hurtled forward automatically into the next neatly devised sequence of incidents.

The novel is thematic rather than logical, and its themes are at once the strictly national concern of a country's liberation struggle, and the universal one of human behaviour when fighting for survival. How people behave in such extremity has little to do with their own intellectual or psychological reasoning and everything to do with their surroundings. In circumstances where life is almost unbelievably cheap, and both death and sex are a haphazard and messy business, three *compañeros* struggle to do their bit for the revolution but with such a chaotic lack of organisation and communication that, rather than being instigators of action, they repeatedly find themselves merely reacting to events from which they constantly strive to escape.

On the other side of the country's divide is Catalino López, a colonel in the National Guard, who is ambushed in a cinema by Sandinistas under Pedro Altamirano, and escapes as sole survivor of the ensuing rout and fire by hiding in the projection room. Neither his cowardice, in failing to shout an order and in hiding under a bed, nor the Sandinistas' brutality in systematically despatching the survivors of their gunfire, their 'machetes being put to work, smashing through bones, splintering through benches, raising sparks from the floor', are described with any kind of moral overtones. Catalino's relationship with Indio Larios is depicted with touching gruffness even to the point where, when Altamirano's head is brought home in triumph on a pike, Indio defects from the National Guard in a miraculous escape and retires to piñata-making and revolution-mongering in neighbouring Guatemala.

Behind them all stands *el hombre*, the dictator Anastasio Somoza, so much less substantial in every way in real life than the aura that surrounds him would suggest. The aura is the carefully-promoted display of immutable power, yet, even with the full weight of Franklin D Roosevelt behind him (headlined together, in *Las Americas* magazine, as 'Champions of Continental Democracy') there is always something faintly ridiculous about Somoza's entourage, which lacks any real presence at the centre to hold it all together. Somoza is first seen through the eyes of Taleno's proud father, come to observe his son's graduation ceremony as a cadet, who 'suddenly finds himself staring straight at *el hombre's* face, motionless under the lights of a film camera . . . *el hombre* in the centre of the platform, flanked by high-ranking officers standing to attention, their caps under their arms, and at one end Catalino López, caught out by the anthem before he could reach his place'.

This sense of something being amiss in the state is always a circumstantial one: not even in the mouths of the most consistent revolutionaries (among whom number the erstwhile model cadet, Taleno) is there a single diatribe against the monstrous iniquities perpetrated by the dictator who fed human beings to wild animals and had his Guards dismember infants before their parents' eyes. The rottenness seeps out into the city and the land, so that a fraudulent election (lost, through ballot box-stuffing, to the grandfather of the third roving revolutionary, Jilguero) is followed by debris and dull despair: ' . . . the side-street wind as always sweeping dust, seeds, bits of vegetation into the shops and the deserted ironmongers, with their bales of cloth and cotton prints, rolls of barbed wire, tin pails, and shop-soiled stock laid out on the pavements, the rubbish yellowing and rotting in the deep ruts left by the oxcart wheels or clogging up the drains of the corner laundries, where mosquitoes started to swarm'.

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The fortunes of Taleno, Jilguero and Indio, linked by a common cause, overlap with those of relatives, rivals and former colleagues whose claims on their lives prove definitive. The image of the wheel of fortune, bought by Taleno's father from a dying fairground traveller, is constant. At once a companion and a master, it accompanies its owner through the everyday inevitabilities: 'downpours, droughts, the horrors of war, train crashes and flooded rivers, knife-fights in gambling dens and cock-fighting pits, the wheel always rolling out its fortune, bringing its luck, taking it away, on all the saints' days in Nicaragua'. Paradoxically, its message is not of the immutability of fate but of the exciting vagaries of fortune.

Ramirez's *Stories*, written mostly in the mid-1970s with the addition of a final couple from the mid-1980s, share much of the rapid movement and some of the same motifs of the earlier novel. The ship that never docked at San Rafael del Norte (to collect the cargo of caged monkeys that Taleno's father had carefully amassed in order to make his fortune selling them to the USA for castration in the interests of science and impotent men) is transformed into Mrs Onassis' yacht, for whose arrival the Managua Lions Club waits indefinitely aboard the specially bought and bedecked *Queen Elizabeth*, which bears a giant heart-shaped wreath of red flowers inscribed with the story's title, 'To Jackie with all our Heart'. Indio's reminiscences of the 1942 Baseball World Championship, lost 'because of drink . . . The pitchers could hardly stand up when they went out to warm up', becomes the family tragedy of 'The Perfect Game' in which once again Cuba puts paid to Nicaraguan hopes. The pants-wetting terror of Colonel Catalino crawling under his bed is reborn in 'The Siege' as Septimio's fear, again 'under the bed for shelter . . . hit by the smell of stale urine, spit and foul shoes'.

The mythic dimensions afforded *To Bury Our Fathers* by quotations from Blake and Aristophanes are re-embodied in angelic presences, the contradictions inherent in our notions of the eternal ('Charles Atlas Also Dies') and the possible ('Nicaragua is White'). But the influence of foreign countries and the incapacity of the First World to treat the culture of the Third as anything but a folkloric joke are also illustrated. Ramirez's years in Germany resurface in the cruel story of a Venezuelan student desperately seeking employment as a party Father Christmas in Berlin. While his employer reprimands his drunken wife for giving 'a false impression to foreigners—stressing the word *foreigners* to emphasise how unthinkable her conduct was', Frau Schleting herself persists in her desire to shout and 'dance *Que Viva España* with her Spanish Santa Claus', too careless to remember his true nationality. The final irony is that the student is abandoned to police investigations: 'Filled with the bitterness and frustration he'll take back with him to Maracaibo, he knows in an instant that he'll be dubbed, with pitying sarcasm: *the German*. Forever.'

The problem of exile is not merely the condition of having to live abroad. Each Central American country not only has its economy but its culture violently distorted by the USA. Baseball, perhaps the most assimilated of these influences and Nicaragua's national sport, features in two of the stories; the impossibility of North American information ever being wrong, or even misleading, is the subject of both 'To Jackie' and 'Nicaragua is White'. 'Charles Atlas' is the more pathetic and less ludicrous for lifting the veil on the otherwise apparently impermeable monolith of the USA. It begins to expose the realities of the much-vaunted social melting-pot and the whole American dream as Atlas confesses to his real name (Angelo Siciliano) and his origins in Calabria, in 1927. As the gauze mask, which cancer of the jaw obliges him to wear, is gradually

lifted, so the mask slips from the face of the omnipotent, all-North American Superhero.

The cover describes the book's contents well as 'Eight elegant and ironical tales'. They are also witty and beautifully-crafted, and however macabre the undertow they never lapse into polemics or cynicism. Like Aesop or Aristophanes in their deft moral content, they linger in the mind long after reading. Nick Caistor, who translated both books (and provides a welcome guide and chronology to *To Bury Our Fathers*) is so at ease with his craft that one is left with the slightly disquieting sensation of having read an unmistakably Nicaraguan author in the original.

The Jaguar Smile is a book about Nicaragua written by a non-Nicaraguan author. Enormously popular and effective, its broad audience accessibility and clear style are undoubtedly among its greatest assets.

Based on a journal Salman Rushdie kept while participating in a delegation visiting Nicaragua, and written in the form of a travelogue, *The Jaguar Smile*, is named after an anonymous limerick which runs:

'There was a young girl of Nic'ragua
Who smiled as she rode on a jaguar,
They returned from the ride
With the young girl inside
And the smile on the face of the jaguar'.

This limerick leads Rushdie to muse on its possible conservative and radical interpretations; if 'the young girl was taken to be the revolution, seven years old, fresh, still full of the idealism of youth, then the jaguar was geopolitics, or the United States . . . but what if the young girl were Nicaragua itself, and the jaguar was the revolution? Eh? What about that?' Rushdie's own sympathy lies with the former interpretation. Setting himself firmly within the politico-literary traditions of Defoe and Swift in order to defend the turning of his private sentiments into public opinion, he concludes that, for all its flaws and petty contradictions, the revolution is not in the process of devouring itself as so many others have before it.

The Jaguar Smile is substantially more than a mere 'portrait of a moment, no more in the life of that beautiful volcanic country'. It cleverly interweaves Nicaragua's past and present with her optimism for the future. The timing of Rushdie's three-week-long visit there in July 1986 is used to maximum advantage in eliciting and recording responses from the 'nation of poets' presenting their country's case for survival: as Rushdie says elsewhere 'You can hardly call the victim of such monumental aggression the guilty party'. In June 1986, the International Court of Justice followed up its findings that Nicaragua's harbours had been illegally mined, with proof that the invading 'Contras' were being armed and financed in defiance of international law. Almost at once, President Reagan managed nonetheless to have another \$100m of 'aid' voted through the House of Representatives for his counter-revolutionary 'freedom fighters', analogising them to the Lincoln Brigade who went out to join battle with the Republicans during the Spanish Civil War.

The fact of this decision attracted considerably less international outrage than Ortega's closure of the opposition daily *La Prensa* under the terms of the declared state of siege. Rushdie doesn't mention that this followed the disclosure of evidence that it was being funded through the US Embassy in Managua, and occurred on the day it was

to appear with a triumphant cover portrait of Reagan celebrating the acquisition of his '100m blood money. He does, however, include full reports of the case as stated both by Violeta Chamorro, *La Prensa's* editor, and Sandinista government members. For himself, while mistrusting 'this aristocratic lady' who proved to be 'the hardest person, of all the people I spoke to, to pin down to specifics', Rushdie also mistrusts Nicaraguan 'ears and instincts which read into *La Prensa* a CIA-backed fifth column—further evidence of North America's willingness to sabotage by whatever means it could buy. Censorship is ever an issue to evince an energetic parade of categorical moral scruples, but Rushdie comes down firmly on the side of Western liberalism, favouring the maintenance of controls but not the imposition of closure.

In alternating the relevant statistics recording 'Nicaragua's considerable post-revolutionary achievements with his personal impressions, Rushdie avoids falling into the emotionally-charged pitfalls exemplified by Jean Didion's book on *Salvador* four years previously. Yet, even while he comes across as considerably more wry and friendly than Didion, there's a tone running through his opinions that (were he less of a plainly likeable character himself) one might be tempted to attribute to that most heinous of crimes, a *neo-colonialist attitude*. Having once sensed it, all the protestations about being an 'escritor hindú' from a fellow Third World country seem merely disingenuous. Somewhere along the way, the question of class is bound to rear its hydra heads; while a close understanding of another culture is always enormously difficult, empathy becomes almost impossible when an anglicised Indian of impeccable education and cultivation encounters a popular culture as homegrown from below as Nicaragua's.

The Jaguar Smile lapses occasionally into a certain quaint folklorism regarding Nicaragua's natives. Of the statements that left me most uncomfortable, the pronouncement that 'Sandino had become his hat' is at best meaningless, at worst an obscure insult. While the stencilled cartoons that decorate walls around the country do indeed emphasise the hat (just as Fidel's cap and cigar are his hallmark in Cuba), ask any newsboy—as I did—and even the most modest schooling will already have informed him of some essential facts about 'the father of the revolution'. And what does one make of Rushdie's speculations on President Ortega's fast during a presidential dinner party? He surmises that while refraining from eating 'could have been a sign of nervousness' it was 'more likely, an attempt to make himself seem a man apart, different from the crowd'. Why? Why on earth didn't Rushdie simply ask Ortega the reason, before drawing what seems such an unlikely conclusion? Perhaps the man didn't eat because he wasn't hungry or had already eaten with Rosario and the eight children or, as has elsewhere been suggested, suffered damage to his oesophagus under torture during his seven years in Somoza's jails, and finds it embarrassing to eat with people he doesn't know.

While one longs for a bit of journalistic interrogation to establish the truth (or otherwise) of such statements, other mistakes of fact could—and should—simply have been removed by a competent editor. Doris Tijerino was not massacred in a 'safe house' in Managua 'resisting the might of Somoza's tanks and heavy artillery' (p 19) but is alive and well and has been Chief of Police these past several years. 'Grey Panthers' is not a 'nickname' dreamed up by youthful Nicaraguans for 'a group of Californian old age pensioners' (p 62) but the name chosen by a thriving national organisation of North American senior citizens, *après* the Black Panther movement of the 1960s. Whoever compiled the list of Contents should note that every page reference after Chapter 1 is wrong.

Rushdie is, however, at his best with anecdotes, and in his own particular mixing of dialogue—often on a high and animated plane—with the incursions of an often banal surrounding reality. There is one example, in which Rushdie is travelling with Sergio Ramirez and Luis Carrion, (members of the nine-man FSLN National Directorate) along Nicaragua's notoriously bumpy roads. The conversation turns from censorship to a recent and suspicious report on the country by the International League for Human Rights:

Ramirez began by saying that the most important human rights organisations had given Nicaragua a pretty clean report. Then he lost his temper. 'You see,' he cried, 'if we do not murder and torture as they do in Salvador, it just proves that we are so fiendishly subtle.'

A cow strolled across the road and the driver braked violently . . . 'One must understand one's animals,' Luis Carrion said mildly. 'A cow will never deviate from its chosen direction, never turn around. A dog, however, is unreliable'.

Neither dogs nor cows are native to Nicaragua. The jaguar, however, is.

AMANDA HOPKINSON

London

The double yoke: women's writing from the Third World

Other Fires: Stories from the Women of Latin America

Edited by Alberto Manguel

London: Picador. 1986. 222pp. £3.50pb

Unheard Words: Women and Literature in Africa, The Arab World, Asia, the Caribbean and Latin America

Edited by Mineke Schipper

London and New York: Allison and Busby. 1985. 288pp. £4.95pb

A Double Colonization: Colonial and Post-Colonial Women's Writing

Edited by Kirsten Holst Petersen & Anna Rutherford

London: Dangaroo Press. 1986. 188pp. £15.95hb/£8.95pb

All three books take as their subject women's writing in ex-colonial countries, and the titles are already indicative of their editors' points of view. Alberto Manguel underlines the 'otherness' of the female, as do the best of the stories in his anthology. Mineke Schipper's over-ambitious collection mourns the passing of oral cultures in the Third World, a demise that further diminishes the traditional social and cultural role of women, while Kirsten Holst Petersen and Anna Rutherford equate gender oppression with national subjugation.

Manguel's anthology is impeccably selected. The reader must be grateful both for his

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knowledge of Latin America's literature and for the ability he possesses as a translator, which has made available in English—in most cases for the first time—work by this rich group of authors, whose sex appears to have excluded them from the world-wide success enjoyed by their male counterparts. The geographical distribution of the authors chosen is an accurate reflection of Latin American literary production, though Manguel pointedly rejects the concept of 'Latin American literature', attributing it, and the generalisations it implies, to Eurocentrism.

A common voice does not emerge from the collection nor many common themes. What unites the authors is simply their second-rate status within their national cultures, and delayed international recognition as they have had to wait for the full impact of First World feminism to be felt by publishing houses. Suicide is an unfortunate response to the unresolved dilemma between creativity and gender, yet two of the authors anthologised—Marta Lynch and Alejandra Pizarnik—felt compelled to follow that destructive path.

Angélica Gorodischer and Vladý Kociancich, two further River Plate authors, explore a genre favoured by their male colleagues; the fantastic. Silvina Ocampo, a great stylist, examines the way in which we construct reality, and the arbitrariness of the world's morality. These voices are not distinctively feminine, but Beatriz Guido's appropriation of a traditional male preserve—the erotic, and the fascination for perverse sexuality—is definitely so, as is the voice of Pizarnik who chooses similar themes.

For Armonía Sommers, a latter-day Uruguayan surrealist, reality is only apprehensible as subjective experience. In 'The Fall', with a clearly feminist focus, she re-writes the story of a Virgin Mary who does not want to 'be alone among her sex'. Rejecting her role as a sexless object of male fantasies, she takes possession of her body through the sexual act. Human at last, Mary leaves behind her resignation and iconic status—a male invention—and claims revenge for her son's death. Sommer's story and that of Clarice Lispector are the most truly subversive in the anthology. In Lispector's 'The Imitation of the Rose', the female narrator's voice has been thinned down to a whisper. Midway between madness and suicide (traditional 'female maladies') she is aware that the world outside belongs to the male, and that all that is required of her is to look beautiful, keep house and remain silent. This existential uncertainty and the fear of chaos, the male dictum of female nature, leads to obsessions with order and cleanliness and to a preoccupation with the minimal; the abstract, like causality, being a male preserve. Guilt accumulates with an unawareness of the rationale behind man-made laws. The world outside is truly alien and the narrator's only defence is to wish for invisibility, to lose her voice. There is no co-existence, just despair and alienation.

Mexico's Inés Arredondo rejects the Mexican male writers' tradition, firmly rooted in history, and re-writes myth from a female viewpoint, while another Mexican, Elena Garro, comments on the strength of women's imaginative powers. Her compatriot, Elena Poniatowska, is that rare flower; a humorous feminist. Her story, 'The Night Visitor', turns the tables on the usual Mexican model and has the female as the bigamist; an innocent, generous creature aware that the men need her. By showing up the judge's incomprehension of her motives, Poniatowska not only demonstrates the repressive rhetoric of power and a fraudulent morality, but identifies 'law-speak' with 'male-speak', thus cracking the solemn façade of society. In 'Death of a Tiger' Rosario

Castellanos's compassion does not hide the fact that submission has a degrading effect; the Indian and the woman in her story are one in her eyes, choked with despair.

Unheard Words is a pell-mell, arbitrary and necessarily unrepresentative selection. How can anyone attempt to summarise in 288 pages the entirety of women's cultural production throughout the Third World? Why was such a feat even attempted? Are women so unproductive that 288 pages suffice? Obviously not; the result is a confused text, with some chapters better than others, but devoid of unifying criteria and lacking in analysis. The book fails to reflect social realities and prevents the reader from gaining an understanding of a very complex and varied situation.

Each chapter covers a huge geographical area and is opened by a compilation of proverbs—the first in the Latin American section is a quote from Schopenhauer—which seeks to prove the essential anti-feminism of popular culture. Inadequate attempts to provide panoramic views of very complex issues follow, and the chapters close with interviews with prominent writers. Such is the wide angle used, that each chapter begins to resemble the others in the impression it gives of improvisation and under-research. Nevertheless, some central facts, shared experiences and parallel traditions emerge. Oppression, repression and lack of expression persecute women writers in the Third World. These writers, ignored both by their peers and by publishers, are hindered in their practice by their families. Severely limited by the disproportionate rate of illiteracy among women (it is four times higher than among men in Africa) and by their restricted access to education, women find that even their role as story-tellers, so central in largely oral cultures, is being eroded by the relentless forces of modernity, a predicament that leads some writers to join the nostalgic chorus in regretting the passing of traditional cultural forms which were themselves responsible for female oppression. In her introduction, Mineke Schipper tries to place the book within a socio-political framework, but while it may be true that globally two-thirds of working hours are performed by women and only one-hundredth of the wealth is owned by them, to pretend that women across the range of countries examined face similar problems, is a misrepresentation. Women have in common their conditioning on the basis of biology but most of the writers from Latin America, the Arab world and India, unlike those from Africa, are enabled to carry on their work because they have a maid of their own as well as the requisite room. And the view that promiscuity is a form of liberation for women may be possible in the sophisticated English writings of some Indian novelists, but it would be inconceivable in Africa, where virginity is a prized treasure and childlessness the ultimate punishment.

From orality to poetry, to the short story. This is the path followed by most women: poetry is a 'hiccup' art which does not require continuous practice; the short story, a 'reduced' version of the novel favoured because it does not depend on a publishing industry but can be accommodated in newspapers and magazines. For Africa and Asia the 'modern' world starts with European colonisation, which was arguably a liberating influence for women. Even today's writers such as Buchi Emecheta, have used the European experience to isolate and describe their African concerns, the double yoke that falls on African women caught halfway between the demands of modernity and the pressures of tradition. The way out for Emecheta is through individual salvation. For Miriam Tlali, the central concern of South African women writers arises from the conflict between militancy and motherhood. They accept the taboos of the patriarchal society—avoiding writing on the loss of virginity, or on sex with the white man—while

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the black male is free to see white women not simply as desirable, but as a symbol of freedom. Meanwhile, they accuse their womenfolk of being 'colonised' if they attempt to free themselves from traditional strictures.

The chapter on Arab literature attempts to summarise a rich culture in just two pages and is hopelessly outdated as it does not take into account the fundamentalist revolution that invalidates the chapter's thesis of a gradual betterment of women's condition. Marriage and writing emerge as incompatible, and because of public perceptions of feminine literature as autobiographical the weight of taboos is, simply, crippling. North African women writers, like those of India, add to the existing problems by writing ostensibly in the language of the coloniser, thus placing their work out of reach of their needy sisters and exposing themselves to the charge of writing exclusively for national bourgeoisies or for First World markets. Assia Djebar decided to abandon the printed word and take up the camera as a way of reaching her illiterate sisters, and the increasing numbers of Third World women film-makers has been an encouraging development.

The Caribbean and Latin American chapters are confused and therefore confusing. The data on translation can, at best, be said to be whimsical in its incompleteness. The reader will never know what material is available in translation, and the careless handling of dates (sometimes the translation date, and at other times the original publication date, appears next to the title) adds to the general obscurity. I would seriously question the inclusion of River Plate authors within a Third World anthology. Hugely sophisticated, their concerns are in the mainstream of First World preoccupations. The panoramic intentions of the Latin American chapter lead to wild generalisations. The haphazard selection of writers—what is that great seventeenth-century nun, poet and student of science, Sor Juana Inés de la Cruz, doing in an anthology about modern women?—does a disservice to the literary production of women from twenty republics. Many points jar: Perón never did use the feminist movement because it simply did not exist; he worked closely with his wife, and her undoubted influence gained women the vote and workers their paid holidays. While it may be true that the desire to renew the language is a central concern, it is not a women's preserve, but the emblem of modernist and post-modernist writing in Latin America, from Ruben Dario to Severo Sarduy. As for the task of impressing on language the identity of the continent, the reader is free to wonder whose identity? Amerindian, African, Iberian, Italian, Arab, 'criollo' or mestizo? Or is the critic implicitly advocating a 'universal' Latin American culture that will paper over all the painful cracks which are still visible? Yet, if this is the case, how can a chapter ostensibly on Latin American literature overlook Brazil which, as is evident from Manguel's anthology, boasts some of the most astonishing women's writing?

The clear theoretical introduction to the Caribbean chapter is marred by a hopelessly confused examination of actual texts. Ineke Phaf appears to favour the recounting of story-lines and the use of unsupported assertions. A lack of respect for the texts, and even for literature itself, strips them of their complexities and reduces them to the status of mere plots—even in the case of Guillermo Cabrera Infante's *Tres tristes tigres*, where the author deliberately sets out to destroy plot and conventional characterisation. The author's account of *Cecilia Valdes* leads me to suspect that she has not read the book very attentively. All the Cuban writers chosen are male. Not only Dora Alonso, Fina García Marruz and the new Cuban writers are ignored, but similarly overlooked are that formidable pair of literary critics (a rare breed among women, as so many of the

contributors have remarked), Camila Henríquez Ureña and Mirta Aguirre, who in magazines, periodicals and at university exerted a decisive influence on twentieth-century Cuban culture. Spelling mistakes may be the fault of the typesetters, but to describe the protagonist of *Habanera* as a black psychiatrist is to have neglected to see the film whose white protagonist was Daisy Granados, the wife of the director. The film was much criticised by politically-minded Cubans who saw the preoccupations of the prosperous characters as inherently bourgeois. Although the director of *De Cierta Manera* was a black Cuban woman, the film is not concerned specifically with black problems; all the main characters are white (significantly the girl), or almost white. Oscar Lewis's *Four Lives* is not the 'first' testimony from the mulatto girl, and what the author identifies as a specifically Caribbean stereotype, the sexy mulatto, is in reality merely a regional variation (others exist in Brazil and elsewhere) of the European 'femme fatale', who in the nineteenth century was dressed up in exotic clothes. I suspect that Ineke Phaf is not a literary critic or even a sympathetic reader, otherwise how could she claim that women's novels are subjective—implying that men's are not—or assert that women writers never present the reader with stereotypes?

The most interesting chapters of *A Double Colonization* are those covering ex-colonial First World countries: Australia, Canada and New Zealand. These provide an illuminating contrast with the concerns of Third World women writers. The editors have a point of view, a theoretical framework and a good knowledge of the materials anthologised. *A Double Colonization* is not a descriptive book. It sets out to invent strategies of dealing with existing myths, and to create both a new consciousness that will change the present and a new language that will begin to erode the dominance of 'male-speak'. The non-African contributors are aware that they are middle-class and that feminism itself is also, for the time being, largely a middle-class movement, but this awareness of privilege does not annul the double colonisation they experience.

The question of a 'difference' between male and female writing is a crucial one, concerning not only the Third World, but the First World, whose recent colonial past has exaggerated male domination and male-oriented myths deriving in the main from the conquest of the land. If nostalgia is one of the sources of literature it becomes doubly so in the colonial countries where the loss of Eden is repeated in the act of exile. Aritha van Herk, from Canada, points to Genesis as the source of misogyny; woman, the result of an afterthought at the Creation, is the direct cause of the loss of innocence. She is the sinner, the impure. Man, on the other hand, can recover his purity in the vast open spaces where the erotic impulses are absorbed by hard work; The founding myth is of a male living outdoors, in the bush or in the prairies: the cowboy, bushman or gaucho. The necessity to create an identity for the new countries turns these myths into the national culture. The newly-independent nation becomes identified with the male, and woman—declared reactionary and puritanical by the new man—is identified with the colonial yoke. Displaced, woman wishes to return to her native land, as in the new country she is even more incapable of changing events. She retreats further into herself and into the household and traditional women's preoccupations such as love and the writing of 'romances', which do not have the same 'universal' appeal as adventure stories—the distinctive male genre in nineteenth and early twentieth-century Commonwealth literature. Male literature is seen as realistic, normative and positive, while female literature is romantic, deviant and negative. Woman, as in Freud's analysis, is an anti-civilisation force.

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This identification of the national with the male is also remarked in the Jamaican, Bev Brown's critique of Braithwaite's theories of creolisation, a process of cultural adaptation in which sexual relationships play a crucial bridging role. The link between ideology and sexuality results in a male-centred memory of the history of creolisation; when Braithwaite looks for myths to underpin his theories he uses only those which emphasise the patrilinear, like the Sun God. On the other hand, two women writers from the Caribbean, Jean Rhys and Zee Edgell shun the sun and focus on young women whose personalities develop through their identification with women-centred experiences.

The issue of 'difference' is already present in the work of these two writers, but has become paramount in the New Feminism which tackles the issue of female specificity in an attempt to overcome the negative associations of 'otherness' and sexual oppositions. Language is identified as the first patriarchal structure, and the importance of this issue may help to explain why women's writing based on the notion of 'difference' is distinctly avant-garde. But then so is the writing of men whose central concern is language itself. So, where is the 'difference'? It could be argued that by opposing realism, the New Feminists place their writing beyond the reach of most women, ignoring the fact that oppression is produced and functions within very specific economic and social structures. Living alone, single parenthood, lesbianism, the appropriation of eroticism and humour are pressing concerns for First World women writers, but not so for those of the Third World: a global community of women is an escapist dream, as is 'sisterhood' because it can operate only in limited locations, within the same culture, the same race and the same class.

NISSA TORRENTS

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Future landscapes

A Sport of Nature

Nadine Gordimer

London: Jonathan Cape. 1987. 396pp. £10.95hb

A Land Apart: A South African Reader

Edited by André Brink and J M Coetzee

London: Faber and Faber. 1986. 256pp. £9.50hb

Until quite recently the white woman tended to be marginalised in the literature of imperialism. Fictional treatments of the colonial experience featured male 'adventurers', with the daughters of Empire firmly relegated to a subordinate role. Of late, however, the marked resurgence of interest in Victorian female travellers and explorers, together with such literary figures as Olive Schreiner and Karen Blixen, has provided a welcome correction to literary and political readings of empire which

concentrate exclusively on the male. J M Coetzee's recent 'Robinsonnade', *Foe* (1986), which rewrites *Robinson Crusoe* to import a female consort on to the all-male island of Defoe, Ballantyne, Golding and Tournier, is a significant case in point. It is therefore no surprise that Nadine Gordimer's latest novel, *A Sport Of Nature*, should take as its focus a female adventuress, thus simultaneously overturning literary and cultural norms.

From the beginning of her career, Gordimer has proceeded from a recognition of the complex interaction of gender with genre. Both her first and second novels offer examples of the *Bildungsroman*, first with a female, then with a male protagonist, illustrating the different meanings of 'the novel of development' in sexual as well as political terms. Both were, in a sense, family romances, *The Lying Days* (1953), charting the heroine's escape from bourgeois family repressions which were identified equally with the mother and the motherland, and *A World of Strangers* (1958), testing a young male's vexed relation to the worthy liberalism of an apparently enlightened family. Love, particularly stifling family love as a microcosm of political restrictions, has long been Gordimer's subject. *Occasion for Loving* (1963) registers the terminal malaise of the South African liberal position through an account of an inter-racial love affair. In *The Late Bourgeois World* (1966) the heroine's political commitment is re-awakened with her sexuality. *A Guest of Honour* (1971) draws upon Wilhelm Reich's psychosexual analysis of the failure of revolutions (here, in the context of a newly independent African ex-colony) to argue for a necessary rearrangement of sexual intimacy as the first prerequisite of successful revolution. More recently, *The Conservationist* (1975), the rewriting of the story of an African farm in post-Schreiner terms, was followed by the similarly intertextual *Burger's Daughter* (1979), which approached issues of racism through Conrad and *The Tempest*, and by *July's People* (1981) a novella set in a future South Africa in which white refugees depend utterly for their survival on their 'Man Friday'.

A Sport of Nature reworks many of Gordimer's major themes (the family romance, African nationalism, a chilling dissection of the South African bourgeoisie, a vigorous repudiation of reformist liberalism, an emphasis on sexuality as innately radical) against a background which embraces most of Africa and extends in time from the early 1950s to (one hopes) a near-future, independent black Republic of South Africa.

Hillela, the heroine of the novel, is described by its title as a *lusus naturae*: According to the OED, 'a plant, animal, etc., which exhibits abnormal variation or a departure from the parental stock'. A spontaneous mutation, Hillela enters the novel as the child of an adulterous mother, Ruth, who has departed for Mozambique and a Portuguese lover, abandoning her daughter to the care of her two sisters, Olga—arch-bourgeois representative of a world of swimming-pools and expensive *objets d'art*—and Pauline, the committed reformist wife of a radical lawyer, who is progressively embittered by her exclusion from the black world in which she formerly exercised her social conscience. Expelled from school in Rhodesia for consorting with a 'coloured' boy, Hillela returns to South Africa only to outrage her adoptive family's norms by a quasi-incestuous affair with her cousin/adoptive brother, Sasha. Rejected by both sisters, this latter-day Cinderella embarks on a series of picaresque adventures. She appears successively as a go-go dancer, the lover of a deceitful white journalist (who transports her to East Africa and abandons her), a 'beach bum', the mistress of a Belgian diplomat (in Tanzania, in an unspecified francophone African country and Accra), the wife of a black South African freedom-fighter (assassinated in Ghana), and thence via an aid-related career in the

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USA returns to South Africa for its independence celebrations as the wife of the President of the Organisation of African Unity, General Reuel.

The narrative technique of the novel is highly unusual. Throughout, Hillela is viewed almost entirely from an external point of view. The narrator pieces together her history as if researching the biography of a public figure, admitting lacunae in the account, speculating as to motive, and tracking an evanescent subject through multiple changes of identity. Named in honour of a Zionist great-grandfather, Hillela sheds her awkward forename to assume the protective colouration of 'Kim', amidst the Susans, Clares and Fionas of her Rhodesian school. Reverting in South Africa to Hillela Capran, she is later transmogrified into Mrs Whaila Kgomani, and finally rebaptised Chiemeka (Igbo: 'God has done very well') by her second husband. Various historical figures enjoy walk-on parts (Oliver Tambo, Joshua Nkomo, Archbishop Desmond Tutu) as does the fictional Rosa Burger.

It is tempting to perceive this narrative technique as consciously Marxist, as Hillela changes according to the forces of circumstances and history. The external view certainly registers the crisis of the liberal view of the individual subject, with its accompanying assumptions of the organic coherence of the individual, transcending social conditions. On the other hand, as the narrator remarks, the gaps and silences in the life-story also associate Hillela, via similar lacunae, with the lives of individual heroes. Indeed, her mysterious paternity, early abandonment, surrogate parents, expulsion as taboo-breaker, exile, wanderings, trials and triumphal return all link Hillela to the paradigm of the mythical (male) hero, as delineated by Joseph Campbell. A strong mythical undertow runs as a subtext to the novel which pullulates with references to Greek tragedy, myth, folk- and fairy-tales. (Whaila first encounters siren Hillela in the sea, not long after a discussion of Qamata, the Xhosa god who emerges from the sea to chase away the Christian gods of submission.) Poised between myth and history, however, Hillela remains, by the freak of her background, unconditioned by the family and outside the cultural norms of her native land, recreating herself at every turn, sloughing off successive lives in order to move on. In interview, Gordimer described her narrative method as carefully chosen to reflect the fact that external events are moving too swiftly in South Africa to permit the writing of an 'internal' novel, in which a character might contemplate her own navel. Gordimer also drew attention to the confluence of sexual and political radicalism in the novel. Though apparently growing into political militancy through the force of historical circumstances, Hillela's self-creation proceeds on grounds of instinct rather than ideology. Her personality is of itself so luxuriant that she remains unattracted by material luxury. In the midst of the cruelty that is South Africa, individual love appears as selfish, white 'brotherly love' is an idea beset by sophistry, as Hillela's own love-making with her 'brother' demonstrates to her ostensibly liberal family. Only sexual love remains, for her, as a touchstone of integrity.

If there is a driving force which transforms Hillela's various desultory adventures into a purposive quest, it is the desire for a home and a family of a radically different type. By the accident of her early abandonment, Hillela becomes an exile from birth, an eternal guest of honour, going 'home' in the school holidays to a family location chosen arbitrarily for her by others. Knowing her real mother only as a sexual being, through a discovered cache of explicit love-letters, Hillela avoids the 'Calvinism and koshering' of her mother's background, learning a furtive expertise in illicit sexual adventurism which

stands her in good stead in later, less adolescent, activities. Accustomed to displacement she readily learns to move to successive postings at the behest of her political 'family': 'Without a cause is without a home.' The abstract relations of her childhood mean that she is free from conventional family conflicts. The central event of the novel, perceived by her aunts as a definitive break with the taboos of the bourgeois family, is for Hillela not incest at all. Her emergent sexuality strips the family of its illusions, simultaneously making a political point: that there can be no 'family life' for whites while blacks are denied it, that Hillela can no longer set up home in a house where only white people can live. In the novel, imperialism is envisaged in family terms, originally in the interrelated monarchies of the nineteenth century (Queen Victoria's cousins), then with foreign national economies providing the extended family of the West. Hillela thus moves less from lover to lover than through a series of families, as surrogate daughter to the Belgian ambassador to whose children she is nanny and big sister, then as hopeful mother of a 'rainbow' interracial family, a project cut short by Whaila's death, thence to a narrow escape from the nuclear model in America, to end up as one of three wives of an African General, in a non-matrilineal, newly-invented family paradigm, based on her protection and (it is hinted) seduction of the General's son by another wife. (Reuel is so free from the exclusive loyalties of family that he has this favourite son kidnapped (and worse) for political ends.) Hillela's own pride in her daughter, named Nomzamo in honour of Winnie Mandela, depends precisely on a reversal of usual parental feeling, a delight in *not* having reproduced herself all over again in another advantaged white child. Her commitment to the extended family of African nationalism develops from a clear-eyed unsentimental perception of the reality of the 'rainbow' family, memorably described:

The real rainbow family stinks. The dried liquid of dysentery streaks the legs of babies and old men and the women smell of their monthly blood. They smell of lack of water. They smell of lack of food. They smell of bodies blown up by the expanding gases of their corpses's innards, lying in the bush in the sun.

If Hillela appears eventually to succeed in combining a cause and a home, ironies remain nonetheless. The implicit connections with a children's revolt of a more specifically political nature, and with the image of whites as child-killers in present-day South Africa, are made explicit in the fate of Sasha, Hillela's male counterpart, who remains caught in the tragic House of Atreus of his South African family. Imprisoned for political activism, Sasha finds himself 'thrust up back again into the womb', incommunicado apart from permitted visits from his gorgon mother, who succeeds in reasserting the maternal role only via her son's incarceration. In the final courtroom scenes, it is as much the parents who are on trial as their son who, despite becoming a hero to the blacks, fails to participate in the visionary futurity of the closing pages. Gordimer leaves only time to tell which of the pair, Hillela or Sasha, is the 'sport of nature', which the representative hero.

If this review has devoted most of its space to Gordimer's epic novel, this is not to undervalue the strengths of *A Land Apart*, a selection of recent prose and poetry from South Africa, both in English and translated from Afrikaans. The only flaw in the volume is the absence from it of any work by either of its over-modest co-editors. Apart from these omissions, it provides an excellent introduction to the writing (excluding drama) of the post-Soweto generation, oriented towards the work of younger writers (no Lewis Nkosi, Alex la Guma, Dennis Brutus or Es'kia Mphahlele, though Nadine

Gordimer is included). The laconic notes on contributors tell their own stories. ('Born c. 1957', 'died under unexplained circumstances', 'jailed 1976-83', 'drew heavily on his previous experiences as a prison warder'.)

The stories themselves are a revelation. Though the English-language selection includes some writers who already enjoy international reputations (Sheila Roberts, Christopher Hope, Mazisi Kunene) it is the Afrikaans material, even in translation, which is unforgettable. Etienne Van Heerden, Jeanette Ferreira, George Weideman, P J Haasbroek, to name only a few, introduce the reader to an apocalyptic landscape of war, violence, rape, and lost innocence, much of it focused upon women and children, or mediated through feminine experiences. If a real sense of doom emerges from the content, the stories none the less give voice to contemporary South Africa in a dynamic mode which is entirely individual.

JUDIE NEWMAN

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Satires of class and power

Out of India

Ruth Praver Jhabvala

London: John Murray. 1987. 288pp. £10.95hb

Rich Like Us

Nayantara Sahgal

London: Hodder and Stoughton. 1987. 268pp. £3.95pb

'It was a novel about India, written by an English lady: well-written too, Amrita could see that, all the proper accoutrements of style and sensibility, but Amrita could not understand why the lady had given Indian names to her characters.'

Such quizzical, sometimes dismissive and occasionally patronising attitudes towards Indian writing in English are much the fashion today. An oft-quoted view suggests that writing on India in English is for foreigners; those who participate in such an exercise, however creatively, are themselves in some sense uprooted. Since the colonial past must be disowned, the future of its language forms the subject of constant debate, entailing a great deal of antagonism to its development or indeed to its very presence on Indian soil. The paradox lies in the fact that much of this debate is itself conducted in English, which continues to be the gateway to many areas of economic advancement; those who do not wield the language are often eager to acquire the skill.

Ruth Praver Jhabvala, an outsider by birth, has been unsparing in her scrutiny of India and of herself in India, which is perhaps why she took account of such critical views even in her first novel, *To Whom She Will* (1955). Yet, her work since then, has undeniably been a projection of urban Indian Life at the level at which she, a European, would meet it or indeed understand it. This is not to suggest a superciliousness or incomprehension in her approach, but the existence of a screen that prevents her from discerning complexities, although she does appear to be aware of them.

There is very little about urban, middle-class India as a scene for the comedy of manners that escapes the sharp focus of her lens; indeed, it is possible to argue that she is the first to have recognised this source of creative entertainment, and to have explored and refined its dimensions in her work. *Out of India* is a selection of stories that includes the essay 'Myself in India', an incisive expression of the emotional cycle experienced by Westerners in India which finally settles into the love/hate relationship typical of colonialism.

Jhabvala's social observation and satirical studies have occasioned comparison with Jane Austen and Anton Chekhov, obvious parallels being provided by the superficial similarities in mores and manners and the class and society they respectively depict—post-Independence urban elites in India, the landed gentry of Regency England and the parallel society of pre-Revolutionary Russia. Commendable indeed, is Jhabvala's acute observation, her feel for the comic incongruities of Indian life, her clear-eyed view of spiritual seekers from the West cushioned by spiritual frauds from the East, and her sensitivity to the experience of those caught in the often destructive clash of cultures. Yet, her greater, and often unacknowledged achievement, is the ability to capture the cadence of the urban bourgeoisie's Indian English idiom, whether it be that of the cultivated brown sahib or of his less pretentious fellow-Indian who uses English more naturally.

The stories reveal a nexus of social relationships, and the human predicament, but with a suggestion of deliberate withdrawal from more complex truths of Indian experience. Jhabvala remains the detached observer, quite uninvolved in the emotional upheavals she records so vividly. Her ironic stance lacks the dimension that comes with compassion and involvement, or indeed with a more clearly articulated vision of the values trampled in lost worlds which underlie her work. Perhaps the mode of distant observer is a defence, a necessary weapon developed from her own personal history of displacement and expatriation—a family of Polish Jews who emigrated to England from Germany in 1939; a further expatriation to Delhi in 1951 after marriage to an Indian.

The trouble is that unsparing use of a caustic pen on classic targets of satire—egotism, vanity, affectation, insensitivity—can be mistaken for cynical attacks upon India. The stories in this collection are no exception, *Out of India* contains some of Jhabvala's most powerful work—'Desecration', 'How I Became a Holy Mother', 'The Widow' and the introductory 'Myself in India' which expresses the author's honest and provocative understanding of her own predicament. 'Desecration' analyses female consciousness, as do many of the short stories at various levels. Here it is the experience of a sensitive and passionate woman, a Muslim of ambiguous ancestry, married to an ageing and civilised rajah who respects and adores her; the passionate abandon of her affair with a brutal and violent man reveals the subtle depths of a woman's dreams that lead her to debased self-destruction.

Jhabvala's sensitivity to the conflicts of culture and class takes various forms: 'Desecration' rests on assumptions that can blight relationships between the mainstream and minorities—here the confrontation is Hindu-Muslim; 'An Experience of India' and 'A Spiritual Call' offer glimpses of Western sensibility seeking a home in an enticing but alien environment. Her Europeans when young choose to stay on in a deliberate but misguided manner; others as in 'Two More Under the Indian Sun' and 'A Man with a Dog' have no choice but to remain. The relentless light cast on these attitudes is also turned on the sentiment and insensitivity, the sentimentality and unintentional cruelty

of relationships in a joint family setting. However, it needs to be said that the Indian family as composed of scheming relatives, weak or domineering men and frustrated or ambitious women, contains elements of fact but does not quite add up to the truth.

Out of India straddles various layers of the leisured class of post-Independence India—business and professional, exiled and expatriate, spiritual seekers, Westernised Indians and Western Indophiles. On occasion, as in 'On Bail', and in the person of the clerk, Har Gopal, in 'Passion', Jhabvala attempts a glimpse into the pressures on clerical workers in Delhi's jungle of power. Nayantara Sahgal understands the world of power and she captures its complex nuances in *Rich Like Us*, a novel that won her the Sinclair Award. Although it lacks the controlled precision of Jhabvala's craftsmanship, and even in some instances the detail of character that makes Jhabvala's vignettes come to life, Sahgal's novel says much through the sweep of cultural history it portrays.

Rich Like Us is dedicated to 'The Indo-British Experience and what its sharers have learned from each other'. These lives, as many individual histories, make up the scope of the novel which encompasses not merely the impact of Western education but indigenous reform movements, colonial law, and a Hinduism which 'is not taught, [nor seeks converts]. It simply is.' The novel echoes with the hushed voices of generations striving to be heard within the more strident tones of modern India. As a niece of Jawaharlal Nehru, and in her own right, Nayantara Sahgal has had a privileged view of the top echelons of government and industry, a position which makes her an insider by more than birth, and she describes the machinations of power groups with considerable verve and honesty.

The focal point of the novel is the Indian Emergency of 1975–77, a traumatic time when, in the name of modernisation and social change, the fundamental structures of a democratic State and the rule of law were overthrown. Some of the ignominious aspects of this time are recreated in Salman Rushdie's novel, *Midnight's Children* (1981). Both Rushdie and Sahgal use the period to illustrate various confrontations: between liberal traditions and technological imperatives such as birth control; between a severely stratified society and masses seething to break constraints; between modern infusions and the intransigence of a reality that cannot be facilely relegated to the status of economic, social and political 'evils'. The turn of the century will no doubt witness a shift in focus, with extremist and separatist claims taking the place of the Emergency as the new power fragmenting India. With historical hindsight, however, there may be increasing justification for the view that the fragile infrastructure of law, values, administration and a unifying political ethos, was irreparably damaged by the sweeping and overriding powers that arrived with the Emergency and continue to lurk today.

Sahgal's insights are distilled through the experience of Sonali, an idealistic, Oxbridge-educated administrator in the aftermath of Independence, thirty years on. Her commitment has been nurtured by a father who belonged to the first generation of Indian administrators within colonial government—a 'civil servant whose body had served the sovereign power and his heart and mind, *satyagraha*' (Mahatma Gandhi's doctrine of passive resistance). The narrative suggests regional differences, even clashes, between the 'sparkling self-assured, softly contoured world' of Sonali's Kashmiri mother and the harsher terrain of her father, part of a family from the coast who moved to plateau country and thus became part of Shivaji, the Mahratta warrior's legendary history. A many-layered history, woven a little too thickly to be contained in

Sonali's first person narration in a story that also extends to a treatment of *sati* (the obligatory burning of widows) forced on an unwilling forebear.

Yet, with corrupt politicians, businessmen and bureaucrats at the centre and a beggar on the periphery, *Rich Like Us* offers a cohesive and intimate portrait of the intrigues of power. If the satire is sometimes suspect, it is because Sonali's resignation from the Civil Service—she is unwilling to betray the underprivileged in favour of sweeping modernisation to please the urban consumer—suggests the disillusionment of a power group that has found itself displaced.

More forthright are the revelations attempted by Sahgal at the trader level of business, and through Rose, the cockney memsahib whose robust matter-of-factness cuts through the cant, hypocrisies and subterfuges of opinion-makers, socialites and wielders of power. Largely unaware of the refinements of liberal sensibilities in working-class England, she remains unaffected by the urbane and worldly values of her husband, Ram, and eventually wins the respect and understanding of her hard-nosed, orthodox father-in-law, a small trader.

The novel's many voices recreate interactions of family, social and public life but only remotely touch the repercussions of the Indo-British experience outside the structures of power. Sahgal confronts the erosion of liberal traditions but does not lend much time to thoughtful illumination of a more crucial strain on the Indian psyche—that created by the imposition of an ill-defined secular ideal upon a fundamentally spiritual land. A discussion of issues such as Sahgal attempts should extend beyond the history and displacement of elites to a recognition of the forces of the land and its people. Such a recognition Jhabvala achieves indirectly, and Rushdie suggests in depth, both in the structure and characterisation of *Midnight's Children*. If English, still the language of a privileged elite in India, could not encompass this wider and more fundamental reality, then its many detractors within the country would indeed have a point about its limitations as a creative tool within the Indian context. Yet, Indian poetry in English has transcended the limitation, as have the novelists of the previous generation who were inspired by pre-independence dreams of freedom.

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London

The oil of acceptance

Talkative Man

R K Narayan

London: William Heinemann. 1986. 123pp. £7.95hb

R K Narayan's latest novel, *Talkative Man*, published in his eightieth year, adds, even his greatest admirer must admit, not much more than a charming grace note to the weight of fifty years of distinguished literary production. There are in *Talkative Man* some authentic Narayan touches, an ardent, easily impressed hero and a menacing central character, Dr Rann, who takes up residence in the waiting-room of Malgudi railway station, having come to the town on some mysterious ploy of his own, before

establishing himself in the Talkative Man's house in Kabir Street. Dr Rann is related in character and significance to other figures in Narayan's work who represent an impersonal and negative influence most inimical to the free flow of life.

In a postscript Narayan expresses his puzzlement at the way in which this novel—really hardly more than a *conte*—decided, in spite of anything he did or felt, to end itself. Yet surely this is no more than a signal of naturally declining powers, a phase of life which has to be endured, even by Narayan. Yet this novel gives us an opportunity to remind ourselves of Narayan's special and splendid contribution to the novel.

Narayan was born in 1907 in Madras, of an old Brahmin family. The family—they spoke Tamil at home—moved early to Mysore where he learned his English in a small school, taught by a model for the ferocious but by no means inefficient schoolmasters who appear in his fiction. His higher education was at Maharaja's College—now part of the University of Mysore—but he does not appear to have made any particular mark as scholar. His first book, *Swami and Friends*, was published in 1935 and he has continued to produce regularly ever since.

His novels are regional, in that they convey an intimate sense of a given place, without being parochial. They include the intimate resonance given by village life as well as the more sophisticated tone of the impersonal city.

Narayan is much preoccupied with the skills and problems of various kinds of work; commerce, teaching, journalism, money-lending, sweet-making. Within this scope, however, his habit is to focus his attention sharply and to proceed with an instinct for limitation. He writes of the middle class, his own class, the members of which are neither too well off not to worry about money and position, nor dehumanised by absolute need. The family provides the immediate context in which he operates, and his novels are remarkable for the delicacy and precision of the family relations depicted—those of son and parents, and brother and brother in *The Bachelor of Arts* (1978); of husband and wife, and father and daughter in *The English Teacher* (1978); of father and son in *The Financial Expert* (1952); of grandmother and grandson in *Waiting for the Mahatma* (1955).

The firmly delineated town, therefore, is the outer circle of the action; within it is the subtler and more wavering ring of the family. At the centre stands, or rather flinches, the Narayan hero, a tentative, spiritually sensitive, appealingly limited yet ardent character, in whom modesty is a positive force, whether he be the leathery old proprietor of a tiny industry, like Jagan in *The Sweet-Vendor* (1967), the converted 'con man' Raju (apologetically converted, in spite of himself) in *The Guide* (1958), or the nervous editor of the press on Market Road, Nataraj, in *The Man-Eater of Malgudi* (1961). The characteristic Narayan figure is wry about himself and sufficiently conscious to have an active inner life, and to grope toward some existence independent of family. Yet he always has the capacity to be surprised by the turn of events. His individuality has a certain formlessness, a lack of finish, as though the definition of his personality depended upon the play of external influences—which of course in India, with the immense weight of inherited tradition, is perhaps frequently the case. This quality of incompleteness in the person implies a further capacity, not just to be startled by external events, but to be at least in part reconstituted by them. The procedure followed by a Narayan novel is almost invariably one of renovating or reforming character in response to the encouragement or provocation provided by events. This process, however, is never total enough to be revolutionary, but is simply sufficient to create a

new bend in the flow of continuity. Yet, if this is how the process appears to the observer, it reveals itself to the protagonist in terms of his own efforts to achieve a more explicit and articulate sense of self.

Narayan's novels are comedies of sadness, evoking, as Graham Greene observed, comparisons with Chekhov, rather than anything in English literature. The sadness is twofold: it stems from the painful experience of dismantling the routine self, which in the Indian context seems less a private possession than something distilled by powerful and ancient conventions; and from the reconstitution, more frequently passive than active, of another personality. The comedy arises from the sometimes bumbling, sometimes desperate, sometimes absurd exploration of different experiences in the search for a new, perhaps exquisitely inappropriate, role. The complex theme of Narayan's serious comedies, then, is the rebirth—one need not balk at the word in an Indian context—of self and the process of its initial conception or education, the set of conditions in which rebirth takes place. Friction between the two parts of the composition is prevented by a subtle oil of acceptance, secreted both by the inclusive and tolerant stance of the author, and by what is ultimately a fundamental attitude of acceptance on the part of the characters. These characters occupy a universe characterised by both the influx and the plurality of being. Things flow, an infinite variety of things, men and manners, relations and women, avocations and degrees, joys, disappointments and disasters. To the author this is the nature of reality, to the characters it is what they will perhaps, with a moderate kind of happiness, finally accommodate themselves to.

Malgudi, the locale of *Talkative Man*, as of all the novels, is a metaphor of India. Whatever happens in the one happens in the other, but also, the reader begins to believe, whatever happens there happens everywhere. Against the background of a single place, and amidst the utter variety of human kind, the single individual engages with the one, universal problem: the effort not simply of being, but of becoming, human.

The realisation of this reading of experience is effected in the novels by means of a triple capacity of the author. First there is the minute fidelity with which the surface of Malgudi life is effortlessly reproduced; the streets, the houses, the shops, the temples, the trades, the routines and crises of the family, the exact grain and patina of place and people. Next there is the author's unblurred perception of the complicated play of a whole throng of motives, each member of the group ousting another, and being replaced in turn, in even the simplest action. One of the most brilliant exhibitions of this gift for psychological and moral analysis occurs in *The Guide*,⁴ in the way in which each thread of deception and sincerity is teased out by the author's nimble and tactful fingers. Accuracy on the surface is accompanied not only by this deftness of diagnosis but by a third quality, a subdued, suggested poetry, implicit in the natural relation Narayan finds between on the one hand, human actions and their purposes—conscious or not—and on the other, the ancient, complex Indian myths. The orchestration of his work at this level adds another and more profound dimension to his perception.

This complicated cargo is carried along by an English style which is limpid, simple, calm and unaffected, natural in its run and tone, and beautifully measured to its purposes. It has neither the American purr of the combustion engine nor the thick marmalade quality of British English; it communicates with complete ease a separate, Indian sensibility.

A quiet version of such a vision and such an art sustains *Talkative Man* throughout.
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Occupied Palestine: the writer as eyewitness

The Secret Life of Saeed: The Pessoptimist

Emile Habiby

London: Zed. 1985. 169pp. £9.95hb/£3.95pb

Wild Thorns

Sahar Khalifeh

London: Al Saqi. 1985. 207pp. £3.95pb

Critics such as the 'orientalist', H A R Gibb, were of the opinion that modern Arabic fiction could not be regarded as a part of world literature.¹ They felt that it was more interesting as social document than for its literary merit. The two works of prose fiction under review are, however, both social documents and literary achievements in their own right. Palestinian resistance literature gained new impetus when these two works were published in the original Arabic in the mid-1970s. The writers were Palestinian eye-witnesses who were recounting events in contemporary Palestine and describing the conditions under which the Palestinian Arabs had been living in Israel.

Both Khalifeh and Habiby chose to stay in Occupied Palestine, enduring the hardships of living under occupation, while continuing to write. Habiby (born 1919) is one of Israel's best-known Arab journalists and editors, a communist and a long-time member of the Israeli Parliament and a novelist with an uncompromising pen. Khalifeh (born 1941) is a teacher at the University of Iowa and Bir Zeit University in the West Bank. Her first novel was confiscated by the Israeli authorities; her second was published in Cairo and *Wild Thorns* is her third.

The Pessoptimist (a combination of 'pessimist' and 'optimist') is a long allegorical letter addressed to a friend from outer space, describing the hardships, struggles and second-hand citizenship of Palestinian Arabs who remained in Israel after the exodus following the 1948 and 1967 wars. Habiby chose comic and episodic prose fiction to describe the chaotic and sometimes farcical present in Palestine, where Arabs are repressed and discriminated against. The witty anecdotes show a frenzied search for a deeper structure underlying the chaos of events in contemporary Palestine and the 'miracles of this strange age'.

The work has no consistent central setting. Times and places are combined in a haphazard manner. In one chapter, the reader is carried from the Jazzar Mosque in Acre to Lebanon then back to Haifa. Graceful flights between centuries take place

¹ M J L Young, 'Modern Arabic Fiction in English Translation', *Middle Eastern Studies* 16(1).

throughout the book, where sometimes the narrative starts in the twentieth century and then jumps back to the thirteenth and fourteenth. The chapters are arranged in three main 'books' each of which is named after a female character with whom Saeed was in love. First, Yuaad, a word meaning 'once more'; second, Baqiyah, 'she who remains behind'; and third, the Second Yuaad.

Saeed, the main character, is a comic figure who sees his relations with the world as simple and comprehensible. No matter what happens to him, he believes that a potentially greater disaster was thereby averted, and he habitually thinks 'thank Him that it was no worse'. While writing his letter, he soars with his friends, creatures from outer space. Right from the beginning he associates himself with an ass, the stupid ass who is exploited by both Arabs and Israelis, the ass that did most of the donkey work to build modern Israel and the ass who does not 'raise an eyebrow if kings are deposed or if they stay'. In *Keshet*, Nattityahnu Peled said, 'Always the people are seen running away without exactly knowing why.'² However, Saeed returns to his homeland, crossing the border with his sister's lover. The fine line between his naivety and his knowingness is carefully drawn throughout the novel. When a guerrilla fighter in prison calls him 'father', the transition in his character takes place. He turns into a visible human being with a distinctive identity and becomes 'free at last'.

Saeed finally ends up sitting on a long stake, scanning the choices he has as a Palestinian Arab living in Israel. His future is full of promises of weddings and deaths. Jacob the Sephardic Jew is sitting on another stake. The Ashkenazy Jew denies the existence of a stake and asks for peaceful collaboration. The young man carrying the newspaper, a symbol of the communist party, wants to chop down the stake with his axe. Baqiyah, her son Walaa and the guerrilla fighter, invite Saeed to take part in the armed struggle. He rejects all these alternatives and departs with his friends from outer space, who symbolise death, a supernatural power or madness.

'For the sake of Truth and History', the account ends with an epilogue confirming the impaired mental capacity of the narrator. The writer's attempt to shake the reader's faith in the narrator is designed to offer an answer to the multi-dimensional problem described in the work. The fantastic nature of the narrator and his extra-terrestrial friends gives an indirect expression to doubts which society refuses to entertain. Trying to make life both manageable and satisfying is seen as an attempt to transcend human limitations, which elicits the label of insanity.

This novel, for which plans to adapt it into a film may be afoot, enjoyed great success in the Arab world and was highly praised by critics. This is a strong indication that the novel in the Arab literary tradition has begun to gain status after a long period of stagnation. The writing of Habiby is sharp, full of irony and historical parody. Because of its 'critical revisiting of the past' and its endeavour of filling new bottles with old wine, this work probably constitutes the first post-modern Palestinian novel.³ Edward E Said described it in his book, *After the Last Sky*, as 'the best work of Palestinian writing yet produced, precisely because of [it's being] seemingly disorganised and ironic'.⁴

Salma Jayyusi, describing the prose fiction of modern Arab writers, said 'Whether they wrote in the romantic or realistic tradition, in the tragic or heroic mode, they

² Nattityahnu Peled, 'Special Number on Arabic Literature', *Keshet*, Tel-Aviv, Spring 1970

³ Linda Hutcheon, 'Postmodernism', *Textual Practice*, Volume 1, Number 1, Spring 1987.

⁴ Edward W Said, *After the Last Sky*, London: Faber and Faber, 1986.

favoured a serious tone and a direct approach.³ Habiby's work was a fresh challenge to this traditional notion of perspective and to the novel as a genre.

The solemn tone and direct message of Sahar Khalifeh's novel place it firmly within the category which Jayyusi has described. *Wild Thorns* is a socialist-realist novel which attempts to reveal the truth of contemporary political and social conditions in Palestine, and to record accurately and classify day-to-day life, in a deterministic way.

Occupied Nablus is the stage for the confrontations both between the Israelis and the Palestinian Arabs and among the Palestinians themselves. An aura of the 1970s pervades the romanticised locale which is always seen with a pair of loving eyes. Nablus is almost tangible with its Mamluki old houses and new social values. One of the main characters, Usama, has to cross the bridge across the Jordan river and to be interrogated and searched before being allowed to enter his home town. The lurking threat of an occupier is well-caught in the novel.

The linear narrative starts at the beginning of Usama's exploratory voyage, during which he inspects the conditions under which the Arabs of the West Bank live. He is the fighter from the outside who perpetually criticises people living in occupied Palestine without taking into consideration the dilemmas they face in everyday life. 'What's happened to the country? What's become of everyone?', Usama cries in a condemning voice, executing his premeditated guerrilla operation against Arab workers who are helping to build modern Israel through their offer of cheap labour. Usama is a symbol of the Palestinian who lives outside Palestine, in the Arab or Western countries, and comes back to scrutinise and sometimes punish the Palestinian Arabs who chose not to leave their country but to live under occupation, accepting all the complications and concessions that accompany that choice.

The novel is essentially anti-heroic because Adil, the main character and central consciousness, is incapable of heroic deeds. He spends most of his time helping the people of the neighbourhood and his fellow-workers. He seeks consolation in drinking at night and working during the day. There are no questions to ask nor any final answers in his world. He simply takes life as it comes. He fails to do anything to save his house from being blown up and his sole achievement is to leave behind the kidney dialysis machine which pumps life into his father, who in turn spends most of his time talking about the past to uninterested foreign journalists. Although prisoners continue to struggle in proliferating prisons, houses to be blown up and children to be arrested, 'nothing changed' for Adil. The nearest thing he achieves to a positive act is to put an end to that old generation who believe in miracles and archaic values.

Adil does not turn into a thorn, a guerrilla fighter, like Usama or Basil, but Zuhdie does. When he is faced with the choice of either killing a Palestinian or an Israeli, Zuhdie turns into a guerrilla fighter to kill as many Israelis as he can. Unlike Usama, he was forced to take up arms not from any desire but from necessity. Abu-Sabber is yet another symbol for the limited alternatives facing the Palestinians under occupation. He represents the mutilated Arab worker who is basically paralysed and can do little to bring change to his surroundings.

The novel's scene of the destruction of houses was a triumph for Khalifeh (pp 104-6) and does not backfire because the emotion it evokes in the reader is precisely that which the writer had in mind. It portrays vividly how the Israelis blow up houses in a

³ Salma Khadra Jayyusi, *Introduction to the Pessoptimist*, London: Zed Books, 1985.

mechanical, nonchalant way and how the Palestinians show their rejoicing and happiness because they consider it one of several methods of struggle and steadfastness. The atmosphere in the neighbourhood is well captured and the reader can hear the voice of the old man whose house has been destroyed, when he stands on a neighbouring roof and calls for prayer 'Allahu Akbar'. "'God is great", repeated the neighbourhood in unison . . . women raised their voices in loud ululations, while the girls continued to beat a rhythm on empty cans.' The particular dialect of colloquial Arabic which is spoken in that part of Nablus is presented in Um-Sabir's speech when she says, for example, 'May God break your arm! May seventy evil eyes get you! May your children all die young! May God destroy you, by the glory of the Prophet Muhammad.'

The major problem of this novel is its voice and perspective. Authorial voices and those of characters overlap and fly into each other. The reader may become confused by the similarity between the respective trains of thought or mental images of Usama and Adil. In certain scenes the voice cannot be attributed to anyone but the author, despite an evident wish not to present her point of view in this particular fictional work. Some scenes are sketchy (p 30), some are melodramatic (p 39) and others are not justified within the context of the novel (p 36). It is worth noting, however, that all the above mentioned technical faults have been ironed out in Khalifeh's subsequent novels. *The Sunflower* (1980) is a follow-up to *Wild Thorns*, both titles having been taken from Fadwa Tuqan's poem 'The Song of Becoming' in which the Palestinian grows up in the shadow of bitter Wild Thorns and takes up arms to become a Sunflower.⁶ The feminist theme in *The Sunflower* and the realistic, down-to-earth language have, meanwhile, been beautifully developed in her latest novel *Memoirs of a Non-Realistic Woman* (1987).⁷

The influence of Western literature on both *Wild Thorns* and *Pessoptimist* is evident. Habiby ridicules the critics who said, 'he ended up falling short of *Candide* by a couple of hundred years.' Saeed's extraterrestrial friend accuses him of imitating *Candide* and he defends himself saying, 'Blame our way of life that hasn't changed since Voltaire's day, except that El Dorado has now come to exist on this planet.' The satirical tone of Habiby is obvious while he was defending the first edition. The combination of 'real' and 'supernatural' to create a more comprehensive world and adequate language may remind the reader of Kurt Vonnegut's *Slaughterhouse Five* where Billy becomes unstuck and meets the Tralfamadorians who 'were simply able to give him insights into what was really going on'.⁸ The supernatural or madness are the only refuges from the ugly reality that Billy witnesses when Dresden is destroyed by the allies' aerial bombing of 1945-6. The effect Sahar Khalifeh tries to achieve is also similar to that of many Western realist novelists.

The translation of Habiby's novel by LeGassick and Jayyusi is one of the best the reader may encounter. The excellence of the writer's Arabic language finds its match in the translator's sharp English. The constant search for the closest English expression to Arabic idioms and the translator's extensive historical and linguistic research is evident throughout the work. On the other hand, the translation of LeGassick and Fernea of Khalifeh's novel is not as good. It is hard to determine whether this is attributed to the simple, realistic language of the writer or to the foreignness of the translators.

⁶ Sahar Khalifeh, *The Sunflower*, PLO, 1980.

⁷ Sahar Khalifeh, *Memoirs of a Non-Realist Woman*, Beirut: House of Literature, 1987.

⁸ Kurt Vonnegut, *Slaughterhouse Five*, London: Traid Grafton Books, 1979.

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The message of both works of fiction is essentially the same: the Palestinian issue is a complex phenomenon in contemporary history. Living in Palestine is not as easy as it may look for the theoreticians and engineers of revolution living outside, far from the big iron fist of the Israelis. The necessity of earning a living in such conditions might lead some people to make partial compromises. In such circumstances, writing becomes as futile as pouring paint in the 'bottomless bucket of the madman'. Habiby expresses this sense of futility in his novel when he writes:

'Give me the voice' I exclaimed.

'Continue writing to your friend.'

Many adopt literature because they lack power for anything more, while others avoid taking a stand by moving abroad. In such a situation, everyone is under scrutiny; Palestinians living in Occupied Palestine, Palestinians and Arabs living outside Palestine, Arab systems, immigrant writers and these novelists themselves. Under this scrutiny, according to the writers, we are all found guilty of passivity based on naïve optimism.

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Poetry and politics

Modern Poetry of the Arab World

Translated and edited by Abdullah al-Udhari

London: Penguin. 1986. 154pp. £3.95pb

The appearance of an anthology of modern Arabic poetry in English translation is an event to be welcomed by all lovers of Arabic poetry who would like to see it better known to the English-reading public. This is all the more so when the volume is published in such a popular and widely circulating series as *The Penguin Poets*. This book is an anthology not of the whole of modern Arabic poetry, but of poetry published only during the last thirty years, the earliest poem dating back to 1957 while the latest was written in 1984 and revised in 1985. Although the anthology is entitled *Modern Poetry of the Arab World* the poets included in it come exclusively from Iraq, Syria, Lebanon and Palestine; no other part of the Arab world, not even Egypt, is represented.

Within its limitations this anthology has much to recommend it. The translation is generally readable and at times even elegant, which is more than can be said for much 'academic' translation of Arabic verse. Abdullah al-Udhari was certainly wise to seek the advice of two distinguished sympathetic literary figures: John Heath-Stubbs and George Wightman. Moreover, the anthology succeeds in illustrating forcefully and poignantly the extent to which in their work the contemporary Arab poets have bravely confronted 'the shattering events that have overtaken the Middle East since the Second World War'. It provides yet another instance of what seems to be an inevitable preoccupation with political issues in the literature of the Third World. It is this preoccupation which probably more than any other factor, distinguishes the poems in this volume from the work of most contemporary Western poets. However much they

may be troubled by perennial or metaphysical questions arising from the nature of the human condition, contemporary Arab poets, for obvious historical reasons, seem unable to escape the impact of politics, be it the tragic sufferings of the Palestinians, following the loss of their homeland, or the suppression of individual liberties and the affront to human dignity caused by internal authoritarian regimes. The result is that the reading of this volume is a deeply moving experience.

Yet it must be pointed out that the limitations of this anthology are very serious indeed. First and foremost is the editor's seemingly inexplicable omission of *all* Egyptian poets. While very minor Lebanese, Syrian and Iraqi poets are represented, the volume does not contain a single poem by an Egyptian poet, not even by leading figures such as Salah 'Abd al-Sabur and 'Abd al-Mu'ti Hijazi who both formally and thematically made significant contributions to the Modernist movement in modern Arabic poetry. The obvious political bias of the anthology, which bears the dedication 'For Beirut', leads to the conclusion that there must be a political explanation for this otherwise baffling phenomenon. It is as if by excluding all Egyptian poets the editor wished to make a political statement, objecting to Sadat's Camp David Peace Agreement with Israel in 1978 which removed Egypt from the Arab-Israeli conflict. It is sad to see politics interfering so damagingly with literary and aesthetic judgement, and the result is that this anthology, despite its title, cannot be regarded as a fair representation of contemporary Arabic poetry. No one unacquainted with Arab literature who reads this book would suspect that Cairo was an important cultural centre of the Arab world.

Secondly, regarding the poets included, there is a disturbing imbalance in the amount of work presented. For instance, while there are no fewer than eighteen pages allotted to each of the two probably most translated Arab poets, Adonis and Mahmoud Darwish, the Lebanese Khalil al-Hawi (surely one of the major figures in modern Arabic poetry by any standard) is represented by an insignificant piece of five short lines containing no more than twenty-six words, less than half the number of words used in the biographical note provided on him.

No less eccentric is the classification scheme of the volume. It claims to trace four major trends or movements to which it gives the names 'the Taf'ila Movement' (Iraqi School) 1947-57; 'the Majallat al-Shi'r Movement' (Syrian School) 1957-67; 'the Huzairan (June) Experience' 1967-82, and 'the Beirut Experience' 1982 onwards. The dates given lend a false air of neat chronological sequence. Yet many of the poets listed under one heading or another belong in fact to all four categories at once. For instance, it is not clear why Adonis is listed under 'the Majallat al-Shi'r Movement' and not under the so-called 'Beirut Experience', despite the fact that one of the longest poems in the entire anthology, running to twelve pages, was directly inspired by Beirut and given the title 'The Desert: the Diary of Beirut under Siege, 1982'. The confusion arises from the lack of clarity and consistency in the criteria of classification, and from the mixing of formal and thematic principles. The Taf'ila Movement, as the name suggests (*taf'ila* being a prosodic unit), describes experimentation in the metrical form of the poem, experimentation, incidentally, which was by no means confined to the Iraqi poets, but was common to many of the poets included in this anthology. The 'Majallat al-Shi'r Movement' describes a group of poets who published in the eponymous avant-garde poetry magazine, in which, it must be remembered, Iraqi poets no less than Syrian or Lebanese also published their work. The two last so-called movements are not

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movements at all, but they denote themes or subjects about which poets, of all categories, have written: namely the June war and the subsequent traumatic events in Beirut, ranging from the civil war to the Israeli invasion.

As far as the accuracy of translation is concerned, the editor forestalls criticism by providing this disarming footnote (on page 25): 'To avoid misunderstanding, I should point out that a few poems have been edited with the approval of the poets concerned.' I shall therefore confine my few remarks to poems by al-Sayyab who died in 1964 and was therefore in no position to give the translator his approval, although it is difficult to see why in 'The New Noah' (p 59) Adonis wanted to change what should be translated as

The earth trembled and God rushed to say to me
'Noah, save the living'

to And the earth trembled and God was mad
And Noah asked me: 'Save the living'

or in 'The Wound' (p 62) what should be

The charm cast by your eyes
In the last kingdoms
Is left neither tempting sail nor island
Since the wound has passed over it

to The wound is beyond the fate
Your eyes cast
On the lost civilizations.
It's left no sails
Nor islands.

Or in 'A Mirror for the Twentieth Century' (p 63) what should be

A wild beast approaches, bearing a flower

altered to A wild beast hidden in a flower.

Equally it is not clear why Mahmoud Darwish wished to have his '*huwat al-ritha'i*', which means 'amateur mourners', rendered as 'professional mourners' (p 139).

In Al-Sayyab's 'Rain Song' (pp 29ff) '*turiq al-kurum*' or 'the vines burst into leaf' is translated as 'the vines flower'. In the line 'like a little boy raving about his mother' the words *qabla an yanam* or 'before he goes to sleep' are omitted. 'Tasiffu min turabiha' should be 'Eating soil', not 'Licking soil'. Similarly, in 'The River and Death' (p 32)

Tower bells lost at the bottom of the sea

should be 'Bells of a tower lost at the bottom of the sea', 'lost' referring to the tower and not to the bells. Likewise,

I wish I could walk in the dark

should be 'I wish I could run (*'adawtu*) in the dark.' Towards the end of the poem (after the first line on p 34) the translator quietly omits two important lines, which could be translated as

I wish I could rush to lend my support
To those engaged in the struggle
Clenching my fist to strike Fate in the face.

These are but a few examples to show the rather cavalier manner in which the translator sometimes treats the text of his original.

As for the nine-page introduction to the volume, the less said about it from a scholarly point of view the better. Although it undoubtedly expresses the editor's enthusiasm and commitment, it is full of sweeping generalisations and wild, unsubstantiated assertions. It grossly exaggerates the significance and influence of Jibran and Rihani. While rightly drawing attention to the relevance of the political ideas of Antun Sa'ada, it tends to underrate the direct influence of Western poets such as T S Eliot and Edith Sitwell. Clearly, *al-Udhari* has not benefited from the various scholarly studies of modern Arabic poetry that are now available in English. This is a pity, because had he done so and had he been less guided by political considerations, his view would have been more catholic and his anthology might have afforded a more accurate picture of contemporary Arabic poetry. Here was a great opportunity sadly lost. A more comprehensive and less idiosyncratic Penguin anthology would have been a most effective means of introducing an interesting chapter of an old and fascinating poetic tradition to a large number of English readers with little or no knowledge of the Arabic language.

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Spanning Muslim Literature

The Worlds of Muslim Imagination

Edited by Alamgir Hashmi

Islamabad: Gulmohar. 1986. 270pp. \$12.95hb

Pakistani Literature

Edited by Alamgir Hashmi

Islamabad: Gulmohar. 1987. 107pp. \$10.00hb

Devised and published by Alamgir Hashmi, these two volumes are well-planned anthologies of writing from Third World countries. Both books are roughly divided into three sections: Prose, Poetry, Critique; plus an index of contributors, including both writers and translators. Selections have obviously been made with a view to interesting the general reader. The short stories are both entertaining and reflective of the society and literature of the countries from which they originate—in the case of *The Worlds of Muslim Imagination*, these can be as culturally removed from one another as Indonesia and Egypt. The poetry sections of this volume, further sub-divided into poems written in English and those translated from other languages, are infinitely rich and varied in theme and character. Sarmad Sehbai's evocative *Second Portrait* (p 93) starkly reminiscent of Pakistan's inner-city streets, Yahya Kemal's elaborately painted and

romanticised *Night*, translated in measured rhythm and rhymed couplets by Roger Finch (p 153), and Majid El Houssi's stylish and structurally complex *Alternatives*, translated from the French by Eric Sellin (p 157), demonstrate the extraordinary aptness of the title.

The English language market in international literature, in terms of material on and by Indian writers in English, has been fairly well served for the major part of this decade. Translations of Arab and Franco-Arab modern classics have been popular far longer, though perhaps somewhat more marginalised in marketing terms as translations than such mainstream authors as Anita Desai and Salman Rushdie. However, it is only in the most general terms, as 'Third World Literature', that these works have ever been considered collectively, until this ingeniously conceived collection. Hashmi's anthology brings together modern classics and popular writing, poetry and fiction, both in translation and in the original English, from several Muslim countries. Thus we see such internationally acclaimed literary giants as Najib Mahfuz alongside writers who have received far less exposure, such as the Pakistani poet, Kaleem Omar. The collection includes the work of African, Arab, Iranian, Indonesian, French and Turkish writers but the focus is heaviest on writers from the Indian sub-continent writing in languages as diverse as English, Urdu, Hindi, Bengali and Tamil. The quality of translation is frequently of the highest calibre, having been handled in the main by well-respected American academics specialising in translating the writers concerned. In addition, many Urdu translations derive from the pens of established Pakistani poets of English, such as Taufiq Rafat and Athar Tahir.

The criticism section is perceptive and informative, providing valuable historical background to the material included, as well as information on general social and political trends within the various countries whose literature is included.

While the content of *The Worlds of Muslim Imagination* is necessarily more complex, encompassing as it does both original English writing and translations, *Pakistani Literature* provides a fuller flavour of the English material deriving from Pakistan. It includes a variety of short stories covering, for example, the experiences of a dilettante diplomat ('Under the Juniper Tree', Ahmed Ali, p 5), those of an immigrant Pathan factory worker on his way back to Pakistan ('Shore leave in Port Said', Shuaib bin Hasan, p 30), and the growing pains of a callow post-pubescent student, whose guilt-laden forays towards his first sexual experience are reminiscent of the fiery remonstrations of patriarchs exhorting men to see their sister in every woman ('Encounter', Athar Tahir, p 14). In contrast are the colourful Brazilian characters ('With Music by Dmitri Tiomkin: A Short Story', Z Ghose, p 23) who have peopled nearly all Ghose's novels other than *The Murder of Aziz Khan* (1967). Interestingly, Z Ghose's poem 'A Memory of Asia' (p 43) throws light on his feelings about his native Pakistan—'. . . the memory of the temple/is of no importance. It means nothing to me./There are temples all over Asia. And this one's/like a picture of an old calendar one has left/on the wall and can't help seeing from time to time/and reminding oneself half-heartedly to take it down/but somehow it still hangs there, its colours remarkably/gaudy after all these years, though the dates have yellowed.'

The male Pakistani poet writing in English is an established phenomenon who finds his forum in magazines, newspapers, Western anthologies, competitions and international writers' circles. A prolific poet, also editor and contributor to at least two anthologies of Pakistani poems for the Oxford University Press, is Kaleem Omar,

whose work is described by Coppola in his essay 'Recent English Poetry from Pakistan' (p 90) as 'consciously "poetic"' in terms of discourse and syntax, in contrast to that of Ghose and Hashmi (both living and working in America) whom he describes as, for better or worse, having joined 'the mainstream of modernity in Western poetry'.

Pakistani Literature is a lively and energetic selection of work by the best known and most representative writers. Generally well-presented and obviously intended for the enjoyment of a wide readership, it has the further advantage of informed expert comment from Carlos Coppola and Beatrice Stoerk.

The three-page index of contributors is a valuable appendix to the anthology since, unlike their Indian counterparts, many of the writers included are not known to the general English-reading audience outside Pakistan. However, the book was first published in 1978 and the 1987 edition suffers in that the index has not been properly updated. It is said that Shahid Hosain '... lives and works in Rawalpindi' (p 106); Hosain has been a resident of Britain for several years.

This anthology is a valuable contribution to the study of South Asian writers in English and in particular, a useful pointer towards an area as yet largely unexplored in Britain and one which might well provoke popular publishing interest as well as indicating a new area of academic research.

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London

BOOK REVIEWS

Soviet Interests in the Third World

Edited by Robert Cassen

London: Sage, for the Royal Institute of International Affairs. 1985. 329pp. £27.50hb/
£10.50pb

Ethiopia, the United States and the Soviet Union

David A Korn

London: Croom Helm. 1986. 199pp. £19.50hb

Soviet Power and the Third World

Rajan Menon

New Haven and London: Yale University Press. 1986. 261pp. n/p

Soviet relations with the Third World contributed more to the decline of East-West détente than any other aspect of Soviet defence and foreign policy. It was believed in the West that under cover of détente, the Soviet leadership had adopted an expansionist policy into areas traditionally considered at least neutral, if not firmly within the Western sphere of influence. A new and dangerous Soviet activism was detected in the role played by Cuban troops (with Soviet logistic support) in Angola in 1975 and in Ethiopia in 1977. The climax was the direct intervention of Soviet troops in Afghanistan in 1979. Détente deteriorated into a new Cold War and US Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger was soon warning that 'regions that were once free from the threat of Soviet armed forces have now come under the shadow of Soviet military power' (cited by Menon, p 130).

In fact, Soviet policy in the Third World has been rather less successful than the conventional wisdom of the second Cold War suggests. Moreover, it has usually been reactive, a response to events, rather than the execution of a long-term plan to expand either the Soviet empire or international communism. The number of socialist-oriented states has grown to about fifteen. But while the Soviet Union enjoys diplomatic and economic relations with nearly one hundred less-developed countries (LDCs), can usually rely on their support in the United Nations and has useful strategic arrangements with some of them, the opportunity costs have been high. The collapse of détente was perhaps the most expensive cost. But there have been dramatic failures in Soviet Third World policy and the economic returns have been disappointing. Arms transfers have earned hard currency, but military programmes have sometimes rebounded. The Soviet model of development has proved inapplicable or unacceptable to the majority of LDCs. The cumulative result has been a more pessimistic Soviet view about the potential for socialist development in LDCs.

These three books concentrate on different aspects of these failures. Korn, head of the American Embassy in Addis Ababa from 1982 to 1985, is concerned to present a favourable record of American efforts to reach a better understanding with the Ethiopian government. He believes that American overtures were unavailing because Mengistu Hail Mariam feared that better Ethiopian-American relations would be interpreted by the Soviet leadership as a weakening of Soviet-Ethiopian ties. He also explains that the Somali invasion of the Ogaden in 1977 (which forced the Soviet

leadership to choose between Somalia and Ethiopia) took place 'because the Soviet Union recklessly armed Somalia in the years before' (p 45). Many of the contributors to the book edited by Cassen demonstrate that the first of these two arguments is far too simplistic. By the 1980s, the Soviet Union was actively encouraging socialist-oriented LDCs to seek economic and other relations with the capitalist world—the rejection of Mozambique's application to join CMEA in 1982 and Soviet acceptance of the Nkomati accords in 1984 indicate that the Soviet Union had abandoned the idea of exclusive relations with socialist-oriented states.

There is some justice in his view that without Soviet arms, Somalia could not have attacked Ehtiopia. But the argument is counter-productive from someone whose avowed purpose is to get a better press for American Third World policy. The data presented in Menon's book (p 80) of arms transfers to the Third World from 1976 to 1983 (before which the two superpowers sold equal amounts or the USA was the undisputed leader) prove that in 1976, 1978, 1982 and 1983, America supplied a larger proportion than the Soviet Union of the total arms transfers to LDCs. If recklessness in arms sales is measured by the incidence of wars initiated by recipients, the American record is no better than that of the Soviet Union. *Ethiopia, the United States and the Soviet Union* is a fairly interesting account of the frustrations of being an American diplomat in Ethiopia, but an inadequate analysis of Ethiopian, American or Soviet policy.

Korn would have benefited from studying the other two books with which the review is concerned. The book edited by Cassen (the outcome of a Chatham House study group) consists of fifteen short essays (with an introductory overview by the editor) divided into three parts: the regional context; the Soviet economy and the Third World; and six country case-studies. Although the contributors are not unanimous in their conclusions, the prevailing view is that the Soviet Union is 'a beleaguered major power' (p 2), that there are strong economic motives in many Soviet–Third World links and that the Soviet Union has had limited 'ambitions in the Third World and capacities to pursue them' (p 12) in recent years.

Limited economic and political capabilities, economic motives and the privileged position of the military industry within the Soviet economy help to explain the increased salience of military power in Soviet Third World policy since 1970, the subject of *Soviet Power and the Third World*. But an important contributory factor is the new capacity for force projection. Menon examines three selected aspects of Soviet policy: Soviet theory on East–West competition in the Third World; the status and significance of Soviet power projection forces; and the role and usefulness of arms transfers. He writes lucidly, carefully refuting counter-arguments to his well-substantiated views. He concludes that 'the Soviet Union understands not only the opportunities provided by the shifting sands of Third World politics, but also the perils and burdens associated with competition' (p 254).

Soviet Interests in the Third World and *Soviet Power and the Third World* both demonstrate that the frequently found tendencies to over-simplify Soviet policy by interpreting it in terms of a single motive and to treat LDCs as passive objects of Soviet and American policy do not serve to elucidate the complexities of international relations.

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BOOK REVIEWS

The Soviet Union and the Third World: An Economic Bind

Elizabeth Kridl Valkenier

New York: Praeger. 1985. 188pp. n/p

There are those who see Soviet relations with the Third World on the model of predator and prey; for others, the Soviets are the one major power which has the true interests of the Third World at heart. Neither of these extreme views can survive careful examination. In this book, Elizabeth Valkenier enquires into the economic relationship, quite explicitly as a means to understanding Soviet foreign policy. It is a distinguished work, and though originally published in hardback four years ago, still well worth reading today.

Professor Valkenier discusses aid and trade, and Soviet views of the world economy, development theory and the New International Economic Order. In each case Soviet attitudes and practice have changed almost in parallel over time, following major political change inside the Soviet Union. The main account begins with the Khrushchev era, when Moscow pursued thrusting and confident policies around the globe. Soviet development theory viewed economic backwardness as a function of colonialism, and saw the escape from it as a state-led strategy with little room for market forces, and economic relations with socialist countries as a major source of support. Soviet aid, particularly for large state sector projects, was given generously to a variety of countries where political gains seemed likely.

In the mid-1960s a harder-headed stance began, with aid to be used much more for economic advantage, particularly by investment in producing goods in Third World countries that the Soviet Union wished to import. After a number of reverses, when countries which they had befriended (often at great expense) imprisoned Communist parties, broke off relations, and even repudiated debts, the Soviet Union began to be more selective in the choice of countries with which ties were to be fostered. In the 1970s further policy adjustments were made, as the desire for hard currency earnings played an ever greater part in trade, and the Soviet Union showed less and less inclination for involvements in remote parts of the world where costs could be high and benefits temporary.

Side by side with these groups went gradual rethinking about the nature of development. More sophisticated perceptions dawned of categories of developing countries, the more and the less advanced. Soviet development theory, while still giving primacy to the role of the state, began to discriminate more among types of countries, and accept the usefulness of other instruments, including private capital, for economic advance. *Mnogoukladnost*, the multi-structural character of economies and societies, began to appear as a key theoretical concept, permitting more refined analyses of the specifics of individual countries—and also a considerable variety of interpretations within the academy, even debate.

In NIEO discussions the Soviet Union never accepted the programmes of the Group of 77, even if they enjoyed the criticism of the Western industrial countries which came with them. Today the Soviet Union, rather than assent to NIEO views, puts forward its own account of the 'new international division of labour', in which its own concerns for raw material supplies receive far from 'new' expression; it stresses the need for developing countries to achieve self-reliance through better use of their own resources, and offers exchanges itself based on clear mutual advantage. The Soviet Union does not enjoy

Third World demands for more aid and better access to their markets, even less the growing tendency of Third World countries to lump the socialist bloc into an undifferentiated and reprehensible 'North'.

It is very clear that economic self-interest plays an increasing part in Soviet relations with the Third World. There is no better guide to the subject than Valkenier. One of her themes is the role of Soviet academic analysers in the formulation of Soviet policy. One would like to think that Western policy might be guided by understanding as sophisticated as hers.

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Superpower: Comparing American and Soviet Foreign Policy

Christer Jonsson

London: Frances Pinter. 1984. 248pp. £18.50hb

Comparative analysis of the international behaviour of the superpowers is an inherently difficult problem. Most efforts in this underdeveloped field lapse either into a Manichaean juxtaposition of good and evil or into a facile equation of the United States and the USSR as dual hegemon and co-exploiters of the rest of the world. Reasoned discussion of the subject is inhibited not only by the ideological stakes inherent in it, but also by a methodological dilemma pertinent to comparative politics as a whole. In attempting to reach forceful and useful generalisations about different states, we tend to under-emphasise the dissimilarities in historical, cultural, and geopolitical heritages which render each unique. Objective and rigorous efforts to weigh the similarities and differences between the two superpowers are rare.

Professor Jonsson's book is a useful effort to fill this gap in the literature. Drawing upon the secondary Western literatures dealing with Soviet and American policy, he attempts to answer three principal questions: Do the superpowers behave similarly in foreign affairs? Are the superpowers equally powerful? Has a superpower condominium been established? In the attempt to answer these questions, he discusses first of all the determinants of superpower foreign policy. He posits that the nature of superpower status and role, similarities in ideology, history, and decision-making structure may lead to parallel outcomes in Soviet and American behaviour. He then notes that this possibility is circumscribed by clear disparities in Soviet and American capacities to influence international events.

The last half of the book is devoted to an effort to apply the theoretical analysis and conclusions to three case studies of Soviet and American foreign policy behaviour: aid relations with the Third World; crisis management in the Middle East; and, nonproliferation. He concludes that in these three issue areas, there are a number of important similarities in Soviet and American behaviour. These are the product largely of Soviet emulation of American conduct. Behavioural differences between the two are

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attributable largely to asymmetries in power and leverage which generally favour the United States as the more established power, possessing a wider array of the instruments of power. The three issue areas display a wide spectrum in levels of cooperation—tacit or explicit—between the superpowers, from very low levels on the question of aid to reasonably impressive ones on the question of non-proliferation. These disparities reflect varying degrees of conflict and community of interest. Cooperation of the two at the expense of the rest is constrained at a more profound level by the role that the 'enemy image' of the other plays in the role definition of each superpower and in the legitimation of its policies.

These conclusions are rather modest, and one might have hoped for more startling and exciting ones. But they appear to be all that the evidence will bear. They are, moreover, a balanced antidote to the 'holier than thou' approaches of so many American and Soviet apologists and to the somewhat paranoid and conspiratorial analyses of the 'pox on both your houses' school.

A number of specific aspects of the book stand out. The analysis of the growing sophistication of Soviet-American crisis management in the Middle East is well argued and makes very interesting reading. Given the continuing problems in the region, Jonsson's conclusions on the subject are somewhat reassuring.

As with any work of this scope, there are many bones for the reviewer to pick. Methodologically, the analysis could perhaps have been enriched by greater attention to primary sources in the analysis of Soviet and American perspectives and policies. For example, in noting that both powers had learned the perils of 'appeasement', Jonsson cites the Western experience in Munich and the Soviet experience with the Nazi-Soviet Pact (p 41). There is little evidence in Soviet commentary to suggest that Soviet analysts and policy-makers consider the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact to have been a failure of Soviet diplomacy. As such, one wonders whether this is merely mirror-imaging, rather than a substantiable element of the Soviet perspective on international relations.

The attempt to deduce similarities and differences between Soviet and American behaviour through a comparison of the secondary literatures on American and Soviet foreign policy carries with it a second methodological difficulty—a tendency to over-estimate the degree of consensus in each of the two bodies of writing in order to facilitate forceful comparison. For example, the author quotes Robert Wesson on p 226 to the effect that the USSR feels compelled to represent itself as the 'harbinger of historical justice, the flood tide which must sweep over all . . . Russia is and must be unconditionally opposed to the open pluralistic state system'. There is some evidence which arguably supports this view, but it is certainly not an uncontested one in the literature on Soviet foreign policy. Why should we accept Wesson's view *a priori*, rather than, let us say, that of those who argue that, as the Soviet polity and society mature, the role of ideological messianism in both role definition and in legitimation has diminished and that as bipolarity in world politics decays, Soviet diplomacy has not only adapted to but has sought to take advantage of incipient multipolarity? Without further explanation, one suspects that the author accepts the one view while ignoring the others because the former suits his preconceptions concerning the nature of 'superpower' rather better.

It is to the credit of the author that these difficulties do not detract significantly from the value of the work as a whole. Professor Jonsson's work is an important contribution to the comparative analysis of Soviet and American foreign policy, providing not only

perceptive analyses of specific cases, but a useful theoretical framework in which to situate them.

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Pills, Policies and Profits: Reactions to the Bangladesh Drug Policy

Francis Rolt

London: War on Want. 1985. 114pp. £2.95pb

Bitter Pills: Medicines and the Third World Poor

Dianne Melrose

Oxford: Oxfam. 1982. 277pp. £4.95pb

Pharmaceuticals and Health in the Third World

Surendra J Patel

London: Pergamon. 1983. 100pp. £11.50hb

Conflicts between Third World governments and trans-National Corporations (TNCs) are rarely as sharply exposed as they are in the area of pharmaceutical policies. Perhaps the only issue in development that contrasts population welfare and commercial self-interest as acutely is the co-existence of starvation in developing countries with the destruction of food surpluses in developed countries.

While potential or actual conflicts exist in other economic sectors, nowhere else could lives that were lost have been saved at so little cost. Market mechanisms provide one solution to the problem of resource allocation, but they clearly do not provide the best solution—at least from the point of view of those unfortunate individuals who die unnecessarily. Active state intervention in the pharmaceutical market could result in immense health benefits and at the same time yield significant foreign exchange savings.

The core issues can be summarised as a rational choice of drugs (restricted drugs lists and an elimination of non-essential items on a prescription), the rational purchase of drugs (the use of bulk import orders by competitive tender), the use of rational drug nomenclature (generic rather than brand names), and the encouragement of domestic production of drugs.

The three books reviewed here all deal with the political economy of pharmaceutical policy. *Pills, Policies and Profits* by Francis Rolt is a detailed case-study of the evolution of pharmaceutical policy in Bangladesh. The government of Bangladesh was one of the first of the growing number of Third World governments to attempt to implement some part of the World Health Organisation (WHO) recommendations that developing countries should adopt restricted drug lists. Out of a total of 4140 drugs on the market, 1700 were scheduled for a phased elimination from the market in June 1982. While this is a long way from restricting purchases to the 225 or so drugs then on the WHO essential drugs list, the policy did nevertheless incur significant hostile reactions from the pharmaceutical industry as well as a number of developed country governments. As the case study indicates, many of these reactions were either empty threats or simply

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irritants. Most agents reacted rationally. US investment in the country did not fall, and TNC pharmaceutical manufacturers increased domestic production of essential drugs at reduced prices. For strategic details I would suggest reference to this original and highly readable work.

Bitter Pills by Dianne Melrose and *Pharmaceuticals and Health In the Third World* edited by Surendra Patel are both more oriented towards providing overviews. The titles are misnomers. The former has a greater emphasis on health status than the latter. The former, though well referenced and systematic in its treatment of the major problems, is more vividly journalistic and anecdotal, providing a wealth of case histories, quotations, and reproductions of advertisements for drugs that speak for themselves. Concrete examples include multi-item prescriptions in which only the (unnecessary) vitamin pills are affordable and advertisements for anabolic steroids marketed as a safe means of promoting growth in children. In developed countries, a series of serious side-effects are conventionally listed and packaging explicitly states that they are not to be used for children.

A chapter on traditional medicines describes both good and bad practices currently in use, and some of the attempts that are being made to formalise the role of this sector by evaluating herbal remedies and training traditional healers in the use of modern drugs.

A series of small-scale solutions—including Gonoshasthayta Pharmaceuticals Limited, the Bangladeshi pharmaceutical enterprise, as well as schemes in Nepal, India and Mexico—are described. The final section of the book focuses on 'Healthy solutions' and 'The rich world's response'.

If *Bitter Pills* emphasises the problems and solutions experienced by communities and people, *Pharmaceuticals and Health* is more rooted in the policy-making and academic traditions. It is a book of readings from experts in various fields (including Dianne Melrose, whose contribution is titled 'Double deprivation: public and private drug distribution from the perspective of the Third World poor'). The readings are classed in four major sections. The first is a global overview of the major political, economic, and policy issues. The selection of essential drugs, the roles of patents and trademarks and the economic savings associated with various types of pharmaceutical policies are given special attention.

The second major section is a series of case-studies reviewing national approaches to critical issues. These are drug selection in Mozambique, drug procurement and production in Cuba, drug control in India, restricted drug lists in the United Kingdom, the evolution of the Egyptian drug industry, the political economy of pharmaceutical production in Mexico, and the Bangladesh 'Report of the Expert Committee'.

Part three deals with emerging responses and includes an article on the suppliers' point of view, the perspective of consumers' organisations, and the evolution of regional collaboration between developing countries who have found economies of scale in purchasing and production agreements. The last section replicates a series of essential documents including the WHO revised model list of essential drugs, the IFPMA code of pharmaceutical marketing practices, and the Health Action International proposals.

That the interactions between drug producing TNCs and the Third World have at times been bitter is hardly in doubt. It seems, nevertheless, worthwhile to remember the great improvements in health that the Third World has made in the post-war period. Some part of this progress has been due to improved availability of essential drugs. Although the market has not worked perfectly, not all the pills were bitter.

The pharmaceutical industry may righteously feel slighted by some critics. Car manufacturers are not blamed for selling cars to careless drivers, or to people who do not need them. It is, nevertheless, clearly the case that pharmaceutical products that have been banned or restricted in developed countries have been marketed in the Third World with misleading claims. These products are harmful in themselves, irrespective of the user. This type of moral issue has affected the 'market image' of drug companies, and is well documented in *Bitter Pills*.

The rest is pure economics. Brand name loyalty does not last forever even in the best of conditions, as we have seen with cars and electronics, both industries that require a relatively high level of industrial development. It is increasingly clear to Third World governments that there is no advantage in importing non-essential drugs or in paying inflated prices. If the TNCs continue to sell essential drugs at inflated prices, they will soon be put out of business by producers in developing countries who will find an initial market niche in that area. *Pharmaceuticals and Health* and *Pills, Policies and Profits* give clear indications of how this might come about.

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Patriarchy and Accumulation on a World Scale: Women in the International Division of Labour

Maria Mies

London: Zed. 1986. 251pp. £18.96hb/£6.95pb

Women in Development: A Creative Role Denied? The Case of Tanzania

Marja-Liisa Swantz

London: C Hurst, New York: St Martin's Press. 1985. 177pp. £12.95hb/£5.95pb

Development, Crises, and Alternative Visions: Third World Women's Perspectives

Gita Sen and Caren Grown for DAWN (Development Alternatives with Women for a New Era)

New York: Monthly Review Press. 116pp. \$7.50pb

Piecing together the puzzle of women in the development process requires an understanding of international economic relationships, the state and public policies, and the enormous variation in indigenous social formations. Rarely do all these factors come together, although these three volumes approach that task.

As her title warns, Maria Mies tackles an enormous intellectual agenda in her *Patriarchy and Accumulation on a World Scale*. The book is even more sweeping than Gerda Lerner's *The Creation of Patriarchy* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986), but less thoroughly documented. While Mies makes the obligatory tribute to women of the world defining their own feminisms, the bulk of this work suggests that all but the strongest attack on patriarchal accumulation—both in its capitalist and socialist forms—represents co-optation. The common denominator which sparks feminist

consciousness is what Mies calls 'body politics', or violence against women in many forms.

Mies' analysis is best when tracing the linkages between women labourers in the underdeveloped world and women consumers in the overdeveloped world through the process of 'housewifisation'. Her chapter on violence against women, drawing largely on her field expertise in India, is positively chilling. She manages to link women together well in multinational export processing, the 'flesh trade', and frivolous consumption in an integrated world economy that divides women politically.

The analysis falters, however, in her complex construction of the emergence of accumulation which necessarily subordinates women's productivity. Men's power emerges from their hunting tools, giving them the means to destroy and providing the potential to establish relationships of exploitation and domination. Mies calls this the 'predatory appropriation mode' based on a patriarchal division of labour and says this becomes the paradigm for exploitation relations. Witch-hunts against millions of women, she says, resulted in men consolidating their control over women's labour and sexuality and establishing 'civilised' housewives. The most ambitious of chapters, it jumps from epoch to epoch and universalises case-study generalisations, ultimately raising more questions than are answered.

For Mies, accumulation as the world now knows it and female emancipation are mutually exclusive. Readers might very well gasp at the implications of this approach for practice. Mies does, however, come up with strategies that are consistent with, though not quite up to this gargantuan political agenda.

Marja-Liisa Swantz could not offer a more striking contrast in her grassroots, field-oriented empirical study of several regions of Tanzania to Mies' abstract theoretical tome. Swantz's theoretical question asks how women's customary significance in the generation and sustenance of life—'reproduction', broadly defined—has altered to produce what is clearly a grim set of circumstances for contemporary women in terms of arduous physical labour and little control over their time or the fruits of their labour. Literally hundreds of women speak through Swantz in participatory research during her seven-year stay in Tanzania. While there is no doubt that her contemporary generalisations are valid, her rich cultural and historical description provide little evidence of a pre-capitalist (pre-accumulation, *à la* Mies?) reality free of female subordination. Accelerated accumulation, however, does appear to generate more unpaid work for women, less value for reproduction, and men's abuse of customary prerogatives. Paradoxically, though, these abuses hinder accumulation processes by stifling female productivity.

Swantz presents case studies of Bukoba and Moshi Districts, the coastal region, and women in towns, including several *Ujamaa* villages. Contrary to much Africanist literature now critical of the state, Swantz paints the picture of a somewhat benevolent, if distant and weak, state which occasionally allies itself with progressive reform for women such as communal plot income distribution according to labour input instead of allocation to husbands of working wives. While women are subordinate in all areas, the nature and form of that subordination varies. This variation is ever so much more complex in a world-system analysis.

Swantz's occasional prescriptions are little more than general admonitions that planners avoid adding more work to women's burdensome load, and that women be compensated directly for their labour (though she acknowledges that, for the latter,

men would contribute even less). As for women's past valued reproduction, it will take more than a few symbolic crumbs from a resource distribution table, but rather a fundamental alteration of gender in social and material relations. Is such alteration compatible with accumulation? At least, now, many women seek to accumulate more to free themselves of servile and dependent relationships with men.

Writers for Development Alternatives with Women for a New Era (DAWN), a project of international women based first in India and now in Brazil, link micro- and macro-level perspectives to assess the impact of development. In *Development, Crises and Alternative Visions*, they say poor women provide the best vantage point for such understanding and its implications for a practice envisioning a 'future free of the multiple oppressions of gender, class, race, and nation' (p 10) in which women's nurturant values characterise social relationships (p 80). Participants in the Non-Governmental Organisations Forum at the United Nations End-of-the-Decade Conference in Nairobi will be familiar with this widely circulated platform document. Potential readers now have Monthly Review Press to thank for reissuing this succinct, lucidly argued book that deserves wide dissemination.

Development theory and practice is, the authors argue, in crisis in much of the world, and women's activities are central to resolving the crisis. Their particular focus is on market economies which worsen inequities: multilateral institutions press for structural adjustments—usually detrimental to women—of national economies but not of international economic relationships. Compounding these detrimental effects for women are militarism and government-abetted sex tourism. Although the perspective is world system and the critique, dependency, DAWN's strategies to realise alternative visions rest on organisational activity, global networks, and self-sufficiency. For DAWN, though, accumulation is not so much the problem as are the structural relationships surrounding accumulation. But the visionary future lies neither with the multilateral structural adjusters nor the critical economists who are blind to gender, but with women and those who recognise the fundamental importance that altered gender values will bring.

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Calculated Kindness: Refugees and America's Half-open Door 1945–Present

Gil Loescher and John A Schanlan

London: Macmillan. 1986. 346pp. £17.95hb

Despite growing concern with United States refugee policy, few reliable or up to date accounts of its evolution since 1945 have emerged. This work represents an attempt to fill this research gap. Loescher and Scanlon provide a detailed well documented study embodying three main objectives. Firstly, to present a detailed historical account of the development of US refugee policy since 1945; secondly, to indicate the major participants in the refugee policy areas; thirdly, to argue that the nature of American refugee policy is a reflection of foreign policy 'ideological' goals.

Historical analysis is presented in the form of ten chapters corresponding to a distinctive period in the evolution of refugee policy from 1945 to the present. In their introduction Loescher and Scanlon document an evolving 'cold war' politics of escape which has overwhelmingly favoured those claiming to be oppressed by left-wing rather than right-wing regimes. Moreover, they argue that despite the ideological neutral standards set by the 1980 Refugee Act, this discrimination continues. Secondly, they identify three major groupings that have historically influenced the admissions process: the restrictionist view, whose principal objective is to limit overall immigration and contend that refugees are difficult to assimilate and compete with native Americans for jobs and services. Opposed to the restrictionists are a second group made up of two sections. Religious and ethnic groups that undertake lobbying and campaigns for displaced friends and relatives abroad and humanitarian interests that advocate an almost 'open door' policy for all foreign victims of persecution and tyranny. The third group consists of those inside government who believe that refugees are not merely immigrants or victims, but also valuable assets in a continuing struggle with communism. Members of this group sit in the White House, the State Department and the CIA. Since 1945 well over 90 per cent of those admitted to the United States have fled communist countries.

However, the book does have some shortcomings. Its opening chapter only briefly touches upon the broader foreign policy issues without either implicitly or explicitly placing refugee policy within its parameters. As Spanier and Uslaner in their book *Foreign Policy and the Democratic Dilemmas* have shown, there are three types of foreign policy issues: those concerning intermestic issues, those involving national security issues and crises decisions. Each of these three types display a different policy-making process, although they share some common features such as the significant role of bureaucracy. Intermestic issues (among which refugee policy would neatly fit) are those in which it is exceedingly difficult—because of the growing interdependence between American society and the outside world—to disentangle foreign and domestic policy. Yet the implications for refugee policy is never really drawn out, although hinted at in several passages in the book. For example, although tensions between different departments within the executive arena are clearly shown, the growing assertiveness of Congress in the last decade is never fully developed. Yet one of the key Congressional factors in shaping refugee policy in recent years has been the Senate Judiciary Committee, under Edward Kennedy, and especially its sub-committee on Immigration and Refugee Affairs.

Further, the final chapter covering the Reagan Administration ends rather abruptly. In the absence of a conclusion it leaves the various narrative threads somewhat dangling in the air rather than tied up together comprehensively. In addition, the broader international relations perspectives, while implied, are never really discussed, particularly as the authors adopt a critical approach towards the older 'cold war' model and the re-emergence of the new 'cold war' realism of the Reagan Administration. Yet the authors themselves are clearly adopting the liberal internationalist-interdependent model, without recognising the inherent limitations of this approach in comparison to other perspectives, such as the dominance and dependence model, or the new 'realist' model.

Nevertheless, despite these criticisms, this is an excellent book in an area which has often been neglected, and it is hoped that this publication will inaugurate a growing

academic interest in the refugee policy of other political systems, particularly those within the EEC, given the increasing restrictionist trends in Europe, notably towards Third World refugees.

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Qadhafi's Libya

Jonathan Bearman

London: Zed. 1986. 297pp. £18.95hb/£6.95pb

Qaddafi and the Libyan Revolution

David Blundy and Andrew Lycett

London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson. 1987. 230pp. £12.95hb

Libya: Qadhafi's Revolution and the Modern State

Lillian Craig Harris

Boulder, Colorado: Westview/London: Croom Helm. 1986. 157pp. \$24.95hb

Before I begin this review, let me first reveal what connections I have—or am supposed to have—with these books, for in two of them—Harris, and Blundy and Lycett—my name is mentioned in the acknowledgements. I read drafts of several of Dr Harris' chapters and discussed aspects of Libyan politics and history with her more than once during the course of the preparation of the manuscript. By contrast, I believe I spoke to Andrew Blundy once in person, and perhaps once on the telephone, but I had no role in the writing of the book worthy of mention. It may be that since Blundy and Lycett provide no documentation, footnotes, or citations for their assertions and arguments they mean to suggest by their list of 'people who, in various ways, helped us with this book' sources for material they read. Certainly, I provided offprints of a number of my own writings, as I do to all visitors who express an interest.

In any event, it gives me no particular satisfaction to report that the best of these books—indeed, in my view, the best account of Qaddafi's tenure in power yet to appear—is the one with which I have no connection. Jonathan Bearman has done a masterful job of putting Qaddafi into his Libyan context and of describing the evolution of the intellectual rationale and the policy of the regime over the course of seventeen years.

As Mr Bearman makes apparent, Qaddafi's longevity in power is a consequence not only of the oil revenue which the state enjoyed during the 1970s—itself not an insignificant factor—but also of the increasingly ambitious and radical agenda of the regime. Each wave of new policy initiatives, which consistently caught erstwhile supporters by surprise, brought in new groups to replace those alienated and new vehicles for popular organisation to replace those abandoned. Bearman identifies four phases: development of state capitalism; creation of a state monopoly on foreign trade; expropriation of industrial, or productive, capital; and, finally, expropriation of large sections of commercial capital. By the mid-1980s a government which came to office

supporting and supported by 'non-exploitative capitalists' had virtually eliminated private capitalism.

So, too, the regime's early Arab nationalism and reliance on an Egyptian-style Arab Socialist Union gave way to the revolutionary political structures of popular committees and congresses outlined in the Green Book and eventually to the 'supplementary' revolutionary committees: by the mid-1980s, though Bearman does not go so far as to say so, it is clear that Qaddafi had also virtually eliminated any semblance of democracy, direct or otherwise.

This is so in my view—and here Bearman and I part ways—because Qaddafi had run out of constituents. Bearman claims that while 'the commercial bourgeoisie and the small productive bourgeoisie have been eliminated . . . the working class has grown in size and social importance.' (p 276) I do not think that is true; on the contrary, there is still almost no indigenous working class in Libya, because there is almost no industry, and what industrial labour there is is done by foreigners.

There are other failings in Bearman's book. The discussions of the USA are not nearly as careful as those of Libya—Harlem is an area of New York, not a street—and Claudia Wright's Foreword is largely irrelevant and not a little silly. It must be said, however, that although some of Bearman's associates and associations—he mentions Louis Eaks and The Main Event in his acknowledgements—have come under fire from opponents of Qaddafi, the discussion of the opposition is quite fair-minded. Indeed, despite its imperfections, it must be said that this is a serious, intelligent and thoughtful work about a country and a political figure rarely accorded such treatment.

More typical, in fact, is the approach of Blundy and Lycett whose book is designed more to titillate than to inform. Much is made of the reports by foreign women journalists of Qaddafi's having made passes at them and of stories about other of his rumoured sexual liaisons, including the suggestion that he bedded Imelda Marcos. What influence these stories, if true, might have had on politics is not clear. Clearer, perhaps, is the implication of our being told, again without substantiation, that 'Qaddafi's hatred of Israel, Zionists and Jews in general is almost Hitlerian', and of the chapters titled 'Terror, Inc.' and 'Murder in London'—this last being an excruciatingly detailed discussion of the events surrounding the death of Policewoman Yvonne Fletcher in St James Square in April 1984. Apparently there is a market for sex and violence dressed up as current events. In fact, Blundy and Lycett evince a contempt for their subjects—Qaddafi and his countrymen—barely concealed by their leering preoccupation with vice. The historical discussions are garbled and inaccurate: the Sanusiyyah did not extend to India, Ahmad al-Sharif did not lead the resistance against the Italians in the 1920s and 1930s, the 'Wafala' tribe is the Warfala. I can understand why people might buy a book like this but I cannot understand why anyone would write one.

Lillian Harris introduced her book as 'a descriptive account—a briefing, if you will'. Like a briefing paper, it is short, concise and given to annotated lists: Qaddafi's personality traits, the main opposition groups, even the country's non-migratory birds. Also like a briefing paper, and more importantly, it is policy oriented. Like the other authors, Harris views the American bombing of Tripoli and Benghazi in April 1986 as having been a mistake. She goes further than the others, however, in ending her book with a discussion of policy options, including the difficulty of identifying 'the correct way for democratic societies to handle Qadhafi'. (p 133) As such the book may speak more to

the debate in the USA during the Reagan Administration over what should be done to 'deal with' Qaddafi than to analytical or scholarly disputes over the circumstances which produce and sustain regimes like that of Libya.

Taken together, these three books illustrate the state of the art of modern Libyan studies, and as such, they prompt one final comment. None of them draws upon any Arabic language sources. Indeed, Blundy and Lycett go so far as to make the ludicrous observation that, when pronounced by Libyans, Qaddafi's name is 'incomprehensible'. In principle and in practice, Arabic is the language of the land and the leader about which these books are written; it is time to recognise that in research and writing.

LISA ANDERSON

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The Lure of Zion: The Case of the Iraqi Jews

Abbas Shibliak

London: Al-Saqi Books. 1986. 177pp. £16.00hb/£4.95pb

This carefully researched and well-documented book is a history of the last years of one of the most deeply rooted and profoundly integrated of all the Middle Eastern non-Muslim communities, the Iraqi Jews. It concentrates particularly on their mass exodus to Israel in 1950 and 1951.

It is clear that, in common with most of their co-religionists in the Arab world, the bulk of the Iraqi Jewish community was not attracted to Zionism. Zionist emissaries to Iraq in the 1920s, 1930s and well into the 1940s were not well received, and their activities were evidently unwelcome to the Jewish community there. Politically active Jews in Iraq involved themselves in the national movement in the broadest sense, and their participation in it was fully accepted by their non-Jewish compatriots, as Shibliak shows in a telling quotation from a right-wing pan-Arabist newspaper in as late as February 1948.

Shibliak deals well with the *farhud*, the anti-Jewish rioting in Baghdad at the beginning of June 1941 in which some 250-300 Jews were killed. In common with another recent analyst, (see Reeva S Simon, *Iraq between the Two World Wars: the Creation and Implementation of a Nationalist Ideology*, Columbia University Press, 1986, p 160), he sees these events as an expression of anti-British rather than of anti-Jewish feeling, which could most probably have been prevented or at least suppressed very quickly if British troops encamped a few miles away had been allowed to enter the city.

Of course, the creation of Israel transformed the situation of the Iraqi Jews, and the government immediately began to take discriminatory measures against them. In addition, like Jews elsewhere, they became the objects of a widespread Zionist campaign intended to convince doubters that their only safety lay in emigrating to Israel, and that they would always be vulnerable if they stayed where they were. Shibliak adduces interesting evidence to show that the Denaturalisation Law of 1950 was conceived against a background of British Foreign Office encouragement of a somewhat fanciful scheme of a transfer of populations, of Palestinians to Iraq in exchange for Iraqi Jews to Israel. Although this did not materialise, there is ample evidence that both Britain and the USA were pressing the Iraqi government to 'facilitate' Jewish

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emigration. Again, Shiblak shows that the bomb attacks in Baghdad on Jewish lives and properties in 1951 were organised by Zionist activists sent from Israel with the sanction of senior Israeli politicians.

It is a shabby and squalid story, but it is also a deeply tragic one. It is greatly to Shiblak's credit, and a measure of his humanity, that he has conveyed these two aspects so convincingly and so movingly.

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Indonesia: The Rise of Capital

Richard Robison

Sydney, Australia/London: Unwin and Hyman. 1986. 425pp. £11.95pb

Last year, during a not untypical hiccup in Australian-Indonesian relations, the Indonesian government suspended permission for Australian-Indonesian relations, the over Indonesian airspace. At the time it was widely assumed that Indonesia was retaliating against the publication of a book by the Australian academic, Richard Robison, which presented a detailed analysis of Indonesian capitalism. Such is the sensitivity of President Suharto's authoritarian regime towards discussion of its management of the economy. But, as Indonesia sinks deeper into recession after the collapse in world oil prices, the regime is finding its economic policies subjected to ever more thorough scrutiny by the banks and governments in the West which have hitherto been its most uncritical supporters. Suharto was said to have been outraged by a number of articles in the Australian and US media last year exposing the corrupt business practices of his ruling military elite; the offending publications were banned in Jakarta and some of their correspondents expelled. Richard Robison's book has certainly made a timely arrival.

But at the start of his book Robison states his intention to challenge the commonly-held view that Indonesia is dominated by a patrimonial military dictatorship serving only its own narrow interests. He argues that Indonesia's capitalist class has become strong and influential on government policy and should not be thought of as a feeble tool of the military or of international capital.

Tracing the history of capitalism in Indonesia back to the colonial period, Robison accepts and investigates the traditional weakness of the indigenous capitalists, overshadowed on the one hand by the intrusions of large-scale Dutch enterprise and on the other by the successful Chinese minority. The absence of an assertive capitalist class left a power vacuum in Indonesia after independence in 1949. Control of political power was decided only in 1965 when General Suharto led a military coup against President Sukarno and eliminated the Indonesian Communist Party in a series of purges and massacres that cost up to one million lives. But control of the economy was decided only in so far as Suharto crushed the proponents of a socialist system and received the broad endorsement of the capitalist and land-owning classes.

Under Suharto's 'New Order' government an old debate has persisted in Indonesia as

to whether the country should have an open economy in which international capital plays a major role, or whether the state should manage the economy and take responsibility for growth and development. Since 1965 Indonesia has shifted uneasily between these two positions, but, Robison argues, the military rulers have not had the debate to themselves. He believes that all the important economic groups in Indonesia—the Suharto military clique, the politico-bureaucrats, indigenous and Chinese entrepreneurs and representatives of international capital—have held some sway over economic policy and that all have made gains under Suharto, particularly from the high levels of state spending in the 1970s brought on by the oil boom. As a result one can now see among these groups the perceptions and interests of a distinct capitalist class independent of the political elite.

The core of the book, and surely the most valuable part of it, is the excellent research into the structure of Indonesia's main business groups and the links between them and the state. Freedom of action for the Suharto regime, Robison shows, has been limited by its need to provide the conditions for the indigenous capitalist class on which it had pinned its hopes for an economic revival after 1965 to prosper. And that capitalist class has grown out of Indonesia's heterogeneous business interests and thrived despite the drain on the economy imposed by the military elite's need to finance its own hold on state power. Robison insists that we examine the Indonesian state in terms of a symbiotic partnership between it and capital. It is not correct to interpret the state as representing either 'rational' capitalism or 'irrational' patrimonialism. There are, he believes, both distinct capitalist interests and distinct state interests at work in the Indonesian government but the distinction between them is blurred at the level where the officials of business and the state have dealings with each other and may be one and the same person. Under Suharto the state has tried to meet the demands both of a patrimonial elite and of a growing indigenous capitalist class whose voice, Robison believes, will be increasingly heard in Indonesia, perhaps leading to the development of an authoritarian capitalist state on the lines of South Korea or Singapore when the military steps down.

The question is, will the military step down in the foreseeable future? And will its needs be subordinated to those of capital? I think the author's assessment of the long-term strengths of Indonesia's capitalist class are misplaced. The key factor is oil. Few observers, perhaps including Robison, have allowed for the extent of the Indonesian economy's dependence on high oil prices during the 1970s. Oil provided over 70 per cent of state revenue in 1982 which is a vital consideration in view of the central role that state spending played in fostering the growth of an indigenous entrepreneurial class. It is right that our attention should be drawn to this class: no longer just the Chinese and the multinationals and more influential than has usually been supposed. As Robison admits, ethnic Indonesian entrepreneurs, described as *pribumi* or *asli*, are the weakest part of this rising class, dependent on joint ventures with foreign or Chinese capital or on state contracts. It is the first group to suffer during a recession such as Indonesia is undergoing at the moment and the one most damaged by the severe contraction in government spending which has accompanied it.

The long term political consequences are serious. A capitalist class in which the Chinese and foreign elements are seen to be the most healthy and important will not be able to build roots among Indonesia's huge and largely impoverished population which it would need to replace the authoritarian rule of the army. The disaffected *pribumi*

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entrepreneurs could become a source of stronger opposition to the Suharto regime when it has yet had to face, joined as it would be by a host of even more dependent smaller sub-contractors and middle-men whose livelihoods are being ruined by the economic crisis. And there is no reason to suppose that the military will always protect the interests of capital, now that it is so sorely short of cash. Under threat the Suharto regime has often shown in the past a tendency to retreat into inward-looking, nationalist policies which do not suit the requirements of business. In one of his many enlightening comments Robison suggests that Suharto's business empire, for all its size and range, does not have good long-term prospects without the President's influence. But Suharto is an extremely adept political manipulator whose main concern is power, not economics. He has ruled Indonesia for an unusually long period of time, and he will face serious obstacles overseeing an orderly transfer of power to a chosen successor; but we can be sure his preoccupation with this task, while enforcing political stability and the predominance of the military, will be a deciding factor in the course of Indonesian politics for the foreseeable future.

JONATHAN HEAD

London

Elections and Democratisations in Latin America, 1980-85

Edited by Paul W Drake and Eduardo Silva

San Diego, California: University of California. 1986. 335pp. n/p

Latin America. Bankers, Generals and the Struggle for Social Justice

James F Petras *et al*: Totowa, New Jersey: Rowman and Littlefield. 1986. 187pp. \$28.50hb/\$12.50pb

In retrospect, the first half of the 1980s might well prove to have been a significant quinquennium in modern Latin American affairs, though the cautionary word 'might' is used advisedly, given the unpredictability of the continent in the past, the short perspective of today, and the massive imponderables of tomorrow. Yet, few would deny that a major *political* characteristic of the period for a fair number of countries was the transition from authoritarian military government—each with its own degree of repression—to democratic forms and the restoration of civil liberties. In South America, Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay, for very different reasons and through dissimilar processes, took that course, while Peru, with the election of Alan García in 1985, consolidated that development. The most long-standing democracies—Colombia and Venezuela—reinforced that tradition, leaving Stroessner's Paraguay and Pinochet's Chile in rather less than splendid isolation. Similarly, in Central America, no less long-standing military regimes in Guatemala, Honduras and El Salvador handed power over to civilian hands, though, the sceptic might say, more as leasehold than freehold. Still, the comparison with the mid-1970s was striking.

Such political developments coincided, more or less, with an *economic* depression for the entire region for which, in this century, only the Great Depression of 1929-31 invites comparison. Its causes were complex and its outcome still remains, for the vast majority of states, uncertain. All the new democratic regimes inherited from their military

predecessors enormous economic problems, in which the size of the external debt was a major factor. Public pleasure—in most cases euphoria—at the withdrawal of the military has been increasingly tempered by the, perhaps, no less harsh reality of the economic situation.

Though the two books reviewed here are quite disparate, their subject matter is interrelated, since *Elections and Democratisation* focuses on politics, *Latin America. Bankers, Generals and the Struggle for Social Justice* on economics. And, indeed, the titles themselves indicate their very different nature and purpose. The first is an excellent series of papers, detailing the transition to democracy in the former military-ruled states, assessing the significance of the electoral process which marked it, and suggesting possible future panoramas. A brief 'overview' by the editors is followed by a series of individual papers, one on El Salvador, two on Nicaragua, three on Mexico—which, strictly, not in the same category as the others but important both for its continental weight and for internal political change in the period—three on Argentina, two on Uruguay and two on Brazil. The volume resulted from a conference in February, 1985, and the essays published here are, in effect, the papers presented there. It would be a little invidious to name only a few—for lack of space—of the fourteen contributors, apart from the editors: suffice to say that specialists on Latin America will have full confidence in their quality as regional experts, while not necessarily sharing all their opinions. This is a most timely and interesting collection of studies highly relevant to anyone interested in contemporary Latin America.

While, obviously, the economic dimension of the transition of democracy, and the problems it entails for the success of that process, is not ignored in this book, its essential thrust is political. The book by Petras and his colleagues is a different kettle of fish and, unlike the dispassionate appraisal of the other book, has much of the character of the polemic. There is nothing particularly wrong in that: the writers are clearly committed to a view about US policy, the IMF and socialism as the panacea for a solution of all the ills afflicting the economic and political evolution of Latin America. And, it has to be said, they do provide some very solid data to support their views. The first part of the book consists of four essays on 'Perspectives on Development'; the second, three essays on 'US-Latin American Relations', and a concluding chapter on 'Authoritarianism, Democracy and the Transition to Socialism'. One is still left with the uncomfortable feeling that the conspiratorial interpretation of history looms too large. Nevertheless, this book should be read by anyone interested in the continent: it has a lot of recondite information and is an interesting interpretation of the political and economic forces—internal and external—shaping the continent's future.

Most of the writers in the first book avoid prescriptions and are cautious in their prognostications: most of those in the second are less reticent on the former but hardly less so on the latter. Both books should be read by Latin Americans and their sympathisers as we grope for solutions.

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BOOK REVIEWS

The Dominican Republic: Politics and Development in an Unsovereign State

Jan Knippers Black

London: Allen and Unwin. 1986. 163pp. £22.95/£7.95pb

The importance of the Dominican Republic within the Caribbean is not always recognised by those who live outside the immediate area. Yet it is the second most populous nation in the region and has a history of political turbulence and foreign intervention, much of it of recent origin. It also currently faces intractable economic problems and major political dilemmas which threaten the tenuous 'progress' the country has made in the last two decades. All this is central to Professor Black's introductory volume to the politics of what she rightly terms 'an unsovereign state'. Following a brief introduction to the history of the country she plunges into the contemporary period setting out the context in which its present politics is given its particular form. She then identifies, with considerable skill and economy of style, the economic and social structures, political institutions, social sectors and interest groups which all play a part in the domestic formation of policy. Of particular note here is her skilful use of information gleaned from interviews with the Dominican political elite in 1985 and which provide fascinating commentary on the complex and often hidden political processes at work in the country. However, as she makes clear in a chapter on international politics, external factors must also be considered as these frequently play a decisive, often a detrimental part, in policy outcomes. So much so, in fact, that members of the Dominican political elite adopt policies of self-censorship in respect of programmes that are advanced, seeking always to ensure US support or tolerance of them. Finally, Black examines the difficulties and promises of the two Dominican Revolutionary Party administrations 1978-86.

While her sympathies clearly lie with the forces of social and economic change which were anticipated in their accession to office, her judgement of them is largely negative, noting how much was sapped and squandered by leaders placating and supporting the 'traditional' features of Dominican political life. This is a point she re-emphasises in her conclusion when she affirms that Dominican politics is essentially 'a family affair' and that the basic cleavage in the polity rests 'less on class than on traditional versus modern and rural versus urban orientations'. (p 147).

This book is to be welcomed. It condenses a great deal in a style which is both accessible and informative. Students of Latin American and the Caribbean will find no better introduction in English, and certainly not one which conveys with as much conviction the passion and the frustration in the republic's politics as it presents itself to its people.

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BOOK NOTES

The Economist World Atlas of Elections: Voting Patterns in 39 Democracies

Dick Leonard and Richard Natkiel

London: Hodder and Stoughton. 1987. 159pp. £45.00hb

The purpose of the *World Atlas of Elections* is to enable the reader to obtain, at a glance, details of the most recent parliamentary and presidential elections in each of thirty-nine democratic countries. For each of these countries a map is provided showing the actual electoral areas, or constituencies, from which its parliamentarians or congressmen are elected.

How do the compilers arrive at the figure of thirty-nine democracies? The following selection criteria were established in 1985: a minimum population of 200,000; independence for at least five years preceding 1985, with a minimum of two contested parliamentary elections in that period; and a ranking in the 'free' category for at least five years before 1985, based on Freedom House surveys. Leonard and Natkiel defend their rigorous criteria of freedom and independence: 'it is not a purpose of the authors to lend a spurious respectability to regimes whose concept of freedom of choice for their fellow citizens does not extend to the right to give marching orders to their rulers.' These thirty-nine nations, then, are said to be the only democracies amongst the world's 169 sovereign territories.

The volume will be a useful tool for businessmen, politicians, journalists, academics and diplomats alike.

South America, Central America and the Caribbean 1986

Europa Publications

London: Europa Publications. 1985. 582pp. £45.00hb

The latest edition to Europa's series of international reference works, this volume will in future be published biennially. Essays written by over twenty specialists on the region, include Harold Blakemore on dictatorship and democracy in Latin America, and the history and economy of Argentina and Chile; Colin Clarke on sovereignty, dependency and social change in the Caribbean; and Peter Calvert on Central America's foreign relations. Regional organisations listed include the Andean Group, the Caribbean Community and Common Market, the Central American Common Market, the Inter-American Development Bank, the Latin American Association, and the Organisation of American States.

Compiled according to the high standards for which Europa is renowned, this volume is a recommended addition to every Latin American and Caribbean scholar's bookshelves.

The Book Notes were written for Third World Quarterly by Ruth Bowden.

International Terrorism: A Bibliography

Amos Lakos

London: Mansell/Boulder, Colorado: Westview. 1986. 481pp. £30.00hb

The alarming proliferation in recent years of politically motivated acts of violence and the growing number of interest groups willing to use terrorism for political objectives have resulted in a vast body of literature describing and analysing terrorist activities. In this comprehensive bibliography, Lakos—a librarian specialising in political science materials at the University of Waterloo, Ontario—has annotated English-language materials covering terrorist activities over the last two decades, including monographs, journal articles, government documents, conference reports and doctoral dissertations. 'Geographical subdivision' is the longest section, covering all aspects of terrorism, with the emphasis on geographic locations and specific terrorist incidents. Arrangement here is by continent, state and incident.

Elsewhere in the volume the literature is categorised by tactics, security counter-measures, the nuclear threat, media coverage, international legal perspectives, and the psychology of terror. Major works in each category are abstracted, and materials cross-referenced where appropriate.

International Guide to Research on Mexico

Center for US-Mexican Studies, University of California and El Colegio de la Frontera Norte, Tijuana

San Diego, California: Center for US-Mexican Studies, University of California/Tijuana, Mexico: El Colegio de la Frontera Norte. 1986. 502pp. n/p

This bilingual edition contains abstracts, each in Spanish and English, on 835 unpublished research projects being conducted by 1,150 researchers located in fifteen different countries. The directory lists a majority of researchers in Mexico (769) and the United States (340). While the social sciences and history continue to be most strongly represented among the projects summarised, forty-seven disciplines are represented and the scope of research is seen to extend across a broad spectrum including business administration, criminology, forestry, veterinary science, theatre and oceanography.

The International Foundation Directory

Europa Publications

London: Europa Publications. 1986. 434pp. £35.00hb

Now in its fourth edition, this directory of international foundations, trusts and other similar international non-profit institutions claims to provide a comprehensive picture of foundation activity on a world scale. It lists not only organisations operating internationally but also large international foundations with an international impact. Information of 770 institutions in forty-nine countries includes details of each organisation's finances, activities, awards, publications and officers, and is arranged by

country. Justice is certainly done to the proliferation of philanthropic activity in North America and Europe, with eighty pages devoted to America. But the reader cannot help remarking that there is only one entry under the People's Republic of China and wondering if there are not other bodies—academic or political—active in international affairs that deserve a mention here.

Syria

Ian H Seccombe

1987. 376pp. £45.00hb

Sri Lanka

Vijaya Samaraweera

1987. 240pp. £29.00hb

Barbados

Robert B Potter and Graham M S Dann

1987. 356pp. £47.75hb

Pacific Basin and Oceania

Gerald W Fry and Rufino Mauricio

1987. 508pp. £59.95hb

Oxford: Clio. World Bibliographical Series

These four volumes are the latest in the steady output from the World Bibliographical Series (wbs), now numbering seventy-seven volumes.

Ian Seccombe's study takes in a range of recent as well as older, more standard sources on Syria. The largest sections are devoted to the foreign relations, minorities and history sections.

Potter and Dann's study of Barbados reflects the focus of the publishing trade on travellers' accounts, languages and dialects, social conditions, women's studies, the history of plantocracy, peasantry and slavery. The reader is made aware of the somewhat dated store of publications currently available on the country.

The Sri Lanka volume allocates prime space to religion and history, and is a timely publication, given the increasing attention prompted by the present ethnic conflict.

The compilers of *Pacific Basin and Oceania*, the largest of the four books, have adopted one of the broader geographical delineations of the Pacific region, which includes all island areas in the Pacific and regions which have Pacific coasts, such as Siberia, China and the Pacific Northwest in North America, and which contains approximately 43 per cent of the world's population. Fry and Mauricio's study departs from the standard wbs format to introduce sections dealing with ocean service, environmental issues, small boat voyages, culture and social change, and separate sections under the geographical headings of Melanesia, Micronesia and Polynesia, with subsequent sections devoted to the individual islands of those areas. The section

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'Contemporary foreign relations—towards a Pacific community' annotates the literature on the controversial community concept of this highly diverse region.

Third World Guide 1986-87

Edited by Neiva Moreira

New York: Grove Press for Third World Guide, Rio de Janeiro. 1986. 642pp. \$22.50pb

This is the third English-language edition of the Guide, published by the Mexico, Uruguay and Portugal-based editorial teams of the *Third World* magazine, 'An independent, non-profit network of professional journalists which aims to provide alternative information on the Third World.'

Each country has its own entry containing information on geography, demography, government, political parties, trade unions, economics, health, armed forces, communications, education and an overview of political history to 1985. The book is divided into sections on: countries of the world, diplomacy, history, economy and a rather ambiguously-entitled 'problems'. The political focus is—as shown by the 1979 Spanish edition—not claiming to be "objective" but excluding the constant deformations and distortions that characterised the European or US-eye-view publications of capitalist enterprises.'

Sixty-five pages have been allocated to a new section entitled 'Other countries', requested by African teachers who use the Guide as a support text, and here Japan, Europe, the USA and the Soviet Union feature in the context of their relations with the Third World.

A standard reference text in Latin American and African schools and universities, this volume is (in spite of unclear referencing of sections, and a regular scattering of inaccuracies in typography and spelling) to be highly recommended as an encyclopedic introduction to Third World studies, and also as a useful reference tool for the more seasoned researcher.

The Middle East and North Africa 1987

Europa Publications

London: Europa Publications. 1986. 911pp. £52.00hb

Now in its thirty-third edition, this yearbook continues to be a major source of reliable information. The format is comprehensive: two preliminary sections contain a series of essays providing background information on history, economics, politics and culture and a list of regional organisations. Rodney Wilson's article on Islamic Banking and Finance, which the 1986 edition carried, has been updated, and Malise Ruthven's survey of Islamic Politics has been expanded to include a more detailed consideration of the impact of a resurgent Islam on the countries of the region. Fifty pages are devoted to detailing activities and addresses of organisations such as the Arab States of the Gulf, the Islamic Conference, OAU and OPEC, as well as the United Nations and its agencies.

THIRD WORLD QUARTERLY

Introductory articles analyse the main themes in contemporary Middle Eastern affairs. A study of the oil industry by Richard Johns and Michael Field gives a historical background, comparative tables of production, existing reserves, government revenues, prices and refinery capacity. There are details of the major companies holding concessions in the area. An article by Chris Cragg examines the role of natural gas in the region.

A separate chapter on each country contains: articles on geography and social history; an economic survey; a statistical survey covering area and population, employment, trade, agriculture, oil, industry; details of the political, judicial and religious systems; directories of diplomats, banks, the press, publishers, and trade organisations. Addresses, telephone and telex numbers are supplied, and enhance the practical value of this essential reference tool.

Encyclopedia of the Third World: Third Edition

George Thomas Kurian

Oxford: Facts on File. 1987. 2,128pp. £95.00hb

A fully updated edition of this three-volume international reference work, providing concise descriptions of the dominant political, social and economic systems of 124 nations of the Third World.

The publishers state their aim of overcoming the developed world's disinterest and misunderstanding of the Third World at a time when growing interest is rarely satisfied by the scant and often unreliable information that is allowed to filter out.

Each entry comprises a basic fact sheet, followed by sections on location and area, climate, population, ethnic composition, language, religion, colonial experience, constitution and government, human rights, civil service, local government, foreign policy, parliament, political parties, economy, agriculture, industry, energy, labour, transport, defence, education, the legal system, health, food, media, culture, social welfare, a chronology of the country's history, and a bibliography. This is a long list, and is witness to Kurian's tireless efforts in producing easily-read text with a digestible measure of statistics, rendering the information accessible and relevant to both the scholar and the general reader.

A Handbook for African Writers

Edited by James Gibbs

London/Munich: Hans Zell. 1986. 218pp. n/p

This volume grew out of a recommendation made at the 1984 London Conference on 'New Directions in African Literature' and is a pioneering effort to gather together practical information and advice for African authors.

Finding a publisher, how to present a manuscript, dealing with literary agents, advice regarding contracts, remuneration, copyright and piracy, writing for children, relations with publishers, correcting proofs, and information on publicity and review outlets,

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feature alongside the more personalised chapter 'Patterns of publication' in which accounts of eleven well-known African authors provide case-studies on major issues confronting aspiring creative writers. A short bibliography indicates further reading on specific countries and topics. This represents an indispensable source of information, from a publisher with a sound reputation in the African market.

World Encyclopedia of Political Systems and Parties: Second Edition

Edited by George D Delury

Oxford: Facts on File. 1987. 1,296pp. £120.00hb

Coups, revolutions, elections, constitutional reforms and wars have made significant changes in the structure of world governments since the previous edition of the World Encyclopedia in 1983. Over 100 political systems have been toppled, reformed and replaced. The new edition tracks these changes in a series of commissioned country studies that cover the essential components of the political systems of 169 sovereign nations and eight dependent territories. Each entry includes details of: the country's electoral systems and political parties—their origin, organisation and function; legislative, judicial and regional government systems; other forces of political importance (the army, religious and ethnic groups and national movements); the nation's prospects for continuing or attaining political stability in the near future; and recommendations for further reading.

Africa South of the Sahara 1987

Europa Publications

London: Europa Publications. 1986. 1,141pp. £65.00hb

The sixteenth edition of *Africa South of the Sahara* covers the wide spectrum of political, social and economic developments that have taken place during the past year in the fifty-one countries and territories of the region. The background to the upheaval in South Africa and its impact on neighbouring states, *coups d'état* in Lesotho, Nigeria and Uganda, and the continued famine in the Horn of Africa are analysed in a series of essays, including Basil Davidson's extended view of Africa in historical perspective, Robin Luckham's piece on the political and social problems of development, Tony Hill on Africa and the EEC, and Peter Lawrence with Ian Livingstone and Diana Hubbard on economic issues. The South African territories of the so-called 'Bantu Homelands' (Bophuthatswana, Ciskei, Transkei and Venda) receive individual attention, and are listed on the contents page. Maps at the end of the volume provide information on languages spoken, with a further map on Bantu language dispersal, and colonial and trade history.

Statistical Yearbook of China 1986

The State Statistical Bureau of the People's Republic of China

Oxford: Oxford University Press/Wanchai, Hong Kong: Economic Information and Agency/Beijing: China Statistical Information and Consultancy. 1987. 761pp. £70.00hb

In comparison with the previous yearbook, this latest edition is improved in contents, indicators and form of presentation. Newly-added information includes detailed figures which reflect economic development at a macro level, such as total product of society, material consumption, national income, accumulation, consumption, sources and distribution of commodity purchasing power, revenue and expenditure of public finance, and regional breakdowns of major indicators on the economic and social development of the country in 1985. The book is divided into sixteen chapters, giving comprehensive coverage of the country's economic activity. Two appendices deal with principal economic indicators of Taiwan and China's economic and social statistics in comparison with other countries.

Appropriate Technology Sourcebook

Ken Darrow and Mike Saxenian

Stanford, California: Appropriate Technology Project (distributed in the UK by Intermediate Technology Publications, London). 1986, 800pp. \$26.95hb/\$17.95pb (concessionary price: \$9.00pb)

Over 50,000 copies of previous editions of this sourcebook have been used in 145 countries, and have proved indispensable in locating technical books needed for small technology and community development projects. In the new edition, 1150 publications from international and American sources are reviewed or abstracted, covering a wide range of applications from small water supply systems and beekeeping to crop preservation, and small business management. The volume is illustrated throughout. Local groups in developing countries may obtain the bibliography at a reduced price when paying with their own funds.

African Economic Handbook

Michael Hodd

London: Euromonitor. 1986. 335pp. £45.00hb

The *African Economic Handbook* sets out to explore the differences in economic performance and structure which exist in Africa south of the Sahara, both between and within the regions of East, West, Central and Southern Africa, and also examines Africa's position compared with the rest of the world. Each country survey gives an overview of economic and political stability, economic structure (including education, literacy rate, and health and welfare) and economic performance. Economic profiles of

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three major economies in each of the four regions are also included together with a statistical fact-file on all African countries south of the Sahara.

The information is clearly presented, and will be indispensable to both academic and business readers. Previous titles include *Caribbean Economic Handbook* and forthcoming editions will cover the Middle East, and South America.

The Encyclopedias of India

Henry Scholberg

New Delhi: Promilla. 1986. 109pp. n/p

India produced encyclopedias in Sanskrit seven or eight centuries before Diderot's *Encyclopédie* or the first *Britannica*. Forty-seven general encyclopedias in the several languages of the country form the output to date: one in Assamese, six in Bengali, three in Gujarati, four in Hindi, three in Kannada, four in Malayalam, six in Marathi, five in Oriya, one in Punjabi, six in Sanskrit, two in Tamil and four in Telegu; and also two in Urdu. The author has treated the whole subcontinent as one single linguistic area.

This is the first 'encyclopedia of encyclopedias'. Promilla will shortly be publishing an index to the biographical dictionaries of South Asia, and are also planning a biographical dictionary of Greater India.

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Third World Foundation News

'Regional Conflicts and International Law' seminar, 10-11 April 1987

The Third World Foundation's two-day seminar on 'Regional Conflicts and International Law' was attended by some two hundred participants. The subject which had brought so many people to the Commonwealth Institute was the issue of contemporary regional conflict; its diversity, complexity and intensity and the seeming inability of multilateral institutions to find answers for some of the most pressing problems of the age. These problems were shared and discussed at the seminar through the medium of panel sessions and papers by twenty-six speakers from a variety of backgrounds. The key-note address was a paper prepared by Michael Manley, former Prime Minister of Jamaica. It was unfortunate that Michael Manley was not present to read his paper through illness, although copies of the paper were made available to the seminar. The seminar focused on regional tension and conflict primarily in the context of international law. The perspectives outlined by the majority of speakers emphasised the importance of understanding international law within an interdisciplinary context. It was stressed that international law could not be looked at in isolation from the dynamics of regional and global politics. Politics was seen as the factor which both determined the effectiveness of international law and the status of these multilateral institutions which attempted to formulate and then enforce international law.

Three principal areas of conflict were examined by the seminar: the Middle East and the Gulf, Southern Africa and Central America and the Caribbean. Each area was notable for the existence of a conflict which threatened to undermine Third World peace, security and development. Speakers pointed out that although economic intervention was probably the most pervasive source of conflict in a number of these areas, little had been achieved in the international arena to outlaw this most subtle form of intervention. Conversely, it was also noted that current definitions of conflict used by the international community also failed to provide support and solidarity for national liberation movements as well as for those states struggling against forms of economic as well as political domination.

A feature common to a number of the papers was the emphasis on interdependence as a factor in conflict and conflict resolution. Both Manley and Thomas in their papers on economic intervention emphasised global economic interdependence as the main characteristic of the international

system rather than national sovereignty defined in terms of territoriality. Kopietz, introducing the arms trade and the Gulf War, argued that South-South interdependence based on arms transfers had considerably weakened the traditional leverage of the superpowers on Third World states by breaking their monopoly as arms suppliers. Similarly, Fitzgerald showed that in the case of Central America, Nicaragua's ability to survive the American trade embargo was due in no small part to its ability to diversify both trade and aid through extensive linkages with the Third World. These linkages had clearly not been available to Cuba when facing similar circumstances during the 1950s. In the Central America context again, Duran made it clear that the relative success of the Contadora group had been due to an acute awareness that economic and political wellbeing in the region was dependent foremost on a mediated solution to the US-Contra-Nicaragua conflict.

Although the questions posed for the seminar were numerous, two clear lines of enquiry seemed to arise from the proceedings. The first was a concern with the antiquated nature of formal definitions of national sovereignty used by multilateral institutions, which emphasised territoriality to the exclusion of other factors. The seminar was thus concerned with exploring how multilateral institutions could develop comprehensive definitions and legal principles to secure sovereignty, justice and self-determination in all its forms.

The second line of inquiry explored whether current trends in conflicts were indicative of a strengthening or weakening of international law and the role of the multilateral institution. Two rather contradictory conclusions were reached in this respect. The first was that there had been a significant shift in power to the North, eroding the legitimacy of multilateral institutions and reducing their ability to articulate and enforce international legal principles. This view held that without consensus among states, there was no basis for cooperation in international law. The second view suggested that new interdependent relationships were being formed beyond the nation-state, which required cooperation, and thus consensus and principled regulation in international terms. This view held that factors such as the globalisation of capital would of necessity lead to the strengthening of international law. It was concluded that with the demise of the nation-state, multilateral institutions would also tend to disappear given that their rationale had originally been based on the need for cooperation among nation-states.

The main points and conclusions reached by the papers presented at the seminar are outlined in summary form below.

Seminar Proceedings

Keynote Paper: Dominance or Equity: The Multilateral Institutions, by Michael Manley, Former Prime Minister Jamaica (1972-80) and Leader of the People's National Party, Jamaica.

Michael Manley's paper set out the context for much of the later seminar discussion, providing a historical review of the origins of multilateral institutions and the factors which have informed their responses to economic intervention. Manley argued that multilateral institutions such as the UN system were products of the North, created for the express purpose of providing a political framework for economic regulation of the international economy by the North. Manley argued that the emphasis on political sovereignty rather than economic sovereignty ensured continuing Northern dominance over the international economy. While newly independent states could elect parliaments and participate in multilateral institutions, their control over their own economies was so limited that benefits achievable through political sovereignty in the South bore little relationship to the benefits enjoyed through sovereignty in the North.

Manley felt that our perceptions of the current world situation would have us believe that decisions and choices to be taken by multilateral institutions were those that involved choices between 'anarchy' and 'order'; he suggested that this was a false dichotomy; the real choices to be faced today were not between 'anarchy' and 'order' but between economic 'dominance' and 'equity'. Because the North had no desire or interest in dismantling the multilateralism which had served to promote productive forces world-wide, multilateral institutions were likely to be used as a double-edged weapon; while the major nation-states 'needed multilateralism to create an appropriate environment for their growth', the world's peoples need multilateralism as the means to seek 'redress and equity'. Manley counselled that 'ordinary people of nation-states' must begin to realise the nature of the 'limits placed upon their national power by the internationalisation of production'. It was on this basis that he believed that a solution for the most pressing of problems—the problem of equity—could be sought and found within the international arena.

First Session: Sovereignty, Interventionism and Self Determination

Session Chairman: Professor Ian Brownlie QC, Professor of Public International Law at the University of Oxford. Discussants: Ken Coates, Bertrand Russell Peace Foundation; James Mayall, London School of Economics; P Saravanamuttu, University of Southampton and Christopher Clapham, University of Leicester

1) Economic Intervention and Third World States, by Caroline Thomas, Department of Politics, University of Southampton

Caroline Thomas addressed the problem of sovereignty and conflict, taking up some of the themes introduced by Manley in the keynote speech. She concurred with Manley in noting that the question of economic sovereignty had been notably absent in both political and economic debates in the North. If the principles of non-intervention were adopted internationally and applied to

economic interests, this would necessitate fundamental revision in the international system and major changes in the corresponding distribution of benefits within that system.

Some quite significant steps had already been taken towards articulating a principle of economic intervention. Latin American states in particular had attempted to outline terms of reference for defining economic intervention. The 1948 Charter of the Organisation of American States expressly forbade economic intervention. In the more recent period, the 1974 UN Charter of the Economic Rights and Duties of States established the most legitimate expression of the principle of economic sovereignty for the overwhelming majority of states. It was concluded that while some Third World states had gained national control over resources, the recent shifts in power relations between North and South, and developments in finance, trade and debt made the prospects for strengthening economic sovereignty increasingly bleak.

2) International Law and Wars of National Liberation: Use of Force and Intervention, by Julio Faundez, Department of Law, University of Warwick

Julio Faundez's paper tackled the contradiction between General Assembly resolutions calling upon states to assist national liberation movements and the accepted norms of the international legal system which prohibited intervention in the affairs of other states. The questions that Faundez asked fell into two categories. First, whether General Assembly resolutions on this question had international legal status, and if so, did this reflect a capacity to adapt international law to changing political circumstances? Secondly, if such resolutions were recognised in law, did this not reflect a move towards the undermining of the international legal system by introducing a further element of instability into international affairs?

Faundez argued that the acceptance of the principle of assistance to liberation movements did not imply changes to rules governing non-intervention. It was noted that if wars of national liberation were defined as internal conflicts between government and population then such conflict was governed by customary law and the rule of non-intervention would apply. If the conflict was defined as external, then General Assembly resolutions would apply in a form recognised by customary law.

Faundez observed that General Assembly resolutions binding under international customary law affirmed the principle of self-determination and the inadmissibility of the use of force in depriving people of national rights. In such circumstances the law recognised that where struggles for self-determination were taking place, the territories concerned had separate status in international law. This status would not change until the people concerned were able to exercise their rights to self-determination. Conflicts were thus

deemed 'external' where states illegally administered populations and frustrated their attempts at self-determination. In such circumstances, the national liberation movement acted as the legitimate authority in the area with the right to use force in self-defence and call for the assistance of other states. The actions of the liberation movement would remain legal in so far that its actions took place within the boundaries of the unit to be self-determined.

In conclusion, it was noted that the distinction between internal and external conflict was established within General Assembly resolutions and this distinction formed the basis for International Court of Justice rulings on customary law.

Second Session: *The Middle East and the Gulf*

Session Chairman: Dr Nazih Ayubi, Department of Politics, University of Exeter. Discussants: Baqer Moin, BBC Persian Services; Don Kerr, International Institute for Strategic Studies, London; Saiid Rizvi, Compass News Features, London

1) International Legal Implications of Conflicts in the Gulf and the Mediterranean, by George Joffe, Economist Intelligence Unit, London

George Joffe's paper expanded the theme of international law to examine conflict in the Gulf region and the Mediterranean. The paper explored how the principles and conventions of international law could be used both as a reservoir for ideas for the future evolution of international law and as a form of legal and political weaponry for pursuing national self-interest.

In the case of the Gulf of Sirte, Joffe noted that Libya's unilateral decision to treat the Gulf of Sirte as part of its internal waters in 1973 resulted in a uniformly hostile reaction from the North. The basic objection to the Libyan claim was that it did not conform to any standard definition of 'internal waters'. Joffe observed that there were precedents based on historical title, notably the USSR's closure of St Peter the Great Bay, the Tunisian closure of the Gulf of Gabes and Tunis, and major closures by Burma and Colombia, which should have allowed the Libyan claim to be taken seriously. In each of these cases, action was justified in terms of 'historic rights', rights sanctified by long and exclusive usage based on the security and the economic needs of the state concerned. Joffe argued that the concept of 'historic rights' was of major importance to the South where colonial development had emphasised littoral economic development with export patterns linked to concentrated coastal settlement. In such circumstances, the Libyan claim appeared reasonable given that the survival of the state was tied to its export trade and that the waters in question had never been subject to prolonged dispute over sovereignty,

In the case of the Shatt al-Arab issue, Joffe argued that international legal principles were both manipulated and re-formulated to reflect dominant

patterns of relations between states. It was observed, however, that disputes concerning irridentist, maritime and navigational claims had become magnified not only by the Gulf War but also by the issue of offshore oil and gas. Joffe concluded by noting that despite the war situation, states in the Gulf sought to justify their actions through recourse to international legal principles. This had occurred even where states had shown little concern for legal principle in the past.

2) *The Gulf War and Arms Sales*, by Dr Hans-Heino Kopietz, International Institute for Strategic Studies, London

Hans-Heino Kopietz introduced his paper by noting that despite the Irangate controversy over arms transfers to Iran, this policy was more consistent with the interests of a superpower in the area than the boycott policies adopted by the USA in response to the issue of hostages and international terrorism. Kopietz justified his position by noting that arm sales had played a most important historical role in cultivating patron-client relations between dependent arms-consuming states and supplying states with a monopoly over arms production. In the case of the Gulf, he noted that there had been a significant erosion of this important foreign policy tool. Kopietz observed that before the war, both Iran and Iraq obtained 'major' weaponry from a limited number of sources, three suppliers in the case of Iraq, four suppliers in the case of Iran. This situation had changed quite dramatically during the war with Iraq obtaining military support from another ten suppliers and Iran increasing its total number of suppliers to eighteen. In the case of Iran only four of these suppliers were represented by industrialised countries and fifteen suppliers were supplying arms to both sides.

Kopietz argued that the rapid diversification of sources for arms supplies in recent years had upset a relatively homogeneous international system based on arms monopoly, with arms supplied solely by superpowers and Western states. The proliferation of Third World producers, such as Brazil or South Korea, had weakened not only the traditional arms transfer monopoly of the major states, but also the relationship between arms transfer and foreign policy. In conclusion, it was argued that the main issue behind Irangate was not so much the hostage crisis as the issue of Iran's future dependency on the West, in particular its dependency on the USA. Irangate was seen as an attempt by the US Administration to re-establish a previously reliable foreign policy option based on arms transfer. It was noted, however, that with the emergence of arms suppliers from the South this option was becoming increasingly untenable, limiting the capacity for superpower action in regional conflicts.

Third Session: *Southern Africa*

Session Chairman: Randolph Vigne. Discussants: Brian Wood,

Namibia Support Committee; Alan Brooks, Anti-Apartheid Movement; Dorothy Keet, Mozambique Information Office and Ian Linden, Catholic Institute for International Relations

1) Namibia: The Politics of Linkage and Repression, by Peter Katjavivi, Institute of History, University of Joensuu, Finland

Peter Katjavivi's paper drew attention to the fact that, despite unanimous agreement within the international community that Namibia should become independent, none of its resolutions on the Namibia question had been implemented. In this respect he noted that the case of Namibia was unique. Namibia was the only territory to fall directly under the jurisdiction of the UN, and yet even with this authority, the UN seemed incapable of acting decisively. Katjavivi observed that not only was the issue of Namibia at stake, it also presented a challenge to the international community in upholding the authority of the UN.

Katjavivi charted the background to the present impasse faced by both Namibians and the international community. He observed that developments over Namibia had moved through several stages. During the 1960s and 1970s the problem had been how to gain widespread international recognition of the UN's authority in Namibia. In the period from 1981 onwards, the problem had shifted to trying to enforce UN resolutions against South Africa. The problem was no longer that of UN legitimacy, but of UN effectiveness. It was observed that one of the major stumbling blocks for the UN was the point at which the issue moved from the General Assembly to the Security Council. Katjavivi argued that the triple veto used by France, Britain and the USA against resolutions calling for an end to diplomatic ties with South Africa had also paralysed movement on past UN resolutions. In addition, he noted that Western regional interests had led to the deflection of the issue away from Namibia itself, to Namibia's role as a buffer-state between South Africa and Cuban troops in Angola. The convergence of interests between South Africa and the West had merely resulted in increasing talk to avoid action. Katjavivi concluded his paper by calling for the Namibia question to be judged on its own terms and for international sanctions to be imposed on South Africa.

2) South Africa's Destabilisation Policies, by Dr Joe Hanlon

Dr Hanlon's paper focused on the regional implications of apartheid, and South Africa's destabilisation strategy. Hanlon noted that South Africa had not only waged war against its internal population, it had also waged full-scale war against independent states in the region. Since 1980, 700,000 people had died in the Front-line states as a result of South Africa's destabilisation policies, in addition, four million have been made homeless. The cost of destabilisation in economic terms had amounted to US\$25 million, two and half times the

value of all aid received by Front-line states during the same period. Hanlon argued that the scale of South Africa's destabilisation was linked not only to the need to keep war outside its borders, but also to the need for regional control.

Hanlon identified three factors underlying South Africa's regional policy. First, the military requirement to keep pressure on Front-line states in order to force them to mute their opposition to apartheid. Secondly, a political and ideological consideration, both for internal white South African consumption and for the international community as a whole. Hanlon pointed out that one of the main arguments used in support of apartheid was that majority rule would bring chaos to South Africa. Evidence of successful majority rule in the region would thus effectively undermine this premise. Hanlon argued that destabilisation was an effective means for ensuring the continued identification of chaos with majority rule. The third factor outlined by Hanlon was the economic consideration. Destabilisation ensured that the Front-line states remained economically dependent on South Africa with substantial profits accruing to South Africa from its neighbours.

Destabilisation was seen to be principally aimed at deflecting the threat of sanctions. Hanlon argued that the most serious threat to apartheid lay in the implementation of sanctions, a fact appreciated by both the Front-line states and by South Africa itself. Destabilisation was seen by Hanlon as the means for perpetuating the circular argument that sanctions would hurt the blacks more than it would apartheid. He observed that dependency also hurt and that without the implementation of sanctions, dependency and destabilisation would continue. Hanlon concluded that, when faced with such circumstances, the only conceivable investment that Front-line states could make towards their future was the swift imposition of sanctions. Sanctions represented the only means possible for ending the threat of further destabilisation.

Fourth Session: *Central America and the Caribbean*

Session Chairwoman: Maria Elena Hurtado, *South Magazine*.

Discussants: Jenny Pearce, Latin American Bureau; James Painter, Latin American Bureau and Reggie Norton, formerly with the Washington office on Latin America

1) **Contadora: Legal Framework or Empty Act**, by Esperanza Duran, Royal Institute of International Affairs

Esperanza Duran in her paper explored some of the themes touched upon earlier by Thomas, namely, the central role of the rules and principles of international law in Latin and Central American Affairs. These she noted were central to the development of the Contadora process and its approach to conflict resolution in Central America. Two important aspects of the relationship between international law and Central America were outlined.

Firstly, it was noted that regional law, encapsulating non-intervention and self-determination were largely the product of the historical experience of US domination and intervention. Secondly, such interventions had always carried with them significant spill-over effects on neighbouring states. The need for cooperation to minimise disruptions to the region as a whole and the requirement for some form of mechanism to resolve border disputes had led to a fairly advanced system of regional cooperation on legal matters.

These considerations Duran suggested, also helped to explain part of the success of the Contadora group set up by Venezuela, Mexico, Columbia and Panama in 1983. Duran noted that contemporary Central American problems, such as the Nicaragua situation, had significant implications for other states, particularly in regard to the stability of their economies and political systems. The rationale for cooperation thus lay with preserving and strengthening links which already existed, with the conflict resolution element of cooperation arising from past legal precedents. Duran located the importance of the Contadora process in that it served as a 'safety valve' averting all-out regional conflagration, while providing a permanent forum for dialogue and negotiation. Duran concluded that the level of cooperation achieved through the Contadora process was not the result of any inherent superiority in legal forms of cooperation, but arose from concrete political and economic considerations which had demanded a forum for regional consultation and consensus.

2) Destabilisation and International Justice: The Case of Nicaragua and the USA by Professor E U K FitzGerald, Institute of Social Studies, The Hague

Professor FitzGerald's paper reintroduced a number of points made by previous speakers, particularly Hanlon on economic destabilisation, Thomas and Manley on economic interdependence, Kopietz on the role played by South-South linkages in minimising the effects of superpower intervention and Duran on the significance of regional linkages in a conflict zone. FitzGerald noted that destabilisation and interventionism was aimed principally at the economy and the services most closely associated with Nicaragua. FitzGerald told the seminar that since 1981, Nicaragua's export capacity has been reduced by half as a result of economic sabotage and the trade embargo and problems of resettlement from the war zone had reduced production of basic foodstuffs by 33 per cent. He also noted that since 1983 economic growth had ceased and per capita income had declined.

At the regional level, FitzGerald's observations corresponded with those of Duran. The conflict has had a quite significant impact on the region as a whole. It had resulted in a break-up of national markets and this had further reduced the scope for productive economic activity. FitzGerald noted that small states such as those of Central America were generally of insufficient size to support

industrial development on a national basis; cooperation was therefore required at the regional level in order to generate industrial growth and maintain the stability of regional markets. FitzGerald was more positive in his assessment of support given on a South-South basis. He noted that one-third of trade and aid support received by Nicaragua was derived from the Third World. The largest single donor was Mexico which had been providing oil on credit over the past five years. Algeria had taken up Nicaragua's sugar quota immediately after the imposition of the trade embargo and India and China had provided help with transport infrastructure and farm machinery.

Concluding, FitzGerald pointed out what he thought to be a most interesting development with regard to American involvement in Nicaragua. Large numbers of US companies were still operating in Nicaragua, despite the US administration's opposition, using their non-US-based subsidiaries as a means of circumventing the embargo. This development FitzGerald stressed, had important implications for the future, particularly for small states. He suggested that multipolarisation in world politics, as with South-South interdependence and as a result of the mobility of world capital, was increasingly going to frustrate the actions of major states with hegemonic foreign policies. He suggested that the movement towards the internationalism of capital might well bring about some quite fundamental changes in the role of international law and multilateral institutions in world politics. He thought that the interests of world capital were such that they would not support destabilisation policies, instead they would articulate opposition to such policies by seeking a strengthening of international systems of law quite independently of any developments in the UN system. This he felt was a positive step forward for the protection of small states.

Closing remarks: Mr Altaf Gauhar, Secretary-General, Third World Foundation

The closing address to the seminar was presented by Mr Altaf Gauhar, Secretary-General of the Third World Foundation. In his address, Mr Gauhar outlined why the seminar had been organised around the theme of international conflict and international law, noting that this had also been a point put to him earlier during the two-day proceedings. Mr Gauhar observed that despite the wide-ranging nature of the topics explored during the seminar there was one common denominator which linked the various contributions together and which provided the seminar with both its focus and relevance. The primary objective of the seminar he felt had been to formulate a question concerning the nature of the economic world order as enshrined in the UN Charter. The question itself was relatively simple: did the world order of the 1980s correspond in any way to that envisaged by the UN Charter? If so was the order still there, or had the experience of the 1980s indicated that the order

was weakening and crumbling? In other words, were we now faced with the need to conduct a post mortem, had the system failed to prove itself and what, if anything, existed to take its place?

Mr Gauhar stressed that to explore this question further, it was necessary to dissect the system, to examine its component elements and match each element with those embodied in the UN Charter. This required an examination of the principles underlying the Charter in relation to its main elements—sovereignty, security and non-intervention. In this respect he noted that the seminar had been quite successful in defining the ground rules for such an examination. The papers of the seminar had taken up issues related to the Charter, and these issues had been further elaborated in the discussions of the guest panels and the audience.

On a pessimistic note, Mr Gauhar suggested that the experience of the 1980s indicated a fundamental breakdown in the relationship between law and power. Regional and international law if it was to be effective, had to be informed by some form of social consensus. Law was based on consensus and without international consensus there was nothing to sustain international law. The experience of the 1980s had not been one of consensus, but one of governance by the most powerful.

In his conclusion, Mr Gauhar noted that two elements were emerging on the national and international arena which provided a basis for a hope for the future. The first was the force of public opinion. Public opinion had become a major catalyst for change. This was evidenced by public reaction to various events in the past few years and the increasing need on the part of some states to disseminate blatant public disinformation in support of their policies. Increasingly, public opinion had come to be seen as a force to be reckoned with within the international arena. The second element which had increasingly become a factor for change was a belief held by many people in the possibility of transforming destinies, whether their own, or theirs in conjunction with others. Mr Gauhar felt that it was these two factors, more than anything else, which would make Michael Manley's demand for 'productive opportunity and equitable outcome', a realisable proposition.

'The Politics of Exile' conference, 25–26 April 1987

This conference was co-sponsored by the Third World Foundation and *South Magazine*. It was attended by exiled writers, artists and politicians from the Third World, together with other intellectuals whose own displacement from their countries of origin afforded them insight into the problems and

possibilities of exile. The participants, many of whom combine writing with political activism, included Ariel Dorfman (Chile), Claribel Alegria (El Salvador), Nuruddin Farah (Somalia), Buchi Emecheta (Nigeria), Abdulrahman Mohammed Babu (Tanzania), Dennis Brutus (South Africa), Fawaz Turki (Palestine), Nawal El Saadawi (Egypt) and Shirley Geok-Lin Lim (Malaysia).

Organised into four sessions, the conference discussed the nature of exile in relation to Latin America, Africa, the Middle East and Asia. Among the themes explored were:

- the intolerance of regimes which create the necessity for exile by refusing to countenance dissent or non-conformity;
- the use of exile as a tool of government control and an alternative to silencing by censorship or imprisonment;
- the dilemmas facing exiles in relation both to their host countries and their countries of origin, including the choices involved in engaging in political activism abroad;
- the manipulation of exiles for political purposes as occurs in Southern Africa and Central America, where rebel movements are fuelled by external funding;
- incidences of mass exile, including the 'black diaspora' resulting from the slave trade in Africa, and the Palestinians as a nation in exile;
- the possible cultural and political contribution which exiles can make, by virtue of their special perspective, as a bridge between different societies;
- the effects of exile on individuals' creativity, whether they be detrimental in terms of the despair and inertia induced by deracination, or inspirational in intensifying memory and enhancing objectivity;
- the fluid distinction between exiles and refugees or economic migrants;
- the relationship of language to exile;
- the role played by the 'myth of return' in the psychology of exile.

In addition to the more tangible phenomenon of geographical displacement, exile was considered as a pervasive metaphor for alienation or exclusion. As the Egyptian feminist, Nawal El Sadaawi, pointed out, the largest group of exiles in the world comprises women, who are exiled both within their own countries and from themselves.

The Politics of Exile conference papers will be published in *Third World Affairs 1988*, together with an account of the conference proceedings.



Speakers at *The Politics of Exile* conference in London in April 1987:

above: Professor Dennis Brutus, reading from his poetry

below left: Nawal El Saadawi

below right: Ariel Dorfman

Pictures by Carlos Reyes

JOURNAL

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North-South Monitor

UN SYSTEM

▲ **UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)**
Preparatory Commission for the International
Seabed Authority (ISA) and the International
Tribunal for the Law of the Sea
Fourth Regular Session
New York, 12 August–5 September 1986

■ The Preparatory Commission resumed its fourth regular session, to discuss preparations for the new institutions to be created with the entry into force of UNCLOS. The Commission dealt with the rules and regulations under which the institutions of UNCLOS would commence their functions; the formulation of a mining code to govern activities in the New International Seabed Area; the formulation of procedural, administrative and financial rules for the ISA and for the Tribunal, the chamber dealing with disputes among seabed miners. The Commission also discussed the protection needs of land-based producers, the registration of 'pioneer investors' and the operation of the mining arm of the authority—the 'Enterprise'.

An issue outstanding from the earlier Commission session in Kingston, Jamaica (17 March–11 April) was resolved during this session.¹ Agreement was reached on the problem of overlapping claims by France, Japan and the Soviet Union to seabed mining areas in the north-east Pacific Ocean. The dispute had previously threatened the finalisation of arrangements over the rules of registration for 'pioneer investors', a category which gives states, or a group of states, exclusive rights to explore and exploit an ocean area. Of the four states qualifying for pioneer investor status, three were contesting the north-east Pacific area, the fourth, India, having an uncontested claim to the Indian Ocean. A formula was established whereby the north-east Pacific would be reserved for the exclusive use of France, Japan and the Soviet Union, given that part of the application area would be relinquished at a later date upon their registration as pioneer investors. These areas would then be reserved for possible future application from four consortia representing eight UNCLOS states. The same formula was also approved for India, recognising that country's exclusive rights to an area in the Indian Ocean.

The agreement on the north-east Pacific question paved the way for formalising the rules of registration for pioneer investors. The agreement allowed for two new developments:

- Developing countries were given the opportunity to submit applications of registration as pioneer investors, with the condition that they would be required to comply with UNCLOS requirements, by the time UNCLOS came into force.
- France, India, Japan and the Soviet Union were given a new date for the submission of revised applications for registration as pioneer investors. The applications were to be considered during the first two weeks of the Preparatory Commission's next session.

The North-South Monitor was written and researched for Third World Quarterly by Maya Jaggi and Richard Sexton.

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Progress was reported in areas governing the institutional arrangements and rules of procedure for the Assembly and the Council of the ISA. The first reading of the rules of procedure for the Legal and Technical Commission (LTC) and the Economic Planning Commission (EPC) were completed. The LTC will function as the organ of the Council which reviews and makes recommendations on applications for mining contracts. The EPC will review trends and factors affecting supply and demand and prices of materials from seabed areas. The EPC will also deal with compensation and economic adjustment measures where developments are likely to affect adversely the economies of developing land-based mineral producers. Progress was also reported on the revised draft rules of the Tribunal which completed its second reading. The question of the Tribunal's seat was reopened, however, when several delegates questioned its proposed siting at Hamburg. It was pointed out that West Germany may not be a party to the Convention when it comes into force.

Representatives of the Commission were unable to agree on the status of the proposed compensation fund. The Group of 77 (G77) argued that a compensation fund was required to satisfy certain provisions of the convention. A group of West European and other countries argued that the Commission's mandate required it first to establish the need for such a fund before proceeding with implementation. It was further argued that seabed mining might make land-based mining more profitable given that seabed mining was dependent on favourable world market prices and that land-based mining had lower production costs. The secretariat was asked to prepare studies on the economic impact of seabed production on the mineral market and the legislative history of the idea of the compensation fund.

The session concluded by noting that progress had also been made on the mining authority—the 'Enterprise'. Chairman, Lennox Ballah (Trinidad and Tobago) observed that the Commission was moving towards agreement on three recommendations—arrangements permitting the Enterprise to function as a commercial entity, training obligations and a Chairman's advisory group to monitor economic conditions and carry out pre-feasibility studies. Work was also reported on the mining code with a preliminary examination of its draft regulations on contracts and payments to contractors.²

▲ UNCTAD Trade and Development Board (TDB)

Thirty-third Session

Geneva, 1–10 September 1986 and 3 October 1986

■ The 129 member-states of the TDB met for their Autumn session to discuss a range of issues, including the provisional agenda, date and location of UNCTAD VII, (a decision on which had been deferred from the special session of the Board held on 16–17 June 1986).³ The plenary of the Board's session was devoted to issues associated with the interdependence of problems of trade, development finance and the international monetary system and the debt and development problems of developing countries. The plenary used as the basis for its discussion UNCTAD's *Trade and Development Report 1986*, which had been released by the TDB in early August 1986. The work of the Sessional Committees I and II covered an in-depth review of the international trading system and a review of trade relations among countries with different economic and social systems. The main achievement of the session was to

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move forwards on the draft agenda proposal for UNCTAD VII. The vote on the agenda proposal was deferred to a special meeting on 3 October 1986 where the provisional agenda was finally adopted.

In his opening statement to the Board Mr Kenneth K S Dadzie, Secretary-General of UNCTAD, reiterated the main themes of the UNCTAD *Trade and Development Report 1987* by branding deflationary forces as the 'single most pervasive threat to world prosperity, as well as the most important impediment standing in the way of efforts to restructure national economies and international economic relationships'. Mr Dadzie also drew attention to the need for movement in the key areas of international trade, commodities and debt, stressing the importance of greater trade liberalisation and multilateral action on commodities through the Common Fund for Commodities. In respect of debt, Mr Dadzie called for measures which included proposals for temporary reductions of interest rates and the linking of interest payments to the price of the debtor's major export commodity. Mr Dadzie noted that while steps such as the IMF's Structural Adjustment Facility (SAF) and the Baker Plan⁴ located debt and growth in a 'longer-term perspective', such measures had not been 'placed squarely in the context of a coherent international strategy for reviving growth in the world economy'.

The plenary meetings of the Board took up many of the points raised by Mr Kenneth Dadzie in his opening statement, with the UNCTAD report forming the main focus for discussion. Karim E Al-Shakar (Bahrain), on behalf of G77, said that his group endorsed the analysis of the report on the negative effects of deflationary forces on economic history. He went on to say that industrialised nations should coordinate more 'in order not only to correct the trade imbalance among themselves but also to cut real interest rates and to stimulate global growth which depends today on realising the potential demand in developing countries'. This view contrasted with that of Alex Oxley (Australia) for the OECD countries, who felt that there could have been 'a better balance between internal and external factors' and that the report should have given more weight to the importance of the national policies of developing countries in determining their development performance. A similar line of argument was followed by John Sankey (United Kingdom) for the EEC who argued that the report concentrated excessively on the macro-economic policies of developed countries, with little attention to the domestic economic policies of developing countries.

Saad Al-Faragi (Egypt), who was elected President of the thirty-third session, presented a summary of the discussion noting that while different groups attached varying degrees of weight to external and domestic factors, and while the acceleration of non-inflationary growth still remained a major policy objective, it was widely felt that there was now considerable scope for expansion. He also noted that future prospects were to a large extent dependent on external markets, terms of trade, the trade policies of developed countries and the level of financial inflow from official and private sources.

The provisional agenda for UNCTAD VII was adopted at a special meeting of the TDB on 3 October 1986. The provisional agenda was agreed on the basis of a ballot proposed by the USA. The Board adopted the provisional agenda, noting the negative US vote on the document. The main agenda items proposed by TDB for UNCTAD VII are:

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- Revitalising development, growth and international trade, in a more predictable and supportive environment, through multilateral cooperation.
- Assessing relevant economic trends and global structural change, and appropriate formulation of policies and measures, addressing key issues in the following interrelated areas: (a) resources for development, including financial and related monetary questions; (b) commodities; (c) international trade; (d) problems of the least developed countries, bearing in mind the Substantial New Programme of Action for the Least Developed Countries.

The TDB also recommended to the General Assembly that the seventh session of UNCTAD be held in Geneva from 6 to 31 July 1987. The quadrennial UNCTAD Conference represents the largest international forum for consideration of North-South economic issues. The Republic of Zimbabwe was designated a member of the TDB. This brings the membership of the Board to 130.⁵

▲ The UNCTAD Committee on Shipping
Twelfth Regular Session
Geneva, 10–21 November 1986

■ Representatives of the 101 member-countries of the UNCTAD Committee on Shipping, the main international body concerned with the harmonisation of national shipping policies on a world-wide basis, were joined by intergovernmental bodies and non-governmental organisations for their twelfth session. The session was dominated by the problem of dealing with excess tonnage and surplus shipbuilding capacity in the industry.

The Committee held discussions on five major areas relating to shipping policy. resolutions were past on four of the five areas covered. The four areas for which resolutions were agreed were as follows:

- The problem of excess tonnage in the world shipping industry. In this connection, consideration was also given to problems of protectionism and the high levels of subsidy extended by many countries to shipping and shipbuilding. In the final plenary meeting, representatives welcomed the decision to make this problem a priority item for the agenda of the thirteenth session. It was agreed that the seriousness of the problem merited the session being brought forward by six months and that international organisations representing shipping and shipbuilding industries, banks and financial institutions should be invited to attend.
- Member-states were invited to ratify or accede to the February 1986 UN Convention on Conditions for the Registration of Ships.⁶ The Convention seeks to establish an international standard for registration of ships. The instrument would help ensure the identification and accountability of ship-owners and operators by strengthening the link between ships and flag states. This would be achieved through the participation of nationals of the flag state in the ownership, manning and management of national flag ships.
- The protection of shippers' interests by improving consultation between liner conferences and shippers' organisations. This resolution aimed to improve the effectiveness of consultations between liner conferences and shippers' organisations through the adoption of 'fair and equitable methods of calculating and applying

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bunker and currency adjustment factors'. The resolution set out a list of issues on which consultations could be held. The UNCTAD secretariat was asked to prepare, for information, a report based on experiences in freight rate negotiations to assist shippers in their negotiation with conferences.

- This resolution was detailed in five parts—multimodal transport and technical developments, ports, international shipping legislation, technical assistance and training, and cooperation among developing countries. The first part invited states to become contracting parties to the UN Convention on the Carriage of Goods by Sea (Hamburg Rules) and to the UN Convention on International Multimodal Transport of Goods. With respect to international shipping legislation, the resolution promotes the early establishment of a Maritime Fraud Prevention Exchange for gathering world-wide information to combat marine fraud. The final part of the resolution called for the Secretary-General of UNCTAD to convene in 1987 an *ad hoc* intergovernmental meeting on cooperation among developing countries in shipping, ports and a multi-modal transport.

The fifth area for which no resolution could be agreed upon, was intended to bring into focus issues concerning the status of the Convention on a Code of Conduct for Liner Conferences, in preparation for the 1988 Review Conference on this subject.

The central issue tackled by Committee was the problem of surplus fleet tonnage and shipbuilding capacity. It was noted that the industry as a whole currently experienced record levels of surplus tonnage, with 25 per cent overcapacity in fleet carriage and 40 per cent excess in world shipbuilding capacity. It was also noted that the problem was exacerbated by the level of subsidy to shipbuilding industry, which was averaging 25 per cent of contract prices on a world-wide basis. Luis Alberto Amado Castro (Mexico), speaking on behalf of the Group of 77 (G77), said that protectionist policies coupled with large subsidies in developed market economy countries were the main factors responsible for the present glut, effectively negating any potential comparative advantage held by developing countries. Liz Zhimin (China) pointed out that developing countries' share of world shipping still fell short of the 20 per cent targetted for the end of the decade by the programme of the UN Third Development Decade.⁷

The view that developing country shipping contributed only marginally to the glut was indirectly supported by Giuseppe Papuli of the UN Industrial Development Organisation (UNIDO). He pointed out that UNIDO's activity centred around small carriers not exceeding a capacity of eight to ten thousand tons, noting that 'the impact of such activities on the present over-capacity is marginal'. On the question of whether developing countries might be encouraged to develop scrapyards, Papuli noted that they 'have neither the vessels nor facilities' for scrapping. Lalit M S Rajwar (India) requested that the secretariat's supplementary report on the imbalance between supply and demand in the industry, should include a detailed analysis of direct and indirect subsidies and other protectionist measures. In addressing the final plenary, Kenneth K S Dadzie, Secretary-General of UNCTAD, noted that the resolution on imbalance 'was of particular significance in stressing the need for a global solution to the problem'.

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INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND (IMF)/WORLD BANK

▲ Group of Twenty-Four (G24)

Ministerial Meeting

8 April 1987

Group of Ten (G10)

Ministerial Meeting

9 April 1987

IMF Interim Committee

Twenty-eighth Meeting

9-10 April 1987

IMF/World Bank Development Committee

Thirty-first Meeting

10 April 1987

Washington DC

■ Discussion at the mid-year meetings of the IMF and World Bank policy-making committees focused on the need for developed and developing countries to stimulate and sustain growth through structural adjustment and increased economic coordination. It was noted by the committees that such policies would have to be implemented against a background of uneven performance in the world economy, characterised by growing debt, trade imbalance, worsening terms of trade, increasing protectionism and declining capital flows to developing countries. Both the Interim and Development Committees reaffirmed the central role of the Bank and the IMF in promoting growth-oriented programmes and mobilising resources from both official and private sources.

The Committees noted that lower-income countries implementing growth-orientated adjustment strategies required more resources than were available under the International Development Association (IDA) and the newly-established Structural Adjustment Facility (SAF) of the IMF. Although the recent agreement on the \$12.4 billion eighth replenishment of the IDA (IDA VIII) was welcomed,⁸ it was generally recognised that funds from this source were insufficient for adjustment strategies in lower-income countries. The Development Committee therefore requested a review of the 'adequacy of resource transfers to developing countries', to be prepared for discussion at its September 1987 meeting. Similar proposals were put forward at the Interim Committee for a review of the SAF. Ministers believed that the review's recommendations would lead to additional support. The Interim Committee also asked the IMF Executive Board to conduct a thorough review of adjustment programmes to ensure that they remained appropriate to the needs of lower-income countries.⁹

A proposal by the British and French representatives of the Paris Club creditors to assist low-income countries, particularly African countries, by extending debt repayment periods from ten to fifteen and twenty-five years was welcomed by the

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Committees. No clear decision was reached on the issue of rescheduling terms, which was to be referred to the Paris Club's July 1987 meeting. Proposals put forward by G24 to the Interim Committee for concessional interest rates to African countries and a further allocation of Special Drawing Rights (SDR) were resisted. The Secretary to the US Treasury, James Baker, told the Committee that the USA 'was not convinced of the need for a new allocation of SDR'. His views were supported by the UK, Japan and West Germany, although a sizeable majority of members in the Committee were in favour of an additional SDR allocation. The Committee asked the Executive Board to continue to examine the issue.¹⁰

The Interim and Development Committees and the Group of Ten at their ministerial meeting reaffirmed the importance of the 'Louvre Pact' of February 1987 as a major step towards cooperation on exchange rates and trade imbalance.¹¹ The Interim Committee also affirmed the importance of economic indicators for strengthening economic policy and multilateral surveillance. The Committee asked that a progress report on this subject should be submitted to the next meeting in September 1987. An area of considerable concern was the decline in private capital flows to developing countries. It was acknowledged at both the Interim and Development Committees that the performance of commercial bank credit had been disappointing, particularly for countries which had been pursuing appropriate adjustment policies. While positive moves by the private sector concerning, for example, debt equity swaps were noted, it was recognised that there was a need for further policy measures on the part of multilateral institutions to stimulate expanded flows of private investment.¹²

Five other issues were discussed by the Development Committee: agricultural trade; industrial protectionism; commodity markets; environmental protection; and the vulnerability of marginal groups in development. The Committee identified protectionist policy as a major distortion in agricultural trade, depressing commodity prices, producing surpluses in production leading to major budgetary drains. The Committee welcomed the inclusion of agricultural trade in the Uruguayan round of GATT negotiations.¹³ The Committee also felt that liberalisation of industrial protection required serious attention. It requested both the Bank and the Fund to prepare a report on the impact of protectionism on industry. Serious consideration was given to the depressed commodity market situation. The Committee requested that a report should be prepared, detailing measures which might be used to broaden the export bases of countries dependent on commodities, in order to offset fluctuations in export earnings. Recommendations were also made on environmental protection and the position of marginal groups in planning and development.¹⁴

The Group of Twenty-Four (G24) at its ministerial meeting launched one of its strongest attacks yet on current international economic policies arguing that 'existing strategy offers no prospect for a lasting solution to the debt problem'. In its communiqué, the G24 emphasised the fact that for many countries the unfavourable external environment made it impossible to pursue a growth-orientated strategy. They noted that even where countries had embarked on a growth-orientated adjustment strategy, their situation would continue to deteriorate without some form of concessional funding. On debt, the communiqué estimated that in 1986, developing countries had transferred US\$118 billion to industrial countries, not

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including debt interest payments. The earlier draft report of the deputies had argued with reference to existing policy that 'the mere cash flow approach to debt is no longer enough', and that it is necessary 'to assess whether the size and profile of the debt as well as the debt service are compatible with sustained economic recovery'. 'Debt reconstruction should replace mere debt rescheduling.'¹⁵

G24 also expressed dismay at the lack of progress in negotiations on general capital increases. It noted that there had been a general fall in the level of funding available from multilateral institutions and a declining flow of capital from the World Bank. While welcoming the recent agreement on IDA VIII, the G24 stressed that it did not represent a real increase in the level of resources available to low-income countries. In view of what G24 saw as a 'rapidly aggravating debt crisis entering a new and a dangerous phase', the communiqué included a statement for immediate action, the ministers called for:

- industrialised countries further to reduce interest rates, stabilise exchange rates, reduce protectionism and improve terms of trade. In particular, they were urged to increase provision of Official Development Assistance (ODA) as a matter of urgency and to recycle their huge current account surpluses, as well as increasing resources to multilateral institutions and reviewing lending policies;
- the creation of a representative Committee of Ministers which would form a joint subcommittee of both the Interim and Development Committees, to examine proposals for the reform and improvement of the IMF;
- the creation of a Council of Ministers to examine the debt problem, including specific solutions for low-income countries, particularly sub-Saharan Africa;
- the cancellation of official debt to low-income countries, the conversion of debt into the grants and the rescheduling of debt on concessional terms.¹⁶

The main development of the mid-year meetings was that closer cooperation was agreed upon by the major industrialised powers within the G10. No major initiatives were taken by the Interim Committee to ease the problems of major debtor countries, the Committee simply affirming that the IMF would continue to play a central role in assisting the enactment of adjustment programmes. The issue of possible agreement on policies for exchange market stability and lower interest rates still remains open. The Development Committee noted little movement on debt reconstruction or the issue of commodity prices. Developments in respect of the latter fell short of achieving international commodity stabilisation, and agreement had yet to be reached on rescheduling terms offered under Club of Rome proposals.¹⁷

COMMODITIES

▲ UN Conference on Natural Rubber, 1985

Fourth Session

Geneva, 9-20 March 1987

■ At their fourth attempt, in negotiations spanning two years,¹⁸ representatives of forty natural rubber producer and consumer countries reached agreement on a

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successor to the current International Natural Rubber Agreement (INRA). In force since 1980, the current INRA is due to expire on 22 October 1987, and is precluded by its terms from further renewal.

The new Agreement was to retain the reference price in effect at the expiry of the present Agreement, and currently fixed at 201.66 Malaysian/Singapore cents per kilogramme. The seven producer countries successfully resisted a proposal by the thirty-three consumer countries to lower the reference price if the buffer stock (currently at 360,000 tonnes) increased to 450,000 tonnes. The prices at which buffer stock operations would be activated remained 15 per cent above or below the reference price in the case of 'may sell/buy' prices and 20 per cent above or below the reference price in the case of 'must sell/buy' prices.

Changes in the mechanism of price adjustment largely entailed concessions on the part of producers towards the consumers' insistence that the prices defended by the new agreement should better reflect market trends. The frequency of price adjustment was increased, with reviews being held at intervals of fifteen months rather than the current eighteen months. The adjustment to be made in the reference price, when the daily market indicator price had been outside the target price range for six months, was to be an automatic one of 5 per cent, unless the International Natural Rubber Council decided on a greater adjustment. In the current agreement, the Council decides on the size of the adjustment. There was also to be an automatic adjustment of 3 per cent, or more if the Council decides, when the buffer stock reaches 300,000 tonnes.

The maximum size of the buffer stock was to remain at 400,000 tonnes, with an additional contingency buffer stock of 150,000 tonnes. Financing of the stock was to be shared equally by producers and consumers, according to their respective market shares within each group, but—in the wake of the tin débâcle¹⁹—provision for borrowing to finance purchases for the buffer stock was eliminated. As before, the buffer stock was to be the sole means of controlling prices under the agreement, to the exclusion of export quotas and production restraints.

The new accord was to be opened for signature on 1 May 1987 and required signature by countries accounting for 75 per cent of world exports and 75 per cent of world imports, in order to enter into force. It was not expected, however, that this would be achieved (with the requisite ratifications by national legislatures) before the expiry of the current Agreement. During an anticipated six-month hiatus between agreements, the buffer stock was to be frozen, and prices left to find their market levels.²⁰

● 'I regard this as an important achievement for international economic cooperation in the commodity sector, as we look ahead to UNCTAD VII in July, especially in renewing confidence in the value of the Integrated Programme for Commodities.' Manaspas Xuto of Thailand, President of the conference, making a sanguine assessment of the outcome of the negotiations. *UN Press Release TAD/INF/1866*, 16 March 1987.

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▲ Inter-African Coffee Organisation (IACO)

Emergency Meeting

Abidjan, Ivory Coast, 20–22 May 1987

International Coffee Organisation (ICO)

Executive Board Meeting

Bali, Indonesia, 1–5 June 1987

■ Representatives of producer and consumer countries in the ICO failed to progress at their meeting in Bali towards practicable agreement on the restoration of export quotas, the price support mechanism of the International Coffee Agreement (ICA). The ICO's quota system had been suspended in February 1986 in order to compensate for an expected shortfall in the Brazilian coffee crop, but had not been reinstated at a session of the ICO Council in February–March 1987 owing to a deadlock over the principle of quota allocation.²¹ Oversupply and static demand were currently combining to contribute towards the lowest coffee prices in the ICO's twenty-five year history.

The eight consumer and eight producer countries of the Executive Board agreed on the need to support the market to achieve the ICA's target price range of 120–140 US cents per pound, and to reinstate export quotas to this end. Agreement, however, on the principles of distributing quotas remained elusive.

At the April 1987 meeting of the full seventy-five member Council, Brazil—the world's largest coffee producer—had stated its determination to retain its historic 30 per cent share of the global market, and was opposed both by the consumer countries and by a group of eight 'dissident' producers: Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Peru, Papua New Guinea, Indonesia, Honduras and India. These producers joined the consumers in demanding that quotas be allocated on the basis of 'objective criteria' as opposed to historical title, and Indonesia lobbied the Bali meeting to the effect that the relevant criterion should be that of 'exportable surplus'.

Following a meeting of the Inter-African Coffee Organisation in Abidjan in May 1987, the twenty-five African coffee producers of the IACO had also accepted the principle of 'objective criteria' in preference to the continued absence of quota restraint. It was understood that they were prepared to espouse the principle even at the cost of reductions in some of their own quotas, including that of the Ivory Coast, Africa's largest producer.²²

The ICO Executive Board meeting proved inconclusive once Brazil restated its commitment to the past system of allocation. It seemed likely that the reintroduction of quotas was not the priority for Brazil that it was for other coffee exporters. Anticipating a full crop in the 1987 harvest, Brazil was likely to compensate for lower prices simply by exporting larger volumes of coffee.

A meeting of the ICO Executive Board was scheduled to take place in London on 20–24 July 1987, prior to a full session of the ICO Council on 21–30 September 1987, though there was little optimism that an early reintroduction of quotas would be possible.²³

● It is important to determine 'the right annual quota based on a system of equitable distribution among the member countries'. Rachmat Saleh, Trade Minister of Indonesia, advocating a reformed system of quota allocation. *Far Eastern Economic Review* (Hong Kong) 18 June 1987.

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'Nothing has happened in the world market to make Brazil change its position on quota.' Jorio Dauster, Brazil's chief spokesman in the ICO, insisting on adherence to the present quota system. *Far Eastern Economic Review* (Hong Kong) 18 June 1987.

DISARMAMENT

▲ Soviet Union–United States

Nuclear and Space Talks (NST): Seventh Round

Geneva, 15 January–6 March 1987 (26 March 1987 for Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF))

Ministerial Meeting

Moscow, 13–16 April 1987

■ The seventh round of 'umbrella' NST, involving arms control in the three areas of INF, strategic nuclear weapons and space and defensive weapons, was dominated by moves towards a superpower agreement on INF.

Negotiations had been stalled since the end of the sixth round, when both sides had accused each other of having retreated from the ambitious goals espoused at the Gorbachev–Reagan summit in Reykjavik in October 1986.²⁴ A decision by both sides to upgrade their respective chief negotiators at the beginning of the seventh round seemed designed, however, to give the talks renewed impetus. The Soviet chief negotiator, Viktor Karpov, was replaced by the more senior Yuli Vorontsov, Soviet First Deputy Foreign Minister. Max Kampelman, the US chief negotiator, was meanwhile promoted to the position of Counsellor to the Secretary of State. The negotiators also took the decision to establish working groups in each of the three NST fields, to draft agreements in those areas.

In a statement of 28 February 1987, the Soviet leader, Mikhail Gorbachev, removed what had appeared to be the main obstacle to an agreement on INF, by abandoning his previous insistence at the Reykjavik summit that progress on INF be made conditional upon curbing the US Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI).²⁵ Entertaining the possibility of a 'free-standing' interim agreement on INF seemed to constitute a return to the Soviet position at the Gorbachev–Reagan 'fireside' summit in Geneva in November 1985.²⁶ Gorbachev's proposal was formally tabled in Geneva on 2 March 1987. It was based on the tentative Reykjavik accord, whereby, over a five-year period, both sides would eliminate all INF from Europe (a 'zero option' embracing Soviet SS20 missiles and US Pershing II and Cruise missiles) and reduce their numbers outside Europe, to leave both sides with 100 warheads on missiles in Soviet Asia and in the USA, respectively.

In line with the Soviet concession at Reykjavik, British and French nuclear forces were to be exempt from the restrictions. On short-range INF (SRINF) with ranges of 500–1000 kilometres, the Soviet Union said that on the signing of the INF agreement, it would withdraw its SS12 and SS22 missiles from Czechoslovakia and East Germany where they were deployed after 1983 in response to the deployment of US Cruise and Pershing II missiles. Without repeating its Reykjavik offer of a mutual freeze on the remaining SRINF, the Soviet Union expressed a readiness to begin immediate talks on reducing and ultimately eliminating these weapons. Soviet

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negotiators also agreed to the principle of on-site inspection as a means of verifying the INF agreement.

The USA responded on 4 March 1987 by tabling a draft INF treaty, after which the INF talks, due to end that day with the rest of the round, were extended until 26 March 1987. The main draft was followed by the tabling of a six-point verification plan on 12 March 1987. It included provision for:

- a guarantee of non-intervention in each other's national technical means of verification;
- restriction of the permitted remaining 100 INF missiles to specified areas and facilities;
- exchange of data on missiles and facilities;
- reciprocal up-dating of this data;
- procedures for the destruction, dismantling and conversion of long-range INF systems into short-range ones;
- on-site inspection and monitoring for the duration of the treaty.²⁷

The fifth point of the verification plan underlined differences between the two sides on SRINF, which emerged strongly at a subsequent ministerial meeting between US Secretary of State, George Shultz, and Soviet Foreign Minister, Eduard Shevardnadze, in Moscow. In the light of fears amongst the USA's NATO allies that the removal of INF in Europe would leave the Soviet Union with a virtual monopoly of SRINF, these forces had become a key issue for US negotiators. Shultz reportedly proposed a freeze on SRINF at their current levels, with the USA having the right to 'build up' their forces to the level of Soviet SRINF. Such a build-up would, according to the US plan, include the possibility of converting US intermediate-range Pershing II missiles (with a range of 1800km) to SRINF Pershing II missiles (with a range of 740km), a suggestion strongly opposed by the Soviet Union. Limits on SRINF would, moreover, have to be global rather than confined to Europe, since the missiles in question were mobile. In contrast to the suggestion of Soviet negotiators on 10-11 March 1987 that INF and SRINF talks be kept separate, the US seemed to be moving towards a position of regarding limits on SRINF as an integral component of an INF agreement. The USA also insisted on tactical nuclear missiles of a range of under 500km, forming the subject of negotiations immediately following the signing of any INF agreement.

The Soviet Union responded to these concerns by proposing a 'double zero option'. During Shultz's visit to Moscow, Gorbachev reportedly offered to eliminate all SRINF in Europe within a year, and to liquidate all shorter-range tactical missiles in Europe while advocating a mutual global SRINF limit.

Less progress occurred in the remaining fields of strategic weapons and space and defensive weapons during round VII, which ended on 6 March 1987. Both sides, however, tabled new proposals during the ministerial meeting in Moscow. The USA offered to adhere to the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty for five years after any possible agreement on strategic weapons had been concluded, rather than the ten years Reagan had proposed at Reykjavik. The likelihood of an agreement taking two years to be reached, however, lengthened the effective period of compliance to seven years. In that period, the USA would adhere to a 'broad' interpretation of the treaty, or one which held that technologies unknown when the pact was first signed in 1972 (such as the space-based lasers integral to SDI) would be exempt from the ABM

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Treaty's restrictions. The USA also proposed to increase the period for a mutual 50 per cent reduction in strategic arms from five to seven years, having abandoned totally the concept mooted at Reykjavik of eliminating all strategic ballistic missiles in ten years.

In response, Shevardnadze proposed a ten-year non-withdrawal pledge on the ABM Treaty, during the last two to three years of which negotiations would commence on the deployment of space defences. If at the end of the ten years, no agreement had been reached and one side began 'purposeful and practical' development of space defences, neither side would any longer be bound to the strategic arms agreement.

During round VII, the Soviet Union ended its unilateral moratorium on nuclear testing by exploding its first nuclear device for eighteen months, on 26 February 1987. The Soviet moratorium began on 6 August 1985 and had been extended four times, with unsuccessful appeals being made to the USA to join the moratorium as a first step towards the negotiation of a Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban (CTB) Treaty.²⁸

● 'The Soviet Union suggests that the problem of medium-range missiles in Europe be singled out from the package of issues and that a separate agreement on it be concluded without delay.' The Soviet leader, Mikhail Gorbachev, in a statement on arms control. *Financial Times* (London) 2 March 1987.

'The Soviets have de-linked the issue of intermediate-range missiles from defence and space issues before. I hope this time it sticks.' Edward L Rowny, arms adviser to President Reagan, expressing scepticism on the Soviet offer. *International Herald Tribune* (Paris) 4 March 1987.

SRINF 'have to be an integral part of the [INF] treaty and have to be constrained. We think what we need is equality. The Soviets have a certain number. We think we ought to have the right to match them.' Maynard Glitman, head of the US delegation on INF at Geneva, speaking of the US desire to build up to Soviet SRINF levels. *Financial Times* (London) 5 March 1987.

'It would be a tragedy if the [SRINF] issue were allowed to block an INF agreement . . . The only equal ceiling we can envisage is zero.' Viktor Karpov, head of the Soviet Foreign Ministry's arms control directorate, speaking in London of the Soviet Union's opposition to making SRINF integral to an INF treaty, or allowing the USA to build up to Soviet SRINF levels. *The Guardian* (London) 13 March 1987.

WARSAW PACT

▲ Warsaw Pact Summit

Political Consultative Committee Meeting

East Berlin, 28-29 May 1987

■ The seven member-countries of the Warsaw Pact (Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Poland, Romania and Soviet Union) met for the annual summit of the Pact's highest body, the Political Consultative Committee. The summit was overshadowed by growing concern over the prospects for a breakthrough in arms negotiations on long-range and shorter-range intermediate-

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range forces (INF) (the 'double-zero' option: see above) and progress on tactical nuclear missiles in Europe. The summit followed a meeting of NATO Foreign Ministers in Brussels which had urged the alliance to increase defence spending on conventional forces by 3 per cent a year. Leaders of the Warsaw Pact emphasised that battlefield nuclear weapons with a range of under 500 kilometres could not be dealt with separately from conventional forces.

The Warsaw Pact summit dealt with five main issues:

- a change from an offensive to a defensive emphasis in Warsaw Pact military doctrine;
- the mutual withdrawal of the most dangerous conventional offensive weapons;
- a reiteration of the Pact's 'Budapest initiative' of 1986 on major troop reductions in Europe²⁹
- an endorsement of proposals to remove tactical missiles and nuclear weapons from Europe;
- support for an agreement with verification safeguards for outlawing chemical weapons;

A special declaration on military doctrine was issued by the Warsaw Pact which promised to re-fashion Warsaw Pact military doctrine as a purely defensive strategy. The final communiqué stressed that the Warsaw Pact would 'never, and under no circumstances, open hostilities' and would 'never be the first to use nuclear weapons'. The communiqué suggested that armies should be redeployed 'only within such a structure and such a style that they would be in a situation to repel an attack'. It also proposed joint NATO-Warsaw Pact consultations on ways of implementing new defensive doctrines.

The offer to give priority to limiting the capability of each side to take offensive action as proposed by a revised military doctrine was coupled with proposals to remove the most dangerous offensive conventional weapons from the zone of direct contact between the two military alliances. Wolfgang Meyer, the East German Foreign Minister had made reference to the proposals before the conference when he promised that the Warsaw Pact would examine 'practical measures' for the 'drastic reduction of forces and weapons of all kinds'. The measures represented an advance on proposals put forward at the June 1986 Budapest Summit which had been limited merely to troop withdrawals. These new proposals suggested, for the first time, recognition of the imbalance in conventional forces in Europe. The proposals were seen as a means of removing disparities in various categories of conventional weapons and as a positive step towards securing the minimum level of security required by both sides for defence.

The summit also reiterated a proposal for major troop withdrawals in Europe, previously put forward at the Budapest Summit. The proposals called for troop reductions of up to half a million by the early-1990s and the creation of a 300 kilometre-wide de-nuclearised corridor through Central Europe. These proposals had previously been rejected by NATO. The Warsaw Pact endorsed proposals to remove tactical nuclear weapons from Europe through multilateral negotiation. *These proposals had been raised initially in talks between US Secretary of State, George Shultz, and the Soviet leader, Mikhail Gorbachev in Moscow in April 1987 (see above).* The Summit also expressed support for a multilateral convention on chemical weapons. The chief Soviet negotiator on chemical weapons, Yuri

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Nazarkin, had previously stated that the Soviet Union agreed in principle to 'quick challenge' inspections of suspected chemical weapons storage or production sites. This is believed to represent a significant step forward, although it was not clear whether the proposed system of verification addressed the key issue of non-refusal of inspection.³⁰

THE NORTH

▲ Group of Seven (G7)

Meeting of Finance Ministers

Washington DC, 8 April 1987

■ The Group of Seven industrialised countries, consisting of the finance ministers and central bank governors of Britain, Canada, France, Italy, Japan, the USA and West Germany, met to discuss international economic and financial matters in the run-up to the mid-year meetings of the IMF and World Bank policy-making committees (see above).

The main subject for discussion was the progress achieved in implementing the undertakings embodied in the 'Louvre Pact'³¹. Ministers and Governors reaffirmed their commitment to the cooperative approach on exchange rates, global economic expansion and trade imbalances agreed at their Paris meeting in February 1987. It was agreed that further action was required to resist protectionist measures, stimulate expansion and trade. No new measures or policies were announced, although it was affirmed that existing measures provided the basis for increased cooperation and the strengthening of economic policy.

The G7 communiqué³² welcomed Japan's proposals for 'extraordinary and urgent measures' to stimulate the Japanese economy, which comprised the early implementation of a large supplementary budget and increased public works expenditure. The Japanese government reaffirmed its intention to take further measures to open up its domestic markets to foreign trade. Also discussed was the use of a common system of indicators for coordinating economic policy. The use of indicators in a prescriptive as well as a descriptive role is enthusiastically supported by the USA and France and opposed by West Germany and Britain. Its proponents believe that the adoption of indicators would represent an important step towards formalising a system of international economic cooperation.³³

● The G7 communiqué is 'a weak response to a worsening situation'. Giovanni Goria, Italy's Minister of Finance, assessing the outcome of the meeting. *The Economist* (London) 18 April 1987.

▲ Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)

Twenty-Sixth Ministerial Council Meeting

Paris, 12-13 May 1987

■ The finance, foreign and trade ministers from the OECD's twenty-four member-states discussed the international economy and agriculture at their annual meeting.

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The meeting was overshadowed by an OECD Report which reported a steady decline in economic growth indicating that slow rates of growth, high unemployment and large trade imbalances were likely to persist unless strong action was taken by OECD member-states. The 'Economic Outlook' report was considered to be one of the gloomiest reviews by the OECD of the world economy in recent years.³⁴

Japan and West Germany were the major targets of attack for inaction in carrying out expansionary measures. At the reception for OECD ministers, President François Mitterrand called upon Japan and West Germany to use their massive trade surpluses to stabilise the world economy and aid developing nations. In a series of sharp exchanges of view, a similar line of argument was adopted by US Treasury Secretary, James Baker, who argued that low-inflation countries such as West Germany and Japan, should adopt more expansionary monetary and budget policies. Conflict over this issue resurfaced towards the end of the meeting when Britain attacked Japan for failing to take speedier action to open up its markets. The final communiqué succeeded to some extent in glossing over these differences, partly as a result of the undertakings by West Germany and Japan to bring forward expansionary measures, or adjust policies accordingly.³⁵

In their final communiqué, the twenty-four member-states agreed to strengthen cooperation towards promoting economic growth, reinforcing efforts to reduce trade imbalances and seeking stability in foreign exchange markets. Despite doubts over the continued credibility of the 'Louvre Pact'³⁶ by a number of senior monetary officials, the final communiqué urged effective implementation and support for the policies of the agreement.

Ministers welcomed a report by the Economic Policy Committee on structural adjustment and economic performance, which focused on possible micro-economic causes of slow growth and high unemployment in the 1980s. The report urged a complete reversal of many of the economic policies implemented by governments over the past two decades, and focused on structural adjustment policies required to increase free-market competition within and among countries. The report emphasised the need to:

- eliminate restrictive trade measures. International trade competition was seen to be the 'most powerful means of promoting economic efficiency and growth';
- liberalise financial markets;
- reform taxes to produce incentives for work, saving and investment;
- improve the responsiveness of education and training to technological and structural change.

The report also called for the need to reform and decentralise the public sector, 'ending programs where goals have been met or where underlying premises are no longer valued'. It called for appropriate public sector de-regulation and denationalisation in order to increase competition and efficiency. On employment, it stressed that unemployed people should be given 'incentives to get back to work'. Unemployment benefits should be taxable and linked to tests for availability for work. The report also argued that 'governments have committed themselves to providing old age pensions on a scale which is likely to be incompatible with budgetary constraints and present views on taxable capacity, even were growth rates to increase significantly'.

The other major background report at the meeting was concerned with

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agricultural reform. Research by OECD staff showed that total agricultural support amounted to more than one-third of the value of agriculture production in the industrialised countries. OECD agricultural policies were believed to cost over \$100 billion a year and were responsible for 60 per cent of farm income in Japan and more than 40 per cent in the EEC. The report looked at the consequences of a 10 per cent cut in agricultural support measures over a four to five year period. Jean-Claude Paye of France, the OECD's Secretary-General, warned that 'the world food system is in a deep crisis that seems to be beyond the control of traditional mechanisms, national and international'. The final communiqué pledged 'a progressive reduction of assistance to, and protection of agriculture across all countries and commodities'. Senior US and European officials described the agreement as a 'historic breakthrough', while Mr Clayton Yeutter, the US Trade Representative, described it as 'the most comprehensive and forward-looking' policy he had yet seen from an international forum.

The agricultural reform agreement is to be based on the following principles:

- a progressive introduction of market forces into national and international agricultural policy;
- the introduction of measures which will reduce guaranteed prices and other forms of production incentives;
- support for measures which minimise possible economic distortions and which permit a better functioning of the market mechanism;
- farm income support to be de-coupled from price guarantees and factors of production. Farm income support where appropriate, would take the form of direct income support and be targetted at low income farmers, disadvantaged regions and farmers disproportionately affected by structural adjustment.

The reform agreement aims to give political impetus to the talks on agriculture included in the Uruguay Round of the GATT negotiations. Two aspects of the original proposals were not referred to in the final communiqué. No mention was made of a new OECD computerised system for measuring the relative levels of subsidy for each of the OECD countries. The main opposition to this programme came from Japan. The OECD staff were authorised to continue work on the system, although no final decision was made on its use. No agreement was reached on the time-scale for the 10 per cent reduction in subsidy contained in the OECD staff proposal. It was believed that a decision on this matter would follow indirectly from the Uruguay Round of GATT talks.³⁷

● 'With the continuation of present economic policies very little improvement in future economic prospects is in sight.' Kurt Mosbakk, Norwegian Trade Minister, speaking at the meeting. *International Herald Tribune* (Paris) 15 May 1987. 'Evidence to show that these policies are working should become evident no later than September.' US Treasury Secretary, James Baker, appealing for time to demonstrate the effectiveness of existing agreements among the industrialised countries in achieving balanced growth. *International Herald Tribune* (Paris) 14 May 1987.

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▲ Thirteenth Western Economic Summit Venice, 8–10 June, 1987

■ The leaders of the seven major industrialised countries (Britain, Canada, France, Italy, Japan, the USA and West Germany) held their annual summit meeting in Venice.³⁸ The main topics discussed at the meeting were nuclear arms reduction; the situation in the Gulf; economic growth and cooperation; currency stability; trade and protectionism; AIDS (Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome) and terrorism. The summit's final declaration largely reaffirmed existing policies, leaving a number of key problems on the economic front unresolved. Although no significant initiatives emerged, it was deemed sufficient by the ministers that agreement had prevailed on such potentially divisive issues as the Gulf, economic cooperation, trade and protectionism.

An area which had been a significant cause of friction between the USA and Japan was eased slightly during the opening stages of the summit. The USA announced moves to lift partially the US\$300 million of special tariffs and duties imposed on Japanese electronics in March 1987. The US move reduced by \$51 million, or 17 per cent, the total sanctions package placed on DRAMS (dynamic random access memory chips), the mass-produced chips which had been heavily subsidised by Japan. Before the start of the summit, US Treasury Secretary, James Baker, had signalled the possibility of such a move when commenting on Japan's proposed \$26bn package of expansionary measures, which he had referred to as 'a very positive development'. Although Japan privately expressed some disappointment at the limited extent of the US move, this did not deter Japan from announcing a further expansionary package to recycle credit worth a further \$20bn to developing countries, over a three year period. It was proposed that the funds would be channelled bilaterally to heavily indebted countries, and on a multilateral basis through international development institutions. This \$20bn brings Japan's total flow of funds to developing countries to \$30bn, representing an addition to the \$10bn announced last year.

Efforts to prevent a slowdown in economic growth were seen as the major task facing the summit. Its final communiqué³⁹ called for a 'further market-led decline of interest rates' and noted that further shifts in exchange rates would damage growth and efforts to control trade surpluses and deficits. The US Treasury Secretary stressed that there would be no specific moves taken at the summit to stabilise exchange rates. Instead, the leaders reaffirmed previous international agreements made in Paris and Washington. Ministers agreed that 'Louvre Pact'⁴⁰ had been successful, noting that exchange rates had been brought 'within ranges broadly consistent with economic fundamentals'. In regard to expansion, there was little evidence to suggest that Japan and West Germany faced further pressure at the meeting on expansionary fiscal measures, despite an earlier statement by the US Treasury Secretary suggesting that it was time for West Germany and other surplus countries to 'pick up the slack'. The final communiqué was ambivalent in this respect; while it was admitted that there were major problems with slowing economic growth and trade imbalances, and leaders were unable to agree that growth-orientated policies would be pursued at present. The final communiqué merely noted that stimulative actions should be postponed, unless 'world economic growth is insufficient'.

Progress was reported on the use of target performance indicators. The early

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announcement that agreement had been reached was unexpected. Both France and the USA had been pushing on this issue with some opposition from Britain, West Germany and Japan. It was agreed that the countries would provide each other with medium-term projections for their economies, based on 'objective indicators'. The indicators used would probably include growth of output, monetary growth, budget and current account deficits and exchange rates. It was agreed that the IMF would supervise the use of indicators and that finance ministers would meet to coordinate economic policy if performance deviated significantly from projections.

On the issues of trade, agriculture and world agricultural reform, the USA pressed for an international agreement to reduce subsidies. A US demand to end agricultural surpluses by the year 2000 failed to meet with the approval of a number of European countries. The final communiqué reiterated support for existing positions within GATT and the OECD. Canada expressed concern that several countries might wish to backtrack on the May 1987 OECD agreement to liberalise agricultural trade and dismantle farm subsidies (see above).

African debt was a major subject of concern, although the USA refused to endorse a British proposal to lend at subsidised rates to sub-Saharan African debtor countries. The British proposal, supported by Japan, called for the rescheduling of debts, the conversion of debts into loans and the introduction of concessional interest rates. A proposal was also brought to the summit by the World Bank, which called for US\$20-25 billion in debt relief to Gambia, Madagascar, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Togo, Zaire and Zambia. The final communiqué took note of the problems of sub-Saharan Africa and proposed that further consideration should be given to the possibility of applying lower interest rates to their existing debts. Agreement was reached on Third World debt in two areas: a proposal by the Managing Director of the IMF to increase the Structural Adjustment Facility (SAF) from \$4 to \$12 billion was agreed, with Japan indicating its willingness to fund 50 per cent of the increase; in addition, the final communiqué made reference to the financial stability of the World Bank, noting that its ability was increasingly constrained by a shrinking capital base. This was seen as giving further support to World Bank efforts to obtain an increase in funding. A French proposal to fix development aid at 0.7 per cent of GNP was blocked by the USA.

The summit also considered a range of political issues, with the Gulf War dominating the proceedings. A joint communiqué on the Gulf War supported the UN Secretary-General's attempt at mediation, calling for 'new and concerted efforts' to end the Iran-Iraq war. Concern had been expressed that the USA would try to deepen European involvement in the Gulf. US Secretary of State, George Shultz, had earlier stated that the USA was seeking a UN Security Council resolution that would urge a cease-fire, with 'enforceable' measures in the event of non-compliance. These measures were generally seen as aimed against Iran. The carefully worded communiqué calling for 'just and effective' measures was seen to imply equal treatment between the two parties, although George Shultz interpreted the statement to mean that the seven leaders would impose mandatory sanctions if Iran continued to reject calls for a cease-fire. The USA had hoped for support from the summit for a resolution 'with teeth' from the UN Security Council, in which the summit members form a majority.

Terrorism, South Africa, AIDS and East-West relations were the other issues

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discussed. Notable for its absence in the terrorism statement, in the wake of the US 'Iran-Contra' scandal, was the pledge made at the previous year's Western Economic Summit in Tokyo to 'refuse to export arms to states which sponsor or support terrorism'. In a separate annex, the summit strengthened its 1978 Bonn Declaration on terrorist attacks against civil aviation. The seven undertook to halt flights to and from countries which refused to extradite or prosecute those accused of committing acts of terrorism. Full-scale criticism of South Africa, and a draft declaration of the guiding principles for Western relations with Pretoria, were blocked by Britain. The British view was that it was the wrong time to launch an initiative so soon after the elections in South Africa (in which the white population alone had participated). Progress was made in highlighting the seriousness of the AIDS problem. A statement issued in the name of the summit's acting head, Amintore Fanfari, Prime Minister of Italy, aimed to place AIDS at the top of the international health agenda. The statement urged countries to join the World Health Organisation (WHO) in its support for the AIDS effort. A call by Britain's Minister of Health, Norman Fowler, for a ministerial-level meeting on this subject, focusing on AIDS education, was also supported. The statement by Prime Minister Fanfari and the call by Norman Fowler both implicitly rejected American approaches based on mandatory testing.

The summit included an unusual declaration on East-West relations, expressing the hope that recent developments in Soviet internal and external policies 'will prove to be of great significance for the improvement of relations between East and West'. The positive tone of the East-West statement was believed to be the result of pressure from West Germany. The statement also made reference to human rights in the Soviet Union and requested a 'rapid and total' Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan. A West German appeal for greater economic collaboration between East and West Europe was rejected. On arms control negotiations, President Reagan was unsuccessful in coordinating an appeal to the Soviet leader, Mikhail Gorbachev, to drop objections to the US Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) in order to move forward on negotiating nuclear force reductions. The final communiqué gave only general backing to US efforts to negotiate 'balanced, substantial and verifiable' intermediate-range arms reductions.⁴¹

NORTH-SOUTH

▲ Papua New Guinea—Solomon Islands—Vanuatu Summit

Rabaul, Papua New Guinea, 21 May 1987

South Pacific Forum (SPF)

Eighteenth Annual Summit

Apia, Western Samoa, 29–30 May 1987

■ At its annual summit, coinciding with the twenty-fifth anniversary celebrations of Western Samoa's independence, the South Pacific Forum increased its membership to fifteen with the admission of two former US territories, the Marshall Islands and the Federated States of Micronesia. Of the thirteen other SPF members, however, only twelve were represented at the summit: Australia, Cook Islands,

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Kiribati, Nauru, New Zealand, Niue, Papua New Guinea (PNG), Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu, Vanuatu and Western Samoa.

Notably absent was Fiji, whose Governor-General, Ratu (Chief) Sir Penaia Ganilau, issued a statement to the Forum pleading 'preoccupation with important matters at home'. The matters in question were those arising from the *coup d'état* of 14 May 1987, led by Lieutenant-Colonel Sitiveni Rabuka, which, in the South Pacific's first military intervention against a democratically elected government, had ousted Fiji's four-week old coalition government of Dr Timoci Bavadra.⁴²

Reactions to the coup among Forum members were mixed. Most vociferous in their opposition were Australia and New Zealand, whose Prime Ministers, Bob Hawke and David Lange, threatened to boycott the summit if Fiji was represented by Sir Kamisese Mara, the Prime Minister of Fiji from independence in 1970 until the April 1987 elections, who was alleged to have supported the coup and was currently adviser on foreign affairs in the new Council of Advisers. Appointed by Fiji's Governor-General on 22 May 1987, this Council was staunchly criticised by a group of three former ministers from Timoci Bavadra's cabinet, who arrived in Apia to lobby SPF members. Criticising Sir Penaia Ganilau for appointing the Council in place of the duly elected government, as well as for granting Rabuka an amnesty for his part in the coup, and promoting him to the rank of full Colonel and head of Fiji's 2,700-strong army, the former ministers advocated non-recognition of the Council, the establishment of a peace-keeping force in Fiji, and the application of economic sanctions against the country.⁴³ An export ban had already been imposed on Fiji by trade unions in Australia and New Zealand, while New Zealand, in common with the USA, had curtailed aid to the country.

A 'spearhead group' of relatively radical Melanesian states (PNG, Solomon Islands and Vanuatu) had coordinated their own positions at a meeting in Rabaul before the summit. Officially deploring the coup, these governments tended to identify with the indigenous group in Fiji (representing 46 per cent of the island's population), whose political supremacy—lost in the April 1987 elections to a coalition government dominated largely by Indians (representing 49 per cent of the population)—the coup by the Fijian army had attempted to reinstate. In a communiqué, the three governments welcomed Sir Penaia Ganilau's steps towards a peaceful resolution to Fiji's problems, expressing concern over statements by Prime Minister David Lange that New Zealand was willing to provide logistical support to enable Fijian soldiers abroad to return to their country, should they be needed to depose the Rabuka regime. Criticising the interventionist stance of Australia and New Zealand, the leaders counselled that Fiji, like all the island states, should be allowed to determine its own future in its own time.⁴⁴

The coup in Fiji threatened to exacerbate existing tensions with the SPF over other issues. Australia in particular had been critical of Libyan overtures towards South Pacific states, particularly Vanuatu. In retaliation for what it considered to be undue interference in its own internal affairs, Vanuatu had banned visits by Australian warships and aircraft, and its Prime Minister, Father Walter Lini, had warned that any attempt to raise the issue of Libyan involvement in the region at the summit in Apia would signal the demise of the SPF.⁴⁵ The Melanesian leaders were also anxious that neither the coup in Fiji nor the question of Libya should be allowed to deflect attention from what they regarded as the most important regional issue;

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that of New Caledonia's independence, which had been the subject of a special meeting of SPF foreign ministers in Auckland in March 1987.⁴⁶

The coup in Fiji was not an item on the formal agenda of the SPF summit but, largely due to the efforts of Bob Hawke, it dominated both unofficial discussions and the final communiqué. The SPF leaders agreed to offer assistance to Fiji's Governor-General and to send, at his request, a three-member mission to help mediate between parties in order to resolve the country's crisis. Led by Bob Hawke, the mission was to include the Prime Minister of the Solomon Islands, Ezekiel Alebua and Henry Naisali, former Finance Minister of Tuvalu and current Director of the SPF Secretariat, the South Pacific Bureau for Economic Cooperation (SPEC).⁴⁷

The final communiqué was strongly critical of French policies in New Caledonia, rejecting the proposed referendum which was to offer inhabitants a stark choice between total independence or continued French rule. 'In the circumstances,' the communiqué stated, 'such a referendum would be divisive, futile and a recipe for disaster.'⁴⁸ The leaders also agreed to an Australian proposal for a system of 'information exchange', involving the increased sharing of security intelligence among member-countries, apparently aimed at monitoring foreign incursions, including those of Libya, into the region.⁴⁹

The next SPF summit was scheduled to be held in Nuku'alofa, Tonga, in 1988.

● 'The situation in Fiji requires sensitivity and understanding, not reckless threats of military intervention.' The Rabaul communiqué by the leaders of PNG, the Solomon Islands and Vanuatu. *Far Eastern Economic Review* (Hong Kong) 4 June 1987.

'We draw your attention to the explosive situation building up in Fiji which threatens a breakdown of order and the outbreak of violence . . . These people have manipulated gullible indigenous Fijians along a path to racial confrontation that will certainly bring about a flight of people and capital from Fiji, widespread unemployment, food shortages and unnecessary suffering.' A written appeal to the SPF members by former ministers in the Cabinet of Timoci Bavadra. *The Guardian* (London) 30 May 1987.

'The Forum doesn't have any formula. What we have is a common desire to assist, if Fiji wants, in finding an acceptable outcome.' Bob Hawke, Prime Minister of Australia, speaking of the Forum's offer to send a mission to Fiji. *The Independent* (London) 1 June 1987.

'My government has a very profound concern about trying to ensure that what has historically been a Pacific region basically free of the tensions of superpower rivalry or destabilising terrorist-type activities should remain in that position.' Bob Hawke seeking to justify Australia's preoccupation with the question of Libyan involvement in the South Pacific. *The Independent* (London) 30 May 1987.

SOUTH-SOUTH

▲ Group of 77 (G77)
Sixth Ministerial Meeting
Havana, 20-26 April 1987

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■ Over 660 delegates from 100 Third World countries attended the Havana ministerial meeting in preparation for the seventh meeting of UNCTAD (UNCTAD VII), to be held in Geneva in July 1987. The ministerial meeting was seen by the UNCTAD Secretary-General, Kenneth K S Dadzie, as a 'unique opportunity to strengthen multilateral cooperation for development and to consolidate the UNCTAD itself'. The Cuban Trade Minister, Ricardo Cabrisas, reiterated this position when he told the meeting that decisions produced by the ministers would serve as the basis for concerted action in North-South economic relations and lead to greater cooperation.

Agreement was expressed on the view that Third World debt could not be serviced and repaid under present conditions and without sustained economic development. G77 called upon UNCTAD VII to consider ways to overcome the situation. It was agreed that a positive trade balance could not be achieved while exports from the Third World faced major restraints and commodity prices were depressed. Ricardo Cabrisas argued that debt and trade 'should be the focus of the debate and the negotiating process in UNCTAD'. On Central America, G77 agreed to a resolution which demanded that the blockade imposed by the USA on Cuba more than twenty-five years ago be lifted. They also called for the revocation of the commercial embargo against Nicaragua, and demanded that the USA abide by the ruling of the International Court of Justice regarding the 'Contras'. They re-emphasised the need for peace in Central America through negotiated political settlement under the auspices of bodies such as the Contadora group.⁵⁰

▲ Non-Aligned Movement (NAM)

Extraordinary Ministerial Conference on South-South Cooperation
Pyongyang, 9-13 June 1987

■ The first meeting of the Ministerial Conference on South-South Cooperation was attended by 105 representatives from member-states of the Non-Aligned Movement and representatives from other states, liberation organisations and international bodies. The committee was formed in accordance with the decision of the eighth Non-Aligned Summit Conference held in Harare in September 1986.⁵¹

The Conference defined the duty and role of the committee and adopted the Pyongyang Declaration and a wide-ranging Plan of Action on South-South Cooperation. The Declaration called for changes in the international monetary system and proposed the holding of an international conference on money and finance. The Declaration also recommended the introduction of a common currency unit for the non-aligned countries. The Conference also set up a standing ministerial committee for economic cooperation. It was decided that the second session of the Committee should be convened during the forty-second session of the UN General Assembly.⁵²

▲ Contadora Group—Lima Support Group

Meetings of Foreign Ministers

Buenos Aires, 13 April 1987

San Carlos de Bariloche, Argentina, 16-17 April 1987

■ The crisis in Central America formed the subject of a meeting of foreign ministers of the Contadora Group (Colombia, Mexico, Panama, Venezuela) and its Lima Support Group (Argentina, Brazil, Peru, Uruguay).

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In a declaration issued after the meeting,⁵³ the eight ministers expressed concern over what they termed the 'paralysis of the negotiating process' towards the signing of the Contadora Treaty for Peace and Cooperation in Central America. However, they considered auspicious the peace plan proposed by the Costa Rican President, Oscar Arias Sánchez (the 'Arias Plan') and a projected Central American summit, due to be held in Esquipulas, Guatemala, at which the plan was to be discussed.⁵⁴ They also acknowledged President Arias's assurances, conveyed in a letter to the eight governments of the Contadora and Support Groups, that his initiative was intended to supplement rather than supplant the Contadora peace process.

With prophetic disquiet, however, the ministers appealed to 'countries directly or indirectly involved' in the Central American conflict to 'refrain from any action, forceful action or intimidation' that could obstruct the prevailing propitious climate for dialogue between the Central American states, or affect the result of the Esquipulas summit. In the event, the Esquipulas summit, scheduled to take place on 25-26 June 1987, was cancelled unilaterally by El Salvador and Honduras, the chief allies of the USA, following a tour of the region by Philip Habib, President Reagan's Special Envoy in Central America.⁵⁵ It had been foreseen at the time of the announcement of the Arias Plan that many of its provisions would fail to find favour with the USA.⁵⁶

In San Carlos de Bariloche, the eight ministers met for the first time in their capacity as a permanent committee for consultations and political discussions, whose creation had been presaged at a previous meeting in Rio de Janeiro in December 1986.⁵⁷ Continuing the discussions which had begun in Buenos Aires, the ministers covered a broad range of topics far beyond the immediate crisis in Central America. Their ambitious goal, as stated in a final communiqué,⁵⁸ was to 'expand and expedite the Latin American integration and cooperation process through the reactivation of the existing institutional system', not least through revivifying the Latin American Parliament. Discussing a number of technical and legal aspects of Latin American integration, the ministers also requested the immediate convening of a technical-level meeting of the Cartagena Group (consisting of the eight countries minus Panama and with the addition of Bolivia, Chile, Dominican Republic and Ecuador, which are all signatories to the Consensus of Cartagena). They decided to promote the implementation of a Regional Emergency Food Assistance Treaty (TAREA) and to support an initiative of President Virgilio Barco of Colombia for an extensive programme to combat the 'extreme poverty in Latin America and the Caribbean'. The ministers also agreed to hold the first meeting of the technological-scientific commission in Buenos Aires in August 1987, when they would also convene another meeting of foreign ministers in Brazil.⁵⁹

▲ Argentina-Uruguay Summit

Montevideo, 25-26 May 1987

Argentina-Brazil-Uruguay Summit

Montevideo, 27 May 1987

■ President Raul Alfonsín of Argentina and Julio Maria Sanguinetti of Uruguay signed the Montevideo Act on 25 May 1987 ratifying previous political decisions to

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further bilateral integration. In a joint declaration at the end of their talks, they expressed satisfaction with the strengthening of cooperation between their two countries since the signing of the 1985 Colonia de Mayo Act, and described the Latin American integration process, which includes Brazil and all the other countries of the Latin American Integration Association (ALADI), as a basic condition for economic and social development in the region. They referred to the need to intensify the integration process through a number of specific projects.⁶⁰

Following the arrival in Montevideo of President José Sarney of Brazil, the three leaders expressed concern at recent rises in interest rates which to them represented a serious setback to their efforts to address their foreign debt problems. In a letter to the seven major industrialised countries due to meet at the forthcoming Western Economic Summit in Venice (see above), the leaders appealed for lower interest rates as well as curbs on growing protectionism within the industrialised countries. President Alfonsín called for the introduction of fixed rates of interest on debts; a hope, he said, that had been fuelled by the recent decision of Citibank, a major commercial creditor, to set aside US\$3 billion for potential loan losses. Uruguay's Foreign Minister, Enrique Iglesias, spoke of a growing consensus among debtor countries that the interest on old debt should be fixed at 2 or 3 per cent over a long term. President Sarney said that his country's recent debt moratorium had been aimed at inducing banks to adopt a more flexible position on international debt—Brazil being the largest debtor, after Mexico, among developing countries. Speaking of Brazil's intention to resume negotiations with foreign banks within the next month, President Sarney said that Brazil would now expect to receive 'just treatment' in negotiations, which he went on to describe as permitting repayment of the foreign debt without suffering and without the collapse of Brazil's economy.⁶¹

● Brazil's decision to suspend interest payments had caused bankers and international organisations to be 'more flexible and comprehensive in reaching accord with diverse countries around the world'. President José Sarney of Brazil giving an optimistic assessment of Brazil's debt moratorium. *International Herald Tribune* (Paris) 30 May–1 June 1987.

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- ▲ Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN)
Twentieth Annual Ministerial Meeting
Singapore, 15–16 June 1987
ASEAN—Australia, Canada, EEC, Japan, New Zealand, USA
Joint Ministerial Meeting
Singapore, 18–20 June 1987

■ Settlement of the Kampuchean question and the related problem of Indochinese refugees were key issues considered by the foreign ministers of ASEAN (Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore and Thailand) and pursued in subsequent discussions with their six Western 'dialogue partners'.

The ASEAN meeting was opened by Lee Kuan Yew, Prime Minister of Singapore, on a note of cautious optimism. Voicing tentative hopes in common with other ASEAN states such as Indonesia, he suggested that recent changes within the Vietnamese government and its chief ally, the Soviet Union, had increased the chances of

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achieving a negotiated settlement in Kampuchea, which Vietnamese forces had occupied since 1978. Lee Kuan Yew reasoned that the new priority accorded to economic reform within Vietnam and the Soviet Union would lead to a realisation of the costs of the continued occupation, in terms of Vietnam's isolation and the consequent burden placed on its economy.

ASEAN ministers were nonetheless perturbed by the recent announcement in May 1987 by Prince Norodom Sihanouk that he was taking a year's leave of absence from his post as head of the UN-recognised exile Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea (CGDK). This resistance coalition, composed of the Sihanoukist National Army (SNA), the Khmer People's National Liberation Front (KPNLF) and the Khmer Rouge, had been created under ASEAN auspices and remained a key element in ASEAN's strategy towards solving the Kampuchean question. ASEAN ministers feared that the coalition's credibility would be undermined by Sihanouk's absence, which he attributed to continued Khmer Rouge attacks against his followers and human rights abuses in the refugee camps under Khmer Rouge control on the Thai-Kampuchean border.⁶²

Yet both Thailand and Singapore opposed the suggestion (made by a New York-based human rights group, the Cambodia Documentation Commission) to subject the Khmer Rouge leadership under Pol Pot to a trial at the International Court of Justice at the Hague, under the UN Prevention of Genocide Convention.⁶³ The removal of the 'genocidal Pol Pot clique' (whether defined as the highest leadership or a wider section of the Khmer Rouge) has long been a condition imposed by Vietnam for the withdrawal of its troops from Kampuchea and the attainment of a political solution.⁶⁴ Thailand and Singapore feared that attacking the Khmer Rouge would merely play into the hands of Vietnam by removing the main military opposition to its occupation within the CGDK.

In their joint ministerial communiqué, ASEAN and its six dialogue partners agreed to continue calling for the withdrawal of Vietnamese troops from Kampuchea, and to respond to any Vietnamese moves towards this end. Meanwhile, they determined to sustain their efforts to isolate Vietnam economically and diplomatically. The US Secretary of State, George Shultz, voiced a general disappointment with Vietnam's announcement during the meeting of the appointment of the relatively conservative Pham Hung as Prime Minister and Vo Chi Cong as President. The moves, in Shultz's words, 'snuffed out hopes for a more flexible leadership' which could prove more accommodating on the question of Kampuchea. There was general criticism of Khmer Rouge activities at the meeting, in an apparent vindication of Prince Sihanouk's accusations.

In their own communiqué, the ASEAN ministers criticised Vietnam's failure to stem the flow of refugees from Vietnam, Laos and Kampuchea, emphasising the need to tackle the refugee problem at its source in Indochina. At the same time, they expressed concern over the growing 'compassion fatigue' of Western resettlement countries, warning that reduced resettlement opportunities would merely increase the numbers of refugees in camps within ASEAN countries, and appealed to the West not to reduce their intake of refugees or impose difficult conditions on their entry.

In subsequent discussions, George Shultz acknowledged the ministers' concerns and said that the USA would continue to support refugee programmes and to resettle refugees 'in substantial numbers', subject to Congressional limitations. He appealed

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to countries of first asylum, such as Malaysia, Thailand and Hong Kong, to maintain their commitment to the humanitarian treatment of all those seeking asylum pending resettlement in the West, despite the problems posed by the continuing influx of refugees. By contrast, Australia's Foreign Minister, Bill Hayden, stressed the need for assurances that all those accepted for asylum and resettlement were 'genuine refugees', conforming to the UN definition of their having a 'well-founded fear of persecution', rather than economic emigrés. While ASEAN's dialogue partners gave assurances that they were seeking durable solutions to the problem of Indochinese refugees, none promised to increase the numbers accepted for resettlement.

ASEAN ministers once more expressed alarm at growing trade protectionism within the USA and Europe, and welcomed Japan's promises to increase its aid to their countries. They also agreed to continue consideration of the possibility of establishing a South-East Asian Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone (NWFZ), as discussed at the previous year's meeting.⁶⁵ In his enthusiasm for the project, Indonesia's Foreign Minister, Mochtar Kusumaatmadja, was supported by New Zealand's Deputy Foreign Minister, Frank O'Flynn, but opposed by the US Secretary of State. George Shultz argued that peace relied upon nuclear deterrence and that other ASEAN countries had voiced their opposition to the concept. The reference was understood to be to Singapore and Thailand most notably.⁶⁶

ASEAN is to hold the third summit in its twenty-year history in Manila on 14–16 December 1987—the first ASEAN summit in ten years.

● 'Hanoi knows her isolation is the direct result of her present policies, and this isolation has inflicted too heavy a burden on her economy . . . ASEAN is willing to help work out an honourable formula which represents the Cambodian people's rights as well as the security interests of Vietnam.' Lee Kuan Yew, Prime Minister of Singapore, at the opening of the ASEAN meeting. *The Independent* (London) 16 June 1987.

'It is high time the nuclear question should not be left to the superpowers to decide. The global balance and nuclear deterrent is one view, but concern should also be given to potential victims such as Indonesia of accidental spillage.' Mochtar Kusumaatmadja, Foreign Minister of Indonesia, arguing in favour of a South-East Asian NWFZ, which would also address the problems of nuclear waste. *BBC Summary of World Broadcasts* FE/8600/A3/5, 22 June 1987.

A NWFZ for South-East Asia, like that supported by New Zealand in the case of the South Pacific,⁶⁷ is 'an important assertion of the needs and rights of small nations which have nothing to gain from superpower rivalry'. Frank O'Flynn, Deputy Foreign Minister of New Zealand. *Far Eastern Economic Review* (Hong Kong) 2 July 1987.

▲ South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC)
Ministerial Council Meeting
New Delhi, 18–19 June 1987

■ A regular meeting of foreign ministers from SAARC's seven member-countries (Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka) took place in an atmosphere of regional tension arising from the continuing dispute over India's aid to Tamil separatists in Sri Lanka. The dispute had been exacerbated following a

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Sri Lankan military offensive of 26 May 1987 against Tamil strongholds in the northern Jaffna peninsula of the island. India had responded first by sending a flotilla of fishing boats carrying relief supplies to the Tamils, which had been turned back by the Sri Lankan navy, and subsequently with a successful air-drop of supplies into Jaffna, on 4 June 1987. Colombo lodged a complaint against India at the UN, for what it considered to be an illegal incursion into Sri Lankan airspace, and received the support of SAARC members, Pakistan (which already actively assists the Sri Lankan army against the Tamil guerrillas), Bangladesh and Nepal.⁶⁸

The SAARC meeting was initially jeopardised by Sri Lanka's threat to boycott the session in New Delhi, and India's response that it would in that case feel constrained to postpone it. Following diplomatic consultations in which Pakistan, Bangladesh, Nepal and the Maldives appealed to Sri Lanka to reconsider, the Sri Lankan Foreign Minister, A C S Hameed, consented to attend the meeting. By this time, Sri Lanka had announced the suspension of its Jaffna offensive on 10 June 1987, to be resumed if the main guerrilla group, the 'Tamil Tigers', declined to negotiate, and talks between Hameed and the Indian High Commissioner in Colombo, J N Dixit, had produced an agreement on the acceptance of relief ships at the northern Sri Lankan port of Kankasanturai.

The Tamil issue was not directly raised at the SAARC meeting, India's Foreign Minister, N D Tivari, having pointedly reminded the assembled ministers that 'bilateral and contentious issues' were explicitly excluded from SAARC's purview by the terms of the SAARC Charter.⁶⁹ Equally pointedly, however, the Sri Lankan Foreign Minister called for the adoption of a binding regional convention on the conduct of inter-state relations among SAARC member-countries, and India was in effect isolated by the other six states, whose ministers all reiterated the principles of the UN Charter affirming respect for national independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity. The unity of India's neighbours reflected their traditional fear of India's hegemony as a regional power, a fear which had been at least partly responsible for delaying the formation of the two-year old regional grouping.

Considering the report of a SAARC expert group on terrorism which identified a list of terrorist offences not to be considered 'political' for extradition purposes, the ministers agreed to enact or amend national legislation on extradition (though each country retained a degree of discretion in responding to other countries' demands for extradition). It was decided to convene a group of legal experts to draft a regional convention on terrorism, a subject which had previously eluded agreement among SAARC countries.⁷⁰ The ministers also agreed to establish a 200,000 ton reserve of food grain as security against regional emergencies, and endorsed five further areas of SAARC cooperation:

- the joint production of radio and television programmes through a SAARC audio visual exchange (SAVE), to begin in November 1987;
- organised tourism;
- joint chairs, fellowships and scholarships in the region's universities, beginning in the academic year 1988;
- a regional documentation centre;
- a youth volunteers programme.⁷¹

The third annual summit was to be held in Kathmandu on 2-4 November 1987.

- A regional convention on inter-state relations should 'bind the seven nations by

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a solemn declaration to respect one another's independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity by refraining from any acts of aggression, interference, violation or oppression'. A C S Hameed, Foreign Minister of Sri Lanka, advocating the signing of such a convention in the wake of India's air drop on Jaffna. *Far Eastern Economic Review* (Hong Kong) 2 July 1987.

'... we will end up in a stalemate and miss the immense opportunity that regional cooperation offers.' N D Tiwari, Foreign Minister of India, warning against the introduction of bilateral issues into SAARC's discussions. *Far Eastern Economic Review* (Hong Kong) 2 July 1987.

▲ Arab League

Eighty-seventh Ministerial Council Meeting

Tunis, 4-6 April 1987

Issues

■ Attempts to restore unity within the Arab world dominated the proceedings of the Arab League Council in an attempt to prepare the ground for a future Arab summit. It was recognised that the Gulf conflict and Syria's support for Iran against Iraq was a major obstacle to Arab solidarity. A unanimous decision by Arab League foreign ministers led to the formation of a committee to make visits to the five UN Security Council member-states (Britain, China, France, Soviet Union, USA) to urge an end to the Iran-Iraq war. The initiative seeks a Security Council resolution which includes sanctions against Iran if it refuses to adhere to a call for a cease-fire. The Arab League also mandated the Saudi and Algerian Foreign Ministers to visit Damascus to urge Syria to lend its support in efforts to end the conflict.

The League also adopted resolutions on the Palestinian issue. The Council is understood to have adopted a resolution which supports the holding of an international conference on the Middle East under UN supervision. The resolution includes mention of the participation of all parties, including the PLO, on an equal footing with other member-states. The Council also expressed its solidarity with Syria following the EEC boycott and Britain's accusations of 'state terrorism'. The Syrian Foreign Minister, Faruq al-Shar, at a press conference later, said that Arab countries would not resume the Arab-European dialogue until normal relations were restored.⁷²

▲ Gulf Cooperation Council (gcc)

Twelfth Meeting of Oil Ministers

Jeddah, 19 May 1987

■ Oil ministers of the six member-countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council (Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates (UAE)) met to prepare for the OPEC conference in Vienna on 25 June 1987 (see below). Four of the gcc countries, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the UAE and Qatar are also members of OPEC.

The purpose of the meeting was to pave the way for agreement at the Vienna

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conference on the continuation of the OPEC agreement on quota levels for the remainder of the year. The original agreement was set at OPEC's December 1986 conference in Geneva. Before the meeting, UAE and Qatar had expressed concern about existing quota and price levels. The UAE Oil Minister, Dr Mana Saeed al-Otaiba, had insisted that the June 1987 OPEC conference should agree on higher output quotas for the UAE. Qatar complained that it still experiences severe marketing difficulties.

After the meeting, ministers issued a communiqué stressing their agreement on the necessity of adhering to the OPEC agreement 'to the production levels agreed on for each member, and to the production ceiling set in the agreement for each quarter until the end of 1987'. Dr Mana Saeed al-Otaiba indicated that he would defer his demand for a substantially higher quota until the end of the year.⁷³

▲ Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)

Ministerial Council: Twenty-third Session
Jeddah, 6-8 June 1987

■ The six-member Ministerial Council of the GCC was dominated by concern over navigation in international Gulf waters. A carefully worded final statement provided political support for the USA's escort role for shipping in the Gulf. The GCC foreign ministers emphasised the US role in the context of the existing GCC position, namely that the safety of navigation in the international waters of the Gulf is the responsibility of the international community as a whole. Kuwait's Foreign Minister and Deputy Prime Minister, Shaykh Sabah al Ahmad, said in reference to recent press reports of US involvement, that his country had never given consideration to establishing US bases in Kuwait.

The Council issued a statement expressing solidarity with Kuwait. The statement discussed the 'escalation of threats against the State of Kuwait', denouncing 'terrorist' and 'subversive actions'. The reference was to the arrest of six Shi'ite saboteurs, and to threats made against Kuwaiti commercial and economic interests.

The Council also reviewed recent developments in the Middle East, expressing its condolences with the family of the late Prime Minister of Lebanon, Rashid Karami. The Council also reaffirmed previous resolutions on the territorial integrity of Lebanon. On the question of Arab unity, it noted the recent steps which had been taken towards increased Arab unity within the region and expressed satisfaction with the outcome of the Palestinian National Council meeting in Algiers in April 1987.

It also considered developments relating to military cooperation among its members, observing that there had been increased integration and coordination on the military front. The Council agreed to submit a draft of its newly proposed security strategy to the next session of the Supreme Council to be held in Riyadh. It also agreed to hold a joint ministerial meeting with EEC foreign ministers in Brussels on 23 June 1987. The purpose of the meeting would be to discuss a reduction of the duties on petrochemicals. There has been growing concern among GCC members about EEC tariff measures and it is believed that the GCC may make agreement on other issues conditional upon movement by the EEC in the area of petrochemical tariffs.⁷⁴

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▲ Organisation of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries (OAPEC)
Ministerial Council: Thirty-eighth Meeting
Damascus, 10 June 1987

■ OAPEC oil ministers approved major budget cuts and a strategy to enable the Organisation to carry out a narrower range of functions, focusing primarily on research and training. The budget cuts and the review of objectives, administrative structures and programmes of the Organisation results from the greatly reduced oil revenues experienced by all OAPEC countries over the past year. The proposed budget for the Secretariat of \$5.1 million is about half of its 1983 peak level. The organisation's budget deficit is estimated to be \$14.4 million. In view of the severity of the measures to be taken, it was agreed that the Organisation would establish a Committee headed by Shaikh 'Ali Khalifah al-Sabah, Oil Minister of Kuwait, to implement a five year working programme starting in 1988.⁷⁵

Agreement was reached on the payment of overdue instalments by Qatar, Algeria, Tunisia, Iraq and Syria. Qatar met its 1986 payments and Algeria indicated that it expected to do the same. Tunisia, which withdrew from active OAPEC membership in 1986, paid the first of ten annual repayments of backdues. Tunisia did not send a delegation this year. Iraq and Syria have both agreed to meet their 1987 contributions on the basis that shortfalls in backpayments will be written off and paid by other member-states.⁷⁶

OAPEC announced that the next Council of Ministers' meeting will be held in Kuwait on 28 November 1987.

▲ Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC)
Eighty-first Ministerial Conference
Vienna, 25-27 June 1987

■ Oil ministers from OPEC's thirteen member-countries reached rapid agreement on an overall OPEC production ceiling for the remainder of 1987. The ceiling was intended to maintain prices at or above the official OPEC reference price of US\$18 per barrel, which had become operative on 1 February 1987, following the previous ministerial conference in Geneva in December 1986. There, the decision had been taken to return to a fixed pricing system for OPEC oil, after a year of pursuing a strategy designed to achieve a 'fair market share' for OPEC members.⁷⁷

Prices had indeed been maintained above the \$18 per barrel level since February 1987, and as the conference opened, Rilwanu Lukman, the Oil Minister of Nigeria and President of OPEC, criticised those non-OPEC oil-producing countries that had taken advantage of OPEC's efforts to support prices, in order to expand production, while contributing nothing themselves to stabilising the oil market. OPEC ministers nonetheless agreed to maintain their overall production ceiling at 16.6m barrels per day (b/d) for the remainder of the year (from the current ceiling of 15.8m b/d), rather than planning the increase to 18.3m b/d in the fourth quarter of 1987, that had been anticipated at the December 1986 meeting.

The decision on output represented a compromise between on the one hand Algeria, Iran and Libya, which advocated that output remain unchanged in the second half of the year, in order to push prices higher than \$18 per barrel, and on the

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other hand, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, which wished to follow the December 1986 plan. They considered that maintaining a price of \$18 per barrel would discourage non-OPEC producers from further increasing their production, and thus safeguard OPEC's share of the market. A solution to the disagreement followed Saudi Arabia's compromise on increasing output, though Kuwait remained opposed to the accommodation.

The final output decision reflected the recognition that Iraq (which had dissented from the December 1986 decision and similarly refused to sign the Vienna agreement) was already producing above its official quota, and was likely to increase output by 500,000 b/d in September 1987, on completion of a new pipeline through Turkey. Other OPEC members, including the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait and Qatar, were also known to be exceeding their official quotas.

At Kuwait's instigation, a five-member committee, consisting of the oil ministers of Algeria, Indonesia, Iran, Nigeria and Venezuela, was established to monitor oil prices. It was empowered to convene an extraordinary ministerial conference before the next regular OPEC session in December 1987, if altered production levels were deemed necessary for maintaining market stability. A further group was created to monitor the depreciation of the dollar, as a prelude to suggesting measures for maintaining oil prices in real terms.⁷⁸

● 'The events of the past six months have once again underlined the fact that OPEC's intervention is necessary to defend price and restore stability to the oil market. This fact does not justify non-OPEC producers leaving the responsibility for market stability to OPEC alone, especially when the benefits of our organisation's policies are enjoyed by all oil-producing countries. I find it difficult to understand why some of the other oil producing countries should benefit at the expense of OPEC countries whose economies are totally dependent on oil. It is indefensible when a developed country with the advantages of a diversified economy, exploits our members. They should also appreciate that OPEC cannot continue to bear the heavy burden of price stability alone and that the only long-lasting remedy would be a concerted effort by all to cooperate.' Rilwanu Lukman, Oil Minister of Nigeria and President of OPEC. *The Times* (London) 26 June 1987.

▲ Communauté Economique de l'Afrique de l'Ouest (CEAO)

Twelfth Summit

Nouakchott, Mauritania, 20-21 April 1987

■ The twelfth summit of the francophone West African Economic Community was attended by Heads of State or Government from CEAO's seven member-countries (Benin, Burkina Faso, Ivory Coast, Mali, Mauritania, Niger and Senegal) together with observers from Togo and Guinea.

In his opening speech, Mauritania's President, Colonel Maaouya Ould Sid'Ahmed Taya, cited the CEAO as an expression of its member-countries' desire to break the cycle of under-development perpetuated by chronic drought, the world economic crisis, deteriorating terms of trade and an onerous debt burden. President Ould Taya went on to prescribe increased administrative austerity within CEAO as a means of strengthening its solidarity. The organisation had been shaken by a

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financial scandal involving the embezzlement of funds from its autonomous solidarity and intervention fund, FOSIDEC, by officials who were subsequently tried and imprisoned. Attempts at investigation of the financial mismanagement had met with some obstruction on the part of member-governments, which had led to the postponement of the twelfth CEAO summit, originally due to take place in October 1986.⁷⁹ The leaders agreed to cut CEAO's annual budget by 10 per cent, and to foster a stronger monitoring role for the organisation's secretariat.

Trade within the community became an issue of prime contention at the summit, with evidence of widening differences in the commercial strength of member-countries and their consequent ability to take advantage of CEAO's concessionary trade provisions, particularly as regards manufacturing goods. The President of Burkina Faso, Captain Thomas Sankara, accused Ivory Coast and Senegal of benefiting from easy access to the regional market while failing to assist the community's poorer states through reciprocal trade, choosing instead to import goods from outside the region, despite their ready availability within it.

President Mathieu Kerekou of Benin became CEAO's new Chairman, while President Ould Taya remained Chairman of the Non-Aggression and Defence Aid Agreement (ANAD), which groups the seven CEAO countries and Togo, and whose eighth summit coincided with the CEAO meeting in Nouakchott.⁸⁰

● 'The CEAO is a concrete expression of our desire to break the cycle of underdevelopment which afflicts our community of 40 million citizens.' Colonel Maouya Ould Sid'Ahmed Taya, President of Mauritania, in his opening speech. *West Africa* (London) 4 May 1987.

▲ Angola-Mozambique-Zaire-Zambia Summits

Luanda, Angola, 16 April 1987

Lusaka, Zambia, 30 April 1987

■ The presidents of three southern African Frontline States (FLS) and Zaire agreed on a scheme to rehabilitate the Benguela railway, which services the transport needs of Angola, Zambia and Zaire.

The rehabilitation scheme was officially launched at a summit in Lusaka, in accordance with a decision taken by the leaders in Luanda. The scheme was to cost a total of US\$280m over a period of two years, and in a communiqué issued after the meeting in Lusaka,⁸¹ the leaders appealed to potential donor countries throughout the world to assist their efforts to minimise their dependence and that of the other FLS on transport routes through South Africa.

The Benguela railway track had been the target of repeated sabotage operations by the South African-backed rebel UNITA forces in Angola, led by Jonas Savimbi. Savimbi had maintained that UNITA was in control of the track, and would not permit its reopening unless the Angolan government of President José Eduardo dos Santos agreed to negotiate. Possibly under pressure from UNITA's allies, the USA and Zaire, however, UNITA had recently announced that it was prepared to allow the railway to operate, provided that it did not carry government soldiers or weapons. A further condition that UNITA members should be permitted to check the contents of each railway carriage was reported to have been rejected by President dos Santos.

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According to the Lusaka communiqué, the four leaders also reviewed political developments in Southern Africa, calling on Pretoria to dismantle apartheid, end the state of emergency in South Africa, lift press censorship, allow the African National Congress (ANC) and other political organisations to operate, release Nelson Mandela and other political prisoners and initiate dialogue with what the communiqué referred to as 'the true representatives of the oppressed people of South Africa', towards the establishment of fair, democratic and representative government.⁸²

● Angola is prepared to take the necessary measures, within the context of its sovereignty, to make that railway function, so that there can be stability and peace in this region and we can serve our own interests and the interests of the neighbouring countries and the peoples of this region.' President José Eduardo dos Santos of Angola, speaking of the Benguela railway line at the close of the Luanda summit. *BBC Summary of World Broadcasts* ME/8546/B/1-2, 20 April 1987

▲ Lusophone African Countries

Seventh Summit

Maputo, Mozambique, 21-22 May 1987

■ The presidents of the five Lusophone African countries (Angola, Cape Verde, Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique and São Tomé and Príncipe) reviewed developments regarding Southern Africa since their last summit in April 1986, at which the Luanda Declaration on the situation in Southern Africa had been issued.⁸³

In their Maputo Declaration at the close of the summit,⁸⁴ the five leaders expressed satisfaction at the developing world consensus that the sole cause of the violence, terrorism and instability within Southern Africa was identifiable as the apartheid regime. They pointed to the increasing number of states contributing to the isolation of Pretoria, though President José Eduardo dos Santos of Angola had observed that the current level of international economic sanctions and diplomatic moves towards isolating the apartheid regime was still insufficient to provoke the requisite peaceful political change.⁸⁵

The leaders reiterated the need for all countries, particularly those in Africa, to deny aid or sanctuary to South African-backed rebel forces whose aim was to destabilise the governments of the FLS. They expressed concern at the fact that certain unspecified countries continued to assist rebels in Southern Africa, in flagrant violation of the principles of international law governing relations between states. Both Malawi and Zaire had been criticised in the past by the FLS for the assistance they afforded to the Mozambique National Resistance (MNR) and the rebel Angolan movement, UNITA.⁸⁶ President dos Santos repeated his country's refusal to negotiate with 'the UNITA puppets', while expressing a willingness to enter into a direct dialogue with the USA.

The leaders also repeated in their communiqué an appeal made in the Luanda Declaration for the USA to cease assistance to UNITA and to give unconditional support to Namibia's claim to independence. The Maputo Declaration reaffirmed that Namibia's independence could not with impunity be linked to 'extraneous issues', in a reference to demands by Pretoria and Washington that South Africa's withdrawal from Namibia be made conditional upon the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola.

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Mourning the absence of the late President Samora Machel of Mozambique, the leaders suggested that South Africa was implicated in his death in an air crash on 19 October 1986. His death, they said, occurred in the context of a renewed escalation of aggression against the FLS, particularly Angola and Mozambique, and at a time when the FLS were taking diplomatic steps to wean other countries away from Pretoria's influence. At the time of President Machel's death, President Hastings Kamuzo Banda of Malawi was being successfully urged to cease his support for the MNR.⁸⁷

NOTES

In these notes the following abbreviations are used for newspapers and periodicals: *Econ* = The Economist (London); *FT* = Financial Times (London); *FEER* = Far Eastern Economic Review (Hong Kong); *Gma* = Granma (Havana); *G* = The Guardian (London); *I* = The Independent (London); *IDP* = International Development Policies (London); *IHT* = International Herald Tribune (Paris); *MEED* = Middle East Economic Digest (London); *MEER* = Middle East Economic Review (Washington DC); *MEES* = Middle East Economic Survey (Nicosia); *Obs* = The Observer (London); *S* = South (London); *SN* = Soviet News (London); *SW* = Soviet Weekly (London); *ST* = Sunday Times (London); *SWB* = Summary of World Broadcasts (London); *T* = The Times (London); *TWQ* = Third World Quarterly (London); *UNPR* = UN Press Release; *USIS* = US Information Service; *WA* = West Africa (London); *XNA* = Xinhua News Agency.

¹ See *TWQ* 8(4) October 1986, pp 1369–70.

² *UNPR* SEA/727 12 August 1986; *UNPR* SEA/728 13 August; SEA/761 27 August 1986; SEA/777 8 September 1986.

³ For further details, see *TWQ* 8(4) October 1986, p 1368.

⁴ On the Baker Plan for Third World debt, see *TWQ* 8(2) April 1986, pp 690–91.

⁵ *UNCTAD Bulletin* (Geneva) September/October 1986; *UNPR* TAD/INF/1435, 10 September 1986.

⁶ On the UN Convention on Conditions for the Registration of Ships, see *TWQ* 8(3) July 1986, pp 1032–3.

⁷ *UNPR* TAD/INF/1837, 11 November 1986; *UNCTAD Bulletin* (Geneva) December 1986.

⁸ On IDA VIII, see *TWQ* 9(3) July 1987, pp 1052–3.

⁹ *IDP* January–March 1987.

¹⁰ *FT* 6, 7, 11 April 1987; *African Wireless File* 13 April 1987.

¹¹ On the 'Louvre Pact' reached at a meeting of the Group of Seven (G7), see *TWQ* 9(3) July 1987, pp 1059–61.

¹² *IDP* January–March 1987.

¹³ On the agenda of the GATT Uruguay Round, see *TWQ* 9(1) January 1987, pp 311–14.

¹⁴ *IDP* January–March 1987.

¹⁵ *IMF Survey* (Washington DC) 20 April 1987, *IDP* January–March 1987.

¹⁶ *IDP* January–March 1987; *IMF Survey* (Washington DC) 20 April 1987.

¹⁷ *IDP* January–March 1987; *FT* 11 April 1987.

¹⁸ On the previous round of the UN International Conference on Natural Rubber, see *TWQ* 9(2) April 1987, p 684.

¹⁹ On the collapse of the sixth International Tin Agreement, see *TWQ* 8(2) April 1986, pp 696–9 and 8(3) July 1986, pp 1039–41.

²⁰ *UNPR* TAD/INF/1865, 10 March 1987, TAD/INF/1866, 23 March 1987; *UNCTAD Bulletin* (Geneva) April 1987; *FEER* 2 April 1987, pp 48–9; *S* June 1987, p 97.

²¹ On the February–March 1987 meeting of the ICO Council, see *TWQ* 9(3) July 1987, pp 1053–4.

²² *FT* 8, 28 May 1987; *IHT* 25 May 1987; *WA* 8 June 1987.

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- ²³ *G* 15 June 1987; *T* 3 June 1987; *FEER* 18 June 1987, p 78; *WA* 22 June 1987; *ICO Press Release* PR-111/87, 9 June 1987.
- ²⁴ On the Reykjavik summit and subsequent Shultz-Shevardnadze ministerial meeting in Vienna in November 1986, as well as round VI of the Geneva NST, see *TWQ* 9(3) July 1987, pp 1055-9.
The previous rounds of the NST are covered in *TWQ* 7(4) October 1985, pp 1030-32, 8(1) January 1986, pp 289-92, 8(2) April 1986, pp 699-701, 8(3) July 1986, pp 1042-44, 8(4) October 1986, pp 1379-82.
- ²⁵ Gorbachev's statement is in *SN* 4 March 1987.
- ²⁶ On the US-Soviet 'fireside' summit in Geneva, see *TWQ* 8(2) April 1986, pp 702-15.
- ²⁷ The US verification plan is detailed in *USIS* Briefing Paper, 12 March 1987.
- ²⁸ *FT* 12, 13, 14 January 1987, 4 February 1987, 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, 9, 13, 14 March 1987; *IHT* 12, 21 January 1987, 10, 18, 25 February 1987, 2, 3, 4, 5, 9, 11, 12, 13, 14-15 March 1987; *T* 12, 13, 14 January 1987, 10 February 1987, 2, 3, 4, 5, 9, 11, 13 March 1987; *I* 14, 24 January 1987, 4, 18 February 1987, 2, 3, 4, 5, 9, 13 March 1987; *G* 13, 14, 16, 20 January 1987, 3, 5, 13 March 1987; *Obs* 1 January 1987, 15 March 1987; *ST* 1, 8 March 1987; *Econ* 7 March 1987, 18 April 1987. *Armament and Disarmament Information Unit (ADIU) Report* (Sussex) March-April 1987 and May-June 1987; *Arms Control Today* (Washington DC) March 1987, April 1987, May 1987; *SN* 15 April 1987.
- ²⁹ For the 1986 Budapest summit see *TWQ* 8(4) October 1986, pp 1384-6.
- ³⁰ *I* 28, 30 May 1987; *FT* 28, 30 May 1987; *G* 30 May 1987.
- ³¹ On the Louvre Pact of February 1987, see *TWQ* 9(3) 1987, pp 1059-61.
- ³² The G7 communiqué is in *IMF Survey* (Washington DC) 4 May 1987.
- ³³ *IMF Survey* (Washington DC) 4 May 1987; *FT* 8 April 1987; *Econ* 18 April 1987; *IDP* January-March 1987.
- ³⁴ See *IHT* 19 May 1987; for details of the twenty-fifth Ministerial Council meeting, see *TWQ* 8(4) October 1986, pp 1390-2.
- ³⁵ The OECD final communiqué is in *OECD Press Release* (Paris) PRESS/A (87)27, 13 May 1987; and *IMF Survey* (Washington DC) 1 January 1987.
- ³⁶ For the Louvre Pact, adopted by the G7 in February 1987, see *TWQ* 9(3) July 1987, pp 1059-61.
- ³⁷ *FT* 13, 14, 15 May 1987; *IHT* 11, 12, 13, 14, 15 May 1987; *IMF Survey* (Washington DC) 1 June 1987.
- ³⁸ Leaders present at the Thirteenth Western Economic Summit were Ronald Reagan of the USA, Yasuhiro Nakasone of Japan, Helmut Kohl of West Germany, François Mitterrand and Jacques Chirac of France, Margaret Thatcher of Britain, Amintore Fanfani of Italy, Brian Mulroney of Canada and Jacques Delors, President of the European Commission. For details of the Twelfth Summit see *TWQ* 8(4) October 1986, pp 1392-95.
- ³⁹ The Venice communiqué is in *T* 11 June 1987.
- ⁴⁰ On the Louvre Pact, agreed in February 1987 by the G7, see *TWQ* 9(3) July 1987, pp 1059-61.
- ⁴¹ *T* 9, 10, 11 June 1987; *FT* 9, 10, 11 June 1987; *I* 9, 10 June 1987; *G* 10, 11 June 1987; *IHT* 8, 10 June 1987; *WA* 15 June 1987; *Econ* 13 June 1987.
- ⁴² For background on the coup in Fiji, see *FEER* 28 May 1987, pp 10-11 and 4 June 1987, pp 40-41; *Econ* 16 May 1987.
- ⁴³ The three former ministers were Krishna Dutt, former Foreign Minister; Tupeni Baba, former Education Minister; and Joeli Kalou, former Labour Minister.
- ⁴⁴ On the Rabaul meeting, see *SWB* FE/8566/i, 13 May 1987, FE/8573/1, 21 May 1987 FE/8577/i, 26 May 1987; *FEER* 4 June 1987, p 41.
- ⁴⁵ *SWB* FE/8560/i, 6 May 1987 and FE/8565/i, 12 May 1987. For background on the dispute over Libyan involvement in the South Pacific, see *FEER* 21 May 1987, p 22.
- ⁴⁶ On the *SPF* meeting on New Caledonia, see *TWQ* 9(3) July 1987, pp 1062-3.
- ⁴⁷ The excerpts of the communiqué which concerns the coup in Fiji are in *SWB* FE/8583/A3/8, 2 June 1987.
- ⁴⁸ Notwithstanding these criticisms, the French government announced on 10 June 1987 that the referendum on New Caledonia's future would proceed on 13 September 1987. *IHT* 11 June 1987.

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- ⁴⁹ *FT* 27, 28 May 1987; *G* 29, 30 May 1987, 1 June 1987; *I* 29, 30 May 1987, 1 June 1987; *T* 30 May 1987; *ST* 24 May 1987; *FEER* 18 June 1987, p 26; *SWB* FE/8582/A3/5-6, 1 June 1987.
- ⁵⁰ *SWB* ME/8549/D/3, 23 April 1987, ME/8554/iii 29 April 1987, ME/8554/D/1, 29 April 1987; *WA* 4 May 1987, 1 June 1987; *UNPR* TAD/INF/1875, 24 April 1987.
- ⁵¹ On the NAM summit in Harare, see *TWQ* 9(1) January 1987, pp 327-29.
- ⁵² *SWB* FE/8590/i 10 June 1987, FE/8594/i, 15 June 1987, FE/8595/i, 16 June 1987, FE/8595/C1/1-17 (A1-5) 16 June 1987. For full details of the Pyongyang Declaration and Plan of Action, see *SWB* FE/8595/C1/2-17, 16 June 1987.
- ⁵³ The Buenos Aires Declaration is in *SWB* ME/8544/D/1-2, 16 April 1987.
- ⁵⁴ On the Arias Plan and the proposed Esquipulas summit, see *TWQ* 9(3) July 1987, pp 1065-67.
- ⁵⁵ *FT* 15 June 1987; *G* 16-19 June 1987; *I* 19 June 1987.
- ⁵⁶ See *TWQ* 9(3) July 1987, pp 1065-67.
- ⁵⁷ On the Rio de Janeiro meeting, see *TWQ* 9(3) July 1987, pp 1064-65.
- ⁵⁸ The San Carlos de Bariloche communiqué is reported in *SWB* ME/8547/3-4, 21 April 1987.
- ⁵⁹ *SWB* ME/8543/D/1, 15 April 1987, ME/8544/D/1-2, 16 April 1987, ME/8547/D/3-4, 21 April 1987.
- ⁶⁰ On the previous summits among Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay, held to promote regional integration, in July and August 1986, see *TWQ* 9(1) January 1987, pp 320-21.
- ⁶¹ *FT* 27 May 1987; *IHT* 30 May-1 June 1987; *SWB* ME/8580/i and ME/8580/D/1-2, 29 May 1987.
- ⁶² These alleged abuses of human rights on the part of the Khmer Rouge are documented in a report of June 1987 published by Amnesty International.
- ⁶³ On Prince Sihanouk's decision to take a year's leave of absence, and the suggestion of a 'genocide trial' for the Khmer Rouge leadership, see *IHT* 29 May 1987.
- ⁶⁴ On the previous Indochinese and ASEAN approaches to a Kampuchean settlement, see *TWQ* 8(1) January 1986, pp 300-2 and 321-3, 8(3) July 1986, pp 1060-1 and 9(1) January 1987, p 317-20.
- ⁶⁵ For plans to draft a Southeast Asian NWZ Treaty, see *TWQ* 9(1) January 1987, p 318.
- ⁶⁶ *FT* 16 June 1987; *IHT* 16, 19 June 1987; *I* 16, 17, 20 June 1987; *T* 16, 19 June 1987; *G* 17, 19 June 1987; *Econ* 20 June 1987; *FEER* 11 June 1987, p 26 and pp 20-22, 25 June 1987, p 14, 2 July, pp 30-31; *SWB* FE/8595/A3/1, 16 June 1987, FE/8596/A3/4-5, 17 June 1987, FE/8599/A3/2, 20 June 1987, FE/8600/A3/3-6, 22 June 1987.
- ⁶⁷ On the South Pacific Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone ('Spinfiz'), see *TWQ* 8(1) January 1986, pp 292-3.
- ⁶⁸ On the SAARC Charter, adopted at SAARC's first summit in Dhaka in December 1985, see *TWQ* 8(2) April 1986, pp 724-7.
- ⁶⁹ For background on the Indian air-drop and the issue of Indian assistance to the Tamils, see *FT* 27 May 1987; *G* 6 June 1987; *ST* 7 June 1987; *FEER* 11 June 1987, pp 11-12.
- ⁷⁰ For the SAARC ministerial council meeting in August 1986 at which the issue of regional terrorism was discussed, see *TWQ* 9(1) January 1987, p 317.
- ⁷¹ *FT* 6, 11, 15, 19 June 1987; *G* 6, 9, 10, 11, 16 June 1987; *FEER* 2 July 1987, pp 16-17; *SWB* FE/8594/A3, 15 June 1987, FE/8597/A3/2, 18 June 1987, FE/8591/i and FE/8599/A3/1, 20 June 1987, FE/8601/A3/1, 23 June 1987.
- ⁷² *MEES* 13, 27 April 1987; *MEED* 9 May 1987; *SWB* ME/8535/i, 6 April 1987, ME/8536/i, 7 April 1987, ME/8537/i and ME/8537/A/i, 8 April 1987. See *TWQ* 9(3) July 1987.
- ⁷³ *MEES* 11 May 1987 and 25 May 1987.
- ⁷⁴ *MEES* 15 June 1987; *SWB* ME/8588/i, 10 June 1987; *FT* 23 June 1987; see *TWQ* 9(3) July 1987.
- ⁷⁵ *MEES* 15 June 1987; *MEED* 13 June 1987.
- ⁷⁶ *MEES* 15 June 1987. For details of Tunisia's withdrawal and the Thirty-Seventh Meeting of OAEPC, see *TWQ* 9(3) July 1987.
- ⁷⁷ On the OPEC meeting in Geneva in December 1986, see *TWQ* 9(3) July 1987, pp 1071-72.
- ⁷⁸ *FT* 22, 25, 26, 27, 29 June 1987; *T* 22, 26, 27 June 1987; *IHT* 22, 29 June 1987; *G* 26, 29 June 1987; *I* 27 June 1987; *Obs* 28 June 1987; *WA* 22 June 1987, p 1029 and 6 July 1987, p 1309; *MEED* 20 June 1987.

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- ⁷⁹ On the CBAO financial scandal and the eleventh CBAO summit in Ouagadougou in March 1986, see *TWQ* 8(4) October 1986, pp 1410-11.
- ⁸⁰ *SWB* ME/8549/ii, 23 April 1987 and ME/8550/B/3-4, 24 April 1987; *WA* 4 May 1987, pp 857-8.
- ⁸¹ The Lusaka communiqué is in *SWB* ME/8558/B/1-2, 4 May 1987.
- ⁸² *SWB* ME/8546/ii and ME/8546/B/1-2, 20 April 1987, ME/8547/B/2-3, 21 April 1987, ME/8558/B/1-2, 4 May 1987; *Obs* 17 May 1987.
- ⁸³ On the Luanda Declaration at the sixth Lusophone African summit, see *TWQ* 8(4) October 1986, pp 1411-12.
- ⁸⁴ The Maputo Declaration is in *SWB* ME/8576/B/1-3, 25 May 1987.
- ⁸⁵ The speeches of President Chissano of Mozambique and President dos Santos of Angola are in *SWB* ME/8573/b/3-6, 23 May 1987.
- ⁸⁶ On the FLS accusations against Malawi and Zaire, see *TWQ* 9(1) January 1987, pp 326-7 and 9(2) April 1987, pp 644-5.
- ⁸⁷ South Africa's renewed offensive against the FLS following the FLS diplomatic moves towards Malawi was the subject of an emergency FLS summit in Maputo on 2 October 1986. See *TWQ* 9(2) April 1987, pp 644-5.
- SWB* ME/8575/b/3-6, 23 May 1987 and ME/8576/B1-3, 25 May 1987.

